The musicking voice: performance, affect and listening

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to develop a theory of the musicking voice. The voice has been studied extensively in musicology, philosophy, literary, media and sound studies. Most often, however, voice is equated with the speaking voice. Arguably, the voice engaged in musical activity differs from the speaking voice; but a specific musical mode of voicing has often been neglected in theories of voice.

The main questions is: What is the musicking voice? I answer this question theoretically and from an interdisciplinary perspective: bridging musicology, sound studies, media studies, performance studies and philosophy. My particular methods stem from theories of deconstruction, affect and performance. I analyse several case studies of singing voices in order to theorise the specific performative and affective constitution of the musicking voice – ranging from different popular traditions (Howlin' Wolf, Ella Fitzgerald, Kate Bush) and experimental musics (Joan La Barbara, Annette Peacock, Scott Walker, Leon Thomas) to Renaissance choral music (Josquin des Prez). The analyses are guided by a close listening to the musicking voice.

These detailed discussions show the voice as a musicking force that is both material and immaterial, object and subject. In music, the voice becomes an impersonal musicking force. As such, this voice cannot be reduced to language, body, sound or subjectivity. It cannot simply be approached through vocal ontology, either. Instead, I argue that the musicking voice must be approached from a vocal ontology and a listening phenomenology. The musicking voice only comes into being by way of a relation to a listener. In this relation, it manifests as a musical entity in its own right. The theory of the musicking voice brings a specific musicological perspective and musico-epistemological problem to the current fields of voice studies, sound studies and philosophies of voice and music.

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Introduction

The radio is tuned to New Jersey's WFMU. We are talking after dinner, when our attention strays from the conversation and wanders to a lonesome trumpet quietly playing to itself. It gestures a four-note upward figure *g-c-d-e* which opens the piece. The trumpet's last *e* ensnares the semitone to *f*, reaches up a third to *a* and settles on the lower *g*, tinged with a sighing vibrato. Into the trumpet's last breaths, a saxophone starts playing a discernible melody on *e* as a whole tone figure, its attack hesitating. The trumpet catches up with the melody and attempts to imitate or double the sax on *g*. They now play the melody in parallel but each in their own space and time, loosely aligned but each in their own mood. Their play meanders between unison and delayed imitation. My listening is mesmerised by this lonesome longing of the two instruments playing to, with and alongside each other. How beautifully they tread together out of time, each in their own universe and in ensemble creating a place of solace – removing and removed.

As if announcing a new song, a voice suddenly cuts into the quiet, with a distinct attack, accompanied by a piano. Together they play the main two-note melody already laid out by trumpet and sax beforehand. The voice sings a text. I can clearly hear it phrase: "there is a balm in Gilead". It sways the alternating notes on the first part of the phrase landing on "balm" and moving up on "in Gilead". Like trumpet and sax before, voice and piano echo one another; their timings are idiosyncratic, each moving in their own pace, passing not as one but as themselves, each in their own space. I hear this voice singing together with the piano and the double bass, and I can feel the other players of the ensemble rest, silently listening to the dancing weaving of the voice and the piano. The bowed double bass plays on in the background, providing a drone, here and there accentuating the changes in the harmony.

I am drawn to this voice, to its play – its own and that with the piano and double bass. I am drawn to every move it makes, the changes in phrasing, how it sounds the words. I am

drawn to the change of phrasing: a sharp attack first, then long breathy stretches. There is no vibrato here; the changes of tones are sharp, as if no effort had to go into this singing. The melody is simple and the voice's playing of it is intricate. This voice musicks with and against the piano by emphasising the downbeat and slightly stretching the offbeat. The voice here lives in the melody, it is carried by the music, making a home in ensemble with piano and double bass.

After the passage has been repeated, the piano and double bass remain silent. The recording is so vacant that I hear the crackling of the room sound and possibly the recording and playback equipment. This voice is now on its own, playing solo into the echoey room. It has freed itself from the words and all that comes out is a vocalisation on a soft 'u' vowel. It improvises the memory of the song just heard, makes only small gestures and remains within the harmonic frame of the melody; and yet the singing here is enchanting. The musicking is generous and the voice provides space to participate. My listening becomes part of the voice's movement. While this voice unfolds the song gradually, I can feel tingles run down my spine, a gentle wave rush over my scalp and I feel touched, embalmed by the voice that now ends its phrase with an upward gesture when it almost starts trembling on an *f* before pausing.

The piano comes in to hold it and together with the double bass they repeat the previous line: "There is a balm in Gilead". After the second iteration, voice and piano leave, the trumpet comes back and play around the theme with the double bass, now in duet again. Briefly interspersed by double bass and sax, the trumpet closes the hymn with a solo improvisation and takes us into the night, leaving us with a recurring song and my ears with a voice that I will never forget.

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"There is a Balm in Gilead" is an African American spiritual. It is a traditional hymn consisting of two distinct melodic lines. The first line separates itself into two: The first phrase repeats a

whole tone figure and ends on a third below, the tonic to F major; the second phrase moves up from the lower dominant to the higher mediant. The second melodic line then functions as a closing gesture and winds around the mediant to conclude in a subdominant cadence. The version that sounded from the radio and which caught my listening attention derives from the Archie Shepp record *Blasé* from 1969 (Archie Shepp, 2015) – with Lester Bowie on the trumpet, Shepp on the saxophone, Malachi Favors on the double bass, Dave Burell on the piano and the voice that I heard was that of Jeanne Lee.[1]

What surprised me, all ears attuned to the sounds that streamed from the kitchen radio, was the addition of the voice in the piece. I did not know the melody beforehand, did not know the song. The trumpet's playing and its delayed shadowing by the saxophone, their intricate musicking, directly caught my attention. I adore hymns played by wind instruments. But when this voice came into play, when it started singing with the ensemble, I was so moved because I was touched by the voice's taking part in the musicking. Of course, this voice was singing a hymn and it was the only entity in the ensemble that was able to utter the words. But it was not the words that touched me. It was the voice's ability to musick: to be playing with the piano and the double bass, moving as and in music. In this moment, I did not wonder who was singing, I did not care for anything that provided me with information about the voicer. I was listening to this voice as it was musicking.

What is the voice as it makes music? Clearly, what I heard in Jeanne Lee's singing of the Gilead hymn is not a message, I did not hear anyone speaking, but I heard a voice sing. So, how can the voice make music and not merely be at the service of verbal communication? What is this voice if it cannot be explained by reference to linguistic meaning? Can it be explained by way of the voicer, their subjectivity or personality? Does their technique and body reveal anything about the voice? This voice that I heard was a reproduced voice, it had been

[1] The piece can be found on YouTube: https://youtu.be/G69T4HDb9d4 (Accessed: 3 November 2021).

recorded in 1969 and I listened to it in 2021. How then, can this voice be real and have real effects on its listeners? Does it not only become sonic matter like any other recorded sound? Is this voice just another instrument or how does it differentiate from other instrumental musicking? These are some of the questions that I ask myself when I listen to Jeanne Lee's musicking voice. And these are the questions that have animated this PhD project. I could have opened the introduction with any of the voices that *get* me, there are so many – Mary Margaret O'Hara's, Nina Simone's, Ella Fitzgerald's, Roberta Flack's, Marvin Gaye's, Arthur Russell's, Liz Fraser's, Jessye Norman's, Al Green's, FKA twigs' and all the phonographic voices that initiated my thinking of the voice in music: Visionist's, Kelela's, James Blake's, Klein's or Arca's. What they all have in common is the concern of this thesis: the voice's ability to musick and to enchant its listeners. In listening to these many different voices, I have been asking the same questions: What is the musicking voice? What does it do? And how can it be theorised?

What is the voice?

The voice is a problem. Not only in music, but also in speech, in psychoanalysis, as a metaphor in political theories, in philosophy, in literature, in metaphysics, in psychology and even in physiology. Of course, what each field regards as voice is fundamentally different. Any attempt to an overall definition of *the* voice seems to be entangled in a problematic game of reductionism and essentialism. The recent field of voice studies has pluralised the term voice as a concept and has therefore left the definition of its object ambiguous. Nina Eidsheim and Katherine Meizel, both editors of *The Oxford Handbook of Voice Studies*, problematise the temptation to construe a catch-all definition of voice. They argue that the new field of voice studies "does not make a claim to a given definition of voice, but instead suggests the limits of any one claim" (Eidsheim & Meizel, 2019, p. xv). Every discipline of course has its own claims what voice is supposed to be: Is it in the service of verbal communication, as linguistic theories

would argue? Or is it an unconscious real that lies outside the grasp of the subject, as psychoanalytic theories would maintain? Or, as many cultural studies and political theories would contend, is voice an index of a person's agency?

My approach is animated by listening to the voice as it musicks. I am primarily a musicologist interested in the musical workings of voice. As such, I do not wish to claim my own authoritative definition of the voice in general, simply because voice in my case mainly concerns a small piece of the big unknowable pie that is called voice. I will not argue that the physiologist's or the linguist's conception of voice is faulty because they do not lend their ears to music. What I will argue is that conceptions of voice developed in the fields of sound studies, media studies or political theory cannot simply be adapted to the problem of music. Music works and affects differently than sound, media or politics; in music, the voice becomes a force in its own right. But why is the voice a problem then? Is the problem mainly a definitory one? The fact that different disciplines cannot agree on one concise definition for a singular term? I think the problem lies elsewhere.

Phonocentric impasse

Martha Feldman has gathered several musicologists to respond to the recent surge in voice scholarship in the form of a colloquy for the *Journal of the American Musicological Society* (Feldman *et al.*, 2015). In her own short article called 'The Interstitial Voice: An Opening', Feldman sketches voice studies from a musicological perspective (Feldman, 2015b). Her article paints the voice and its theoretical study aporetically from the outset: "Voice is nothing if not boundless, furtive, and migratory, sometimes maddeningly so" (Feldman, 2015b, p. 656). The study of voice, particularly with regards to music, inevitably must circumnavigate the voice's proliferations. Can the voice be reduced to its body? Does it index a voicer's identity or their subjectivity? Is voice a sound or can there be an unsounded voice? These questions

occupy Feldman as well as much of this thesis. I build on Feldman's work here not in order to reproduce her argument, but because I find a methodology to the study of voice prefigured in her article. Feldman argues that *"voice is nothing if not relational*, always situated at boundaries" (Feldman, 2015b, p. 658; original emphasis). This statement might sound self-explanatory: the voice must be understood in relation to another subject or object, for instance, a piece of music, speech, a body or a listener. But Feldman's statement maintains something more fundamental to the study of voice, particularly that of the musicking voice; namely, that the voice is in need of other entities in order to come into being. Voice does not exist without a relation *to* something else; studying voice hence means studying the relations of voice. This shift from theorising voice as a singular entity to grasping it by way of its relations already describes one of the main problems of any theory of voice: that is, the problem of reducing voice to any of its constituting traces. Wayne Koestenbaum sums up this problem of the voice's inevitable traces when he writes: "voice evades categorization" (Koestenbaum, 1993, p. 164). The theory of the musicking voice is first and foremost a theory of the relations between voice and music. Whenever I speak about the voice in this thesis, I speak about a relation between entities. I have laid out the different relations in which the musicking voice finds itself in five chapters: body (1), sound (2), reproduction (3), subjectivity (4) and listening (5).

Brian Kane has developed a model of the voice in an article called 'The Voice: a Diagnosis' (Kane, 2016b). He argues that the humanities have undergone a "vocal turn" (2016b, p. 91): the voice has become a focal point in disciplines ranging from cultural and media studies to philosophy, literature and sound studies. Kane's text is a welcome critical intervention as it names the often unacknowledged theoretical inheritance of Jacques Derrida's philosophy to much of voice scholarship. Kane wonders "how to turn (or return) to the voice without, at the same time, affirming the metaphysics of presence" (2016b, p. 91). Derrida has

famously critiqued the tradition of the metaphysics of presence in *Of Grammatology* (Derrida, 2016) and *Voice and Phenomenon* (Derrida, 2011).

In his 1967 *Voice and Phenomenon*, Derrida argues that Edmund Husserl tried to conceptualise consciousness by way of an internal, phenomenological voice. Husserl's phenomenological voice, according to Derrida, is the voice of a subject silently speaking to itself (Derrida, 2011, pp. 64–66). By way of this silent voice, consciousness appears as the subject affects itself without any necessity for an outside or any other entity that acts upon it: Derrida would describe this as Husserl's theory of auto-affection (2011, p. 68). Derrida's close reading of Husserl's phenomenology showed that Husserl's idea of consciousness fundamentally depends on the conflation of voice with sound and with *logos*. Derrida argues that "no consciousness is possible without the voice" (ibid.) because, for Husserl, the silent voice is the place where the subject produces "*itself in the world as an auto-affection*": "this auto-affection is the possibility of what we call *subjectivity*" (ibid.; original emphasis). Derrida critiques Husserl's idea of "pure auto-affection" (ibid.) as it produces a subject "without any detour through the agency of exteriority, of the world, or of the non-proper in general" (2011, p. 67). Phonocentrism is the word Derrida has given to this "long tradition of Western metaphysics", where the voice is a privileged "site of living presence" (Kane, 2016b, p. 92). The subject self-identifies in the "operation of 'hearing-oneself-speak'" (Derrida, 2011, p. 67), that is, through the voice's self-presence. Phonocentrism is the "absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice and the ideality of meaning" (Derrida, 2016, p. 12). Husserl's phonocentrism, however, is at the same time a logocentrism, as voice and *logos* are inimitably wedded. The problem for Derrida lies in the fact that "the essence of the phoné [voice] would be immediately proximate to that which within 'thought' as *logos* relates to 'sense,' produces it, receives it, speaks it, 'puts it together'" (2016, p. 11).

The idea of voice as presence, functioning as a gateway to sense and being troubles Derrida. His deconstruction of Husserl's phenomenology reveals that the function of the metaphysics of presence is to ignore the difference at play in any mode of affection and any form of sensing. In terms of the voice, this means that there is always a spatial and temporal gap in the "operation of 'hearing-oneself-speak'" (Derrida, 2011, p. 67). Husserl's philosophy, however, ignores this spacing, as Leonard Lawlor states in the introduction to *Voice and Phenomenon* (Lawlor, in Derrida, 2011, p. xiv). Only by ignoring this spatial and temporal difference, Derrida argues, can Husserl theorise consciousness as an auto-affection, appearing in hearing-oneself-speak, that is, by way of a phenomenological voice. It is important to note that the aim of Derrida's critique of Husserl's philosophy is not to theorise voice but rather to problematise the primacy of speech over writing, to think language not via orality but from a (grammatological) theory of writing and to move away from the "assumption that the voice is […] the basic element of language" (Dolar, 1996, 11). Derrida uses the notion of voice found in Husserl to problematise this primacy of presence and of speech in order to conceptualise writing as "originary supplementarity" (Derrida, 2011, p. 75).

Brian Kane asks how any theory of voice can be written in the aftermath of Derrida's deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence. Kane does not offer a theory of the voice himself, but he proposes "a 'model' of the voice [that] will have diagnostic implications for voice studies and the vocal turn" (Kane, 2016b, p. 93). He attempts "to evade or surpass the Derridean impasse" (2016b, p. 94) by conceptualising voice not as a self-contained entity but rather as constituted by its different traces. He writes:

> *Phoné* [φωνή], voice, is distinct from three other terms to which it is often identified. Those terms are: *echos* [ἦχος], *logos* [λόγος], and *topos* [τόπος], roughly sound, meaning, and site. (2016b, p. 93)

Kane argues that voice (*phoné*) cannot ever be reduced to any one of these three terms. Instead, voice must be studied in the intersections between sound, meaning and site. Voice "involves the movement, or displacement, between these terms" (2016b, p. 94).

For my endeavour, particularly two of these three terms are crucial, namely sound and site. Meaning (*logos*) is less significant for a theory of the musicking voice as musicking differentiates from language and so the voice in music only marginally concerns the category of *logos* – I discuss the difference between speaking and musicking voices further below. The two remaining terms and their reductions – *topos* (site) and *echos* (sound) – are the concern of the first two chapters.

Kane is, however, not content to complicate the voice as emerging in the crossings between the three categories of sound, meaning and site. He argues that there is another principle at play that animates and arranges the constellation, which he calls *technê*. "*Technê* disturbs the circulation of *phoné* by rearranging and redistributing *topos*, *logos*, and *echos*" (2016b, p. 104). For Kane, *technê* designates both the "bodily and cultural techniques that subjects apply to themselves as well as the technologies that they employ to shape, define, and alter their experience" (ibid.). Kane uses the example of the vocoder, which is a voice technology that fundamentally alters the sound of the voice in order to produce a new site – beyond the mere physical body of the voicer (ibid.). Even though I take Kane's diagnostic model as a springboard for my own theorisation of the musicking voice, I emphasise the idea of performance. Performance lies at the heart of the musicking voice and it is performance that – similarly to Kane's notion of *technê* – disturbs the idea of voice as a stable signifier. The voice in performance always exceeds a simplistic reduction to either *topos*, *logos* or *echos*. I will further discuss performance below.

Kane's voice model is productive because it asks of any voice theorist to circumnavigate the problems of phono- and logocentrism after Derrida. It also asks me to avoid

the pitfalls of vocal essentialism, that is, the reduction of the voice to either of its constituting vectors. My theory of the musicking voice attempts to navigate the phonocentric impasse by emphasising the problems that the study of voice poses to a theory of the voice in music. This thesis is arranged according to these problems. Chapter 1 and 2 address the two key issues of the voice's bodily emanation and its reduction to sound. The remaining three chapters illustrate how a musicking voice must be conceptualised in distance to carnal essentialism and sonic materialism. Chapter 3 shows how phonography exceeds the voice's reduction to either object or subject. Chapter 4 shows how the musicking voice expresses impersonally, it is a virtual musicking force that disidentifies from the voicer's personality or subjectivity. Chapter 5 shows how the musicking voice comes into being in the affective encounters between vocal production and listening perception. Problematising the tendencies to essentialise voice, my thesis argues that the voice in music can neither be approached ontologically nor phenomenologically, but instead must be conceptualised from both vocal ontology *and* listening phenomenology at the same time.

What is the musicking voice?

Two comments have particularly inspired my endeavour to theorise the voice in and as music. I find the first in Wayne Koestenbaum's *The Queen's Throat* (Koestenbaum, 1993), which in many ways contradicts what I will argue in this thesis. The second arises from a review of Adriana Cavarero's *For More than One Voice* written by Mary Ann Smart (Smart, 2005).

Koestenbaum's previously cited statement of the voice's categorical elusiveness was made in relation to not just any voice but specifically to the singing voice. He writes:

> A singer wanders; a singer deviates. A voice begins in the body's basement, a zone that no one dares to name or authorize; and the singer sends the voice (or the voice sends the singer) to an *elsewhere*, a place outside of our knowledge, a verge I won't sketch or legislate except to say that I want to live there. Singing is a movement that never coalesces long enough for us to hold it. As soon as we can remark the moment of singing, it is gone. (Koestenbaum, 1993, pp. 163–164; original emphasis)

Much has been said about Koestenbaum's erotic portrayal of operatic voices (Jarman-Ivens, 2011, p. 20; Middleton, 2006, p. 96; Smart, 2000, p. 10). I am mainly interested in the questions that invite a thinking of the voice in music. Koestenbaum indirectly asks how singing can possibly be known when its power overshoots any signification and it sends the voice to an "*elsewhere*", "outside of our knowledge" (Koestenbaum, 1993, p. 164). Koestenbaum wonders about the epistemology of the singing voice. How can we know what it does? Does the singer sing the voice or the voice the singer? How are they related? And also, what is the role of the one affected, the listener? Similar to Feldman, Koestenbaum acknowledges and accepts the impossibility of fully grasping what this entity is that affects so strongly. As soon as we think we have found an answer or just the right word to describe its actions, "it is gone" (ibid.). The place that Koestenbaum finds for this eluding creature is a "verge" (ibid.), a different name for Feldman's "boundaries" (Feldman, 2015b, p. 658).

Koestenbaum invites me to question: What is the power at play that makes the voice sing? Where is it to be found? In a body, as he partly assumes? In its movements? In a sound? Koestenbaum already suggests that it is not the singer that provides answers as he is unsure if it is the singer that sings or if, indeed, the singer is being sung. By what? What moves a voice to musick? Koestenbaum seems to suggest that music is this power that sends the singer and possibly the listener to an "*elsewhere*" (Koestenbaum, 1993, p. 164) – an outside that the singing voice makes available in performance. But if this musical voice evades capture, how can I theorise it? How do you theorise a verge? Perhaps, the listening desire that animates Koestenbaum's meditation offers a path. If capture is not an option, perhaps listening is more inviting.

Mary Ann Smart similarly wonders about the singing voice and how to theorise it (Smart, 2005). In a review of Adriana Cavarero's vocal philosophy (which I will discuss in Chapter 4), Smart critiques the fact that the musical voice is strangely absent not only from

Cavarero's theory but from philosophies of voice more generally. But Smart also critiques musicology's inability to incorporate philosophical arguments, in particular Cavarero's notion of relationality, into more material or formalist analyses of musical voices. In short, Smart draws attention to the missing link between musicological and philosophical approaches to the study of the musical voice. She writes that Cavarero's philosophy of voice

> is notable for never asking *what* the voices sing or *how* they sing; the sheer fact *that* they sing is everything. In contrast, musicological writing about voice has overwhelmingly been oriented toward drawing voice back into language in various ways. We [musicologists] begin, often, by acknowledging the power of voice as primal cry or moan; but the true force of the endeavor is usually devoted to exploring ways of taming that elemental force—segmenting the vocal utterance, grounding it in history and style, or inventing terminology by which we might better understand what voice is capable of: *this* roulade, *that* registral break, *that* echo of a theme from an earlier area . . . In a way, the specificity and concreteness of such work is precious, one of the things that sets musicology apart from philosophy. Yet, reading *A più voci* [*For More than One Voice*], I also want to urge musicologists to get busy building grand theories of voice, because if we don't do it, someone else always will. (Smart, 2005, p. 109; original emphasis)

I cite Smart here not to ask for permission to venture into the space in between musicology and philosophy but rather to signal a lack. There are numerous theories and philosophies of voice, many of which will be discussed and critiqued throughout this thesis: Roland Barthes' in Chapter 1, Cavarero's in Chapter 4, Mladen Dolar's in Chapter 4, Jacques Derrida's roams throughout. However, none of these offers a distinct theory of the voice in music. Such an endeavour would – as Smart argues – must take into consideration both "what voice is capable of" (Smart, 2005, p. 109) musically, to listen to "*what* the voices sing or *how* they sing" (ibid.; original emphasis) *and* at the same time to take serios its powerful and "elemental force" (ibid.) which is so strong that Koestenbaum says: "I want to live there" (Koestenbaum, 1993, p. 164). The challenge of a theory of the musicking voice is to navigate the voice's problems and relations and to conceptualise this voice as a musicking force in its own right that exceeds the reductions to body, sound, subjectivity or language.

Preliminary definition

What is the musicking voice? It is the voice as it musicks. It sounds and it is heard. The musicking voice is not only the singing voice: any vocal musical performance allows for the emergence of a musicking voice. The musicking voice cannot be regarded as existing prior or outside of perception but it comes into being by way of a relation to a listener, no matter if this is another person or the one voicing. There is no singular ontology of the musicking voice: it always calls into question a phenomenological enquiry.

The musicking voice is *not* a 'political voice', a voice that connotes agency of a subject, i.e. the discursive voice that is often found in political discourse and theory (Cavarero, 2005a; Fiol-Matta, 2017; Ochoa Gautier, 2014). It is also *not* an authorial voice, the voice of an author or the voice in literature or of writing, a lyrical or poetic voice, as often found in literary studies and criticism (MacKendrick, 2016). The musicking voice is *not* a thingly voice, an agency that philosophers often attribute to objects or things in the world by anthropomorphising them (Ihde, 2007; Neumark, 2017). It is also *not* a psychoanalytic voice that regards voice as an object of desire out of the subject's grasp (Dolar, 2006a; Lagaay, 2008; Middleton, 2013; Poizat, 1992; Silverman, 1988). The musicking voice is *not* simply a metaphysical voice, a voice of God, a silent phenomenological voice or a thinking voice of consciousness (see Cavarero, 2005, pp. 224–225; cf. discussion of phonocentrism earlier). It is *not* a dramatic voice of theatre (Macpherson, 2012; Thomaidis, 2017). And it is also *not* simply the voice of an instrument, as musicology often construes it, the timbre of an instrument, a musical line, a phrase or a musical enunciation (Abbate, 1991a; Middleton & Elliott, 2003). The musicking voice is *not* a metaphorical voice like many of these above-mentioned notions imply. The musicking voice is a physical, affective and empirical entity that comes into being in musical performance.

The wording “musicking voice” takes into consideration music as an activity and performance. I have found the only other application of the term in Kofi Agawu’s work, he speaks of “the ‘musicking’ voice” (Agawu, 2016, p. 195) – but Agawu is a music semiotician and in this case understands voice differently, namely as a mode of utterance in music. This is not what my conception of the musicking voice – without inverted commas – attempts. The voice that I theorise is not literal but musical. Agawu’s voice, nonetheless, brings to light another problem that I need to discuss at the outset, namely the difference between the speaking voice and the singing voice. Because lastly, the musicking voice is *not* a speaking voice. It is not the voice as it speaks. This last understanding of the voice as a mode of speech and furthermore language is, however, most stubbornly attached to the thinking of voice.

Speaking voice and singing voice

In the introduction to Jacques Derrida’s *Margins of Philosophy*, Michel Leiris is quoted extensively, his text arranged on the right margin of the print (Derrida, 1982). Leiris thinks the voice as a margin, as a verge. He writes: “mysterious is the voice that sings, in relation to the voice that speaks” (Leiris, in Derrida, 1982, p. xxiii); it can only be “represented as a margin, a fringe surrounding the object” (ibid., p. xxiv). As with Koestenbaum before, the voice’s marginality is exemplified not by any voice but by the musical voice. Both voice and music reach beyond the grasps of signification and so, Leiris portrays the musical voice as an ultimate other. What gives singing, what gives music this specific aura of otherness? Leiris contrasts the singing voice’s mysterious force with the speaking voice: it brings to the fore a dichotomy – well-known and often reproduced – of language and music, of reason and mystery. I do not wish to reproduce such romanticist idealism of music, nonetheless, I must establish a difference between speaking and singing.

I argue that the speaking voice and the singing voice differ. Unlike Martin Heidegger, I argue that "song […] is [*not* just] language" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 78). I am interested in the voice as it musicks and not as it speaks. My theory of the musicking voice is grounded in this difference. I am not interested in establishing an originary beginning in the difference between language and music, in thinking music as a primary language or language as existing prior to music. I am not interested in a cultural history or archaeology of the voice nor in establishing an ontological difference. As I have shown with regards to phonocentrism earlier, such a project would only reproduce a binary logic of speaking and singing where one determines the other. That is to say, I am decidedly not engaging in the "fantasy that the singing voice might cure the wound inflicted by culture" (Dolar, 2006, p. 31). This fantasy can be, however, found in many philosophical ruminations on singing. Viktor Zuckerkandl, for instance, bemoans that the "original unity of singing and speaking has fallen apart" (Zuckerkandl, 1964, p. 63).[2] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, too, writes that there "would not have been an initial difference between the act of speaking and the act of singing", and that the "initial form of language, therefore, would have been a kind of song" (Merleau-Ponty, 1973, p. 81). Lydia Goehr has commented on the primacy of song over speech in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's music philosophy and has argued that the idea of music existing prior to language is merely another sign of the limits of philosophy to describe music's performances (Goehr, 2004, pp. 98–105). It is an old trope in the history of the philosophy of music but one that illustrates the stubborn conception of music as the mysterious and unreachable.

One text that is often accredited to having developed a notion of the singing voice that differs from the speaking voice is a chapter on singing and signing voices in Lindon Barrett's *Blackness and Value* (Barrett, 1999). Barrett "contests the notion that literacy […] provides the only significant means of voice for any culture" (1999, p. 61). As a result, he theorises the

[2] The translation from the German original is mine.

singing voice in contrast to the signing voice as a site for African American cultural production. In shouts, moans, hollers and other forms of sung vocalisation, Barrett reads Black cultural expression as primarily bodily. For him, the singing voice shakes up the order of Whiteness, literacy and the "tyranny of speech" (Cavarero, 2005, p. 128) by way of its sheer physiology: "The idiom of disturbance and confusion seems to designate activity in the absence of propriety, order, significance, and meaning" (Barrett, 1999, p. 64). In contrast to signing voices, singing voices are "unexplored and undesignated sites of meaning" (ibid., p. 65). Even though I can follow Barrett's attempt to theorise and valorise otherwise or non-signing voices, the overreliance on the singing voice's physicality becomes problematic for a theory of the voice in music. In Barrett's case the body becomes the primary site of the singing voice, contrasted with the speaking voice which is conceptualised somehow less materially. Barrett is by no means alone in positing the musical voice in opposition to speech. Jean-Luc Nancy imagines a similar voice, one that is primarily musical, an "intimate prelude to language, yet foreign to language itself" (Nancy 2006, 39).

The problem with such dichotomising of singing and speaking is that music is portrayed as a saviour. Music is asked to save the voice from the modernist "tyranny of meaning" (Barthes, 1977, p. 185). This thinking, of course, flatters music but it also overcharges it and does not actually provide any critical understanding of music or musicking. As much as the voice cannot be regarded ontologically without taking "any detour through the agency of exteriority" (Derrida, 2011, p. 67), music is not ontologically sound either (Levitz, 2017). But if the difference between the speaking voice and the singing voice cannot be theorised ontologically, what is their difference?

In 'There is a balm in Gilead', I heard Jeanne Lee sing both with and without words. Her solo vocalisation, simply intonated on a 'u' vowel, moves away from the voice as uttering speech. Lee's voice here does not need to bend to the conventions of singing words – this voice

is not supported by an understanding of its ability to speak but mainly functions musically. The same can be observed in the preceding verse, where she sings the words of the spiritual. Here, too, she moves this voice to music and not only to the lyrics. The words function as rhythmical and semantic markers, but they are worked, bent, cut by the musical flow because "music swallows words", as Susanne Langer writes (Langer, 1953, p. 152). What I hear in Lee's musicking voice is "[s]ong cutting speech", as Fred Moten says (Moten, 2003, p. 39). Lee's voice sing-speaks these words, but she makes them musical: she stretches them, slows them down, breathes through them, thins them out, frays them; she syncopates the words, lets them vibrate, entangles them with the piano's ritardando timing and the double bass's distant rustling. All of these movements are activities not of a speaking voice; they are musical performances. They do not belong to the register of language but rather indicate a musicking agency.

The difference between speaking and singing is one of degree and not of essence. Speaking and singing both take place in a fluid continuum (Middleton & Elliott, 2003; Rings, 2019, p. 37), with rap or Sprechgesang on one end and wordless singing on the other. Even though the continuum theory is plausible, it does not fully answer the problem of their difference either. However, it does bring into play the central role of performance in determining singing as differing from speaking. I am not interested in singing per se but rather in theorising the voice as it musicks. Singing, of course, is part of the musicking voice but does not solely constitute it. The notion of the musicking voice also incorporates other modes of vocal musicking and different styles of singing, extended vocal techniques, Sprechgesang, scatting, yodelling and phonographic voices. By focusing on musicking rather than merely on singing, I emphasise the musicking *forces* of the voice. This voice opens itself to the affective capacity of musicking. If singing and speaking are different performances of the voice with

differing functions, I can also conclude that their difference is not ontological but plays out in performance.

The example of Jeanne Lee's singing voice already suggested the problem of listening to lyrics. Arguably, in much worded vocal music, the combination of words and music and their specific constellation constitutes an aesthetic of the voice as both musical and linguistic. However, my theory of the musicking voice proposed in this thesis is primarily oriented towards the voice as it musicks. Music's power – if we care to listen to it and allow for it to affect – overwhelms voice-as-speech. Brian Eno hears this power in doo wop singing where the words often fail to make sense: "Doo wop lyrics serve the music, they make the voice musical" (Eno, in Rubin, 2021). I am interested in the moment when the voice becomes music and when we can no longer listen to the voice as *saying something* because words fail to grasp its doings. It is here that a voice as and in music emerges. Martha Feldman, too, argues that the musical voice departs from the grasps of linguistic thinking and instead must be studied from the difference that is musicking.

> What matters for us here is above all, I think, a fundamental contrast between verbal language and music. Verbal language—that medium of most vocal music—can only ever heal the breach in part, since by seeming to lie on the rigid side of the formal and repeatable domain of the symbolic, on the side of what is automatic and iterable in Lacan's view, language becomes part of the problem. Whereas music, notwithstanding its formalities and repeatabilities (da capos, recaps, twelve-bar blues, ghazal couplets, medieval virelais), is in some sense its converse. Music, we could say, while it hinges on certain formal equivalents to language—musical syntax and related structural conventions—even more significantly has the capacity to pull away from them. Even texted vocal music is both married to language itself and ready to renounce it. (Feldman, 2019, p. 198)

The difference between speaking and singing can be specified along the lines set out here by Feldman. The difference is music. Music is not a language and so the voice that musicks moves away from the word and from the symbolic. Because music "has the capacity to pull away" (ibid.) from language, it cannot be theorised only by reference to symbolic and linguistic structure, as Feldman argues. The musicking voice similarly needs to be pulled away from the

grasps of linguistic signification. Different to the voice that speaks, the musicking voice does not need to signify, enunciate or utter. One of the underlying tasks in the development of a theory of the musicking voice is thus to continuously listen away from the voice as text, as language, and instead attune to the musicking performances of voice. I will follow Feldman's notion of music's "capacity to pull away" (ibid.), that is, music's powers to affect, because "[m]usic's power lies in its sonority rather than in its words" (Goehr, 2004, p. 125).

The problem of music

I have already argued that the voice is a problem because it cannot just be explained by reference to its body (Ch. 1), a sound (Ch. 2) or a voicer's subjectivity (Ch. 4); it always emerges as a multiplicity in performance, a "braided polyphony" (Derrida, 1984, 81). In the case of the musicking voice it would seem as if music were the answer to the problem of the voice as it musicks. But what is music? Music, too, is a problem. Music philosophers most often search for music's being in a musical piece or artwork (Davies, 2020). Anthropologists look for an answer in communicative interaction and social or cultural signification. Formalist musicologists would argue that music is the arrangement of sounds in time. However, this questioning does not touch on music's affective power. It leaves this most interesting part of music to psychologists, neuroscientists or metaphysicians. The problem is the kind of answer such ontological enquiry anticipates. The problem is that music is asked to provide an answer. But music cannot answer, musicking is not decipherable; as Vladimir Jankélévitch and Carolyn Abbate have argued: music is not a code, it is not a symptom of expression, sociality, biography or history, as critics of musical hermeneutics have maintained (Langer, 1953, p. 26; Jankélévitch, 2003, p. 11; Abbate, 2004, pp. 515, 526–527; Gallope, 2017, p. 251). Similarly, music cannot function as an answer to the limits of philosophy, as Lydia Goehr reminds us (Goehr, 2004, pp. 18–19). Music cannot be simply the answer to the question of the voice as it

musicks because music does not provide answers, it poses more problems. Rather than demand an answer of music, one way to approach it is by way of its affections. In order to approach the complexities of music, theorists have thus suggested to move away from the ontological questioning of music and to focus on music's affects – its performative potentials, its capacity to affect and its vivid and powerful affections; to ask: what does music do? Musicologists have studied music's affections in philosophical terms and have theorised them differently as "musical power" (Thompson, 2019, p. 6), "music-power" (Van Elferen, 2020, p. 152), music's "effictions" (Szendy, 2016, p. 15) or the "drastic" (Abbate, 2004, p. 510). What all these different approaches have in common is to think of music in terms of affect. In the case of the musicking voice, I will argue that affect enables me to bridge music's apparent dichotomies, such as material and immaterial (in Ch. 2), subject and object (in Ch. 3) as well as production and perception (in Ch. 5). To think about music's affections allows me to shift the question from music's ontology to its performances. It furthermore makes space for a listening phenomenology, which will prove crucial for a theory of the musicking voice (Ch. 5).

I take inspiration from the music philosophy of Vladimir Jankélévitch whose notion of music as ineffable grants music both immense affective power while at the same time being indebted to the actual formal qualities of musical sounds. Jankélévitch's philosophy asks how to "address music's ephemerality as performance" (Kane, 2016a, p. 217). Carolyn Abbate has famously developed the notion of music as drastic from Jankélévitch's philosophy and has made it productive for a theory of musical performativity (Abbate, 2004; I will discuss Abbate's notion of music as the drastic in more detail in Ch. 2). Jankélévitch's philosophy can be described as "a rigorously attentive—but nonsystematic—fidelity to music's inconsistency" (Gallope, 2017, p. 182). Jankélévitch shies away from ever confining music to either its object or its subject. He argues that music is at the same time "immediate, drastic, and indiscreet" (Jankélévitch, 2003, p. 1). There is an openness to Jankélévitch's musical writing; his thinking

follows a methodology of indeterminacy. He says: "music is the domain where ambiguity holds sway" (2003, p. 58), it is "infinitely equivocal" (2003, pp. 63–64). In contrast to musical mystery, which thinks music as the untellable, Jankélévitch thinks music as the ineffable (2003, p. 72). Music can be spoken of, but it is ineffable; it "cannot be explained because there are infinite and interminable things to be said of it" (ibid.). Instead of demanding an answer from or of music, the philosopher's work is to trace music's affections and to "incessantly speculat[e] anew about what the music might be doing" (Gallope, 2017, 190). Jankélévitch's methodology thus involves a listening subject. Music demands of its participants that "[o]ne must give oneself over" (Jankélévitch, 2003, p. 82) to its "efferent force" (2003, p. 89). This thesis only tangentially touches on Jankélévitch's music philosophy in Chapter 5. However, it takes seriously his approach to thinking music as aporetic. Consequently, music or the musicking voice cannot be approached solely ontologically but must involve music's "drastic performativity" (Van Elferen, 2020, p. 155). Instead of asking what the voice in music *is*, I ask what it *does*. This thesis is an attempt to follow the musicking voice's indeterminable and ungraspable actions, to trace the musical forces and powers that animate the voice to musick.

Vocal and instrumental musicking

Thus far, I have argued that both voice and music are prone to indeterminacy. In the case of the voice, this indeterminacy can be found in the voice's undecided position. It operates in a "third space", as Freya Jarman-Ivens writes (Jarman-Ivens, 2011, p. 3), in between inside and outside, subject and object, materiality and immateriality, production and perception (cf. Connor, 2000, pp. 6–7, 41; Dolar, 2006a, p. 166, 2019, p. 341). If the musicking voice is primarily an entity that musicks but does not speak, can we not simply regard it as a musical instrument? How is the musicking voice different from, say, a trumpet or a violin or a synthesiser?

On the one hand, it has often been argued – particularly in 19th century Western music philosophy – "that instrumental playing should approximate to the condition of singing" (Goehr, 2004, p. 118). When, for instance, a violin is heard as particularly expressive, it is often said to resemble the human voice singing, an analogy that "depends upon an elusive metaphor of musicality usually expressed with all its Romantic and metaphysical grandeur" (Goehr, 2004, p. 123). The problem with such an analogy is the belief of music to have its foundation in the voice, as Lydia Goehr argues (Goehr, 2004, p. 118). Vocal musicking is deemed more 'original' than instrumental musicking, with singing indicating musicality *as such*. This striving for the qualities of singing in instrumental playing furthermore brings to light the ideals of expressiveness and vitality which are heard in and associated with the singing voice (Goehr, 2004, pp. 121–123). Musicality, voice and expressiveness are equated in the moment that an instrument is heard as aspiring to the qualities of the singing voice. This vocality is, however, primarily a metaphor, variously signifying musicality or expression or simply the ineffable qualities of musical affection.

On the other hand, why can the voice not be regarded as a musical instrument in the moment it musicks? After all, the voice can be used musically and it can be *instrumentalised* as if it were an instrument like any other. Vocal pedagogy, for instance, often regards the voice as an instrument (Van Elferen, 2020, p. 62). In many vocal practices, the voice might even sound like a specific instrument, such as a trumpet, a violin or a synthesiser. The musicking voice might be a musical instrument, in the sense that any device, any tool, anything that engages in the making and doing of music or any constellation of bodies that is "manufactured" in musicking (Szendy, 2016, p. 9; see 3.4.), can be called a musical instrument. A problem appears, however, when the musicking voice is heard as something other than itself, when it signifies another entity. The musicking voice cannot be heard as if it was another instrument, like a saxophone or a trumpet – because in the moment of signification this musicking voice is

reduced to another signifier, the *sound* of a saxophone, the *timbre* of a trumpet, etc. Its own musicking agency, however, is lost in signification. Calling the musicking voice an instrument does not fully describe its multifarious affections, the problems and traces that animate this voice to musick. It misses the problematic connections to its body and sound (Chapter 1 and 2), but more importantly, it misses its specific technique, its phonographic play between object and subject (Ch. 3), its impersonal musicking force (Ch. 4) and the distancing play of voice and ear, its perception (Ch. 5). The question of the voice as an instrument thus leads again to the problems of the voice. As I have argued before, the voice cannot be theorised ontologically, instead, I can only study its relations and affective traces (Feldman, 2015b, p. 658).

Ella Fitzgerald's voice, for example, has often been heard *as* a saxophone (Cerulli, 1998, p. 41). Fitzgerald's voice is, of course, not a saxophone, but when it is heard as if it was a sax, a "decision is imposed" (Derrida, 2014, p. 7). Only because the voice is here supposed to signify something, in this case the sound of another instrument, can the writer Dom Cerulli hear Fitzgerald as something other than itself, that is, as a saxophone. In the very moment he hears her voice not as a musicking agency but as another instrument, he fails to listen to its musicking. Cerulli's listening stifles the voice's traces and fails to keep the musicking voice open to affection. In fact, in calling Fitzgerald's voice a saxophone, Cerulli has reduced the voice to a signifier and has fallen prey to phonocentrism. Instead of hearing the musicking voice *as* a musical instrument or *as* a specific body or *as* a subject, I want to listen to its multifarious affections. This voice is never self-contained, it never identifies with a single allocation because there is "always something more to the voice—a remainder, a gap, a reverb, an echo" (Feldman & Zeitlin, 2019, p. xiii).

To return to the question of the instrumental character of the voice, my preliminary answer must be: The voice is not simply a musical instrument because it defies the reduction to a singular source. That is also why this musicking voice could not simply be classified in

the rigid systems of organology because such a practice would define the voice by its body. But the musicking voice is not simply a corpophone (Libin, 2014), as I will discuss in Chapter 1. Rather than try to resolve its problems, my approach embraces the voice's indeterminacy. The acceptance of the voice's excesses is not solely apologetic but can – as Lydia Goehr has shown with regards to music philosophy (Goehr, 2004, pp. 37–38) – become a theoretical practice of non-essentialism and non-idealism. A theory of the musicking voice that does not try to explain (away) but leaves open the problems of voice and music, takes its own "limits […] and explanatory gaps very seriously as techniques of philosophical theory" (Goehr, 2004, p. 37). The musicking voice resists capture and as such, my task is to acknowledge the indissolubility of the voice as it musicks and to follow its affections; any other final "conclusions, however tentative, are sure to invite much more skepticism than agreement, as anything to do with singing always does" (Feldman, 2015a, p. xx).

Planes of consistency: musicking, performance, affect, listening

Before I outline the five chapters more thoroughly, let me briefly expand on some of the key terms that frame this thesis. Four conceptual vectors cross through it: musicking, performance, affect and listening.

Musicking

The term musicking has been coined by Christopher Small (Small, 1998). Musicking, for Small, is a word that tries to emphasise music's activities and performative actions. Music is an event, something that people do and musicking is the verb that captures the complex web of events, actions and relations that constitute music (Small, 1998, pp. 2, 9). Musicking is

> the present participle, or gerund, of the verb *to music*. […] *To music is to take part, in any capacity, in a musical performance, whether by performing, by listening, by rehearsing or practicing, by providing material for performance (what is called composing), or by dancing*. (Small, 1998, p. 9; original emphasis)

Musicking can include musicians, dancers, audience, technicians, organisers (1998, pp. 9–10), but also instruments, objects or musical materials. Musicking describes music as a process and not as a stable and knowable object. In Chapter 2, I discuss Small's theory of musicking in more detail.

I regard the voice in and of music as a musicking voice because it actively produces and makes music. This voice sings and shouts, raps and whispers, bends and breaks and moves the voice as and to music. At the same time, this voice is actively made and produced with and within music, as if this voice was charged by musical power. However, I have decided to call this entity *musicking voice* rather than 'musicked voice' to signal its own affective forces.

Performance

Small's notion of musicking regards music as performative. In this case, performance does not solely designate a performance that takes place on a stage, for an audience. But the notion of performance that I make use of throughout this thesis can be conceptualised slightly differently. As a discipline, performance studies has variously developed out of theatre and drama studies (see Fischer-Lichte, 2008) and speech act theory (see Austin, 1962). As a premise, performance is regarded as an event that can incorporate bodily gestures, iterations, statements and actions.

Musicology has picked up on this notion of performance, too, albeit much later (Cook, 2012; Cook & Pettengill, 2013; Cusick, 1999). An influential discussion of musical performativity can be found in Carolyn Abbate's essay 'Music – Drastic or gnostic?' (Abbate, 2004). Based on Vladimir Jankélévitch's music philosophy, Abbate wonders if music can be studied hermeneutically, what she calls the gnostic (Abbate, 2004, p. 505). She argues that the dominant model of hermeneutic analysis reduces music to a cipher which consequently can be deciphered in contemplation. Arguably, such gnostic apprehension of music omits "musical performance's strangeness" (Abbate, 2004, p. 508), its experiences, physicality, "desperation and peril" (Abbate, 2004, p. 510) which is music's ability to affect; in short, the "transformative

power" of musical performance (Fischer-Lichte, 2008, p. 192). Abbate finds this power in Jankélévitch's notion of the drastic (Abbate, 2004, p. 505). By embracing music as a performance, it can be theorised not as a distant object but as an involving, affecting and powerful event (Abbate, 2004, p. 509). This turn to musicking as an event moves the study of music away from a written score and an author intention and instead allows us to include performers, listeners, musical objects, materials and also immaterial affects to be part of the musicking event.

This notion of performance as an event has been taken up by voice scholars too – I follow this trajectory in thinking the voice as emerging in the play of performance (Frith, 1996; Duncan, 2004; Schneider, 2004; Schlichter, 2011). To think the voice as a performance not only means to study it as an event, but furthermore also enables the deconstruction of the voice as signifying an originary being. Along these line, Steven Connor writes:

> my voice is not something that I merely have, or even something that I, if only in part, am. Rather, it is something that I do. A voice is not a condition, nor yet an attribute, but an event. It is less something that exists than something which occurs. (Connor, 2000, p. 4)

This notion of *doing* marks the voice as a performance, as an entity that occurs rather than merely exists. In this thesis, I will think about the specific musical performance that makes the voice a musicking voice. I discuss theories of musical and vocal performance in more detail in Chapter 2.

Affect

I have – in passing – already used the term *affect* or *affective* when talking about either the processes or the powers of musical performance. In the wake of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's writings, the concept of affect has gained traction and has led to a wider field of affect theory which variously reaches into the domains of art, culture, politics, media, neuroscience and social sciences (see, for instance, Deleuze, 1988; Massumi, 2002; Clough and Halley, 2007; Deleuze and Guattari, 2013). Affect can be described as "pre-individual

bodily forces [that augment] a body's capacity to act" (Clough, 2008, p. 1). Affect, theorised as such, cannot be reduced to the senses and emotions or be easily grasped through signification. In many ways, affect describes a quality of a body's affections, its movements, forces or intensities rather than its identity or state (Massumi, 2002, p. 15). Throughout the thesis, I will argue that the musicking voice cannot be grasped as a stable object, but it is an event. I can never fully grasp this voice, but I can trace its affections because – as a listener and active participant – I am affected by it, I take part in its performance. When the voice is as an affective entity, it does not simply signify. It does not causally relate to any one signifier. Instead, as it musicks, it consists of impersonal intensities and forces (Massumi, 2002, p. 217). To study music is to study music's performative and affective powers. The turn to affect, as Marie Thompson and Ian Biddle have argued, enables musicology to shift the question from "'what does music mean?' to 'what does music do?'" (Thompson and Biddle, 2013a, p. 19).

The concept of affect has another advantage when it comes to the study of voice and music. My theorising of the musicking voice must, time and again, navigate both ontological and phenomenological claims of the voice. The voice has often been studied ontologically (as presence, consciousness or subjectivity) or phenomenologically (as a perceived and perceiving body or as sounding forms). I will argue that neither approach helps me to theorise the problems of the voice as it musicks. The musicking voice cannot be reduced to its physiological production, as I argue in Chapter 1, nor, as argued in Chapter 2, to a sonic materialism; it is always more than singular and roams between object and subject (Ch. 3), it has no subjectivity (Ch. 4) and it cannot be solely found in listening alone. Listening, however, will be central in the constitution of the musicking voice. Affect theories will help me to trace the movements between the voice and its perception in listening. Affect thus enables me to theorise the musicking voice as an entity that emerges in between production and reception. Its effects are always real, but they cannot be narrowed to a materialist constitution of the voice or of music.

I will examine affect theories in more detail in Chapter 5 – where I also discuss the importance of listening for the theory of the musicking voice.

Listening

Why does a theory of the voice focus on listening? After all, is the voice not produced in the vocal body rather than in the ear? Any voice, as long as it sounds, is certainly produced in a body and within a system of vocal production, but the physiological workings do not yet sufficiently describe the voice as it musicks, as I argue in Chapter 1. In order to think the voice as it emerges in the performative play of music, a perspective of its perception in listening is also necessary. While some theorists have neglected listening's ability to co-produce the voice (for instance Cavarero, 2005), others have overestimated the capacity of listening in construing the voice (for instance Eidsheim, 2015, 2019). My approach prioritises neither vocal ontology nor listening phenomenology. Instead, I argue that the musicking voice can only be theorised in the movements between the two approaches. The musicking voice calls for a listening *and* this listening calls for a voice. Both movements co-constitute each other. I argue that listening can be regarded as an active musicking co-producer of the voice. I will discuss the specific relationship between the musicking voice and listening in Chapter 5. The notion of listening, furthermore, prescribes the methodology of the theory at hand. Only in a practice of listening, can I theorise the voice as it musicks.

Methodology and archive

Listening is both a concept and a method with which I theorise the musicking voice. Most of my analyses of concrete material voices follow my own listening affections. In listening, I zoom into the voice's movements, intensities and musical bearings. It is here, in the active participation, that I can follow the voice's affections. In listening, I can theorise this voice as exceeding the reductions to sound, body, language or subjectivity. In the theory of the

musicking voice, listening becomes the tool with which to untie voice from its ontological shackles. In listening, I will maintain that the voice can be heard as a musicking force in its own right.

If my approach to the musicking voice relies so heavily on a mode of listening, how can I possibly define an archive from which I construe my theory? Which cultural artefacts determine the making of this theory? First of all, it is worth acknowledging that this project has been inspired as much by theories of voice as by actual musical voices. The material that I analyse and with which I think similarly stems as much from theoretical texts as it does from musical examples. My endeavour is primarily theoretical and my claims primarily concern the critical engagement with theories of voice, sound and music. I approach my questions as a musicologist and not as a cultural theorist or a media or voice scholar. That is not to say that I am not strongly indebted to the fields of cultural studies, media studies or sound studies. However, I approach my subject matter from the perspective of musical performance, musical sounds and musical affect. The voice that I theorise emerges in the play of music. My thesis is not a philosophy or theory of the voice in general. It is an attempt to carve out a philosophical space to think about the voice in music.

As the voice that I am theorising is a musical voice and a sounding one, my theory must bracket out questions of non-sounding and D/deaf voices, which by no means are merely metaphorical but function nonetheless differently than the proposed theory. The non-sounding voice, like so many other notions of voice that are non-musical, would have to define its main concepts – such as voice and music – differently. This would require, however, a fundamentally different epistemological premise and has to be dealt with elsewhere (see Holmes, 2016; Meizel and Daughtry, 2019).

I have listened to and theorised with the voices of Jeanne Lee, Howlin' Wolf, Joan La Barbara (Ch. 1), Ella Fitzgerald (Ch 2), Kate Bush (Ch. 3), Annette Peacock, Scott Walker,

Leon Thomas (all Ch. 4) and those of the Musarc choir in London (Ch. 5). The musics that are represented are diverse, most of them stem from singular singers, many of them derive either from traditions of experimental practices or from more popular traditions. Culturally, they are non-specific. This thesis does not deal directly with cultural, historical or social issues of the voice. Instead, it attempts to theorise the voice as a musicking entity in its own right. This is far from denying these voices their cultural specificity. However, my aim is to find in the different examples and instantiations of voice something that can be called its musicking force.

Chapter overview

This thesis is arranged in five chapters. The first two chapters discuss the problem of vocal essentialism: Chapter 1, the problem of reducing voice to its producing body, and Chapter 2, the problem of reducing voice to a sonic materialism. These two chapters deal – in Kane's terms – with the voice's *topos* and *echos*. Where the first two chapters discuss the problems of the voice, the three remaining chapters each develop a different aspect of the musicking voice. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, the musicking voice is conceptualised as a phonographic (Ch. 3), impersonal (Ch. 4) entity and as constituted in listening (Ch. 5). Where each chapter can be read and regarded as a separate essay, Chapters 1 and 2 establish the foundation to a theory of the musicking voice which is explicated in more detail in the chapters to follow.

In Chapter 1, I theorise the musicking voice's relation to its producing body. In the first instance, I will discuss the voice's physiology. Alongside examples from Howlin' Wolf and biphonic singing practices, I argue – in contrast to many carnal phenomenologies of voice – that the voice does not simply index its producing body nor can it be theorised as grain. I study the shaping of the vocal body in vocal pedagogy and argue that the voice's body is reproduced in performance and, as such, cannot be regarded as a stable signifier. By way of acousmatic theory, I maintain that listening allows for a disidentifying of the causal relationship that is

often assumed between the voice and its body. In order to follow this notion of listening's disidentifying, I study Joan La Barbara's practice of extended vocal technique. Alongside La Barbara, I theorise the relationship between the musicking voice and its body as complicated and multicausal, the voice offers itself as a musicking entity and not merely as a carnal phenomenon. Listening functions as a methodology to disidentify the causal ties between the voice and its producing body.

Chapter 2 problematises the reduction of voice to sound. I will read different theories of voice from the realms of sound studies that conceptualise voice primarily as a sonic entity. I trace the sonic materialism that I find in sonic theories of voice and attribute the dominance of ontological models of sound to the influence that German media studies has had on the field of sound studies. I argue that the reduction of voice to sound cannot account for the musicking voice. Music exceeds sonic materialism and the musicking voice exceeds vocal sonocentrism. In order to highlight the musicking and not merely sonic capacities of the voice, I listen to Ella Fitzgerald's vocal performances. Listening to her musicking vibe, play and improvisation allows me to develop a theory of the musicking voice that contrasts a sonocentrism. For this, I first discuss theories of musical performativity that enable me to think the musicking voice as emerging as its own being in the performance of music. The musicking voice cannot be simply reduced to sonic matter nor to its place of emanation. Instead, as I will argue by listening to Ella Fitzgerald, it emerges in musical performance as a musicking agency in its own right.

The findings from Chapter 2 will be explicated and elaborated in the succeeding three chapters. Chapter 3 discusses the voice's phonographic reproduction. Here, I problematise the understanding of phonography as capture and representation. Capture and representation fall short of a conceptualising of phonography as they both render reproduction secondary to an originary notion of sound or voice. By way of Alexander Weheliye's notion of phonography as re/production, I theorise the phonographic voice as both recording *and* performance. I argue

that the musicking voice emerges in phonography as both recorded *and* performed, the musicking voice is neither object nor subject but roams indeterminably in between. Kate Bush's voice work serves as the case study for the phonographic musicking voice. Particularly on her album *The Dreaming*, Bush has made use of digital sound technologies (Fairlight CMI) to create her phonographic voices. Bush's voices cannot be described as capturing or representing a performance prior to recording because they are a re/production, both recording and performance. I expand the idea of phonography further by reference to Peter Szendy's notion of effiction. Phonography enables the musicking voice to create "*fiction in effect(s)*" (Szendy, 2016, p. 15; original emphasis). The phonographic musicking voice does not capture or represent or mediate another voice, one that musicks prior to its reproduction. Instead, the musicking voice emerges from an ensemble of vocal production, sound reproduction technologies and their interaction. In phonography, the musicking voice creates ever new and fictitious performances. This musicking voice both reproduces and produces itself as both object and subject at the same time.

Chapter 4 dispels the myth of the voice's relation to subjectivity. While prominent voice theorists – such as Adriana Cavarero – have regarded voice as revealing its voicer's unique subjectivity, others – such as Mladen Dolar – have argued that the voice does not so much reveal its voicer's self but shows that the voice is always already foreign to itself. By way of two extensive case studies, I will argue that the musicking voice expresses nothing if not an impersonal musical force. For this, I study the work of singer and composer Scott Walker. Here, I discuss how the voice performs as an entity that distances itself from any personality and in turn becomes a musicking entity of its own accord. In Walker's singing, no personal attachment to the voice remains, instead "another thing, another person" animates this voice to sing (Walker, in Hattenstone, 2012). I take up this notion of musicking's impersonal expressiveness by listening further to Leon Thomas' "egoless" singing (Thomas, in Lazarus,

1995, p. 31). Thomas' powerful performance shows the vital and impersonal forces at play in the musicking voice. I analyse both Walker's and Thomas' vocal performances by way of Susan Langer's aesthetic theory. By disidentifying the voice from any notion of subjectivity, the musicking voice can be regarded as a vital, virtual and impersonal musicking force.

In the concluding fifth chapter, I focus on the relationship between voice and listening. I begin by reconstructing Jacques Derrida's critique of Husserl's auto-affection. Hearing-oneself-speak, in Derrida's discussion, becomes the site where the idea of *différance* can be developed. I take up the notion of spacing that is at play in any relationality between voice and ear and will argue that the theory of the musicking voice can only successfully be developed in the interanimation of vocal ontology and listening phenomenology. The musicking voice does not emerge in itself but always in relation to a listener – no matter if this listener is the voicer themself or another. I hear this interanimation at play in Josquin's vocal polyphony where singing and listening create the musicking voice in ensemble. I theorise their relationality by way of affect theory. I argue that the voice in music affects a listening, this is the voice's incantation of the listener. At the same time, listening calls for the musicking voice to affect, the ear stretches out to hear the voice in music. I describe these movements between voice and ear as affections. Listening affects the voice and the voice affects a listening. In this reciprocal affection, the musicking voice emerges as its own being which cannot be reduced either simply to its production, a vocal ontology, nor simply to its perception, a listening phenomenology. The musicking voice takes up the space in between.

1. Bodies in song: disidentifying voice and body in music

Mary Margaret O'Hara's voice enters the song with a sigh, her voice breathing exhaustively. She sings and her "body's in trouble". O'Hara's voice sings this trouble; singing *with* a troubling body and *of* the body's trouble. In the song's lyrics, we hear that the body is out of control, acting wilfully, not abiding by her. And in the singing, too, I can hear that this body becomes another, this voice moves in its own ways; the phrasing is wayward as if it withdrew from her body's control. In her singing, O'Hara wonders if this body is *hers* at all (O'Hara, 1988).[3]

Where is her body heard? I can hear Mary Margaret O'Hara's voice as a moving body that jumps, contracts, disappears, turns; a voice that carries and is carried by a body's unconscious flickers. Only O'Hara's voice moves like this. But I cannot hear this voice as *her*. As a listener, I have no sense of hearing *her* body in the musicking actions of this voice. And in O'Hara's lyrical bending of the words, too, the body becomes another or more than one. Does she sing "body's in trouble" or "bodies in trouble"? What is troubled is perhaps the idea of a singular body altogether? Any body is in trouble. Mary Margaret O'Hara's singing leaves me wondering. But it is not the song text that concerns me, I am not interested in the lyrics but in the musical performance of this voice. What troubles me is the body *of* a voice, the body *in* a voice. Just as there is a possibility to listen away from the song's lyrics and attune to the musicking actions of O'Hara's voice, there is, I argue, a way to disidentify body and voice. That is not to say that the voice becomes disembodied, it never is. "Perhaps voice and body are related, sharing a deep, secret resemblance, but nothing guarantees such resemblance" (Kane, 2014, p. 156) because the body cannot function as the sole guarantor of the musicking voice.

[3] O'Hara's song 'Body's in Trouble' can be heard on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7JL6loXbebo (Accessed: 15 October 2021).

My aim in this chapter is to listen away from a carnal essentialism of voice and instead tune into the musicking diffusion of the voice's body.

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> *Thus is there not only an aesthetical side to the art of singing, but a physiological and a physical side also, without an exact knowledge, appreciation, observance, and study of which, what is hurtful cannot be discerned and avoided; and no true culture of art, and consequently no progress in singing, is possible*. (Seiler, 1884, pp. 34–35; original emphasis)

The voice needs a body in order to produce a sound, the same holds true for singing, as Emma Seiler writes. The voice's relationship to its body is crucial, the body is the voice's source, where its sound is caused. The voice does not exist without a body because a "sound untainted by any source […] does not exist" (Chion, 2016, p. 104). Even though the voice needs a body in order to sound, their relationship is *troubled* (O'Hara, 1988). In this chapter, I ask: What is the relationship between the voice and the body in music? How does musicking trouble the voice's relationship to its body? And: how can I theorise the musicking voice without reducing it to its body?

First, I discuss how the voice is produced physiologically in and with the body (1.1.). I briefly venture into semiotic theory in order to describe their relation as indexical and question Barthes' idea of the grain of the voice (Barthes, 1977). I then look at different vocal practices – falsetto singing and biphonic singing – that complicate the assumed identification of a body in voice when it is heard (1.2.). Hereafter, I discuss the idea of acousmatic sound and the acousmatic voice in order to introduce listening into the question of the voice's relationship to the body (1.3.). This notion of listening to the voice is then specified by way of Joan La Barbara's extended vocal techniques (1.4.). In the concluding part, I develop an idea of listening as disidentifying which enables me to theorise the relationship between the musicking voice and its producing body as one that does not only exist in the voice's production but also in its perception (1.5.).

1.1. The voice's body: physiology, index & grain

Physiology of the musicking voice

Any sounding voice, no matter if it speaks or sings, is produced by a body. The body both generates and alters the sound of the voice. Physiologically, voice is produced in the larynx and as part of a sequential system of (1) respiration, (2) vocal production and (3) sound filtering. This system includes a body's (1) lungs (bronchi, trachea), (2) larynx (vocal folds, glottis, ligaments) and (3) the vocal tract, the space between glottis and lips, including pharynx, tongue, jaw, palate, oral cavity, teeth and lips. Furthermore, voice production also entails the use of abdominal muscles, chest, nasal cavities, cranium and ears. The voice is produced within this system and forms an assemblage of body parts.

The voice scholar Johan Sundberg has studied the acoustic and physiological aspects of the voice (Sundberg, 1987, 2011). I partly follow his model as Sundberg studies the physiology of the singing voice and contrasts it to the speaking voice. However, his model is also problematic as it mainly takes into account the voice of concert or opera singing and its styles, trainings and performances. Other modes of singing and other modes of vocal musicking such as rapping, growling or shouting make use of different physiological intricacies (Sundberg, 2011, p. 246). Nonetheless, I briefly outline his model of the functions of the singing voice in order to provide an overview of the physiological workings of the vocal body.

Breathing

The sound of the voice is generated when the vocal folds vibrate: the glottis and the vocal folds function as the sound generator of the voice. In order to set the vocal folds to vibrate, a speaker or singer needs to make use of their breathing mechanism which is activated by way of abdominal and diaphragm muscles. The lungs function as the initiator of the vocal production by supplying the vocal folds with a stream of air. The vocal folds are set into vibration through

air pressure from the lungs. Sundberg compares the respiratory system with a compressor: the purpose "of the breathing system is to compress the air in the lungs, so that an airstream is generated past the glottis and the vocal tract" (Sundberg, 1987, p. 9)

Phonation

When the compressed air passes through the vocal tract, it initiates a vibration of the vocal folds. At this stage, sound is generated in the vibration of the folds. Sundberg calls this the "voice source" (Sundberg, 1987, p. 10) as it is only at this stage that the voice organ actually produces a sound. Sundberg, for instance, compares the function of phonation to an oscillator, i.e. a machine that generates sound signals (ibid.). In German vocal pedagogy and vocal physiology, this stage of phonation is also called *Stimmgebung*, which translates as the *giving* of voice (Seedorf and Seidner, 1998, col. 1414). *Stimmgebung*, voice giving, happens in the larynx when the vocal folds are moved by an airstream produced in the lungs. The notion of *voice giving* suggests a performative act of producing voice as sound rather than assuming its prior 'existence' in the vocal folds. Lucie Vágnerová has argued that the "vocal tract is often positioned as the origin of the voice but […] to name the limits of vocal production is organologically impossible and musicologically inadequate" (Vágnerová, 2016, p. 18). In short: there is no physiological entity that is called 'voice' because voice is produced in the activity of phonation and dependent not only on breathing but articulation, too. Even though the sound of the voice is *given* in the vibration of the vocal folds, a singer or speaker needs the whole vocal tract (pharynx, cavities, mouth, tongue, teeth, etc.) to articulate the sounds that are produced within the larynx. Without the vocal folds we would merely hear an exhaling sound of air; without the vocal tract we would merely hear the voice's loudness, rough pitch and laryngeal timbre.

Articulation

When a sound is produced in the vocal folds, when the voice source is *given*, the sound is filtered and articulated in the vocal tract. The function of the vocal tract is the forming of the voice sound. Singers and speakers use the vocal tract to let the sounds resonate – it amplifies, filters and modifies the voice source. The vocal sound will resonate depending on the shape of the vocal tract and its connected cavities; singers and speakers have control over the shaping of the vocal tract through moving their jaw opening, tongue, teeth, soft palate and lips. A singer or speaker needs to shape their vocal tract in order to produce certain vowels and to manipulate the timbre of the laryngeal vocal sound. What results from this last step of vocal production is speech, singing or any other mode of voicing.

Singing voice

The singing voice differs from the speaking voice in terms of physiological activity. It differs with regards to

- (1) respiration: the level of control over the breathing mechanism is necessarily more developed in singing than it is in speaking, also the amount of air pressure is usually significantly higher than in speaking (Sundberg, 1987, p. 35);
- (2) vocal production: the level of laryngeal activity is more complex and the control of the voice source is often more intricate in singing than it is in speaking (1987, p. 74);
- (3) the vocal sound formation: while in speaking we use the vocal tract to articulate vowels, in the act of singing we also use it to change the timbre of a sound (1987, p. 105); vocal articulation is also responsible for the difference in loudness between speaking and singing (1987, pp. 115–117).

Voice, body, index

The physiognomy of the larynx as well as the vocal cavities is individual to any person. This unique physiognomy leads to a "personal voice timbre" (Sundberg, 1987, p. 2). Since all of us individually live in different shapes of bodies, our voices are heard as singular: only I produce *my* voice and only you produce *your* voice. Furthermore, the physiognomy of the biological sex and age of the singer or speaker often determines the sound that is 'natural' to that singer or speaker. A child's voice, for instance, is higher than that of an adult simply because its vocal folds are shorter (Seedorf and Seidner, 1998, col. 1426). The singularity of one's voice has not only fascinated philosophers and theorists of voice (Cavarero, 2005, p. 173; Nancy, 2006, p. 40; MacKendrick, 2016, p. 36) but is also used as a marker of identity with regards to politics (Frith, 1996, pp. 196–198; Middleton and Elliott, 2003) and media technologies (Young, 2015, pp. 94, 179). Regarding the voice's relation to identity, the physiologically determined "personal voice timbre" (Sundberg, 1987, p. 2) accounts for the rhetoric of *owning* or *having* a voice. For media technologies, on the other hand, the individual voice has become a measure that carries valuable information about the voicer. The term voiceprint is often used to identify a person's unique voice, similar to the notion of a fingerprint. Voiceprint is, for instance, utilised in biometrical speech recognition systems where the voice functions as a surveillance and identification tool (Hansen, 2018; Jones, 2018). Timbre arguably plays a crucial role in the voice's identification with a certain body (Dolar, 2006a, p. 22; Eidsheim, 2019, p. 5; Van Elferen, 2020, pp. 51–53). The relationship between the voice and its body is causal when a voice is successfully identified with its producing body. This causality is at play in the idea of voiceprint but also in the politics of the voice. In music, this relationship between voice and its producing body seems more complicated.

Charles Sanders Peirce has identified a causal relationship as indexical (Peirce, 1955, pp. 98–119). In Peircean semiotics, an index is a sign that has a physical connection to its object

(1955, p. 114) and which “direct[s] the attention” to the object “by blind compulsion” (1955, p. 108). In the Peircean triadic semiotics of icon, index and symbol, the index denotes the relation between the sign and an object by way of an experienced occurrence. The relationship between the voice and its body can be understood as indexical because the voice needs a physical body to exist: voice is factually made in the vocal apparatus. Furthermore, this connection is experienced. When I hear a voice, my experience tells me that it comes from and is produced by a body. Voice and body occur together, voice and body are causally connected.

Peirce’s index can be exemplified, for instance, by the gesture of pointing a finger at something, which is the creating of a relationship between the pointing and the object which is being pointed at and thus pointed out, brought to attention (Peirce, 1955, p. 109). When the voice indexes its body, it is as if a finger points to the body of a voice when the voice is heard. When I identify a friend on the phone by her voice, I have established this causal connection between the voice that I hear and my friend’s body who produces her voice within her vocal apparatus, even if her body is out of sight. In this moment, my listening functions as the pointing. But my listening poses a problem: it introduces another entity into the equation of voice and body and their relationship. Peirce calls this third position the interpretant (Peirce, 1955, pp. 99–100). The interpretant is another sign and can be understood as a translator (Savan, 1988, pp. 17, 41). The interpretant is involved in another triad: that of sign, object and interpretant. “Now a sign is something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant thought, C” (Peirce, 1955, p. 93). In my case, a sign (voice) denotes a fact (body) to an interpretant (listening). Voice, body and listening interrelate and determine one another. In other words, the interpretant is “the effect produced by a sign upon the mind of the person who receives and understands the sign” (Savan, 1988, p. 40). In the case of the voice indexing a body, it is my listening that is called to establish and affirm the relation. My listening translates and re-affirms the index of the voice. When I theorise the relationship of voice and

body as indexical, I cannot disregard the position of the listener (interpretant) which bears responsibility for the connection. I will pay closer attention to listening and its role in the relationship of voice and body later on (1.3.).

The voice's indexicality describes the reaction in the act of listening: almost automatically when a voice is heard, a listener might ask whose body is heard (Eidsheim, 2019, p. 1). As the voice is regarded as unique to every person, listening brings about a desire to identify, to categorise a voice upon hearing; this is a desire to establish a connection and to *authenticate* it. For instance, let us listen to the singing voice of the blues musician Howlin' Wolf (his birthname is Chester Arthur Burnett).

Howlin' Wolf: 'I'll Be Back Someday'

I watch a black and white video of a live performance of Howlin' Wolf from 1964's American Folks Blues Festival (Howlin' Wolf, 2003).[4] He sings and plays the guitar, together with a band: Willie Dixon on the double bass, Clifton James on drums, Hubert Sumlin on guitar and Sunnyland Slim on the piano. The band is placed in an empty bar and they play Howlin' Wolf's song 'I'll Be Back Someday'. The video starts with a shot on Burnett: he sits on a chair, speaks in a distinctive and deep voice to his band members and asks them if they have ever been 'in the groove'. He'll take us there. His foot taps the rhythm, the piano plays the first notes, he strums his guitar; and bass, drums and second guitar cue in: easily finding each other in the groove. When Burnett starts to sing (min. 01:30) his voice strikes through the ensemble and through the mellow musical play. His singing voice grinds against the softness of the ensemble's blues standard. Similarly, his head, shoulders and upper body frantically move to the vibe of singing, the rest of the band stay in their languid stance and stoically play along.

[4] The video clip can be accessed on YouTube: https://youtu.be/vybjzYkqS4Y (Accessed: 1 October 2021).

He sings to his imaginary lover and hums "your heart is gonna be broken … when I walk away" (03:20). I hear his tongue press against the gums and nasally shape a long *n* in the mouth: "your heart's gonna be brokeennnnnnnnnnnnaaahhhhh". He spits out the word and with it the last reserves of breath; stretches the phrase as if he wanted to terminate it. And I hear Wolf cough up the words. When he tries to comfort his lover, the word 'baby' is growling in his throat (03:48), the blue note glissandos play with the words in his mouth, they are sung from his vocal tract. And we can hear the actual weeping as it corresponds with the words and his head shakes: "don't be cryin'" (04:26).

Eric Lott says, Howlin' Wolf had

> a voice of gravel and broken glass whose power, like that of Louis Armstrong's trumpet, comes physically from so much air being pushed so forcefully through the instrument. (Lott, 2012, p. 701)

Wolf's singing voice offers itself to us as listeners as physical work, as roughness and friction. I hear how his singing makes itself audible through all kinds of material forces and pressures. I hear Wolf breath in and out, sighing really, before his singing kicks off. I hear the exhaustion of exhaling, the pressing and straining of his vocal folds, singing as if out of breath. I hear the guttural sounds and the stops of breath, cutting the band's play; he smacks his lips. The words dictate his musical phrasing and become plosives, they splice the melody and pause the flow. He gasps for air and sings these breaks. His singing takes place as much in these gaps and breaks as in the portamento. The musicking voice does not only happen in the singing, not only in the articulation of words but also in the para-linguistic registers of vocal production – in groans, shouts, breaks and pauses (Lacasse, 2010, pp. 227–228). It is arguably in these breaks that the musicking voice's body is heard most evidently; when the voice moves away from linguistic signification and makes space for the physicality of the singing voice. This is one reason why African American popular musics such as blues, soul or funk lend themselves to the thinking as well as deconstructing of the relationship between voice and body. These

traditions have utilised para-linguistic techniques of voice production more extensively than many other musics (Maultsby, 1985, p. 49; Middleton, 1990, p. 264; Duran and Stewart, 1997, p. 83).

The above description signals the physiology at play in the singing of the blues singer Howlin' Wolf: the way he breathes, presses his vocal folds and articulates his vowels and phrases, they all make his musicking voice unique. But of course, we not only hear an abstract vocal physiology of singing, we also hear a low register bass voice "booming" (Burnett, 2010). And we arguably hear a black male voice, but not because of the physiology of his vocal apparatus but because of genre traditions and style: his phrasing, his singing, his musicality, all of it is steeped in a tradition of the blues and the blues is "Black life" (Baraka, 2009, 23). Rather than an essentialised 'black voice', we hear the blues sing (through) his body (François, 1995, p. 453; Griffin, 2004, pp. 105–106; Eidsheim, 2019, p. 10). Instead of thinking about the blues, I primarily want to hear the fact that his musicking voice is determined by the body that sings it: by the physiology of his voice box, his cavities, his panting breaths and his heavily pressed vocal folds. When we listen to singing, we hear a body sing: this is the voice as it indexes a body, and Howlin' Wolf's singing arguably indexes his unique voicing produced by his specific body.

The tale of the grain

What we have just heard in Howlin' Wolf's singing voice would often be described as the *grain* of the voice. This notion of the voice's grain of course refers to Roland Barthes' famous essay (Barthes, 1977). Barthes' *The Grain of the Voice* has – particularly in pop music studies – motivated musicologists to study vocal performance as a bodily phenomenon. Barthes' essay "invites different ways of thinking about the voice" (Jarman-Ivens, 2011, p. 6) and has enabled scholars to study the corporeal traces of music and listener's libidinous attachment to and

involvement with it (Middleton, 1990, pp. 261, 264; Middleton and Elliott, 2003). While many commentators have already discussed Barthes' grain as the voice's physiology, rawness, trace of corporeality, texture or presence (Middleton, 1990, pp. 261–267; Frith, 1996, p. 191; Dunsby, 2009; Jarman-Ivens, 2011, pp. 5–7), it is here helpful to briefly discuss the notion of grain once again – in light of Howlin' Wolf's performance and in light of a theory of the musicking voice.

Barthes understands grain as the place where music and language meet in the voice (Barthes, 1977, p. 181). In *The Grain of the Voice*, Barthes listens to two different singers in order to carve out a theory of grain where the voice's bodily and erotic work can be heard. Barthes argues that the German singer Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau lacks vocal grain as his performance is only at the service of language, what Barthes following Julia Kristeva calls the phenosong (1977, p. 182). Charles Panzera, on the other hand, performs on the level of genosong, he "escape[s] the tyranny of meaning" (1977, p. 185). Panzera is able to let the workings of music's friction with language be heard. His voice has grain because in his singing, Barthes hears the physical work of a body in performance, here "the performer's body […] forces [us] to evaluation" (1977, p. 188). Grain describes this quality of vocal musical performance which otherwise gets lost in the hermeneutic demand of signification. Barthes' semiotic reading of the grain of Charles Panzera's voice as not merely his timbre but rather his "body in the voice as it sings" (ibid.) allows me to theorise the relationship between a singer's body and the voice that is heard. It thus opens up a category of musical thinking which lies beyond simple hermeneutical understanding. While Barthes' theory of the grain has enabled voice theorists to study the bodily erotics of voice in performance, it also has its limits with regards to the musicking voice and its complicated relation to a producing body. Barthes writes:

> The 'grain' of the voice is not — or is not merely — its timbre; the *signifiance* it opens cannot better be defined, indeed, than by the very friction between the music and something else, which something else is the particular language (and nowise the

> message). The song must speak, must *write* — for what is produced at the level of genosong is finally writing. (Barthes, 1977, p. 185; original emphasis)

Even if Barthes lays the ground for a theorising of the performing body in music and particularly in vocal musicking, the problem is *how* the grain is theorised. The category of grain enables Barthes to theorise the corporeal action of a body in song, however, his musical bodies do not just musick, they signify by way of *speaking*. As this above quote shows, the song *speaks*, it does not *sing*, and the notion of speaking places music not only in friction with but also in proximity to language. Barthes maintains that the grain is the site where music and language rub against each other (ibid.). Music is thus determined by way of language and not in its own or any other way: speaking has a different *meaning* than singing. Elsewhere, Barthes makes music's ability to speak even more pertinent. He writes that the musical body

> speaks, it declaims, it doubles its voice: *it speaks but says nothing*: for as soon as it is musical, speech—or its instrumental substitute—is no longer linguistic but corporeal; what it says is always and only this: *my body puts itself in a state of speech*: *quasi parlando* […]. (Barthes, 1991b, p. 306; original emphasis)

Music, for Barthes, has no other means of meaning than in relation to speech. Even if he argues that music does not say anything, its body speaks, it cannot help but signify *as if* it was speech, *quasi parlando*. Barthes' attempt to make space for music's specific "*signifiance*" (Barthes, 1977, p. 182 original emphasis) risks reducing it to corporeal activity and it does so by way of an analogy to language (see Van Elferen, 2018, p. 8). His notion of grain or genosong as writing (Barthes, 1977, p. 185) suggests a similar proximity to language: writing does not obey the logic of linguistic signification but calls for "the materiality of the body *speaking* its mother tongue; perhaps the *letter*" (1977, p. 182; my emphasis). Even though Barthes tries to offer an "'aesthetics' of musical pleasure" (1977, p. 189), his aesthetics is as much a theory of the complicated relationship between music and language as it is a theory that highlights the signifying practices of the musical body. Isabella van Elferen has critiqued Barthes' essay for

similar reasons. She argues that Barthes' grain poses a problem to theories of voice, music or timbre, because he

> continue[s] to place music firmly in the domain of semiotics. Even if he argues that musical *signifiance* occupies the very outer boundaries of signifying, his position excludes other, less textual understandings of music and musicking. (Van Elferen, 2020, p. 77)

Music, however, is not "a signifying praxis" (Van Elferen, 2020, p. 76). While grain can be utilised to tease out the "musicking body" (Rahaim, 2012, p. 2) from the naming practices of musical hermeneutics, it does not lead to a theory of the musicking voice. The musicking voice depends on a producing body and yet it cannot be reduced to its mere corporeality nor to its relation to language. The problem is that Barthes equates "corporeality (the body that musicks) with musicality (the capacity to musick)", he thus "privileges corporeal index over any other aspect of vocal performance", as Van Elferen contends (Van Elferen, 2020, p. 78). In other words, what Barthes' grain leaves untouched is the musicking performativity of the voice which exceeds the voice's reduction to the body; the musicking voice moves beyond a materialism of music and beyond the grasps of language (more on the shortcomings of materialism, see Chapter 2).

Let me transfer Barthes' grain and my critique of it to the example of Howlin' Wolf. With Barthes we could say that we hear in Howlin' Wolf's singing the grain of his voice. My listening takes pleasure in the physicality of the production of his singing. I hear that and how Burnett uses his vocal apparatus to produce this unique sound, this body of his with which he sings. The grain, which Barthes talks about, becomes available then for analysis: by hearing the physical production of Wolf's singing, I am not only able to ponder about the singer, his identity, his expression, musicality and virtuosity, but to make the bodily activity part of the musical analysis. However, by naming the body which we can hear in singing, I have merely identified and categorised the physiological activity that happens in singing. Furthermore, by describing the physiology of singing, I have instead reduced the voice to its body and have

tried to explain singing through its physiology. To flip Emma Seiler's quote at the outset of this chapter: there is not only *"a physiological and a physical side"* but also *"an aesthetical side to the art of singing"* (Seiler, 1884, p. 34; original emphasis). That is to say, by insisting on the voice's corporeality, indexicality or grain, I have not yet sufficiently questioned the relationship between voice and body or grasped the forces that animate the voice to musick. What I have so far disregarded in my listening to Howlin' Wolf is the musicking performativity of the voice which cannot be reduced to physiology, indexicality or grain (Van Elferen, 2020, p. 78). In the next part, I will move away from a physiological description of the singing voice and listen to *how* the musicking voice complicates the voice's relationship to the body.

1.2. Beyond index and grain: the musicking voice's relation to the body

The first section of this chapter established that the musicking voice is produced as part of a sequential system of breathing, phonation and articulation. I now want to complicate the relationship between voice and body: first, by showing how vocal pedagogy constitutes and reinforces the body with which a singer musicks and second, by listening to two case studies of falsetto singing and biphonic singing.

Vocal pedagogy & the making of the singing body

Singing happens when the vocal apparatus is engaged in the performance of music. When Howlin' Wolf sings, the voice's bodily production can be heard in his vocalisation. Singing is a performative act that requires the singer's body. Nina Eidsheim stresses the voice's bodily performativity in her book *Sensing Sound* (Eidsheim, 2015, p. 140). Singing, according to Eidsheim, is not primarily constituted by the sound of the voice but more importantly by the singer's bodily activity of musicking (Eidsheim, 2015, pp. 111, 116). Like any other act of musicking, singing is trained, practiced and performed. Eidsheim wants to move away from a

naturalistic understanding of voice and instead tries to show that singing is a "material practice" (Eidsheim, 2015, p. 148). She shows how the singing voice is systematically practiced and physically constructed in training, vocal pedagogy is exemplary of such voice training (Eidsheim, 2015, pp. 132–153). Similar to acoustic and physiological treatments of voice (as discussed in 1.1.), vocal pedagogies posit a crucial role in determining ideas of voice (Eidsheim, 2015, p. 139); they negotiate certain ideas of the voice's relation to its producing body. Not only do pedagogies shape our thinking of voice but they furthermore shape the bodies with which singers sing, they make an operatic voice operatic or a blues voice bluesy (Eidsheim, 2015, pp. 134–135).

In my first singing lesson, for instance, my teacher helped me exercise the control of my breathing: this simple practice had direct physical consequences with regards to how I breathe and regulate air pressure during certain passages. On the one hand, vocal pedagogies actually shape the bodies with which singers perform through devising singing techniques such as breathing, posture, articulation, etc. On the other hand, vocal pedagogies also convey anatomical and physiological knowledge of the vocal apparatus to the singer which furthermore informs the practice of singing. Arguably, the knowledge between the singing voice and its producing body is not only established in training but furthermore enforced and reproduced in practice (Eidsheim, 2015, p. 116).

Annette Schlichter has studied processes of subjectification in vocal pedagogy from a Foucauldian perspective (Schlichter, 2014). Schlichter's discussion, too, shows the formations of ideals of voice in pedagogy, in particular the Kirstin Linklater method. In this method, Schlichter argues, voice is understood as inherently embodied. The voice's embodiedness, however, is conflated with the notion of the 'natural voice' (Schlichter, 2014). Schlichter problematises this idea of the natural voice in the Linklater method as the voice's body becomes "a ground of selfhood" (Schlichter, 2014). Voice is reduced to its body which in turn becomes

an ideal site of the self and authenticity (see also Chapter 4). It is a truism to say that the voice needs a body to come into being (1.1.) but Schlichter shows that the voice's connection to its body is performed – in her case, this is a speaking voice but the same holds true for the musicking voice. While the voice's body is a fact, the actualisation of their connection needs to be established and is never natural. This is, according to Eidsheim and Schlichter, the work of voice training and pedagogy. Schlichter maintains that "pedagogical method[s] [often function] as disciplinary action" (Schlichter, 2014) and therefore account for a narrowing and naturalisation of the relationship between voice and body.

The shaping of the voice's body in vocal pedagogies has consequences with regards to the indexical relationship (see 1.1.). After Eidsheim and Schlichter, I can think this relationship between voice and body as reproductive: without doubt the voice needs a body to sing but *how* this relationship manifests, is a question of performance, pedagogy, style, genre, tradition and physiological knowledge. The relationship between the voice and its body is not natural because singing is a technique.

> Because the natural voice has never existed, the qualities we essentialize from the voice to the vocalizer (including authenticity, subjectivity, truthfulness) are also not natural, but learned and performed. (Eidsheim, 2015, p. 144)

I partly agree with Eidsheim, but I would add: the body can also not be essentialised as a quality from the voice to the vocaliser. Voice is given by a body, this is called phonation (see 1.1.), but the relationship between the voice and its body is never simply given, it is performed and negotiated. Van Elferen, furthermore, argues that in vocal pedagogy, "the voice tends to be regarded as an instrument, which can be nourished, trained and transmitted by the singer" (Van Elferen, 2020, p. 62); vocal pedagogy is a practice that differentiates the voice from the voicer's identity (see Chapter 4) and its body. Instead, regarding the voice as an instrument "indicates a marked distinction between the sound, the sound source and the person who happens to operate the sound source" (Van Elferen, 2020, p. 62). It thus becomes clear that the relationship

between the voice and its body is never just given, but always needs a performance in order to come into being. As Suzanne Cusick reminds us, voices "are always performances of a relationship" (Cusick, 1999, 29).

Two case studies: falsetto & biphonic singing

I want to now look at how the relationship between the voice and its producing body is negotiated in different instantiations of the musicking voice. Let us return to Howlin' Wolf's singing. In 1.1., I have discussed Howlin' Wolf's voice as a possible example of the voice's grain. In my listening, I have assumed a causal, indexical relationship between Wolf's voice and his body. In the moment I identify his voice with its body, I naturalise its relation and establish a causal essentialism of voice. The previous detour into the disciplining practices of vocal pedagogy shows that singing is a practice that is learned and culturally engrained and so is the relationship between the voice and its body. This of course holds true also for Howlin' Wolf. When singing is trained, its training also determines which body parts are used for a specific vocal technique. Vocal pedagogy fine tunes the vocal apparatus for stylistic purposes: this holds true for bel canto singing as much as it does for the traditions of Swiss yodelling or blues singing. If the musicking voice continuously negotiates the relationship between voice and body, indexicality becomes a problem because a vocal body cannot be found as a stable or singular signifier in musicking. Musicking, as a performance in and of music, complicates vocal indexicality and troubles a carnal essentialism. Mary Margaret O'Hara's singing reminds us that the "body's in trouble" (O'Hara, 1988). Let us listen again to Howlin' Wolf, this time to the song 'Smokestack Lightnin''.[5]

[5] The song is available on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Ri7TcukAJ8 (Accessed: 3 October 2019).

Case Study 1: Falsetto

Chester Arthur Burnett carried the stage name Howlin' Wolf for a reason: in his songs, he regularly breaks out of his typical throaty voicing and 'howls' in a higher vibrato falsetto, a practice he had apparently adapted from blues yodeler Jimmie Rodgers (see Gifford, 1968). On 'Smokestack Lightnin'', for instance, Wolf begins the song with a vocal timbre that resembles that of 'I'll Be Back Someday'. The first lines "Ah-oh, smokestack lightnin' / Shinin' just like gold / Why don't ya hear me cryin'?" are sung with the guttural voice I have indexed earlier (1.1.). The vocal folds are heavily pressed, and he intonates with a slight vibrato on the swooping entrance "Ah-oh" (00:10). But when his voice answers to the question "Why don't ya hear me cryin'?", it returns in a different register and with a howling falsetto: "Whoo-hooo, whoo-hooo, Whooo" (00:22). The musicking voice wailingly responds in head register. Each time, the repeated *whoos* set off in a middle register before they wind chromatically into a high falsetto register (G4), the second of the *whoos* cascades downwards into the chest (00:25), before the last one dips just below the head register, breaks into chest voice and immediately moves back up into airy falsetto (00:28). In these falsetto passages, Wolf's voice utilises different body parts, his articulation moves slightly away from the pharynx and takes place in the nasal cavities. The difference in vocal timbre is a result from the musicking performance of his voice and it shows the manifold possibilities of Wolf's musicking voice.

Compared to 'I'll Be Back Someday', it seems 'Smokestack Lightnin'' is sung by different bodies. But what really is going on is that different body parts are being worked by the voice. Two different vocal bodies sing with each other, in a call-and-response dialogue: a throaty, full-bodied voice calls and a lofty, nasal voice responds wordlessly weeping. Howlin' Wolf's different voices musick in duet. And yet, and of course, those different singing voices are both caused in Howlin' Wolf's one body, his one set of vibrating vocal folds.

Through Howlin' Wolf's different techniques, I can hear that the singer Howlin' Wolf *is* neither the throaty voice ('I'll Be Back Someday'), nor *is* he the falsetto voice ('Smokestack Lightnin''). Rather, his singing *works* his vocal body in different ways: in one moment, more in the throat and in another, more in the nasal cavities. When Howlin' Wolf sings, his body is in continuous movement, it changes, interrupts, contracts, loosens, strains and stretches, because that's what musicking does with and to the body. Sometimes the musicking voice sings more from the pharynx, other times more from the frontal sinuses. If the musicking voice moves different body parts in performance to create singing, how substantial is the indexical causality between voice and body?

Falsetto singing is often portrayed as disembodied but of course it is as much embodied as any form and style of singing (François, 1995, p. 447). Howlin' Wolf still uses his throat, breathing mechanism and his vocal tract that shapes and makes the sound of his voice when he sings in a high falsetto register. However, there are slight differences mostly to do with the vibrating of vocal folds that physiologically distinguish falsetto from other modal register singing (Högset and Sundberg, 2001, pp. 34–35). Howlin' Wolf's musicking voice shows that different techniques of singing highlight different parts of the vocal body. His falsetto singing functions as one exemplary vocal practice that problematises the indexical relationship between voice and body by amplifying how the musicking voice is constituted by multiple and complex bodily causations and not just one source.

Case Study 2: Biphonic singing

Biphonic singing – or also called throat singing, overtone-singing or reinforced harmonics – is a style of singing where "a single performer produces more than one clearly audible note simultaneously" (Pegg, 2001). Biphonic singers perform two pitches at the same time, mostly a throaty drone sound and an airy sound of overtones on top of the fundamental. These

overtones or (reinforced) harmonics most often produce the melodic line while the fundamental bass tone builds a drone. Biphonic singing gives a listener the impression of listening to two different singers simultaneously. The style of singing is most closely associated with singing cultures in the Central Asian region of Tuva (or Tyva), bordering today's states of Mongolia, Russia and China. But the technique of biphonic singing can also be found in other voice cultures like Tibetan chants, South African xhosa or Western experimental traditions.

In Hugo Zemp's film *The Song of Harmonics*, the musician and ethnomusicologist Trần Quang Hải is portrayed as a teacher and expert of biphonic singing (*The Song of Harmonics*, 1990).[6] Trần explains that biphonic singing utilises the acoustic properties of any sound by separating the fundamental pitch from its harmonic overtones. The vocal technique of biphonic singing enables the singer "to reinforce certain harmonics to make a melody" (*The Song of Harmonics*, 1990). "One should avoid a belcanto voice and rather use a hoarse voice, a throaty voice", Trần says (ibid.). The fundamental sound is mainly produced in the larynx ('first' voice), whereas the overtones are produced from the shaping of the articulators ('second' voice). Here, different vowel sounds are used in order to change melody and contour of the 'second' voice. The shaping of the mouth and the positioning of the tongue account for the changing of the harmonic overtones (see Trần and Guillou, 1980, p. 171).

As with any other form of phonation, the voice is given in the larynx. But while this suffices to explain the fundamental tone, the 'second' voice's acoustics are more complex. The sound source of this 'second' voice is the same as that of the 'first', i.e. the vibration of the vocal folds, but this 'second' voice needs another resonant acoustic space to produce the harmonics. Trần shows that through the movement of the tongue, the oral cavity can be split to create a second resonant acoustic space; this way, Trần is able to reinforce the fundamental's harmonics. For this, "one should move the tip of the tongue against the palate, thus dividing

[6] The film is available at: https://kingston.kanopy.com/video/song-harmonics (Accessed: 5 October 2021).

the mouth into two cavities. Just like pronouncing the letter L" (*The Song of Harmonics*, 1990). This technique is also called dual cavity technique; Trần moves his tongue to separate "the oral cavity into a front cavity and a rear cavity" (ibid.). The sound of the 'first' throaty voice holds the pitch but the tongue position and the shaping of the vowels in the mouth and nasal cavities allow to reinforce and change the harmonics, thereby creating a different sound on top which most often is used for melodic play (ibid.).

Biphonic singing is a vocal practice that needs a specific training of the body in order to produce the intricate sounding that is desired. And even though listeners have commented on the "disembodied" character of reinforced harmonics (Levin and Edgerton, 1999, p. 84), others show that throat singing is as embodied and in need of a vocal body as is any singing (Pegg, 2001). Physiologically, it is distinct from other modes of the musicking voice because of its different use of specific vocal techniques and body parts, i.e. the throat, the vocal articulators (tongue, nasal cavities, lips, etc.) and the so-called false vocal folds (ibid.).

What interests me about biphonic singing with regards to the question of the voice's relationship to the body is the fact that one voice and one vocal body allow us to hear more than one sound. It doubles the perceived voice. A phenomenological problem appears upon listening to biphonic singing: a causal and linear indexing of the body in voice becomes problematic. Even if we *know* that there is only one vocal source, we perceive two vocal sounds. Through the vocal techniques of throat singing the voice's relation to its body becomes problematic once we hear two distinct sounds but cannot identify two distinct sources.

Music's performing of the body

Both these two case studies – Howlin' Wolf's falsetto as well as biphonic singing – show that the voice needs a body to musick. It is the body that gives voice. Indeed, both case studies are mere examples; I could have extended them to metal growling, singing with a cold, castrati singing or yodelling. In any case, I argue that the musicking voice in general highlights the

problematic relationship between the voice and its body. What singing does is to move and perform the body as it gives voice. In the act of singing, the body is trained, strained and played; irrespective of style or genre. Singing is always technical and as such moves the body with which it sings. It lays bare that the body is being worked when the voice musicks. The voice's performativity shows that the voice cannot be grasped by mere reference to its body as index or grain. Voice cannot be conflated with its sound source, as Van Elferen argues with regards to vocal timbre (Van Elferen, 2020, p. 61); the musicking voice's performativity overshoots the listener's desire to fasten it as an index of the voicer's body.

For instance, Howlin' Wolf's body is worked when his singing breaks out into falsetto, it moves his voice into a different register: Howlin' Wolf sounds different then, different to the assumed throatiness that we indexed in his voice earlier (1.1.). But of course, his falsetto is produced by the same body, only it is worked in a different way. Falsetto singing deceives the monocausal (Chion, 2016, p. 117) assumptions of his voice. Biphonic singing, on the other hand, works the vocal body in order to produce two distinctly perceivable vocal sounds from within one body. This poses a problem between the voice's indexing of the body and how this voicing is perceived (as more than one). In both cases: the musicking voice works and performs the body and in reverse is worked and performed by the body. What is crucial is the musicking voice's performance. Vocal pedagogy and different practices of the musicking voice suggest that the relationship between the voice and the body is performed, trained and reproduced. To tune into the performance of the musicking voice enables a problematisation of their relationship. A voice's body is not merely to be found in the voice box but also in the chest, cavities, tongue, lips and mouth. It is *given* in the voice box but hereafter worked and amplified in the whole vocal apparatus. Singing strains the body and tears it apart, and it is arguably our listening that is left to gather all the pieces and synthesise it into one identifiable vocal body.

Such listening will be the focus of the next part, where I engage in a thinking of the acousmatic voice which introduces listening more carefully into the voice-body problem (1.2.).

1.3. Acousmatics: listening, voice and the problem of causality

In the previous section, I discussed how index and grain are not sufficient tools to describe the myriad corporeal activities that make a voice musick. The musicking voice cannot be reduced to its body, nor can it be reduced to the grain of the voice (1.2.). If the causalities of the voice's body are not sufficient to describe the manifold workings of the musicking voice, how can I approach a theorising of its bodily activity? I need to move away from the voice as a self-contained entity and include its listener into the equation. Earlier, I mentioned that Peirce's semiotics calls for a triadic relationship between a sign, its object and an interpretant (1.1.). In the case of the musicking voice, an interpretant is the voice's perception, a listening. This inclusion of listening results in a move away from vocal ontologies and makes space for a phenomenology of listening to voice. Not only does musicking complicate the relationship between voice and body (1.2.) but this relationship does furthermore not exist prior or outside of another semiotic entity: listening. The question of the relationship between sound, source and listening have occupied theorists of the acousmatic. I will briefly introduce the acousmatic situation and discuss the issue of acousmatic listening and the acousmatic voice afterwards.

The acousmatic situation

The term acousmatic "refers […] to a sound the cause of which remains unseen" (Steintrager, 2016, p. xi). An acousmatic situation describes the phenomenon when a sound is heard but its physical source and cause is out of sight. In an acousmatic situation "one hears without seeing" (Chion, 2016, p. 134).

In his *Treatise on Musical Objects*, Pierre Schaeffer argued that the acousmatic situation enables to think about the relationship between a sound and its cause, source and effect by focusing on the "sound itself" (Schaeffer, 2017, p. 211). When listening is supported by visual accompaniment, a sound's provenance is affirmed. When a sound, however, is heard but not seen, a listener starts to wonder about the sound's source and cause. The concealing of the sight of a sound has consequences for auditory perception. For instance, when I hear a croak and see a frog at the same time, both my hearing and my vision tell me that this frog that I see makes this croak. Whereas, when I hear a croak but can't see the frog, I am left wondering *where* it croaked from, *how* it croaked, *why* it croaked, if indeed the sound was a croak and not a quack, or even if the croak that I hear comes from the animal or not from a nature documentary that sounds from my neighbour's open window. In the case of the acousmatic situation our hearing is left to figure out a perceived situation without the aid of vision. The acousmatic situation is the starting point for Schaeffer to think about sound and how it is traced by its source, cause and effect whenever it is heard. Acousmatic sound propagates a specific knowledge of listening to sounds.

Acousmatic theory of listening

As argued before and by way of Peirce, the relationship between the voice and its body, between a sound and its source, is in need of a third position, a listener as interpretant. In order to theorise the complex relationship between the voice and its body, I am then in need of a listening phenomenology. Brian Kane has worked out such a listening phenomenology in Pierre Schaeffer's writings. In his book *Sound Unseen* (Kane, 2014), Kane argues that although Pierre Schaeffer set out to write and theorise sound as an object and thus to ontologise and taxonomise sound, he did so repeatedly by developing a system of listening (Kane, 2014, p. 26). Schaeffer, according to Kane, more or less unknowingly posed the problem of theorising

sound from two angles: from its assumed ontology *as well as* from its point of perception, its phenomenology. Kane argues that Schaeffer's whole theorisation of sound conflates a phenomenological listening to sound with an objectification and pseudo-ontology of sound (Kane, 2014, pp. 34, 36). Most clearly, this leveling of ontology and phenomenology can be seen in Schaeffer's theory of the "sound object" (Schaeffer, 2017, p. 210) which as an object paradoxically can only be attained perceptively, in the act of listening, via "reduced listening" (Schaeffer, 2017, p. 212). While Schaeffer, the composer, does not seem too bothered by this conflation of approaches, Kane scrutinises Schaeffer's acousmatic theory for its pretend ontology (Kane, 2014, pp. 30–36). Kane suggests that acousmatic theory should pay attention to the theories of listening that Schaeffer offers (Kane, 2014, pp. 26–30). The acousmatic situation, Kane argues, is less defined by the object of sound and its ontological condition but rather by a listening position from which sound is conceptualised (Kane, 2014, p. 7).

Kane's critique of Schaeffer's sound theory is important for my project because it shows that the acousmatic situation depends on a listener, who determines the relationship of sound to its source in the act of listening. Michel Chion has commented on this double bind of sound and listening, too. He writes: "Sound is not graspable outside a dialectic between the place of the source and the place of listening" (Chion, 2016, p. 105). Acousmatic theory is a phenomenological project which centres the primacy of listening; it is a phenomenology of sound. This becomes apparent in Schaeffer's *Treatise* from the outset, when he writes: "this work has no other purpose than to encourage *listening to sounds*" (Schaeffer, 2017, p. 23; original emphasis). Acousmatic theory parallelly asks about the object *and* the subject of sound: "listening itself becomes the phenomenon under study" (Schaeffer, 2017, p. 65). There is no acousmatic situation without a listening subject. Listening brings about the problematisation of sound: how it is perceived and how it relates to its source (Kane, 2014, p. 225). The question of sound's listening phenomenology, however, is different from the voice's

problematic relationship with its body. So, how does an inclusion of a listening phenomenology impact the question of the voice's body?

The acousmatic voice

The problem of the voice's body and the question how or *if* at all the voice indexes its body can only be approached by including a listening. Only through the acousmatic listening to voice am I asking about its source or cause, i.e. its relation to its body (Eidsheim, 2019, pp. 1–3).

The acousmatic voice is a figure known from any film where the sound of a voiceover is heard from outside the visibility of the screen. The voiceover does not exist visually and physically in the film narrative and yet sonically tells us about itself and leads us through the film. Michel Chion calls this specific figure an "acousmêtre"; this acousmatic being is "a special being, a kind of talking and acting shadow" (Chion, 1999, p. 21), a voice that has not been visualised yet and exists only in the realm of imagination. The voice as "acousmêtre" is, however, not confined to the medium of film: a stranger's voice on the phone can be an "acousmêtre" as can a radio voice or any imaginary, godly or hallucinated voice (Chion, 1999, p. 24).

The acousmêtre is intriguing because it posits as a "*voice without a place*" (Chion, 1999, p. 27; original emphasis). It demands a question of its emanation; particularly *because* its place of emanation is unknown and imagined. More than any other acousmatic sound, the acousmatic voice is defined by the listener's desire to know what cannot be known. Because its source is (always) out of (visual) reach, a listener continuously searches for it in listening. Kane has argued that a sound's source is always underdetermined, this is part and parcel of "the very acousmaticity of sound" (Kane, 2014, p. 149). This underdetermination particularly emerges in the acousmatic voice. Chion maintains that a voice needs a visually corresponding mouth in order to be fully authenticated (Chion, 1999, p. 28), this authentication is troubled

once the visual correspondence falls away and a listener is presented with a voice without an image. In this underdetermination of the acousmatic voice, the voice's problematic relationship to its body comes to the fore. Mladen Dolar, too, has discussed the acousmatics of the voice and sees its uncanny power similarly in the unstable relation to its producing body. The acousmatic voice, he writes,

> is a voice in search of an origin, in search of a body, but even when it finds its body, it turns out that this doesn't quite work, the voice doesn't stick to the body, it is an excrescence which doesn't match the body […]. (Dolar, 2006, pp. 60–61)

Arguably, the relationship between the voice and its body can be exemplified by way of the acousmatic voice. The voice has an "inherently acousmatic character" (Dolar, 2006, p. 70) because the relation to its body, as Dolar argues, is never resolved. The voice's relation to its body is a problem for sound theory and the perception of sound, and it is both a problem for vocal ontology and listening phenomenology.

The acousmatic voice and listening are complexly linked: in listening to voice, a listener is immediately and almost unconsciously conjuring a voice's body or source. The problem with such a listening is not only the wish to linearly identify a single body with a single voice that is heard but furthermore that once this body is imagined, the listening as searching ends. When I have *found* a voice's body in my listening, I seem to be content: a monocausal identification (Chion, 2016, p. 117) has been established and the voice that I hear indexes a body. This identification, however, does not actually describe the musicking actions of the voice; it petrifies an idea of voice and reduces it to an idea of a body. This monocausality says more about listening and its need for identification than about the voice and its relation to its body, it regards the voice as primarily bodily and leads to a carnal essentialism of voice. The voice's "cause, once identified, is always more easily grasped and described than is the sound" (Chion, 2016, p. 119) but sound as well as voice have a life beyond monocausal identification. Chion argues that instead of questioning sound with regards to its qualities we prepare it to fit a

semiotic system and to make it commodifiable by indexing sound and thus conflating sound with its finitely identified source. He calls this the discourse of "*sonic naturalism"* (Chion, 2016, p. 119). Monocausality describes a finite narrowing of a sounding phenomenon such as the voice to a singular source. Identifying a singular body in a voice misses the manifold differences of the musicking voice's production – as I have argued previously by way of Howlin' Wolf and Trần Quang Hải (see 1.2.). The problem is not the voice's place or places of emanation but rather listening's urge to identify its cause. Monocausality, as Chion argues, fails to account for any act of sounding. To counter this monocausality, Chion advocates for a listening that maintains a certain openness to and for sound's multiple causalities in order to theorise its manifold actualisations (Chion, 2016, pp. 117–118). Kane, too, challenges such identifying listening because it forgets about *how* a sound is produced, it forgets about its *technê* (Kane, 2014, p. 220). A listening to the musicking voice needs to be attuned to the musicking performance. Musicking troubles a monocausal identification of a voice's body.

Howlin' Wolf's singing as well as biphonic singing have shown the complex, diverse and intricate performances of physiological activity that take place in the musicking voice. A linear or definitive identification only reduces the voice to its producing body. The musicking voice is a performative figure which auscultates the multiple and simultaneous happenings of the body when it performs the voice in song. The musicking voice is always in the process of being performed, involved in the performing of and with a body. As such, it needs to be heard. Of course, there is no denying that this voice, too, is produced by a body; my listening to singing admits this physiological activity in the voice as it sings, as the performances of Howlin' Wolf and Trần Quang Hải have ultimately confirmed. Nonetheless, listening to the musicking voice destabilises the singularity and fixity of what the body *is* when it is heard in voice. The body in song is in continuous flux. No singer has just one unmoved body from

which they sing, singing activates and multiplies the body from which we perform. In the last part of this chapter, I want to attune to such a listening to the musicking voice.

1.4. Joan La Barbara's extended vocal techniques

> You sing with your whole body, not just the throat or […] simply from your breathing mechanism. You really have to draw the energy from your feet, all the way up. (Joan La Barbara, in Roulette Intermedium, 2010)

Joan La Barbara has widely become famous for her development of so-called 'extended vocal techniques' (EVT) in the 1970s and after. In La Barbara's vocal practice, these techniques can be identified, for instance, as glottal "clicks, cross-register ululation, multiphonics, ingressive singing, reinforced harmonics, alveolar and dental clicks" (Bell, 2016, p. 144). Her use of these techniques has placed La Barbara in a lineage of avant-garde singers that have experimented with the voice and the body as their primary musical tools such as Meredith Monk, Laurie Anderson, Cathy Berberian, Diamanda Galás and Pamela Z (Eidsheim, 2015, p. 29). Lucie Vágnerová critiques this description of vocal techniques as 'extended' as it reinforces an othering of the female musicking body (Vágnerová, 2016, pp. 20, 45–46) which can be seen in Michael Edgerton's description of extended vocal techniques as "extra-normal" (Edgerton, 2004, p. xv). La Barbara has regarded these vocal techniques as a musical instrument: her first record from 1976 is titled *Voice Is The Original Instrument* (La Barbara, 2003a). In this section, I follow La Barbara's vocal techniques and show how her manifold ways of voicing trouble an indexical relationship between voice and body. For this, I first discuss the different vocal techniques which La Barbara has developed. Afterwards, I will listen to her composition *as lightning comes, in flashes* (La Barbara, 2017). My listening analysis will outline a specific disidentifying listening to the musicking voice which will help me to further theorise the complicated relationship between the musicking voice and its producing body.

Placing and mapping the voice

Like many other singers and performers, La Barbara has become a teacher and educator throughout her career and passed on her knowledge of extended vocal techniques to younger singers. In a public masterclass, which has been video recorded, she explains many of these specific techniques (NewMusicBox, 2019).[7]

In the video, La Barbara tells the singer Leighanne Saltsman how bel canto singers ought to blend the different resonance areas in the face and the head in order to generate a clear and homogenous sound which the singer is able then to project. Instead of "blending those resonance areas", the aim in La Barbara's practice of extended vocal technique is "to isolate", "to find very specific places inside your head, behind your cheeks, the centre of your nose, centre of your mouth, maybe back of your throat" (NewMusicBox, 2019). Similar to bel canto and many other styles of singing, extended vocal technique emphasizes the 'placing of the voice', it is important to attune to the differences of the vocal musculature and auscultate the various timbres of the voice. In this particular masterclass, La Barbara introduces the techniques of overtone singing, inhaled singing, inhale glottal clicks, vocal fry, multiphonics as well as ululation. The table below shows some of the vocal techniques La Barbara has developed and explains both their pedagogy and physiology (see Table 1).

Table 1: Register of some extended vocal techniques according to Joan La Barbara (NewMusicBox, 2019).

Technique	La Barbara's instructions[8]	Body parts involved	Minutes
Overtone singing	Start with a very hard, nasty *e* to place the sound at the bridge of the nose. Then gradually go from an *e* vowel toward *y* and down to the corner of the mouth ('*err'* territory), and down into *o*, *r*, and towards the sine tone quality of the *u*. This movement from the sounds *e* to *y*, *o*, *r* and *u* helps change the shape of the vocal tract, thereby	Voice sound is 'placed' in the front of the face, on the sides of the nose and particularly on the bridge of the nose. Voice is thus 'mapped' onto "mouth, cheekbone, nose, forehead, and eye regions" (Brown, 2002, p. 31). In	05:32 – 13:45

[7] The video can be found on vimeo: https://vimeo.com/322839755 (Accessed: 11 October 2021).
[8] I am paraphrasing most of La Barbara's instructions here, her original instructions can be found in the video (see NewMusicBox, 2019).

	creating different spaces of resonance, i.e. reinforcing particular harmonics.	order to create reinforced harmonics, movement of the tongue is crucial (see 1.2.).	
Inhaled singing	Start with simple breathing, inhaling and exhaling. At some point, start making a sound on the inhale breath. Then start intoning also the exhale breath and stay on the same pitch. Can be used for circular breathing (see La Barbara's piece *Circular Song* (La Barbara, 2003b)).	Works both with open and closed mouth. Main focus is here on the breathing, i.e. air flow from the lungs.	13:45 – 18:25
Inhale glottal clicks	You are taking in a very small amount of air. Mostly, a very low sound. The slowness of inhaling breath regulates the ratio of the clicking of the glottis.	Involves inhale breathing that very slowly animates the glottis. Glottal clicks or stops are "percussive sounds created by the sudden stop of airflow in the vocal tract" (Vágnerová, 2016, p. 43).	20:00 – 23:35
Vocal fry	Similar technique to glottal clicks but exhaled. The term comes from the sound of frying, think of the sound of a frying egg. Resembles a growl.	Involves exhale breathing which very slowly animates the glottis.	23:35 – 24:30
Multiphonics	In order "to produce the multiphonic (essentially, double stops for the voice: the simultaneous sounding of two or more pitches), one needs a very relaxed position of the vocal apparatus as one is actually causing the 'false vocal folds' to sympathetically vibrate with the 'true vocal folds'. I can then tune the pitches to an octave or, if I choose, go for more of a noise effect" (see liner notes to La Barbara, 2017).	Relaxed position of the larynx. The vocal folds produce a subtone and the false vocal folds start vibrating sympathetically, thus creating the *noisy* mixture of sound.	24:30 – 30:10
Ululation	It comes from the same place as laughing. Pick a pitch and make the sound of laughter ("hihihi"). Then, maintain the tension and don't let the laughter fall off. Start controlling the sound by supplying it with more air flow. It can also resemble a yodel or a yodel flutter which is a sound that moves across registers. Here, you are moving the voice between your upper and your mid register.	Involves an open throat and "rapid movement of the tongue and uvula" (Sanford, 2018). Ululation is "created through aspiration of glottal stops" (Ripley, 2016, p. 15).	30:10 – 33:25

In one of La Barbara's early compositions *Voice Piece: One-Note Internal Resonance Investigation* from 1974 (La Barbara, 2003c), many of these techniques are put to work.[9] La Barbara herself has called the piece "a rigorous étude exploring the multitude of timbres, colors, overtones, and multiphonics that could be created from a single tone" (La Barbara,

[9] A recording of *Voice Piece* can be found on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G-JnXRaQS3E (Accessed: 11 October 2021).

2002, p. 38). During the piece's 15 minutes, La Barbara intonates the same pitch while moving through different vocal techniques, this way altering the timbre of the pitch by changing her voice's shape. *Voice Piece* can be regarded as an exercise of La Barbara's vocal techniques; many of the techniques described in the above table are here put to practice and show her voice as a versatile instrument that activates different places of resonance.

I want to listen to a different piece, however: *as lightning comes, in flashes*. More so than on *Voice Piece, as lightning comes, in flashes* shows the musicking diffusion of the voice's body. *Voice Piece* exercises the voice's technical possibilities; *as lightning comes, in flashes* goes further and plays with these techniques and their musical potentialities. On the one hand, she employs simultaneous voice tracks, i.e. the phonographic multiplying of voice, which in itself troubles the voice's embodiment (see Chapter 3). On the other hand, and more importantly, it allows the inclusion of listening into the questioning of the voice's body by asking of the listener to make sense of these different body parts. Listening here becomes an active musicking agent which accounts, too, for the question of the voice's body.

as lightning comes, in flashes

The piece was originally intended as an "outdoor performance piece for singers, dancers [and] oversize costumes" and was premiered in 1981 (see liner notes to La Barbara, 2017). After the performance, however, La Barbara reworked the piece for a record release:

> I recorded my own voice on each track in real time […] allowing the voice to change and morph as I felt it happen, letting the energy direct the sound. (see liner notes to La Barbara, 2017)

After recording, the different voice tracks were arranged in the mix as if different (voice) characters were interacting with each other: "Each track represented a specific vocal gesture and shape with its own characteristics" (see liner notes La Barbara, 2017). Let me zoom in on

some of the different voice tracks at the beginning of the recording and map them onto a voicing body (see Figure 1).[10]

A vocal fry starts the piece off; produced at the glottis: the larynx lets air pass through but immediately stops the airflow once a portion of it has passed (see Figure 1, I). A few seconds later another track can be heard: a humming (see Figure 1, II), which is unvoiced and does not really involve tongue movement, otherwise needed for articulation; instead, here it resonates in the nasal cavities. On another track we can hear ululation (see Figure 1, III), performed by the movement of the tongue and its touching of the hard palate. The multiphonic singing (around minute 00:40, see Figure 1, IV) takes place further back in the pharynx. Multiphonic singing is supported of course by the larynx but here probably produced by the sympathetic resonating of the false vocal cords, that is why we hear a second sound source. Also, I hear a sound that resembles monkey chants (see Figure 1, V), a high frequency voiced sound that resonates in the nasal cavities, at the front of the skull, behind the frontal sinuses (min. 01:00).

[10] La Barbara's *as lightning comes, in flashes* can be accessed via YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fu5MIOHP9k0 (Accessed: 11 October 2021).



Figure 1: Cartography of physiological activity in Joan La Barbara's as lightning comes, in flashes. *Model of vocal apparatus taken from Mario Marafioti's book* Caruso's Method of Voice Production: The Scientific Culture of the Voice *(Marafioti, 1922, p. 1).*

The above diagram (Figure 1) is of course merely an approximation of the complex physiological (inter)actions that are happening in the first minute of *as lightning comes, in flashes*. But in listening to La Barbara's multiple voicings, it becomes apparent how the body is manifold involved in the making of the musicking voice. Speaking of *one* body which linearly indexes *one* voice becomes increasingly troublesome.

Musicking diffuses the voice's body

In her practice of extended vocal technique, La Barbara has developed "a vocabulary of vocal sounds, an orchestra if you will, of vocal sounds" (Gonsher and La Barbara, 2016). All of the different voice sounds (see Table 1 and Figure 1) emerge from her one singular body but from different body parts. Upon listening to *as lightning comes, in flashes*, I hear the glottal clicks of her vocal frying which underlie the whole 22 minutes of the composition. I can hear a body

producing a sound from deep within its throat (see Figure 1, I). When I hear the multiphonics (Figure 1, IV), I listen to at least two sound-producing bodies simultaneously and I can't decide if one produces the other (Barnett, 1977, p. 117; Edgerton, 2004, p. 81). When I hear the ululations (Figure 1, III), I hear the agility of a tongue, caught in the act of somersault; the voice makes heard the wetness of the oral cavities, and I hear the tongue slip between palate and jaw. A causal relationship between the physical body that produces the voice and its identification in my listening collapses and gives way to a diffused one: La Barbara's musicking voice lets me engage in a listening to singing as it unfolds the voice's manifold bodies. Her many voices and fleshly folds within her vocal tract amplify a myriad of bodily activities at play in the musicking voice. I don't know *who* or – for that matter – *what* this body is or belongs to that produces this musicking. What *matters* is that there clearly is bodily production at play. And it is this physiological play that makes the voice musick. Monocausality gives way to the many and diffused sources of these voice acts.

Of course, all of these different vocalisations happen simultaneously because I am listening to a recording of the layered voices of Joan La Barbara; she cannot perform all of these sounds at one time but that does not matter here (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of the phonographic musicking voice). What matters is the diffusing of the vocal body that make up the musicking voices on *as lightning comes, in flashes.* La Barbara's extended vocal technique complicates the relationship between voice and body because it multiplies the possibilities of its connection. Her extended vocal technique demonstrates the physicality of producing a musicking voice, but this voice cannot be limited to a singular source of one sounding body. La Barbara's vocal practice makes apparent that "the voice doesn't stick to the body" (Dolar, 2006, p. 61). Any voice is produced by a body but a voice never "sticks" to just one body or vice versa, their relationship is slippery. The musicking voice slips away from the shackling grasp of its body.

La Barbara's vocal practice manifests the voice's need of a body in order to musick. But it, too, complicates the causality of the body as the source which sounds and grounds the voice. The voice's body is being performed and played and as such never a stable guarantor of the voice. La Barbara's singing diffuses the causal linearity to her voice's body. By way of La Barbara's diffusion of the musicking voice's body, I want to tweak the relationship between voice and body: away from a necessarily strict and linear monocausality and towards a relationship which can be heard as "multicausal" (Chion, 2016, p. 118). Instead of continuing to ask where this voice *comes from*, I ask: What are we listening *for* when we hear singing? And what do we hear when we listen to the musicking voice? A voice or a body?

1.5. Listening as disidentifying

At the outset of this chapter, I have delineated the discourse regarding the relationship between the voice and its body (1.1.). Acoustic studies have shown how the body produces the voice. Within a Peircean semiotic framework their relationship can be called indexical. When I listen to a voice and immediately identify its producing body, then the voice indexes its body. I problematised said indexical relationship between voice and body by listening to different performances of the musicking voice (1.2. and 1.4.). The musicking voice needs a body to come into being but it always also moves the body, it troubles an all too easy identification and equating of body with voice. Following acousmatic theories, I furthermore established that the voice – or in fact, any sound – cannot be understood as a given object; any voice is also constituted by its listening. Regarding the question of the voice's relationship to its body, this means that the identification of a voice's source or body depends also on the act of listening. Instead of claiming that a sound indexes its source, the inclusion of listening shows that causality never just exists but is (re)produced in perception. Kane calls this "acousmatic listening" (Kane, 2014, p. 7), a listening that only makes possible the questioning of a sound's

source (1.3.). An identifying listening hears the voice primarily as bodily and falls prey to monocausality (Chion, 2016, p. 117). But the musicking voice's body cannot be fixed to a stable source. The musicking voice diffuses its bodily source. It enables a listening to voice that *dis*identifies from a fixed source and amplifies the musicking activity of the voice. I suggest that the musicking voice – as I have shown by way of Howlin' Wolf, Trần Quang Hải and Joan La Barbara – asks for a different listening which does not think of voice as merely bodily. Such listening – as any listening – can be practiced and established.

Disidentifying listening

I want to call this *disidentifying listening* or a listening as disidentifying. In queer theories, this notion of disidentification has been read as "a strategy that works on and against dominant ideology" (Muñoz, 1999, p. 11). In the case of the musicking voice and its relationship to its body, disidentifying can be regarded as a practice of listening differently or otherwise. A listening as disidentifying aims to undo the monocausalities of the voice (Chion, 2016, p. 118). It relates the musicking voice to its producing body without essentialising it. The musicking voice – as I have argued – is produced in many places inside the body but it has not one essential, singular source; it shows the body in flux, on the go. Disidentifying listening accents the slipperiness between voice and body. When "the voice doesn't stick to the body" (Dolar, 2006, p. 61), disidentifying listening makes us hear the manifold possibilities of its slippery connection. Disidentifying listening attunes to the "affirmation of that slippage" between voice and body (Butler, 1993, p. 219). Rather than listening to the voice *as* a body, the musicking voice amplifies the voice's performances *of*, *with* and *in* a body.

Let me return to Joan La Barbara's musicking voice. Listening to her vocal practice, I am not asking *whose* or *what kind* of body I am hearing. Her vocal techniques make me wonder about the performance of voice in music, how voice can be worked and used as a means of

musicking. Her vocal practice does not index a fixed body but amplifies the voice's musicking performances. In my listening, I know *that* a body is worked in her singing. But I can hardly hear what *kind* of body it is which is being worked. Her vocal techniques do not really signify the body as index, they are also not the grain of *her* voice. Instead, what I hear is *bodily* work. And this work is the performing of the voice's musicking. Of course, paradoxically, the vocal sounds that La Barbara produces have become synonymous with *her*. This, however, has more to do with style and genre and the specific way *how* she works her body. It is not an expression of the voice's carnal essence. La Barbara's voice is individual to her because each voice is given by a differently unique body – it "sounds one way because of my bone structure, my body, where it resonates" (La Barbara, in Sheridan, 2006). But in listening to this musicking voice, I am not wondering about her voice or her body but rather the voice's musicking ability, its techniques and manifold soundings.

There is no one static body of ours, our bodies age and they are in continuous movement, they are in flux. Singers know this all too well because singers work their bodies; and in this working they make us who listen aware of its manifold and intricate performances. This way, the musicking voice most artistically troubles the relationship between voice and body. In this disidentifying listening lies the power of the musicking voice. Instead of reducing voice to a body, the musicking voice wants to be heard as a musicking performance, to be valued for its breath-taking acrobatics and not its sheer materiality.

2. More than sound: when voice and music meet

2.0. Prelude: Ella Fitzgerald – 'Cry Me a River'

In my right ear, an acoustic guitar plucks a three-note descending figure, a minor second up on d and a fifth down from d# to g#. On the one (g#), a bass enters, accompanied with a hit on a ride cymbal, placed in the centre of the mix. A second guitar track corresponds to the first and plays an upwards triad of g#-d#-b into my left ear and into the pauses opened by the first guitar. This little introductory constellation is repeated four times, slightly altered, until another instrument takes the stage. I hear a beautifully soft attack on a 'u' vowel, a gently striving tone working its way (out) into the ensemble of the double bass, the plucking guitar and the beating of the cymbal. My ears gravitate towards this alluring tone that will always retreat from my listening grasp. It swings into a slight vibrato and seamlessly into an elaborate melisma. The timbre of its beginning is crisp, evoking a horn-like attack, but it morphs during the falling of the melismatic bend, goes lower and rasps towards the end of the phrase. Here, the last reserves of air are pushed out, the carried tone drives forward the phrase and with it the music. This phrase has come to an end, the voice rests, breathes in, and it repeats the phrase with the same crystallised intonation. With little to no remaining breath it again bears a ray of enchanted sound which stirs the musical play.

I listen to the entry into the song 'Cry Me a River' where Ella Fitzgerald moves her voice wordlessly (Fitzgerald, 1961).[11] Instead of vocalising language, she plays with musical sounds, those of her vocal apparatus and those of Joe Mondragon's bass, Herb Ellis's guitar and Stan Levey's drums. This short scene in which Fitzgerald's voice stages the beginning of the song is captivating. Her voice carries not only my listening and holds my tension as a listener, but it, too, carries the music. It carries the music because of a conjuring power that I

[11]Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WlIsUrISQKE (Accessed: 23 March 2021).

hear in her legato phrasing, the melismatic bending and the sostenuto tension. Fitzgerald syncopates the steady 4/4 meter and rhythmically plays her voice within the intricate melisma. This vocal scene takes place within roughly eight seconds, during which her voice swirls through a range of diverse timbres and an ambitus from a high C#5 to a low G3. I am enchanted by her voice's musical playing. I am fascinated by the way how she bends musical time with her improvised melodic and harmonic inventions, how she holds the players with her voice and vibes with them in ensemble, how her phrasing conducts the flow of the music. How does this voice become music? How do voice and music meet? What is a musicking voice?

Ella Fitzgerald's voice defies objectification. It is, as Duke Ellington has said, "Beyond Category" (Ellington, 1973, p. 237). It is not just smooth, silky or "horn-like" (Perea, 2015), versatile, clear or fluid. But her voice smoothens and softens musical material, it imitates the playing of a horn, it changes, refines or liquifies its musical sound. It does not care for adjectival identity but rather for the powerful playing of music, its performance. This is what Roland Barthes heard in the voice of Charles Panzera: the voice in music cannot be fossilised by fanciful adjectives, instead it demands of the theorist to listen for its musicking performativity (Barthes, 1977, pp. 179–180; see Chapter 1). In this chapter, I follow the musical performance of the voice. I wonder how voice meets music and how the voice becomes a musicking entity in its own right. Ella Fitzgerald's voice paves a way for a musical theorising of voice that exceeds the categories of sound, technique or physiology. It enables me to shift the perception and the theorising of voice towards the intricate performative musings, the playing, vibing, bending and holding of her voice in the moments it bears music. This chapter aims to develop a theory of the musicking voice.

Ella Fitzgerald's voice differs from a speaking voice. Instead of speaking, Fitzgerald moves her voice towards music as play. Here, linguistic signification is suspended, bent by and towards music. By listening to Fitzgerald's elaborate vocal performances ('Summertime' and

'How High the Moon'), I will show how this voice becomes a musicking entity in its own right. To approach her voice's musicking capacity not only dissociates voice from linguistic signification but furthermore also highlights its difference to the voice's mere sonic qualities. Even though her voice in 'Cry Me a River' could be heard or confused with the sound of a horn, its musical qualities are not to be equated with the sonic. Throughout this chapter, I will argue that sonic concepts of the voice cannot account for the musicking capacities of Fitzgerald's voice (2.1.). I will contrast sonocentric voice theories by focussing on the voice's musical performativity. In 2.2., I approach the musicking voice by listening to the vibe of Ella Fitzgerald's voice in a performance of 'Summertime'. In 2.3., I attempt a preliminary theorisation of the musicking voice in more detail by discussing performance theories of music and voice. I will conclude this chapter by listening again to Fitzgerald's musical voice; this time, I focus on the modes of play and improvisation in her scat singing in 'How High The Moon' (2.4.).

2.1. Sound, voice and sonocentrism

2.1.1. Voice as sound

Like many other disciplines, sound studies have recently undergone a vocal turn (Kane, 2015, 671). Studies in the field have put forward questions of the politics of voice; for instance, with regards to gender and race (Wallis, 2018; Eidsheim, 2019), vocal affect (Fuller, 2019), mediated voices (Weheliye, 2002; Pettman, 2017; Trower, 2019) or the relationality of voice (Neumark, 2017). It is fair to say that the voice is a central phenomenon in the field of sound studies. Many canonical anthologies in the field – such as *The Sound Studies Reader*, *Keywords in Sound*, *Sound as Popular Culture*, *The Routledge Companion to Sound Studies*, *Remapping Sound Studies in the Global South* – all feature chapters or even whole sections on the issue of voice (Sterne, 2012; Novak and Sakakeeny, 2015; Papenburg and Schulze, 2016; Bull, 2019;

Steingo and Sykes, 2019). In most theories, voice is a sonorous, sounding phenomenon. The inclusion of the phenomenon of voice into the mainframe of sound studies seems to be self-explanatory. However, a short-circuiting of the terms 'voice' and 'sound' becomes problematic when both phenomena remain ambiguous and elusive. The term 'voice' is often understood to encompass diverse utterances without specifying whether this voice speaks or sings, whispers or shouts, cries or screams or murmurs (Cavarero, 2005; Ihde, 2007; Neumark, 2017; Pettman, 2017). Even when the act of voicing indicates screaming (Fuller, 2019, p. 43), lamenting (Ikoniadou, 2019b, p. 73), whispering (LaBelle, 2014, p. 147) or singing (Eidsheim, 2015), voice is most often heard and theorised as sound. Brian Kane has problematised this flattening of voice as sound. This is the case when "the voice is reduced to its purely sonorous aspect, capable of subjection to all the standard forms of phonetic, spectrographic, and acoustic analysis" (Kane, 2016b, p. 94). Nina Eidsheim, too, has argued for a problematisation of the "figure of sound" in the studies of voice and music (Eidsheim, 2015, p. 17). Both their diagnoses will serve as a starting point for my own critical discussion of the voice's reduction to sound. I argue that vocal sonocentrism poses a problem to the study of voice in its musicking capacity. I will outline the problem of sonocentrism below (2.1.2.), but first, I will illustrate the theoretical reductions of voice to sound alongside two examples from the fields of media sound studies.

I find such a reduction, for instance, in Eleni Ikoniadou's writings on voice. Ikoniadou's work focusses mainly on the philosophies of sound, media and sound art but has recently also brushed on issues of voice. Two short essays on voice have appeared in the edited collection *Unsound:Undead*; one deals with the myth of the Siren song (Ikoniadou, 2019a), the other with the lamenting voice (Ikoniadou, 2019b). In the latter, Ikoniadou describes the lament as a vocal practice that incorporates "talking and singing[,] sobbing, keening, and wailing" (2019b, p. 75). In Ikoniadou's discussion, lamenting is regarded as a performative, musical practice that

revolves around the voice and functions by way of repetition and improvisation. In her description of lamenting, Ikoniadou makes use of musical vocabulary, such as: singing, clapping, beating, rhythm, crescendo, intonation (2019b, pp. 73–74). The conception of the voice that animates this musical practice, however, seems vaguely unmusical. Instead of tuning to the voice's musical potential, Ikoniadou hears this voice mainly as a sound and conceptualises the lamenting voice as a "sonorous force" (2019b, p. 75) – an alien, "inhuman" entity, of "unknown origin, separate from the body that hosts it" (2019b, p. 75). Ikoniadou strips the lamenting voice off its musicking capacity and instead theorises it as a sonorous outside: this voice is a sound that stems not from the human body or its musical performativity but becomes an abysmal entity that exists prior to corporeal performance. As such, it approximates an ontological voice detached from any performative or musical iteration.

Similarly, in her essay on the Siren myth (Ikoniadou, 2019a), voice is conceptualised primarily sonically and not musically. Here, Ikoniadou turns the Siren song into an unreachable signifier for an "inaudible and unknowable" outside (Ikoniadou, 2019a, p. 58). It is unclear if Ikoniadou speaks of the Siren's actual voices, of their singing, of the song as a myth or of their voices as metaphor. The concept of voice is ambiguous but conceptualised again by reference only to sound. This voice – incorporating both song and singing – is rendered as an unreachable ground, a metaphysical rather than an actually sounding or musicking entity. The Siren's "song suggests access to what lies outside mediated knowledge" (Ikoniadou, 2019a, p. 58). The song, a musical form that incorporates the singing voice, is here reduced to an idea of sound. The voice that emerges in Ikoniadou's discussion is a strange concept, it gives its listener access to a "beyond—an abyssal contingency from which all sounds, words, and ideas emanate" (2019a, p. 58); this voice "holds the irrevocable truth of the inhumanness of the human condition" (Ikoniadou, 2019a, p. 59). The voice's specific performance or mode of operation, for example

its actual musicking, is omitted in Ikoniadou's theorising. Voice is reduced to a ontological entity that resembles a sonorous noise more than an embodied practice.

Both the lamenting voice and the Siren voice are singing voices – and significantly different ones – but their musicking capacity and performativity seems to be of no concern in either case. Ikoniadou merely understands voice as a sonic phenomenon, not a musical one. Her voice risks to be conflated with an ideal notion of sound that seems to cipher an outside or a real that lies beyond human cognition. The musicking voice, however, cannot be described simply as an outside "sonorous force" (Ikoniadou, 2019b, p. 75) because this would ignore its embodied practice (see Ch. 1), its musical performance and its specific capacity to affect (see Ch. 5).

Norie Neumark's approach to voice resembles Ikoniadou's. While Ikoniadou's approach makes use of a theoretical vocabulary of speculative realism (outside, real, inhuman, etc.), Neumark is engaged rather in the theories of new materialism. In her book *Voicetracks*, she studies voice "through media, the arts, and new materialism" (Neumark, 2017, p. 1). As such, Neumark is interested in a voice that is not confined to the human realm. She conceptualises voice as a category that includes "voices beyond the human, the literal voices of things and of nature, as they speak and tell us things" (2017, p. 3). Her approach to voice exemplifies the tendency towards conceptual ambiguity in theories of voice, the aim here being to track voice "across its various registers—across the affective and the symbolic, the literal and the metaphoric" (2017, p. 25). Voice, for Neumark, simultaneously designates a performative event (2017, pp. 8, 10), a material and sounding entity (2017, p. 27), a political metaphor (2017, p. 18), an expressive subject (2017, p. 8) and a relational, ethical concept (2017, pp. 12, 13, 18). In her case, all these different perspectives on voice are tied together by her focus on listening (Neumark, 2017, pp. 18, 23). Neumark's book is an attempt to take voice out of its anthropocentric framework and instead to "attune" (2017, p. 58) – that is, listen – to

the manifold voices found in other species, entities and things, such as animal sounds, the voices of places or the voices of technologies (2017, p. 29). Neumark's understanding of voice moves beyond a narrow sonic materialist understanding (as discussed in the work of Eleni Ikoniadou). Instead, her focus on listening to voices utilises Don Ihde's anthropomorphising of sound as voice (Ihde, 2007, p. 195; Neumark, 2017, pp. 12–13). Indeed, Neumark refers to Ihde in her introduction, citing from his book *Listening and Voice*: "all things, the things of the world, have voices" (Ihde, 2007, p. 190; see Neumark, 2017, p. 3).

Ihde theorises voice as a metaphor that offers a perspective *on* or *of* the sounding world. Voice, for Ihde, indicates the *who* or *what* of a sound (Ihde, 2007, pp. 168, 195). The problem with Ihde's understanding of voice is that it becomes synonymous with sound, he conflates voice and sound and levels their differences. Ihde's conception of voice is "a perspective, a metaphor, by which we understand part of the world itself" (2007, p. 189); voice thus functions as a metaphorical tool for his phenomenology of listening. To listen to the voice of a sound is to listen to its "complex and multidimensioned richness" (2007, p. 191) – in this regard, Ihde's project can be regarded as a vococentrism of sound (Chion, 2016, p. 156). Similar to Ihde, Neumark, too, is interested in listening and defines the many voices that she finds in media and artworks by way of listening. Neumark acknowledges the difficult endeavour of defining the voice (Neumark, 2017, p. 8), she nonetheless restricts the voice to the realm of sound – that which can be *listened to*. This way, she not only neglects the differences of voice in its (human) performative modes (such as speaking, singing, coughing or whispering, etc.) but also confines voice to a (new) sonic materialism. Even though Neumark argues that she does not "understand voice as the same as sound, nor as reducible to sound or to vibration" (2017, p. 29), sound remains the binding material which holds her many registers of voice together. Voice, in this approach, remains an unspecified category, it simultaneously functions as a cipher for an ethics of relationality, it is an embodied sound of both human and more-than-human and it becomes

a metaphorical concept for a phenomenology of listening. All of these different notions of voice have one thing in common: they come into being through listening and are approached through sound. As in Ikoniadou's case, sound is privileged in the theoretical conception of voice. While both Ikoniadou and Neumark unconvincingly render the voice sonic, neither provides an answer to the question of the musical voice.

Kittlerian sound studies

Both these discussions of voice emerge at the intersection of media and sound studies. This particular crossing has become a dominant branch in sound studies and in many ways takes its intellectual cues from 'German' media theory and Friedrich Kittler in particular. Kittler has had a strong influence on theorising sound, particularly by way of sound reproduction, phonography and its effects on the studies of sonic phenomena (Steintrager and Chow, 2019, pp. 10–11), with regards to historical (Sterne, 2003), techno-affective (Goodman, 2010; Ikoniadou, 2014) or philosophical approaches (Kim-Cohen, 2009; Cox, 2011). Maren Haffke's work – at this point only available in German – centres around the specific question of Kittler's legacy for theories of sound (Haffke, 2015, pp. 32–33). Haffke argues that Kittler's media theory has been influential in sound studies because it proposes a concept of sound that escapes the order of writing. In Kittler's media theory, sound is epistemologically and ontologically different from writing, with all its problematic consequences for issues of signification and representation (Haffke, 2015, p. 33). Arguably, the reductions of voice to sound can be found in sound studies' "strong sound paradigm" (Haffke, 2013, p. 173) which can be regarded as the inheritance of 'German' media theory.[12] I argue that the renderings of voice as sound can be critically examined by way of problematising this particular Kittlerian notion of sound and

[12] I translated this passage from the German original.

voice. Let me, therefore, briefly venture into Kittler's theory before I discuss the more general problem of the voice's reductions to sound, hereafter (2.1.2.)

Friedrich Kittler has been fascinated with the voice and its reproduction which he discusses in Chapter 1 of his *Gramophone* book (Kittler, 1999, pp. 21–114). Like Ikoniadou and Neumark, Kittler construes the voice as a sonic entity. Kittler argues that due to the possibilities of sound reproduction, voice is rendered calculable and can be reduced to the sum of its traceable frequencies (Kittler, 1999, pp. 1, 23). Kittler thus understands the phonographic voice as mere sonic matter. But in his reading, the phonographic voice still poses a problem, because Kittler's voice holds a strange relationship to subjectivity and an inner voice, a voice that does not sound (Kittler, 1999, pp. 36–37). This latter voice signals an inwardness and points to Kittler's latent Romanticism. He feeds this romantic idealism of voice for instance with Friedrich Hegel's understanding of sound "as a 'saturated expression of the manifestation of inwardness'" (Hegel, cited in Kittler, 1999, p. 36). However, this romantic idealist voice is furthermore complicated as it is overshadowed by Kittler's psychoanalytic readings. Kittler famously arranges his media theory by way of the Lacanian order of the symbolic, the imaginary and the real (Kittler, 1999, p. 15). Within this order, Kittler renders sound (mainly in its phonographic state) as the Lacanian *real*. He writes that "the real […] has the status of phonography" (1999, p. 16); the real is "the physiology of a voice" that emerges from the phonograph (1999, p. 82). Jacques Lacan has famously conceptualised the *real* as that which cannot be symbolised or put into speech (Lacan, 1991, p. 66). The real is an impossibility. "[I]f it 'is' in the first place" (Botting, 1994, p. 24), it is "intrinsically elusive" and "by nature [resists] capture" (Johnston, 2018) – the real always "eludes us" (Lacan, 1998, p. 53). Kittler's transfer of Lacan's tripartite order to the media technologies of the typewriter (the symbolic), the film (the imaginary) and the phonograph (the real) is clunky; particularly so, when he grants the phonograph the power to register the real (Kittler, 1999, pp. 15–16). He theorises the

phonograph as an apparatus that allows an encounter with the real – this encounter, according to Lacan, however, is "essentially [always] the missed encounter" (Lacan, 1998, p. 55) because the real cannot be captured or perceived. When Kittler writes about sound – and in particular, the phonographic voice – he short-circuits phonographic sound with the category of the Lacanian real. He renders sound and its perception indeterminate and impossible. Because the phonograph, as Kittler writes, "registers acoustic events as such" (Kittler, 1999, p. 23), sound is equated with matter. Sound can accordingly not be symbolised, nor can it be perceived phenomenologically (Kim-Cohen, 2009, p. 95). According to Kittler, the phonograph dismantles the symbolic and the imaginary and somehow enables an impossible encounter with the real which Kittler often calls "Rauschen" (Kittler, 1986, p. 72) – translated as noise or roaring. By making the voice almost interchangeable with sound in the moment of sound reproduction, Kittler also places the (phonographic) voice in proximity to sound as a category of the real. Reproduced sound is rendered as noise, it reveals the "physiological accidents and stochastic disorder[s] of bodies" (Kittler, 1999, p. 16). For Kittler, this includes the "recorded, but transient voice" (Kittler, 2015, p. 7). In summary, the term voice in the Kittlerian vocabulary is crowded and indistinct: voice – as well as sound – paradoxically signals an asignifying noise while it is at the same time inhabited by Romantic notions of inwardness. As with Kittler's rendering of sound, his notion of voice is unformed, it meanders between an acoustic determinism, a Romantic idealism and a misunderstood Lacanian real.

I mention Kittler's vague and conflated notion of voice, because it has informed or rather misinformed many of the theories of sound and voice that have populated (media) sound studies in his aftermath. Kittler's influence can be detected for instance in the works of Steve Goodman (Goodman, 2010), Christoph Cox (Cox, 2012), Douglas Kahn (Kahn, 2013) or John Durham Peters (Peters, 2004). Particularly Cox's reference to Kittler signals a current trend of theorising sound as an ontological category in itself, removed from any cultural ties to

signification and representation (Cox, 2011). Ikoniadou's writings on voice can be positioned in this line, positing sound and – by proxy – voice as outside of signification and as a cipher for a speculative realism (see previous discussion). Neumark's work, too, is prone to submit the voice to a (new) sonic materialism. Even though Kittler's discussion of sound as real is laced with a Romantic idealism, it is his overt sonic materialism that proves most problematic for my discussion of the musicking voice.

In the aftermath of Kittler's media theory, sound studies run the risk of narrowing its object's openness, as can be observed in the current trends of sound studies' "ontological turn" (Kane, 2015a). As Brian Kane and others have argued, this ontological turn predominantly renders sound material; it becomes an object in itself rather than a relational phenomenon (Kane, 2015a; Thompson, 2017; Campbell, 2020). I argue that many theories of voice – Ikoniadou and Neumark are just two examples – fall prey to this "strong sound paradigm" (Haffke, 2013, p. 173). Within these traditions, voice is primarily conceptualised as sonic matter and reduced to physiology, acoustics and a sonic materialism.

I argue that the voice differs from sound, it cannot be reduced to its sounding constitution or sonic matter alone. Particularly the musicking voice – as a performance of the voice as it musicks – is more than just sound. This voice musicks and thus produces musical sounds which are performed and affected in and as music. The musicking voice has no ontological footing in the realm of sound and its reductive materialism. On the contrary, it shows that the voice cannot solely be theorised ontologically; it needs a phenomenological approach that can account for its performance, affects and its listening. I find the omission of different vocal practices and iterations of sound – be they musical or not – in the above-mentioned theories particularly problematic. The conflation of voice and sound, which I have discussed in Ikoniadou, Neumark and Kittler, is problematic and signals a wider problem in the realms of sound studies, namely a reliance on an exclusive and ontological rendering of

sound. The equation of sound and voice is contestable and reveals a particular lack of attention to music and the musicking voice in sound theories. Musical sound differs from the notion of sound used in acoustic theories, from sound in the practice of medical auscultation, and from the sonic landscape inhabited by a sound engineer. Musical sound, however, appears to go unheard in sound studies of the media theoretical branch.

2.1.2. The problem of sonocentrism

The over-reliance on sound as a catch-all theoretical figure in sound studies has been met with criticism, both from within musicology but also from other sound theorists. Michel Chion, for instance, writes that there is no

> "sonic material" as a sort of pre-existing reservoir from which we draw. Let me clearly state that there is no totality of sounds that pre-exists any system of communication or expression whatsoever. Sound reveals itself to us via a gradual elaboration not only with respect to languages but also in music, cinema, those arts that make use of it, and, of course, in reflection and theorization. There is thus much sound to create, and it is never totalized. (Chion, 2016, p. 47)

Chion argues that sound should always be studied as an event and in its particular iteration – music being only one elaboration. His insistence on the specificity and situatedness of sound intervenes in approaches which treat sound as an ontological totality. For Chion, sound is not just sound but it has different connotations, philosophies and logics depending on the mode of its performance, perception and reflection (ibid.). Just as the term voice (Feldman, 2015b, p. 659), sound resists any one unitary conception because sound designates different things to an historian of technology, an anthropologist, an acoustician, a sound artist or a music philosopher. In his book *Sound: an Acoulogical Treatise*, Chion proposes a theory of sound that bridges the gap so often left in the divide between ontological and phenomenological approaches to sound. Chion argues that sound is too slippery and ambiguous to be fully reified (Chion, 2016, pp. 193, 203, 205) – this holds true for both phenomenological exercises such as

Schaeffer's reduced listening (Schaeffer, 2017, pp. 212–214) as well as any ontological claims to sound's "nature itself" (Cox, 2011, p. 153). As an event, sound escapes any unifying approach because "*sound stubbornly refers us to something other than itself*" (Chion, 2016, p. 201; original emphasis). Chion proposes a differentiated approach that regards sound as a complex phenomenon which cannot be fully apprehended by one theory: sound "*is torn* […] *between disparate disciplines*" (2016, p. 195; original emphasis). Sound means one thing in acoustics or physics, something else in theories of perception, something altogether in linguistics and yet something else in the various theories of its artistic, social or otherwise performances (2016, p. 193).

Chion's approach to sound is a productive critique of sonic materialism that regards sound either as ontological – as in Ikoniadou's voice – or distributes agency solely to a phenomenology of listening – as in Neumark's voice. Chion withstands the decision to think sound as *either* a physical phenomenon – what he calls "verberation" (2016, p. 16) – *or* that which is perceived – what he calls "auditum" (2016, p. 192). Instead, acoulogy is "the science of what one hears considered from every angle" (2016, p. 210), it attempts to bridge the physics of sound with its perception and it paves a way to think sound both ontologically *and* phenomenologically. His sound theory allows for the paradoxes of sound to remain unresolved. Sound "takes on the appearance of a non-object blanketed in qualities and properties because, one might say, endless description never manages to constitute it" (2016, pp. 202–203). In light of Chion's theory of sound, I argue that the voice cannot be reduced to sound because the voice's performative activity reaches beyond mere sonic matter. The musicking voice cannot be solely grasped as a sonic entity or a "sonorous force" (Ikoniadou, 2019b, p. 75) but its theory must take into consideration its musicking agency.

The reduction of voice to sound can be compared with a reduction of music to sound. Following a similar argument to Chion, Adam Harper coins the term *sonocentrism* to diagnose

the reduction of music to sound in recent scholarship (Harper, 2011, 2017; also see Friedner and Helmreich, 2012). Harper describes sonocentrism as "[t]he convention that suggests that music is nothing but sound(s), or that the sound is the only relevant factor in music" (Harper, 2011, p. 33). While sonocentrism does not touch on the problem of voice, it highlights the lack of theoretical vocabulary and conceptual rigour with regards to the specificity of musical performance in sound studies. Harper's critique of sonocentrism aims at developing a theory of musicking that does not rely (merely) on the sonic. Sonocentrism, according to Harper, narrows down musical performativity and music's ontology to its sounding form, thereby reducing music to organised sound (Harper, 2017, p. 274). This "leveling of music and sound" (Kreuzer, 2017, p. 232) – previously discussed in Kittler and other sound theorists (2.1.1.) – becomes a problem because it neglects music's particular performativity, agency and perception.

The shift towards sonocentrism relates to a wider turn to the sonic (Eng, 2017, p. 317) which has not only occupied studies of music but the humanities as a whole. This turn towards sound is not a new phenomenon in the Western philosophies of music but prefigures in the canonical avant-garde music traditions in the 20th century. Composers like Edgard Varèse, Luigi Russolo and John Cage have all developed specific philosophies and compositional theories to highlight the artistic qualities of sound and noise (see Cox and Warner, 2005). These composers, among others, have often been portrayed as predecessors of sound art which would privilege the idea(l)s of sound over those of music. Sound art, furthermore, has often been regarded as a precursor to the academic discipline of sound studies (Kane, 2015a, p. 9; Thompson, 2017, pp. 270–271, 275). Arguably, sound studies' overemphasis on sound (Friedner and Helmreich, 2012) and the negligence of music' performativity and its affective agency can be traced within this historical development in the 20th century. The turn to the

sonic dimension of music seems to coincide with a theoretical negligence of musicking, as if music and sound had to be pitted against one another.

It is important to notice that the sonocentrism, diagnosed by Harper, opens up to a wider problem of sonic materialism. Sound theorist and philosopher Christoph Cox has put forward a specific branch of materialist sound theory since at least 2011 when he published a widely cited article with the title 'Beyond Representation and Signification: Toward a Sonic Materialism' (Cox, 2011). In the article, Cox attempts to develop an "alternative theoretical framework" (2011, p. 146) that enables the study of sound in a materialist and speculative realist manner. His aim is "to grasp the nature of sound and to enable analysis of the sonic arts" (2011, p. 146) which according to Cox has gone unnoticed in music and sound scholarship. Cox argues against sound theories that incorporate representational or critical methodologies as developed in the fields of cultural theory. Instead, Cox is interested in fashioning a model of sound that theorises sound in its 'natural' or 'realist' constitution; he does so, however, by throwing out representation and signification altogether. Cox refers here specifically to Kittler's rendering of sound as the real (Cox, 2011, p. 154). The problems of this "materialist theory of sound" (Cox, 2011, p. 157) that brackets out sound's performative, cultural and historical constitution has undergone marked critique in the fields of sound studies (Kane, 2015a; Goh, 2017; Thompson, 2017; Campbell, 2020; Haffke, 2020).

The problem of a narrow sonic materialism is not only that sound is theorised as an ontological totality, devoid of any cultural or historical implications, but furthermore, and this touches on my issue at hand, that it does not account for a performative mode of sounding such as musicking. Not only are such attempts of a sonic materialism politically debatable, but they furthermore privilege a totalising concept of sound over any other performative mode of sounding: both musicking and the voice are such specific performative events which cannot be grasped in any meaningful way within such a theoretical framework. Sonic materialism

proposes an understanding of sound that lies beyond perceptual grasp, it posits sound as well as any other mode of sounding on an *a priori* plane: sound becomes a noumenal Thing, a natural but not cultural entity (Kane, 2015a, p. 15; Thompson, 2017, p. 271). Music and music's performative affectivity are lost to a sonic materialism as music cannot simply be reduced to sonic matter. Many of the sonic voice theories that I have so far discussed – particularly Ikoniadou, Neumark and Kittler – rely on a sonic materialism and as such cannot account for the performances of sound that are more than merely material. What can be observed in this "favoritism towards sound" (Jankélévitch, 2003, p. 12) is a narrow rendering of sound as mere matter that fails to theorise not only music but any sounding performance. Music, arguably, cannot be reduced to sound and to a sonic materialism because music is not only material but affects also immaterially.

A music-philosophical response to sonic materialism can be found in Isabella van Elferen's book *Timbre: Paradox, Materialism, Vibrational Aesthetics* (Van Elferen, 2020). Even though I am not specifically concerned with timbre, Van Elferen's work proves productive for my argument as she claims that music exceeds the confines of materialism (2020, pp. 82, 96). Van Elferen illustrates how research into timbre tends to fall on either side of a binary between materialism and idealism (2020, p. 10). She argues that timbre is either discussed in terms of a firm sonic ontology, rooted in acoustics and a phenomenology of sound perception or it is on the other hand approached as an ideal or transcendental entity that can never be described, grasped or sensed in concrete terms (2020, pp. 9–11, 122). Instead of following this dichotomy, "it would be constructive to acknowledge both sides of the musical (and musicological) coin" (2020, p. 10). This binary is, according to Van Elferen, timbre's fundamental paradox (2020, p. 134). Timbre is caught up in the problem of being both material *and* immaterial, it relates to its acoustic form and yet exceeds it as a musicking agency (2020,

pp. 67, 88). Van Elferen does not try to settle this paradox; on the contrary, she aims to bridge these incongruent approaches of materialism and idealism.

Timbre is not the only musical phenomenon entangled in the dichotomy of materialist and idealist philosophies. In fact,

> [m]usicology has not reached consensus on the question of whether music should be considered material or immaterial, and whether it wants to think of music in realist or idealist terms […]. (Van Elferen, 2020, p. 135)

This indecision can be traced historically throughout the discipline of musicology and further into Western philosophies of music in the 19th century. Van Elferen refers to Lydia Goehr's *The Quest for Voice* (Goehr, 2004) in which Goehr discusses the doubleness of these two trajectories in the music philosophy of the 19th century. The two opposing sides that Goehr discusses are Eduard Hanslick's formalism on the one hand and Richard Wagner's musical transcendentalism on the other (2004, pp. 92–97). By discussing this historical debate between musical autonomy and extramusicality, Goehr proposes an approach to the philosophy of music which takes into account both sides: to engage in musical metaphysics without discarding its physical and formalist side. Goehr advocates for a philosophical doubleness which enables her to think music from the perspective of both formalism and transcendentalism; she calls this approach an "enhanced or critical formalism" (2004, p. 2). Van Elferen argues that Goehr's discussion has fundamental consequences for a philosophy of music because her "philosophical doubleness […] deploys the gaps between these two opposed strands of thinking not just as a methodological bridge but also, itself, as the aesthetic location of music" (Van Elferen, 2020, p. 96). Van Elferen transfers this doubleness of formalism and transcendentalism in 19th music philosophy to the discussion of timbre's paradoxes and specifically to the binary of materialism and idealism. The problem with this binary logic (materialism on one side, idealism on the other) manifests, for Van Elferen, not only in the lack of a theory of timbre but furthermore lies at the very heart of a more general epistemology of music (2020, p. 135).

According to Van Elferen, music is always both material *and* immaterial, it cannot be reduced to either materialism *or* idealism. Timbre, just as any sonic event, clearly needs an acoustic resonance, i.e. a material sounding body, in order to come into being, it needs to be studied in its material causation – even though the causality between sound and source is always deferred or unclear (as discussed with regards to voice in Chapter 1; also see Van Elferen, 2020, pp. 52–67). At the same time, however, timbre is also immaterial because it affects listeners in a way that exceeds any material analysis. This immaterial side of timbre (and arguably music at large) can be observed in the manifold aporetic descriptions of its sublime affections (Van Elferen, 2020, pp. 123–130): music is ineffable because its affections cannot possibly be described accurately, and yet we strive to continuously find words to describe music's powerful charm (Jankélévitch, 2003, p. 87). Van Elferen theorises timbre as a doubleness that is positioned in the gap between materialism and idealism (Van Elferen, 2020, p. 123) and argues that timbre's paradoxes are not a problem but in fact constitutive. Her theory of timbre thus embraces timbre's manifold paradoxes rather than siding with either of its binaries. It accounts for both "the numinous ineffability and the firm materiality" (2020, p. 123) of timbre because both "are the simultaneous qualities of timbral aesthetics" (2020, p. 123) –arguably, this includes other musical phenomena as well.

How does this discussion of music's doubleness relate to the musicking voice? As discussed before, voice is often theorised as mere sonic matter and reduced to a sonic materialism (2.1.1.). Arguably, philosophies of voice that concern the voice in music are similarly held in an epistemological dichotomy of either materiality or immateriality. Of course, the voice in music is a material phenomenon, I have discussed this material constitution of the musicking voice in Chapter 1. And of course, the voice is a sounding entity. But Ella Fitzgerald's crisp intonation at the beginning of 'Cry Me a River' cannot be heard solely as sound because it moves with and in music. Any listener who grants her voice a musical quality

hears her voice musically rather than merely sonically. Fitzgerald's voice illustrates that an exclusively sonic conception of voice is problematic because it neglects the voice's musical performativity. By conflating voice with sound, voice is not only reduced to acoustics but moreover its performative capacities go unheard. In such a narrow definition, voice is theorised as a unitary concept. The above-mentioned theories of voice (2.1.1.) can thus be accused of a stubborn sonocentrism. The perspective of music's doubleness – as both material and immaterial – becomes important for the musicking voice as I regard it not as a "sonorous force" (Ikoniadou, 2019b, p. 75) but rather as an entity that evokes its own musicking agency.

2.2. Interlude: Ella Fitzgerald – 'Summertime'

Let's turn to a live version of George Gershwin's 'Summertime' (*Ella Fitzgerald - Something to Live For*, 2007). Ella Fitzgerald has recorded numerous renditions of the song, but this 1968 version – recorded live at a Berlin concert with the Tee Carson Trio (Donald "Tee" Carson at the piano, Keter Betts on bass and Joe Harris on drums) – stands out for its extraordinary vocal performance.[13]

Fitzgerald's voice sneaks into the song and slowly announces the word "summertime". The last syllable 'time' is stretched, held in her voice and within the chromatically murmured cue. The slurred bending of 'time' is a short and subtle vocal gesture, but it already carries the vibe that will conduct the whole performance. She sings this rubato figure with a slowly wavering vibrato and her singing seems oblivious of metrical rigour. Instead, it meanders effortlessly, striding through the song's lyrical frame in melismatic fashion. She has her musicians awaiting the changes in the voice's direction; I, too, attune my listening to these minute movements. Her singing appears to be directed by a musicking force that commands this flow and the free-floating rubato gesturing.

[13] The clip is also available on: https://youtu.be/u2bigf337aU (Accessed: 18 December 2021).

I return to the beginning and listen again, trying to track the voice's seamless flow. The performance opens with gentle piano chords and swooshing brush movements on the snare drum, the bass comes in with a three-note figure and gives way for Fitzgerald's voice to enter the ensemble. The words move ponderously and there is a strong rubato on every sung line. At first, the dynamics are restrained and the melody advances only in small intervals, mostly seconds and thirds, with little harmonic modulation. Fitzgerald then moves out of the song's restrained frame at the beginning of the second verse, where she begins to sing in familiar melismatic character (on a higher pitch D4, on "Daddy", 00:50). Her melisma singing becomes more pronounced and ends in a long-stretched rubato figure. Throughout the song, her voice moves in correspondence with the bass which plays sparse melodic lines while overall still maintaining a cool and distanced flow with its repeated gestures of c-a#-g and e-f-g when in the tonic.

This rather reserved musical atmosphere breaks open at the onset of the chorus when Fitzgerald's voice lunges out. Her voice rises up in volume on the phrase "one of these mornings" (from D4, G4, A#4 to D5). Both listeners and the ensemble seem surprised by this spontaneous upsurge but they obey Fitzgerald's movement and follow along: the drums by emphasising the moment's driving force with repeated hits on the ride cymbal (as if applauding); from the audience, I believe to hear an appreciative scream; and in the video, Donald "Tee" Carson (piano) is seen turning his head towards Fitzgerald, he smiles but keeps his musical play unfazed. Fitzgerald holds the musicians and the audience within her voice's melodic flow: her vocal delivery takes centre stage and draws us as listeners, and the band members as listening participants, towards and into the musicking spell of her singing.

A similar vocal controlling of the band members is heard, too, at the end of the song (02:36) when Fitzgerald takes up the last line of the chorus ("There's a'nothing that can harm you"). She switches up the musical play gently but determinedly by moving the end of her

elaborate melismatic line to the D4 (on "you") instead of resting on the fifth below (G3) as expected. She moves the song and the ensemble into another direction, into the tonic of D. The ensemble rests and Ella Fitzgerald begins the 'coda' of the chorus in solo ("with Daddy and Mammy standing by, don't you cry"). Her slow tempo has the ensemble listening even more intently, we can hear her voice slowly but articulately move around the word "standing" (02:57 – 03:06) – almost resembling a slowed-down scat performance or an appoggiatura exercise. A few seconds later, she brings the ensemble back together on her command before her voice moves into another bent swaying (on "don't", 03:13 – 03:19). Again, her vocal delivery guides the play and gathers the musicking ensemble, collects their attention, and ultimately everyone's musicking engagement when she ends the song on a soothing rubato on a G4. Her voice lets the music slowly fade.

In a conversation with the conductor André Previn, Fitzgerald talks about her relation to the accompanying musicians. She says:

> Sometimes I think I run the piano players crazy, 'cause they have to follow. I sing just what comes out, and sometimes I guess it's confusing. (*Ella Fitzgerald - Something to Live For*, 2007)

Fitzgerald suggests that it is not she who commands the voice but that it is a musical force that animates her voice to flow with the music: what "comes out" through her voice is not necessarily herself but a musicking agency (ibid.). This is not a subjective force but one governed by music. What is this force that moves this voice to and in music? What gives her voice such a power to affect?

In this version of 'Summertime', Ella Fitzgerald's voice generates a powerful sense of focus. This musicking attentiveness is specific to the vocal play and vocal delivery of Ella Fitzgerald's musicking and can be called "vibe" (King, 2007, p. 173). Her accompanying players correspond with her and each other, they are enthralled by the vibe of her demanding voice. Ella Fitzgerald's singing plays a crucial role, her voice guides the ensemble. It is her

singing that decides when to slow down, when to retract, when to pause and give time or space to itself or the others. Fitzgerald's voice musicks the ensemble and musicks with the ensemble, particularly by way of its melodic hunches. Her enthralling of the ensemble is conducted by the voice's melismatic vibing, the fluid melodic shaping which stands in contrast to the stagnant harmonics. While the overall harmony mainly rests in D Minor, G minor, C Minor and Bb Major, her melismas carry the voice through a wide ambitus; the phrasing, too, is formed by the melismatic quality of the voice's melodies and seems to move the ensemble effortlessly.

When critics of vocal performances, voice teachers or voice scientists describe a vocalist's technical abilities, they often speak of 'vocal control' or 'control of voice' (Russell, 1907, p. 1; Monks, 2007, pp. 46, 157–160; Zarate and Altenmüller, 2013, p. 1; Eidsheim, 2017, p. 249). Such control is considered a determining factor of a singer's musical craft. Ella Fitzgerald's powerful musicking voice on 'Summertime' highlights this musical technicality of the vocal instrument. But it does more than that: it shows the voice as capable of transfixing the musical flow. Her voice conducts the musical play. Peter Szendy has written about the musical powers of the conductor. As a 'silent' musician and endowed with "*conductive* capacities" (Szendy, 2016, p. 121; original emphasis), the conductor is able to touch the musical play "from afar" (2016, p. 129). "The conductor is a fascinating telepathic machine. A machine to fascinate, quite precisely. And with galvanism" (2016, p. 128). Ella Fitzgerald is not a technician nor a silent musician, her voice is her musically sounding instrument. And yet in her voice's spellbinding performance, as heard in 'Summertime', musical power is at play (Thompson, 2019; Van Elferen, 2020, p. 152); I will discuss music's affective power in more detail in Chapter 5). By way of her voice's playing – the ritardando gesturing, the stretched phrasing and undoing of metrical time – she conduces, brings together, her participating musicians and myself as a listener and initiates an encounter of voice and music.

2.3. The musicking voice: an approximation

Ella Fitzgerald's voice in 'Summertime' provides a possibility to think the voice beyond a simplistic reduction to sound. Vibing – which is essential to Fitzgerald's musicking voice – is not just a sonic force. The musicking voice is manifold and constituted by the voice's numerous musical agencies, which include melody, rhythm, timbre, vocal range, vocal technique, phrasing, articulation, dynamic, attack and timing. All of these musical agents (Van Elferen, 2020, p. 14) constitute the interactive assemblage of the musicking voice: it is impossible to reduce the musicking voice to any of its constituent qualities. Although the musicking voice is undeniably produced by a physical, sounding body, reducing it to physiology or sound alone obscures its emergent qualities occurring in the performative play of music. I propose an approach to the musicking voice that moves beyond sonocentric confines and instead listens to the "incantatory power" (Jankélévitch, 2003, p. xxi) of the voice when it musicks. The vibing that I heard in 'Summertime' is an effect of this incantation. Ella Fitzgerald's voice reveals its vibing through musical performance. Where this voice cannot be reduced to sound, a theory of the musicking voice requires a conceptual framework of performativity.

2.3.1. The performativity of music

Erika Fischer-Lichte's *The Transformative Power of Performance: A New Aesthetics* aims to shift the study of theatre away from a text-centred approach and towards the performance and performativity of the drama (Fischer-Lichte, 2008). She argues that theatre should be studied as a performative event. Theatre, as any performance, depends, Fischer-Lichte maintains, not only on the 'work of art', a text, score or libretto, but more importantly, it is an event. As such, it is constituted by the interactions that happen between a text, the performers on stage and an audience (Fischer-Lichte, 2008, p. 36). Performance takes place, emerges, in this play between

all interactive participants. This shift to the eventness of performance results in a shift in aesthetics. Whereas hermeneutics was the main aesthetic approach to art when the focus is on the artwork, a hermeneutic aesthetics is no longer capable of accounting for the performance as an affective event. Against the hermeneutic model, Fischer-Lichte promotes an aesthetics that accounts for bodies, affects and the eventness of performance (2008, pp. 23, 36, 40). This aesthetic theory takes the subliminal, elusive and performative aspects of artistic practice and cultural production seriously.

Musicking

Fischer-Lichte's aesthetics of performativity resonates with the fundamental notion of music as performative. In musicology, performativity has been studied by scholars of Western classical music, ethnomusicologists as well as pop music scholars (Cook, 2012; Cook and Pettengill, 2013). Christopher Small has contributed a widely read discussion of music's performative constitution which would result in the neologism *musicking* (Small, 1998). Music, for Small, cannot be grasped as an object but only as an event, something that people *do*. Small reaches this conclusion by studying in detail the performative rituals of a Western art music concert. Meticulously, he describes the ritualistic actions that take place in a concert hall, from the architectural designs of concert spaces to the roles of composers, performers and conductors to the habitual practice of contemplative listening (1998, pp. 27, 78). By describing all the happenings that make up the music and which are not limited to the musical work, Small can posit that all of the diverse performative actions (such as musician's positioning on stage, announcements, applause, modes of listening etc) constitute the multi-faceted fabric of music. In short, music is not a singular object but an activity. Small replaces the noun music with the verb "musicking", which describes more appropriately the complex web of events, actions and relations that constitute music (1998, pp. 2, 9).

By turning away from a definition of music as an object and towards the action of musicking, Small also avoids defining music sonically. In a chapter dedicated to the role of the conductor in an orchestra, he portrays the conductor – similar to Szendy – as a silent musician whose gestures and movements nonetheless constitute orchestral musicking (1998, pp. 75–86). The conductor is as much a musicking participant as any other musician in the orchestra, despite the fact that they do not actually produce a sound. Such a conceptualising of musicking results for Small in a turn towards the gestures, movements, actions and interactions of musicians, listeners, composers and all other involved participants of a musicking event. These entities can be material (such as instruments, concert hall acoustics, performers or listeners) or immaterial (such as harmonic, melodic, rhythmic entities, perceptions or reflections of musicking). I deploy Small's idea of musicking for my theory of the musicking voice. I take up his notion of musicking as the performative interactivity of music to describe the voice that emerges in the interplay of music. The musicking voice, in my conception, is an entity that comes into being in the performance of music.

Musical performativity: the drastic

The musicologist Carolyn Abbate has provided another crucial intervention in the study of music and its performativity with her 2004 essay "Music – Drastic or gnostic?" (Abbate, 2004). Her conception of performance relates to both Fischer-Lichte's wider notion of performativity and to Small's notion of musicking. Abbate is concerned with the discipline of musicology; her question of music's performativity is epistemological. She asks: How can music be approached if not as a decipherable text (Abbate, 2004, pp. 515, 529)? Abbate's much cited text is a result of her ongoing engagement with the work of philosopher Vladimir Jankélévitch. Jankélévitch regards music's power to be "immediate, drastic, and indiscreet" (Jankélévitch, 2003, p. 1) and beyond hermeneutical grasp because "in itself, music signifies nothing, unless

by convention or association" (Jankélévitch, 2003, p. 11). In her essay, Abbate theorises this "drastic" approach to music further and opposes it to the "gnostic" which is based on a cognitive and reasoned understanding of music (Abbate, 2004, pp. 509–510). Abbate traces this approach to music as gnostic throughout the history of the discipline of musicology as an aesthetics of hermeneutics. Whereas hermeneutics was helpful in understanding music as text (formalism) or its relation to biography, history or sociality, Abbate claims that a hermeneutic understanding fundamentally misses the powerful effects that music has on its listeners and performers (Abbate, 2004, pp. 513–514). The drastic, in contrast to the gnostic, "connotes physicality, but also desperation and peril, involving a category of knowledge that flows from drastic actions or experiences and not from verbally mediated reasoning" (Abbate, 2004, p. 510). Like Fischer-Lichte and Small, Abbate refers extensively to the visceral and affective qualities of performance.

By making space for the drastic in music, Abbate has paved a way for musicologists to study the performative and affective powers of music and to take those visceral qualities of music seriously. Abbate's approach accepts music's affecting forces to exceed the gnostic reasoning of music found in formalism or hermeneutics because music's performativity is "contingent, fugitive to understanding" (Abbate, 2004, p. 529). The musicking voice, just like any act of musicking, resists an easy hermeneutic reading because it comes into being in performance, creating affective encounters that cannot be reduced to either its body nor a sonic materialism. I will discuss the affective qualities of the musicking voice in more detail in Chapter 5. For now, it is important to mention that these drastic experiences – as heard in the melodic vibing of Ella Fitzgerald's voice (2.2.) – must feature in the theorising of the musicking voice.

Performance theories of voice

How does this discussion of musical performativity relate to the voice in music? Arguably any vocal act, musical or otherwise, is performative (Duncan, 2004; Epping-Jäger and Linz, 2004; Schrödl and Kolesch, 2018). Studies of the voice in pop music have utilised performance theories but for the most part have focussed on questions of the performance of subjectivity and identity (Frith, 1996; Weheliye, 2002; Smith, 2008; Brooks, 2011; Jarman-Ivens, 2011). Historical musicology, too, has studied vocal performances. These studies, however, as Annamaria Cecconi argues, regard vocal performance as the interpretation *of* a given work but have failed to deal with the more theoretical question of the voice in the mode of musicking (Cecconi, 2005, p. 103). In recent years, the field of voice studies has turned to the performativity of voice, too (Eidsheim and Meizel, 2019b). In order to stress the voice's performative constitution, voice scholars use the terms 'vocality' or 'voicing' rather than the singular nominal term 'voice' (Eidsheim and Meizel, 2019a). Most of these studies on vocality or voicing describe particular practices of the voice or socio-political situations in which the voice is used (André, 2006; Weidman, 2006; Harkness, 2014; Schlichter, 2014; Magnat, 2020). Even though great progress has been made with regards to the performative constitution of the voice – in recent studies, voice is for instance conceived of as an event rather than an object (Eidsheim, 2015) –, much of the work found both in musicology as well as in voice studies do not attend to the abstract quality of the musicking voice and its distinct modes of performance. A number of studies describe voice as acts of identity formation or the negotiation of subjectivity (Weidman, 2006; Harkness, 2014; Schlichter, 2014); in other studies, voice primarily designates a body in performance (Cusick, 1999; Eidsheim, 2015). Of course, the voice is involved in performative acts of identity formation and dependent on physiology and vocal technique in music, too. But as I argued in this and the previous chapter, the musicking voice is not solely determined by its physiology or its sounding form. None of the above-

mentioned theories are concerned with the musicking voice as emerging in the interplay of musical performance or the specific musicking capacities of the voice illustrated by Ella Fitzgerald's powerful vibing and vocal play (2.0. and 2.2.). This musicking voice thus poses a problem to definitions of voice as merely corporeal or sonic. The remainder of this chapter will therefore approach the specific performativity of the musicking voice.

2.3.2. A theory of the musicking voice

Singing being

Upon the release of the English translation of Adriana Cavarero's widely read *For More Than One Voice* (Cavarero, 2005), the musicological journal *Women and Music* issued two critiques of the book, one by Mary Ann Smart (Smart, 2005; see Introduction), the other one by Annamaria Cecconi (Cecconi, 2005). Cecconi discusses Cavarero's philosophical project in detail and sketches its feminist politics of voice which is routed in a phenomenology of the physically sounding voice. Cavarero thinks the voice as an entity of sound rather than of *logos* (i.e. word). She critiques the logocentrism of voice found in much of Western philosophy of consciousness and linguistics in its aftermath (Cavarero, 2005, p. 181). I contest Cavarero's politics of voice in Chapter 4; for now, I follow Cecconi's argumentation. Cecconi concurs with Cavarero's critique of the logocentrism of voice. She takes issue, however, with Cavarero's attempt to transfer a politics of voice to the operatic voice (Cecconi, 2005, p. 102). Cecconi's main critique is that Cavarero's idea of voice remains unspecified: Cavarero posits voice simultaneously as a political, philosophical and metaphorical concept, a sounding entity as well as a musical figure in the context of opera. Cecconi, on the other hand, is interested in the musicality of voice and consequently states that "'[v]oice' and 'singing voice' are not the same" (ibid.).

I agree with Cecconi's diagnosis. Her critique of Cavarero's theory exemplifies how the term 'voice' is prone to conceptual conflation. Different vocal phenomena (such as singing or speaking) demand different theories of voice. For the problem at hand – the shortcomings of sonocentric conceptions of voice – Cecconi's critique serves as a welcome starting point. Cecconi notes the lack of musical models of voice within voice theories. Her intervention thus functions as a diagnosis of voice theories at large. Even though Cecconi does not develop a theory of vocal musicking herself, she imagines a theoretical engagement with the musical performativity of the voice (2005, p. 103). My theory of the musicking voice begins where Cecconi diagnoses this theoretical lack. Her intervention becomes fruitful for my project as her notion of musical performativity of voice does not engage in the problems of vocal essentialism, i.e. the reduction of voice to identity, subjectivity, corporeality or a sonic materialism. Instead, Cecconi argues that the voice in music becomes an abstract musicking entity. She writes:

> If we think of the singer as a voice-bearer, he or she performs a singing being whose sound is only partially determined by the interpreter's own unique (natural) vocal qualities. (2005, p. 102)

Cecconi is keen to complicate the causality between the singing voice and its indexical source (as discussed in Ch. 1): the singing voice does not (naturally) indicate a singularly traceable body nor does it index a voicer's subjectivity (see Ch. 4). Instead, the singer bears a voice in the moment of performance (ibid.). The singing voice, in Cecconi's comment, does not simply exist but comes into being in the act of singing. The voicer's physiology and their vocal technique shape the emergence of a voice in the moment of musicking. The singing voice is not solely "determined" (ibid.) by the voicer's technique or their physiology because the singing voice emerges in the performance as an autonomous being. The singer is merely its carrier, a "voicer-bearer" (ibid.). The singer's body will leave its mark on this entity – this is the voicer's unique timbral imprint, connected to vocal physiology and laced with the voice's

indexical problems (see Ch. 1; see Van Elferen, 2020, pp. 52–54) – but neither the singer, their vocal physiology nor the sound that is created are the "singing being" that Cecconi hears (Cecconi, 2005, p. 102). Cecconi is very precise about this: it is not the voicer who *becomes* a singing being but the voicer "*performs* a singing being" (ibid.; emphasis mine). This vocal musical entity therefore does not index an essentialist notion of identity, physiology or acoustics but emerges – as a being of singing – in the moment of the musical performance of voice. I have heard such a "singing being" before: in Ella Fitzgerald's subtle vocal opening gesture of her rendition of 'Summertime' (2.2.), in this vibe with which her singing voice carries the music and gathers the ensemble. I have also heard it in the sostenuto phrasing of her performance of 'Cry Me a River', in the time-bent wavering of her singing voice (2.0.). What is this "singing being" that Cecconi imagines and which I seem to hear in Ella Fitzgerald's singing voice?

Cecconi's intervention does not coalesce in an elaborate theory of the singing voice but it carves out a space for a theory of the voice as it musicks. She paves the way for a concept of voice which emerges in musical performance and which cannot be pinned down to a stable source (vocal production or physiology) nor can it be reduced to a sonic ontology or a listening phenomenology. For Cecconi, the voice in music must be conceptualised as a musicking entity in its own right, a "singing being" (Cecconi, 2005, p. 102). Let me dwell on this notion of the "singing being" a little longer.

Life of singing

In *Operatic Afterlives*, Michal Grover-Friedlander attempts a theorising of the singing voice that resembles Cecconi's "singing being" (Grover-Friedlander, 2011). Grover-Friedlander's question circles around the operatic singing voice and its relation to its operatic character. As opera's "meaning is engendered in singing" (2011, p. 16), Grover-Friedlander is interested in

theorising singing as a specific operatic and musical figure. She problematises the common idea that the singing voice relates directly to an operatic character on stage and argues that the operatic voice dissociates from the character in the libretto or the singer on stage. This singing voice is not fixed to a source but emerges in the performance of music, it is always "indirect and circumvented" (2011, p. 15).

Grover-Friedlander discusses this non-essentialist notion of the voice alongside opera's preoccupation with the staged death of its characters which she calls opera's "death song" (Grover-Friedlander, 2011, p. 16; also see Clément, 1989, pp. 5, 11, 22). In these so-called death songs, the characters die onstage or in the libretto, but their singing often continues in the musical performance. She highlights one such prominent example in Maria Callas depiction in Franco Zeffirelli's film (*Callas Forever,* 2002), where Callas' voice becomes a haunting figure dissociated from and yet inhabited by the famous singer. Grover-Friedlander argues that opera's death songs pose a problem to the relation between voice and character: it puts into question the 'being' of voice in opera because operatic singing oscillates between life and death. In death song, singing "grows independent of character and its utterance" (Grover-Friedlander, 2011, p. 15), "music overtakes narrative", and a narrative logic of opera is dispelled "in favor of singing" (2011, pp. 16–17). Throughout *Operatic Afterlives*, Grover-Friedlander discusses singing as a particularly striking and powerful musical entity. I am interested in these moments when the voice dissociates from its character and from its operatic staging, when the singing voice "takes on a life of its own" (2011, p. 20). In Grover-Friedlander's discussion, singing becomes a force that meanders between life and death, an entity that "has its own being, and is not the emanation of the character's subjectivity" (2011, p. 20).

The power of the musicking voice

What is this strange notion of the singing's own being that both Grover-Friedlander and Cecconi evoke? Singing is an act of musical vocal performance and in the moment of its performance, it can become a life-like force itself – this is what Grover-Friedlander suggests. It is enacted, performed, but not necessarily fully inhabited by a singer – this is what Cecconi suggests. It leaves the body of the singer – Steven Connor would say, "it goes" (Connor, 2000, p. 3) – and transforms into an entity that affects all involved musicking agents (its listeners, its participating musicians, the singer themselves and all other musical entities). This voice is not so much an object that can be isolated, studied and grasped; the musicking voice demands a different aesthetics. As there is always a lag between its production and its perception, studying this voice is a tracing of its effects. The musicking voice can only be heard as a musical event in time. In music, I argue, voice has a "life of its own" (2011, p. 20) and it has its own being.

Grover-Friedlander's idea of a life of the singing voice and Cecconi's notion of the "singing being" (Cecconi, 2005, p. 102) point to an immaterial aspect of musicking which counters not only a sonocentrism of voice but it, too, moves beyond the voice as a carnal essentialism (see Ch. 1). In fact, a sonic materialism, as argued before, leaves no space for ineffable experiences of and with music. I concur that musical performance and perception is always embodied, but in a materialist dictum of sound and music, a crucial immaterial affection is omitted. This immaterial affect of music arguably always forms part of the performance of music. To speak of the musicking voice's immaterial aspects then also means to speak of music's doubleness (see 2.1.2.).

The musicking voice – and in fact, music at large – is marked by an epistemological conundrum. As discussed previously, Isabella van Elferen has diagnosed such an epistemological problem in musicology with regards to timbre (see 2.1.2.) and has proposed a model of "musical vital materialism" for the study of timbre in music (Van Elferen, 2020, p.

156). Such a vital materialism – informed by Jane Bennet's theory of vibrant matter (Bennett, 2010) – allows musicology to bridge the paradox of music as both material and immaterial. Van Elferen argues that the problem of timbral theory – similar to Chion's discussion earlier (2.1.2) – is its binarity of materialism and idealism, to overcome therefore this "timbral binarism demands an engagement with a major unsolved problem in music epistemology" (Van Elferen, 2020, p. 135). Her solution is a musical vital materialism that "replaces binarism with pluralism and multidimensionality" (2020, p. 156). A theory of musical vitality accepts music to be both material *and* immaterial, object *and* subject, physical *and* metaphysical, affecting body *and* mind. Instead of imposing a decision, it enables to theorise the "relationality of musicking" (2020, p. 157). Van Elferen's musical vital materialism further refines music's "drastic" (Abbate, 2004, p. 510) and "ineffable" (Jankélévitch, 2003, p. 9) qualities as it centres the performativity of music without reducing music either to its sonic, corporeal materiality or to a lofty idealism of musical metaphysics. Even though timbre is not to be confused with the musicking voice, a similar doubleness is at play here, too. The musicking voice is physiological and hence phenomenological; but in its performance and its perception, it takes on the qualities and effects of an immaterial musicking force. When it affects its listeners, players and the musical flow, it exceeds the strictly phenomenological material of the voicer's emanating body and the mere acoustics of vocal sound. In performance, the voice interacts with all of its available musicking agencies and becomes a musical entity in its own right. It emerges as a musical force in the interactivity of musicking (see Van Elferen, 2020, p. 157).

The voice's musicking performativity is not simply a concept but can be perceived; just as music, it is not only transcendental but immanent, too (Mackey, 1987, p. 32). It might be "felt as thought" (Priest, 2013, p. 48), and in fact, such a feeling is often described by singers. Ella Fitzgerald, for instance, describes the voice as a strange being that is only partly under her vocal control, this idea is common also among voice teachers and students (see van Elferen,

2020, pp. 62–63). I return here to Fitzgerald's comment that I discussed earlier (see p. 99) where she admits to having only limited control over her voice; she says: "I sing just what comes out" (*Ella Fitzgerald - Something to Live For*, 2007). Fitzgerald acknowledges that there is an autonomous agency at play in the moment of singing that cannot fully be grasped by a singer's technical ability, their physiology or a sonocentric understanding of voice. Instead, this strange entity that "comes out" (ibid.) – or which comes together in coming out – might be a 'being' on its own. I draw on both Cecconi's and Grover-Friedlander's interventions as a springboard for my own theory and will follow this "multiplicitous voice that emanates as force" (Duncan, 2004, p. 290) and that I hear in Ella Fitzgerald's singing. I call this autonomous force the musicking voice.

2.4. Postlude: Ella Fitzgerald – 'How High the Moon'

Play

Ella Fitzgerald is not only famous for her seamless melodic vibe but also for her elaborate and improvised scat solos. Often, these solos weave together well-known songs and function as deviations and improvised versions of tunes: they often are performed as lengthy and spectacular medley sessions. The jazz standard 'How High the Moon' is one of the songs Ella Fitzgerald has regularly sung in concert and which has often generated such elaborate scat improvisations. The 1960 version recorded in Berlin and released on *Mack The Knife - Ella in Berlin* is one of her most famous scat improvisations (Fitzgerald, 1963). I listen to a 1966 version, recorded live in concert in Stockholm (ReelinInTheYears66, 2018).[14] In this live performance, Fitzgerald is accompanied by a smaller combo of piano (Jimmy Jones), drums (Gus Johnson), double bass (Joe Comfort) and trumpet (Cat Anderson). The performance

[14] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1GUmxnYheK0&ab_channel=ReelinInTheYears66 (Accessed: 18 November 2021).

begins with two verses (00:00 – 01:13), followed by the first chorus (01:14 – 01:40), which afterwards functions as the head of the improvisation. From here on, the main theme (the chorus 'How High the Moon') is interspersed with extended scat solo improvisations in which the head is repeatedly brought back in more or less recognisable form. I want to pay particular attention to the ways Fitzgerald *plays* the musical material with her voice. By listening to the *playing* of her voice, I want to focus once again on the musicking capacities of the voice – in this case mainly the rhythmical drive of her vocal performance.

The song begins with two verses which are sung in a comfortable register with smooth articulation remaining in the recognisable territory of the jazz standard. After the second verse, the group moves into the chorus with a lofty swing feel and in double time (01:12). Here, as the drums move the band into the chorus with a drum break, the bass picks up the groove and runs its continuous bass lines in semiquavers and Fitzgerald, snapping her fingers, starts singing her lines in a staccato-like fashion. Her vocal delivery changes accordingly: it switches from a stretched ballad-like singing with accentuated vibrato to a rhythmical vocalisation with focus on articulatory precision rather than phrasing or melody arc. The staccato singing corresponds with the quick bass line, not fully doubling it, but playing with it in slightly syncopated manner, both aligning and straying off the rigid pattern of bass and swinging drums. In this correspondence with bass and drums, Fitzgerald already indicates a move into scat territory and even comments on this change in tone and character when she addresses the audience: "we're singing it, 'cause you asked for it, so we're swinging it just for you" (01:21).

While the bass has already moved into a frantic bebop rhythm, Fitzgerald's shift in tempo and mood is more gradual (01:40). As is usual, the rhythm section becomes the backdrop of the chorus – with bass and drums playing quick patterns in semiquavers – while the piano keeps the tempo with accompanying chord progressions. Only Fitzgerald's singing voice and the trumpet roam more freely. Fitzgerald's voice solos over the rhythm section, scatting with

great flexibility, speed and often syncopating the breaks. The trumpet joins in or plays around Fitzgerald's voice intermittently, most noticeably when her riffing reaches a breaking point and has moved up to longer sustained almost yodel-like falsetto phrases, falling in octaves (02:05). The audience applauds the moment and Fitzgerald moves back to her scat riffing before she returns to the familiar line of the song by repeating the phrase "though the words may be wrong to this song, we ask you, how high high high…" (02:25).

In this rushing tempo (ca. 150 bpm), Fitzgerald keeps on switching up songs, riffs and the familiar standard over the course of the next three minutes: singing mock operatic aria impressions, evoking the song 'Idaho' (originally composed by Jesse Stone) and Charlie Parker's 'Ornithology', as well as juggling The Beatles' 'A Hard Day's Night' and The Platters' 'Smoke Gets in My Eyes'. This medleying through different tunes in her rapid vocal improvisation is fascinating, but I am more interested in the way Fitzgerald estranges her voice from lyrical congruence and instead styles it as a rhythmical force. In her acrobatic juggling of the main theme, she strays away from the song's melody and lyrics, allowing the voice to roam by shaking off lyrical comprehensibility in favour of rhythmical play. A similar form of vocal play occurs in the melismatic bending of the vocal lines on 'Summertime' (see 2.2.); but her scatting on 'How High the Moon' moves further towards the rhythmical abilities of the musicking voice. Let me zoom in on one particular moment.

In the first scatting episode (01:40 – 02:25), lyrical wording gives way to abstract phonemes which are uttered in complex rhythmical phrasing. Fitzgerald's voice moves from the discernible word "high" towards "hay di" and further to an abstract syllabic pattern of "ba doo dee lee dee doo dee loo dee do dee…". Her voice rushes ahead, syncopating the ensemble and swallowing the one of every bar; playing on the plosives *b* and *d* and the lateral consonant *l* (01:40-01:47). Then she switches to another riff where her scatting marks a short syncopated "boooo … daa daa daa" with strong emphasis on the *d* (01:47). But only for a second, before

it moves from a raspy “baa baa baaaeee” (01:48) to a softer utterance on a “dee” slightly higher in register (01:49). A short breath gives pause to the upbeat to the next phrase: “aah buueee” bounces from her lips (01:50).

In these first 20 seconds of the scat solo, Fitzgerald makes use of an exceptional amount of timbral nuance, partly evoking the sound and playing of the bass and the trumpet. A particularly striking example of such imitative playing can be heard a few seconds later (02:05). Here, Fitzgerald has reached a high D#5, uttered on an *e* vowel, when she lets her high D#5 fall down in portamento on a D# minor scale (A#4, G#4, F#4) down to the octave D#4. When the melody falls, the trumpet syncopates her vocal line (also on a D#5 and following her octave down to D#4). Trumpet and voice enter into a shadowing interplay, with the voice moving forward and the trumpet catching up and varying the voice’s phrasing. The voice’s timbre changes and approximates the trumpet. Such clear attack results from the shaping of her mouth to an *e* vowel, the D#5 seems to furthermore hit a resonant frequency and towers as a formant over the band as a whole. Timbrally, but also with regards to the phrasing and shaping of the melody, the voice aligns with the trumpet and, as on ‘Summertime’ (2.2.), it conducts the musical play of the ensemble. Despite aligning with and foreshadowing the trumpet, the voice marks itself as difference: the voice both aligns with the playing and the timbre of the trumpet and yet it does not merge into the trumpet’s timbre or its bebop rhythmical playing. This brief interplay of trumpet and voice (02:05 – 02:09) gathers my listening as it shows the voice’s astonishing adaptability as a musical player, mimicking the trumpet’s musical flow.

In his analysis of the structuring functionality of timbre in Louis Armstrong’s and Betty Carter’s scat solos, William Bauer describes scat singing as a specific vocal style that disjoins linguistic and musical meaning:

> by dissociating the vocal line from verbal meaning, scat singers venture into the realm of so-called ‘absolute’ music where musical sounds are apparently free of the extra-musical associations that words create, a realm typically identified with instrumental music. Jazz

> singers who explore this realm do so by adopting the role of the horn player in the ensemble. (Bauer, 2001, p. 303)

I do not agree with Bauer's notion of absolute music; nonetheless, his comment is productive for my discussion of Ella Fitzgerald's vocal playing. I follow his idea that scat singing allows for a clarity of musical play which many other forms of vocal music occlude. Due to its blurring of lyrical congruence and by way of imitating jazz combo instruments, scat singing verges on the realm of instrumental musicking. I argue that this musical capacity of the voice comes out when the voice timbrally and rhythmically mimicks instruments; in 'How High the Moon,' it is noticeable when Fitzgerald's voice grooves and plays with the trumpet. As Bauer notes, the instrument-like sound quality of scat singing is produced by the articulate shaping of phonemes in the moment of singing and is thus connected to vocal timbre (Bauer, 2001, pp. 317–318). Ella Fitzgerald's scat singing musicks such phonetic entities. Those phonetic sounds stray away from linguistic signification and instead become rhythmical strokes that structure the medley. In 'How High the Moon', timbre and rhythm co-constitute the musical phrasing of Fitzgerald's scatting voice and enable her to play it. Brent Hayes Edwards has described this quality of scatting as a "vocal play that liquefies words" (Edwards, 2002, 648). As in opera's death songs (Grover-Friedlander, 2011, p. 16), singing takes over the word; and in taking over the word, it takes hold of its listeners.

The element of play I discern is not simply the joy of singing and hearing Fitzgerald sing, but part of what constitutes the performativity of vocal musicking: Fitzgerald's voice performs and plays music. Playing becomes synonymous with musicking. The notion of 'playing music', however, tends to be reserved for the musical activity of playing an instrument or pressing the play button on a hi-fi device. The notion of playing could be extended to the musicking activities of singing in order to acknowledge the voice's musicking in playful interaction with other musicians as well as musical material. Playing signals the performativity

of the musicking voice. Ella Fitzgerald's play is the negotiation, appropriation and versioning of other songs into improvisations as heard in 'How High the Moon'. In 'How High the Moon', the musicking voice's playful performativity comes to the fore particularly in Fitzgerald's rhythmical grooving with the trumpet and her careering phrasing. Fitzgerald's voice cannot be described simply as a specific timbre or identity or be reduced to its sounding form; instead, in and through its play, this voice has itself become a musicking agency.

Improvisation

As mentioned before, scat singing is usually discussed in terms of imitation and the timbral and musical alignment of voice with certain instruments. It is referred to as a specific vocal musical style which originated most likely "in the USA as singers imitated the sounds of jazz instrumentalists" (Robinson, 2001). Scatting is considered a "form of vocalization [that] allows the voice to assume the role of an instrument, that is, to be used as if it were an instrument engaged in improvised solos" (Shipton, 2003, p. 159). These two definitions take up two common notions of scat that are important for my listening to Ella Fitzgerald's scatting voice: imitation and improvisation.

Many commentators have compared Ella Fitzgerald's voice – and scat singing more generally – to the sound of other musical instruments. In an essay titled *Ella…The Jazz Horn*, Dom Cerulli, for instance, writes that "Ella has always had a little of the tenor sax in her voice" (Cerulli, 1998, p. 41). In the Grove Music dictionary, Jessica Bissett Perea calls Fitzgerald's voice "horn-like" (Perea, 2015). Len Lyons speaks of the "instrument-like voice quality" in Fitzgerald's and other scat singer's voices (Lyons, 1988, p. 130). Such comparative descriptions of Ella Fitzgerald's voice are problematic because hearing Fitzgerald's voice as the sound of a horn or any other instrument not only reduces her singing voice to a vague notion of timbre – with all its indexical problems – but they furthermore render both Fitzgerald and

her voice mute, ridding them of any musical agency. Reducing the voice to a mere description of its sonic qualities arrests the musicking performance and prohibits the musicking voice from affecting its participatory musicking agents (musicians, listeners, Fitzgerald herself etc). Like the sonic theories of voice discussed above (2.1.1.), such sonocentric descriptions of scat singing are problematic as they undermine the voice's musicking agency. Sonocentrism omits the musicking power that is generated in vocal performance, particularly in improvisation.

It is important to note that imitation in the form of scatting cannot be understood as a simple copying or doubling of sound or melody. When Ella Fitzgerald's voice evokes the sound of a trumpet, her voice approaches the instrument's timbre but never fully merges in it. Fitzgerald *mimicks* the sound and the playing of the trumpet but never emulates it. Mimicry describes playing with the other and its shadowing or camouflaging rather than its copying. Fitzgerald's imitations always remain excessive: her voice performs *as if* it was another instrument. This is reminiscent of Cecconi's "singing being" which emerges in the act of vocal musicking (Cecconi, 2005, p. 102). As mentioned earlier, Cecconi describes the singer as a "voice-bearer" (ibid.):

> [the] voice on stage is always a 'performed/preformed' voice, coming from a performed body, since it is the singer who finds in herself the sound of another and builds it. (ibid.)

Although Cecconi's notion of "the sound of another" (ibid.) refers textually to the composer's 'voice', i.e. a written score, her idea of the voice as always performed and preformed resonates with my understanding of Fitzgerald's mimicking voice. In these moments of mimicking, Fitzgerald's musicking voice exceeds the voice's fixity to sound and identity by way of caricature – for instance, when she evokes and impersonates the vocal timbre and style of Louis Armstrong on 'I Can't Give You Anything But Love' (Fitzgerald & Holiday, 1980a). Most strikingly, these excessive imitations can be heard in her improvisatory medleys such as 'Airmail Special' (Fitzgerald & Holiday, 1980b) or 'How High the Moon' which I described earlier. In those medleys, Fitzgerald mimicks known melodies and songs, stitches them

together in improvisations and suggests familiar motives and phrases; but ultimately, she surprises her listeners by changing gears, switching melodies or making up new lyrics. The musicking voice, in Fitzgerald's scatting, differs from a voice that merely sounds.

It is important to reiterate that despite the play of imitation in her scat singing, Ella Fitzgerald and her voice do not turn into (the sound of) a horn, Ella Fitzgerald is not the "Jazz Horn" that Dom Cerulli wants to hear (Cerulli, 1998, p. 42). Neither Cerulli nor other sonocentric thinkers allow for the power of the musicking voice and its vocal-musical affections. To reduce the voice to the realm of the sonic simply ignores its musicking performativity. I argue that Fitzgerald's vocal play is not merely a "sonorous force" (Ikoniadou, 2019b, p. 75) but her vocal improvisations expose this voice as a musicking entity. Ella Fitzgerald's voice is a performative force because there is a musicking power that runs through it, affects it and is affected by it. This musicking voice shows that sonocentrism cannot grasp the voice's performative doings. Fitzgerald's voice overwhelms and drags along its fellow musicians and becomes a driving musicking force. Her improvisations suggest that this is due to her remarkable vocal control; at the same time, however, her improvisations suggest a free playing and vibing of music. This is a musicking force beyond anyone's immediate control – Fitzgerald's, the band's or the listener's.

In her vocal improvisations and in the ensemble playing, Fitzgerald embraces what Fred Moten calls the "transformative effect of improvisation" (Moten, 2003, p. 119). In the play of her voice and in vibing with her accompanying musicians, Fitzgerald's voice shows that the musicking voice is dynamic and ever evolving. In performance, it emerges as a musicking entity which conveys an "efferent force […] that converts us every time" (Jankélévitch, 2003, p. 89). As such, it cannot be reduced to a single body nor to a sonic materialism. Sonocentric approaches to voice cannot comprehend the voice's musicking performativity, they exclude

the nuance and playfulness of voice in the mode of musicking. The musicking voice does not solely sound, it musicks. And musicking implies agency.

3. The musicking voice and its phonographic effictions

Kate Bush's song 'Leave It Open' plays on my headphones (Bush, 1982).[15] I hear drums, bass and piano chords; but my listening is led astray by the many wandering voices. The first one sings through a flanger effect and multiplies; another squeaks from the background and is doubled by a slapback delay, transposed to a higher register as if it were a child's voice. A swarm of other voices swoops from the right stereo space to the left and whispers strange words into my muddle-headed ears: "harm is in us". This ghostly breathing is countered by an ensemble of deeper, more steadfast voices grunting a similarly cryptic "power to arm" from the centre of the stereo space. In these first few moments of the track, my listening is held in tension by this polyphonic band of voices that sing, creak, roam and hush from all directions. Who or what sings here? And what is *left open*?

Not all voices on 'Leave It Open' can be ascribed to Kate Bush's remarkable and memorable voice. Some of the choral voices derive from deeper vocal registers, such as the responding ensemble in the chorus. Yet most of the differently sounding and differently performed voices on the track are recordings of Kate Bush's voice. Of course, Bush is known for her extraordinary voice. The reproduction of her voice that I can hear on 'Leave It Open' and other tracks of its album *The Dreaming* are, however, a more abstracted version of her previous vocal performance. Bush's vocal prowess has been studied in its own right (Gordon, 2005; Withers, 2017) but, in this chapter, I am particularly interested in the phonography of Bush's musicking voice. By playing and manipulating the voice in the studio, by treating it as abstract sound material, Bush invites me to a questioning of the musicking voice's phonographic constitution. Kate Bush's voices – in the case of 'Leave It Open', they certainly are plural – are suitable as an example because her work employs the phonographic voice and

[15] The song is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fBlox63041w (Accessed: 1 September 2021).

vocal manipulation as a musicking entity. They provoke a chain of questions regarding a theory of the voice in music: Whose voice am I hearing? Can I still hear these different voices as representations or mediations of her voice? Can I still delineate an ontology of the voice from its technological reproduction? When I listen to 'Leave It Open', do I hear a performance or a recording of a performance or is there a phonography at play that dispenses the dichotomy of performance and recording? What kind of effects does the musicking voice generate in its phonographic reproduction? And how can I theorise these effects of the musicking voice?

The phonographic voice

The phonographic voice is a stubbornly uncanny phenomenon resulting from sound reproduction technologies. Theorists have long been fascinated by the phonographic voice as it uncovers a set of theoretical problems (Dolar, 2006, p. 78; Kane, 2014, pp. 182–186): the reproduced voice "confronts us with [the voice's] disturbing and uncanny nature" (Dolar, 2006, p. 22). The voice's reproducibility problematises the voice's ontology, its uniqueness, its assumed liveliness and evanescence as well as its sound source. In sum: sound reproduction, as numerous scholars have argued, troubles fundamental assumptions of the voice's naturalness (Weheliye, 2002, p. 34; Sterne, 2003, p. 21; Middleton, 2013, pp. 294–295).

Often, the phonographic voice is imagined as a disembodied voice. In Chapter 1, I argued that the voice's relationship to its body is always precarious. The possibility of its reproduction, however, opens a new problem because "the phonograph [offers] a disembodied voice" (Laing, 1991, p. 7). Rather than rest with the idea of the phonograph's potentials to 'free' the voice from its bodily constraint, theorists have argued that the voice's reproduction not only highlights its problematic relationship to its singer and their body but also challenges "the philosophical identification of the voice with an animating soul or subject" (Kane, 2014, p. 185; also see Chapter 4). In fact, by underdetermining its sound source (Kane, 2015b, p. 99),

sound reproduction renders the voice not more but less determinate, as Richard Middleton and Barbara Engh have argued (Middleton, 2013, pp. 296, 300). Instead of providing information regarding the voice's provenance or its meaning, the phonographic voice opens up a "gap of undecidability", it leaves the voice in pending "relations of inside/outside, subject/object" (Engh, 1994, p. 128). The "recorded voice refuses the boundaries of any given body" (Middleton, 2013, p. 294). Kate Bush's 'Leave It Open' has already pre-empted my main argument: phonography does not represent an original image or body of the voice but enables the musicking voice to create new and multiple entities. In this chapter, I will listen to this phonographic indeterminacy from which the musicking voice emerges.

Phonography arguably has much to say about the musicking voice. Instead of essentialising the voice, phonography turns the voice into an entity that is always produced. Scholars who have theorised the phonographic voice, however, have often not specified the mode of the voice's performance: Does it speak or sound or remain indeed a silent phenomenological voice? Most theories of the phonographic voice do not yet concern the specific musicking voice. For the remainder of this chapter, I will expand on Middleton's and Engh's notion of the phonographic voice's indeterminacy by way of the phonographic voice that musicks. Kate Bush's vocal studio experiments assist my theorising.

The issue of phonographic indeterminacy touches again on the problem of the theoretical shortcomings of vocal ontologies. In Chapter 2, I have argued that the musicking voice cannot be theorised by way of sonocentrism or a sonic materialism; its study must take into account the specific musicking agency that animates the voice. The musicking voice in its phonographic constitution cannot be simply regarded as a reproduced sound or voice. While the phonographic voice deals only with the problem of the reproducibility of a general notion of voice, I am concerned with the intersection of 'phonography', 'voice' *and* 'musicking'. When the phonographic musicking voice is not only sound but ultimately a musicking entity,

what is being recorded, reproduced or written? What is the phonographic musicking voice? It is a sounding entity, yes, but not solely. Sound technologies of music are always involved in musicking, they are not neutral or passive participants but rather active musicking agents (Blake and Van Elferen, 2015, p. 67; Ismaiel-Wendt, 2016, pp. 3–4). *How* the musicking voice is recorded, replayed or reproduced matters – not only sonically but musically. Serge Lacasse, for instance, has discussed this with regards to certain paralinguistic and musical inflections in vocal performance; he calls this the "phonographic staging" of the voice (Lacasse, 2010, p. 230). Rather than rehashing a discussion of music's media technologies and their estranging of the voice, I want to ask about the phonographic constitution of the musicking voice. I am not concerned with phonography's impact *on* the musicking voice but with the phonography *of* the musicking voice. This questioning not only poses the musicking voice as a performative and musicking entity (see Chapters 1 and 2) but also *and at the same time* as a phonographic entity: I argue that the musicking voice emerges in a convergence of performance *and* recording. A double-movement of phonography – as both performance *and* recording – enables me to move away from ontological accounts of sound, music and the voice found in many theories of sound reproduction.

In order to theorise the phonographic musicking voice, I first want to discuss different models of phonography. Phonography most often is thought either as capture, as representation or as mediation (3.1.). I problematise these different notions of phonography with a focus on the phonographic voice. Where these models differently problematise the ontologies of sound and voice, they often also re-introduce a binary logic of an originary sound and its subsequent reproduction. By way of Alexander Weheliye's discussion of phonography as re/production, I propose a model of phonography that evades the logic of original and copy (3.2.). Weheliye argues that "any sound re/production is technological, whether it emanates from the horn of a phonograph, a musical score, or a human body" (Weheliye, 2005, p. 7). The musicking voice,

as I have argued in previous chapters, defies an immediate identification with its sound source (Chapter 1) and with a singular ontology, such as a sonic materialism (Chapter 2). I will extend Weheliye's notion of phonography by way of Fred Moten's comments on Theodor W. Adorno's writings on phonography. All three theorists problematise the dichotomies of performance and recording, of subject and object, and enable a different theorisation of phonography that moves away from a binary logic of sound and reproduction.

In 3.3., I return to Kate Bush's track 'Leave It Open' and analyse the musicking voice in its concrete phonographic constitution. Listening to Kate Bush's voice and her work with the Fairlight CMI will lead me to a discussion of the musicking voice's phonography (3.4.). I will engage in the work of Peter Szendy in order to unsettle an ontology of voice which still haunts the models of phonography discussed in 3.1. Szendy's notion of "effiction" enables me to trace the fictive productions of the phonographic musicking voice (Szendy, 2016, p. 15). By way of a close listening to Kate Bush's voices, I argue that the phonographic musicking voice cannot be thought as capture, representation or mediation; on the other hand, her musicking voice generates *another reality*, it produces musical effictions.

3.1. Phonography as capture and representation

Phonography as capture

John Durham Peters and Eric W. Rothenbuhler attempt a media theoretical definition of phonography in an article called "Defining Phonography: An Experiment in Theory". They write:

> The phonograph inscribes not the spirit of music but its body, its *acoustic being in time*. Phonography *captures* not the code but the act, not the script but the voice, not the score but the performance. (Peters and Rothenbuhler, 1997, p. 243; my emphasis)

I want to stress two particular points of their statement: the "acoustic being in time" (ibid.) and the notion of capture. Several problems appear in their description of music's ontology. For

one, there is an assumption of a strict difference between music's immaterial metaphysics (here called music's "spirit") and its material physics (its "body"). This strong division is a common mistake made about music. As discussed in the previous chapter, musicking emerges as a twofold and non-divisible simultaneity of immaterial and material affection (see 2.1.2.). Even more problematic is their understanding of music's being residing on the side of the body. Not only do Peters and Rothenbuhler understand music's being – which in a Kittlerian twist converges with acoustics (see 2.1.1.) – as its body but their notion of music seems furthermore untouched by the media processes of phonography. This brings me to the second issue: phonography as capture. Sonic media technologies are often conceptualised as devices of capture which becomes a problem for musicking and the voice (Wright, 2017). By conflating music's being with its body, and furthermore music's body with the voice, Peters and Rothenbuhler fall prey to what I have discussed previously as the problem of a sonic materialism of voice (see 2.1.). Their phonographic voice is a mimetic image of an a priori event (for instance, a vocal performance) and as such only ever an imperfect copy of a more original and 'real' voice. Phonography understood as capturing an original sound becomes problematic as it ignores the deconstructive work of phonography with regards to sound, music and the voice (Middleton, 2013, p. 294). Peters and Rothenbuhler's notion of musical ontology as an "acoustic being in time" (re)introduces a musical subject which in the process of phonography alienates itself from its body (Peters and Rothenbuhler, 1997, p. 243). Phonography as capture reintroduces the long-held belief of sound reproduction as a form of disembodiment. Peters and Rothenbuhler's notion of the musical voice's ontology as situated merely on the side of the body can thus be read as an attempt to render the voice as only material. Phonography, however, highlights the voice's (already inherent) problematic relationship to its material body and to a stable source or ontology. The musicking voice cannot be captured in recording. As the musicking voice has an unresolved relation to its body, it is

both disembodied *and* embodied (Dolar, 2006, pp. 59–60; Jarman-Ivens, 2011, p. 8). Reproducing the voice cannot lead to a sudden disembodiment; rather this problem of and with the voice's body exists before *and* after phonography. Furthermore, as the musicking voice has no singular ontology (its body or its sound), it has no being and particularly no "acoustic being in time" (Peters and Rothenbuhler, 1997, p. 243) that abstracts further in phonographic reproduction. As I have shown in Chapter 2, the musicking voice's being – if music ever grants such a totality – emerges in the performativity of musicking and does not exist *in* or come *from* the voice 'itself'. If phonography does not capture an original image of the voice, does it represent? And if so, *what* does it represent?

Phonography as representation

The reproducibility of sound has not only been discussed in media studies but in musicology, too. Here, phonography is often understood to be a representation of a musical event. Sound is *re*produced and has an origin *a priori* to its representation: first there is sound, then there is its reproduction. This, of course, has consequences for the conceptualisation of music that is being reproduced. In a representational model of recorded music there is a state of *pure*, pre-mediated music and only *a posteriori* recorded music. The problem with representational models of phonography – similar to the model of capture – is the ontological difference between sound and its reproduction. Such a representational model can be found for example in Simon Zagorski-Thomas' *The Musicology of Record Production* from 2014. Here, Zagorski-Thomas claims that musicology "hasn't sufficiently addressed the ontological question of how recording changed music and how that change needs to be incorporated into its study" (Zagorski-Thomas, 2014, p. 1). By focusing on how recording technology *changes* music, Zagorski-Thomas imagines and holds onto an idea of music as positing somehow, somewhere an *a priori*, that is pre-technological. When he claims that "recording changed music" (ibid.), he imagines a pre-mediated situation of music, a time or locus in which music was untouched

by processes of technological mediation and untouched by phonography. This pre- or non-technological ontology of music is problematic for a general discourse of music and even more so in the case of the musicking voice. In such a representational model Kate Bush's singing, for instance, would need to be sketched as pre-technological: there would be a voice of Kate Bush before and one after phonographic reproduction. Zagorski-Thomas contends that "[r]ecorded music is a representational form of art. […] [W]hat is produced is a schematic representation of some real or constructed performance" (Zagorski-Thomas, 2014, p. 6). But if we think of the different voices on Kate Bush's track 'Leave It Open', what are they representing? Even if they were to represent a "constructed performance" (ibid.), what kind of performance is this and how can we account for the many and different voices that are heard on the track?

The problem is a reliance on the notion of representation. Representation always calls for a recording of an original event, no matter how artificial or constructed it seems to be. This is the problem of the representational logic of phonography: an original event will always function as a first and any subsequent reproduction will conform to the logics of mimesis and copy. The idea of recorded music as representational still populates musicology and its study of recorded music, as canonical texts such as Mark Katz's *Capturing Sound* or the anthology *The Cambridge Companion to Recorded Music* suggest (Cook *et al.*, 2009; Katz, 2010). However, representational models have also been critiqued: many pop music scholars have shown how recorded music needs to be studied as its own phenomenon, not in relation to an idea of performance that is being recorded (Wicke, 2016). In fact, much of pop music can only be conceived if the specific aesthetics of reproduction are studied in their own right and not as representations *of* performances (Gracyk, 1996; Frith, 2006).

I argue that a representational model of sound reproduction falls short of accounting for the many different voices on Kate Bush's 'Leave It Open'. The track exemplifies how digital

sampling technology obfuscates her singing voice and how it blurs the distinction between performance and recording. But instead of asking for the 'real' voice of Kate Bush, one that is technologically unharmed, 'Leave It Open' rather fails to provide a place or time in which there ever was an 'original' voice of Kate Bush.

Artificial representation or remediation

In an afterword to the *Cambridge Companion to Recorded Music*, Georgina Born offers a more complex model of recorded music which tries to account for the mediations and re-mediations that make up the processes of recording/playback/dissemination (Born, 2009), particularly with regards to digital sampling technologies and its practices of versioning and remixing. Born introduces a model of music in the digital realm that accounts for the artificiality of any kind of sound reproduction. She writes that "recording as representation should be grasped as fully, positively artificial" (Born, 2009, p. 300). Born claims that recorded music is not simply involved in processes of representation but goes beyond simplistic notions of mimesis and towards an artificial representation. By way of Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin's media theory, Born maintains that in the age of digital reproduction, any musical production is technologically and culturally mediated and remediated (Bolter and Grusin, 1999).

While Born's model already signals phonography's artificiality and problematises the quest for an origin of sound reproduction, I want to extend her argument further. I contend that the musicking voice/s that we have heard on Kate Bush's 'Leave It Open' are not only "positively artificial" (Born, 2009, p. 300) and remediations of artificial origins; but they are "artifactual" (Derrida and Stiegler, 2002, p. 5). In a conversation with Bernard Stiegler, Jacques Derrida argues that media technologies are machines of "artifactuality" (ibid.), they fabricate a reality that is always already artificial because it has been produced. "No matter how singular, irreducible, stubborn, distressing or tragic the 'reality' to which it refers, 'actuality' comes to us by way of a fictional fashioning" (2002, p. 3). Phonography, arguably, creates its own, real-

effectual entities and places itself in time. Born's model of remediation accounts for the mediated networks through which any sound production ultimately comes into being. But it leaves the problem of representation untouched. No matter how artificial or 'unnatural', in Born's conception of digital music, sound reproduction remains "a representational form of art" (Zagorski-Thomas, 2014, p. 6). The musicking voice or voices that I hear on 'Leave It Open', however, trouble any notion of representation as they do not so much return to an original voice but create voices, musicking voices, which have not *been* before, which have no origin that is not already phonographic. They are products of Kate Bush's phonographic machine.

3.2. Phonography as re/production

How can phonography be theorised if not as the capture of sound, its representation or mediation? Alexander Weheliye provides an answer in his book *Phonographies: Grooves in Sonic Afro-Modernity* (Weheliye, 2005). Weheliye says little about the voice but his theory of phonography nonetheless helps my thinking around the question of the phonographic musicking voice. He is interested in a different narration of modernity, one which does not think modernity merely as a narrative of whiteness and progress; instead, Weheliye emphasises that there is a "codependency of blackness and the modern" (Weheliye, 2005, p. 45). Weheliye finds a different narrative in Afro-diasporic music cultures and its sound technologies, particularly DJ mixing practices. Crucial to Weheliye's discussion of a different narration of modernity is the disbanding of the binary logic of original and copy. Weheliye attempts to overcome the technological divide of sound and its reproduction: Afro-Modernity, for Weheliye, problematises a logocentrism by making space for a thinking in and with sound (2005, pp. 34–35, 203). Phonography highlights not only iterability with regards to language but incorporates an aurality, in particular sound and music. Music, for Weheliye, is always

technological, no matter if it is produced in an elaborate studio environment or performed more spontaneously. In return, Weheliye argues that the developments of sound reproduction technologies are "unthinkable without black music" (2005, p. 20). For this reason, Weheliye calls black musical production "*techne*logical" rather than *techno*logical (2005, p. 20; my emphasis). This refers to Derrida's thinking of writing as "originary supplementarity" (Derrida, 2011, p. 75). The idea that technology or technique is not ancillary to any cultural production but constitutes any human body "originarily" (Derrida, 1992, p. 244) resonates in Weheliye's thoughts on phonography. He writes that "sound recordings do not secure evidence of preexisting information but 'merely' disseminate recorded sounds: they are forever suspended in a circulatory tide" (Weheliye, 2005, p. 24). As writing, phonography renders any sound production iterable – including the musicking voice (2005, pp. 30–31): "any sound re/production is technological, whether it emanates from the horn of a phonograph, a musical score, or a human body" (2005, p. 7). In contrast to representational models of sound recording which will always repeat the problems of mimetic renderings of original and copy (see 3.1.), Weheliye proposes a notion of phonography

> as a machinic ensemble (to cross-fade Fred Moten's and Deleuze and Guattari's idioms) that accents the eventness of the (re)production of the source; the source is always (re)produced as an (anti)origin while also appearing as a differently produced occasion in each of its singular figurations. (2005, p. 32)

Production and reproduction of sound and music are intertwined in Weheliye's notion of phonography. Reproduced sound does not represent but rather initiates another production, it produces a sounding and musical event upon (re)play. By including a slash in between the words *reproduction* and *production* (re/production), by arguing that "any sound re/production is technological" (2005, p. 7), Weheliye highlights phonography's productivity which is already inscribed in every reproduction. Phonography occasions an event, a new encounter with sound which both depends on a recording as well as on a performance; not only can recording itself be regarded as a performance but its reproduction again calls for a performance

in perception. This is the paradox of the "phonographic event" (Middleton, 2013, p. 302). In pop music, this productive work of phonography has long been acknowledged because records are not reproductions of performances but "musical events *in themselves*" (Frith, 2006, p. 237; original emphasis).

If sound recordings do not actually capture sound or "secure evidence" (Weheliye, 2005, p. 24) of a sound source, how do performance and recording relate? This is not to ask if a performance is being recorded but how recording and performance can be thought *together and at the same time*. With regards to my specific question, I ask: how can the musicking voice be thought both as a recording *and* a performance? The double bind of performance and recording is also at the heart of Fred Moten's discussion of phonography. In Moten's case the question of performance and recording moves slightly away from the discussion of record production and instead highlights the indivisibility of the subject and object of the phonographic voice.

Recording *and* performance

Similar to Weheliye, Moten, too, has thought about the centrality of phonography for a counter narrative of modernity; one example can be found in his essay *The phonographic mise-en-scène* where he understands the Black opera singer Jessye Norman's recorded performance of Arnold Schönberg's *Erwartung* as an "invented and philosophical sensing [that] is the anorigin of our modernity" (Moten, 2004, p. 270). In this essay, Moten discusses Theodor W. Adorno's writings on the phonograph and attempts to move "through the opposition of the denigration of the recording in the discourse of performance and the denigration of performance in the discourse of 'classical' musicology" (Moten, 2004, p. 272). In short: Moten, by way of Adorno, theorises the phonographical as a specific site where recording and performance converge. As Ruth Sonderegger has remarked, despite their political and aesthetic differences (Sonderegger, 2020, p. 81), Moten's and Adorno's philosophies align on the issue of the phonographic. It is

here, in the recording or capturing of musical performances that processes of objectification and subjection become problematic. For Adorno, these are processes of the commodification brought around by the culture industry whereas Moten reads them in terms of slavery and Black subjectivity. In both their discussions, however, the indivisibility – or, in Moten's terms, convergence (Moten, 2004, p. 280) – of object and subject is rendered audible by "the montagic, dissonant, syncopated abstract" (Moten, 2004, p. 270) machine of the phonograph (Sonderegger, 2020, pp. 104–108).

For Adorno, the phonograph marks a central moment in musical history as it unsettles music's ontology. Evidently, Adorno's thinking of music is governed by an idealist notion of mainly German classical music and its bourgeoise systems of composition, notation and performance. He argues that music's ground has been shaken by phonography's possibility of re/production as music has found its "true character as writing" (Adorno, 2002b, p. 280). He writes: "In the aesthetic form of technological reproduction, these objects" – Adorno mentions here particularly the reproduced voice – "no longer possess their traditional reality" (Adorno, 2002a, p. 271). The phonograph "transforms not only the technology of distribution but also that which is distributed" (ibid.); after the invention of the phonograph, there is no music that can be considered without its possible reproduction. When Adorno mentions the voice specifically as one such object which loses its "traditional reality" (ibid.) due to reproduction, its status becomes troublesome. Adorno finds the problem of the phonograph for music's ontology in the phonograph's triangulation of sound, body and reproduction (Adorno, 2002a, pp. 274–275). Arguably, the reproduction of sound divides the voice or any sound from its emanating body; this of course is the discourse of the disembodied voice which in the case of Adorno becomes a site of a crude and hardened sexual difference. Whereas the male voice is able to be recorded (such as Caruso's famous phonographic voice), the female voice on the other hand – which in contrast to the male voice requires "the body as a complement" (Adorno,

2002a, p. 274) – lacks in reproductive fidelity (Adorno, 2002a, pp. 274–275). This sexual difference that Adorno lays out is – to say the least – absurd, it attempts to bridge the problem of the voice's body by reference to a sexual binary. What crystallises in Adorno's discussion of the phonographic voice, however, is the problem of the voice's subject and object, of subjecthood and objecthood (Engh, 1994, p. 134; Moten, 2004, pp. 275–278). Even though Adorno would famously propose the "preponderance of the object" in his *Negative Dialectics* (Adorno, 2007, p. 183) from 1966, Moten makes clear that Adorno fails to acknowledge the object's potential to resist its subjection in his phonograph texts written in the late 1920 and early 1930s (Moten, 2004, p. 280). The reification of the voice due to phonographic reproduction brings forth a question of sexual difference, which for Moten becomes also a site of racial difference (Moten, 2004, pp. 277–279). By allowing this sexual difference to govern his thoughts on the phonograph's subjections, Adorno accepts the voice's reproduction as a form of objectification. The musicking voice which emerges from the phonographic situation does not simply side with a (musical) subject, it too, has become an object in the process of phonographic re/production. As Adorno's aesthetics of music imagines a bourgeoisie autonomous subject, the acceptance of music's objectification in phonography causes grave issues, it moves music away from a subject and re-organises the dichotomies of musical subject and object.

In contrast to Adorno, Moten has no problem with the dis/appearance of the body in phonographic musicking. For Moten, phonographic music is not so much disembodied but, in line here with Kodwo Eshun, hyperembodied (Eshun, 1998, p. -002). Moten insists that phonography reveals the failure of the reduction of "the material trace" (Moten, 2004, p. 277), this for Moten is particularly the case in the musical aesthetics of the Black radical tradition. As re/production, phonography not only highlights an indexical 'originary' body, as acousmatics teaches us (see 1.3.), but furthermore also instantiates another body, it produces

new bodies – this is the anorigin that Moten hears in Jessye Norman's *Erwartung*. Rather than representing an origin, Moten, similar to Weheliye, suggests phonography is the "engineering of musical ~~re~~production" (Moten, 2003, p. 225). The return to an original body or sound source is crossed out (~~*re*~~) because phonography does not capture a performance but generates new performances. Such a new performance is, for instance, the rhythmical phrasing of Marvin Gaye's singing voice that Moten hears on his 1971 *What's Going On*. Gaye's musicking voice only emerges "in the performance that is recording" (ibid.). Gaye's musical performance is not imaginable without a recording, i.e. a form of objectification: "There is no performance in the absence of the recording" (Moten, 2003, p. 81).

It is of course crucial to note that Moten's notion of phonography is particular to his discussion of an aesthetics of the Black radical tradition; Moten is interested in the possibility of the object's resistance to its subjection. The convergence of recording and performance "marks and makes possible that resistance of the object" (Moten, 2003, p. 225). What he hears in the phonographic "convergence of personhood and audiovisual objecthood" (Moten, 2004, p. 280) is Black sociality and Black subjectivity in the making. But even though Moten's discussion of phonography is developed along the particular aesthetics of the Black radical tradition, it enables me to rethink a general idea of phonography.

As Weheliye has argued, phonography disrupts the dominant narrative of modernity: this is a deconstruction of the predominant systems of writing that centre language. Weheliye's deconstruction allows for a different mode of writing of the sonic and the musical. I am interested in both Weheliye's and Moten's conceptions of phonography as they undo the problems of the dichotomy of original and copy on the one hand and open up to thinking the phonographic as an event that occasions the creation of new encounters and bodies on the other. The musicking voice can be thought as a phonographic event which emerges in the double bind of recording and performance, it emerges in between subject and object. This deconstructive

overturning of phonography – where neither performance nor recording are separate entities – has consequences for an understanding of sound, music and voice. There is no sound or voice that is not already reproduced or traced. That also means that any ontology of voice risks getting caught up in the ideality and purity of voice (see Chapter 2). Phonography highlights the voice's impurity, its inherent workedness and artifactuality. As discussed earlier with Weheliye, phonography does not disrupt music or remove its body, but it is a productive machine involved in the affections of musicking.

3.3. Phonographic polyphony: Kate Bush and the Fairlight CMI

Kate Bush truly became a studio musician by the time of the release of her third album *Never for Ever* (1980). While her previous records *Lionheart* (1978) and *The Kick Inside* (1978) had made her a famous singer and songwriter, her turn to the studio and its different possibilities for phonographic musicking fully manifested in the early 1980s. This development can be heard most strikingly on the album *The Dreaming* (1982) where she is credited as the sole producer. *The Dreaming* has often been received or even disregarded as Bush's most experimental work (Toop, 1995, p. 275; Lindsay, 2012). Where *Never for Ever* already made extensive use of the newly developed digital sampler Fairlight CMI, *The Dreaming* further expanded it. This encounter with the new synthesizer and its new potential for sound sampling, recording and manipulation had radical consequences for her musical output and particularly her use of voice. Before I return to a closer analysis of the music and to 'Leave It Open', I will provide a brief overview of the Fairlight CMI technology and discuss its "phonographic work" (Großmann, 2016, p. 359).

Fairlight CMI

The Fairlight CMI (Computer Music Instrument) was introduced in 1979 as one of the earliest commercially available digital synthesizers. The switch from analogue to digital sampling

allowed the user to record, manipulate and play back sound almost instantaneously: sound could either be recorded with a microphone and then manipulated or sound waves could be drawn directly onto the monitor (see Figure 2). Furthermore, the digital sampler came with a large array of presets which again could be manipulated and altered. The work produced with the digital sampler – Fairlight CMI only being one example – was considered more precise and faster and led at least theoretically to a larger shift in music production from analogue to digital in the 1980s (Bennett, 2019, pp. 19–24; Harkins, 2020).

Figure 2: Fairlight CMI Series IIx (1983). Photograph available at: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fairlight_CMI-IIx.jpg (Accessed: 4 September 2021). Licensed under the Creative Commons license, author of source: Peter Wielk.

The company Fairlight (founded by the engineers Kim Ryrie and Peter Vogel) was based in Australia but the new technology was embraced particularly in the UK. One of the reasons was the early promotion of the synthesizer by the BBC, both in television formats (such as the BBC's *Tomorrow's World* (see Synthasy2000, 2011)) as well as in their studios of the BBC Radiophonic Workshop (Harkins, 2020, p. 33). Peter Gabriel, subsequently, to be Kate Bush's

collaborator, was an early and avid user of the instrument, too. For the ITV programme *South Bank Show*, Gabriel was filmed during his work for his fourth solo album *Security* (1982) which would prominently feature the Fairlight CMI. In the video from the show, we observe Gabriel demonstrating the instrument.[16] With the microphone, he records different sounds, such as his voice, the breaking of glass or the beating of metal. For the sound processing, he makes use of the visualisation of the sound waves on the monitor (see Figure 2). Afterwards, Gabriel is able to play the recorded sounds on the keyboard, to transpose and stretch the samples. He uses his own voice to demonstrate this process of recording, processing and playing. He picks up the microphone that is connected to the computer and squeaks a high-pitched "mummy" into it. Instantaneously, "mummy's" wave form appears on the monitor and the sample can then be played on the keyboard. Just like the earliest inventors of sound reproduction technology, Gabriel as well as the English television viewer in 1982 seem bewildered and amused by the uncanny immediacy of the voice's reproduction and its possibility to become another entity entirely. Peter Gabriel would go on to use the Fairlight CMI for more 'serious' tricks and would produce a range of orientalist "world music" records throughout the 1980s (Taylor, 1997, pp. 39–52).

The fascination for this new digital musical instrument was not limited to the UK. In 1983, *Sesame Street* invited Herbie Hancock to demonstrate the Fairlight to a wider audience in the US. While Gabriel was portrayed recording his new solo album with the Fairlight, Hancock's demonstration had a more pedagogical goal: to teach a group of kindergarten kids the basics of digital sampling (Herbie Hancock, 2017).[17] The video begins with a close-up of the CMI's sequencer function (Page R) and subsequently shows Hancock improvising on the keyboard over the programmed loop. Like Peter Gabriel, Hancock, too, demonstrates the

[16] The video is available at: https://youtu.be/scmYG1Pv1_Q?t=959. Gabriel's demonstration of the Fairlight CMI starts at minute mark 16:00 (Accessed: 4 September 2021).
[17] The clip can be accessed at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=daLceM3qZmI (Accessed: 24 September 2021).

processing capabilities of the CMI by recording a voice, that of the soon to be movie star Tatyana Ali. He lets her speak her name into the microphone and then shows how the digital sound bite can be mapped almost instantaneously onto the keyboard, playing it back to the confused and amused group of kids. Hancock then plays and jokes with Ali's voice, he time-stretches and transposes her voice into higher and lower register. The kids are in awe of this strange voice and try to laugh off the eeriness of its re/production. "What happened to your little voice?", the moderator asks. Hancock continues playing, looping and doubling the voice. He plays chords with it and multiplies it. At the end of his little improvised demonstration, he starts playing the voice backwards – now, this voice seems to haunt itself. In the end, a whole swarm of 'Tatyana Alis' is pouring from the speakers.

Both videos are of interest to my questioning as they present the Fairlight as a musical instrument that generates and manipulates voices; here, the CMI is a vocal synthesizer. Both Gabriel and Hancock use the voice in order to demonstrate the possibilities of digital sampling technology. This use of the voice in demonstrating new sound technology can be regarded as a returning figure in the history of sound technology. Jonathan Sterne argues that the reproduction of the voice has always played a central role in the long history of sound technology and has partly fostered its developments (Sterne, 2003, p. 33).

The Fairlight CMI has been used by composers of vocal music, too. One example is John McGuire's piece *A Capella* (1995-97) for soprano and playback.[18] The singer Beth Griffith, for whom the piece was written, was recorded with the Fairlight CMI at the Studio für Elektronische Musik at WDR in Cologne. McGuire and Griffith recorded three different sung vowels (a, e, u) which would then be used as samples for the composition. McGuire mapped these vowels onto the Fairlight CMI and was able to utilise Griffith's voice as a musical instrument in its own right. Her voice is being abstracted in the process of sampling, multiplied

[18] The piece is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0d3gyMdLlns (Accessed: 25 September 2021).

and made into musical material. In the live performance and also on the recording of the piece, Griffith would sing in duet with her previously recorded voice (see liner notes to the CD; McGuire, 1999). In an interview with Martina Seeber, McGuire says that the idea of the piece was that Griffith "sings with herself" (*WDR3 Open Sounds*, 2017).[19] On *A Capella*, we are both listening to a singer sing as well as an abstracted version of their voice. Both voices belong to the same body and the same singer and yet they are not only multiplied but also technologically abstracted, tele-operated. On *A Capella*, Beth Griffith sings *as* and with her sequencer voice. Due to the voice's articulated clarity, the voices oscillate between the sound of a sine wave generator and that of a humanly body. As listeners of the piece, we are left wondering which of the two differentiating voices was sung live and which with the assistance of the Fairlight. The differences between the voices seem to diminish; and it is for this reason that the piece is of particular aesthetic interest. The two voices merge into a new abstracted and machinic musical instrument: a voice that is and is not traceable to either the singer Beth Griffith or simply to the Fairlight. Griffith's voice becomes a musicking entity that roams between performance and recording. I discuss McGuire's piece at this stage mainly in line with Hancock's and Gabriel's demonstration videos; all three examples show the potential of creating voices with digital sampling that depend on the artifice of singing but that are ultimately produced. Contemporary singers of course show that this integration of digital sampling has become a common practice: as any record or performance by the likes of Arca or FKA twigs demonstrates.

McGuire's piece aside, I now want to pay closer attention to Kate Bush's experiments with the Fairlight CMI and listen to the production and manipulation of her voice. Bush was one of the first musicians in the UK to extensively work with the instrument and to adapt the new possibilities of digital sampling for her songwriting. Her phonographic voice is

[19] The translation from the German original is my own.

particularly of interest to my questioning as ‘Leave It Open’ shows this musicking voice not only as a reproduction but as a musicking entity produced with the instrument of the Fairlight CMI.

Kate Bush: *The Dreaming*

Kate Bush’s fourth album *The Dreaming* (1982) continues her exploration into the experimental studio practice that had already been heard on her previous record *Never for Ever* (1980). This time, Bush produced the record single-handedly. The Fairlight CMI had already found entry on *Never for Ever*, on songs such as ‘Army Dreamers’ (the sound of reloading guns) and famously on ‘Babooshka’ (the breaking of glass) (Harkins, 2020, pp. 28–32). On *The Dreaming*, the Fairlight CMI becomes yet more important and can be found on seven of the ten tracks; prominently for instance, the tinny trumpet sounds and vocal samples (“ooh”) on ‘Sat in Your Lap’ or the spacey synth accompaniment and the stabs on the title track.

The Dreaming is an interesting case for the question of the phonographic voice. Bush’s voice is here not only the recognisable singing voice that listeners have heard on her previous records but it, too, is abstracted through phonographic work. Her voice has become a musical material with which she experiments and plays. However, Bush’s voice was regarded as a strange phenomenon even before phonographic experimentation: already her non-reproduced singing voice had been heard as “eerily versatile“, “superhuman“ (Gordon, 2005, S. 40) or “unearthly“ (Reynolds, 2014) and has hence problematised the voice’s assumed naturalness. Katherine Angel suggests that Kate Bush has always been interested in the abstraction of the voice. Angel remarks that Bush

> is interested in what a voice is, and what it can do. She uses her voice like an instrument to rend and tear, to sometimes painful effect. (Angel, no date)

The vocal techniques that she makes use of for her particular vocal style already abstract her voice and distance it from identification with a singular body: here, I think of her extreme

ambitus, for instance, or the use of shrieking, shouting, whispering or 'Sprechgesang'. Such techniques are of course, as I have argued in Chapter 1, part of the general practice of the musicking voice and trouble the ideas of a *natural* voice: the musicking voice is a performative figure and already distanced from a singular origin. Bush shares this conception of the anoriginal voice. In an interview, she regards her voice as a musical tool which can be controlled and manipulated. When asked about her continuously changing style of singing, she answers:

> I purposely try to do that because I do feel that every song comes from a different person, really, so this is one way of making something different about it. I like to 'create' voices […]. (Kate Bush in *Electronics & Music Maker*, 1982, p. 46)

It becomes clear that Bush regards her voice as a performative entity of musicking. It is nothing personal, instead, it becomes an almost impersonal entity, it plays different roles, becomes several people and populates different bodies. Through the use of digital sampling and the vocal manipulation with the Fairlight CMI, Bush creates not one singular version of her voice but a phonographic polyphony of voices which – being made by her own body *and* by the machine – celebrates the musicking voice's inherent artifactuality.

'Leave It Open'

Let's listen once more and closely to *The Dreaming*'s 'Leave it Open'.[20] Next to drums, piano and bass (later also strings and guitars), the listener is presented with a landscape of diverse voices: sung through a flanger effect, squeaking and spaced through a short delay, murmurs drenched in rich reverb, swarms of breathy vocals hushing by my ears and deeper voices streaming from the centre of the stereo space. At other moments, voices are distorted, they shriek and howl, whirl around and some of them form rhythmical groups. Towards the end of the track, double tracked voices can be heard even singing backwards. All these different voices

[20] The song is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fBlox63041w&ab_channel=KateBush-Topic (Accessed: 7 September 2021).

happen simultaneously; sometimes they intermingle, in other moments they are layered on top of each other or succeed one another. In the refrain for instance, different voices move towards one another, become sound effects and roam as ghosts through the stereo space. Kate Bush has talked about the use of these voices on 'Leave It Open' in a fan club newsletter from 1982:

> There are lots of different vocal parts, each portraying a separate character and therefore each demanding an individual sound. When a lot of vocals are being used in contrast rather than "as one", more emphasis has to go on distinguishing between the different voices, especially if the vocals are coming from one person. To help the separation we used the effects we had. When we mastered the track, a lot more electronic effects and different kinds of echoes were used, helping to place the vocals and give a greater sense of perspective. (Bush, 1990)

Bush suggests that the differently sounding voices result from narrative and textual decisions. In the song, she uses different voices for differently connotated emotions or characters. This way, she interweaves both the textual and the musical levels. However, I also hear a difference in the spatial separation of the voices that parallels the vocal difference of the musicking voice's phonography. Kate Bush calls this elsewhere "the difference in my voice" (Kate Bush in Electronics & Music Maker, 1982, S. 46). It seems important that the voices are not only differentiated in the spatial image of the song – in its moving stereo space – but furthermore that these voices differentiate with regards to their re/production: they are not one and the same voice of the singer. Instead, each of these voicings takes on a character or emotion on their own, they become their own being, a "singing being" as Annamaria Cecconi would say (Cecconi, 2005, p. 102; see discussion in previous chapter, 2.3.2.). They are a new version of an anoriginal voice. Of course, in the process of phonographic abstraction, the voice or the voices don't lose any of the musical power (see Chapter 5), instead they each become semi-autonomous entities of musicking.

The phonographic work with effects and echo, such as delay, reverb or room acoustics, allows the voice tracks to be differentiated. But this is not only a sonic difference, Bush describes these voices as musical sound. She refers to the musical qualities of a voice and

decidedly not to its sentimental or indexical causalities such as identity, emotion or body. These voices, arguably then, are heard as phonographic events, not as representations of *one* true voice of Kate Bush. They are heard as vocal musical events. We are not listening to the *one voice of Kate Bush* but rather to an array of different voice tracks which Kate Bush has recorded, composed, worked, abstracted, made musical and then mixed into a phonographic polyphony. Of course, many of these voices remind us of the singer and most of these voices can be credited to her voice apparatus. Only a few actually might stem from other singers, but the liner notes unfortunately do not provide information on this. In any case, these voices' physiological source does not matter much because what makes them musick is not their identified place of emanation but rather their phonographic workedness, their meandering between object and subject. This phonographic playing of and with voice uncovers the problematic theorisation of the voice in music. Upon listening, I wonder how this voice can be theorised if the phonographic abstraction distances the musicking event from its sound source and thus from *the* voice of Kate Bush? What happens to the voice on 'Leave It Open'? Who or what sings? And how can this musicking entity – a newly created entity – be theorised? Can we still differentiate an original voice from its technological manipulation and reproduction? Or has the voice itself become a musicking machine in the process of phonography?

3.4. The musicking voice's phonographic effictions

If I cannot distinguish between the vocal performance of Kate Bush and the re/productive work of the digital sampler, if the musicking voice that I hear is a production, an ensemble of both her vocal bodily performance and the Fairlight CMI work, how can I describe this musicking entity that emerges? Is it Kate Bush's voice that is altered or is it merely the informational material of the digital sampler? It is neither, because both answers would rely on a firm ontology of either voice (Kate Bush) or a sonic materialism (Fairlight CMI). I question these

ontological claims and argue that the phonographic voice that emerges in Kate Bush's 'Leave It Open' has itself become a machine that makes music.

I have discussed earlier that the phonographic voice cannot be theorised as capture or representation (see 3.1.); instead it has to be theorised in a double movement as reproduction *and* production (see 3.2.). The phonographic voice therefore both problematises and goes beyond the indexical traps of the voice, it highlights the voice's dependency on its sound source but ultimately shows this relation as precarious (see Ch. 1). I want to now leave the question of the indexical trace behind and ask about the production of new traces that phonography renders available in and with the musicking voice.

Peter Szendy, in his book *Phantom Limbs* (Szendy, 2016), has dealt with musical bodies in a different way than the theorists of the acousmatic who are occupied with the question of sound's causality and indexicality (see 1.3.). Szendy, in contrast, is interested in the creating of bodies that emerge in the musicking ensemble, in fictive bodies that are, for instance, created in collaboration with a musical instrument. In particular, he focusses on the piano. Szendy argues that at the moment that a pianist plays their instrument, a new type of musical body emerges, one that is both dependent on the physiology of the player, their fingers, their style and training but also on the shape of the instrument, the sonic qualities of its make, the smoothness of the keyboard and the acoustics of the room one plays in (Szendy, 2016, pp. 73–76). Szendy appeals to music's power to create new constellations of musical agents that are responsible for the making of music. Musicking does not depend on a subject here, nor simply on its material object, instead, music is performed and made within a network of material and immaterial, technological and organic, musical and non-musical instruments. He calls this new arrangement an "organology of musical bodies" and the bodies that emerge are its "*phantom limbs*" (Szendy, 2016, p. 111; original emphasis). A musical body, for Szendy, is therefore not tied (only) to the player's – or in my case singer's – corporeality but is also constituted by the

instruments with which s/he interacts. Also the less material interactions of musicking – such as a certain vibe (as in Ella Fitzgerald's case, see 2.2.), timbre (van Elferen, 2020) or groove (Keil and Feld, 2005) that emerge from a specific musical assemblage – constitute Szendy's musical body. For Szendy, this musical body is thus a constellation of material and immaterial forces that form a temporary bond in and of music. These new constellations of musical bodies can of course also come into being by way of technological assemblages. In the case of the recording studio in which a pianist records a piece of music a musical interaction happens not only between a pianist and their body and the piano as a musical instrument but furthermore with a whole system of sound reproduction and its phonographic effects of spatial and temporal distancing. Szendy writes:

> with electricity, musical instruments inaugurate a new regime of the *coupling of bodies* where the distance between them is potentially infinite. In other words, it is on the basis of the electrification of sonorous bodies that the articulation of *musical arealities* is absolutely untied from any organic or geographical unity (local, punctual, compact). It is no longer a question of greater or lesser proximity or distance: The dislocation is radical. (Szendy, 2016, p. 141; my emphasis)

Szendy's musical bodies do not necessarily rely on external technological circuiting. Where phonographic work changes and radicalises the game of the "coupling of bodies", it does not need "electricity" or media technologies for music to initiate this "coupling" (ibid.). Szendy thinks musicking and its potential to create new bonds of material and immaterial musical bodies as already technical. Similar to Weheliye, Szendy's notion of music assumes that musicking is always technological "whether it emanates from the horn of a phonograph, a musical score, or a human body." (Weheliye, 2005, p. 7). I am intrigued by this notion of musicking as *technê* but also by Szendy's notion of musical areality which again brings into play the question of phonography as re/production. What kind of reality does phonography re/produce?

Musicking areality

When Szendy introduces the notion of musical areality, he makes use of a concept by Jean-Luc Nancy (Nancy, 2008, p. 43; Szendy, 2016, p. 133; also see Van Elferen, 2020, p. 193). Areality connotes, on the one hand, a geographical entity, an *area*, for instance, of a body. In Chapter 1, I have discussed Joan La Barbara's extended vocal technique as an areal mapping of the vocal body. Her piece *as lightning comes, in flashes* could be described in terms of Szendy's musical areality (see 1.4.). There is a spacing of body parts and her corpus at play when different corporeal areas are being *instrumentalised*. On the other hand, the term 'areality' also connotes *realism* and *reality*, i.e. notions of the real; whereas the prefix *a-* hints at its denial or rejection, its opposite. It is this latter connotation that interests me mainly as it again opens the discussion of phonography as a machine of re/production. While Adorno saw phonography as a threat because it problematises the "traditional reality" of music (Adorno, 2002a, p. 271), Szendy's idea of musical areality – which forms in and as the constellation of new musical bodies – embraces music's power to undo reality or to create new ones. Phonography then, arguably, heightens music's capacity to create irruptive moments of areality. It is important to notice that Szendy does not entertain the notion of music as being disconnected from reality, music is not unreal. On the contrary, its interactivity, its creating of new bodies, is the production of an oppositional reality, a different reality, one that – even if temporarily – lets its participants encounter musicking as difference.

I have argued before that both Szendy as well as Weheliye, and in fact, Adorno, too, problematise the opposition of technique and nature. This has of course consequences for theorising the musicking voice as a performative entity. With Weheliye, I could thus call the musicking voice "*techne*logical" (Weheliye, 2005, p. 20), involving technique, technology as well as performance. Insisting on a questioning of the musicking voice in terms of either indexicality (see Chapter 1) or ontology (see Chapter 2) is misleading because musicking is

ultimately a distancing practice; a practice in which new bodies are formed and new relations emerge (I discuss this notion of distancing further in Chapter 4).

As the musicking voice is not self-contained but only always emerges in and as musicking and is as such technical, it functions as a prime example of phonography's originary arealising practice. Phonography amplifies the musicking voice's indeterminacy.

> [T]he more arealizing technicity is implicated in music, the more the original structure that brings together excitation, resonance, and amplification, already secretly present in every primitive sonorous body, *is exposed as such*. Is arealized. (Szendy, 2016, p. 142; original emphasis)

Musical technology brings out and to our ears the spaced out, arealised 'nature' of music and its sonorous bodies. As I have argued in Chapter 1, the musicking voice already has a precarious relationship to its producing body. A sound source is always imagined but cannot account for the effects and the powers of the voice. The distancing or dislocating – or I might also say, disidentifying – effects of phonography now only heighten this problem of the musicking voice's ontology. The musicking voice can be theorised as phonographic, in the sense that its disidentification, its status as neither object nor subject, its inherent artifactuality, is immanent and does not come about in an afterthought of *re*production. Its production, technological or not, always already places the voice in a strange in-between reality. Rather than understanding the musicking voice and its phonographic situation as a lack, I want to stress its ability to produce and to generate musical affections (see Chapter 5). These productions do not only invite its participants to engage with its musicking but they furthermore bring about a fictive areality, a new reality. Peter Szendy has called this musicking's ability of "effiction" (Szendy, 2016, p. 15).

Phonographic effictions

I have argued in the previous two chapters that the musicking voice emerges in performance: it needs to be acted out, performed, instantiated for it to exist. This performance of course, as

further specified in Chapter 2, depends on the performativity of music (2.3.1.). The musicking voice is a voice that plays and is played by music, it does not so much speak or think. The musicking voice is an action, an event that calls for a performance. If it cannot be theorised by way of a stable causality to its producing body (Ch. 1), nor to an ontological certainty of a sonic materialism (Ch. 2), all I can study is its ineffable and yet drastic performative actions (Abbate, 2004; also see discussion in 2.3.1.). This holds true also for the musicking voice that is phonographically re/produced. The question remains: What does the musicking voice *do*? I argue that the musicking voice creates its own areality. It derives – in Kate Bush's case – from a vocal bodily performance as well as the sound technological configuration in which its performance takes place, such as the Fairlight's phonographic work. But how does the musicking voice become areal? Peter Szendy would say that the phonographic musicking voice – as a music machine – creates a fiction of itself as a new organ, it effects musically a constellation of phantom limbs. He calls this music's "effictions" (Szendy, 2016, p. 15). What are these effictions?

Szendy regards the musical body as a fiction which is created in musical assemblages; these are chimeras of physical, instrumental and imagined bodies. Despite their fictionality, these musical bodies are actually made, they are a fact, "they are *there*" (Szendy, 2016, p. 16; original emphasis). Similar to Derrida's notion of artifactuality, Szendy's musical bodies are both fictional *and* factual. Fact and fiction come together in the power of a musical chimeric organology: new musical bodies are new musical instruments. To describe this particular musical assemblage in which fictive bodies are made, Szendy uses the word "effiction" which is "the contraction into one word of fiction and its power, of its *efficacy*. A new-old figure, then, that would state *fiction in effect(s)*" (Szendy, 2016, p. 15; original emphasis). Effiction describes "the peculiar *agency* of phantom limbs and organs that the musical body-to-body experience causes to emerge" (ibid.).

Effictions are caused by a musical power that creates new instantiations of imaginary bodies as musical instruments. Music has the capacity, for Szendy, to fiction and to create new constellations of musical bodies. Bodies, material or immaterial, that are touched by music's efficacy are conjoined to new conglomerates of bodies. Szendy's musical bodies are not merely the biological or the instrumental or generally material corpi of music (a singer's larynx, a pianist's hands, a trumpeter's embouchure or a DJ's turntable). Szendy is not a materialist, in fact, he is interested in the fictive constellations or encounters of different types of musical materials which in ensemble and in the moment of musicking create musical bodies that are effects of fictioning: phantom limbs. Similar to Christopher Small's notion of musicking, i.e. music as process (Small, 1998, p. 2), Szendy's musical bodies are always *in the making*, in fact, musicking can be understood as the continuous creation of effictive bodies: "sonorous bodies are constantly weaving new ones, which are awaiting, pending, to *consist* effictively" (Szendy, 2016, p. 19; original emphasis). Music has the power to effect such fictioning. This ongoing weaving of musical phantom limbs renders the physical differences of the pianist's body and the piano's corpus obsolete: in music, in the interaction between these bodies, a new body is "manufactured" (Szendy, 2016, p. 9). This is not Glenn Gould or Steinway but *Glenn Steinway*, as Szendy cites from a passage of Thomas Bernhard's *The Loser* (Szendy, 2016, pp. 8–9). Musical subject and musical object become porous and converge.

In the case of the musicking voice, I think again of the different mappings of Joan La Barbara's voice (see 1.4.). Her extended vocal technique can be heard as such a weaving of musical bodies. In performance, she makes available a voice as a conjunction of different body parts. The result is a "manufactured" musicking voice as a chimeric fiction (Szendy, 2016, p. 9). In the case of the phonographic voice, fictions of musical organs are continuously being created. Phonography, as I have argued previously, is not so much a representation and thus a copying of a sound source but the phonographic musicking voice becomes a machine that

produces fictions. Phonography creates new constellations of sounds that do not have an a priori image; its sounds are always new and arguably fictitious.

Phonography emphasises what I have argued both in Chapter 1 and 2, namely that the musicking voice depends on music's performativity and is "manufactured" (Szendy, 2016, p. 9). It is an entity that emerges from the effictions of musicking. While it depends on a physical sound source, it cannot ever be described in terms of an origin. If any musical body or any musicking performance, results in the creation of fictive, artifactual or anoriginal "phantom limbs" (Szendy, 2016, p. 15), then no 'natural' or unaffected bodies remain. The question of the musicking voice's origin in contrast to its copy becomes obsolete. There is no musicking voice prior to phonography because this 'original' voice is already an effiction. The musicking voice is a voice that has been affected by music's efficacy.

The musicking voice's indeterminacy

If phonography troubles the idea of a voice's origin, how can the phonographic musicking voice be theorised? Is the musicking voice an object *or* a subject? A performance *or* a reproduction? Szendy writes:

> the musical body-to-body experience would produce inventions of improbable bodies that are still without figure or destination. Bodies that are neither monstrous nor fabulous, neither glorious nor weak nor empty: simple but powerful thrusts from even before the drives, from "behind"; threads or traces of still unorganized organs—neither living nor dead—that are membering, dismembering, hurrying, crowding, growing, ramifying. (Szendy, 2016, p. 11)

When Szendy argues that music arealises its participants and creates effictions, it is important to maintain that the new reality – these "inventions of improbable bodies" (ibid.) – that music creates cannot be foreseen or -heard. We cannot possibly know this other, different reality; this is part of musicking's effictions. Music remains a fiction, its effects cannot be foretold. Music's bodies are always in the process of being produced, "membering" (ibid.), but never fully finished or finalised entities. Musicking, for Szendy, thus always points to an unknowable

future, it is unactualized future time. Phonographic musicking is, "still without […] destination" (ibid.), indeterminate, as Derrida argues:

> it is the indetermination itself that makes the experience of the gramophonic act so perilous: too much freedom, a thousand ways, all just as legitimate, to accentuate, to set the rhythm, to make the tone change. (Derrida, 2014, p. 6)

As charming as Derrida's and Szendy's phonographic indeterminacy might seem, it does not specify the problems of the musicking voice and its phonographic situation. Phonography, as Middleton argues, reveals the musical body as "mutable and mobile", it "produces an irreducible ethical *undecidability*" (Middleton, 2013, p. 296; original emphasis). It can function as a political and philosophical tool not only to understand musical cultural production but also to de-centre the primacy of logocentric writing, as Weheliye's project of a sonic Afro-Modernity proposes (Weheliye, 2005). In the context of the present interrogation, phonography's indeterminacy shakes hands with the musicking voice's indeterminacy. The phonographic musicking voice escapes any capture, it is forever underdetermined. We cannot define or determine the phonographic musicking voice as anything else but a voice which is animated by the indeterminate workings of phonographic musicking. Other than this, there is not much more that I can say about its being. The diagnosis of this double indeterminacy (phonographic and vocal) is epistemological; it is a question about the possibility of knowing the voice. To paraphrase Wayne Koestenbaum, all we know is that the musicking "voice evades categorization. A singer wanders: a singer deviates" (Koestenbaum, 1993, p. 164). But such a conclusion would be all but apologetic and by no means satisfactory. As I have argued throughout this chapter, phonography teaches that there is no and there cannot be a return to an origin; there is no sense in asking about the musicking voice's origin. Ontologies do not create effictions, musical arealities do. Again, the question cannot be: What *is* the musicking voice? Or, what *is* the phonographic musicking voice? So, let me ask a different question. The only reasonable question that can be followed and whose answer can be approached wonders

about the musicking voice's effects, its "*fiction in effect(s)*" (Szendy, 2016, p. 15; original emphasis). What does the musicking voice *do*? How does it create its phonographic effictions?

'Leave It Open'

Let's return to the beginning of this chapter and to the anorigin of Kate Bush's voices. As in Joan La Barbara's case, 'Leave It Open', too, presents its listeners with an arealised voice, mapped onto different body parts. But in Kate Bush's case these bodies are no longer only organic or confined by the indexicalities of the singer's body. These voices are already musical bodies, phantom limbs, in Szendy's understanding. They sing backwards, in reverse, are multiplied, doubled, estranged, grunt through flanger effects, delays and harmonisers. They shriek, sing, cry, break and creak. These voices are areal, they are not representations of an original reality prior to studio recording but products of Kate Bush's musicking: her vocal techniques, her studio technologies and her techniques as a studio musician. These voices have no clear indexical source (see Chapter 1). Instead this musicking assemblage from which the voices emerge in song can be called "a machinic ensemble" (Weheliye, 2005, p. 32) – Weheliye's use of machinic, here, refers to Deleuze & Guattari's notion of machine which "does not mean either mechanical or organic" (Deleuze and Parnet, 2007, p. 104) but rather designates an abstract productivity. The phonographic musicking voice does not capture or represent or mediate another voice, one that musicks prior to its reproduction. The musicking voice emerges from an ensemble of vocal production, sound reproduction technologies and their interaction. To call it phonographic merely hints at the musicking voice's "*techne*logical" (Weheliye, 2005, p. 20) constitution as a musicking entity that is re/produced, both performed *and* recorded. What we hear, when we listen to Kate Bush's 'Leave It Open' is not so much a voice of Kate Bush, or many voices of Kate Bush, but a musicking voice as a machine. In trying to theorise its doings, we are only left to wonder about its effictive traces.

The musicking voice moves forward and out, not *back* to an imaginary indexical source or origin. Tracing its machinic effictions enables me to think of the musicking voice as a generative force, as taking "on a life of its own" (Grover-Friedlander, 2011, p. 20). Its life, however, is fragile; the voice in music is prone to failure, as voice theorists have shown (Jarman-Ivens, 2011; Wilbourne, 2015): in fact, vocal failure can "constitute an inherent condition of voice as both an object of play and a site of misadventure" (Feldman, 2019, p. 188). As much as life cannot be captured or held captive, phonography does not capture or represent or mediate the voice; instead, it creates new encounters and new instantiations of the musicking voice because it amplifies the voice's strange position between object and subject, between iterability and event, between recording and performance.

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"We let the weirdness in" sings the last voice, more or less unintelligibly, at the end of 'Leave It Open'. This voice is backmasked: its lyrics had been recorded in reverse, so that upon replaying, it would sound like an eerie vocal effect, like a speaking- or singing-in-tongues. The topic of the *weird* populates much of *The Dreaming* but arguably does not only refer to the goth folk tradition in which Kate Bush's music has often been placed (Reynolds, 2014). In this case, weirdness also regards the question of the musicking voice and its difference. This backmasked voice that enchants a "weirdness" haunts the concept of the voice as singular, original and self-contained.

Digital sampling technology, like the Fairlight CMI, allows Bush to treat her voice like any sonic material or any other musical sound. However, this does not mean that we hear it as just that. Instead, phonographic work marks the musicking voice's difference, its inherent problematic lingering between object and subject, between performance and recording. Bush herself has called the voice's phonographic indeterminacy "the space in between" (*Electronics & Music Maker*, 1982, p. 47). Such a space is opened by her phonographic polyphony; through

the use of “delay machines”, “harmoniser”, “double tracking” and “an awful lot of compression”, “[e]specially with voices, as you start compressing them more and more, so many different levels start coming through on it” (*Electronics & Music Maker*, 1982, pp. 46–47). On ‘Leave It Open’, the voice’s indeterminacy is emphasised, the voice here moves forward and out and is left open, it lets “the weirdness” creep in. By way of phonographic work, Bush conjures the other, unknown and non-singularity of the musicking voice. She *leaves* the voice *open* to music’s “effictions” that lead the voice to music/k (Szendy, 2016, p. 15). Kate Bush’s polyphonic voice becomes a musicking machine in its own right – not fully Kate Bush, not fully Fairlight CMI, not only embodied and not only machinic, but a musicked and musicking voice.

4. Impersonal expressiveness and the voice's vital musicking force

I'm here, right here, for you
One, I'm the one

... sings Annette Peacock's voice through heavy distortion and a myriad of vocal effects. This warped synth-voice summons the psychedelic prog rock of her 1972 debut record *I'm the One* (Peacock, 2012).[21] Her "Electric Vocals" – as this voice is credited on the back of the album cover – run through the opening of the title track and together with synthesizers, drums, bass and guitar they create an almost symphonic beginning. The band gathers (01:50) and Peacock sings the lines: "I'm the one …". When this first part of the track fades away (03:36), Peacock's singing aligns smoothly with the ensemble playing. They now play a soothing blues rock. This tranquil episode lasts only shortly (04:35) until the singing voice gradually moves out of the blues constellation and starts to shriek (04:53). This voice now sings through full distortion, increasingly becoming more noise than distinguishable vocalised text, when it screams:

Can't you see it in my eyes
Can't you feel it in my voice
Can't you feel it in my skin
When you're buried deep within me
I'm the one for you

The track ends in an intense musical drama. Here, Peacock's singing powerfully calls for its listener, when the voice yells, almost cries, and demands: "Can't you see it in my eyes? / Can't you feel it in my voice?" Can I? Can you? *What* can you feel? What is *it*? What am I supposed to *feel* in this voice? And, how am I feeling this feeling in the voice that sings *its heart out*?

'I'm the One' could be heard as a romantic drama, a call for a lover's attention, maybe a confession, a voice asking for love, announcing its willingness to love. Everything in the lyrics signals this desire: the reference to a desiring body, the intensity of utterance, the

[21] The title track is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1dP4ux-hRek (Accessed: 11 November 2021).

insistence of being the 'one' – and so does the voice: it seems to *say* something about its voicer, their subjectivity or emotions. As if I or you or any listener immediately knows to identify with Peacock: as if her voice and the longing that sounds through it calls upon a listener. The sound of her voice sparks affection: and I give myself over to this expression, with pleasure. I want to react, cry back at her affirmatively and shout: 'yes, I can hear *you* in your voice. You *are* the one. I believe you, because I believe your voice.' But do I?

No matter if a biographical enquiry into Annette Peacock's life in 1972 gives us any clues as to the factuality of her words, it does seem to matter *who* sings (in) a voice and how; because voice indexes the voicer's subjectivity. Or at least, that is the assumption. Simon Frith has argued that as pop listeners we long for a persona in the voice that sings (Frith, 1996, p. 186). By listening to a voice, the listener often believes they *know* the one who voices, or at least believes they know *something* about the voicer's self. After all, it is commonly assumed that a "human being that sings expresses him- or herself through pure efferent spontaneity" (Jankélévitch, 2003, p. 29), that a person's voice "always carries within itself that recapitulation of voiced self" (Ihde, 2007, p. 198) or that the "voice proclaims a sensitive being" (Rousseau, 1998, p. 325). But all of the attributes that I can infer from the lyrics – longing, desire, love, romance, etc – and that seem to be naturally flowing from this voice have little or nothing to do with music. On the contrary, they assume that this voice is *saying* something. The musicking voice, however, cannot ever signify these ideas of longing or desire or love, it does not *say* anything about its voicer.

The following chapter interrogates the assumed relationship between voice and subjectivity. I will problematise and seek to disidentify the relationship by way of listening to the musicking voice. Singing, as I have established in the introduction and throughout the first three chapters, functions differently than speaking and therefore also relates differently to the

question of the voice's subjectivity. That is to say, the speaking subject is different from the singing subject. Following Annette Peacock, I ask: what is *in* a musicking voice that listeners feel they can access or relate to? The chapter begins with a discussion of the problematic relationship between voice and subjectivity (4.1.). Here, I critically discuss two distinct theories of vocal subjectivity (Cavarero, 2005; Dolar, 2006) and highlight their shortcomings with regards to the musicking voice. I argue that the musicking voice does not express a voicer's personality or subjectivity, instead it expresses an impersonal musicking force. I study two cases where I will discuss the voice as an impersonal force. First, I follow Scott Walker's voice and his comments about the voice's troubled relationship to self (4.2.). In the second case study, I listen to the singer Leon Thomas and discuss the forces that impel his voice to sing (4.3.). I theorise the notion of music's impersonal expressiveness, hereafter, by way of Susanne Langer's philosophy of music (4.4.).

4.1. Voice and the problem of subjectivity

It is often assumed that the voice indexes its voicer; as if voice implies "a subjectivity which 'expresses itself' and itself inhabits the means of expression" (Dolar, 2006, p. 15). The singer and voice historian John Potter, for instance, writes in the introduction to the *Cambridge Companion to Singing* that "our voices *are* us, directly expressive of our personalities and emotions" (Potter, 2000, p. 1; original emphasis). Annette Schlichter contends that "western singing is often portrayed as a form of expression of interiority" (Schlichter, 2011, pp. 34–35). In this reading, the relation between voice and self is naturalised: it seems natural that the sound of the voice bears evidence of the voicer's self (Schlichter, 2014; Eidsheim, 2015, p. 133). In other words, the voice inevitably carries its owner's sense of self within it which consequently can be accessed upon listening. In such constructions, the voice is an index of the voicer's subjectivity and voice is understood to designate a subject position, often a person's agency.

This assumption also bears on the discussion of the voice in music, as Potter and Schlichter signal. But is "music really so transparently expressive of personality? Is a voice" (Frith, 1996, p. 185)? Can voice in music really be understood as a "*willed sound*" (1996, p. 190; original emphasis)? I argue that neither music nor the voice can simply be conflated with the voicer's subjectivity. But what "is singing, if not the most inimitable, indelible mark of an individual's individuality" (Coleman, 2017, p. 8)? If the musicking voice does not express anything about its voicer, what expresses in the musicking voice?

4.1.1. Voice reveals

A widely read discussion of vocal subjectivity can be found in Adriana Cavarero's book *For More Than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression* (Cavarero, 2005). Cavarero is not primarily a voice scholar but a philosopher: voice for her signals a metaphysical problem. Similar to Derrida's critique of the metaphysics of presence (Derrida, 2011, 2016; discussed in more detail in Ch. 5), Cavarero's aim is to deconstruct the predominance of metaphysics in the history of Western philosophy. But whereas Derrida aims to deconstruct the voice (of speech over writing), Cavarero uses the voice as a deconstructive tool. She posits that voice has been subjected to *logos* (reason, the word). Logocentrism, for Cavarero, only functions by way of the "devocalization of logos" (Cavarero, 2005, p. 40). Cavarero's project does not only concern the history of philosophy but her project is furthermore political: she aims to rethink (feminine) subjectivity by acknowledging the voice's uniqueness. She maintains that every voice is constituted by its corporeality and is thus construed as embodied uniqueness. That is to say, that every voice can be heard as inherently unique; in fact, Cavarero argues that the voice

> has a revelatory function. Or better, more than revealing, it communicates. What it communicates is precisely the true, vital, and perceptible uniqueness of the one who emits it. (Cavarero, 2005, p. 5)

Cavarero's philosophy works towards developing a feminist subjectivity, one which is founded on the voice, a voice which signifies said embodied uniqueness. The subject that Cavarero then construes in her "vocal ontology of uniqueness" (2005, p. 173) can be accessed precisely through the voice, when a voice is heard. Cavarero's subject, even though it is relational, always embedded in a plurality of other voices (Cavarero, Thomaidis and Pinna, 2019, p. 84), comes to the fore in and through the singular voice, because her conception of voice is fundamentally corporeal and as such it is unique and individualised, confined to one body and one essential expressive subjectivity. If I were to listen to Annette Peacock's 'I'm The One' from the perspective of Cavarero's theory of vocal expression, all I would hear is the voice as an ontological uniqueness – probably a timbre, mainly the body that produces that timbre – but what I would fail to hear is the voice as it musicks. Because Cavarero's theory presents a unitary concept of voice that generalises the singular voice. In the process, she disregards any other performativity of voice, such as the voice that musicks. Cavarero's construction of the voice as corporeal uniqueness is a material essentialism of voice. And as such, falls prey to the same reductions that I have already critiqued in Chapter 1 – where I discussed and problematised the indexical causalities between the voice and its producing body. I have argued that the musicking voice performs its body in and with music; as such, it is impossible to regard the body as a stable signifier. I have disputed the causality between the musicking voice and its body because the voice's performance estranges and disidentifies from monocausality. Isabella van Elferen suggests that a similar problem is at play when vocal timbre is regarded as an index of a voicer's subjectivity. The voice's physicality and its subjectivity are often equated, as in Cavarero's case of embodied uniqueness:

> The identity of vocal timbre is often seen as comprising not just the material source of that timbre – the body of the singer, their vocal tract, breath control and so on – but also the subjectivity of the singer, their personality, personal history and cultural background. (Van Elferen, 2020, p. 60)

Van Elferen argues that vocal timbre emerges "from [a singer's] body and [is] entangled with her subjectivity but extending far beyond them" (2020, p. 66). In other words, voice cannot be reduced to either its body or its voicer's subjectivity. The political subject that Cavarero construes through the voice, however, theorises the voice as signalling the voicer's subjectivity by way of essentialising the voice's corporeality (see Kane, 2016b, p. 103). Cavarero vocal ontology becomes problematic because it is based on the equation of a voice with its corporeal emanation *and* its voicer's subjectivity. Cavarero not only creates a political ontology through the voice (Howard, 2020), but more importantly renders the voice metaphorical in the process. Voice becomes a metaphorical concept, devoid of any performative potentiality. It bears no relation to music, or indeed any other type of performance. Consequently, Cavarero's ontology of voice is a problem for a theory of the voice as it musicks.

4.1.2. Voice as Other

If the voice "has a revelatory function" (Cavarero, 2005, p. 5), something is being revealed when the voice is heard: voice, for Cavarero, indexes the "one who emits it" (ibid.). Where Cavarero looks for something *more* in the voice, for a solution, Mladen Dolar regards voice as an empty signifier – indeed, if it is anything, it is a problem (Dolar, 2006, p. 3). In his book *A Voice and Nothing More,* Dolar theorises the voice from a psychoanalytic perspective (Dolar, 2006). Dolar is interested not in the voice as "the vehicle of meaning" (Dolar, 2006, p. 4) which Cavarero could be accused of, nor in the voice "as the source of aesthetic admiration" (ibid.); instead, he theorises voice as the Lacanian *objet a* (Lacan, 1998, p. 258). In stark contrast to Cavarero's conception, Dolar's voice is not aligned with a vocalising self but rather with a subject's desire. As such, the object voice is not necessarily a material or sonorous voice. Jacques-Alain Miller maintains that Lacan's "voice as object *a* does not in the least belong to the sonorous register" (Miller, 2007, p. 139) because the object voice is the inscription of the listening subject's desire and "neither an organ nor a function of any biology" (ibid.); as such

this voice is "*a-phonic*" (ibid.; original emphasis). The voice as *objet a* is "a little thing separable from the body" (Miller, 2007, p. 140), an object that gathers desire and is the exterior interiority, the extimacy of the subject. Jacques Lacan, Miller argues, has developed the voice as an object in clinical experience, particularly alongside patients with psychosis who heard voices that did and did not belong to them, voices that felt real but are not necessarily constituted by their "sonorous materiality" (ibid.). In short, Miller defines Lacan's object voice "as everything in the signifier that does not partake in the effect of signification" (Miller, 2007, p. 141). The object voice is the remainder of signification, the "waste scraps, […] dead leaves, in the form of the straying voices of psychosis" (Lacan, 2014, p. 251).

Similarly, Dolar's rendering of the object voice is non-sonorous. Even though he discusses the physics and acousmatics of actually sounding voices, his theory is motivated by the psychoanalytic question of the voice as object and cause of desire. Divorced from "the empirical voices that can be heard" (Dolar, 2006, p. 103) and "devoid of phonic substance" (Dolar, 1996, p. 15), the object voice is "the outcome of the structural operation" (Dolar, 1996, p. 9), a theoretical figure rather than a performing or performed entity. In this regard, Dolar's theory of voice can be compared to Cavarero's: in both instances, voice is not empirical, not experiential, but rather conceptual, in the service of their distinct theories of subjectivity. But while Cavarero hears a subject in the uniqueness of voice, Dolar does not conflate voice with a subject. In fact, voice does not belong to a subject, rather "it comes from the Other, but this is the Other within" the self (Dolar, 2006, p. 102). The voice, in Dolar's theory, highlights the extimacy of the subject, because it is "located at the juncture of the subject and the Other" (ibid.). Its relation to the subject is disarticulated, as Fred Botting writes, it "confronts subjectivity with an interior and abyssal (non)relation" (Botting, 2015, p. 94). Dolar's object voice is thus atopical, neither located in the subject nor the Other, it is "the element which ties the subject and the Other together, without belonging to either" (Dolar, 2006, p. 103). In fact,

Dolar goes as far as to say that the voice has no self, because it is always already, "its own other, its own echo", "a reflexivity without a self" (2006, p. 161). This notion of non-belonging is crucial for a theorising of the musicking voice's relation to its body (see Ch. 1) and language: voice does not *belong* to either body or language, but it is the irreducible intersection of body and language (2006, p. 73).

While Cavarero can be accused of theorising voice as a gateway to the voicer's subjectivity, Dolar argues that the voice is always located between subject and Other and can never fully be recognised. In fact, as its own other, the object voice always distances itself from self-recognition. He formulates this paradoxically: "one becomes a subject only by fidelity to the 'foreign kernel' of the voice which cannot be appropriated by the self" (2006, p. 123). This obscure formulation suggests that the voice enacts a desire to hear an other in it(self). By tracing an other in the voice, a return to any originary or authentic self seems illusionary. For Dolar, it is this double bind of self and other that constitutes the voice: a self which appears (if it does) only really in the analytic session by way of the voice. But this is the object voice and not an empirical voice, not a sounding voice. The object voice is never really heard; it is a function of the signifying chain (2006, p. 23) and "not linked to such or such sensory organ or to such or such sensory register" (Miller, 2007, p. 142). Where the object voice surfaces in the analytic session, it only does so as a glimpse of the *real*. This real, however, cannot account for a theory of the voice that sounds, as I have discussed in Chapter 2, because it renders sound, music and the musicking voice as mere noise or places music within the realms of trauma or the unconscious. Dolar's theory proves productive because it disputes the voice's indexing of subjectivity. Its limits, however, appear with regards to a theory of the musicking voice, a mattering and sounding voice; Dolar is interested in the object voice and not in "the voice as the source of aesthetic admiration" (Dolar, 2006, p. 4). In fact, as soon as the voice musicks, it is of no use to Dolar (2006, p. 30). Dolar is wary of the metaphysical implications of an

aesthetics of the voice in music, and thus avoids its "immediate intense attention and […] aesthetic pleasure" (ibid.). Singing, according to Dolar, turns the voice into a fetish object, singing is a non-voice (2006, p. 32) and "the very opposite of the voice as object *a*" (2006, p. 31). He maintains that "music evokes the object voice and obfuscates it; it fetishizes it, but also opens the gap that cannot be filled" (ibid.). Following Steven Shaviro, I would like "to affirm — to rehabilitate and pursue — the fetishization and aestheticization of the voice" (Shaviro, 2006); an aesthetics is after all what is called for in the theorising of the musicking voice as an entity in its own right. The musicking voice is a voice that has no causal relationship to the voicer's subjectivity because it emerges as a musicking force. Dolar's object voice is not interested in such musings; his object voice is, however, productive as it shows the voice as never aligning with a self. In itself it is already an Other and as such it roams between subject and Other, sits in "between body and language, in between biology and culture, in between inside and outside, […] in between mere sound or noise and meaningful articulation" (Shaviro, 2006).

Both Cavarero and Dolar instrumentalise voice as a concept or object. Neither actually attunes to the material sounding force of voice, and particularly not the musicking voice. Both theorise subjectivity by way of the voice, either as a signifier of ontological uniqueness or as the subject's object of desire, forever unattainable. Both of their models are therefore necessarily constrained by the voice as a concept. The musicking voice that I attempt to theorise is not merely conceptual but emerges as an entity in musical performance. Cavarero's and Dolar's theories of voice both neglect the specific musicking performance of voice. I will try to approach the musicking voice's impersonal performance in the remainder of this chapter. By listening to Scott Walker, I will discuss how the musicking voice distances itself from the assumptions of vocal subjectivity (4.2.). Afterwards, I will analyse the vocal technique of the

singer Leon Thomas where I argue that the musicking voice is activated by an impersonal musicking agency rather than the voicer's subjectivity (4.3.).

4.2. "Just a man singing": Scott Walker and the distancing of voice and self

Scott Walker's singing voice is not only well known but also famously heard as a singular and unique instrument. Even though Scott Walker's music and his singing voice have undergone a remarkable shift from the crooning years of The Walker Brothers all the way to the bleakness of *Bish Bosch* (Walker, 2012), it has always sounded "unforgettable" (McBride, 2018, p. xxi). His "deep, wet baritone, [that deepens] the scope of every measure it inhabits" (Leone, 2006), is "one of the greatest singing voices of all time" (Williams, 2006, p. 9). Like the loneliness that it sings of in 'The Sun Ain't Gonna Shine Anymore' (The Walker Brothers – Thema, 2019), it cloaks itself in "velvet" (Walmsley, 2012, p. 62) and is worn by "the most eccentric of crooners" (Deines, 2007, p. 141). Rather than fix the voice to timbral metaphors, Scott Walker's singing voice functions for me as a critical tool for the deconstruction of vocal subjectivity. Through Scott Walker, I am wondering: What happens if the musicking voice refuses to identify with its voicer?

I will analyse the song 'Patriot (a single)' from Scott Walker's 1995 album *Tilt* by way of a close listening to the intricate performance of his singing (Walker, 2019a). The analytical listening I undertake will uncover different musicking performances of the voice and lets me hear Walker's voice distanced from itself and from signalling any unitary self.

"another thing, another person"

Scott Walker's singing voice has changed over the past 50 years – from the pop days of The Walker Brothers, through the period of the 1970s *Middle of the road* records, the Eno-esque spacious pop in the 1980s and all the way to the more experimental records to be released in

the 1990s and 2000s. For the release of his last album *Bish Bosch* in 2012, Scott Walker gave an interview to Simon Hattenstone for The Guardian (Hattenstone, 2012). Hattenstone was interested in this change of Walker's singing voice over the years: a change from the crooner days of the Walker Brothers to a slow hollowing out of the baritone on *Climate of Hunter* (Walker, 2019b), all the way to the cold theatrics of voice on *The Drift* (Walker, 2006) and *Bish Bosch*. Hattenstone writes:

> Over the years he has stripped his voice of that warmth, pared it down to what he considers its essence. I have always wondered whether he thought his voice was too beautiful; whether he began to distrust it because it could cause such feeling in others while he felt so little himself? [Walker responds:] "Well, it's a beast all on its own. I think of it as another thing, another person. When it's working well I couldn't wish for anything better. But it's temperamental. Sometimes you get up and he's just not ready to go. The great thing about it is that I don't use him for ages then I can open the box and take him out, and there he is." He talks about his voice with real affection, but says he can't judge its beauty. (Hattenstone, 2012)

Walker creates an image of his voice as separate from his own self. It is portrayed as having its own space of existence: it, his voice, remains outside of his full control and is a "beast" (ibid.), a creature that has its own determination and being, it is "another thing, another person" (ibid.). Walker and voice have a relationship, an affectionate one as Hattenstone writes, but similarly one of continuous distress, anxiety, fear of failure, loss of control and insecurity. Walker seems to suggest that his voice wills him to sing, rather than the other way around. He portrays his voice as a partner: singing only works when they are aligned. It is fascinating, however, not only does Scott Walker disentangle his voice from himself, but Hattenstone, too, in his judgement, similarly detaches any vocal subjectivity from Scott Walker 'the singer'. But is it possible for Scott Walker 'the singer' to disappear from himself? How can there be a disidentification of voice and subjectivity? What is expressed in the singing voice if not Scott Walker or Noel Scott Engel – the name Walker was born with? And if there is "another person" (ibid.) singing his voice, who are they?

The "beast" that Scott Walker conjures is not any voice (ibid.): he refers specifically to the singing voice. The singing voice is the beast, and it is the voice's singing that causes anxiety, the singing voice is portrayed as an alien other. This distinction of the singing voice from other notions of voice such as the speaking voice is crucial not only for Scott Walker's fearful notion of voice, but furthermore for my own theorisation. The singing voice obeys a different logic than the speaking voice. They cannot easily be conflated in a unitary understanding of voice. The speaking voice (a voice of writing and language) and the singing voice (a musicking performance of voice) are of different realms: language and music. And since language and music are of fundamentally different domains, so are speaking and singing (see introduction). The singing voice is animated by a musicking agency, a particular musical force. In the moment Scott Walker performs his music, this musicking voice is distanced from the idea of expressing a voicer's subjectivity. But how is this distancing initiated? What is its mode of performance? And what kind of force creates this other voice that is not Scott Walker's or Noel Scott Engel's? Is it a musicking force that ignites the voice? A force that generates this idea of the 'other person' or 'other thing' that Walker talks about?

"Singing is a great terror"

Scott Walker was terrified of singing. In an interview with Rob Young, Walker confesses that he hardly ever sings, that singing for him is not a pleasure. And so, he keeps this cursed instrument at a distance, at bay even, to "take it out of its case" only just before the recording sessions (Walker, in Young, 2012, p. 258). Walker, speaking to Young, says that "singing is a great terror for me [,] it's something that I've never wholly looked forward to" (ibid.). In the same interview he also makes a statement about the role of expression in his voice: Walker reluctantly admits that "it all comes back to the self in some way – not the ego self, but the other self" (Walker, in Young, 2012, p. 251). Scott Wilson comments on Walker's strange

statement and relates it to the song 'Jesse' from the album *The Drift*. Wilson writes: "In Walker's songs […] the 'I' is always also this 'other'" (Wilson, 2020, p. 117). 'Jesse' plays with this problem of a singular and contained self as Walker sings about Elvis Presley's dead-born twin brother. Wilson hears in 'Jesse' "(at least) two selves: ego and other" (Wilson, 2020, p. 117) and it is Walker's doubling or multiplying of the self that "disturbs the idea of the unity or self-identity of the individual" (Wilson, 2020, p. 117). This disturbance comes to light in 'Jesse's' lyrics but it can also be regarded as a characteristic of his vocal performance more generally. When the voice musicks, the voicer's subjectivity takes a backseat, it disappears. Is this what causes the terror that is his singing? Is the musicking voice terrorising Scott Walker? Is he afraid his voice might sound terrible or unlistenable? Or does he fear music's outrageousness? Its power to overcome self and expression? The question remains: What musicks the voice? Is there any character or expression or in fact musicality that my listening can hold onto?

"Just a man singing"

In Stephen Kijak's documentary *30 Century Man* (2006), Walker speaks about the recording process for the album *The Drift*. His later albums after *Tilt*, Walker says, have been primarily defined by a concept of abstraction and reduction of lyrical and sonic material. He calls this process 'honing down'. Like a sculptor, Walker works his compositional material over and over again, reducing and abstracting it in the process: "like Beckett did, […] honing things and honing things down, shaving down all the tracks and things like that" (Walker, in *30 Century Man*, 2006). This 'honing down' affects the sonic and lyrical qualities as well as the arrangement of the songs. Moreover, Walker includes his singing voice in this process of 'honing down', when he says:

> There's less personality, as the years have gone by, in the singing. Ultimately, it's just a man singing now, there are no soul inflections, not that there were ever many with me, but you know, there's nothing like that. I just want to get to a man singing, and when it has to have emotion, hopefully it's real emotion. (Walker, in *30 Century Man*, 2006)

The 'honing down' of sound, lyrics and song-writing leads to the baring of the voice: it is stripped of any "soul inflections" (ibid.), laid bare so that it no longer seems personal. Walker's aim here is to abstract voice so that it stands on its own, as an entity which is no longer Scott Walker but "another thing, another person" (Walker, in Hattenstone, 2012). It is being abstracted, 'honed down', until it no longer carries any essential personal characteristics or immediate expression. The idea is that voice detaches itself from its identification with the person/a Scott Walker. But how does Scott Walker deal with the fact that there is still an emotion left in the singing voice? The way he phrases it in the quote assumes that the voice *itself* holds emotionality or expression: this is what he strangely calls "real emotion" (ibid.); an expression he personally cannot account for. He *hopes* for the voice to emote, but he himself cannot do the expressing. The voice expresses itself impersonally and anonymously. Walker *hopes* for this disassociation of the singing voice, he gives himself over to its musicking doings, a musicking force that initiates or runs through the voice, making it sing. I want to hear how this disidentification is put to work.

Listening analysis: 'Patriot (a single)'

I will trace this notion of the honing down of voice on 'Patriot (a single)' from Walker's 1995's album *Tilt* (Walker, 2019b). Like much of his later work, 'Patriot' is composed of blocks of ideas and sounds. The song's blocks can be divided into verse, bridge, chorus and episode: they appear in sequence each twice throughout the song; a third verse ends the song. I want to closely listen to these blocks as they each offer distinct perspectives of Scott Walker's musicking voice: my aim is to trace the performance of difference and distancing in the voice.

My analytical listening deliberately neglects the lyrics, which conjure images of torture and the Gulf War. I listen away from the words, in order to focus on the musical gesturing and performativity of his voice. Therefore, I recommend you listen to the song first and pay particular attention to the various musical elaborations of the voice throughout the song. The more detailed descriptions I provide hereafter will then be easier to follow.[22]

Verse (00:00 – 01:23)

The verse begins with 13 seconds of dead silence until strings and voice cut through. As if from afar, Walker's singing sounds with a slight vibrato: "Ja '91' / See how they run". In proper crooning style, his voice is miked very closely. Walker's articulation is distinct: I can hear the movement of his mouth, the way his vocal articulators shape certain vowels. I can hear the slight clicking of his tongue against the palate on the "**k**" of "New Yor**k**" or "flec**k**s" and a tingly distortion in the throat on "butter**flies**". It feels as if my ears are almost dangerously close to his voice's microphone inflections (Smith, 2008, p. 81). This claustrophobic feeling is a phonographical effect, caused by the overall spatiality of the verse's sonics: the intricate acoustic un/balancing conjures an odd sonic dimension, a strange spatial position and relationality. The acoustics assume a vague distance from which this voice sings: an ambiguous positioning, neither close nor far (Doyle, 2005, pp. 5–6). And with this undecided position my own listening feels undecided and meanders: trying to find a grounding. But it is not only the sound production, here in the verse, that creates such an ambivalence: the singing itself performs a distancing. This voice is sung quietly, the vocal gesturing reduced to a minimum – bared from much expressive pomp. This voice's articulation trembles in its spoken singing. It distances, retreats, at the end of each sung line, dissipating ever so slightly and fraying the sung

[22] 'Patriot (a single)' is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o7WiHfWlfAI (Accessed: 31 October 2021).

words “nylons” and “butterflies” whenever it gives way to the corresponding bassline. Most evidently at the end of the verse, when the voice sings: “some had specks”. The word “specks” here is stretched: the voice removes itself from my listening grasp, as if it has been pulled, pulled *off* stage from behind a curtain. The singing here gestures such an act of being pulled, as if something or someone other than Scott Walker has been at work: the bassline? The strings? Or the bridge?

Bridge (01:23 – 01:43)

The bridge leads his singing to a different place. It moves it out of the shy distance and exposes the voice, carried by an upwards movement in the strings. The bridge is rather short and mostly functions to take the song forward to the refrain. This surging movement can be traced in the singing, too: not only does the melody, compared to the verse, move upwards, thus creating tension, but the spatial ambiguity seems to wane. When the voice sings “The good news you cannot refuse / The bad news, is there is no news”, it does so with more determination. The voice presents (itself); from my perspective of listening, the voice becomes more approachable. Instead of being pulled, like in the verse, the voice here is not acted upon but instead activated – no longer feeble, but more pronounced. The voice reaches the rising gesture on the first “news” (01:25) in a trembling vibrato. This gesture is accompanied by the strings and the bass, which move in beat with the voice; musicking now from a common stance rather than disparate ones as in the verse. Along with the strings and bass, the voice moves forward in a slight crescendo and together they lead the listener toward the dramatic opening of the chorus.

Chorus (01:43 – 02:25)

The string movement follows the voice’s upsurge to the chorus (“tonight, he’ll rise”) and together they culminate on the *one* with the echoing drums and a straightened on-beat bassline.

In this intense crescendo gesture, the singing voice performs a trembling vibrato and turns into a full-fledged voice. But it is a fullness that feels rather simulated: a reaching loudness that simultaneously moves out and away through a high resonating register as a graspable yet fleeting falsetto. This here is a familiar and yet unknowable voice, there remains a sense of uncanniness in the performance: the timbre *feels* familiar, but the voice is sung through a higher register, rather than the *homely* baritone that we know from the early Scott Walker.

Only now, in the chorus, do I realise how feeble his singing had been in the verse and the bridge. Here in the chorus, it shows itself as fully theatrical. Placed in the front of the mix, the voice towers over the tremolo strings and the distantly resonating drums. When the voice rises, it feels as if it has found *its place*; it suggests to my ears that it has found *a home*. But my listening is doubtful and recognises the voice's sinuous ambiguity. The *home* remains out of reach: a unison deferred.

Episode (02:25 – 03:35)

This uncanny feeling vanishes, abruptly, at the end of the chorus, when the song moves into the rumbling silence of the next part, the episode. My listening wanders through a completely different scene now: a postapocalyptic, metallic wasteland. Whereas verse, bridge and chorus had been connected on a sonic level through the continuity of string accompaniment and lush bassline, this episode tears the song open. Not only have the atmosphere and the acoustic environment dramatically changed but with them the protagonist and his voice: a sparse ensemble of cymbals, military bass drum and piccolo flute play on a rumbling industrial soundscape.

Enter: the voice of "another person" (Hattenstone, 2012). It speaks rather than sings against the rumbling landscape – left alone with its own reverberation. From a drivelling mouth it rambles on about a Swiss newspaper, in a Kurt Weill-style *Sprechgesang*. The voice slur-

sings from deep within its throat. Unable to properly articulate, it sings with no sense of rhythm or melody, rather stumbles through this unformed music. This here is a lonesome singing. Alienated from the musical accompaniment and from any musicking grounding, this voice – in the midst of performance – loses itself. It no longer makes sense. Instead, it is ridiculed by a marching band drummer and its companion, a fluting piccolo fool.

What does singing do?

In the bridge and the chorus Walker's voice sings from a rather familiar territory. Both in the verse and in the episode though, the singing that I hear is distanced and alienated, not only from what is considered *good* singing, but also what is most obviously Scott Walker's recognisable singing voice. In both instances, though in different ways, the musicking voice becomes "another person" (Hattenstone, 2012). Even though his "velvet" (Walmsley, 2012, p. 62) crooning voice can still be recognised, Walker's singing gestures towards an otherness: it opens a possibility of disidentification. There are several characters singing, not only "the ego self, but the other self", too (Walker, in Young, 2012, p. 251). In both verse and episode, singing defers and interrupts the identification of the familiar voice Scott Walker. Both times, singing gestures a distancing from a fixed notion of voice as singular and indexing its voicer's subjectivity. In the verse remnants of the crooner Scott Walker can still be heard, but the crooning turns fundamentally uneasy, as if Scott Walker's voice was performing "another person" or as if "another thing" – a musicking force – was performing his voice (Hattenstone, 2012), singing from "the other side of mankind" (Toop, 2012, p. 241). This is a play of and with voice, a musicked simulating of vocal selves. In the episode, however, his voice seems to have lost control of its sense of self, there is another creature shouting and rambling through his vocal cords; slurring exhaustively. Not only does the lyrical rambling make little sense, musically this voice knows no longer how to sing and how to form a melody: it has become an

uncontrollable "beast" (Hattenstone, 2012). What Michal Grover-Friedlander has said with regards to operatic voices, also holds true for Walker's vocal impersonations: singing "has its own being, and is not the emanation of the character's subjectivity" (Grover-Friedlander, 2011, p. 20).

Table 2: different voice characters in Scott Walker's 'Patriot (a single)'

	VERSE	**BRIDGE**	**CHORUS**	**EPISODE**
WHAT DOES VOICE DO?	distancing gestures, at the end of each sung line; trembling singing	presencing gestures, builds towards chorus, upwards reaching figures	projected singing, vibrato, towering over ensemble	slur singing, *unformed* melodies, vocal stumbling, gesturing loss of control
HOW?	crooning, miked very closely; static strings; sparse melodic movement; low volume	more in synch with strings and accompaniment; louder singing voice	changes into higher register; voice in the front of mix; loud singing voice	rambling, shouting; singing *out of* metrical time; jumps and hiccups rather than portamento
'CHARACTER'	Retreating from voice	Finding the voice	'Being' in the voice	Losing control of voice

Musicked distancing of self

In this description, I allowed myself to listen away from the lyrics, away from the word. And when the words are deferred from listening, I get the feeling of following a narrative of different voices – characters that don't *talk* or *act* but *sing*. In *Unsung Voices*, Carolyn Abbate investigates (instrumental) music's ability to narrate (Abbate, 1991). While she makes clear that music and language are of fundamentally different domains, she attests music a certain capacity to enunciate. This ability to enunciate is, according to Abbate, not limited to the voice, but instrumental music is similarly able to do such speaking. She writes: "Music has […]

moments of diegesis—musical voices that distance us from the sensual matter of what we are hearing, that speak across it" (Abbate, 1991, p. xii).

I think the different musicking voices on Scott Walker's *Patriot* can be heard 'speaking across'. Ironically, this 'speaking across' happens in the form of singing, which is the voice as it musicks and not as it speaks. Calling such singing 'speaking' is thus misleading, because the speaking voice and the singing voice are of different domains (see introduction). In order for music to 'speak', Abbate says, it needs to be "charged with a sense of both distance and difference" (Abbate, 1991, p. xii). The singing on 'Patriot' can be heard as such musicking of difference: this is what my descriptions of the different voicings were aimed at. So, instead of calling it 'speaking', let me say, that singing performs a kind of *musicked distancing* (see 3.4.).

In a strange way, I can hear this musicked distancing particularly well and exposed in Scott Walker's music whenever it verges on the theatrical, when it almost stands in the way of a musical listening, when his music becomes a "scripted drama […], a form of music theatre or radio opera" (Toop, 2012, p. 233). This distancing is then effected by these theatrics as performed on 'Patriot': through singing, the voice distances itself from an assumed vocal subject, and it does so in four different guises or characters (see Table 2). Scott Walker's musicking voice manages to sing these four parts in different ways and styles. In each instance, it lets me, the listener, *know* that I *cannot know* or hear a vocal subjectivity. Each performance of the voice only makes clear: there is not one voice or any voice proper to which to retreat. Neither for the listener nor the singer. This musicked distancing lets me hear how the singing voice is always performed, and as such does not know any originary self or expression thereof. Singing here disidentifies, it performs a musicked spacing of voice and self. The singing on 'Patriot' does not *speak* of the singer Scott Walker, but lets me hear "just a man singing" (Walker, in *30 Century Man*, 2006). There are no "soul inflections" left (ibid.). The musicking voice expresses impersonally, as if it *impersonated* another.

While Cavarero argues that the voice always reveals its voicer (see 4.1.1.), Walker in his singing over the years, works towards the opposite; towards an impersonal voice. Brian Morton has commented on this non-identity of Walker's singing voice. He writes:

> it is difficult to judge whether he is singing as a persona or in his own person, and to some extent the question is unanswerable because self and persona remain cryptic and occluded. (Morton, 2012, p. 186)

Walker wants to get to a "man singing" (Walker, in *30 Century Man*, 2006), away from the voice Scott Walker, the "most eccentric of crooners" (Deines, 2007, p. 141). Through a practice of 'honing down', he models an almost anonymous voice which performs singing: a musicking voice. Of course, listeners are still immediately able to recognise Scott Walker's voice even in his later works, but that is a discussion that concerns vocal timbre rather than the voice's problem with subjectivity. Instead, Walker's impersonal voice distances itself from subjectivity and lets me hear the voice as a musicking force in its own right.

4.3. "I'm a song": Leon Thomas and singing in tongues

When I have already demonstrated how singing distances from the idea of vocal subjectivity, I am still wondering: What animates the voice that sings? While Scott Walker singing already emphasised the voice's problems with subjectivity, I want to now attune to a very different singer where I can hear the musicking voice's own vital force at play. This singer is Leon Thomas.

Leon Thomas was a virtuosic free jazz singer and "vocal innovator" (Baraka, 2009, p. 340). After having played and sung with the likes of Count Basie, Mary Lou Williams or Pharoah Sanders, Thomas started leading his own ensembles in the early 1970s. Here, he moved further away from Soul inflected singing styles and developed his unique vocal techniques: borrowing and adapting yodelling, glottal stops, multiphonics, scatting and ululation (see Klee, 1970; Jeske and Kernfeld, 2003).

I was drawn to Thomas' powerful voice, when I first heard this often non-verbal but nonetheless intensely expressive singing. In many recordings his singing performs acrobatic vocal gestures – and often conjures the musicking force of his contemporaries: Pharoah Sanders, Cecil Taylor or Max Roach. And while his singing is inflected by Soul, and verbal, ardently political as such, Thomas' singing most fascinates in the moments when it breaks out into the non-verbal force of the musicking voice. This can be heard in the track *Um Um Um*, a recording on *The Leon Thomas Album* from 1970 (Thomas, 2013).[23]

Um Um Um starts out with an ensemble of drums, congas, bongos and bass; a stabbing piano (00:15) and whirling flute join in after (00:36). The ensemble grooves on a rhythm standard, when Leon Thomas' voice speaks (or almost raps) an announcement (00:51). Thomas reminisces on the notion of *um um um*: a non-verbal but communicative vocabalic, close-mouthed gesture both of appreciation and disapproval. His musical speaking becomes singing and when Thomas starts singing, in a kind of Soul-like narrating style, he musicks the gesture of *um um um* (02:18): "Blues ever get you? And you didn't know what to do?"

After a few lines, the blues singing switches into yet another mode of voicing (03:05): a close-mouthed groaning from deeper within the throat, that turns into a yodelling and fast tremolo kind of flickering. As if someone else took over the voice, this deep-seated yodel moves forward, all the way to the lips, and bubbles over; some remnants of worded utterance seem to pass through, like an attempted scat, but they burst over into a hasty flutter-tonguing. Lips and tongue halt and the singing moves back to the throaty yodel where the voice cracks in highspeed. 'Another' voice tries to articulate but is cut through again by the bursting of the scatty tongue movements. It escapes the scat grip for a few seconds and sings unimpressed as if caught under the shower: *lada daaa didi da*. A short refuge. It is overtaken again by the

[23] You can find the stream at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UtbgB4CE02U (Accessed 4 February 2020).

tongue twisting and in the blink of an eye it snaps back into a croaky yodel (03:50). Arrested in the groove, the voice rests and the ensemble moves on.

Backed by the grooving of flute, drums, bass and percussion who, like I, are taken by the power of this musicking voice, this acrobatic episode lasted less than a minute (03:05 – 03:50). After a longer instrumental episode, Thomas' voice embarks on another solo (05:30): this time stretching into a longer and more elaborate yodelling performance, scaling up and down. This yodel voice moves steadily to the front again, into bubbly tongue and scat territory. Like in the previous episode, the voice here is a musician, a member of the ensemble, a soloist who deserves its own moment to shine. At the end of the phrase the *solo playing* of the voice switches back into a bluesy singing voice, as if it was the easiest task to perform (06:58). The strained tongue just eases into the well-known full singing voice: "Blues ever get you? And you didn't know what to do? Have you ever cried the whole night and the morning, too? Uuum! Um. Um, um." A faint applause in the audience, rest.

The musicking voice's polyphony

When I listen to these intense moments of multiple voicings, Leon Thomas' singing seems to suggest that the voice that is at the heart of this musicking performs on its own accord. His tongue and throat seem to be moved by a musicking force. A force that pushes through the voice. The voice switches easily between these improvisatory, rather instrumental uses of his singing back into a verbal vocalisation of the blues. With every change of voice technique, another singer is brought on stage: there is one singer of the yodel, another one scatting, yet another one ululates and, in the end, the familiar blues singer returns. All of these different voices are performed from one singer, or I would rather say, Leon Thomas seems to be sung by all of these different songs. I am not suggesting that Leon Thomas or his body has been possessed (by spirits or ghosts) when he takes to singing. Instead, I am fascinated by the

multitude of vocalisations that his voice is able to perform. His singing is highly agile and tightly controlled – this is what makes him such a great singer and his singing so extraordinary. And yet, this non-verbal singing and the polyphonies that his voice performs demand we ask: what animates such singing?

In an interview, the drummer Arthur Taylor asks Leon Thomas what he sings for: "for yourself, for the audience, for money or for what"? Thomas' answer is both wonderful and remarkable. He says, he sings forever. "That's the only thing I sing for: forever. I don't know anything else; that's it. I'm a song, so I've got to sing, you dig" (Taylor, 1983, p. 101). Thomas could have said that it is his profession to sing: a singer sings, that's what they do; or that it gives him pleasure. But instead his answer suggests that there is something else at play in singing but mere volitional musicking. In fact, Thomas the person and Thomas the voice are not one and the same. He says: "My voice is not me, my voice is ancient. This person you see before you is controlled by ego but my voice is egoless" (Lazarus, 1995, p. 31). Thomas disidentifies from his voice and renders vocal expression not only "egoless" but impersonal (ibid.). Upon musicking, Leon Thomas becomes song, or rather, his being song, perhaps a "singing being" (Cecconi, 2005, p. 102), moves his voice to sing. There is a musicking force at play that makes Thomas sing. I do not suggest that Thomas was simply *given* this acrobatic singing voice (this would be Cavarero's vocal essentialism). His singing voice and the music are en/trained, embedded in the specific historical context of the early 1970s, black radicalism, Free Jazz and Leon Thomas' particular Afro-Centrism (Feld, 1996, p. 7; Carles and Comolli, 2015, p. 166). But similar to Scott Walker's abstracted voices, I hear Leon Thomas' musicking voice as removed from vocal subjectivity because these voices perform an impersonal music. Their singing is incited by a specific vital musicking force which cannot solely be reduced to the vocaliser's subject. The musicking voice on *Um Um Um* does not index a subjectivity, somehow related to the singer Leon Thomas, but instead brings to the fore the voice's virtual

musicking agency: his singing performs the "internal exteriority of a voice which is and is not his own" (Moten, 2003, p. 38). The musicking voice cannot be captured or narrowed because it emerges in the intensive and affective play of music.

4.4. Music's impersonal expressiveness

The musicking voice does not relate to any vocal subjectivity. With two examples of Scott Walker and Leon Thomas I have shown that there is nothing in the musicking voice that indicates a subject. In Scott Walker's impersonations, I heard these voicings as abstracted and disidentified from a unitary expression, the voice here never signalled a single self but is a chorus of characters. In Leon Thomas' singing, I more clearly heard a force which not only animated the voice to musick but also abstracted voice from its assumed subject: the voice has become "egoless" (Lazarus, 1995, p. 31). In this section, I want to try to theorise the forces that are at play in the musicking voice and that seem to trouble the identification of voice with subjectivity. To do this, I read Susanne Langer's philosophy of music.

Langer's critique of musical self-expression

Susanne Langer has vehemently critiqued the myth of music essentially being a form of self-expression (Langer, 1954, p. 174). She argues that expression – in the sense of "feelings, beliefs, social conditions, and interesting neuroses" – "is not peculiar to art, and consequently is not what makes for artistic value" (Langer, 1953, p. 26). Even if historians are able to delineate certain conditions or feelings in periods of music and their specific artworks, these feelings do not necessarily specify the aesthetic value of music or any other art. Music does not index a specific expression, particularly no self-expression, because music is not symptomatic *of* anything (Langer, 1954, p. 180).

Langer is of course not alone in problematising the idea of music expressing its producer, voicer, musician, composer or listener: music is not an art of autobiography (Åhlberg, 1994, p. 70). And even though, much of musical aesthetics is understood to be mainly concerned with a hermeneutical following of its producer's intentions or expressions, Langer poignantly argues that "[s]*heer self-expression requires no artistic form*" (Langer, 1954, p. 175; original emphasis). Langer does not deny that music can enact a cathartic emotionality, any musician knows about the effects of "musical outpourings" (1954, p. 176), but music's relation to feelings is "not symptomatic" (ibid.). Instead, as Langer argues, it is symbolic. Musical expression not only refers to the so-called "self-expression theory" (1954, p. 174) but can also describe an "expression of an idea" (1954, p. 26). This, for Langer, is an expression on a different level, it touches on the symbolic and not merely signifying presentation of art; it describes a more discursive and not simply directional capability of music. However, also this notion of expression does not sufficiently describe the affections of music because music engages in a play of affects that reaches beyond hermeneutic understanding. Music's affects are fleeting and only emerge in the act of musicking as always anew and never really predictable.

That means that music's *expressiveness* "may exceed [the composer's or musician's] personal case" (Langer, 1953, p. 28). Here, Langer speaks of "expressiveness not expression" (Langer, 1954, p. 195). This slight shift in semantics is crucial as it moves away from music indicating something 'extra-musical' (subjectivity, sociality, history or ideas) and instead focusses on the "vital nature of [music's] effects" (1954, p. 194). Music is expressive not because it expresses a self but because "it *expresses* life—feeling, growth, movement, emotion, and everything that characterizes vital existence" (Langer, 1953, p. 82; original emphasis). In other words, music does not represent an expression *of* something. Its affects, its vital play, *resemble* the feeling of expression.

Music does not *mean* because it is not structured like language but music "has *import* and this import is the pattern of sentience—the pattern of life itself" (Langer, 1953, p. 31; original emphasis). Langer argues that music resembles the movements and characters of life: "Music is a tonal analogue of emotive life" (1953, p. 27). In difference to language, music's significance, its import, as Langer calls it, "is felt as a quality" and "not logically discriminated" like in language (1953, p. 32). Music is not the same as life – "a work of art is not an actual organism" (1953, p. 373) – but it resembles the qualities of life – it "presents only the appearance of life" (ibid.). Music acts *as if* it was vital, as if it had a life on its own. This is why Langer argues that music does not express an emotion of something (self or idea); music itself is expressive because it expresses itself as if it was sentient. In this regard, too, music differentiates from language as language has the ability to explain while music is able to reveal.

eldritch Priest – who has discussed Susanne Langer's music philosophy with regards to theories of affect – writes:

> Music's abstractions, its semblances, *show* forms of vitality rather than *say* them, and in this regard music is able to articulate and set forth relations that language cannot - namely, relations that are revelatory rather than explanatory. (Priest, 2013, p. 53; original emphasis)

This problem of the difference between music and language refers back to the issue of subjectivity. If I transfer this notion of music's vitality to the question of the musicking voice, I can say that the musicking voice does not indicate anything about its voicer because it does not *say* anything. But it is expressive. It says nothing about the voicer but it shows the musicking vitality of the voice. Langer's vitalism then differs from Cavarero's: In contrast to Cavarero, the voice does not reveal its voicer (their ontological uniqueness) but the musicking voice reveals music's vitality (see 4.1.1.). As already mentioned in Chapter 2, this emerging entity can be called "a singing being" (Cecconi, 2005, p. 102) because the musicking voice shows that it has a "life of its own", it "is not the emanation of the character's subjectivity" (Grover-Friedlander, 2011, p. 20).

Music's virtual powers

I can find an approximation of music's vital forces in a passage where Langer speaks about the virtual powers that instigate the dancing gestures of performers onstage. She writes:

> In watching a collective dance—say, an artistically successful ballet—one does not see people running around; one sees the dance driving this way, drawn that way, gathering here, spreading there—fleeing, resting, rising, and so forth; and all the motion seems to spring from powers beyond the performers. (Langer, 1953, p. 175)

Again, Langer is not interested in hearing or seeing an artistic self-expression in this dance performance, but the example shows that she is interested in the conjuring powers of performance that reach beyond the actualised materialities and gestures of the performers. Langer "sees the dance" (ibid.) and how it moves its bodies rather than pay attention to the wilful movements of the singular performers. Their bodies are propelled by a "power beyond" (ibid.), by dance's "virtual powers" (1953, p. 176).

These "powers beyond the performers" (1953, p. 175) remind me of the musicking voice in Leon Thomas' *Um Um Um* where I heard a musicking force at play that seemed to govern Thomas' actions (4.3.). My listening does not ask of Thomas' personal utterances but rather hears his voice as being moved by a power that lies outside of his own determination, I listen to a "mystic force that works by remote control" (1953, p. 181). This vital force, these "virtual powers" (1953, p. 176), functions as one prime example of Langer's general philosophy of art as it highlights how art reveals such vitality as something that is "abstracted from the physical and causal order" (1953, p. 47) of a performer's body (see Ch. 1) and their subjectivity. The forces that animate the dancing crowd can be regarded as "a play of Powers made visible" (1953, p. 187). In the case of the musicking voice, this is a *play of powers made audible* through the musical affections of the voice. The musicking voice emerges as a virtual and effervescent, fleeting musical entity that distances itself from any causality or indexicality to vocal subjectivity. But why are the powers that Langer sees in the dance virtual?

> All forces that cannot be scientifically established and measured must be regarded, from the philosophical standpoint, as illusory; if, therefore, such forces appear to be part of our direct experience, they are 'virtual,' i.e. non-actual semblances. (1953, p. 188)

Impersonal expressiveness

This brings me back to the conundrum of indexicality that is not only at play in the relation between voice and body but between voice and subjectivity, too (see Ch. 1). When the forces of music are perceived, they have a real effect on the listener, no matter if the cause of their effects is actually "scientifically established" (ibid.) or not. In Chapter 1, I have already discussed how the musicking voice does not merely index its material body but moves beyond the confines of monocausality (see 1.3.). The musicking body changes and cannot be regarded as stable, the musicking voice hence does not simply index its body. The same holds now true for the question of subjectivity. When there are forces at play that cannot be "measured" (ibid.) and do not evidence a voicer's subjectivity – *who or what should this be anyway?* – the musicking voice does not index "the true, vital, and perceptible uniqueness of the one who emits it" (Cavarero, 2005, p. 5). Instead, it shows the voice's musicking and virtual powers, as I would argue alongside Langer.

The virtuality of these powers already hints at their impersonal nature. The powers that Langer sees in the dance are not connected to any of the dancer's personalities or expressions nor the participants 'personal' perception. They are virtual because these forces spread like contagious affections that are not yet actualised feelings. As such they are impersonal. Langer discusses this impersonal expressiveness in the dancer's movements. She writes:

> Virtual gesture may create the semblance of self-expression without anchoring it in the actual personality, which, as the source only of the actual (non-spontaneous) gestures, disappears as they do in the dance. In its place is the created personality, a dance element which figures simply as a psychical, human or superhuman Being. It is this that is expressing itself. (Langer, 1953, p. 181)

The gestures which the dancers enact are often regarded as expressing or evidencing a self, but Langer argues that these gestures are merely virtual and semblances of self-expression, not an

actual expression of a self (1953, p. 180). The audience who sees dance is presented with an illusion of a self-expressive gesture. The "actual personality" (1953, p. 181) of the dancer disappears once dance is being performed in this play of semblance. When an actual personality disappears, a virtual one, a "created personality" (ibid.) takes place in its stead. I would call this, in contrast to Langer, not "a psychical, human or superhuman Being" (ibid.) but rather an impersonal expressiveness. What emerges in the dance and likewise in music is not a subjectivity tied to a voicer, but what emerges in musicking is an impersonal expressiveness. The power of music is the creation of a musicking force that expresses itself impersonally. Music is animated by "impersonal agencies" (1953, p. 184) and so is the voice that becomes a musicking entity in its own right.

Even though Langer's philosophy becomes productive for a theory of music that takes into consideration the affective and not yet actualised forces of musicking (I will further discuss affect in Chapter 5), her theory becomes problematic as it does not differentiate the modes and performances of the different art forms. Music, for instance, has a very close relationship to language in Langer's philosophy – despite her claiming otherwise. Langer's thinking of music as a symbol rather emphasises a simplistic binary between music and language. If music is not just an index or an icon, Langer suggests that music has the capacity to reflect on its own making because a symbol demands perspective and reflection (Langer, 1953, pp. 31–32, 1954, pp. 194–195). Music, however, affects differently than language and has no means for self-reflection. Music is less reasonable (Abbate, 2004, p. 510); rather music is "felt as thought" as eldritch Priest argues (Priest, 2013, p. 48). Music feels but does not reason. Arguably, the semiotic vocabulary of the symbol does not help Langer's argument and her productive speculations about music's impersonal affections because it subjects music to language, time and again.

The voice's vital musicking force

The musicking voice cannot be confused with the voicer, with their body or their subjectivity. This voice does not say anything, rather it is animated by a vital and virtual musicking force which cannot solely be reduced to the vocaliser. My listening analyses of Annette Peacock, Scott Walker and Leon Thomas have shown this in different ways. Peacock's song questioned the desire of listening to the voice in music. What I can *feel* in her voice is never really *the one*; her singing shows that there is not any self that is contained *in* a voice, no self can be evidenced or made whole in the act of listening. By way of Scott Walker, I have furthermore shown that there is no originary voice that can be recognised in music because his impersonated and abstracted singing "disturbs the idea of the unity or self-identity of the individual" (Wilson, 2020, p. 117). The voice in music always distances and estranges from the idea of a proper voice. There is no recognising because – and this is what Leon Thomas' performance has shown – the musicking voice is "egoless" (Lazarus, 1995, p. 31); it moves out and cannot be caught by itself or an identifying listening. Its "musical outpourings" (Langer, 1954, p. 176) are never unitary or singular expressions because the musicking voice expresses impersonally.

Susanne Langer's theory of impersonal expressiveness already hints at the notion of affect. Music's power lies not in its ability to express someone or something concrete; instead, music comes into being in and as a virtual power which affects all of its participating agencies. As eldritch Priest has made clear, Langer's theory enables a bridge towards thinking music as affect (Priest, 2013). When I argue that the musicking voice distances from the idea of a proper voice that lies on the side of the voicer and hence from a vocal ontology, how can the musicking voice be conceptualised? In a last approach, a listening phenomenology is called for. The musicking voice needs both a voicer and a listener in order to be conceived. In the last chapter, I want to ask: What is the relationship between the voice and its perception? How does the voice affect a listening and listening a voice?

5. The musicking voice's incantation: listening and affect

In the winter of 2018, I joined a choir in London. Run by enthusiastic lay singers, Musarc is a project choir that has become known in the London contemporary music scene for performing pieces by a range of composers.[24] The choir organises concerts twice a year where newly commissioned pieces are performed alongside a more traditional Western repertoire. For a midsummer concert in July 2019, held at the now defunct Whitechapel Bell Foundry, the programme included pieces by Heleen van Haegenborgh, Amina Abbas-Nazari, Natasha Zielasinski, James Luff, Greta Eacott, Rūta Vitkauskaitė, Steve Potter and Lin Chiwei. The evening was closed with William Byrd's *Mass for Four Voices*.[25]

During my time at the choir, Byrd's *Mass* became one of the more difficult pieces to rehearse – not due to the complexity of each vocal line but rather for the complex counterpoint. As a lay choir, often performing more abstract pieces, we were not necessarily used to listening to the intricate cueing and rhythmical timings of each other's voices. The task of rehearsing the piece proved more difficult than anticipated. I took great pleasure, however, in rehearsing it. I enjoyed hearing my own voice and the collective voice of my tenor comrades playing with and against the three other voices. Singing polyphonic Renaissance music for the first time, I sensed my voice's capacity to musick. I suddenly enjoyed hearing my own singing voice in the ensemble of soprano (cantus), alto (altus) and baritone (bassus). As soon as I had become comfortable with the tenor's cues and its melodic and harmonic material, I started stretching my ears to the other voices. I stretched my left ear towards the baritone's entries moving into the tenor's melodies. And I heard the alto's beautiful weavings often preceding or succeeding the tenor in fourths or fifths when I stretched my right ear. I also turned my listening to the soprano lines: the tenor often answering to their foreshadowing calls and imitating their

[24] See https://www.musarc.org/.
[25] For the concert, see https://www.musarc.org/events/concerts/le-marteau-sans-maitre/.

melodies a few bars later in a lower register. My voice was not only part of a vocal register – a unified blend of tenor voices – but it was also part of the fugal interplay of the four-part polyphony. By becoming aware of the relation between the many voices and their listening, my voice was able to touch – and be touched by – the many listening ears of the choir. I would notice such an encounter in the *Mass*'s cadences where the voices are drawn together and into homophony. Here, I sensed a waiting in this listening *for* one another: ears stretched out and extending to someone else's voice and one's own. In these moments of waiting, the musicking voice and its listening were bound by a grappling tension. And I felt a particular musical power emerge in this space where voices and ears touched.

This listening as waiting can be heard in the *Mass*'s 'Kyrie', when the tenor line sings a high G4, entering on the four in bar 33. The tenor's G4 gets doubled with the bass (G3) – which then moves a semitone up to the A♭4 on the one in the next bar – and set against the B♭4 in soprano and the D4 (♮) in alto (see Figure 3). The tenor listens attentively when in the pause until it pierces through the other voices with its repeated *kyrie* motive. This cue, like any other, could be learnt by heart or by counting beats but if I didn't *listen* to the other voices – the bass's descending entry or the successions of resolved *d*s in soprano and alto – my entry would diminish the fugal tension, and the musical swaying that is so important to Byrd's polyphony would lose its affective power.



Figure 3: William Byrd, Mass for Four Voices*, 'Kyrie', bars 31 – 35; edited by David Fraser, cf. Byrd, 2008, p. 2. Copyright © 2000 by CPDL.*

The concert at the Bell Foundry was a success, even though we let some mistakes slip into the performance of the *Mass*. By the time the midsummer's day had turned into night, Byrd's *Mass* ended the evening. The room was now lit with handheld candles carried by the audience and one hundred bodies listening to the *Mass*'s last movement, the 'Agnus Dei'. This memory still sends shivers down my spine and through my ears. I am reminded of the softly tallying upbeats of the *miserere* repetitions that move between the voices. I always had to remind myself not to get carried away by the echoed interplay between soprano and alto and particularly the alto's descending seconds of A♭4, G4 and F4 on *miserere* (see Figure 4). I had to be wary not to get too moved away and forget my own cue in the upbeat to bar 13 where the tenor begins the three-part canon. As one of five tenor voices, I had to be attentive to extend the duet's closure and lead the voices into the next canon. This short moment was laden with tension not only because I was nervous to make my voice heard surrounded by all these listening participants but also because of the musical power generated by the polyphonic interaction. In this waiting and cueing, in listening and singing, in their relationship, lies the interanimation of voices and ears.



Figure 4: William Byrd, Mass for Four Voices*, 'Agnus Dei', bars 1 – 15; edited by David Fraser, cf. Byrd, 2008, p. 24. Copyright © 2000 by CPDL.*

I frame this chapter with this narration of choral singing as it puts into question the relation between the musicking voice and its mode of listening. I wonder how the voice affects the ear and how the ear affects the voice. The musicking affections between the voice and the ear, between singing and listening, are by no means singular to my choir experience and to William Byrd's *Mass for Four Voices* but – as I argue – animate any musicking voice. My questions are: What is the relation between voice and listening in music? Is there a specific listening that is *addressed* in the musicking voice? And if their relationship is interdependent, does the musicking voice demand a theory of listening? This questioning opens to a wider philosophical problem of the voice in music. How can the musicking voice be approached from its perception

and not merely from its production? This last question demands to think about the musicking voice's place in a vocal ontology or listening phenomenology. I will argue that the musicking voice roams happily in a strange in-between of ontology and phenomenology.

This idea seems simple at first – to include listening into a theory of the voice – but as other theories and their lack of attention to listening show, this inclusion of the ear in theories of voice is far from self-evident. Roland Barthes, for instance, has thought about different modes of listening; however, he only discusses an intersubjective listening in psychoanalysis and not a specific listening to the musical voice (Barthes, 1977, 1991a). In Mladen Dolar's theory of the voice as *objet a*, listening is altogether hard to find and only receives a minor role (Dolar, 2006, p. 148). The voice's strange position as an object of desire lacks a desiring ear. The same can be said of Adriana Cavarero's influential discussion of the voice in political theory: her subject merely voices but has no need to listen to itself or to others (Cavarero, 2005). Theories of voice that fail to account for its perception easily fall prey to vocal ontology, as can be seen particularly in Cavarero's case and has been argued in current voice studies (Eidsheim and Meizel, 2019a, p. xiv). In this chapter, I am interested in the musicking voice's relation to listening.

In order to theorise the musicking voice's relation to listening, I first discuss Jacques Derrida's notion of hearing-oneself-speak (*s'entendre parler*) and I ask what the relationship between the speaking voice and hearing offers to the musicking voice (5.1.1.). Jean-Luc Nancy's notion of musical listening will help me move from hearing speech to listening to music. I extend Nancy's notion of musical listening by incorporating the musicking voice (5.1.2.). After having discussed the relationship between voice and ear, I take up the position of a listener and will analyse two polyphonic motets by Josquin des Prez (5.2.). In this listening analysis, I will develop the vocabulary with which I theorise the encounter between the musicking voice and listening. In 5.3., I discuss the relationship between voice and listening as

an affective encounter. By way of (musical) affect theories (5.3.1.), I conceptualise the encounter as two interanimating movements: the ear's stretching to voice (5.3.2.) and the voice's incantation of the ear (5.3.3.). Tracing these two movements allows me to theorise the affections that happen between vocal ontology and listening phenomenology. The musicking voice emerges from this space in-between.

5.1. The relationship between voice and ear

The otolaryngologist Alfred Tomatis claims that "[t]he ear and the voice are intimately connected. In their relationship we can find answers to many questions" (Tomatis, 2005, p. 4). Not only otolaryngologists, psychologists or psychoanalysts find questions and problems in the relationship between the voice and the ear. Musicians also know of their particularly intimate and important relationship. For singers, listening often functions as a control mechanism. In hearing-oneself-sing, the singer is already their own audience. The opera singer Roberta Prada goes even further when she insists that "[w]e singers live through our ears" (Prada, in Tomatis, 2005, p. ix). Vocal pedagogy has long paid attention to the relation between voicing and hearing voice and has invented methods and techniques of training and stylising the voice by way of its listening (Sell, 2005, pp. 12, 112). Physiologists and voice physicians, too, have long been interested in the feedback loop of singing and listening and how they affect each other, particularly with regards to pitch correction, placement of the voice, timbre, etc. (Sundberg, 1987, pp. 60; 157–160; Tomatis, 2005; Pauley, 2007, 2008). The voice and the ear are placed in a relation that can be described as an "auditory feedback" (Kreiman and Sidtis, 2011, p. 190) or "audio-vocal circuit" (Tomatis, 2005, p. 10). In critical studies of the voice, however, this relation has often been overlooked; arguably, because the questioning of the relationship between the singing voice and the listening ear brings with it a wider and more problematic question of vocal ontology and listening phenomenology.

The voice scholar Nina Eidsheim has questioned the relationship between singing and listening in her book *Sensing Sound* (Eidsheim, 2015). Eidsheim's main endeavour is to critique ossified concepts of music, sound and voice. By way of regarding music as a "practice of intermaterial vibration" (Eidsheim, 2015, p. 3), Eidsheim attempts to move away from such naturalised notions of defining music or the voice merely as sound (Eidsheim, 2015, p. 111). Instead, she proposes to think music and sound not in objective terms but rather in the modes of performance and practice (Eidsheim, 2015, p. 163). For this, she develops a relational theory of vibration that reconsiders the differences of music's production and its perception. Singing and listening figure centrally in her theorising of music as "intermaterial vibrational practice" (Eidsheim, 2015, pp. 3; 160–165). With her focus on practice, Eidsheim prioritises the carnal activity of performance and the sound which is produced in musicking becomes secondary; singing is "action rather than sound" (Eidsheim, 2015, p. 116). Singing and listening are not considered separate phenomena, instead, they are made of the same material body and are merely different forms of the same vibrational practice. She writes:

> if singing is activity alone, and if the sounds produced are secondary, of what does listening consist? Instead of defining singing as the sounds produced by vocal cords and listening as their reception by eardrums, I have proposed that singing and listening are continuously unfolding physical activities and experiences that engage the total human body. We are never privy to sound in the form in which it is transduced through another person's materially specific body. (Eidsheim, 2015, p. 179)

The problem with Eidsheim's conceptualisation of music as primarily carnal activity is problematic. It privileges the musicking body as the sole generator of musicking (see Van Elferen, 2020, pp. 64; 141–142).. As I have already argued in Chapter 1, the musicking voice always calls for a body in order to come into being but the body cannot function as a stable index of the voice. It is thus problematic that Eidsheim proposes a chronological hierarchy of bodily activity before sonic event. Furthermore, her suggestion of the levelling of singing and listening become problematic for my theorising of the musicking voice as a fundamental difference both in the production of sound and its reception are lost when any musicking

activity becomes vibrational practice. Her theorising of musicking suggests that both singing and listening happen at the same time and in one body. Strangely enough, Eidsheim's relational theory of music re-introduces a presence of the voice that Jacques Derrida had so famously critiqued (Derrida, 2011; I will discuss Derrida in the next section). This problem of the simultaneity and equation of production and reception further opens to a problem of the ontology and phenomenology of music and particularly the musicking voice. Rather than acknowledging that both approaches are at play and necessary for any discussion of the voice in music – as I will show throughout this chapter –, Eidsheim negates any ontology of music and places both music's production and its reception on the side of the subject (both as listeners and performers). As this chapter is concerned with the musicking voice's affections and the relation between the voice and its listening, I need to think about their differences and the effects of differentiation that are at play in the performance of the voice. I argue that the voice's musical affection emerges in the distancing between voice and ear, in its spacing.

5.1.1. Hearing-oneself-speak

The problem that appears in Eidsheim's discussion of singing and listening can be highlighted by way of Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of the voice in *Voice and Phenomenon* and *Of Grammatology* (Derrida, 2011, 2016). For the purpose of my argument, I mainly focus on the issue of hearing-oneself-speak in *Voice and Phenomenon* which lies at the heart of Derrida's critique of Husserl's phenomenology (Derrida, 2011, pp. 64, 66–67). In *Voice and Phenomenon*, Derrida performs a critique of the Western metaphysics of presence. Here, he takes up Husserl's phenomenology and deconstructs its understanding of the self, perception and presence. As Husserl renders the voice an important figure in the construction of presence and consciousness, it lies at the heart of Derrida's critique, too. In particular, Derrida critiques Husserl's notion of a self-same presence as it *presents itself* when I hear-myself-speak. Derrida

argues that Husserl's "phenomenological voice" (Derrida, 2011, p. 64) is a voice without an outside. According to Derrida, Husserl's metaphysics bears a presence because it forcefully brackets out an outside of the voice, a difference that is always already part of any act of utterance and – more so – any act of sensing and self-making. Derrida thus critiques Husserl's belief in a pure presence that is available to a perceiving subject. Husserl's subject perceives itself apparently without any mediation (Derrida, 2011, pp. 60–74).

Important for Derrida's critique is that Husserl's voice is a silent voice, a voice that keeps the silence (Derrida, 2011, p. 60). It is not a voice that needs to be actually spoken or uttered aloud. As a voice silently speaking to itself, this inner voice functions as the basis for Husserl's conception of thought and self. According to Derrida, Husserl's self comes to be by way of the voice's auto-affection. In silently speaking to oneself, being and self are constituted without "any detour through the agency of exteriority, of the world, or of the non-proper in general" (Derrida, 2011, p. 67). The problem with this silent auto-affecting voice is that it becomes synonymous with being, it assumes an "absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice and the ideality of meaning" (Derrida, 2016, p. 12). The self relates to itself, it perceives itself in an immediate "punctuality of now" (Derrida, 2011, pp. 65–68).

Derrida's critique performs what has become known as deconstruction: it introduces an irritation into Husserl's idealist conception of self. He contends that there can never be an auto-affected self-relation because there is always another space or another temporality through which a self perceives itself. This can be exemplified again by the voice. Both the silent voice (in inner speech) as well as the speaking voice go *out* in order to affect or be perceived (both by myself or someone else) (see Connor, 2000, pp. 5–7). In the case of the speaking voice, I can hear my own voice return from and in the space into which it has been spoken. There would be no sound if there was no resonance and there is no resonance without a space. The sounding

voice always has to go through a physical space in order to be perceived. Production and perception differ temporally, perception will always come after – Derrida calls this "temporalization" (Derrida, 2011, p. 73). This sounding voice not only is perceived in a temporal lag, a posteriori to the voice's production, but it also traverses a space. It might be perceived in the same body – as in the case of hearing my own voice –, but in order to be perceived, it must go through a space – this is what Derrida calls "spacing" (ibid.). Now, this problem could be explained in terms of basic acoustic theory. But Derrida goes further and argues that the same phenomenon of "temporalization" and "spacing" happens in the case of the silent voice that speaks to itself and hears itself in soliloquy. He argues that thought never simply affects itself but always has to go through an outside, it will always be mediated. A sensing subject never simply feels itself feel or senses itself sense but this process of feeling or sensing is always traced by another temporality and another space, an outside to oneself. Most easily, this outside can be understood as the system of language. In sum, Derrida – countering Husserl – introduces a concept of the (impossible) subject which is always already temporally as well as spatially split, deferred. The I which silently speaks to itself, Derrida argues, can never be the same I that hears itself speak – there must already be a temporal and spatial gap between both speaking and hearing. Speaker and listener, even if they are the same person, are always spaced. The speaking self thus differs from the hearing self (ibid.).

Derrida's spacing can be related to Dolar's theorising of the voice as the "Other within" (Dolar, 2006, p. 102) or to Steven Connor description of the voice's fundamental "split condition" (Connor, 2000, p. 7) or to what Freya Jarman calls the voice's queer position in and as a "third space" (Jarman-Ivens, 2011, p. 3). No matter what it is called, the voice's spacing comes to the fore in its relationship to listening. There is no immediate access to the voice. And this is where the problem of listening comes into play: as an outside element that co-constitutes the voice in the case of sound and music. Eidsheim's conception of voice and listening –

discussed previously – seems to ignore that the voice is traced by such an outside. In her conception, the voice seems to coincide with its own listening and can be found in the same listening body. Eidsheim attempts to move from a vocal ontology to a phenomenology of listening to the voice. By doing so, however, she overdetermines the power of listening and forgets about the producing voice, a vocal ontology. Strangely enough, Eidsheim's carnal phenomenology of voice reintroduces a voice that perceives itself and does so in the *same* body. I argue, however, that there is a "vocal difference" at the heart of the musicking voice (Derrida and Conley, 1984, p. 81) – it comes into being by way of a listening, even if this listening can only ever approximate the voice. The voice and the ear are different: the voice is deferred in the moment of its perception and its ontological status is thus always out of reach, listening will always arrive too late to capture the voice. Listening and speaking are always deferred, they never happen at the same time or in the same place and yet they cannot exist without one another. The listening ear cannot see a full image of the voice, it cannot see into the voice, it is not a laryngologist; instead, it can only feel and be touched by its traces and effects. The theory of the musicking voice is then a theory of the voice's effects and its affections on listening. Derrida's deconstruction, however, has nothing to say about the voice in music. How is it then useful for my theorisation of the musicking voice?

5.1.2. Ontology *and* Phenomenology

As a problem that touches on the philosophy of voice, Derrida's deconstruction of Husserl's metaphysics of presence roams mainly in the background to my own theorisation. Derrida uses the idea of the voice as a tool to critique phenomenology's problematic inheritance of a metaphysics of presence – his notion of voice is thus not directly of interest to my argument. However, for my problem at hand – the relation of the musicking voice to its listening – Derrida's notion of spacing becomes a useful concept of difference and relationality. Brian

Kane has similarly argued that spacing can be made productive for a theory of voice in the aftermath of the critique of the metaphysics of presence (Kane, 2016b, p. 105). The figure of spacing enables me to move beyond a dichotomy of vocal ontology and listening phenomenology and to propose instead a double movement of the musicking voice and its listening. I argue that the musicking voice as a concept and a performance depends both on an ontological *and* phenomenological philosophy of voice, music and listening.

Michel Chion has developed a theory of sound that bridges the problematics of ontology and phenomenology in his book *Sound: An Acoulogical Treatise* (Chion, 2016). Chion argues that sound can never be totalised, neither as an ontological object (such as in acoustics, psychoacoustics or, for that matter, a sonic materialism, see Ch. 2) nor as a phenomenological object solely constructed by a listening subjectivity. Instead, for Chion, sound can only be approached in an oscillation between both. There is always an inside and an outside to sound, sound is an event but one that depends on its perception. He argues that "[s]ound is not graspable outside of a dialectic between the place of the source and the place of listening" (Chion, 2016, p. 105); "sound is simultaneously within us and outside of us, just as it is simultaneously in the source object and outside of it" (Chion, 2016, p. 107; also see Van Elferen, 2020, pp. 137–139).

In a brief and cursory comment, Chion also mentions Derrida's discussion of hearing-oneself-speak (Derrida, 1993, p. 88; Chion, 2016, p. 94). He critiques Derrida's notion of hearing-oneself-speak for lacking the specific complexity of the feedback between speaking and listening. He contends that Derrida neglects the physical differences of hearing oneself from the inside (internal vibrations, bone conduction) and hearing oneself from the outside (by way of ears and reflected resonance). Chion argues that the "audio-phonatory loop" (Chion, 2016, p. 15) – the "audio-vocal circuit" (Tomatis, 2005, p. 10) – is more complex than Derrida's discussion assumes. He proposes to think self-hearing as

> a continuum between 'hearing oneself from the inside' (through internal vibrations) and 'hearing oneself from the outside' (through the ears, by reflections off the walls, through a loudspeaker if one is amplified, etc.) and this continuum binds the one to the other. (Chion, 2016, p. 93)

Chion includes in his discussion of hearing-oneself-speak the physical and acoustic differences of inner vibration and outer resonance. This doubleness of inner hearing and outer hearing stands not so much in contrast to Derrida's philosophical problem but rather supports his argument of spacing from a sonic perspective (see Villegas Vélez, 2018). It is interesting for my argument that Chion concludes that our "voice is on the whole foreign to us—as much when heard from the outside as when heard internally" (Chion, 2016, p. 94). In Chion's discussion, the relation between speaking and listening becomes spaced not only as the sound of the voice moves outside of myself but also because the sound of the voice is perceived in two different modes: inner listening via bone conduction and vibration and outer listening via room acoustics and the listening ears. Chion contends that we can never know our own speaking voice properly as there are always (at least two) different versions of myself speaking. Similar to Derrida's deconstruction, Chion understands listening as a play of temporal and spatial difference. The "audio-phonatory loop" reveals that audition is always different from and yet dependent on the sound event (Chion, 2016, p. 15).

But again, Chion's discussion of self-hearing mainly touches on the speaking voice. Chion himself has argued that listening to music is different from listening to sound or speech because music is more than sonic matter (2016, pp. 62–63; also see Ch. 2). Musical listening has to do with an "aesthetic listening" (2016, p. 57) that differentiates from modes of listening that are "causal, code-oriented, reduced [or] linguistic" (ibid.). So far, I have not specified such a mode of listening to music and have assumed – with Eidsheim and Derrida – a vague and general understanding of listening. The musicking voice, however, is a particularly musical event and not just a sonic event (see Ch. 2). My question is: What is the mode of listening to

the musicking voice? Is their relationship differently spaced than the one between the speaking voice and listening?

5.1.3. Musical listening

I turn to Jean-Luc Nancy. His short essay *Listening* (Nancy, 2007) can be read in parallel with the previous discussion of Michel Chion's work: both Chion as well as Nancy approach sound from ontology *and* phenomenology. Nancy's understanding of listening similarly contends that neither an ontology of sound nor a phenomenology of listening can separately explain sound, because "listening takes place *at the same time* as the sonorous event" (Nancy, 2007, p. 14, original emphasis). Listening and the sonorous event are interlinked – neither one can posit an a priori over the other. Acoustically, this is incorrect: the "audio-phonatory loop" (Chion, 2016, p. 15) necessarily always calls first for the production of a sound before it can be perceived in resonance. However, Nancy's argument is not acoustic but rather – in line with Derrida – deconstructive. His aim is to think sound as always relating to and being co-produced by a listening. Chion makes this twofold approach to sound apparent by closely theorising the differences of the acoustics of sound and its phenomenological perception. Nancy, however, is interested in developing a relational ontology of sound through the figure of resonance – which enables him to challenge conceptions of sense and subjectivity (Nancy, 2007, pp. 6–9, 12, 17; also see Kane, 2012, pp. 445–446). In any case, both Chion's and Nancy's theories can be applied to overcome a dichotomous problem of sound theory, that is, the dilemma of a sonic ontology *or* a phenomenology of listening.

It is now interesting for my purposes that Nancy ultimately aims to fashion a mode of musical listening based on this deconstructive understanding of sound. Nancy argues that the French verb *entendre* bears problems for the theorisation of listening that he is interested in (Nancy, 2007, p. 6). *Entendre* can most directly be translated as *to hear* but this translation

misses a crucial additional meaning of the French verb which also translates as *to understand* (see Kane, 2012, pp. 440–441). When Derrida critiques the idea of hearing-oneself-speak (*s'entendre parler*), he not only problematises the idea that the voice's auto-affection is grounded in *hearing* but furthermore also hints at the *comprehending* or *understanding* of oneself in the moment of hearing. Nancy, similar to Derrida, critiques this notion of hearing as understanding (Nancy, 2007, pp. 1–2). In opposition to signification, Nancy's essay develops a theory of listening beyond the confines of hermeneutics. Musical listening, for Nancy, is such a highly affective and aesthetic mode of "listening to the beyond-meaning" (Nancy, 2007, p. 31). In musical listening, Nancy argues, meaning does not figure central, instead, it is where music listens to itself, where a self's relation to itself as difference – which he calls resonance (Nancy, 2007, p. 11) – comes to the fore.

> Musical listening seems, then, to be like the permission, the elaboration, and the intensification of the keenest disposition of the 'auditory sense.' (Musical listening means, in the end, music itself, the music that, above all, *is listened to* [s'écoute], whether it is written down or not, and when it is written, from its composition all the way to its execution. It *is listened to* according to the different possible inflections of expression: it is made to be listened to, but it is first of all, in itself, the listening of self.) (Nancy, 2007, pp. 26–27, original emphasis)

Nancy's hierarchisation of music over other auditory phenomena is problematic, but his conceptualisation of musical listening becomes fruitful for my discussion, nonetheless, as it foregrounds not only a spacing of the sonorous event and its perception but furthermore because it opens a space for the inclusion of musical affect. At this point, Nancy's theory of listening becomes productive for my theory of the musicking voice. Nancy's musical listening is a listening that diverges from normative accounts of listening modalities found in the histories of musicology. Nancy is not interested in the musicological expert listener who decodes musical forms, genres, styles, soundscapes or sound objects. He is, however, interested in the specific listening that opens itself to musical affect; in Peter Szendy's words, this is a "musical listening that is *aware of itself*" (Szendy, 2008, p. 1, original emphasis). Arguably,

such listening is part and parcel of musicking as a whole, it co-produces the musical, it is engaged in the affective interaction of musicking performativity. Rather than theorising musical listening as a particularly attentive or noble mode of engagement with music, it can be thought as always co-producing the musical. This would resemble, for instance, Anahid Kassabian's conception of listening – no matter if musical listening is particularly attentive or less so (Kassabian, 2013, pp. xi, xxi–xxii). Thinking listening as actively co-producing the musical also conjures music's drastic performativity which I have discussed in Chapter 2 by way of Carolyn Abbate (see 2.3.1.). While Abbate is less concerned with listening, Jankélévitch affirms the listener's musicking capacity when he thinks of the "listener as [a] fictive re-creator" of music (Jankélévitch, 2003, p. 77). I would tweak Jankélévitch's statement and would argue that the listener is in fact a *co*-creator of musicking. There is nothing to re-create because listening – as I argue with Nancy – already constitutes the sonorous event.

Like many commentators of the singing voice, Vladimir Jankélévitch believes singing to be of a different order than speaking, music affects its listeners differently than language does. He writes the following:

> Music is familiar with the echo, which is the melody's mirror-reflection of itself, and with canonic imitation, but it knows nothing of dialogue. In polyphony, the voices speak together, harmoniously, but they are not speaking among themselves *to one another*, they are not addressing themselves *to one another*: they are singing in concert for an outsider, like choristers who turn toward a listener. (Jankélévitch, 2003, p. 20; original emphasis)

Even though Jankélévitch does not actually appear in Nancy's discussion, Nancy's thoughts on listening seem to echo some of Jankélévitch's ideas about listening to the singing voice. Jankélévitch, like Nancy, thinks music fundamentally as resonating between an object and a subject, music resonates in this in-between space. It has no fixed ontological position but its effects, its traces can be felt and it is those traces that animate us to listen to music's echo (ibid.).

Jankélévitch's comment on the singing voice reminds me of my own choral singing, of Byrd's polyphonic fugal mass that we sang in the choir (see 5.0.). Singing his *Mass for Four Voices* required a particular listening to each other's voices in order to maintain the swaying rhythm, to pace the fugal imitations and its resolving cadences and to keep a tight-knit weave of the voice's sequenced cues. Byrd's intricate fugal polyphony demands of its singers a particular listening, one that anticipates and waits. Jankélévitch's comment intuitively seems to ring true: one of the goals in Renaissance choral singing is the idea of the singing voice's polyphonic interaction, it subsists on the swaying push and pull of imitation and cadencing. And yet, I wonder about the 'outsider' that Jankélévitch addresses or that is addressed in singing; as if he conjured an outsider as a listener, as if an outside listener is *called for* in the polyphonic setting. I am interested in this figure of the outside listener and I am also interested in Jankélévitch's formulation of the *"choristers who turn toward a listener"* (Jankélévitch, 2003, p. 20; my emphasis). I imagine this as the voice's turning towards the outside listening ear. Who or what is this outsider of listening? How does this listener relate to the musicking voice? And why does Jankélévitch choose the particular example of polyphonic choral music to think about listening's outside and the voice's turning?

For now, I can only suggest that this outsider that Jankélévitch hears in singing relates to Derrida's notion of spacing. It is – after Nancy – music listening to itself (Nancy, 2007, p. 27), emerging in resonance between the voice and its listening. While Derrida has no sensibility for the musicking voice, Jankélévitch thinks the polyphonic arrangement of voices as specifically musical. He connects a listening ear to a vocal utterance while both are involved in music's performativity. Jankélévitch's outside could be a spacing that is musicked. The difference between listening to the speaking voice and listening to the singing voice is that the latter is imbued in musicking. Musicking turns Derrida's spacing into Jankélévitch's outside.

In order to follow the spacing of the musicking voice and its listening, I want to place my own ears in the polyphonic play of Renaissance choral singing. I will trace the specific encounter of the musicking voice and its listening ears in two of Josquin des Prez's motets. My listening will be animated by Jankélévitch's ideas of a *turning towards an outside listener* and I will ask: Who is the outside listener that the musicking voice turns to? Outsider of what? And how do the musicking voice and its listening encounter each other?

5.2. Polyphonic listening: Josquin

I now turn to Josquin. I will discuss the specific relationship between the musicking voice and its listening that I find in the arrangement and performance of vocal polyphony. Two motets will be helpful: the *Domine, ne in furore* (Psalm 37 for four voices) and the *Miserere mei, deus* (Psalm 51, for five voices). It is important to signal that my analyses of both *Domine* and *Miserere* are more indebted to my own listening than to the written and transcribed score. The *Domine* particularly touches me when I listen to the recording by the Weser-Renaissance ensemble, led by Manfred Cordes (Des Prez, 2012a). And of the many recordings of Josquin's *Miserere*, I have been most touched by the Cappella Amsterdam recording (Des Prez, 2018). I indicate these specific recordings not only because I developed my listening analyses alongside and with them but also because these recordings can already be thought of as a particular arrangement of listening to Josquin's polyphony, as Peter Szendy would argue (Szendy, 2008, p. 36). The reconstruction of my listening with the help of the score is rather a tool of comprehension and not so much a means in itself.

5.2.1. Imitation and difference: *Domine, ne in furore*

The motet *Domine, ne in furore* is an imitative polyphony for four voices.[26] Like many other sacred motets by Josquin, it is based on a psalm setting.[27] For the most part, the four voices are organised sequentially, in continuous contrapuntal style. While the single psalm lines are short, they overlap with each new line: when the preceding voices start, the following voices are ending their previous lines. This can be exemplified, for instance, at the outset where the "domine" moves sequentially downwards from discantus to altus to tenor to bassus (see Figure 5). Once the phrase has reached the bassus, the next psalm line overlaps in the discantus again, starting with "ne in furore tuo". Here, the complex layered overlapping can already be noticed: in the doubling of the "ne" at the end of the first phrase in the bassus on a G3 with the "ne" in the second phrase in the discantus on an E4 (see Figure 5, bar 3). The range of the four voices is very narrow. The discantus does not move beyond F4 while the bassus only goes down to F2 – in contemporary terms, these four voices are set out in between the vocal ranges of bass and baritone. The very narrow ambitus in which the four voices are placed results in a dense contrapuntal composition, where the voice's differences in timbre and pitch are kept to a minimum.

[26] The Weser-Renaissance recording of the *Domine* is available at: https://music.youtube.com/watch?v=-yINHKZQvVk&feature=share (Accessed: 28 August 2021).
[27] The motet's provenance cannot be accurately ascribed. Contemporary Josquin scholars regard the *Domine* as only doubtfully belonging to the Josquin repertoire (see Finscher, 2000, p. 264).



Figure 5: Beginning of Josquin's Domine, ne in furore *(Des Prez, 2012b, p. 1).*

Through this rather systematic imitative overlapping, Josquin creates a wavering succession from one psalm and melodic line to the next. I want to focus on one short moment in the middle of the composition which concludes the first part and divides the composition in half, it is the line: "miser factus sum et curvatus sum usque in finem, tota die contristatus ingredebar".[28]

This line differs from the previous arrangement as it is sung by mainly two voices that correspond to each other sequentially (bar 98-113; see Des Prez, 2012b). The setting is more spacious which can be seen in a semi-chorus style where mostly bassus and tenor or altus and discantus sing with each other. As such, this moment in the composition is not extraordinary, it merely becomes noticeable as it contrasts with the narrower and 'fuller' imitative setting that we have heard thus far. This "miser factus sum" episode (bar 98-113) appears towards the end of the first part of the piece and functions as a heightening of the cadence that follows afterwards (bar 114-125).

What fascinates me about these few moments of this "miser factus sum" episode is not only the loftier imitative setting but also its specific rhythmical sway. The setting creates a

[28] The translation in the accompanying CD-booklet reads: "For I walk bent and bowed down low; I walk in sorrow the whole day long" (Des Prez, 2012a, p. 25).

disrupting sense of metre. This ruptured flow of time is caused by the third syllable of the vocal line: ‘fa’ (factus) and ‘va’ (curvatus) and the successive doubling of these syllables in the dotted semibreves. As a listener, I am rhythmically swayed out of balance because of the emphasis on the slightly irregular beat (third dotted semibreve). These imitative constellations seem to defer the sung vocal line: I hear this most clearly in the dotted semibreves, ‘fa’, in bar 99, first on F3 in the bassus, then C4 in the tenor, then F3 in the altus and C4 in discantus (bar 101) (see Figure 6). It is also worth mentioning that the bassus and tenor figure is repeated almost exactly in the altus and the discantus, both in pitch and rhythm (bar 98-101). The same figure is repeated in the next psalm line, again on the vowel *a*, when I hear temporally deferred ‘et curvatus sum’, set to the same melodic line, but only sung by bassus and altus this time around, here in semi-chorus. On the Weser-Renaissance recording this doubling on the vowel *a* transforms the vocal sound into the toning of a trumpet or cornett from afar. This change in timbre furthermore emphasises the sense of disruption in this passage. The passage stands out not only because of an irregular sense of timbre and time but also because it forms a central cadence of the piece and signals the end of the first part.



Figure 6: "Miser factus sum" episode at the end of the first part of Josquin's Domine, ne in furore *(see Des Prez, 2012b, p. 5). For the audio example of this passage cf. min. 03:24-04:40 (Des Prez, 2012a).*

The reduced vocal setting – two voices singing in semi-choir – creates a strong sense of attention, a focus that leaves space to think about the listening to singing. Ludwig Finscher has emphasised the passage's "lamento quality" and speaks of an "affective power" in the coming together of the two voices in the 'curvatus' repetition (Finscher, 2000, p. 277). The passage also generates a specific tension due to its particular rhythmical constellation, oscillating between isorhythmic and offbeat movements. This swaying rhythm is created both by the 'delay effect' of the temporal difference in the voices caused by the imitations but also by the extended or dotted semibreves, for instance, on the syllables 'fa' (bars 99, 101, 107-108) and 'va' (bars 103, 110-111). This imitative setting asks of the singer to be highly attentive of the

other voice's movements, their rhythmical timing and changes. Only if these voices, here in a duet, are in sync, will the imitation and its particular contrapuntal and rhythmical intricacy be heard by an audience as a successfully interwoven counterpoint. Arguably, such imitative polyphony works by way of temporal deferral and I hear in this deferral the specific spacing of the musicking voice and its listening.

I want to suggest that both an external listener (you and I) as well as the singers themselves – by waiting for each other's voices – are summoned by the musicking voice's force. The musicking voice addresses an outside listener, as Jankélévitch maintains (Jankélévitch, 2003, p. 20). Polyphonic singing is as much controlled and determined by each other's utterances as well as the listening for the right moment to cue, the adjusting of timbre, pitch, dynamic. This is of course common choir praxis but as a listener I can be part of this listening as waiting, of this stretching towards another voice and its singing. The rhythmic arrangement in the *Domine* is but one very apparent touching of singing and listening. Josquin does not only compose a polyphony of voices but also of their awaiting ears. In this particular polyphonic deferral of overlapping voices, I can trace a listening to singing that is specifically musical. These voices are not "speaking among themselves *to one another*" (ibid.; original emphasis). Even though the psalm is clearly comprehensible, the text is sung and not spoken. These are musicking voices that come into being in ensemble, "they are singing in concert" (ibid.) for their own outside listening ears. Our listening takes part in this musicking.

5.2.2. Cadential magnetism: *Miserere mei, deus*

Josquin's *Domine* fascinates me particularly because of its rhythmical and temporal deferral that differentiates the voices. In this difference, I can trace the interactions of singing and

listening. Now, I want to focus on the moments of contraction, when the singing voices align in polyphony, when they move into and as one. Josquin's *Miserere* functions as an example.[29]

The psalm 51 (Miserere mei, deus) is set as a five-voice arrangement – these five voices are mostly sung canonically, following a less rigid structure of a canon though. The *Miserere* is – in contrast to many other Josquin motets – less polyphonically complex but we can find a particular listening to singing here as well: in the moments in which the voices gravitate towards each other and towards a resolution.

The motet is structured into three parts. The central structuring device is the plea "miserere mei, deus" ("Have mercy upon me, God") which runs throughout the whole motet as a repeated cantus firmus or "motto" (Milsom, 2000, p. 296). It is introduced at the very beginning of the motet as a two-pitch figure in the tenor 1. Every time the 'miserere' repeats, it varies. Throughout, the psalm verses are sung in canonic fashion, often in semi-chorus. These psalms are, however, only sung by four voices; one of the tenor voices only sings the cantus firmus (see Brothers, 1992, p. 157). The continuous verses are repeatedly interspersed by the motto of the "miserere mei, deus" in full chorus. The motto which is contrasting the more modulating and punctuated psalm verses can be heard as contractions of harmonic, melodic and rhythmic material, "like the refrain of a litany" (Macey *et al.*, 2001). The compositional setting in the *Miserere* motto is much more uniform than in the *Domine*; many a times we can hear at least two or three, sometimes all five voices sing in homophony. I want to hear and think the motto in the *Miserere* as an encounter of singing and listening. In the motto, the voices repeatedly contract and gravitate – often in descending motion – towards resolution in "deus". I study one particular iteration of the motto from the first part which shows this most apparently. It is the "miserere mei, deus" that precedes the "ecce enim veritatem dilexisti" (see

[29] The Cappella Amsterdam recording of the first part of Josquin's *Miserere* can be found at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LUjJQOtV7IY (Accessed: 28 August 2021).

Figure 7).[30] Here particularly, I sense an affection in the interplay between the voices and its listening which is due to the delaying of homophony and the deferral of unison.



Figure 7: "Ecce enim veritatem dilexisti" motto from Josquin's Miserere mei, deus *(Des Prez, 2019, p. 5); for the audio example of this passage cf. min. 3:30 (Des Prez, 2018). The voices are arranged from top to bottom: superius, altus, tenor 1, tenor 2, bassus.*

As in most of the interspersing mottos that repeat the tenor's cantus firmus throughout the *Miserere*, this particular iteration is embellished by the ornamentation in the superius and here, too, by the movements in the bassus. The tenor 1 and the altus repeat the cantus firmus truthfully, with the mantra-like semi-tone pitch shift on *"de-us*", while the second tenor cues in later and stays on the repeated E4. The three middle voices (altus, tenor 1 and 2) mainly stick to the formal cantus firmus and allow the framing voices of superius and bassus to become the focal point. Superius and bassus are engaged in a semi-autonomous play of echo and imitation.

The superius, together with the tenor 2, is the last of the voices to enter the lament (bar 112). The superius stands out from the other as the highest voice, paralleling the altus in the octave to B. The first three bars of this particular motto are sung in a delayed homophony, every voice singing on a single pitch that creates a steady and droney pulse (B4, B3, G3, F4, E3). But when the altus and tenor 1 enter into their "deus" part in bar 114, they both move a

[30] Translated as: "Behold, you desire truth". For a translation of the whole motet, see Brothers, 1992, pp. 174–177.

second upwards, while superius and bassus both descend. The superius only moves a second down, to A4, but the bassus drops low, to an A2. The parallel of a double octave creates a strong dramatic shift in tension and puts the two voices in relation, enabling them to frame the ensemble of the other voices. The superius then moves up again and hits the highest note of the phrase (C5 on the syllable "me") which is parallelly followed two beats later in the bassus on the C3 ("de"). The bassus movement introduces the end of the phrase, when it moves up in second steps on "*de-us*". Here, the dotted semi-breve ("de") in the C3 stands out and accentuates the D3's slightly leading quality that leans towards the resolution in E3 on "us". This figure is rhythmically doubled in the superius move towards the resolution on "us", but here, it echoes the bassus's previous movement. The superius's upwards movement comes two beats after the bassus's movement and it, too, is altered harmonically. The prolonged stress is on the G4's "de" that moves into the A4's minim and resolves into the B4 on "us".

The specific power of this short moment in the *Miserere* emerges in the particular interplay between the superius and the bassus. As in the *Domine*, I am interested in the imitative play of difference that happens in vocal polyphony. But what comes out, in the *Miserere* specifically, is the tension of the cadential pull. While the other three voices more or less rigidly stick to the cantus firmus, superius and bassus tease out its melody and rhythm. They bend the temporal flow by shortening or extending certain phrases and by imitating each other's pitches and motives (such as the steps in seconds to the resolution). I am fascinated by this motto in the *Miserere* because it shows the voice's reciprocal play as gathering and contracting. In the play between superius and bassus, the two voices seem magnetically drawn to each other and to the solution on the 'deus'. Their ornamentations can be heard as a resistance to the resolutions's powerful pull. But in the end, the force of the polyphonic union is stronger than each voice's singular efforts.

This playful cueing and waiting, the echoing and imitating, shows the attuning of the singer's voices with its listening. This is a listening to oneself sing *and* a listening to the others sing. Many listening ears create these five singing voices. With Peter Szendy, I would think this particular form of listening in polyphony as a "musical listening that is *aware of itself*" (Szendy, 2008, p. 1, original emphasis). In these brief, tempered successions, the singer's voices and their singing become aware of their listening ears. The singer's voices and their listening interact and together they create polyphonic musicking. In this cadential movement, an affective encounter between the musicking voices and its listening takes place. I hear this cadencing as a touching: the musicking voice is touched by a listening. The term cadence derives from the fall: cado (latin) = to fall, or "*to be driven* or *carried by one's weight from a higher to a lower point"* (Lewis, 1980, p. 258; original emphasis). Such a singing as falling determines the musical power in Josquin's *Miserere*: as if one's voice was to fall into another one's ear, *as if* voice and ear fall into one. In the moment that the superius has given in to the gesture of falling (bar 114), when it allows itself to touch and be touched by the cadential magnetism, listening and singing are charged by each other's affections. When the superius falls into place on the last syllable of *Deus, -us*, we have become ensemble.

Again, Jean-Luc Nancy writes that "listening takes place *at the same time* as the sonorous event" (Nancy, 2007, p. 14, original emphasis). Transferred to the case of Josquin's polyphonic listening: singing does not come before or arrive at listening but both the musicking voice and its listening are bound by contract. This contract is made in the polyphonic difference in Josquin's *Domine* and in the cadential magnetism that incites his *Miserere*.

5.3. Affections: the musicking voice and its listening

Let me return to William Byrd's *Mass for Four Voices*. At the beginning of this chapter, I said that in its performance, *I could sense a powerful affection take place between singing and*

listening, between voice and ear (see 5.0.). Upon listening to Josquin's motets (5.2.), I also spoke of an affective encounter and of the power of the musicking voice's touching of listening. I know that these ideas of musical power and the affections between listening and singing are not merely the product of my own esoteric rumination when even the historical musicologist Ludwig Finscher is haunted by *Domine*'s "affective power" (Finscher, 2000, p. 277). What is this musical affect that seems to animate the musicking voice and its listening? What is this affect that makes ears sing and voices listen? So far, I have discussed how singing and listening relate in musicking: the musicking voice emerges in the space between vocal production and listening reception (5.1.). By focusing on Josquin's vocal polyphony, I have tried to approach this musicking voice by way of its listening (5.2.). But I have not yet discussed *how* the musicking voice and its specific listening interact. How do they affect each other? How does the voice affect listening? And how does listening affect the voice? What is their mode of encounter? Affect theory provides a framework to analyse the movements that animate the musicking voice and its listening. Furthermore, it enables me to negotiate the dichotomy of ontology and phenomenology which I have problematised before (5.1.). The study of the musicking voice's encounter with listening enables me to trace the affections *between* the voice and its listening and to circumvent a dichotomy of either vocal ontology or listening phenomenology.

5.3.1. Affect and music

Turn to affect

In the last two decades, large parts of the humanities and the arts have seen a turn to affect (Clough and Halley, 2007; Clough, 2008, p. 1). Most notably, this turn has led to a conceptualisation of affect as "pre-individual bodily forces [that augment] a body's capacity to act" (Clough, 2008, p. 1). Affect, theorised as such, cannot be reduced to the senses and

emotions or be grasped through signification. In many ways, affect describes a quality of a body's affections, its movements or forces rather than its identity or state. The body of affect is conceived as always composed of multiple bodies and multiple affections with other bodies (human, non-human, organic, in-organic, etc.).

Much of the vocabulary around the turn to affect stems from Benedict de Spinoza's philosophy and particularly Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's readings of it (Hardt, 2007, pp. ix–x). Spinoza develops his theory of affect mainly in his *Ethics* (Spinoza, 1996). He writes:

> By affect I understand affections of the body by which the body's power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections. (Spinoza, 1996, p. 70)

Affections are the relations between bodies, when one body affects another or is affected by another. Affect describes the "passage from one state to another" (Deleuze, 1988, p. 49), the increasing or diminishing of a body's power. The terms affection and affect are not interchangeable but describe different problems for Spinoza. *Affect* describes a body's power to act (ibid.), *affection* describes the relationality between bodies, not a body's essence but rather an encounter with another and the effect this encounter causes (Deleuze, 1988, p. 48). Affection "refers to a state of the affected body and implies the presence of the affecting body" (Deleuze, 1988, p. 49). As I am interested in the musicking voice's encounter with listening, I am mainly focussing on their interanimating affections.

For Spinoza, the body is always only conceived, legible and imaginable through the interactions with another body. The notion of body, for Spinoza, does not necessarily only comprise a human's physical body as it is enveloped by its epidermis. An organ can be a body in itself and react to another organ inside my corpus. In a lecture on Spinoza, Deleuze gives the example of the sun: we can regard the sun as a body and trace how the sunbeams emitted by the solar body affect my corporeal body; in this case, an affective encounter takes place between sun body and human body (Deleuze, 1978). Spinoza's notion of the body is thus more

general and differs from the body as the index of a sound source that I discussed with regards to the musicking voice in Chapter 1. Affections can have different traits, he calls those "good" or "evil" (Spinoza, 1996, p. 120). It is crucial to note that Spinoza's *Ethics* does not follow any moral argument, both "good" and "evil" merely signal the affectivity of the encounter between two bodies: good, when a body's capacity to affect and be affected is heightened (also called joy), and evil, when a body's capacity to affect and be affected is diminished (also called sadness) (Spinoza, 1996, pp. 120, 129, 138). Spinoza's theory of affect became prominent in the second half of the 20th century amongst others by way of Gilles Deleuze (Deleuze, 1988). The Spinozan concept of the body as constituted by its affections with other bodies will prove significant for Deleuze's philosophy. In summoning Spinoza's concept of affect, Deleuze says:

> we don't know what a body can do. But a body must be defined by the ensemble of relations which compose it, or, what amounts to exactly the same thing, by its power of being affected. (Deleuze, 1978)

With Spinoza, Deleuze will not define a body "by its organs and functions", nor by biological "Species or Genus characteristics" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2013, p. 299), but instead, together with Félix Guattari, he defines a body by its affections, its encounters with other bodies. In trying to define a body, Deleuze and Guattari "seek to count its affects" (2013, p. 299).

In his first Spinoza book, Deleuze regards affections as the modes of a substance (Deleuze, 1988, p. 48). Affections have the capacity to change said substance, they are attributes but not the substance's essence. A body does not have an essence when it is composed of affects. A body can only be defined through its affections with another body (Deleuze, 1988, p. 73). We can trace a body's impact on another by way of its affections: "affections are […] images or corporeal traces" (Deleuze, 1988, p. 48). It is impossible to have direct access to a body's affections (what it does) but we are only ever able to trace the affections another body has left behind (what has been done to it). Or put differently, the modes of affection can only ever be determined by and from an external body: a body can neither be affected nor

determined from within itself. It can only imagine another body as a trace on its own, i.e. a body can merely feel being affected: "images are the corporeal affections themselves (*affectio*), the traces of an external body on our body" (Deleuze, 1988, p. 73). Deleuze's notion of affections as "images or corporeal traces" (Deleuze, 1988, p. 48) is important for my theorising of the musicking voice and its listening. And it connects to Derrida's critique of the self's auto-affection through hearing-oneself-speak (see 5.1.1.). A body is only always traced and therefore differing. No single body or self can affect itself.

What Deleuze theorises as the "images or corporeal traces" (Deleuze, 1988, p. 48) of affect links to Spinoza's definition of affect from earlier. Spinoza defines affects not only as the "affections of the body" but also "at the same time, the ideas of these affections" (Spinoza, 1996, p. 70). The *idea* of an affection is what a body imagines as the corporeal trace of another body affecting it. Deleuze's theory of affections is recursive. Instead of asking what a body does, we follow what has been done to it by another body – this is the recursiveness of the corporeal traces of affections.

Musical affect

How does affect relate to music and the musicking voice? What connects affect theory and musicology? Arguably, music's affective potentials (both in performance and listening) have occupied musicologists for much longer than the recent affective turn but a systematic discussion of affect and music has taken place primarily in the last two decades (for an overview of the discussion, see Hofman, 2015; Desai-Stephens and Reisnour, 2020; Graber and Sumera, 2020). Studies in the field of music have, for instance, highlighted different modalities of listening to music (Kassabian, 2013, pp. xii–xiii), discussed sound's tactile affections in electronic dance musics and on dancefloors (Garcia, 2015) or have theorised the affects and atmospheres of music and sound (Riedel, 2020). Other musicologists have more

directly discussed the Spinozan notion of affect and its possible consequences for musical theories (Cimini, 2010, 2012; Thompson, 2019). Thus far, the anthology *Sound, Music, Affect: Theorizing Sonic Experience* edited by Marie Thompson and Ian Biddle is still the most thorough overview of musical affect theories (Thompson and Biddle, 2013b).

In the anthology's introduction, Thompson and Biddle discuss the possibility of a turn towards affect for musicology and sound studies. They argue that affect theory offers a framework to shift the study of musical semiotics to musical performativity, corporeality and affectivity. Instead of insisting on the question of what music means, affect enables to ask "'what does music do?'" (Thompson and Biddle, 2013a, p. 19). As music and sound escape the rigorous practice of naming and hermeneutic fixing of meaning, affect is a valuable category for the study of music's less semiotic effects. The relationship between the musicking voice and its listening can be thought as an affective encounter which cannot sufficiently be described by way of signification or a structural analysis of a musical text.

Even though affect theorists often speak of the a-signifying and pre-cognitive notions of affect (Massumi, 2002, p. 27), affect has something to *say* (for a critique of affect's apparent nonsignification, see Leys, 2011). The encounter between the musicking voice and its listening does not happen in a cultural vacuum, it is not free of meaning. Both singing as well as listening are part of a musicking network and musicking means (something). As Christopher Small argues, it is particularly in the encounter, in the process, "in those relationships that the meaning of the act lies" (Small, 1998, p. 13). Theorising the encounter between the musicking voice and listening merely means to attune a "beyond-meaning" (Nancy, 2007, p. 31). With Small, I can say that the meaning that we would attach to a musicking voice emerges in the act of musicking and – I would add – that this happens in the act of listening. The musicking voice emerges in the encounter. Turning to affect in music and sound scholarship also enables a bridging of the dichotomies of ontology and phenomenology. The turn to affect in music and sound does not

necessarily reproduce firm ontologies of sound and it is also not easily instrumentalised for a phenomenology of listening. As Thompson and Biddle have shown, affect enables to think music as composed of processual bodies, its movements and sensibilities. It does not posit a firm object and subject of sound but rather traces their interanimations. My focus on the musicking voice's affections, for instance, shows the encounter between voice and listening as always in the making and emerging from both a vocal ontology and a listening phenomenology. A focus on affect (in the case of the musicking voice) circumnavigates the pitfalls of the voice's theoretical dichotomy.

I have claimed earlier that the relationship between the musicking voice and listening is one of spacing (5.1.), the musicking voice needs to turn to an outside listener in order to be heard (Jankélévitch, 2003, pp. 20–21). For the remainder of this chapter, I want to concretise the specific encounter that happens between the voice and its listening in musicking. I will return to the discussion of spacing in 5.1. and will bring the notion of affect into play. This encounter is constituted by two interdependent movements: a) the ear's stretching towards the voice (5.3.2.) and b) the voice's incantation of listening (5.3.3.).

5.3.2. The ear's stretching

> To lend an ear, as they say, is of course to *stretch* it; it is in a way to mimic internally the outer mobility of this organ among certain animal species. It is, even if all the while remaining motionless, to *turn* our attention toward what summons our listening. (Szendy, 2008, p. 13, my emphasis)

Peter Szendy's gesture of lending an ear is an act of temporarily giving oneself over to the other – in listening, I lend you my ear. Listening is an *inter*action and Szendy understands it as a loan (ibid.). The idea of giving over of one's own listening capacity is, for Szendy, at the heart of listening. The above quote is particularly interesting as it mentions two words which I have italicised: *stretch* and *turn*.

The translator Charlotte Mandell comments on the first of the two. She includes, in parenthesis, a comment: "*tendre l'oreille,* to listen, means literally 'to stretch the ear'" (ibid.; original emphasis). 'Tendre l'oreille' is a French idiom and can be translated as 'to prick up one's ear' (see Nancy, 2007, p. 5). But 'tendre' as lending an ear is not only a pricking up of one's ear, or a stretching, but in it, I can also read the notion of 'tending to' or 'extending'. What is being extended is one's own capacity to listen *for* something outside of oneself, to attend to a sound that, as Szendy says, "summons our listening" (Szendy, 2008, p. 13). I will return to the second part of this quote and *turn* toward the summoning of this stretching later in this chapter (5.3.3.). For now, let's stay with the idea of the stretching of the ear.

Many theories of listening have problematised the idea of listening as passive (Feld, 1990; Sterne, 2003; Helmreich, 2007; Kassabian, 2013). Szendy, too, attributes agency to the act of listening. To understand listening as active and as having agency in the co-production of a sonorous event, as Nancy would argue (Nancy, 2007, p. 14), puts into question an ontology of sound. As discussed previously in Chapter 2, material ontologies of sound are prone to disregard a phenomenological and culturally specific listener and instead prioritise the acoustic event as an a priori or outside of human perception (see 2.1.). In the case of the musicking voice, the inclusion of a listening in the constitution of a sonorous event, enables me to problematise the privileging of vocal ontology in voice theories. My question is: How does listening conjure the musicking voice? How is the musicking voice dependent on an outside listener?

I can find an answer in Marie Thompson's discussion of Spinoza's philosophy of affect and its possibilities for a theory of musical affect (Thompson, 2019). Following Spinoza, Thompson argues that music can have either a good or bad encounter with another body (see 5.3.1.): studying the encounter can tell us something about the affections music has on its musicking participants, it can "tell us something about the affected listener" (Thompson, 2019,

p. 3). Thompson claims that a body's affections in musical experiences are not merely passive, instead, a musicking body has agency to heighten its affectivity. This is possible when a body becomes self-aware of being composed of other bodies and its affects. Musical performance (in a group particularly) is one prime example of such an awareness of the composition of one's body. In musical performance, I use my body to produce sound and I relate my own musicking body to other musicking bodies (these can be corporeal, technological or even immaterial). The example of aligning the different voice's in the choir comes to mind again. In the choir – at least in the Western tradition – the goal is often to create a collective voice from many individually composed voices; it is an act of composing a musicking body from many singular ones.

If we transfer the self-awareness of the composition of a body to the notion of listening, listening cannot merely be thought as a passive reception of musical flow and sound waves (this would be a communication model of sound and music). Instead, listening is an active component in the musicking field in its own right: it is a place from which musical power is enacted and generated. Musicking always includes not only a mode of production but also of perception, as Christopher Small has argued (Small, 1998, p. 9). Thompson's discussion of the self-awareness of listening and its agency resonates both with Nancy's notion of music listening to itself (Nancy, 2007, pp. 26–27) as well as with Szendy's conceptualisation of musical listening as becoming aware of itself (Szendy, 2008, p. 1). In Szendy's idea of listening awareness, the relation between the *listened to* and *listening for*, between the sound event and its perception, comes to the fore.

Thompson sees the self-awareness of the composition of a musicking body most clearly at play in the practice of Deep Listening, developed by the composer Pauline Oliveros. Deep Listening is a practice of tuning into the sounds of the environment and relating one's own body and listening to and within said environment. It can be understood as a practice that "aims

to facilitate a greater understanding of the relations between the ear, the body, the physicality of sound, its perception and environment" (Thompson, 2019, p. 11). Thompson goes on to say how this musical awareness of the composedness and capability of the body relates to a Spinozan thinking of 'good' music. 'Good' music is not an argument of aesthetic moralism or aesthetic relativism (Thompson, 2019, p. 4) but rather describes a positive, i.e. affective encounter in music. Music is 'good' when a musical body increases its ability to affect and be affected. Here, we can speak of musical power in a Spinozan sense.

> Oliveros' experimental practice of deep listening can be thought of as seeking empowerment through generating awareness of the affective and ideational relations between listening body, its mind and sound. It requires listeners to recognise themselves not as disconnected actors but as part of a broader milieu, within which we can become knowing and thus active in our engagements. (Thompson, 2019, pp. 12–13)

I want to think the relationship between the musicking voice and its listening in the light of Thompson's theorising of musical power. Stretching an ear out to the voice can be thought as an activity. Listening is responsible for the encounter with the voice. In stretching an ear, I listen *for* the musicking voice. As the relationality between voice and listening, between object and subject, is negotiated and open-endedly so, phenomenological theories of listening, such as Pierre Schaeffer's "reduced listening" (Schaeffer, 2017, pp. 212–214) are not sufficient; reduced listening attempts a fixing of a sound object. The musicking voice, however, cannot be fixed and is not a sound object. I argue that in listening to the musicking voice, listening and voice continuously affect each other. There is no clear delineation of object and subject in the affective encounter between the musicking voice and its listening. Listening accounts for the affections of the musicking voice. In this sense, listening is the stretching out *towards* the musicking voice. The musicking voice comes into being, comes to be *with* listening and by way of their interanimating affections. Listening has an agency, it is an agent that conjures the voice and affects its musicking. Such a listening has the musical power to make the voice heard.

I return to William Byrd's *Mass for Four voices* and I am reminded of my own experience of listening *and* singing. The intricate polyphonic cueing and the overlapping fugal voices created a tension between singing and listening. I extended my listening ears both to my own voice and simultaneously to the three other registers; my listening voice trying to both be in tune with itself and in tune with the choral voices. The many listening ears, my own and the many others, inside and outside the choir, all take part in the creation of this polyphony. In the moment that listening becomes aware of its composition and composedness of other bodies (this is my own body and the many others), listening becomes a 'straining towards' and 'stretching out' to the musicking voice. When I lend my ear to singing, I give the voice an ear, my ear tends to the voice and I allow for the possibility of an encounter of the voice and its listening. Together, they musick.

5.3.3. The voice's incantation

Let me return to Szendy's stretched ear. In the passage quoted above (5.3.2.), Szendy writes that part of the relational loan of listening is that as listeners, we "*turn* our attention toward what summons our listening" (Szendy, 2008, p. 13, my emphasis). After focusing on the ear's stretching (5.3.2.), I am now interested in this *turning* of listening and the idea of its summoning. This turn has a behavioural explanation: a mouse stops in its tracks and pricks its ears to listen out for a possible predator. But in musical listening this turning responds not to a threat but to a call. A similar turning gesture can be found in Jankélévitch's comment about polyphonic singing (see 5.1.3). He describes the polyphonic voices in a choir as "singing in concert for an outsider, like choristers who *turn* toward a listener" (Jankélévitch, 2003, p. 20, my emphasis). This turn has – in the case of music – nothing to do with communication, as Jankélévitch makes clear: music has no direct or personal address, rather it is impersonal (see Ch. 4). There is no intention or expression involved in such an address: "Allocution—the

communication of meaning and the transmission of intentions—is out of a job where music is concerned" (ibid.). This goes for the musicking voice as much as for any music that one *turns* to. When music has nothing to communicate, what is this call on listening? What is the listener turning towards? Jankélévitch displaces music's listener and argues that their position is that of an outsider. There is no *you* or *me* in the act of performing music or listening to music because, for Jankélévitch, music is made for an anonymous *he, she, they* or *it*, a listener in "the third person, the outsider" (Jankélévitch, 2003, p. 21). This same listener is summoned when voices "are singing in concert for an outsider" (Jankélévitch, 2003, p. 20). In Josquin's *Domine* this turning to an outside listener can be found in the moments of polyphonic overlapping, when voices wait for each other in listening, when a singing takes place in the fugal listening as waiting (see 5.2.). In the *Miserere*, on the other hand, a turning to an outside listener could be found in the gravity of the repeated ostinato, when the Superius voices extend the resolution, when voices and ears stretch out to touch each other (5.2.). The turning that happens in this listening is orientated towards the musicking voice, and the call to which the turning reacts is the musicking voice's incantation. In ensemble, in a double movement, stretching and incanting initiate the affective encounter between the musicking voice and its listening. Stretching and incanting are the traces that I hear in the affective encounter of the musicking voice and its listening.

I use the term traces not only in reference to Deleuze and Spinoza with which I discussed the traces of another body that can be felt as affections (5.3.1.). But I also make use of Derrida's notion of trace as difference (Derrida, 1981, p. 27, 2011, p. 73, 2016, pp. 67–68). The voice and the ear are never one or self-same. They always need the other's affections in order to let the voice emerge in musicking. Tracing their affections – the voice's incanting of the ear and the ear's stretching out *for* the voice – is the only means I have to describe their relation without falling back onto a vocal ontology or a listening phenomenology. The

affections that I can trace in the ineffable moments of their touching always reach beyond either ontology or phenomenology. The musicking voice sits comfortably in their gap. The musicking voice and its listening are never one, because they need to encounter each other as different bodies in order to affect and be affected. They can only ever touch each other in the imagination of each other's corporeal traces. They are never self-same because there is always a space between the musicking voice and listening and it is exactly this space that allows the musicking voice to emerge as a musical power.

I argue that the musicking voice turns to an outside listener – which might reside in the voice's same body but still estranges its sameness. The musicking voice asks us to listen away from its seeming subjectivity (see Chapter 4), the sheer materiality of its production (see Chapter 1) and from its mere sonics (see Chapter 2) and instead it asks us to listen to it as music. When the musicking voice incants a musical listening, I can hear a voice that musicks. There is an affective space between the musicking voice and its listening, this space both differentiates the voice and its listening *and* it allows for their affections. When the musicking voice touches a listening ear, it incants its listener and a listening is called for in the singing. I have chosen this passive formulation deliberately: it is not the musicking voice that I can actively follow in the voice's incantation, I cannot say for sure, that singing evokes the ear. Rather, it is through listening and how the musicking voice leaves a mark, a trace on listening, that I can name the activity, the spell of the voice, its incantation. The musicking voice's incantation is the affective calling of a listener, a calling that comes from within the musicking voice, one that is not reducible only to sound or music's calling for an ear to listen. This incantation is particular to the musicking voice's affective animation of listening.

5.4. A cadence of voice and ear

Both movements, the ear's stretching and the voice's incantation, might be prone to confusion: both terms indicate activity and both terms can be thought as agential. But neither singing nor listening have sole agency or control over the activity of the other. Singing is not necessarily always able to incant listening. Listening is not necessarily always able to tend to a musicking voice. The double movement of stretching and incanting rather shows their relationship as one of continuous recursion. The listening ear can only feel that something has been done *to* it: that is the voice's incantation. The musicking voice can only feel that something has been done *to* it: that is the ear's stretching. In both cases, there is no direct activity but rather a passive recursion. That is the logic of the corporeal trace that Deleuze talks about (Deleuze, 1988, p. 48): listening is affected by the musicking voice but listening can imagine the musicking voice merely by the corporeal traces that it has left. As much as the musicking voice is affected by listening, it can only imagine the listening ear by the corporeal traces it has left.

When I theorise the relation between the musicking voice and its listening as an affective encounter, I think their interanimating affections as traces. Voice and ear, singing and listening, are not the same but instead they emerge in their musicking difference in ensemble. And yet their difference often appears as a unison. Nowhere could this be heard more clearly than in the dialectic between imitative difference and cadential magnetism in vocal polyphony (5.2.). In the mottos of Josquin's *Miserere* – or also in Byrd's 'Agnus Dei' – a closure of voice and ear is suggested but here, too, the voice's listening and its production are spaced out. In cadential magnetism, there is a possibility of their touching: musicking voice and listening fall into one, *as if* one. But the problem of the voice is that it remains undisclosed. Listening to the voice only brings its listener closer to the tracing of its powerful affections. Affections are traces and so this musicking voice only ever presents itself as differing. Music theorists know that cadences do not have to be conclusive or perfect. Cadences are by no means always

unifying gestures, every voice always has the possibility to insist on its difference in the ensemble of polyphony – as the Superius in *Miserere* displays so magically. The cadence's fall is not a final closure. It is also a gesture that announces a new movement and the succession of play.

This chapter has shown that the musicking voice is interanimated by its listening. An ontology of the voice in music is always dependent on a listening phenomenology. Neither approaches in themselves are sufficiently able to register the affections of the musicking voice. In its affective relationality with a listening, the musicking voice can only ever be traced in the crossing between a vocal ontology and a listening phenomenology. There is no distinguishable vocal object nor a listening subject. There is no ontology of voice that is to be found either on the side of production or reception. The voice does not exist without its own listening; but at the same time, no phenomenological reduction can re-create the voice. The musicking voice only ever emerges, always anew, in its listening.

The relation between the musicking voice and its listening is a double movement of their distinct affections. Listening affects the musicking voice when it stretches out to tend to the voice. The musicking voice affects listening when it incants a listening ear. In incantation, the voice *imagines* an ear. And in the ear's stretching, the ear *imagines* a voice. Singing is the tracing of the voice's affections on the ear. And listening is the tracing of the ear's affections on the musicking voice.

Coda

In this thesis, I developed a theory of the musicking voice. My aim has been to carve a space to theorise the voice in and as music. This voice is different from many other conceptions of voice as language, body, sound or subjectivity. The musicking voice is a voice that emerges in musical performance. Here, it comes into being in its own right and becomes a musicking agency. As such, the musicking voice cannot be reduced to its body or a sonic materialism; it reaches beyond any fixed origin. The musicking voice is a musicking entity that roams between subject and object, it expresses nothing but an impersonal musicking force and it comes into being only in affective encounters in listening. I argued that vocal ontologies are not sufficient to analyse the musicking agency of this voice; instead a listening phenomenology is called to describe its performative doings and its interanimation in listening. The musicking voice is a voice that is attuned to the powerful affects of music.

At the beginning of this thesis – in the Introduction – I differentiated the musicking voice from many conceptions of voice found in cultural studies, political theory, psychoanalysis or sound studies. I made clear that the musicking voice is not a speaking voice and thus cannot be regarded from a perspective of linguistic signification. Chapters 1 and 2 established the critical foundation for my own theorisation and discussed two of the main problems of the voice: the voice's reduction to body and sound. By disidentifying the musicking voice from its body and its reduction to sonic materialism, I argued that the musicking voice must be studied as a musical performance which always already problematises the fixation to a stable signifier. Musicking is both a material and immaterial agency. Chapter 3 introduced the issue of the voice's reproduction. Here, I argued that the phonographic musicking voice is both a performance and a recording. The phonographic musicking voice denigrates the dichotomy of object and subject and instead creates effictions of the voice. In Chapter 4, I dispelled the myth of the voice as a signifier of subjectivity. Here, I argued that

the voice becomes an impersonal musicking force in the moment of performance. The musicking voice has no direct relation to a voicer's subjectivity but instead affects and expresses as a vital, impersonal musicking force. In the concluding Chapter 5, I discussed the notion of musical affect in more detail. I argued that any theory of vocal ontology fails to account for the musicking voice. The musicking voice can only be theorised in an interanimation with its listening affection. The musicking voice and its listening affect each other in a continuous play of distancing.

I conceptualised the musicking voice by way of three main trajectories: phonographic effictions, impersonal musicking force and listening. Two lines of flight did not find entry into this thesis but deserve further enquiry: the issues of temporality and a non-human agency. As musical performativity has a complicated relation to questions of temporality, the musicking voice, too, would have profited from a further questioning of its temporality. What exactly are the relations between time and the voice as it musicks? In deconstructive terms, this temporality most likely cannot be regarded as linear or indeed claim an idea of a self-same presence of the voice. Chapter 3 already suggested that the phonographic convergence of performance and recording also has consequences with regards to the musicking voice's temporality. Phonography undoes a linear notion of time. Furthermore, temporality is, of course, a music-philosophical problem and would have to take into account the complex temporality of musicking.

In Chapter 4, and indirectly in Chapter 5, the question of a non-human agency of the musicking voice has already been broached. However, here too, the limits of the thesis constricted me from further enquiry. If the musicking voice is not related to any exclamation of subjectivity but expresses an impersonal force, it is also worth wondering about the musicking voice as a non-human agency. In other words, it would be worth probing the theory of the musicking voice towards a critical posthumanism, bringing into question the human or

non-human qualities of this voice. Does the musicking voice have any essential anthropocentric traits or can this musicking force actually be heard as an expression of a non-human agency?

The project of the musicking voice is not finalised. Indeed, my theory attempts to provide an opening to thinking the voice in specific musical and music-philosophical terms. As such, it is primarily a beginning, an invitation and a call for further engagement. The voice in music fascinates, it has an enormous affective power – and this power does not just vanish into thin air. No one single theory can fully comprehend its affective forces. However, by engaging in different discourses of voice and having critiqued many conceptualisations of voice found in sound studies, musicology, philosophy, political theory and media studies, I have tried to bring to voice scholarship a concept of the voice as it musicks. This musicking voice has been shaped by the current discourses of voice and it might return and give back to the current discourses around voice, music and sound. My aim was to introduce a concept of the musicking voice that can withstand the absorption of the voice from the grasps of language, sound, carnal essentialism or theories of subjectivity. The result is a concept of the voice as a musicking force in its own right. In the process, theories of deconstruction have proven productive and have been adapted to the problem of music. In this regard too, this project opens a space for further enquiry. In many ways, the theory of the musicking voice asks about the question of music, its affections and performativity. As such, this thesis can be placed in current discourses of music's materialisms and music's relation to and deviation from sound and sound studies. It engages in the discourses of sonic materialism, affect theory and performance studies. The theory of the musicking voice has been conceptualised within these current discourses and hopes to contribute to it with a critical perspective of the voice as a musicking entity.

But my project has of course not only been animated by the discursive landscape of theoretical enquiry. My thinking of the voice has always been accompanied, or more so,

inspired, probed and challenged by the actual voices that I listened to and followed. Some of them have made it into this thesis. My theory of the musicking voice is in the end an attempt to approach my own affections with the power of this voice: the encounter with Ella Fitzgerald's vibe which carries me away every time, Kate Bush's phonographic indeterminacy which confuses and overthrows my listening grasp and Leon Thomas' spellbinding and beaming force of voice which overwhelms any reasoning. And then there is the power of singing in a choir, in the midst of many voices, together finding each other's listening, waiting for each other's voices to sing. Singing in ensemble has allowed me to hear polyphonic choral music as the musicking voice's affection and incantation of listening, as a touching in and as distancing.

And lastly, I am reminded of Jeanne Lee's voice in Archie Shepp's version of "There is a balm in Gilead" (see Introduction). I have still not forgotten its powerful and delicate movements, its imitative playing with Malachi Favors on the double bass and Dave Burell on the piano, its echoing of Shepp's saxophone and Lester Bowie's trumpet. As long as Jeanne Lee's musicking voice keeps playing in my mind, as long as it affects a listening, it will generate ineffable encounters. And who could say really what this voice is; all I am left with is this unforgettable striving of this voice moving out, animated by an intense musical power and touching its listener, inviting us to be part of its wonderful play.

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