Defending Dictatorship across North Africa, the Levant and the Gulf: The Non-Democratic Legitimacy of Arab Presidents and Monarchs during the Arab Spring as Understood through Qualitative Discourse Analysis

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I declare that this submission for the requirement of PhD is my own work

Word Count: 91, 489

THIS THESIS IS BEING SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF KINGSTON UNIVERSITY LONDON FOR THE AWARD OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

March 2020

Acknowledgements

First, I must thank my mother and my wife, Arwa for their support over the past three years on what has been an exciting journey of effort and learning. I must also thank my supervisors, Dr. Atsuko Ichijo and Dr. Antonio Cerella. Last but not least, I must say thank you to my family in Jordan for their love and constant support.

Abstract

The Arab Spring is a series of revolutions in the Arab world. Most literature addresses the Arab Spring as a result of socio-economic ails, its spread through social media, the role of youth during the Arab Spring and the relationship between the Arab Spring and democratic transition. No current literature addresses non-democratic legitimacy within the context of the Arab Spring through qualitative discourse analysis. Qualitative discourse analysis of select speeches given by Arab leaderships during the Arab Spring examines how non-democratic political factors are emphasized to validate the rule of kings and republicans, including religion, welfare and security. Discourse analysis of select speeches is deepened by analyzing the role of constitutional legitimacy as a form of non-democratic legitimacy during the Arab Spring. As recent literature discusses the prospect of democratic transition post-Arab Spring, this investigation contrasts this trend to contribute original knowledge by exploring how select speeches draw on non-democratic political factors of related constitutions to also examine how non-democratic legitimacy is formalized.

This project contributes original knowledge on the strength of non-democratic legitimacy during the Arab Spring and is suitable for International Relations scholars, investors interested in the Arab world and policy makers who wish to understand how regimes can survive unrest.

Findings show that while the hypothesis assumes monarchs will draw on religion as a non-democratic factor of political legitimacy and that republicans will emphasize the material ruling bargain, kingdoms with oil are more likely to draw on material benefits to justify their rule than republicans, who themselves engage in attempts to balance the politicization of the ruling bargain with non-democratic justification, including sparse religious references. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, an oil-dry monarchy represents the strongest hypothesis confirmation of monarchs drawing on religion and traditionalism rather than a material ruling bargain. Across all case studies, the ability of Arab leaders to

draw on constitutional elements to justify non-democratic rule in public discourse is limited, with Jordan again an exception, as Abdullah II enjoys political immunity as King under Jordan's Constitution.

Table of Contents

1. **Introduction to Research Project and Scope**

1.1 What are the factors Arab leaders use in discourse justifying their rule within the context of the Arab Spring? To what extent does this discourse support a (socio-economic) ruling bargain and Religious Legitimacy?

This thesis seeks to explore non-democratic political legitimacy within the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region. More specifically, this thesis seeks to understand factors of non-democratic legitimacy in the Arab world within the context of the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring is an ongoing series of socio-political and socio-economic protests that began in Tunisia in 2010 in response to, inter alia, corruption, unemployment and autocratic rule (Aras and Falk, 2015, p. 322). In Libya and Syria, prolonged protest against specific regimes escalated into brutal civil wars, the latter of which has failed to unseat Syrian President Bashar Assad and is ongoing at time of writing (*ibid.*). As a key demand of demonstrations was for the transition to political openness and democratic participation of citizens, this thesis will explore the opposite of this demand, which has been a key feature of Arab leaderships since their inception: non-democratic rule and to what extent such rule may be construed as politically legitimate. By highlighting and exploring factors of non-democratic legitimacy, this thesis will contribute original knowledge on the Arab Spring and highlight to what extent non-democratic political legitimacy continues to be used as a strategy of regime survival by MENA governments in the face of popular unrest. Further, by investigating constitutional factors of non-democratic legitimacy linked to specific case studies, this thesis will explore how non-democratic legitimacy may be formalized.

Most literature on the Arab Spring has emerged since 2010 (see, e.g. Bradley, 2010). During this year, such literature covered ongoing protests against non-democratic governments (*ibid.*). As the Arab Spring continued, later work began to address these protest movements in terms of how they were organized as a form of 'people power'. More specifically, 2012 onward saw an increasing academic interest in how social media and

mass communications helped organize the mass demonstrations that were challenging non-democratic regimes.

Authors such as Hall (2012) assert that "[…] Twitter and Facebook proved their influence by helping to propel the uprisings into a full-scale revolution" (Hall, 2012). Analysts Bruns, Burgess and Highfield (2013) concur with her assessment in their own discussion of the Arab Spring, also arguing that "[…] protests and unrest in countries from Tunisia to Syria generated a substantial amount of social media activity" that not only helped organize protests but made the outside world increasingly aware of the existence and progress of the Arab Spring (*ibid.*, p. 871). More recent offerings from 2016 continue to focus on what role social media played in the Arab Spring. Ahy (2016, p. 99) discusses the correlation between social media and broadcast media with regards to protest movements. Ahy explores how social media acted as a pillar of both organization for and communication on protest movements, to the extent that "[…] social media content moved into broadcast news" as videos and images from Facebook and Twitter provided firsthand glimpses of demonstrations and government responses, including security crackdowns (*ibid.*).

As this thesis also investigates the link between constitutionalism and non-democratic legitimacy, publications on constitutionalism and the Arab Spring should be considered. El-Haj, Grote and Röder (2016) discuss the role of constitutions in the transition process of states affected by the Arab Spring (*ibid.*, p. xxxi). Similar to how this thesis considers the role of religion being formalized as a constitutional factor, El-Haj, Grote and Röder examine "[…] key aspects of contemporary constitutionalism—democracy, the separation of powers, fundamental rights and the rule of law—in an Islamic context" (*ibid.*, p. xxxi). Such a focus acknowledges the role of constitutionalism in states affected by the Arab Spring but, unlike this thesis, does not analyze the role of constitutionalism during the Arab Spring as a bolster of non-democratic rule. Further, El-Haj, Grote and Röder do not

use discourse analysis to investigate whether constitutional factors are drawn upon by discourse justifying non-democratic rule during the Arab Spring.

Sultany's *Law and Revolution: Legitimacy and Constitutionalism After the Arab Spring (Oxford Constitutional Theory)* (Sultany, 2017) is another extensive text that addresses constitutionalism within the context of the Arab Spring. Moreover, it must be acknowledged that Sultany discusses some of the case studies examined in the current thesis, including Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan (*ibid*, pp. xxvi, 270). Sultany's key aim is to understand "[…] how the developments, debates, and tensions during the Arab Spring destabilized the concepts of legitimacy, revolution, legality and constitutionalism" (*ibid.*, p. xxvi). At first glance, such an aim is similar to the author's own attempts to investigate how constitutions may bolster non-democratic rule. Indeed, Sultany even states that legitimacy and constitutionalism are intertwined and that they exist as part of a "[…] multiplicity of legitimation devices" (*ibid.*). However, Sultany's publication is solely focused on constitutionalism, with an emphasis on how different interpretations of constitutions and related legal materials "[…] do not capture the changes that a revolutionary rupture can potentially [bring]" (*ibid.*, p. xxvii). Unlike this thesis, Sultany does not consider constitutionalism within the context of the Arab Spring being resisted by non-democratic rule but rather within the context of (democratic) transition (*ibid.*, p. xxvi). Further, Sultany does not explore non-democratic legitimacy through discourse analysis or examine how constitutional elements may be drawn on by discourse defending non-democratic legitimacy, which is the original knowledge contribution of this thesis.

As this thesis investigates to what extent analyzed discourse justifying non-democratic rule supports a (socio-economic) ruling bargain within the context of the Arab Spring, it is worth mentioning Freer's 2018 publication *Rentier Islamism: The Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gulf Monarchies* (Freer, 2018). Freer's book focuses on the Muslim Brotherhood's political role and political influence in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Freer, 2018, p.1). Freer's publication discusses rentier politics in (Gulf) monarchies

that are also oil states, touching upon this thesis' own examination of Arab monarchies with oil, discussed in Chapter 5.3. Further, Freer's examination of how the Muslim Brotherhood gained political influence in states that may have minimized "[…] institutionalized means of participation" for the group connects with this thesis' exploration of Muslim Brotherhood-state relations in Egypt (Chapter 5.4) and state relations with Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in Jordan (Chapter 5.2) and Bahrain (Chapter 5.3) (*ibid*., p.1). However, Freer's publication does not explore case studies outside the Gulf and does not take into account non-democratic legitimacy across republics and monarchies, as this thesis does. Further, *Rentier Islamism* does not examine non-democratic legitimacy through discourse analysis or examine whether constitutional elements are drawn upon in discourse defending non-democratic legitimacy within the context of the Arab Spring, which is the original knowledge contribution of this thesis. Rather, Freer's book seeks to explain "[…] the political role of Islamist groups in the oil monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula" (*ibid.*, p. 2).

Finally, as this thesis investigates non-democratic legitimacy through discourse analysis, it is worth mentioning that 2019 saw a thesis on a similar topic. Mohyi El-Deen Saleh Maziad's *The Language of Collapsing Power: A Cognitive-Linguistic Critical Discourse Analysis of the Arab Spring Speeches of Mubarak* places the Arab Spring within the context of discourse analysis (Maziad, 2019, p. 1). Like the current thesis, Maziad analyzes discourse issued by Egypt's Mubarak in response to the Arab Spring (*ibid.*, p. 1). Unlike the author's thesis, Maziad analyzes three of Mubarak's speeches before and during the Arab Spring (*ibid.*, p. 1). Maziad's aim is to develop a theoretical model of collapsing power by revealing how Mubarak's discourse before and during the Arab Spring is an example of how "[…] power was represented, marked, negotiated, then stripped down, in the speeches delivered by the ousted Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, during the Arab Spring Revolution in Egypt" (*ibid.*, p. 1). While there are strong similarities between this author's examination of Arab Spring case studies through discourse analysis and Maziad's

treatment of Mubarak's speeches, a few research gaps remain. First, Maziad's thesis does not examine republican and monarchical case studies but concentrates solely on Egypt's Mubarak and his "[…] previous […] language of power" contrasted with Mubarak's final speech during the Arab Spring (*ibid.*, 2019, p. 9). Second, Maziad's thesis does not examine constitutional factors through discourse analysis and to what extent analyzed discourse defending non-democratic rule drew on such factors to strengthen non-democratic legitimacy. Finally, it is worth noting that Maziad does not declare an intent to investigate non-democratic legitimacy through discourse analysis. Rather, Maziad states that the main aim of his thesis is to "[…] add […] theoretical and methodological contributions to knowledge" by proving that Cognitive Linguistics, Critical Discourse Analysis and Argumentation can be merged into a new transdisciplinary analysis model (*ibid.*, p. 1). Maziad's aim does not conform with the thesis aim of the author's own work, which is to explore non-democratic legitimacy, the factors Arab leaders use in discourse justifying their rule within the context of the Arab Spring and to what extent this discourse supports a (socio-economic) ruling bargain and Religious Legitimacy.

The aforementioned literature emphasizes understanding the Arab Spring from the perspective of protestors, the role of social media and also youth participation (see Webb, 2017, p. 292). It also discusses the role of constitutionalism post-Arab Spring (see El-Haj, Grote and Röder, 2016, p. xxxi and Sultany, 2017, p. xxvi) and the role of ideological groups in rentier monarchies of the Gulf (Freer, 2018, p. 1). However, existent literature on the Arab Spring has not addressed the challenge to authority from the perspective of the governments that have been forced to respond to widespread discontent. Maziad focuses on representations of power for Mubarak before and during the Arab Spring yet does so through cognitive-linguistic analysis for the purposes of merging theories and methodologies to create new (discourse) analysis models. In other words, no work has considered the notion of non-democratic political legitimacy (including through religion) and its existence within the MENA region and to what extent such legitimacy has been

justified by Arab leaders through discourse within the context of the Arab Spring. It is worth mentioning that authors like Schlumberger touched on the resilience of authoritarianism as early as 2004, discussing how regimes may survive without democratic transition (Albrecht and Schlumberger, p. 317). While Albrecht and Schlumberger's article does not differentiate between the legitimacy of monarchies and the legitimacy of republics (as this thesis does), its call for detailed study into non-democratic legitimacy long before the Arab Spring further justifies the original knowledge contribution of this thesis (*ibid.*, p. 387). Indeed, other work from the 1990's bolsters such a call by predicting the Arab Spring. When discussing Egyptian author Nazih Ayubi's final book, *Over-stating the Arab State*, Turkish economist Timur Kuran reflected that "[…] even an ostensibly minor rise in open opposition within one Arab country might trigger a revolutionary cascade that then sets off similar cascades in others (Kuran, 1998, p. 114)". Moreover, no work has analyzed how specific constitutions may formalize non-democratic factors of political legitimacy, which Arab rulers may be able to draw on in discourse defending non-democratic rule. From this research gap, it is possible to derive the research question of this thesis: What are the factors Arab leaders use in discourse justifying their rule within the context of the Arab Spring? To what extent does this discourse support a (socio-economic) ruling bargain and Religious Legitimacy?

1.2 Hypothesis

It is this author's hypothesis that republics will emphasize the socio-economic ruling bargain as the main source of their non-democratic legitimacy in response to the Arab Spring, due to most republics being the result of coups rather than established familial rule (Kartveit and Jumbert, 2014, p. 4). As a result, many republic rulers have weaker ties to traditional (religious) institutes and popular support and rely on a ruling bargain to maintain legitimacy (*ibid.*, p.9). The ruling bargain can be defined as a social contract between a government and its citizens (Gengler and Lambert, 2016, p. 322). This social contract is apolitical in nature and often espouses the reverse of representative democracy;

in exchange for (socio-economic) benefits, citizens will except the rule of non-democratic leaderships. In the Gulf and oil states especially, such a relationship is sustained by hydrocarbon wealth, encouraging the perverse maxim, *no taxation, so no representation* (*ibid.,* p. 323). Monarchs, on the other hand, will draw on Religious Legitimacy more than the ruling bargain due to their longevity and ties to traditional institutions and accepted socio-cultural norms (Yom and Gause, 2012, p. 75). Religious Legitimacy is a term coined by the author and influenced by Richard W. Bulliet's 'Religion and the State in Islam' (2013). In his paper, Bulliet discusses three factors that have historically given Arab rulers legitimacy through the framework of Islam. These include:

- Use of Islamic titles by the ruler (Sultan, Imam, Caliph)

- Enforcement of Islamic law

- Custodianship of holy sites (Bulliet, 2013, pp. 3-5, 12,)

Hence, the author's own term, Religious Legitimacy refers to any Islamic ruler who justifies their political authority through Bulliet's three criteria.

A discourse analysis of select speeches given by leaderships in response to the Arab Spring will allow the author to understand to what extent each leadership relies on the ruling bargain. This analysis will also attempt to understand if the ruling bargain is more common than Religious Legitimacy and hence more relied upon for regime security. Comprehending the nature of the ruling bargain in each case study can allow the author to investigate how each leadership justifies its social contract with its citizens and to what extent this contract regards citizens as apolitical and/or compliant subjects of the state. The notion of obedience to authority within a social contract can be linked to social contract theory, allowing this project to explore non-democratic factors of legitimacy from the perspective of a political contract between citizens and rulers. In turn, this understanding of the contract from specific speeches and an investigation into how constitutions formalize non-democratic rule can help elucidate why certain protests transformed into revolutions

that overthrew leaderships and why other protests did not succeed in creating regime change.

1.3 Aims

By analyzing the select speeches of Arab leaders and the constitutions of relevant case studies within the context of such speeches, this research project aims to:

- Determine whether attempts by Arab leaders to defend non-democratic legitimacy through their speeches had the intended effect on their audience/citizens. This includes examining the making of promises by leaderships to citizens and whether said promises were sincere or insincere

- Understand to what extent non-democratic, religious and democratic forms of legitimacy are enshrined in the respective constitutions of each case study and whether any such constitutional articles were invoked in the speeches of Arab leaders to further bolster their legitimacy

- Contribute original knowledge to existing literature by considering non-democratic political legitimacy as a justification used by Arab leaderships when challenged, including the ruling bargain and Religious Legitimacy. Such contribution contrasts with much literature on the Arab Spring, as most authors discuss the protest movements of the Arab Spring and their spread through social media, rather than considering how authoritarian rule, traditionally widespread in the MENA region, may have attempted to draw on political legitimacy through social contracts (tacit or otherwise) and religious elements

1.4 Method

This research project will utilize John Searle's Speech Acts as a form of discourse analysis. Searle's method of discourse analysis has been selected due to its ability to parallel the central themes of each case study and social contract theory. Searle's Speech Acts considers any discourse to be filtered through mutually understood rules between the

speaker and the listeners, in a sense creating a social contract that governs legitimate speech acts by the speaker for listeners/citizens to comprehend (Searle, 1965, p. 10). Searle's Speech Acts also considers the sub-categories of promises and threats (the former being a promise to do something for listeners, the latter a vow to do something to listeners). The category of sincere and insincere promises along with threats further bolsters the relevance of Searle as a choice of methodology. As the Arab Spring blossomed, presidents like Ben Ali did indeed issue promises to e.g. reduce basic food prices and to investigate corruption (Ben Ali, 2011). Others, such as Muammar Qathafi of Libya issued threats to kill protestors (Warden, 2011).

The selected speeches have also been chosen to augment original knowledge contribution by highlighting factors of non-democratic political legitimacy and to address the research question: What are the factors Arab leaders use in discourse justifying their rule within the context of the Arab Spring? To what extent does this discourse support a (socio-economic) ruling bargain and Religious Legitimacy? Further, chosen speeches have been considered within the context of Searle's Speech Acts and the ability of a speech to persuade listeners to obey issued instructions. Searle considers any act of speaking a process that can be used as an intentional (political) act intended to convey specific messages and also issue instructions (what Searle calls the essential condition) to listeners that should be obeyed (Searle, 1965, pp. 1-2).

Returning to the monarchy-republic comparison, it is necessary to further discuss the political context of chosen speeches and possible limitations imposed by the selection of certain speeches over others. For republican case studies Tunisia and Egypt, the last speeches given by Ben Ali and Mubarak respectively have been chosen. In Tunisia, Ben Ali's final address saw indirect admission of corruption and last-minute promises of reform (Ben Ali, 2011). This latter aspect is arresting, as it implies a politicization of the ruling bargain and returns to Korany's notion in Chapter 2 that the ruling bargain is not static and can change. Further, the notion that the ruling bargain may be politicized can be

used to create an expanded hypothesis to be applied to analysis of post-Arab Spring governments: failure to justify non-democratic rule through tangible Beneficial Consequences should encourage such regimes to politicize the ruling bargain in a step-by-step manner, perhaps akin to Jordan's 'defensive democratization' rather than offer last-minute reforms that emphasize a regime's weakness and knowledge of corruption. Such an extended hypothesis will be further addressed in Chapters 7 and 8.

An earlier address by Ben Ali in December 2010 has been identified. This address occurred within days of Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation, providing a more immediate context than Ben Ali's final speech (Ben Ali, 2010). Moreover, unemployment is a key element of the December speech, paralleling a key motive of the Arab Spring (*ibid.*). However, this address was given before Bouazizi's death, a factor that increased opposition toward Ben Ali (McClatchy Newspapers, 2011). Furthermore, it is in Ben Ali's final address rather than his December speech that he attempts to persuade protestors to cease opposition, providing an essential condition to be filtered through Searle's Speech Acts (Ben Ali, 2011).

In Egypt, Mubarak's final address before stepping down reveals elements of paternalism, security and what Peter refers to as Democratic Approval or the attempt to justify rule through formalized means (Peter, 2016). Mubarak's final address even attempts to draw on Religious Legitimacy (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011). The ability to analyze elements of political legitimacy that both match and contrast with this thesis' assumptions of how republics may draw on a socio-economic ruling bargain rather than Religious Legitimacy justify the choice of Mubarak's final speech as Egypt's President in February 2011. Further, it is the February address that contains instructions to cease protest, which can be filtered through Searle's essential condition. However, it is worth noting that an earlier address by Mubarak in January 2011 has been identified. Selection of this speech would have provided a case study in which Mubarak was considered more assertive and maintained that he was head of state (Saleh, Zayed, 2011). Unlike his final address, the

January speech did not admit that "[…] mistakes can be made in any political system (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011)". In addition, the February address contained further references to economic reform and "[…] new steps to face unemployment and increase the standard of living (Saleh, Zayed, 2011)". Such factors would fit well into the thesis hypothesis that republics will draw on a socio-economic ruling bargain to justify their right to rule. However, these advantages are overshadowed by the lack of availability of the full transcript of the January speech and the fact that the available text of the speech does not feature a strong essential condition that could be filtered through Searle's Speech Acts. Further, the January speech does not feature as many factors of non-democratic legitimacy as its February counterpart, including references to religion. The ability to analyze Religious Legitimacy in a republican case study goes against the hypothesis that republics will draw more on a socio-economic ruling bargain. Hence, such analysis will deepen original knowledge contribution within the context of monarchy-republican legitimacy.

Further, as this thesis seeks to understand non-democratic legitimacy within the context of the Arab Spring, selecting the final speeches of Ben Ali and Mubarak respectively provide a more accurate context that connects directly with the thesis' attempt to understand justification of non-democratic rule when challenged by the Arab Spring. In other words, analyzing speeches given by republics during the period of highest opposition to their rule allows for analysis of each leader's final chance to justify their authority, emphasizing to what extent they were aware of both the political and socio-economic nature of protests.

Turning to monarchical case studies, both Jordan and Bahrain stand as cases where rulers have kept their thrones. It is for this reason that the use of the most similar cases system is done so by acknowledging all four case studies as two sets of cases (republican and monarchical) rather than four uniform cases with dissimilar outcomes. Selected speeches are both from 2012 and under different contexts than their republican counterparts and each other, as Bahrain and Jordan both experienced the Arab Spring in ways linked to their

respective political histories (discussed in detail in Chapter 5). For Jordan, the chosen speech was given in October of 2012, at a time when parliamentary elections were being called and being boycotted by the Muslim Brotherhood's Jordanian branch, the Islamic Action Front (BBC, 2018, *Jordan profile*). Of note is Abdullah's willingness in the speech to acknowledge protests demanding the overthrow of his regime (Abdullah II, October 2012). In addition, the speech draws heavily on Religious Legitimacy while also acknowledging restrictions on a modest ruling bargain (*ibid.*). The ability to analyze multiple factors of non-democratic legitimacy allows the speech to emphatically address the hypothesis. In addition, the speech contains an essential condition to protestors that allows further analysis of possible democratic legitimacy, as it orders citizens to vote (rather than to simply cease protesting) (*ibid.*).

This author has identified a second speech by Abdullah given in December 2012. It must be noted that this speech came shortly after mass demonstrations after the lifting of fuel subsidies and clashes between royalists and those calling for an end to monarchy (BBC, 2018, *Jordan profile*). Such a context may be considered more politically charged than that of Abdullah's October 2012 address. However, the December speech lacks elements of political legitimacy that can be filtered through extensive discourse analysis. The December address was given in the context of marking Jordan University's 50th anniversary (Abdullah II, December 2012). The speech discusses youth and unemployment but within the context of education as a bridge to opportunities and does not issue clear instructions that can be filtered through Searle's essential condition (*ibid.*). The greater diversity of political factors in Abdullah's October speech, including Religious Legitimacy and socio-economic traits within the context of a limited ruling bargain combine with an essential condition for citizens to exercise political involvement through parliamentary votes. Hence, analysis of Abdullah's October address will connect best with the research question and understanding of factors justifying non-democratic rule.

For Bahrain, a speech from November 2011 has been chosen. This speech was given eight months after GCC troops had intervened to quell uprisings and within the context of King Hamad responding to an independent report on excessive force being used by Bahraini troops against protestors (BBC, 2018, *Bahrain profile - Timeline*). This speech is arresting for its acknowledgment of the regime's use of excessive force and mistreatment of prisoners (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011), as republican responses did not admit state perpetration of violence but instead blamed "[…] gangs who have robbed and looted and assaulted people (Ben Ali, 2011)" or pushed blame unto other parties with vague promises of punishment (Mubarak) (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011). However, the core reason for choosing this speech is its constant references to compensation in response to the Arab Spring (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). Compensation and welfare echo the socio-economic ruling bargain. However, the thesis hypothesis assumes that republics rather than monarchies will draw on the ruling bargain, with monarchs resorting to Religious Legitimacy and traditionalism. Hence, analyzing a speech that challenges this hypothesis will strengthen original knowledge contribution by ensuring that speeches contrasting with the hypothesis are considered rather than ignored.

An alternative speech by Hamad from December 2012 has been identified. While the chosen address from November 2011 was given after GCC intervention, the December 2012 address was given two months after heightened clashes between protestors and police forces at the funeral of Ali Ahmed Mushaima, a protestor who died after being detained (BBC, 2018, *Bahrain profile – Timeline*). In response, public gatherings were banned (*ibid.*). Such a context certainly would seem more politically tense than in November 2011 when, after unrest was crushed by regional assistance, the government was willing to acknowledge use of excessive force at a time when Hamad may have felt his authority had been restored by GCC intervention (*ibid.*). However, the brief December speech does not mention welfare or compensation. Rather, it can be seen as a generic statement that does

not address Bahrain's unrest but instead ignores this political reality and instead asserts Bahrain's regional role as "[…] an oasis of love and co-existence among different races and religions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012)". There is no reference to unrest or welfare. Further, there is scarce reference to Religious Legitimacy or other factors of political legitimacy that are to be analyzed to understand non-democratic legitimacy (*ibid.*). This is in stark contrast to the detailed November 2011 speech that openly acknowledges unrest, excessive force and prisoner abuse with an emphasis on compensation, providing not only a context that challenges the hypothesis assumption on monarchies but a longer text for greater in-depth analysis (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). Finally, a further difference is the issuing of instructions to accept compensation in the November 2011 address. No instructions as understood through Searle's essential condition are present in the December 2012 speech (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012).

An overview of speech choices reveals selections that maximize thematic analysis of factors related to (non-democratic) political legitimacy. Republican speeches reveal traits that connect with Korany's notion that the ruling bargain cannot be static (Ben Ali) and the notion that republicans may also draw on Religious Legitimacy (Mubarak). Both selected republican speeches also contain clear attempts to persuade protestors to cease unrest at a time when their respective presidencies were about to end. Selected monarchical speeches may not have been chosen during the height of protest in Jordan and Bahrain but have been chosen for maximizing analysis of political factors that bolster non-democratic legitimacy, especially Religious Legitimacy (Jordan) and a strong ruling bargain that challenges the hypothesis' assumption that assume the ruling bargain is the domain of republicans rather than monarchs (Bahrain).

Speeches and constitutions from each case study will also be considered within the context of the most similar cases system. This methodology has been chosen for its relevance to addressing this author's hypothesis. The cases share many political, geographic and

cultural similarities, including religion, systems of political rule and the experience of social unrest known as the Arab Spring. These similarities, however, are contrasted with dissimilar outcomes, as two out of four cases have seen the overthrow of leaderships, while the other two have not. These traits match the purpose of the similar cases system, which is to explain how cases with similar traits can have different outcomes (Quinn, 2009, pp. 250-251). At the same time, this thesis will analyze two sets of similar cases (Egypt-Tunisia and Jordan-Bahrain) rather than regarding all four case studies as homogenous case studies. Such an approach is in keeping with the theme of exploring how political legitimacy is related to the republic-monarchy dichotomy. In addition, this author has identified a related project on the Arab Spring that also uses the most similar cases system. Joakim Carbonnier's *The Arab Spring and its different outcomes* also utilizes the most similar cases design. Further, Carbonnier explains that the similar cases design has also been used to analyze previous historical revolutions across Europe and Asia (Carbonnier, 2013, p. 25). The existence of a study on the Arab Spring that uses the similar cases design further justifies the approach of this author's own project. At the same time, this author's own project differs from Carbonnier's by analyzing discourse as a tool of regime legitimation rather than democratic transition (*ibid.*, p.1), ensuring an original contribution to existing literature.

1.5 Justification of Project

The perception of MENA rulers' right to authority would contribute original knowledge to Arab Spring literature. This perception will, inter alia, draw on the author's field experience in the Middle East to include commonly cited factors such as paternalism, religion and security. Such a model of analysis can provide a structured framework to predict the future stability of remaining Arab governments. This prediction will be structured from a two-tier framework of legitimacy from the perspective of Arab leaders and by measuring common factors of perceived legitimacy between current and ousted leaders. This two-tier framework of the project and analyzing each case study's

constitution within the context of select speeches will contribute original and practical knowledge to existing literature and benefit scholars, students, policy makers and other professionals and academics of Political Science.

Moreover, the project's original knowledge would address a research gap in existing academic literature. Current texts on the Arab Spring became more pervasive from 2013[1], with greater focus on the role of social media in protests (e.g. Markham, 2014). Other common themes address the socio-economic factors of Arab states, including education and financial opportunities (or a lack thereof) and how such factors influenced the Arab Spring (see e.g. Awdallah and Malik, 2013; Campante and Chor, 2012). Narrowing literary focus down to legitimacy within a MENA context, this author has identified three articles that consider political legitimacy in relation to the Arab Spring. Glen Rangwala's 'the creation of governments in waiting' focuses solely on transitional governments formed after the overthrow of Arab regimes and their subsequent international recognition (2015). Eva Bellin's 'Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring' (2012) and Sean L. Yom and F. Gregory Gause's 'Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On' (2012) address aspects of regime legitimacy only as a peripheral topic. Bellin's paper focuses more on regime survival through repression and social media influence during protests. Yom and Gause's essay addresses the "monarchical exceptionalism" of "royal autocracies", countering notions of royal legitimacy through cultural traditions with analysis of regime survival strategies, including hydrocarbon dependence, power blocs and foreign support (2012, p. 75). All three texts discuss international recognition of governments and domestic regime survival, respectively rather than perceptions of legitimacy.

The aforementioned research gap has encouraged the research question and examining perceptions of non-democratic legitimacy. An overview of speeches from each case study

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[1] See, e.g. Berman, 2013, Gillespie, 2013, Mabon, 2013

provides more precise examples of non-democratic legitimacy, including security, socio-economic benefits for citizens, preservation of religious traditions and paternalism. King Hamad bin-Issa al-Khalifa of Bahrain stressed his rule's security role, implying that the Arab Spring "[...] not only directly challenges the stability and sovereignty of our country, but also poses a threat to the security and stability of other GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries" (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). Tunisia's Ben Ali, on the other hand, tried to placate the first uprisings with promises of increased socio-economic benefits, including employment and education opportunities (Ben Ali, 2011). Finally, Mubarak's Egypt and King Abdullah II's Jordan provide examples of preservation of religious traditions and paternalism. Both leaders evoke God "[...] the Most Merciful, the Compassionate" when addressing their respective masses (Abdullah II, October 2012; British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011). Mubarak further alludes to paternalism in his own attempt to hold "[...] a father's dialogue with his sons and daughters" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011).

This project will contribute original knowledge to existing literature on an ongoing socio-political phenomenon in the MENA region. It will provide a qualitative measure of legitimacy that considers the perspective of overthrown and current Arab governments and any democratic processes and religious decrees of state constitutions that can bolster claimed legitimacy. Further, this project will contribute original knowledge of political legitimacy in the Arab world. The author's selection of methodology allows for consideration of non-democratic political legitimacy. This consideration would be an unprecedented contribution to existing literature, as much literature on the Arab Spring has been written within a context of democratic transition (implying a general belief in democratic legitimacy) often from the perspective of Western authors (e.g. Paust, 2013; Snider and Faris, 2011). This author's format can provide a model to understand the instruments of legitimacy (including religion, paternalism, ruling bargains and security) unique to the Arab world, while discourse analysis of constitutional elements used in select

speeches deepens the qualitative approach by still considering democratic elements of legitimacy and how any political legitimacy may be formalized. Discourse analysis of constitutional elements within the context of select speeches can be used to deepen the two-tier analysis framework to better examine both the legitimacy of remaining governments and their likelihood of survival. This two-tier framework is put within the context of methodology in Chapter 4.5.

The non-democratic understanding of political legitimacy specific to this project's case studies have influenced the project's theoretical approach to political legitimacy. Within this context, Fabienne Peter's Political Legitimacy presents a framework that considers democratic and non-democratic means of rule. Peter's overview of Political Legitimacy is most relevant to this thesis, as Peter does not assume that democracy is the exclusive or most significant source of legitimacy and questions the political limits of democratic decision-making (2012, p. 600). The relevance and use of Peter's theory will be further explicated in Chapter 3.

1.6 Tentative Expectations

The hypothesis of this thesis states that republican rulers will emphasize the socio-economic ruling bargain and related privileges as key indicators of their political legitimacy. Monarchies, however, will augment any such ruling bargain with references to traditional institutions and Religious Legitimacy. This author expects the hypothesis to be confirmed. This author also expects both republicans and monarchs to emphasize security as a form of non-democratic legitimacy, especially for case studies that saw mass protests aimed at that country's head of state. Further, this author expects that constitutions from all four case studies will bolster Religious Legitimacy, as countries across the MENA region often have formalized Islam in written documents as the state religion.

1.7 Thesis Structure

Chapter 1: Introduction to Research Project and Scope

This chapter outlines the research project, identifying the research question and why this problem should be addressed, what the main aims of the thesis are and what methodology will be used to address the hypothesis of the research project and what tentative results are expected.

Chapter 2: A Historical Overview of MENA Politics Leading up to the Arab Spring

Chapter 2 provides a brief history of how Islam and politics became inextricable in the MENA region and explains how Islam specifically could provide some nascent support for non-democratic legitimacy. Further, the chapter introduces the key theories relevant to this thesis in the form of Peter's Political Legitimacy and Bulliet's 'Religion and the State in Islam', from which this author has derived Religious Legitimacy. Both Peter and Bulliet supply theoretical discussion of non-democratic legitimacy and Religious Legitimacy respectively, which tie into the ruling bargain and hypothesis previously mentioned.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Approach to Legitimacy

Chapter 3 provides a more detailed examination of Peter's Political Legitimacy and Bulliet's 'Religion and the State in Islam'. This chapter acts as a literature review of existing legitimation theory and examines why Peter and Bulliet provide the most expedient theoretical background for this thesis and its examination of non-democratic legitimacy. The chapter critiques legitimation theory that bases political legitimacy on citizen involvement as insufficient in scope to address the research question of this thesis, due to such works relying on democratic understandings of political legitimacy. The use of Peter and Bulliet to comprehend non-democratic legitimacy and religion as a form of such legitimacy is hence further justified.

Chapter 4: Methodology

This chapter outlines discourse analysis as the preferred methodology of this thesis and provides an overview of existing discourse analysis and contemporary works that analyze

case studies of the Arab Spring through discourse analysis. The chapter explores to what extent existing studies have examined non-democratic legitimacy and the Arab Spring, illustrating how even publications on the Arab Spring that use discourse analysis as a methodology focus on the perspective of protestors rather than attempting to understand how Arab leaderships justify non-democratic rule in their public discourse in response to the Arab Spring. Chapter 4 ends with an explanation of John Searle's Speech Acts as the preferred methodology of this thesis and how Searle's Speech Acts will be used to analyze collected data, taking into account non-democratic factors of political legitimacy (such as the ruling bargain) and Religious Legitimacy to again ensure original knowledge contribution to existing literature.

Chapter 5: Case Studies

This chapter provides a detailed political profile on each case study country, tracing the history of each country's ruler from the moment they gained power up until they were challenged by domestic unrest. Such profiling places (non-democratic) political legitimacy and Religious Legitimacy within the context of each country's government and style of rule (be it monarchical or republican). The chosen countries include:

- Tunisia, the origin of the Arab Spring

- Egypt, the Arab world's most populous state and a key American ally under former President Mubarak

- The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, where the author resided for four years and a geo-strategic monarchy adjacent to warring Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Jordan remains an ally of the United States especially

- Bahrain, the Gulf case study. Unlike its Jordanian counterpart, Bahrain is a monarchy that claims (limited) oil reserves

The choice of case studies ensures parity by covering the entire MENA region (North Africa, the Levant and the Gulf) and by choosing two republics and two monarchies, with republican case studies representing regimes that fell while their monarchical counterparts represent governments that have heretofore survived the Arab Spring.

Chapter 6: Main Analysis: Speeches

Chapter 6 contains the discourse analysis of speeches given by the leaderships of each case study in response to the Arab Spring. Using Searle's Speech Acts as the methodology, evidence of non-democratic elements of political legitimacy such as the ruling bargain and Religious Legitimacy are considered.

Chapter 7: Main Analysis of Constitutional Legitimacy and Speeches during the Arab Spring

Chapter 7 considers the constitutions of each case study and to what extent such constitutions formalized non-democratic (and democratic) political legitimacy, including religion, the ruling bargain and any mention of political participation (or not) by citizens. Analysis will then return to the speeches analyzed in Chapter 6 and examine to what extent each speech draws on factors of political legitimacy enshrined in each respective state's constitution. The results of the main analysis will then be presented and discussed.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

The final chapter of the thesis will reflect on the results of the main analysis and the thesis as a whole, considering to what extent the investigation of the thesis has succeeded in answering the research question: What are the factors Arab leaders use in discourse justifying their rule within the context of the Arab Spring? To what extent does this discourse support a (socio-economic) ruling bargain and Religious Legitimacy?

This chapter has provided an overview of thesis structure, hypotheses and how examining non-democratic legitimacy addresses a research gap in existing literature. Chapter 2 will

provide an historical overview to place non-democratic political legitimacy within the historical context relevant to Islamic rule in the MENA region.

2. A Historical overview of MENA Politics leading up to the Arab Spring

2.1 Introduction

As stated in the previous chapter, an historical overview feeds into this thesis' contribution on understanding non-democratic regimes. This chapter briefly traces the West's focus on understanding the MENA region since 2001 while also providing an outline of how Islam has been historically politicized and used to bolster non-democratic rule in the MENA region. Hence, this chapter addresses the historical context of thesis research questions on how non-democratic rule has been justified, especially through Religious Legitimacy.

2.2 Historical Context

"[T]he tyranny of the masses is the cruellest kind of tyranny. Who can stand against the crushing current and the blind engulfing power? How I love the liberated masses on the march! They are unfettered, with no master, singing and merry after their terrible ordeals! On the other hand, how I fear and apprehend them! I love the masses as much as I love my father. Similarly, I fear them no less than I fear him. In a Bedouin society, where no government system exists, who can deter a father from persecuting any of his children? Yes. How much they love him, and how much they fear him at the same time! That is how I love and fear the masses. Exactly as I love and fear my father" (Qathafi, 2016).

These are the words of former Libyan leader Muammar Qathafi. They form the opening paragraph of 'Escape to Hell', the first essay of Qathafi's short story collection, *Escape to Hell and Other Stories*. The work was issued in English in 1999 (London: Blake Publishing). Yet that same year, Libya's UN sanctions were being suspended (BBC, 2003). Libya's neighbor, Egypt saw President Mubarak sworn in for a fourth term in 1999 (New York Times, 2014). Indeed, by the start of the new millennium it appeared that MENA rulers were presiding over stable (if not liberal) nations. Zine el Abidine Ben Ali's Tunisia enjoyed a strong Tourism sector. With "affordable luxuries" amid picturesque beaches and its Mediterranean coastline, Tunisia even saw growth predictions of up to 6% in 2001,

despite the September 11ᵗʰ Attacks that same year (Glusac, 2009; News, 2002). Hosni Mubarak's Egypt saw strong GDP growth, gaining over 6% from 2005-11 (Ayres and Macey, 2011).

In a 2008 speech, First Lady Suzanne Mubarak boasted that Egypt's lower income classes also benefitted from such growth. GDP gains allowed "[...] poverty-stricken communities to benefit from an upgraded infrastructure, an improved access to basic health and education services as well as income generating schemes" (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2008). In the Levant, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was consistently represented as an oasis of stability in an unstable region (Knowles, 2005). In the Persian Gulf, Bahrain's Hamad bin Issa al-Khalifa fancied himself a liberal ruler. His tentative years saw him release up to 320 political prisoners in 1999 (Amnesty International, 1999). By 2002, Bahrain had transformed into a constitutional monarchy, with Hamad as King. The nation's first parliamentary elections in 27 years were expected shortly thereafter (Darwesh, 2002).

Qathafi's words, however, would prove both ironic and prophetic. In under a decade since strong GDP growth and shifts toward constitutional kingdoms, a spark was lit in a modest Tunisian town. On the 17ᵗʰ of December 2010, twenty-six year old Mohamed Bouazizi became the first flame in what was to be known as the Arab Spring (Ryan, 2011). Qathafi was right to fear the masses. For Mohammed, a hard-working fruit vendor, harbored the frustrations of millions of Arabs (Fahim, 2011). After having his wares confiscated by officials who harassed him daily, Bouazizi's last words were: "How do you expect me to make a living!" (Uzzel, 2012). Oil wealth, economic reforms and constitutionalism had hidden the socio-economic ills of widespread unemployment and open corruption. With the spark of its first martyr, the Arab Spring had begun (*ibid.*). From Tunisia, the Arab Spring blossomed across the North African states of Egypt and Libya before spreading to the Levant and the Gulf (Shah, 2011).

A war of words began in state after state. As protests spread and intensified, Arab leaders began to defend their governments and the legitimacy of their rule, in turn revealing their own perceptions of legitimacy. For some, their right to reign was paternalistic. Egypt's Mubarak argued that he was the father of the nation in his speech that served as a "[...] dialogue with his sons and daughters" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011). Others such as King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia pointed to the perennial MENA beacon of Islam and his family's role as custodians of the dominant faith (Fakker, 2015). For Gulf and oil states, blunter perceptions of legitimacy were given, including security against (perceived) external threats. Bahrain's King Hamad insisted that foreign forces were "[...] inciting our population to engage in acts of violence, sabotage and insurrection" (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). Last but not least, were government responses that not only played on security fears but openly advertised the tacit ruling bargain of oil states. In the final speech before his death, Muammar Qathafi insisted that protests would lead to civil war and Libya's degeneration into another Somalia (Warden, 2011). In addition, he angrily reminded the masses of their ruling bargain with the state and his generosity with Libya's resources. "Even the money [from] oil," he thundered, "I ask you to take every month" (*ibid.*).

This overview of governmental responses to the Arab Spring provides the outline of this project's themes for non-democratic legitimacy, including security, socio-economic benefits (in exchange for an apolitical populous) and religion. However, in order to understand how Arab governments have traditionally perceived their legitimacy and to further comprehend the traditional relations between ruler and ruled, it is necessary to trace how governance evolved in the Arab world under the umbrella of Islam and beyond.

Brown (2000, p. 1) notes that Islam's place in Arab politics was unavoidable since its beginnings in the seventh century (*ibid.*, p. 10). For Islam combined belief in the divine with concerns for both daily life and the creation of a "[...] divinely ordained political community" here on Earth (*ibid.*, p. 3). At the same time, the faith of Arabia had the

potential to limit interactions between ruler and ruled. Belief in the divine necessarily curbed the belief in human actions, and thus "[...] Muslims [...] were fatalists, disinclined to believe that human exertions could shape events significantly" (*ibid.*). The implications and consequences of this form of Political Quietism will be further explored towards the end of this chapter.

As previously discussed, much (English-language) literature on the Arab Spring has been penned by Western authors. Hence, it may not be inappropriate to consider the Western readership of MENA literature and thus discuss Islam within the framework of familiar Abrahamic faiths. If Islam is compared to the politics of Christendom in Europe, it is possible to make analogies between Muslim rule and the power of the Papacy and Church (*ibid.*, p. 33). However, a key difference that explains Islam's links to the state is the nature of its organization. The Church is often structured around a religious hierarchy (*ibid.*, p. 29). Over time, such hierarchies have often become subservient to governmental structures (*ibid.*, p. 33). Islam, on the other hand, differs markedly from this political pattern because it has never had a rigid or structured hierarchy. Brown explains that "[...] Islam knows no "church" in the sense of a corporate body whose leadership is clearly defined, hierarchical and distinct from the state" (*ibid.*, p. 31). Hence, structured challenge to the state (or equally structured integration of Islam into the state) has been traditionally implausible. Because Islam was not formally organized into a representative council per se, Islam could not directly challenge the state as it did not have the organizational capacity to do so, nor could the state formally absorb representatives of Islam into its own governmental hierarchy. However, this did not mean that Islam was apolitical. Nor did it mean that Arab rulers could ignore the values of Muslim subjects (*ibid.*, p. 32).

Here it is important to note that Islam's lack of hierarchy did not mean lack of popular representation. In Sunni Islam, the Arab world's dominant Muslim branch, there exist the *ulema*. Kechichian (1986, p. 55) outlines their role as religious specialists that straddle Islam's lack of clergy/hierarchy and Islam's need for "[...] theological interpretative

skills", in exchange for which *ulema* receive "[...] rights and privileges", including traditional "[...] advisory roles [that] cannot [be], indeed were not ignored by [...] political leaderships throughout history" (*ibid.*).

An expedient understanding of the *ulema* and their political significance can be framed two-fold. First and as previously stated, the *ulema* were not historically a distinct socio-political class per se. Rather, they have existed as "[...] a category of religiously inclined persons who study Islamic law with great care and with a well-established methodology of interpretation and precedence" (*ibid.*). In a sense then, this definition of the *ulema* almost constructs them as a socio-religious community that only "[...] seek[s] to shed light on their capacity to understand, interpret, and compare their findings with others who are similarly inclined" (*ibid.*). Second, however, it must be recalled that *ulema* have traditionally been accorded political privileges and status by the state. This second aspect of defining the *ulema* is what allows a tracing of Islam's role in state relations between ruler and subjects. Brown (2000, p. 32) elucidates why the *ulema* were traditionally appeased by political rulers. As representatives of Muslims, *ulema* became and continue to be the de facto spokespersons for the masses. Historically, the popular support for the *ulema* has been a power that kings, presidents and emirs have been forced to acknowledge. Failure to do so can and has been fatal, for the "[...] ulama have often led or been intimately involved in movements toppling rulers from power" (*ibid.*).

Conversely, if the *ulema* can topple political governments, they have also been involved in their creation. The most salient case in point is the founding of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Though named after the ruling Saud family, Saudi Arabia was not monopolized by the House of Saud. Indeed, Ismail (2012, p. 404) describes the first Saudi state (1744-1818) not as an exclusive monarchy but as a politico-religious "[...] partnership between [*Sheikh*] Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud, the state's first ruler." Over time, this arrangement expanded into "[...] a wider partnership between the Sunni ulema and the House of Saud, under which the clerics [...] provide the House of Saud with the legitimacy

to rule" (*ibid.*). To this very day, the Saudi *ulema* continue to wield influence and power. The Council of Senior *Ulema* stands as a rare MENA example of an Islamic clerical framework that symbolizes the relationship in the Arab world between religion and governance. The Council's state sanctioned status is given by the House of Saud in return for the body's senior *ulema* providing "[...] tacit approval and, when requested, public sanction for potentially controversial policies" (Global Security, 2016). The privileges of Saudi *ulema* have also extended to include key posts in government, business and even the Armed Forces (*ibid.*).

An overview of Islam's relationship with the state reveals an historical connection between state and religion out of necessity. Not only was this due to the nature of Islam and its concern with the divine and the worldly but also because of the particular structure that became an established norm governing ruler and ruled. Rather than a direct relationship between government and populace, the *ulema* stood as a bridge between the Muslim masses and the political elite. The *ulema* represented Islamic values, tradition and thus embodied the concerns of the people. A government's need for religious legitimacy could thus not be ignored.

Perhaps this need for religious approval explains why governments in the Arab world share an historic tradition (to varying degrees) of cementing their rule with Islamic titles. Bulliet (2013, pp. 1, 12) describes the history of Islamic titles as one element of a tripartite framework that eventually emerged as a form of religious legitimacy used by Arab governments. The emergence of Islamic titles is arresting, as it can be regarded as a time in history in which Islam did indeed start to become more organized. While lacking a formal hierarchy, the introduction of Islamic titles created a structure of religious authority, thus making Islam more concentrated as a movement that now had the nascent organization to become more political. As Bulliet notes, "[...] titles designated the political and spiritual leaders of the community and reflected the varying notions of how God thought the community of Muslims should be governed" (*ibid.*, p. 4).

The most desired title from Islam's beginning (yet also the least pragmatic) was that of Caliph, ruler of a Caliphate or Islamic State. The desirability of this title arose early on in Islam's history. Due to its swift emergence, Karateke (2005, p. 21) describes being Caliph as "[...] [t]he most powerful and effective claim to normative legitimacy in [...] Islamic political discourse [.] [...] A sitting [C]aliph assumed not only a hereditary right but also indirectly a divine right to rule". As ideal a ruler's dream as it might have seemed, however, widespread disagreement over how to define and appoint a divine ruler was compounded by the parallel emergence of *Imam* as a title that could hold equal merit (Bulliet, 2013, p. 4). As with many historical events, the dispute of how a Caliph was designated often ended up being settled through territorial conquest and military victories (*ibid.*, p. 5; see also the execution of the last Abbasid Caliph in 1258, whose power was by then restricted to the city limits. Source: Boyle, 1961, p. 145). Nonetheless, the Caliph/*Imam* debate prompted an alternatively constructed title: Sultan (Bulliet, 2013, p. 4).

Perhaps it is no coincidence that the word Sultan is derived from the Arabic *Sulta*, meaning power or influence (Bulliet, 2013, p. 5). While Caliph held divine emphasis but temporal complexities, the title of Sultan succeeded in gaining territorial and political emphasis while retaining religious elements (Bartold, 1963, p. 118). Interestingly, the title was originally associated with (and theoretically subservient to) the Caliph. Over time, however, the term Sultan came to be less understood as an office of the Caliph and more interpreted as a politically autonomous post that could be gained through, inter alia, conquest (Bulliet, 2013, p. 5). Under the rule of a Sultan, the foundations were laid for the typical traits of a modern Arab Sheikhdom. Many Sultanates, from infant governments to eventual empires often relied on the personal rule of one man (Ahmed, Coşgel and Miceli, 2009, p. 1; Findley, 1980, p. 7). Furthermore, while there could only be one Caliph, it was theoretically possible for there to be several sultans (and thus several Muslim states), all holding defined (but possibly large) territory (Bulliet, 2013, p. 5; Khan, 2007, p. 4).

Whether under a Caliph or Sultan, the creation of an Islamic political order (Caliph/*Imam*, Sultan, *Ulema*), often by conquest, evoked connotations of political clout and power. In other words, without a system of checks and balances, the fear of tyranny looms upon the masses. It is for this reason that subjects expected not only use of Islamic titles by their governments but the incorporation of Islamic law (Bulliet, 2013, p. 12).

Ibrahim (2006, pp. 6-7) expounds on why Islamic law should act as a counterweight to e.g. personal rule. For "[...] freedom is the object of the divine law. Islam has always expressed the primacy of *'adl*, or justice, which is a close approximation of what the West defines as freedom. Justice entails according to the dictates of Islamic law[s], which emphasize consultation and condemn despotism and tyranny" (*ibid.*, p. 7). It is worth adding that Ibrahim's explanation of Islamic law is not unfamiliar to Western concepts of governance. Indeed, Ibrahim argues that Islamic law or *Shari'a* bears a "[...] striking resemblance to Locke['s] ideals that would be expounded centuries later" (*ibid.*). This description echoes notions of a social contract between the ruler and the ruled. In the case of *Shari'a*, said contract should not be defined by the state's monopolized authoritarianism. Rather, in return for obedience from its citizens, the state must uphold the universal rights of Islam: "[...] freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and the sanctity of life and property— as demonstrated very clearly by the Koran, as well as by the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad" (*ibid.*).

As this chapter has already discussed, the status of Islam among the masses and their de facto representatives (the *ulema*) has rarely been dismissed by governments without fatal consequences. Ibrahim's overview of universal values therefore creates a social contract that Arab governments must comply with. To stay in power, Arab leaders must accept limitations upon that power. However, just as states found ways around the Caliph to gain their own Islamic leadership, more contemporary rulers would find ways around *'adl* or the Islamic concept of justice by tacitly promoting and enforcing an apolitical social contract, the ruling bargain.

Some scholars such as Korany (2013, p. 19) have defined the ruling bargain as both evolving yet static. The basic definition of a ruling bargain is that "[...] citizens surrender their political and social rights to participatory government, are expected to accept the legitimacy of the ruling regime, [...] and in return are rewarded with a variety of [...] socio-economic benefits" (*ibid*, pp. 19, 1).

However, Korany argues that this definition of the ruling bargain cannot survive alone without being placed within the framework of the three Ms: the Military, the Mosque and the Masses. In an expanded argument, Korany observes that the three Ms were of paramount importance in Egypt's overthrow of Mubarak because the Military, the Mosque and the Masses "[...] were [all] present [to protest against Mubarak] at [Cairo's] Tahrir [Square]" (2014, p. 256). The fact that all three Ms united against Mubarak illustrates the power of each group in preserving the ruling bargain and how such a framework of cooption can evolve over time. Hence, the ruling bargain, while possessing a simple definition, must also adapt to this politico-religious framework during waves of change (*ibid.*).

In any event, it is worth noting that the ruling bargain as a MENA norm can be regarded as contemporary. Not until the 1950's, when Caliphs and Islamic States had been partially replaced with Arab republics and presidents did this skewed social contract emerge (Kamrava, 2013, p. 2). Nonetheless, the apolitical nature of the ruling bargain and even its modern origins are contrasted by how political rule may be comprehended under Islam and what Brown terms Political Quietism. Brown skillfully defines Political Quietism and illustrates its Islamic legitimacy by quoting a specific *hadith* or saying of the Prophet Muhammad (Brown, 2001, p. 67). In the *hadith* it is claimed that the Prophet was asked whether Muslims should combat authoritarian rulers. "No," Muhammad replied. "[N]ot so long as [these rulers] say their prayers" (*ibid.*). The subsequent religious context created by this *hadith* cannot be overlooked by ruler or ruled, as it birthed a Political Quietism with

both "[...] a theological and cultural basis" that have become perennial due to their mutual and cohesive nature (*ibid.*).

Emphasizing the notion of Political Quietism as a public good has been the historic use of religion and religious terms or practices by Muslim leaders. Their historical utility can be linked to both Political Quietism and state rule. Ayoob (2004, p. 9) argues that Muslim jurists created a two-tier framework to validate "[...] the legitimacy of [a government's] temporal rule". This minimal definition of politico-religious legitimacy decreed that any ruler that can maintain his Muslim territories or *Dar al-Islam* and does not prevent his subjects from practicing their faith is a legitimate head of state. As such, tyranny was actually permissible under a ruler that passed the two-tier test. Furthermore, the Prophet's *hadith* and Islamic juridical practice meant that power-hungry but pious rulers could sleep at night, safe in the knowledge that "[...] rebellion was forbidden" (*ibid.*). Indeed, Muslim jurists gave unlawful rebellion its own term, calling it *fitna* and arguing that such dissension was "[...] worse than tyranny since it could threaten the integrity of the *umma* (community of believers)". Inevitable chaos and political conflict would most certainly ensue (*ibid.*). Thus, a form of stable but Islamic tyranny was ensured from at least "[...] the eighth to the eighteenth centuries", with the ruling bargain able to build upon rather than raze the Political Quietism accepted by the Muslim masses (*ibid.*).

Modern rulers tried to maintain the framework of Political Quietism right up to the Arab Spring. Under Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian government tried to take advantage of Political Quietism and its links to emerging religious trends (al-Anani, 2013, pp. 57, 61). In particular, Mubarak paid close attention to the Salafist movement, which began intensifying its media presence and gained increasing support from 2003 onward. No doubt, Mubarak appreciated the growing popularity of a Muslim branch that "[...] reshaped the religious sphere in Egypt to become more conservative and less progressive in terms of political and religious views" (*ibid.*). The Political Quietism of Salafist Egyptians prompted the regime to give "[...] more space and venues for the Salafis to spread their

views and expand their social network". Further, Mubarak even "[...] employed the political quietism of Salafis to counter-balance [his opposition]" (*ibid.*).

The ruling bargain can thus be understood as a more recent phenomenon created as a skewed social contract between ruler and ruled. However, a brief examination of Political Quietism and its origins in Islam illustrate how the ruling bargain did not appear out of context with definitions of Islamic legitimacy, however loosely defined. So long as a king, president or brotherly leader maintains his territory (under Islamic customs) and preserves the practice of faith, the masses must accept his social contract. To not do so would be unlawful rebellion and encourage *fitna*, dissent that bred anarchy thought to be worse than the stable clutches of tyrannical governance. Nonetheless, this is not to say that unrest never occurred until the Arab Spring. In fact, the Arab world has been subject to a history of contention between protest and acceptance that outlines the limits of *fitna*. Such a history may somewhat explain why Arab leaders did not react strongly to initial protests that would blossom into the Arab Spring.

As is often the case in history, ideology does not always win against pragmatism. Bulliet (2013, p. 13) outlines the consequences of secularized rule under Islamic theory. Bulliet claims that un-Islamic and thus illegitimate rule should "[...] engender the arousal among Muslim populations of a sort of [...] instinctual inclination to see in religion a corrective force against this political imbalance. Thus, as tyranny increased, oppositional movements should have emerged bent on using religion and appeals to Islamic law to [...] limit tyranny and introduce more equitable governance" (*ibid.*). Yet, it must be remembered that should a populace take to the streets against their regime, this action would likely violate the tacit and apolitical ruling bargain that became increasingly common and dominant in the contemporary MENA region. Indeed, Brown (2000, p. 68) traces the importance of the ruling bargain over religion all the way back to the Ottoman era. One tale of the time describes the poor relations between local subjects and their ruler. Wishing to remove the tyrannical governor, the villagers send a representative to the "[...] Ottoman capital" and

request the governor's dismissal. However, "[w]hen the governor got wind of the plan, he summoned the group to his house [...] pointed out a chest and told them to open it. It was filled [...] with coins and precious metals. The governor then said, "When I arrived [...] I brought with me that trunk empty. Now it is almost full. My successor will arrive with his empty trunk" (*ibid.*). Resistance to his rule promptly folded, illustrating how the ideology of political freedom, at least in this case, could not win against the pragmatics of financial leverage (*ibid.*).

At the same time, the very distance created by Political Quietism and the subsequent inability to identify with the state can encourage resistance to its governance. Resistance, according to Brown, is often tied to dignity. It is dignity and honor that caused Algerian tribes to confront Tunisian tax collectors with the sword before opening their purses in the nineteenth century. "[I]f we pay without difficulty one year, [the governor] may well be tempted to increase the levy the following year," explained a tribal leader. "In any case, it would be shameful for mountaineers to pay at the first demand" (Brown, 2000, pp. 69-70). The act of militarily confronting Tunisian tax collectors before meeting payment balances recognizing the legitimacy of the state's right to rule with the dignity of its subjects, and it is dignity that was at the heart of the Arab Spring (Fukuyama, 2012, available online). As Francis Fukuyama put it, "[i]t's hard power that often makes the headlines. But never underestimate the strength of the simple desire for respect" (*ibid.*).

Finally, the tradition of half-hearted resistance to government can be complemented by financial considerations and the political implications of government repression. Brown (2000, p. 73) again illustrates how perennial dictatorships and empires survived through, inter alia, cost effectiveness. In other words, dissidents and combative rebels were not targeted in an 'inch by inch, house by house' manner. Rather, it was more common for rulers to ration resources by "[...] awaiting a propitious time when rebel areas could be brought back into the system without undue cost in manpower or money" (*ibid.*). Guriev and Treisman (2015, p. 6) broaden this model by assessing why repression can be more

dangerous than cooption, propaganda and the ruling bargain, even if the government appears to be under threat. Indeed, if the ruling bargain remains reasonably strong, perhaps bolstered by censorship and propaganda, the illusion of strength and competence becomes pervasive. Hence, using violence "[...] signals to the general public that the regime is incompetent and vulnerable". Violence, in other words, breaks the mirage (*ibid.*).

By examining the facets of Islamic legitimacy, Political Quietism and financial considerations, it is possible to compose a picture of how mass opposition to tyrants may have been minimized. Without painting with too broad a brush, it is not inaccurate to argue that the Muslim belief in divinity and fatalism, coupled with distance from government allowed rulers to impose their will upon the masses, provided they also upheld Islamic traditions. At the same time, financial and political implications made governments reluctant to resort to mass repression. Nonetheless, propaganda, censorship and ruling bargains could not prevent covert expression by subjects of their own political will. From a religious point of view, "[...] that is precisely what happened. Starting with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1930s, movements and parties supporting the concept of Islamic government became increasingly vociferous and popular" (Bulliet, 2013, p. 13).

It is certainly possible to link Islamist will to the Arab Spring, especially when analyzing elections held in Tunisia and Egypt shortly after their respective leaders fell (Haqqani, 2012). However, it is also possible to consider the broader repercussions of tyranny, regardless of how much Islamic legitimacy a government may claim to have. For the Arab Spring was not born purely out of Islamist interests. It was provoked by the human drive for dignity. A drive that, for the Muslim masses, should have been enshrined in constitutions and Islamic law (Pin, 2016, p. 3). Indeed, what is most heartbreaking is that the context of dignity can be found in the early years of many governments that found themselves at the mercy of the Arab Spring's masses. Upon seizing power in 1987, Tunisia's Ben Ali promised that he would "[...] see that the law is correctly enforced in a way that will proscribe any kind of iniquity or injustice (Ben Ali, 2015)". Qathafi's 1969

coup against the Libyan monarchy saw the twenty-seven-year-old officer declare that henceforth the state would be a body of "[...] freedom, the path of unity and social justice, guaranteeing equality to all her citizens" (Qathafi, 2015). Perhaps such promises of dignity forgotten for decades led to the popular expression for such social justice. Dignity is one of the most basic human needs, on par with food and water. As Pin (2016, p. 3) explains "[the] Arabs who occupied the roads of Cairo, Tunis, Damascus, Amman, and many other cities did not call simply for the enforcement of *human rights* or *Islamic law*. In Egypt, the most populated Arab country, the early rallying cry of the 2011 revolution was "Bread, Freedom, Social Justice, and Human Dignity," and it was later enshrined in the 2012 and 2014 constitutions' Preambles" (*ibid.*).

Nonetheless, an overview of Islamic titles, laws and legitimacy illustrates that, from an Arab government's perspective, a framework and thus culture of political legitimacy did exist. It is for this reason that an analysis of political legitimacy from the government's point of view is significant. Current literature on the Arab Spring often addresses the role of social media, socio-economics and the nature of authoritarianism and how these factors contributed to revolution (e.g. Aras and Falk, 2013; Bruns, Burgess and Highfield, 2013). Few articles discuss political legitimacy from the perspective of current and deposed leaderships. Hence, this project's objective of understanding non-democratic forms of legitimacy will contribute original knowledge to an ongoing socio-political trend that affects the MENA region and the world, and that continues to be of interest to IR scholars, policy makers, Western governments, NGOs and migration specialists.

In keeping with the theme of this project, it is worth exploring how states and governments have traditionally wielded political legitimacy and how this tradition has been regarded. From an historical perspective, it is possible to trace the ruling bargain of today's oil sheikhs back to western philosophy and the social contract theory. Commonly linked to Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, the social contract theory was introduced to explain the human transition from stateless groups to organized political communities (Steele, 1993, p.

1). This transition necessitated a centralized administrator, birthing the basic definition of the social contract. Bërdufi and Dushi (2015, p. 392) summarize the social contract as "[...] a way by which people, in order to escape the state of nature, an insecure state of unavoidable war, implicitly agreed to give away some of their individual freedoms to a political ruler, a State, in order for the State to better protect some more important needs and rights to them" (*ibid.*).

As seminal authors of social contract theory, Hobbes, Locke and Rosseau have often been debated by contemporary thinkers, with the outlines of each type of social contract theory compared and contrasted. John Locke argued that man was inherently tolerant but that the birth of state and government was needed to secure property (Broers, 2009). Property was the result of labor and materials from the natural world but created class inequality between the landed and the landless (Devine, 2000, p. 287). As such, the state existed to enforce the rights of equality and other natural laws (*ibid.*, p. 266). Hence, subjects did not surrender all of their rights to a state or ruler but only the right to enforce natural laws in exchange for the state protecting and upholding said laws (*ibid.*).

Thomas Hobbes, on the other hand, espoused a less tolerant view of man's nature and the need for a sovereign government. Hobbes believed that humankind was inherently belligerent. For this reason, the state must be created as a sovereign authority to govern relations between subjects (Lloyd, 2014). Further, Hobbes argued that for a government to be effective it must be absolute. In other words, because man is inherently selfish and combative, there can be no peace without submission to a political authority, the state, which will guarantee cohesion. In the relationship between ruler and ruled, Hobbes believed that "[...] none of the sovereign's Subjects [...] can be freed from his Subjection" (Hobbes, 2014, pp. 20, 22). The notion of total obedience to the state in exchange for safety does foreshadow the ruling bargains of the Gulf States (in which security becomes socio-economic benefits). However, Hobbes did cap the extent of authoritarian rule, arguing that subjects can disobey the state and go against their sovereign if there is a threat

to their lives, families or even honor. In a sense, this limit is logical, as any violation of subjects' safety or even dignity can be regarded as a failure by the state to fulfill its contractual obligation to provide all subjects with security (Lloyd, 2014). Such a cap, if regarded in the context of dignity, can certainly link back to the current state of collapsing ruling bargains and the demands for dignity espoused by the Arab Spring (*ibid.*; Fukuyama, 2012).

After Locke and Hobbes, Jean Jacques Rousseau's social contract theory appears to strike a middle ground. Rousseau argues that man was happy and equal during the so-termed State of Nature before political communities. However, population growth and property creation prompted the establishment of communities and eventually social classes (Doss Santos, 1970, p.167). This socio-economic organization of communities created inequality and thus birthed a desire for the state. However, Rosseau believed that states existed to enforce the 'general will' or wishes of the majority of the populace (Shaaper, 2015, p. 38). This view thus presents a compromise between Locke and Hobbes, as Rosseau does not claim that states posses the absolutism of Hobbes but also implies through majority rule that some inequality will remain (as minority voices are ignored) (*ibid.*).

In any event, all three philosophers argue that a social contract exists between ruler and ruled, and that the authority of the state is accepted in exchange for, inter alia, benefits, whether they be security or representation. The notion of benefits is central to the ruling bargain and further expanded upon by contemporary scholars of social contract theory. Within this context, Fabienne Peter's Political Legitimacy presents a framework that considers democratic and non-democratic means of rule. Peter's overview of Political Legitimacy is most relevant to this thesis, as Peter does not assume that democracy is the exclusive or most significant source of legitimacy and also questions the political limits of democratic decision-making (Peter, 2016).

Peter's theory presents three separate sources of Political Legitimacy, including Consent, Beneficial Consequences and Public Reason/Democratic Approval. Consent is perhaps the most obvious criterion. Peter traces the evolution of consent from the 17th Century onward as "[...] the main source of political legitimacy" (*ibid.*). However, Peter does so within the context of European history and the gradual "[...] replacement of natural law and divine authority theories of legitimacy" (*ibid.*). It should be noted that this aspect of Political Legitimacy does not fully apply to the political evolution of the Arab world and the aforementioned history in the MENA region of Islam and Islamic law. At the same time, Peter is willing to explore degrees of consent in her theory. Drawing on Locke and Rosseau as well as more contemporary thinkers such as David Estlund, Peter is willing to consider that consent may be the most impractical source of Political Legitimacy, as "[...] those governed [can] consent [only] under certain ideal conditions". Peter also brings attention to the fact that objections to the feasibility of consent "[...] are about as old as consent theory itself" (*ibid.*). Given the fact "[...] that actual states have almost always arisen from acts of violence", consent as a true indication of legitimacy is "[...] at best, wishful thinking" (*ibid.*).

The lack of pragmatic implementation regarding consent leads Peter to her second source of Political Legitimacy: Beneficial Consequences. This type of legitimacy is regarded by Peter as far more utilitarian than consent. What makes this particular source so interesting to the ruling bargain is its framework under a social contract, while still existing as "[...] a distinctively political—not moral [...] source of legitimacy" (*ibid.*). At the same time, Peter outlines to what extent this utilitarian alternative may be moral yet still pragmatic (or whether it is more pragmatic than moral). Bentham, Peter argues, rejects the social contract outright. Under Bentham's definition, the state can monopolize power through binding rather than social contracts; however, "[...] legitimacy depends on whether a law contributes to the happiness of the citizens" (*ibid.*; Burns, 2005, p. 47). This definition derived through Bentham allows the state to present a skewed social contract between ruler

and ruled, provided that the state's actions and monopoly contribute to the vague 'happiness' of subjects. Without objectively defining happiness, Peter's Beneficial Consequences can certainly be linked to the MENA rentier states and the heretofore tangible benefits of political acquiescence in exchange for e.g. oil welfare.

The utilitarian image of Beneficial Consequences is complemented by notions of paternalism in Peter's explication. Analyzing Beneficial Consequences through the work of Raz (2009, p. 134), the simplest definition of political authority is "[...] a right to rule", in which the social contract is simplified into de facto legitimacy. Hence, if a law is "[...] issued by someone who has a right to rule, then its recipients are bound to obey" (*ibid.*). Peter expands on this directive by arguing that governments do not need to justify their form of rule so long as positive results of their political administration can be presented to their subjects (Peter, 2016). In other words, this understanding of Political Legitimacy argues that "[...] legitimacy based on beneficial consequences is compatible with everyone having reasons to obey the directives of a legitimate authority" (*ibid.*). This form of de facto recognition in exchange for benefits allows Peter's second source of Political Legitimacy to bolster the ruling bargains of Arab states. Further, the "[...] paternalistic ring" of such politics connects with non-democratic legitimacy, conjuring images of Arab rulers such as Mubarak holding an unequal "[...] dialogue with his sons and daughters" (*ibid.*; British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011).

Public Reason/Democratic Approval, Peter's final source is also relevant to this thesis and the related analysis of MENA constitutions. However, Peter's explanation of Democratic Approval does not necessarily mean a pure democracy, or a definition of democracy espoused by the West for so-called 'developing' nations. Nonetheless, Democratic Approval is strongly linked to consent theory. Peter draws heavily from John Rawls' *Political Liberalism* to discuss the appropriate political format in which to merge public reasoning and democratic approval (Peter, 2016). As explained by Rossi (2014, p. 1), Rawls regarded the social contract between ruler and ruled as contingent upon "[...] the rise

of public justification as the dominant account of political authority" (*ibid.*). Rossi expounds this trend by quoting Rawls' view of political authority being expedient "[...] only when [...] exercised in accordance with a constitution, the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may be expected to endorse" (*ibid.*, p. 11). Peter herself agrees that Public Reason/Democratic Approval is best symbolized by a publicly approved constitution. For under a constitution, "[...] legitimate authority is created by appropriately constrained collective decision-making procedures" (Peter, 2016).

However, Peter does place limits on the role of democratic processes in her overall explanation of Political Legitimacy. First, Peter argues that a publicly approved constitution allows the masses to "[...] accept a democratic decision even if they disagree substantively with it" (*ibid.*). This insinuation implies limits to democracy between ruler and ruled, allowing flexibility in a government's actions that do not necessarily need public approval if following supposedly constrained democratic formalities.

Further, Peter even considers the plain fact that within "[...] contemporary political philosophy, not everyone agrees that democracy is necessary for political legitimacy" (*ibid.*). Peter's argument may be separated into two distinct views. First, there is her view of pure proceduralist conceptions of democratic legitimacy. This bureaucratic account of democracy places emphasis on "[...] pure proceduralism" rather than the outcome of such proceduralism (*ibid.*). Peter cites Christiano (2003, p. 1), who defines the proceduralist view of understanding political outcomes "[...] as essentially evaluable solely in terms of the procedure that brought them about" (*ibid.*). In other words, "[...] [w]hatever the results of the discussions, deliberation, and decision making ..., they are legitimate" (Peter, 2009, p. 146).

The proceduralist approach to democratic decision-making can certainly be linked to Gulf and other Arab monarchies and their parliaments. More specifically, an approach that considers democratic formalities more important than the democratic nature (or lack

thereof) of political results can be linked to the perceived nature of the Arab *majlis* or parliament, which is often regarded as a "[...] rubber stamp for [a] ruling family's policies" (Whrey, 2014, p. 322).

Second, widening the non-democratic scope of Political Legitimacy is Peter's overview of what she terms Democratic Instrumentalism. Despite the use of 'democratic' as part of its namesake, this aspect of Peter's Political Legitimacy actually argues "[...] against democracy" by promoting the view that "[i]f democracy does not contribute to better outcomes, it is not necessary for political legitimacy" (Peter, 2016). Expounding on this theory, Peter argues that it is possible for the existence of a political administration that can create "[...] an ideal outcome that can be identified independently of the democratic process" and from which the regime's "[...] legitimacy can be gauged" (*ibid.*). Peter cites contemporary thinkers such as Arneson (2004, p. 40) who argues that "[s]ystems of governance should be assessed by their consequences". In other words, an individual ruler "[...] has a moral right to exercise political power [...] [if producing] best consequences overall" (*ibid.*).

Democratic Instrumentalism links back to Peter's source of Beneficial Consequences. Both provide non-democratic forms of legitimacy that focus on the notion of a public good accepted by an apolitical populace. Public benefits return the thesis to the notion of a ruling bargain. Both Democratic Instrumentalism and Beneficial Consequences are theoretical buttresses for the ruling bargain. After all, an emir or president can, under Democratic Instrumentalism, minimize democratic processes or even reduce them to superficial formalities, if they provide a palatable outcome to the process such as welfare benefits. Alternatively, the purer ruling bargain linked to Beneficial Consequences can be that the state's ability to provide subsidies and other socio-economic gifts is proof enough of its legitimacy, without the need for democratic bureaucracy.

However, Peter's Political Legitimacy does not consider the role of religion as a service or Beneficial Consequence. Peter's Political Legitimacy does not have a sustained religious context. Only the limited role of Christendom and its influence on consent theory is briefly addressed. It is plausible to start considering religion as one Beneficial Consequence or public good/service provided by MENA states. Yet, the limit of Peter's Political Legitimacy regarding the role of religion and Islam specifically necessitates a return to Bulliet.

Bulliet's *Religion and the State in Islam* can build upon Peter's Political Legitimacy by providing three elements of what may be termed Religious Legitimacy. As previously addressed, these are: practice of Islamic law and customs; use of Islamic titles; and custodianship of holy sites (Bulliet, 2013, pp. 4-5, 12, 3). Hence, this thesis will merge Peter's sources of Political Legitimacy with Bulliet's sources of Religious Legitimacy. This merger will mean that Peter's Political Legitimacy (especially Beneficial Consequences) will remain the primary framework of analysis. However, Bulliet's own sources of Political Legitimacy or Religious Legitimacy will be used to analyze aspects of each case study's speech/constitution that involve or refer to Islam. In these instances, what the author has termed Religious Legitimacy will be given the same weight as Peter's Beneficial Consequences, e.g. religion will be treated as a public good that the state is expected to maintain in order to possess (non-democratic) legitimacy.

Both Peter's Political Legitimacy and Bulliet's Religious Legitimacy can be linked to the Arab Spring and to the four case studies of this thesis. Ben Ali's Tunisia and the Khalifa Kingdom of Bahrain present security as a Beneficial Consequence. In his last public address of January 10th 2011, Ben Ali insisted that the movement against him was due to "[h]ostile elements in the pay of foreigners [...] from outside the country", contrasting this "[...] isolated act of desperation" with promises of justice, employment and educational reform (Ben Ali, 2011). King Hamad bin Issa al-Khalifa's own response to the Arab Spring insisted too that external forces were responsible for "[…] inciting our population

to engage in acts of violence, sabotage, and insurrection". King Hamad warned that any such interference with his rule "[...] not only directly challenges the stability and sovereignty of our country, but also poses a threat to the security and stability of the GCC countries" (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). The implications of both Ben Ali and King Hamad are clearly hinting at socio-economic and political security, respectively, in turn conjuring images of stability. Stability can indeed be regarded as one of Peter's Beneficial Consequences. In fact, under Beneficial Consequences, Peter goes so far as to quote Milton's belief that authoritarianism "[...] is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians". Perhaps Ben Ali and King Hamad would regard the "barbarians" as the external forces they argue are threatening their countries (Peter, 2016).

Mubarak's Egypt and King Abdullah II's Jordan complete the aforementioned case studies with research sites that can be analyzed through Religious Legitimacy as well as social contract theory and paternalism. Both Mubarak and King Abdullah II evoke God "[...] the Most Merciful, the Compassionate" when addressing their respective people, with Mubarak seeing his speech not as his final moment as president but simply "[...] a father's dialogue with his sons and daughters" (Abdullah II, October 2012; British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011).   The need for Peter's Political Legitimacy and Bulliet's Religious Legitimacy will be expanded upon in Chapter 3.

Further, each selected case study features specific characteristics of import to this project and socio-political aspects of significance to the Arab world. First, Tunisia stands as the origin state of the Arab Spring. In addition, Ben Ali's state was often regarded as open rather than conservative, such cosmopolitanism ostensibly bolstered by "[...] the Arab world's best educational system, largest middle class, and strongest organized labor movement" (Anderson, 2011, p. 1). Egypt under Mubarak stood as a major Western/U.S. ally in North Africa (Knell, 2013). Furthermore, Egypt is the Arab world's most populous state and houses Al Azhar, the Arab world's most prestigious religious school for Sunni

Islam (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2016; Hatina, 2003, p. 51). The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a research site this author has lived in for a period of four years. At the heart of the Levant, Jordan is also surrounded by politically significant states such as Saudi Arabia and Syria but has not seen regime change or prolonged political disruption (Tobin, 2012, p. 96). Finally, Bahrain stands as this research project's Gulf case study. Unlike much of the Gulf, the Khalifa Kingdom has limited hydrocarbon reserves, preventing the government from offering the financial sweeteners of their neighbors (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2014). Perhaps this restriction explains why Bahrain came close to civil war, thus representing a case study without regime change but one stained by a period of sectarian violence and government repression (al-Khawaja, 2014, p. 193).

These four case studies allow the research project to span the MENA region, including North Africa, the Levant and the Gulf. However, to ensure parity across all research sites, the project will limit the chronology of case studies to between 2001 to 2012. This timeline will allow background and central analysis to address the political profile of each case study and respective ruler in a balanced manner, considering the time disparity between certain monarchs and presidents-for-life. Such background analysis will start post-9/11 to consider how Arab and Western governments were affected by the 9/11 Attacks. The September 11th Attacks represent a significant shift in MENA-Western relations. It was after 9/11 that the U.S. especially began to question Arab culture and socio-politics and Arab relations with the world and the West (Fadda-Conrey, 2011, pp. 532-533). Further, the so-called War on Terror, a product of George W. Bush's response to 9/11, gave MENA leaders a chance to tighten the grip on their own people. Dictators like Qathafi feigned cooperation in the War on Terror and used it as cover to target their own subjects under the pretense of stopping Islamist militants or other terrorist cells (with Western assistance) (Chorin, 2012, pp. 142-143). Indeed, renowned Arab scholar Edward Said emphasized a week after 9/11 that the War on Terror was a vaguely phrased response that risked

confirming "[…] America's role in the [Muslim] world" and its "[…]sanctimoniously munificent support […] of numerous repressive Arab regimes (Said, 2001)". Hence, 9/11 serves as an expedient starting point of analysis, as it is after 9/11 that Western interest in Arab politics grew, while simultaneously, certain MENA leaderships took advantage of that interest to strengthen domestic repression.

As previously mentioned, this research project will contribute original knowledge to current literature on the Arab Spring by addressing how Arab leaderships perceive their political legitimacy in the wake of sustained socio-political uprisings. In particular, the project will address non-democratic forms of political legitimacy. The qualitative analysis of pertinent speeches and constitutions will address the research gap in current literature on the Arab Spring, which will be further reviewed in a later chapter. This chapter has provided an historical overview of how Islamic rule and Political Quietism partially bolstered non-democratic legitimacy, the key theme of this thesis. Chapter 3 addresses theoretical approaches to legitimacy to illustrate how qualitative analysis will bolster original knowledge contribution, examining how qualitative methodology can address non-democratic legitimacy as a utilitarian concept, connecting with analyzed discourse by Arab leaders defending non-democratic rule.

3. Theoretical Approach to Legitimacy

3.1. Introduction

This project's introductory chapter and Chapter 2 have introduced certain concepts of social contract theory, which in itself can be linked to specific aspects of political legitimacy. Non-democratic arrangements such as the ruling bargain have been placed within the context of Peter's Beneficial Consequences and her theoretical approach to so-called proceduralism in order to discuss the limits of democratic elements in political legitimacy. Discussion of such limits highlights the research question: What are the factors Arab leaders use in discourse justifying their rule within the context of the Arab Spring? To what extent does this discourse support a (socio-economic) ruling bargain and Religious Legitimacy?

Given the previous chapter's focus on legitimation, it is thus most expedient to expound upon the thesis' research question from the perspective of legitimation theory. Further, it is appropriate to understand existing debates and definitions of legitimation theory (and to an extent political legitimacy) in order to justify the use of Peter's Political Legitimacy and Bulliet's Religious Legitimacy.

3.2 Legitimation Theory

Returning to Peter's legitimation theory, although of interest to this author's thesis, it must be noted that Peter's text does not provide an original definition of political legitimacy per se. Rather, Peter's text traces "[…] [d]escriptive and [n]ormative concepts of [l]egitimacy", drawing on Weber and Rawls, respectively (Peter, 2016). From Weber and Rawls, Peter constructs her own definitions of descriptive and normative legitimacy. Peter's discussion of Weberian or descriptive legitimacy under his lecture *Politics as a Vocation* can be linked back to earlier debate on *Dar al-Islam* and the ideal of a Caliphate versus the need for Muslim rulers to reign over defined territory. Weber's definition of the state in his lecture also echoes Islam's history of authority through conquest. For Weber,

early states were founded "[…] on the use of violence" (Weber, 2009, p. 78). While force may not be "[…] the normal or the only means of the state" it remains "[…] specific to the state" to the point where Weber defines the state as "[…] a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (*ibid.*). The birth of states through violence creates a political relation between ruler and subject of domination, in which force and coercion bolster the belief that if "[…] the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be" (*ibid.*). From this description, Weber structures basic legitimacy through tradition or "[…] ancient recognition and habitual orientation", charisma or "[…] the authority of the extraordinary and personal gift of grace" and legality, explained by Weber as "[…] the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional 'competence' based on rationally created rules" (*ibid.*, pp. 78-79). These three sources of legitimacy are echoed in Peter's discussion of the state and how obedience to the state should in turn create a faith bestowed on a ruler by their citizens that is rewarded by the ruler with "[…] social regularities that are more stable than those that result from the pursuit of self-interest or from habitual rule-following", foreshadowing Peter's Beneficial Consequences and discussion of the social contract (Peter, 2016).

Relying on Rawls' normative understanding of legitimacy, Peter explores a more moral version of the social contract. Rawls' *Political Liberalism* serves as Peter's central normative source. In it, Rawls approaches political legitimacy as a social contract that constructs the relationship between ruler and ruled as one of equality and "[…] 'fair terms of cooperation'" (Nussbaum, 2011, p.1). Further, the emphasis on social justice inherent in equality and fairness links back to "[…] the closely related notion of human dignity," expressed by Rawls in his *A Theory of Justice* (*ibid.*, p. 2). Rawls' belief in the role of dignity and political legitimacy is an aspect that, for Peter, allows a normative understanding of legitimacy to explore "[…] the moral justification […] of political authority" (Peter, 2016). Moreover, Rawls' discussion of human dignity can certainly echo

the Arab Spring's main drive according to Fukuyama—the "[…] strength of the simple desire for respect" (Fukuyama, 2012).

From the aforementioned scholars, Peter formulates her descriptive and normative definitions of legitimacy. For Peter, descriptive legitimacy is perhaps vaguely defined as "[…] people's beliefs about political authority and, sometimes, political obligations" (*ibid.*). While perchance a compact definition, the notion of popular belief in not only authority but also obligation links back to the notion of a social contract, under which authority is granted to the state in exchange for the state meeting obligations toward subjects (Bërdufi and Dushi, 2015, p. 392). Such obligations, if broadly defined, can of course be of a non-democratic nature, returning Peter's definition to the skewed ruling bargain of the Arab states (Kamrava, (2013, p.1). On the other hand, Peter's normative definition of legitimacy reflects an expanded understanding but one that still returns to a broad comprehension of a social contract or ruling bargain. For Peter, "[...] the normative concept of political legitimacy refers to some benchmark of acceptability or justification of political power or authority and—possibly—obligation" (Peter, 2016). Peter continues by categorizing the normative definition of legitimacy as creating a "[...] moral duty to obey [the state's] commands." At the same time, Peter returns to the typical conditions of a social contract by asserting that "[...] if the conditions for legitimacy are not met, political institutions exercise power unjustifiably and the commands they might produce do then not entail an obligation to obey" (*ibid.*).

Peter's assertion returns her definition of political legitimacy to the seminal core of social contract theory, especially that of Hobbes' cap on authoritarian rule (Lloyd, 2014). At the same time, Peter's normative definition also connects with the ruling bargain as discussed in Chapter 2 by creating a moral duty for citizens to obey the state in exchange for an undefined standard for state monopolization of authority. If this benchmark is broadly defined (or undefined), it can be assumed that the justification for the state's authority can

be non-democratic and/or a Beneficial Consequence, to use Peter's term, including welfare benefits previously mentioned in Chapter 2's discussion of Arab states.

The notion of non-democratic legitimacy is expanded upon by other contemporary thinkers such as Bruce Gilley in his paper, 'The meaning and measure of state legitimacy' (Gilley, 2006, pp. 499-525). Gilley complements Peter's non-democratic elements of Beneficial Consequences under his own so-called 'performance legitimacy' (*ibid.*, p. 502). While Peter's Beneficial Consequences see "[...] legitimate political authority [...] grounded on the principle of utility [according to the state]" (Peter, 2016), Gilley's 'performance legitimacy' attempts a similar definition but from the perspective of ruled rather than ruler. Gilley hence defines this form of legitimacy in terms of popular support for a regime in expectation of beneficial consequences. However, a key difference between Peter's Beneficial Consequences and Gilley's 'performance legitimacy' is that Gilley's political legitimacy is not a state-monopolized claim but rather "[...] is plausible only in terms of how citizens evaluate performance from a *public* perspective" (Gilley, 2006, p. 502). Gilley himself admits that 'performance legitimacy' "[...] is an ambiguous term" and thus requires a public perspective because Gilley defines political legitimacy as "[...] an endorsement of the state by citizens at a moral or normative level" (*ibid.*).

Just as Peter acknowledges that legitimacy may not be de facto democratic, Gilley himself admits that "[...] [political] legitimacy is a concept that admits of degrees" (*ibid.*, p. 501). For this reason, Gilley categorizes political legitimacy into his own sources known as 'orientation and sub-types' (*ibid.*, pp. 501-502). These three sources of 'rightful legitimacy', 'performance legitimacy' and 'rightfulness' can be partially compared to Peter's Consent, Beneficial Consequences and Public Reason/Democratic Approval. 'Rightful legitimacy' appears to bridge direct consent (considered unrealistic by Peter) with the more realistic notion that citizens generally support the state because the state attempts to consider all policies and mode of rule from "[...] a public perspective" (*ibid.*, p. 502). As previously discussed, 'performance legitimacy' provides a more utilitarian

approach (as per Peter's Beneficial Consequences), whereby legitimacy for the state is created by ensuring a satisfied populace through e.g. socio-economic benefits (but still evaluated from a citizen or public rather than state perspective) (*ibid.*). Finally, 'rightfulness' presents a more complex type of legitimacy. This source of legitimacy is Gilley's most structured definition, filtered through the perspective of citizens. First, the state's existence must accord with subjects' "[...] laws, rules and customs", thus ensuring continuity of traditions (religious or otherwise) of previous governments and that state behavior toward subjects continues to be predictable and stable (*views of legality*) (*ibid.*). Second, the state's legal existence must be bolstered by a moral right to rule. Citizens must agree "[...] to the moral reasons given by the state for the way it holds and exercises its power" and hence the state's right to rule must be "[...] drawn from a shared morality that exists in the everyday discourse of citizens" (*ibid*, pp. 502-503) (*views of justification*).

The final source Gilley draws on for 'rightfulness' is *acts of consent*. Consent, unsurprisingly, is considered the strongest criterion of 'rightfulness' as it addresses the so-called 'legitimacy gap', defined by Gilley as the inability of citizens to grasp the potential legality or justification of a state's political system overall (*ibid.*, p. 503). Gilley thus defines *acts of consent* as "[...] positive actions that express a citizen's recognition of the state's right to hold political authority and an acceptance, at least in general, to be bound to obey the decisions that result" (*ibid.*). Both Gilley and Peter seem to recognize consent as a traditional "[...] main source of legitimacy" that was popularized by Locke (*ibid.*; Peter, 2016). While Peter regards consent as "[...] wishful thinking", Gilley refutes consent more mildly by arguing that it is idealized as "[...] an all-things-considered check on the system" (*ibid.*).

Gilley's three sources of political legitimacy are similar to those of Peter's own text. However, Gilley's discussion of 'rightfulness' presents a more detailed definition (or sub-definition) of how the most desired form of political legitimacy may be constructed. At the same time, Gilley's interest in 'performance legitimacy' provides acknowledgement of

non-democratic legitimacy akin to Peter's Beneficial Consequences and the skewed social contract that is the ruling bargain.

In a sense, both Gilley and Peter share a similar basic notion of political legitimacy but considered from different perspectives. For Peter, her initial definition of political legitimacy can be linked to authority and obligations. In other words a state has "[...] a right to rule—a right to issue commands and, possibly, to enforce these commands using coercive power" but with legitimacy of such enforcement granted through political obligations to the state's subjects (Peter, 2016). Gilley considers the most basic concept of political legitimacy to be related to "[...] how power may be used in ways that citizens consciously accept" (Gilley, 2006, p. 499). This understanding of legitimacy can be compared to Peter's in the sense that it too implies obligations between the ruler and the ruled in order for the state to be popularly accepted. However, while Peter's mention of coercive authority implies a state-oriented definition of legitimacy, Gilley's mention of citizens' acceptance of such power contrasts with Peter's state perspective by considering the perceptions of the ruled regarding the legitimacy of the ruler (*ibid.*).

The citizen approach of Gilley's text reflects a difference in approach to legitimacy that warrants further discussion. Within the context of the Arab Spring itself and citizens' drive for dignity, such a gap between Peter's and Gilley's approaches to legitimacy are conspicuous. Gilley's exploration of political legitimacy can thus be seen as more relevant to the main actors of the Arab Spring: citizens of MENA states. In addition, Gilley's attempts to define types of political legitimacy appear more thorough and structured than the conciseness of Peter's own sources. Gilley's more detailed analysis is evident in his approach to 'rightful legitimacy' and 'rightfulness'. Under 'rightful legitimacy', Gilley considers how consent and the state's (intrinsic) right to rule can be merged into a pragmatically moral framework, whereby the state is generally accepted because of its attempts to pursue policies that consider the public good. This definition constructs a moral

approach that balances idealism with utilitarianism, compared to the more clinical utilitarianism of Peter's Beneficial Consequences.

Gilley's definition(s) of political legitimacy can be regarded as expanding upon Peter's own concepts of political legitimacy. Furthermore, Gilley's paper provides an analysis of Arab case studies, including Morocco, Jordan, Egypt and Algeria, which "[...] generally suffer from low legitimacy" (Gilley, 2006, pp. 512-513, p. 517). The addition of MENA case studies and Gilley's deeper exploration of political legitimacy can certainly be considered relevant to this thesis and hence an adoption of Gilley's legitimation theory appears expedient. However, a key difference between Gilley's and Peter's approach is Gilley's focus on the state as a public servant. For Gilley, political legitimacy of the ruler must be understood as "[...] how power may be used in ways that *citizens* consciously accept" (Gilley, 2006, p. 499, emphasis added). As previously discussed, the approach to legitimacy from a citizen's perspective can certainly be linked to the Arab Spring and the focus of existing research on protestors and civil rights (see Chapter 1). Nonetheless, Gilley's focus on the citizen's perspective contradicts the central theme of this author's thesis, namely, to understand non-democratic legitimacy from the perspective of Arab governments and rulers. Hence, a framework for political legitimacy that is structured around the state as the main actor is more expedient. Further, Gilley's measurement of legitimacy is a broad project that was published six years before the Arab Spring, utilizing up to "[...] 72 states containing 5.1 billion people, or 83 percent of the world's population" (*ibid.*). The scope of Gilley's project, both chronologically and in terms of case studies therefore cannot consider the context of political legitimacy for MENA governments during the Arab Spring as his project was published prior to 2010. Further, the Arab case studies of Morocco, Egypt, Jordan and Algeria are 'diluted' by the inclusion of sixty-eight further case studies across the world (*ibid.*, pp. 515). Lastly, Gilley's approach to measuring legitimacy is quantitative as opposed to this author's qualitative approach to legitimacy. Although a qualitative approach is considered by Gilley, it is effectively

reduced to a secondary role and hence Gilley's project remains entrenched in quantitative methods and outcomes (*ibid.*, p. 506).

Despite such apparent gaps for the purpose of this thesis, a review of Gilley's approach to political legitimacy and especially his focus on the citizen's understanding of state power has influenced further exploration of how legitimacy can be defined in a manner that balances pure civil rights and the perspective of subjects with the power of the state. Hossein Razi's 'Legitimacy, Religion, and Nationalism in the Middle East' (1990) provides an academic source closer to this author's case studies and regional focus. Razi provides a two-tier definition of political legitimacy, which can constitute related or separate understandings of legitimation. Razi first provides a somewhat abstract definition of legitimacy as "[...] a set of norms and values relating to politics that are sufficiently shared to make a political system possible" (Razi, H., 1990, p. 70). These norms and values compose the structures of a social contract and related institutes by addressing "[...] the primary purposes of the government; the rights and obligations of the government and the governed; and the methods of selection, change, and accountability of the governing personnel" (*ibid.*). Razi continues with the second, complementary tier by arguing that the most commonly accepted definition of legitimacy "[...] refers to the extent to which the relevant portion of the population perceives that the regime is behaving" according to the norms and values of the primary definition of legitimacy (*ibid.*). In turn, the state's legitimacy is less influenced by the form of rule per se, and more determined by whether the instruments and manner of rule are "[...] considered just or unjust in terms of [citizens'] shared values" (*ibid.*).

At first glance, it may appear that Razi's approach to legitimacy is akin to the emphasis on citizens adopted by Gilley. However, Razi's explication of legitimacy implies an interesting bridge between citizen rights and state power: the notion that popular norms may belong to citizens but that such norms are constructed by the state. In other words, the ruler creates or at least manipulates norms and values conducive to political stability.

Subsequently, state institutions and agents may disseminate said values and norms to citizens until they are "[...] internalized and in most cases voluntarily obeyed" (*ibid.*, p. 71). This form of 'political internalization' can be linked to discussions in Western philosophy and those of French theorist Louis Althusser on state power. In his 1970 article, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses', Althusser explored what may be termed "[...] the transformation of [political] beliefs in the field of practice" (Bruschi and Maesschalck, 2015, p. 281). In other words, voluntary obedience stems from practice enforcing belief (*ibid.*). Obedience to the state relies on, inter alia, a belief in the need to obey. Hence, state use and manipulation of cultural norms, including Islam is a requirement of state authority, for "[...] individuals [must] first (be made to) believe in order then to obey" (Montag, 1995, p. 64).

Razi's approach thus appears to circumnavigate the issue of consent that Peter argues is a traditional factor of legitimacy. The notion of the state manipulating norms to manage the expectation of citizens (and thus legitimacy) echoes the discussions in Chapter 2 of the ruling bargain as a skewed social contract. Further, Razi's image of citizens internalizing values that can buttress the state can be linked to the manipulation of religion, including Islam by the state for socio-political purposes that may bolster political legitimacy (Sanauddin, 2013, p. 1).

Razi's text is thus an arresting (albeit brief) exploration of how consent may be manipulated and placed within a ruler-ruled context of command and obey. Given the brevity of Razi's venture into legitimacy and voluntary obedience, it seems appropriate to turn to more recent thinkers that attempt to tackle how to adequately define political legitimacy and governance within, inter alia, the context of obedience and power. Jean-Marc Coicaud's *Legitimacy and Politics* (2002) mirrors Peter's state-centric debate on political legitimacy while balancing the citizen-ruler relationship. Coicaud admits that defining legitimacy is often problematized by the breadth of disciplines seeking to address political legitimacy, each one "[...] representing a specific way of understanding reality"

that can lead to "[...] major divergencies", even within the same discipline" (Coicaud, 2002, p. 10). While Coicaud admits that defining legitimacy may be complicated by myriad approaches, he admits that at the crux of political legitimacy is "[...] justifying simultaneously political power and obedience" (*ibid.*). For Coicaud, legitimacy cannot be discussed without addressing the nature of authority "[...] because the latter is a relation of command-obedience" (*ibid.*, p. 13).

Consent thus returns to the political arena as a central measurement of legitimacy for Coicaud. Legitimate political authority and the policies such an authority implements must be "[...] willed by those who obey", thus creating a mutual or reciprocal hierarchy between ruler and ruled (*ibid.*, pp. 8-9). Related to this form of coexistence between state and subject, Coicaud argues that norms are thus mutual agreements that outline "[...] what the activity of governing is going to be" (*ibid.*, p. 14). Only if such mutual agreements exist can the state enjoy a social contract with their masses that grants them *de jure* recognition of political legitimacy. The importance of norms complements consent as a right to govern. Indeed, Coicaud argues that consent is not the central pillar of legitimacy. Rather, consent merely "[...] sets in motion a procedure whose implementation presupposes [a mutually agreed framework of values]" (*ibid.*, p. 14). It is these values that structure the social contract by creating "[...] the substance of rights and duties", which exist as mutually agreed norms to be preserved by the state (*ibid.*, p. 14). Returning to the discussions in Chapter 2 and Bulliet, such norms can be formed by cultural traditions, including Islamic law in the MENA region. Coicaud's assessment of legitimacy thus connects to the Islamic concept of *Dar al-Islam* or the preservation of practicing faith. If the state preserves the value of its masses, it should be granted political legitimacy and thus stability. For values are linked to cultural identity and the "[...] identity of a group or of a society is what assures its continuity and its cohesiveness" (*ibid.*, p. 16). At the same time, Coicaud argues that the ruler can dominate the social contract with his people by taking advantage of the fact that "[...] [o]nly a tiny fraction of the culture [...] of the overall society is really

decisive for its identity" (*ibid.*, p. 16). Again, within the context of Islam it is possible to link Coicaud's argument to the politicization of religion and its management by the state.

Coicaud's understanding of legitimacy and the preservation of norms can thus be linked back to Peter's Beneficial Consequences and the ability of the state to justify its existence using the results of their policies, e.g. norm preservation as "[...] binding conclusions that [their people] are bound to follow" (Peter, 2016). However, as with Gilley's approach, there appears to be greater emphasis on the citizen, or at least a balance between the influence of ruler and ruled to construct political legitimacy. Contrary to Peter's state-centric approach that governs subject obedience through "binding conclusions" to obey, Coicaud argues that the relation between ruler and ruled is mutual and it is thus consent that creates the command-obedience relationship. Hence, the state must act as "[...] guarantors of the public space" and their institutions "[...] are at once the instrument and the expression of [norms and values]." It is the state's ability to preserve norms and values that "[...] places consent at the centre of the right to govern" (Coicaud, 2002, p. 12). Returning to Coicaud's brief discussion of how the state may dominate such a social contract, however, there is perhaps a weakness in the assumption that the ruling bargain of Coicaud's text requires mutually agreed norms, thus assuming that the state's "[...] political institutions require active participation from the members of the community" (*ibid.*). As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the ruling bargain of MENA states has certainly not been regarded as a mutual agreement that encourages the political participation of citizens. Rather, the ruling bargain exists as a state-dominated socio-economic tool not to enter into reciprocal social contracts but to maintain an apolitical populace, "[...] pacify potential rivals and reward [political] allies" (Grigoryan, 2015, p. 168).

As with Gilley's measurement of legitimacy, Coicaud's examination of legitimacy is focused more on the role of citizens and how they may shape the ruling bargain with their state. A key difference between Gilley and Coicaud, however, is Coicaud's mention of

how the state may preserve and thus manipulate cultural norms for, inter alia, political stability and legitimacy. This aspect of Coicaud's work touches upon the MENA ruling bargain; nonetheless, it is clear that Coicaud considers the social contract to be a mutual bargain and for political legitimacy to hence have democratic elements.

Coicaud's essay is an expedient source when discussing the problem of defining legitimacy and the breadth of disciplines interested in their own understandings of legitimation. Indeed, the question of how to define legitimation is an appropriate context for what many academics call the 'legitimacy crises' of states. Contemporary thinkers such as Mattelaer and Severs (2014) argue that the so-called "[...] crisis of democratic legitimacy" experienced in today's Europe is in fact "[...] a crisis of legitimation" (p. 1). In other words, whether democratic or non-democratic "[...] legitimacy is inherently subjective and must be constantly re-earned" (*ibid.*, p. 1). This is not to say that the concept of political legitimacy will reduce the role of the state. However, sovereignty remains part of a social contract in which the general public must be able to trust their political institutions. Therefore, the social contract between ruler and ruled cannot be static. Any breach of trust or socio-economic changes may require "[...] a redefinition of the relationship between citizens and the authorities by which they are ruled" (*ibid.*).

Mattelaer and Severs present an argument that centers on European nation states and nation building post-cold war (*ibid.*). The notion of subjects believing in democratic ideals "[...] remains high and widespread" and is linked to the expectation of political institutions to enforce the same democratic ideals (*ibid.*, pp. 1-2). This crisis is well exemplified in the European Union. As with Europe's states, the question of institutionalized democratic ideals is not limited to domestic political systems and hence "[...] classification of the EU as a non-state political system does not remove the need for it to meet the same standards of legitimation as a liberal-democratic state" (Beetham and Lord, 2001, p. 458). Indeed, the need to ensure a citizen-friendly political system is emphasized by Beetham and Lord's examination of the EU and its institutional capacity. For Beetham and Lord, the EU

represents and hence should deliver "[...] the core attribute of democratic governance, which [is] public control with political equality", reflecting how Europe's 'democracy crisis' is not only linked to the post-Cold War era discussed by Mattelaer and Severs but to more recent events such as the EU's reform crisis and Britain's departure from the EU or Brexit (Besch *et al.* 2016, p. 1).

This expectation of democratic governance through institutions reflects elements of Peter's Public Approval and Democratic Instrumentalism. Returning to her understanding of Political Legitimacy, political institutions should undertake policies that represent "[...] the reason of free and equal citizens", complemented by a specific strand of Democratic Instrumentalism that regards democracy as a necessary component (rather than mere formality) of legitimacy. Hence, institutes should enforce the democratic ideals of the masses as "[...] democratic decision-making mechanisms are best able to produce legitimate outcomes" (Peter, 2016).

While it is certainly pertinent to discuss the disconnects between democratic ideals and institutionalized practice in maintaining legitimacy, the existence of such contemporary literature also reveals a research gap in examining political legitimacy. Countering the democratic emphasis of Mattelaer and Severs, other contemporary theorists like Gustav Lidén place democracy within a context of the fact that "[...] dictatorships are still a widespread global phenomenon" (2014, p. 50). Liden emphasises that there is a dearth of literature analyzing the power structures and legitimation instruments (as opposed to morality) of dictatorships because "[...] [s]tudying democracy is, in many ways, one of the main tasks of political scientists" (*ibid.*). Consequently, seminal and modern works of legitimation theory utilize a democratic approach to "[...] the core issues of distribution of power, representation, and governance" and hence reduce dictatorships to "[...] the residual category, defined only in terms of what it is not" (*ibid.*). Lidén thus argues that there is a need for a non-democratic approach to the legitimation problem in order to understand the

persistence of dictatorships and contribute to "[...] the overall knowledge of what characterises these regimes, how they arise and how they endure" (*ibid.*).

A brief exploration of the apparent 'democratic bias' argued to exist by some critics further validates the original knowledge contribution of this thesis and its examination of non-democratic forms of political legitimacy. Further, it is possible to again return to Peter's Political Legitimacy and Peter's sources of Political Legitimacy within this context. For the dearth of existing literature on non-democratic legitimacy prompts further exploration into utilitarian elements of political legitimacy and the view that if non-democratic mechanisms can maintain a social contract, then "[...] legitimate political authority should be grounded on the principle of utility" (Peter, 2016).

Within the context of the apolitical (and financial) ruling bargain, Raymond Plant's 'Jürgen Habermas and the Idea of Legitimation Crisis' (1982) presents an older but relevant discussion of how financial benefits, through the growth of capitalism, may alter popular values to the extent that a politically active but obedient public is depoliticized "[...] as a result of the long-term erosion of the cultural tradition which had regulated conduct and which, until [the rise of capitalist financial welfare], could be presupposed as a tacit boundary condition of the political system" (1982, p. 341). Plant argues that it is the rise of capitalism that eroded the 'natural' social contract between ruler and ruled, previously governed by cultural norms that placed natural limitations on the political involvement of citizens, which can certainly be reflected in Chapter 2's discussion of Political Quietism under Brown. With the entrenchment of a global capitalist system, however, such social contracts were rewritten and materially expanded to create the apolitical populous under a "[...] liberal [...] welfare state" (*ibid.*).

Plant's explanation for legitimacy through welfare can certainly be linked to the rentier states of the Gulf. As discussed in Chapter 2, oil wealth has exacerbated the welfare privileges of Gulf States to the extent that political institutions are forms of democratic

proceduralism designed to superficially satisfy an apolitical populace already bribed with generous gifts. Verily, contemporary analysts of the Gulf such as Steffen Hertog describe the rentier state as a form of 'coup-proofing' (2011, p. 400). Hertog elaborates by explaining that the combination of oil and dynastic succession has encouraged the material ruling bargain of rentier states, an oil-based state capitalism that "[...] has allowed GCC ruling families to engineer a relatively softer rent-and-patronage-based authoritarianism with multiple centers of power and huge institutional redundancies" (*ibid.*, p. 400). The result of such fragmented institutions and personal rule is the (socio-economic) ability to control parallel military bodies and balance internal family factions, thus 'coup proofing' the ruling monarchy via a "[...] cumulative and redundant state-building process that has stabilized dynastic rule, but has imposed great long-term costs and has made policy coordination in important areas difficult" (*ibid.*).

Both Hertog and Plant provide expedient theories and analysis, respectively of non-democratic ruling bargains influenced by the rise of capitalism and the use of welfare benefits to depoliticize a ruler's subjects. Both authors' discussion of the ruling bargain can certainly be linked back to Peter's utilitarian view of political legitimacy and the maintenance of such legitimacy through Beneficial Consequences. However, Hertog's discussion and Plant's theory provide a socio-political context limited to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Hertog's article addresses how rentier states use oil wealth and dynastic rule to fragment the Armed Forces for the purpose of preventing the possibility of coup attempts (*ibid.*) and mentions the GCC states generally, rather than providing specific case studies (with the exception of Saudi Arabia) (*ibid.*). As this author's own thesis features only one Gulf State as a case study, Bahrain, the utility of Hertog's article is limited. Further neither Hertog nor Plant examine the non-financial aspects of legitimacy in detail. For Plant, mention of such aspects is reduced to a brief acknowledgement of how previous cultural norms limited the political involvement of the populace. Hertog's own focus on the rentier state's coup prevention negates discussions on

how the masses see their relationship in a social contract. At best, the economic approach of both texts may only consider "[...] the economic consequences of democracy", a partially misleading term that frames modernization within the context of how capitalism complicates democracy by eroding cultural norms that manage the political involvement of citizens while creating a state need to regulate economic welfare in response to endless demands of said citizens (Plant, 1982, p. 344).

The aforementioned gaps in Hertog and Plant return this thesis to Peter's ability to discuss and consider both democratic and non-democratic factors for political legitimacy. While such factors, i.e. Beneficial Consequences can certainly relate to Hertog's and Plant's separate economic considerations, Peter's Political Legitimacy also considers the use of democratic processes to validate a regime through pure proceduralism, a practice existent in many dictatorships and the *majlis* or parliament of Arab monarchies. Hence, Peter's theory is again shown to be of greater relevance to this thesis.

Having explored definitions of legitimacy and their associated gaps or perspectives, it is expedient to discuss theories that are willing to address non-democratic legitimation. Returning to Gustav Lidén, it is possible to also link his approach to regime legitimation to Peter. In his work, Lidén addresses the definition of not only a dictatorship but non-democratic regimes, in which rule may be acquired through dynastic succession rather than brutal coups (Lidén, 2014, p. 52). Indeed, the political existence of Arab monarchies fits Lidén's expanded definitions of non-democratic governance. For Lidén, the definition of dictatorship can be as concise as "[...] a situation in which rulers acquire power by means other than competitive elections" (*ibid.*). Nonetheless, Lidén is quick to point out that such a terse summary of dictatorship is minimal and cannot take into account the complexities of non-democratic governance across different political systems rather than pure dictatorships. Drawing on Linz (2000), Lidén expounds on the concept of broader non-democratic regimes as opposed to one-man dictatorships to explain that non-democratic governance can include "[...] political systems with limited, not responsible, political

pluralism [...], without extensive nor intensive political mobilization [...], and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones" (*ibid.*).

From Lidén's aforementioned explication, it is possible to create a theoretical context for non-democratic governments that may use Peter's Democratic Proceduralism and other related democratic mechanisms (including elections) while being de facto non-democratic. Lidén labels such rulers "[...] hybrid regimes" and subdivides such regimes into different categories (*ibid.*). Lidén's analysis is an expedient understanding of the fact that existent governments in the MENA region are not all pure dictatorships but often "[...] placed somewhere between democracy and dictatorship" (*ibid.*, p. 53). Without providing explicit detail, Lidén continues by arguing that categories of hybrid regimes can include "[...] theocracies, sultanates, personalistic regimes, and monarchies" (*ibid.*).

Lidén's overview of dictatorship subtypes as hybrid regimes is certainly of pertinence to the case studies of this thesis. After all, Ben Ali's Tunisia can be regarded as a personalistic regime bolstered by a police apparatus that functioned as an extension of one ruler (Sadiki, 2002, p. 67). On the other hand, much of the Gulf consists of either sultanates or monarchies, including the Khalifa Kingdom of Bahrain (Haimerl, 2013, p. 5). However, Lidén's paper does not address the so-called legitimation crisis from a political perspective. Rather, he addresses how e.g. democracies may transition (or regress) into dictatorships, arguing that such a transition is often "[...] proven to be accompanied by economic crisis" (Lidén, p. 61). Hence, while this author's own thesis attempts to understand non-democratic instruments of political legitimacy, Lidén remains concerned with "[...] economic factors [and how they] affect the transition but not the existence or survival of a dictatorship" (*ibid.*).

The subtypes of regimes presented by Lidén are an appropriate segue to return to the topic of legitimation crisis, with a greater focus on the Gulf States rather than the crisis of

democratic legitimation discussed by Mattelaer and Severs. Maria Haimerl discusses post-Arab Spring how the GCC states face their own legitimation crisis and how the GCC forum has allowed authoritarian monarchs to collectively and forcefully advocate "[...] the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference" (2013, p. 5).

Haimerl echoes the sentiments of other scholars by arguing that legitimacy is never static. "Any authoritarian regime—as any other political regime—needs to create and maintain legitimacy in order to survive over time" (*ibid.*, p. 7). Hence, Haimerl argues that the Gulf Cooperation Council can act as an instrument of legitimation strategy, such strategy itself "[...] an important explanatory factor of the stability of authoritarian regimes" (*ibid.*). While the democratic legitimacy crisis of Mattelaer and Severs emphasizes the need for political institutes to rebuild trust between themselves and the people through democratic ideals, Haimerl argues that the Gulf's own legitimation crisis is less about a transparent social contract between ruler and ruled and more about "[...] the need to establish the legitimacy of both the ruling elites and the political system itself" (*ibid.*). As discussed in Chapter 2, this need is met not by promoting political ideals and citizen involvement but by economic benefits. However, while such benefits are a common factor for constant Beneficial Consequences, a legitimation crisis in the Gulf often sees a responsive, multi-platform strategy intended for domestic citizens and international political actors. Hence, said crisis often sees "[...] authoritarian regimes [...] resort to economic and/or political governance reforms in order to re-establish or regain legitimacy" (*ibid.*).

At the same time, any reforms will be systemic but minimal. The essence of the reforms in question is not political openness but survival of king and family, dynastic succession and minimizing the risk of revolution. Hence, "[...] [these] survival strategies essentially consist of initiating only minimal, and sometimes simply contrived, reforms in the economic and political fields that do not touch upon vested interests and that leave the political status quo largely intact" (*ibid.*). Other critics such as Daniel Brumberg argue that such reforms are in themselves a mode of governance transition, whereby a Gulf monarchy

becomes what he terms a "[...] liberalized autocracy" that extends beyond a mere "[...] regime survival tactic" (2005, p. 5). For Brumberg, this transition through cautious and democratically hollow reform becomes another cooption strategy for the state. In other words, "[...] it is an integrated system whose internal rules and logic not only serve the interests of the rulers, but also those of many (but not all) mainstream opposition elites. Although these elites often complain about the limits placed by the state on democratic expression, the din of their criticism often masks a rough consensus regarding the [preference] of liberalized autocracy over the black hole of full or rapid democratization" (*ibid.*).

Both Haimerl and Brumberg provide a MENA context for the legitimation crisis and GCC efforts to tackle such crises with long-term survival and cooption strategies. This discussion can be expanded and placed within the context of the Arab Spring by Ahram and Lust's 'The Decline and Fall of the Arab State'. Brusquely emphasizing the worst fear of any ruler's legitimation crisis, Ahram and Lust start their essay under the assumption that "[...] the Arab state system was tenuous" (2016, p. 7). Consequently, the authors explore "[...] the premise that "[...] [legitimate] sovereignty was a sham, that Arab states were doomed from birth, and that the current crisis [of the Arab Spring] was therefore inevitable" (*ibid.*).

The notion of 'sham legitimacy' can certainly be linked back to other scholars in this chapter. After all, the legitimation crisis of the GCC is discussed by Haimerl and Brumberg as dynamic and its response one of superficial reform to ensure continued monarchical survival. Perhaps the pith of such reforms would thus be considered by Ahram and Lust to be as artificial as sovereignty itself. Moreover, the notion of an inevitable legitimation crisis is most appropriate when considering other case studies of this thesis, such as Tunisia. Almost a decade before Ben Ali's ouster, Larbi Sadiki described his governance as a sham democracy or "[...] [d]emocracy by [n]on-[d]emocratic [m]eans" (2002, p. 57). Akin to Ahram and Lusts's 'liberalized autocracy', Ben Ali

responded to his own legitimation crisis by consistently creating the image of an electoral democracy. This illusion, akin to the GCC reforms, resulted in the cooption of parliamentary rivals, who were in reality "[...] carefully 'tailored' and constitutionally mandated opposition [...] integrated into parliament since the 1994 elections" (*ibid.*, p. 58). This form of "[...] tightly controlled liberalization" ensured that the core institutions of Ben Ali's power remained untouched. This so-called 'electoral democracy' thus used rigged elections to maintain legitimation by promoting "[...] the importance of elections as a democratic institution and an integral component of democratic development" (*ibid.*, pp. 58-59). Simultaneously, Ben Ali permitted only controlled elections against an artificially birthed opposition, ensuring this one manipulated criterion of democracy changed "[...] very little of the authoritarian structures of the State in the absence of associational life, law-abiding government, free press and freely organized opposition" (*ibid.*, p. 58).

Discussing case studies of this thesis within the context of Ahram and Lust's concept of sovereignty highlights the fragility of legitimation in the international system. Ahram and Lust draw on Krasner in their own text to argue that "[...] sovereignty is inextricable from international hierarchy", explaining that a state must be internationally recognised to allow sovereignty to grant said state "[...] territorial inviolability and autonomy under international law", which in turn allows rulers of states to control their domestic policies, as "[...] sovereignty involves untrammelled control over specific territories and peoples" (Ahram, Lust, 2016, p. 8).

Ahram and Lust's paper provides an expedient and arresting comprehension of legitimacy, implying both the artificial construct of political legitimacy, the constant need to maintain legitimacy and, most intriguing of all, exploring the notion that the sovereignty of Arab states was never stable and even an artificial construct. It is for this reason that for some, the Arab Spring "[...] comes as little surprise. For [many critics] [...] reimagining the regional map is something of a national pastime. They have long assumed that the Arab system was tenuous. [...] While Arab states enjoyed the privileges of recognition abroad,

they faced a perilous dearth of legitimacy at home. In the end, popular resentments would surely sweep aside such political artifice" (*ibid.*, 2016, p. 7).

At the same time, Ahram and Lust's text does not consider domestic legitimation and non-democratic elements of political legitimacy. Legitimation is only considered within the context of the international system. Although both authors do discuss the nature of domestic sovereignty, the social contract between ruler and citizens is again understood within "[...] a system of sovereignty premised on national self-determination, derived from international law, and adjudicated and enforced by international society" (*ibid.*, p. 9). The aforementioned approach and its definition gap regarding domestic legitimacy are again bridged by Peter's theory. Peter balances the significance of the international system with the state as the highest political authority within its borders by introducing the concepts of Political Nationalism and Political Cosmopolitanism. Political Cosmopolitanism complements the international legitimacy of Ahram and Lust by discussing how states exist in a system of "[...] both international and global legitimacy" and that, under such a system, states co-exist through "[...] international [stability], and the rules that regulate their behaviour are supposed to preserve a peaceful order of sovereign states" (Peter, 2016).

On the other hand, Peter also discusses the equal importance of Political Nationalism. She describes its significance in legitimation theory as opposed to Political Cosmopolitanism as the "[...] more familiar, contrasting position" that places political legitimacy firmly in the hands of states and their domestic rulers. In Peter's words, it is "[...] the [common] view that only the political institutions of nation states can overcome the legitimacy problem and hence be a source of political legitimacy" because, inter alia, Political Nationalism ensures that "[...] obligations of justice [are tied to] nation states" (*ibid.*).

An overview of existing literature on legitimation theory provides a myriad of related elements within the theory itself. Gilley's measurement of legitimacy and the definition of

Coicaud both focus on the perspective of citizens as a central element in understanding a state's political legitimacy. These definitions are expanded by Razi's more abstract understanding of legitimacy, which provides a two-tier framework of how legitimacy can be linked to social norms, including allusions to the ruling bargain discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Exploring the so-called legitimation crisis prompted discussion of, among others, two opposing yet interlinked crises: Mattelaer and Severs' crisis of Europe's democratic legitimacy and, on the other end of the spectrum, Ahram and Lust's (Arab) legitimacy crisis that argues not only that legitimation is dynamic but that Arab sovereignty is a construct extant in the international system but doomed to failure in the domestic realm.

The aforementioned literature can be partially linked to Peter's Political Legitimacy due to not only similarities but gaps. Consistently, this gap is often a failure to consider legitimacy from a governmental or state perspective, including no detailed exploration of non-democratic attempts of states to maintain legitimacy, such as via Beneficial Consequences. In the case of Ahram and Lust, the engaging debate on how artificial legitimacy is remains confined to the structure of the international system, rather than providing a state-centric focus. However, as expedient as Peter's Political Legitimacy may be, both the aforementioned literature and Peter's own theory do not directly address the role of religion in political legitimacy. Given the significance of religion in the MENA region, it is imperative to understand how religion may be analyzed from a theoretical perspective.

3.3 Religious Legitimacy

This author's term of Religious Legitimacy underlines an important complementary theme to Political Legitimacy and legitimation theory. Having briefly mentioned Hossein Razi, it is thus appropriate to return to his essay, 'Legitimacy, Religion, and Nationalism in the Middle East' (1990). In this essay, Razi explores how Islam functions as a source of political legitimacy in the MENA region. Razi's understanding of Religious Legitimacy is

presented as a six-point framework. What is interesting about Razi's approach to Islam and its place in political legitimacy is that Razi is able to distinguish between nationalism and religion as intertwined tools of state legitimacy. The difference for Razi between nationalism and religion in the Arab world is that Islam "[...] has a wider and deeper domain than nationalism, particularly among the lower and lower middle strata, which constitute the overwhelming majority of the population" (Razi, H., 1990, p. 75).

Razi's six factors of Religious Legitimacy provide a detailed explanation for why Islam cannot be extricated from political legitimacy. Razi explains that:

- First, Islam has influenced collective cultural identities and legal systems, including social contracts between a ruler and his subjects

- Second, Islam created religion and state at the same time, encouraging their inseparability

- Third, this intertwining of religion and politics guaranteed government involvement in faith for state legitimacy

- Fourth, "[...] Islam has not been completely monolithic or rigid and static", returning discussion to the birth of the ruling bargain and the need for rulers to recognize that the pillars of such a bargain must be able to change with the times

- Fifth, Islam still conversely contains rigid creeds and related political frameworks, allowing pious tyrants to manipulate said customs and the threat of *fitna*/anarchy that would ensue within a politico-religious community

- Sixth, scholars often fail to understand how powerful religious beliefs are in e.g. the MENA region, affecting citizen expectations toward their leadership and in turn the rational choices of political actors (Razi, H., 1990, p. 73).

Razi's six-point definition provides an appropriate contribution to discuss theoretical approaches to religion in the Middle East. While Razi's explication is thorough, the work

of Willam F.S. Miles complements and challenges Razi's assumption that Islam genuinely influences both ruler and ruled. Miles' article analyzes the use of what he terms para-theology. In short, para-theology can be understood as the use of religion by political figures to gain or maintain power. In other words, para-theology can be regarded as the illegitimate use of faith for political gain. At the same time, "[...] [p]ara-theologians do not separate themselves from the divine mission: they purport to be the funnels through which the divine acts and take challenges to their persons as affronts to God. Secular power is thus stockpiled in the guise of divine power" (Miles, 1996, p. 525).

Miles also provides a four-point definition of para-theology and how to classify any particular actor in this category:

- "[...] Activists seek political power in religion's name

- "[...] [Political actor] aims to restructure the state, tinker with governmental structures, remake the constitutional order, or simply rule through para-theologians at the helm of the polity

- "[...] Religious identity is entangled with or collapsed into ethnic or national expressions of identity; theological bases of identity are eclipsed by ethnically or nationalistically derived ones

- "[...] Basis for conflict is defined in religious categories but lacks theological grounding" (*ibid.*, p. 530).

Miles further provides an opposite definition for genuine religious involvement in politics or sacralized politics. As Miles puts it, such power "[...] exercised for authentically perceived divine purposes dispenses with the significance, and interests, of individual actors. [...] In sacralised politics, power is depersonalised and shared" (*ibid.*, p. 525).

Furthermore, of relevance to the investigation of this thesis is Miles' exploration of the relationship between religion and a state's political constitution. The link between e.g.

Islam and a state's written codes of conduct are complicated by the fact that "[...] religions are not constitutional in nature. That is, although they set forth broad principles for the conduct of persons in a society, and some elaborate specific legal systems [...], they do not [...] specify how any government set up in that religion's name ought to be structured" (*ibid.*, p. 528). Miles continues that this ambiguity is present in the Qu'ran "[...] which, given Islam's putative unity of religion and politics, is most striking" (*ibid.*). It is the ruler's command of a Muslim state but under "[...] the lack of a detailed prescription" that explains why many Islamic Republics, from Iran to Mauritania "[...] bear only faint structural resemblance to one another" and may be considered "[...] notoriously unstable, not only in terms of its leadership but in its very mode of governance" (*ibid.*).

Two contrasting cases in point would be the Wahhabi Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Turkey. Saudi Arabia outlines Islam as the state's religion and the subsequent laws of the state are based on the Qu'ran and the *Hadith* or sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (International Constitutional Law, 2010). As a conservative Muslim state, such Islamic or *Shari'a* law is important to ruler and subjects as it is "[...] the perfect template for human life, revealed to the Prophet Muhammad as a guidance to all mankind until the end of time" (Vogel, F.E., 2008, p. 5). Hence, *Shari'a* is the unquestionable legal basis for Saudi governance, providing "[...] the very definition of what it is to be Muslim both individually and in community" (*ibid.*). On the other hand, Turkey retained its Muslim identity from the Ottoman era while transitioning to a secular state even in the later stages of Ottoman rule (Bottoni, 2007, p. 175). This transition was cemented by Mustafa Kamal Atatürk, who ensured secularism became a constitutional foundation in modern Turkey (*ibid.*). While Saudi Arabia espoused *Shari'a* as a legal and cultural expression of Islam, Turkey's legal culture considered that "[...] 'secularism had acquired constitutional status by reason of the historical experience of the country and the particularities of Islam compared to other religions'" (*ibid.*, pp. 176-77). The difference between how Turkey and Saudi Arabia approached the legal status of Islamic law again

illustrates the fluidity of Islam and its status as a guide to living but without a structured framework.

Given the ostensible purpose of religious creed to govern sub-state and interpersonal relations, Miles questions whether basing any constitution on religion can "[...] overstep the line between legitimate theology and the overpoliticisation of religion", with the real risk that such actions "[...] become most dangerous, for if [rulers] do not distinguish between religion and politics, how will their followers" (Miles, 1996, p. 529)?

Razi and Miles provide two partially contradictory approaches to Religious Legitimacy. Razi's theory provides a more descriptive understanding of Islam's inextricability from politics, while Miles challenges to what extent rulers and other political actors may possess genuine faith or simply expropriate this cultural norm for personal gain. The question of genuine faith can be linked back to *fitna* and the legal permission for subjects to rebel against faithless leaders. It is thus better for rulers to be of the same faith as their followers rather than under suspicion and hence resisted (Ayoob, 2004, p. 9). Miles nonetheless also argues that the relationship between religion and constitutions is often vague and crosses into the terra non grata of para-theology. The descriptive aspect of Razi's approach to the religion-state nexus may limit its utility from an analytical perspective if this author wishes to apply it to the case studies of this thesis. Moreover, Miles' para-theology and the effective invalidation of any religious state's constitution clashes with the investigation of this thesis to analyze, inter alia, factors of Religious Legitimacy from each case study's constitution. In addition, if analyzing the non-democratic legitimacy factors of MENA states, especially that of the ruling bargain, it is not possible to reconcile Miles' para-theology with such factors. This conundrum is exemplified by the ruling bargain's common focus on welfare benefits, which can be regarded as non-religious yet, when combined with a ruler's religious claims (such as holy titles) create the "[...] use [of] religious rationale primarily to gain or maintain power" (Miles, 1996, p. 256).

The gaps present in Razi's and Mile's essays allow this thesis to return to the Religious Legitimacy of Richard W. Bulliet. In his paper, *Religion and the State in Islam* Bulliet provides an overview of Islamic history, focusing on how such a history between the earlier Muslim North and the later converts of the Muslim South "[...] sheds light on the crisis of legitimacy in Muslim-majority states like Egypt today" (Bulliet, 2013, p. 3). From a theoretical perspective, Bulliet's chronological tracing of Islamic history provides the context for the three-tier definition of Religious Legitimacy used by this author. These elements are: the preservation of Islamic law and customs; the use of a custodian title as guardian of religious landmarks; and the use of an Islamic ruling title.

As with this author's own comparison between Islam and other Abrahamic faiths, Bulliet compares the evolution of Christian laws with those of Islam. In short, the 17th Century's Peace of Westphalia gradually replaced universal divine law with "[...] fixed boundaries and limited legal jurisdictions", ensuring that "[...] the idea of a universal religious law [...] was abandoned in favor of individual laws for each state [...] with no jurisdiction stretching beyond the newly recognized state borders" (*ibid.*, p. 12). However, no such "[...] parallel legal evolution occurred in the Islamic world. Muslim theorists declared that universal Islamic law limited the tyranny of Muslim rulers, and every ruler had to enforce at least some of those laws [...] to maintain theoretical legitimacy" (*ibid.*). Bulliet's explanation for the enforcement of Islamic law links back to L. Carl Brown's *Religion and State* regarding the importance of Islamic law as a source of *'adl* or justice and its potential manipulation by rulers.

Bulliet's second factor of a custodian title can be linked back to Chapter 2's discussions of the Caliph and caliphate. Ironically, the use of such titles came within the context of political splits away from the supreme title of Caliph. This split was most noticeable during the 12th-13th Centuries and the time of the Crusades. Salah al-Din is often cited as the shift away from an all-powerful Caliph. As "[...] the Kurdish general who [...] drove the crusaders from Jerusalem in 1187" (*ibid.*, p. 6), Salah al-Din expected recognition (and

perhaps reward) from the Caliph of Baghdad. Reporting of his victory in Jerusalem to the Caliph, Salah al-Din was most disappointed when the Caliph retorted that al-Din's victory was due to the symbolic "[...] troops of the Caliph, under the banners of the Caliph" (*ibid.*, p. 6). In response, Salah al-Din declared himself "[...] the Servitor of the Two Holy Places [...] the two holy places being Mecca and Medina [...] and also [...] the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem" (*ibid.*). These two titles were known in Arabic as *Khadim al-Haramain* and *al-bait al-muqaddas* respectively, and "[...] became the core political concept of the later centuries of Islam" (*ibid.*). Perhaps the importance of these titles was augmented by the fact that it meant usurpation by Salah al-Din from a function of the Caliph to an independent status, creating a true split and independent political claim "[...] without reference to the caliphate" (*ibid.*).

Finally, there is Bulliet's related factor of how rulers use Islamic titles for Religious Legitimacy. The existence of such different titles has already been discussed in Chapter 2. However, it is prudent to mention the historical context of such titles and again return to Salah al-Din and the expropriation of the two core titles previously held by the Caliph. Until the arrival of Salah al-Din, other Islamic titles such as Sultan existed at the (theoretical) pleasure of the Caliph and in a subservient role. Salah al-Din's seizure of Custodianship from the Caliph eroded this relationship, allowing Islamic titles to exist independently of a Caliph (*ibid.*).[2]

All three of Bulliet's factors for Religious Legitimacy can be linked back to Peter's Beneficial Consequences. As previously discussed, Beneficial Consequences allow political legitimacy to be "[...] grounded on the principle of utility" (Peter, 2016). However, the importance of religion to political legitimacy in the Arab world can be partially accommodated by Peter's admission that faith can affect the "[...] conception of legitimacy [to become] necessarily a moralized one" (*ibid.*). From the perspective of e.g.

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[2] See, e.g. the Sultanate of Oman, whose head of state is Sultan Haitham bin Tariq. Source: BBC (2016)

morality, which religion is ostensibly grounded in, it is possible to understand both the limitations of Peter's Political Legitimacy when analyzing religion but also how Bulliet's Religious Legitimacy expands upon Peter's theory by complementing Beneficial Consequences with a structured consideration of how faith plays a political role. In turn, this approach allows this thesis to more fully investigate the element of religion as a non-democratic factor in political legitimacy.

Bulliet's Religious Legitimacy is admittedly briefer than Miles' para-theology. However, an important distinction between the work of Bulliet and Miles is that Bulliet traces the historical utility and evolution of Islamic laws and titles. Miles, on the other hand, provides a somewhat sweeping indictment of religion as a political platform "[...] primarily to gain or maintain power" (Miles, 1996, p. 526). As the primary investigation of this thesis focuses on, inter alia, religion as a non-democratic legitimizing factor for Arab leaders, Miles' broad interpretation of para-theology (and thus illegitimate use of religion for political gain) would likely regard most MENA states as illegitimate due to the use of religion in most Arab states for legitimation. Further, Bulliet's Religious Legitimacy provides a relevant historical context, tracing the chronological growth and application of Islamic laws and titles from the "[...] Medieval Caliphate" to the modern "[...] Muslim Brotherhood" (Bulliet, 2013, p. 3). By contrast, Miles' text is not grounded in such an historical context but is loosely structured around "[...] religious revivalism and communist collapse, as of 1996", while para-theology itself is constructed within the theoretical confines of "[...] nationalism, [...] transnational identity [,] [...] contemporary democratic theory [and] [...] secular analysis" (Miles, 1996, p. 525). Again, Bulliet's Religious Legitimacy is more relevant to this thesis compared to Miles' as it presents a theoretical framework influenced by a chronological understanding of MENA history, both religious and political.

Bulliet's historical focus on the political evolution of Islam also allows for greater pertinence to this thesis than Razi's 'Legitimacy, Religion and Nationalism in the Middle

East'. While Bulliet's paper provides an explicit chronological analysis of how Islam became a political and state platform, Razi's text approaches political legitimacy from the perspective of nationalism. Unlike Miles, Razi does not provide a definition or framework for Religious Legitimacy (or illegitimacy). Rather, Razi provides a broader definition of both political legitimacy and stability that is maintained "[...] when the articulate members of a population are by and large satisfied with the government's actions in the areas of identity, participation, distribution, equality, and sovereignty according to the norms they believe in" (Razi, 1990, p. 70). Such aforementioned norms can include but not be limited to religion. In other words, Razi does not focus solely on the political importance of religion as a non-democratic legitimizing factor. Instead, Razi provides an expanded discussion on factors of MENA legitimacy, including both "[...] nationalism and religion as major sources of legitimacy in the Middle East" (*ibid.*, p. 69). This discussion is framed by the perspectives of "[...] behavioralists and rational choice theorists" rather than a chronological historical context (*ibid.*). Further and in contrast to Bulliet, Razi does not discuss the role of Islam for political legitimacy per se but spreads his exploration of the faith across "[...] constitutional theories [,] [...] Islamic fundamentalism" and the role of Islam as a source of "[...] spiritual gratification" (*ibid.*).

Despite the aforementioned dilution of Razi's discussion on religion and legitimacy, it is worth mentioning that Razi does touch upon Islamic constitutional theory and its split into three branches. Razi discusses this split under the relevant "[...] premise that in a state founded on religion the rulers should be religious characters" (*ibid.*, p. 77). This section of Razi's text partially mirrors Bulliet's own by historically tracing the evolution of Islam and its politicization. Razi outlines political models for Islamists from 622 A.D. (the start of the Muslim calendar) to the end of the Umayyad dynasty in 749 A.D. (*ibid.*). However, such an historical context is restricted to "[...] Islamic constitutional theory" and its development under three branches that descended from "[...] Cousin Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad and the first imam of the Shiites, and Muawiyya, the [...] founder

of the Umayyad dynasty" (*ibid.*). The third, traditional and Sunni branch is briefly discussed but not clearly outlined or elaborated. Razi does mention elements of L. Carl Brown's Political Quietism and the religious aspect of traditional ruling bargains, namely that "[...] Sunni ulema (religious scholars) have [...] upheld the duty to obey political rulers as long as they profess Islam and manage to maintain order" (*ibid.*, p. 77). This aspect relates to the previously discussed term of *fitna* and the simple concept of *Dar al-Islam* or maintaining Muslim territories and freedom of worship under Islam in exchange for obedience. However, Razi does not link the use of religion to either the ruling bargain or an extended historical context, commenting simply that "[...] Sunni constitutional theory has not, historically, developed a clear and coherent theory of political obedience" (*ibid.*). Hence, Razi's examination of Islamic constitutional theory feels incomplete and more descriptive than analytical.

Finally, Razi's 1990's text cannot consider the events of the Arab Spring. Bulliet's work, on the other hand, concludes by considering "[...] the Arab Spring in historical context" and how 2011 demonstrations were a response to widespread discontent against, inter alia, military rule (Bulliet, 2013, p. 13). Unlike Razi, Bulliet thus analyzes how the Arab Spring saw Islam become more politicized "[...] as a natural—indeed, almost programmed response by Muslim populations to increasingly tyrannical dictatorial regimes" (*ibid.*, p. 14).

Bulliet further attempts to discuss the post-Arab Spring era, in which "[...] Muslims everywhere in the world are becoming deeply engaged in visualizing the return of Islam to the political arena" while admitting that the mass "[...] desire to reconnect Islam with governance [despite] [poor] knowledge of what Islamic law is" foreshadows "[...] a long period of confusion, uncertainty, and conflict before the outlines of a new relationship between Islam and the state become clear" (*ibid.*, p. 18). This contemporary context not included in Razi's paper allows Bulliet's three-tier Religious Legitimacy to be applied to

the case studies of this thesis within the same historical context of both the Arab Spring and how Islam has been used as a source of political legitimacy.

Within the context of religion and political legitimacy in the Muslim world, it is also worth mentioning the seminal Muslim historian and sociologist Ibn Khaldun. Ibn Khaldun focused on political and institutional transformations in society, and like Brown discusses how religion plays a dominant role in political administration and transition (Ra'ees, 2004, pp. 159-160). Such discussion certainly links back to Brown's consideration of how Islam interacts with daily and political life and Bulliet's notion of Religious Legitimacy. Moreover, Ibn Khaldun discussed the need for divine guidance for successful state formation (*ibid.*, p. 169). Without religion, rulers prioritize power for their own profit, and such selfishness provokes the disintegration of the state (*ibid.*, p. 177). It's safe to say that Ibn Khaldun considers religion to be a moral good and that divine laws are hence required to maximize a state's political legitimacy and ability to provide advanced governance to the satisfaction of citizens (*ibid.*). As discussed in this chapter and Chapter 2, part of this thesis' original knowledge contribution is a utilitarian approach to political legitimacy, including Religious Legitimacy. It is for this reason that Peter's Political Legitimacy has been discussed in depth along with Bulliet, the latter of whom also considers Religious Legitimacy within the context of the Arab Spring. It must be stressed that this thesis does not seek to draw on Western scholarship rather than Arab academia but draws on authors that can bolster the original knowledge contribution of this thesis by ensuring a utilitarian approach to non-democratic legitimacy. As a seminal author of sociology and Muslim history, Ibn Khaldun's significance to literature must be acknowledged. However, his consideration of religion as a moral good contrasts with the utilitarian approach of this thesis to religion as a factor of non-democratic legitimacy.

An overview of existing legitimation theory reveals varied and sometimes broad attempts to define and understand political legitimacy from the perspective of different actors. This variation is seen in the works of both Peter and Gilley. Peter provides both a utilitarian and

moral understanding of legitimacy. This balance between citizen involvement and the unique "[...] coercion deployed by states [for] political authority" allows Peter to consider democratic and non-democratic elements of legitimacy (Peter, 2016). Gilley's own text connects well with that of Peter's. Gilley's 'performance legitimacy' echoes Peter's (non-democratic) Beneficial Consequences. However, Gilley himself admits that 'performance legitimacy' is "[...] an ambiguous term" and thus must be framed within the context of "[...] whether the citizen response [to governance] reflects [public belief in] legitimacy or some other form of political support" (Gilley, 2006, p. 502). Gilley's greater emphasis on a citizen's perspective of the state's political legitimacy is therefore stronger than Peter's balance between utility and morality as a framework for the social contract between ruler and ruled. Gilley's definition of legitimacy goes so far as to argue that political legitimation should be "[...] an endorsement of the state by citizens at a moral or normative level" (*ibid.*).

The citizen-heavy understanding of political legitimacy is continued by critics such as Coicaud, whose own work places political legitimacy within the context of needing "[...] the accord of the population" (Coicaud, p. 12). This clash between state utility and citizen involvement problematizes legitimation, leading to the so-called legitimation crisis and related 'democratic bias' discussed by Mattelaer and Severs and Gustav Lidén, which has tainted scholastic understanding of non-democratic regimes and political legitimacy. This research gap is partially filled by MENA case studies that seek to understand the balancing act of political legitimation in e.g. Tunisia and the Gulf. Such texts lack a structured theoretical approach to legitimation but discuss MENA case studies and the mechanisms of (superficial) legitimation amid political crises. By contrast, Ahram and Lust's sweeping claim that Arab legitimacy is a sham places the legitimation crisis within the context of the international system rather than providing a discussion of domestic legitimacy or a structured analytical framework that can help validate the case studies of this thesis.

Peter's sources of Political Legitimacy thus provide an appropriate utilitarian theoretical context by acknowledging both democratic and non-democratic factors of legitimacy within a domestic context and from a more balanced perspective that leans toward the state, matching the goal of this project to understand non-democratic legitimacy from the perspective of Arab governments. However, a lack of religious context requires a complementary framework to understand the political role of faith. Bulliet's Religious Legitimacy fills this gap. Bulliet's limited framework for Religious Legitimacy provides a three-tier definition within an historical and contemporary context that considers the future of Arab governance post-Arab Spring, allowing for a focused approach that combines theory with a chronological tracing of Islamic history.

This chapter has evaluated suitable theoretical frameworks to discuss non-democratic legitimacy, including how Peter's utilitarian approach will be merged with Bulliet's Religious Legitimacy to ensure that this thesis can fairly discuss non-democratic factors of political legitimacy as utilitarian, which is directly linked to the research question and hypothesis of this thesis. Chapter 4 examines discourse analysis as a methodological framework relevant to understanding the original contribution of this thesis: how Arab leaderships defend non-democratic legitimacy through public discourse during the Arab Spring. More specifically, the next chapter illustrates John Searle's Speech Acts as an appropriate method of discourse analysis, as it considers how speakers attempt to persuade listeners of, inter alia, their right to rule.

4. Methodology

4.1 Introduction

This thesis generates original knowledge on non-democratic legitimacy and the Arab Spring by analyzing select speeches from four case studies given by Arab leaderships in response to unrest. The approach of analyzing public discourse as a form of defending non-democratic regimes has been chosen because speeches given by political leaders are in themselves political acts (see Pocock, 1973, p. 27, Arsith, 2015, p. 619). Further, speeches given by political leaderships can be regarded not only as political acts but as attempts to persuade listeners/citizens to follow instructions (Arsith, 2015, p. 620). Understanding to what extent (public) discourse is political and persuasive is a significant subfield of Political Science and International Relations, investigated as a socio-political form of communication under Critical Discourse Analysis or Political Discourse Analysis (PDA) (Van Dijk, 1995, p. 17).

As mentioned in Chapter 1, existing literature on the Arab Spring discusses the role social media played in organizing protests (Bruns, Burgess and Highfield, 2013, p.871) and the notion of the Arab Spring encouraging democratic transition (Carbonnier, 2013, p. 1). However, existing literature does not analyze how discourse can become a political act to justify non-democratic legitimacy as a form of rule. As speeches can be considered political acts, this thesis' investigation into understanding non-democratic legitimacy through discourse will be strengthened by utilizing an appropriate methodology that examines discourse as a political process of defending specific values (such as non-democratic political factors) with the aim of persuading listeners. For this reason, John Searle's Speech Acts will be the method used to analyze the speeches of each case study in conjunction with constitutional elements that may bolster claims of non-democratic legitimacy, including religion. Searle's Speech Acts considers any act of speaking a process that can be used as an intentional (political) act intended to convey specific

messages and also issue instructions (what Searle calls the essential condition) to listeners that should be obeyed (Searle, 1965, pp. 1-2). Using Searle's Speech Acts as the thesis' methodology will hence feed directly into the thesis' original knowledge contribution of understanding how discourse is used as a political process to defend non-democratic legitimacy in the context of the Arab Spring. Moreover, Searle's Speech Acts as a methodology will be merged with the theoretical framework of Peter's Political Legitimacy, ensuring that main analysis treats non-democratic factors of discourse as utilitarian. The merging of Searle's Speech Acts with Peter's Political Legitimacy and Bulliet's Religious Legitimacy further augments the original knowledge contribution of this thesis.

4.2 An Overview of Discourse Analysis and the Arab Spring

This author has identified two pertinent works. Zouheir A. Maalej's 'The "Jasmine Revolt" has made the Arab Spring' uses Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to examine the last three speeches of ousted Tunisian President Ben Ali (Maalej, 2012, p. 679). This article, published in 2012, addresses only one case study of this thesis: the Tunisian Republic and the final speeches of Ben Ali. It does not address the structural differences between republics and monarchies and does not match the greater scope of this author's case studies that are intended to address the thesis hypothesis: that republicans draw more on the socio-economic ruling bargain, while monarchs have the privilege of accessing Religious Legitimacy. Related to this gap, it is worth nothing that Maalej holds a position (as of 2012) at the King Saud University, Saudi Arabia. Within the context of working for a royally- approved institute, it is interesting that Maalej's paper focuses exclusively on unrest and revolution in republics (*ibid.*). The paper includes no references to monarchical rule, despite the fact that most if not all Arab monarchies have been challenged by internal unrest, albeit less aggressively than in republics (Ilamaran, 2016). Again, this gap is addressed by the author's own thesis by including two monarchies as case studies, namely Jordan and Bahrain.

Maalej provides a line by line analysis of Ben Ali's final three speeches, focusing on Ben Ali's use of pronouns ('I', 'We', 'They' etc.) and how Ben Ali uses pronouns to emphasize his dominant position and that of his government, while deflecting blame upon an external Other ('They') (*ibid.*, p.685). Maalej also refers to 'speech acting' as instances in which the speaker makes it clear that they are still in power and able to issue instructions, thus reflecting the theme of authority and abuse of political status (*ibid.*, p. 693). Maalej explains that, although Ben Ali's speech acts issue instructions intended to augment "transparency and commitment to the values of freedom and democracy", these instructions can be seen as self-incriminatory and delegitimizing as they imply that up until mass protests, Ben Ali never supported democracy, Tunisia's institutions or the accountability of his government (*ibid.*).

Maalej's brief use of speech acts does not allow his methodology to be suitable for this thesis, however. A line by line analysis and compilation of each instance of pronoun-use makes Maalej's approach narrower than the qualitative analysis intended by this thesis, to understand legitimacy as utilitarian, including through religion. Such an approach can be considered qualitative and thematic analysis. As mentioned in Chapter 3, a qualitative approach focused on non-democratic factors rather than a line by line analysis will bolster the original knowledge contribution of this author's research project. Moreover, Maalej's methodology is not designed to explore how non-democratic legitimacy is asserted or presented in specific discourse. Rather, Maalej wishes to explore legitimacy in discourse through understanding how the speaker (Ben Ali) manipulates discourse and to what extent his final three speeches made average Tunisians feel included (*ibid.*, p. 687). Because this author's thesis wishes to explore non-democratic legitimacy, a different methodology is required.

A broader and more recent publication also identified by this author is al-Sowaidi, Banda and Mansour's 'Doing Politics in the recent Arab Uprisings'. This paper encompasses broader case studies by analyzing protests across Egypt, Libya and Yemen (e.g. North

Africa and the Gulf). The approach of the authors is to use PDA to analyze, inter alia, speeches associated with protests in said countries to understand "the change of the political atmosphere in the region" (al-Sowaidi, Banda and Mansour, 2017, p. 621). As with the aforementioned text, 'Doing politics in the recent Arab Uprisings' parallels certain elements of the author's thesis. It addresses a wider set of case studies and uses PDA across speeches. Compared to its 2012 counterpart, it is also a more recent investigation. However, there are still differences between such an investigation and this thesis. The paper covers North Africa and the Gulf but omits the Levant. Further, it addresses only republics rather than including a balance between republics and monarchies. The paper also does not focus on speeches given by Arab leaders in response to the Arab Spring. Rather, the key focus of the paper is on protestors and their use of not only speeches but "banners, wall graffiti, audio-visual instruments, chanting […] and songs", with all such data analyzed to discuss only the use of (anti-government) slogans during the Arab Spring (*ibid.*). Again, this research gap is addressed by the author's own thesis that examines non-democratic political legitimacy and Religious Legitimacy through speeches issued by Arab leaders in response to the Arab Spring, rather than the more common approach of assessing the Arab Spring from the perspective of protestors or its buildup via social media, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.

The majority of collected data includes protestors' slogans used as part of anti-government demonstrations. Further, analysis of such data attempts to understand how such slogans can be defined as a form of political discourse and cover an array of social and political topics linked to the Arab Spring (al-Sowaidi, Banda and Mansour, 2017, p. 641). Hence, all slogans are filtered through a framework that seeks evidence of:

- Political humor and satire

- Political evaluation and juxtaposition directed at leaders

- Political threats against leaders

- Nationalism, resentment of current policies and demand for accountability (including government policies toward Palestine)

- Standard of living

Several passages are analyzed in 'Doing politics in the recent Arab Uprisings' under the aforementioned categories. Discussing political humor and satire, al-Sowaidi *et al.* examine protests in Libya in response to Qathafi's claim that those against him were being influenced by drugs. Demonstration slogans use ironic humor by displaying the phrase: 'The People want Qathafi Brand hallucination tablets' (*ibid.*, p. 627). For political evaluation and juxtaposition directed at leaders, Egyptian youth held banners in response to Mubarak's proud military record boasted of in his final address. The banners' slogan acknowledges Mubarak's combat experience against Israel to juxtapose such patriotism against his treatment of ordinary Egyptians ('The person who led the air strike [on Israel and of whom we were proud] is the greatest of thugs') (*ibid.*).

Linked to such use of irony are political threats against leaders, including slogans against Mubarak that declare '[We will neither slow down [the pace of our protest] nor will we have a wink of sleep till the fall of the regime]' (*ibid.*, p. 628). When examining nationalism, resentment of current policies and demand for accountability, Egypt again exemplifies protest slogans, with banners reading '[Hosni, Bey! Hosni, Bey, tell me, 'why do you siege Gaza?', expressing anger toward Mubarak's policies on Palestine and the term 'Bey' or an Ottoman governor recalling Ottoman imperialism and implying that Mubarak holds himself accountable to no one (*ibid.*). Finally, al-Sowaidi *et al.* analyze slogans that address living standards. Once more, the authors turn to Egypt, identifying slogans that both implicate Mubarak as uncaring and out of touch with average living standards and slogans that highlight the rising prices of essential and staple foods. These slogans include: 'Oh, Suzan [Mubarak], tell the Bey, one kg of lentils costs ten Egyptian

pounds' and '[While [the president] wears the latest fashion trends, ten of us sleep in a stuffy room', respectively (*ibid.*, p.629).

An outline of how al-Sowaidi *et al.* analyze protest slogans makes it clear that the employed methodology is designed to accommodate such slogans and the concerns of protesters, including living standards, nationalism, relations with Palestine and a demand for accountability. Such an approach is hence not expedient for this author's own thesis, which seeks to explore how Arab leaders use discourse to justify non-democratic legitimacy, including through religion or Religious Legitimacy.

An overview of existing PDA literature, including texts that analyze the Arab Spring further justifies this author's research project while also identifying gaps in such literature, especially regarding a focus on non-democratic legitimacy and monarchical case studies. While the aforementioned literature may address the Arab Spring, none of these publications provide a methodology to understand how discourse can act as a political process to validate non-democratic legitimacy through persuasion and the issuing of instructions, as discussed by Searle (Searle, 1965, p. 1-2). Hence, it is best to utilize a methodology that approaches PDA from a social and political perspective, encompassing the main theories of this thesis and focusing on the role of discourse as a form of non-democratic regime legitimation. The thesis' focus on discourse as a form of non-democratic regime legitimation is central to its original knowledge contribution, which augments the relevance of Searle's Speech Acts as its methodology.[3]

4.3 John Searle's Speech Acts

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[3] A wider literature review of PDA methods has identified several works by Van Leeuwen (2007), Van Dijk (2003, 2006), Ietcu-Fairclough (2008), Dunmire (2012) and Hay (2013) that provide various forms of PDA methodology or discussion of PDA. However, none of these texts take the Arab Spring into account as case studies and do not examine discourse as a form of persuasion or issuing instructions within the context of non-democratic legitimacy. It is especially because they do not examine discourse as a form of persuasion that they are a weak base for understanding how leaderships attempt to persuade citizens that non-democratic rule is legitimate. The methodology's ability to examine such an understanding is crucial to the thesis' original knowledge contribution of understanding non-democratic legitimacy as a utilitarian framework.

John Searle's Speech Acts introduces a methodology that parallels the main theories of this thesis, including the ruling bargain and the social contract. In explaining his theory, Searle first acknowledges that a single sentence contains not one but "many kinds of acts associated with the speaker's utterance" (Searle, 1965, p. 1). At the same time, Searle emphasizes that his approach to understanding such utterances is not a descriptive focus but an analytical framework that pays attention to the production of such utterances and the conditions leading to what he terms illocutionary acts; intentional speech acts or utterances that the speaker uses to produce a desired response from his or her audience (*ibid.*, pp. 2, 1). In other words, Searle's Speech Acts can understand discourse as a form of persuasion, which links directly to the speeches of each case study for this thesis. Attempts at persuasion are evident in all analyzed speeches, especially through the issuing of instructions/the essential condition. Ben Ali's final speech saw him mention instructions he had issued to various ministers while also revealing a desperate republican ordering protestors to cease unrest ("Enough with violence! Enough with violence!") (Ben Ali, 2011). Mubarak issued similar instructions to Egyptian youth in Tahrir Square, insisting that they "[stop protesting and] return the Egyptian street to its normal everyday life" (British Broadcasting Channel, 2011). Turning to the monarchs, Jordan's Abdullah II builds on his links to the Prophet Muhammad and his Religious Legitimacy when issuing instructions to protestors to vote so that they can "work from under the dome of Parliament and through the ballot boxes, which are the true representative of the will of the people" (Abdullah II, October 2012). Finally, Bahrain's King Hamad constructs an image of international legitimacy, linked to Peter's Political Cosmopolitanism (Peter, 2016) discussed in Chapter 3 and by Ahram and Lust (2016, p. 8) before politely telling protestors to cease unrest and "do their civic duty to contribute to national unity" (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). Each analyzed speech is a political process that not only defends non-democratic rule but attempts to persuade listeners or citizens to obey instructions (Searle, p. 15). Again, with Searle's Speech Acts regarding discourse as a

form of persuasion, Searle's Speech Acts provides an expedient methodology for this thesis (*ibid.*).

In addition to analyzing select speeches, this thesis will also draw on constitutions from each case study to understand to what extent non-democratic political factors may be formalized in an official document that represents a social contract between the state and its citizens (as defined by the state) (Cammack *et al*. 2017, available online). Hence, to augment the original contribution of understanding non-democratic legitimacy through discourse analysis, the main analysis of this thesis will explore to what extent speeches from each case study draw on constitutional elements to justify non-democratic rule and persuade listeners to obey issued instructions (Searle's essential condition). Therefore, Searle's Speech Acts can be used to understand speeches as political acts of persuasion and to understand to what extent such discourse can draw on constitutional elements to bolster legitimation of non-democratic rule.

Returning to parallels between Speech Acts and social contract theory, Searle explains that performing "illocutionary acts is to engage in a rule-governed form of behaviour" (*ibid.*, p. 2). These rules must be mutually recognized by speaker and listener. Akin to the ruling bargain, a social contract is formed around illocutionary acts, the rules of which "regulate interpersonal relationships" between speaker and audience yet allow for illocutionary acts to both maintain linguistic norms and on occasion "create or define new forms of behavior" (*ibid.*, p. 3).

Searle's methodology consists of a two-part analysis that distinguishes between the proposition of a speech act and the illocutionary force of that speech act (*ibid.*, p. 6). As explained by Searle, the proposition is the content or reference that the illocutionary act is built upon, with the illocutionary act expressing an action to be undertaken that is associated with said proposition (*ibid.*, p. 5). Searle considers propositions as common features that may be found in speech acts, while illocutionary acts themselves differ across

the same common reference point, i.e. the proposition. Searle explicates by providing five similar example utterances:

- Will John leave the room?

- John will leave the room.

- John, leave the room!

- Would that John left the room.

- If John will leave the room, I will leave also (*ibid.*, p. 5)

Each of these utterances represents "performances of different illocutionary acts", ranging from questioning (will John leave the room?) to assertion (John will leave the room), commanding (John, leave the room!) and expressing conditional intent (if John will leave the room, I will leave also). However, they all share a proposition or common reference point, namely John and the act of John (and possibly the speaker) leaving (*ibid.*). Once the proposition has been established, Searle moves on to the second part of his analysis, establishing the illocutionary act and analyzing how the proposition influences "what illocutionary force the utterance is to have, that is, what illocutionary act the speaker is performing in the utterance of a sentence" (*ibid.*, p. 6). Hence, the analysis of propositions and illocutionary acts provides the purpose of each speech act issued by the speaker, a purpose that must be filtered through mutually recognized rules between speaker and listener (*ibid.*, p. 9). Despite the mutual nature of these rules, it is the speaker's responsibility to adhere to said rules and ensure that each speech act is filtered through the listeners' recognition of these rules. In other words, if "a question arises about the truth, correctness, appropriateness etc. of the speech act, the hearer can point to the speaker as the one responsible for its utterance" (Fotion, 2000, p. 21).

Therefore, if a communication is attempted but is not delivered within the context of rules that listeners understand, there is no communication. This element of 'linguistic

legitimacy' is linked to Searle's Speech Act analysis and its consideration of comparing the intention of the speaker issuing the act with the actual effect (intended or not) on his or her audience (Searle, 1965, p. 9). Indeed, perhaps such linguistic conditions were somewhat recognized by endangered autocrats like Tunisia's Ben Ali, whose final speech was delivered "in the language of all Tunisians" (Ben Ali, 2011), a reference to his decision to address citizens in the Tunisian dialect rather than the formal *Fusha* dialect or the colonial-era French (Greene, 2011).

A further element of Searle's analysis that is worth mentioning is that of sincerity and keeping promises. Searle himself admits that the conditions specific to promises are difficult to define, as promises do not "have absolutely strict rules" (Searle, 1965, p. 10). The lack of structural rules naturally implies the prospect of insincere promises by Arab leaders, a notion touched upon in previous chapters and the reaction of autocrats in response to the Arab Spring when compared to their first years in power. Nonetheless, Searle attempts to define clear-cut promises. Hence, Searle argues that a sincere promise requires that:

- The speaker communicates the promise under mutual linguistic rules to the listener, e.g. in a language they both comprehend

- The speaker utters the promise in front of a listener as part of a sentence

- In expressing said promise, the speaker predicates a future act by him/herself to fulfil that promise

- It is assumed that the listener(s) would prefer the speaker go through with the actions of said promise rather than not, and that the speaker believes listeners would prefer the speaker go through with the actions of the promise rather than not. This criterion is certainly relevant when considering context during discourse analysis of speeches that were delivered in response to the Arab Spring. For example, Ben Ali promises his citizens,

"I have understood you. I have understood everyone: the unemployed, the needy, the politician, and those demanding more freedoms. […] I have tasked the government […] to reduce the prices of basic commodities and foodstuffs" (Ben Ali., 2011). This promise can be placed within the context of socio-economic unrest. Here, it is safe to assume that the listeners would prefer such a promise be kept and that the speaker believes the same, being more than aware of the economic factors behind protests, though perhaps not the political ones (Zurayk, 2011).

Searle also discusses threats as the opposite of promises. "A promise," Searle asserts, "is a pledge to do something for you, not to you, but a threat is a pledge to do something to you, not for you" (Searle, 1965, p. 11). Threats create what Searle calls 'defective promises', eroding the legitimacy of a speech act (*ibid.*). As with the aforementioned example of promises, Searle's understanding of threats (and their effect on legitimacy) connects with the reactions of leaderships to the Arab Spring. In his final address, for example, the militant Muammar Qathafi promises to end resistance to his regime by "purify[ing] Libya inch by inch, house by house, home by home, street by street, person by person, until the country is clean of the dirt and impurities" (Warden, 2011). Filtering this speech act through Searle's methodology, Qathafi's words are clearly a pledge to do something to rather than for Libyans and can hence be regarded as a threat (Searle, 1965, p. 11). Searle's mention of threats as 'defective promises' provides a further element of legitimacy that can be addressed in discourse analysis of each case study's speeches.

Related to threats and their defectivity is the notion of insincere promises. Searle refers to this conundrum as the sincerity condition. This condition argues that the "most important distinction between sincere and insincere promises is that in the case of the sincere promise, the speaker intends to do the act promised, in the case of the insincere promise he does not intend to do the act" (*ibid.*, p. 12). Perhaps the difficulty of defining what a promise is and the inability to filter it through fixed rules explains Searle's ambiguity toward the sincerity condition. Searle does not construct sincerity as "the essential feature

of a promise (*ibid.*, p. 13)". Instead, Searle argues that the essential condition of a promise that must be satisfied for a speech act to be classified as a promise is that the speaker intends that the utterance of his sentence will place him under an obligation to perform an action related to said promise (*ibid.*). Note that this condition and that of sincerity does not delegitimize insincere promises but simply acts as a feature that "distinguishes promises (and other members of the same family such as vows) from other kinds of speech acts" (*ibid.*). Searle critic Nick Fotion expands on the notion of sincerity and promises. "The sincerity condition is somewhat peculiar," he explains, "in that, although it is helpful in characterizing speech acts of various kinds, it does not have to be satisfied. The person is likely to be sincere when issuing a [promise] but he does not have to be" (Fotion, 2000, p. 26). The fact that sincerity can be regarded as flexible is touched upon by Searle himself. A lack of sincerity, rather than delegitimizing the speaker, allows said speaker to transform the promise into a generic speech act; "for if a speaker can demonstrate that he did not have this intention [to fulfil the promise] in a given utterance, he can prove that the utterance was not a promise" (Searle, 1965, p. 13).

Critics of Searle have further discussed the sincerity condition and what may be termed speech act abuse. For example, making a promise without the intention of fulfilling it hinges on "lack of sincerity" (Fotion, 2000, p. 27). As discussed by linguist J.L. Austin, a distinction must be made between such abuse and what Austin labels 'misfires'. Misfires are unintentional mishaps in a speech act. The fact that the production of said speech act has been altered by such flaws makes its result null and void (Austin, 1962, p. 16). Abuse, on the other hand, occurs when a speaker intentionally manipulates a speech act, such as issuing a promise with no intention of keeping it (*ibid.*, p. 16).

Although Austin's discussion of abusing "linguistic procedure" was issued in 1955 (over a decade before Searle's own work), more contemporary linguists have applied Austin's division of misfires and abuse to Searle's own methodology. Fotion expands upon misfires when discussing Searle's Speech Acts. Hence, "John cannot sign a contract selling Henry's

car to Mary. Of course, physically he can sign the contract, but once it is clear that John was not authorized by Henry to sign, the document with his signature no longer counts as a contract (is null and void)" (Fotion, 2000, p. 27). In this instance, the fallacy of the act is discovered and hence its effects on speaker/author and audience mitigated. Abuse, however, hinges on speech acts that lack sincerity. Hence, because a speech act is a procedure "designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participant must intend so to conduct themselves" (Bjorgvinsson, 2011, p. 4). In other words, should the speaker express false feelings, including through making promises they do not intend to keep, this can be regarded as speech act abuse.

Although the sincerity condition need not be satisfied, understanding speech act abuse can deepen comprehension of the speaker's (political) intent, which in turn can be linked to discussions of what effect the speech act had on listeners and further analysis of non-democratic legitimacy (*ibid.*). An example of insincerity (albeit not a direct promise) may be found in Mubarak's final address, in which he insists that his family "never sought power or fake popularity" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011). However, mass reaction to his speech in the form of protest did not produce the effect the speaker intended on his audience, and most certainly implies that the speaker's intent was insincere. After all, Mubarak may have promised a last-minute reduction of his time in office yet had spent years grooming son, Gamal to succeed him (Raphaeli, 2003, available online). This example reveals how context of speech acts is as important as the speech acts themselves. Searle describes this 'speech gap' as the result of the fact that "[o]ften [politicians] say one thing but mean something else", leading to a gap between sentence meaning and speaker meaning (Searle, 1965, p. 24).

This aspect can certainly be linked to the history of Arab politics. As is apparent from previous chapters, rulers in the Arab world have often not kept their word regarding

promises made when they first came to power. This breaking of promises can be linked to social justice and dignity, described in Chapter 2. Arab leaders such as Ben Ali who, upon gaining power, assured the masses they would "see that the law is correctly enforced in a way that will proscribe any kind of iniquity or injustice" (Ben Ali, 2015) did not follow their words with action. As such, social justice and dignity became a strong factor of provoking the Arab Spring. As outlined by Andrea Pin, "[the] Arabs who occupied the roads of Cairo, Tunis, Damascus, Amman, and many other cities did not call simply for the enforcement of *human rights* or *Islamic law*. In Egypt, the most populated Arab country, the early rallying cry of the 2011 revolution was "Bread, Freedom, Social Justice, and Human Dignity," and it was later enshrined in the 2012 and 2014 constitutions' Preambles" (Pin, 2016, p. 3).

Searle argues that it is possible for speakers to minimize miscommunication by spelling everything out for their audience to ensure that "whatever is meant can be said" (Searle, 1965, p. 25). Searle refers to such clarification as the Principle of Expressibility (*ibid.*, p. 24). At the same time, it is also possible for analysts and audiences to understand what is meant by stringing speech acts (sentences) from the speaker together to form the speaker's discourse in its entirety. From such discourse analysis, context can be added to place speech acts within their relevant reference, such as the Arab Spring and related socio-political unrest (*ibid.*). Indeed, for the purposes of this thesis, it is unlikely that each speaker will mean everything they say or give voice to all their actual intentions. This unlikelihood can be linked back to Chapter 2 and the nature of non-democratic regimes as multi-layered constructs professing transparency while tacitly supporting nepotism and other corruption at the expense of the masses. For this reason, the use of Searle's Speech Acts will not include the Principle of Expressibility. It will be assumed that each speaker does not intend to spell out their true intentions line by line. However, it is still possible to deepen the use of Searle's methodology through understanding the context in which each speech takes place.

Searle critic Nick Fotion raises an interesting point regarding how Speech Acts can be linked to regional (socio-political) phenomena and national and regional identity. The work of many linguists and political scientists, he explains "is concerned with this or that particular language [or culture]" (Fotion, 2000, p. 18). Searle, on the other hand, provides a methodology of discourse analysis that is most appropriate for understanding regional political events. Rather than confining his methodology to country-specific or language/dialect-specific analysis, "Searle's concern is to show us how language works across national and ethnic borders", connecting with the regional theme(s) represented by the Arab Spring and further emphasizing the relevance of Searle's Speech Acts to this thesis (*ibid.*).

Moreover, this author has identified two works that adopt Searle's Speech Acts within the literature of Politics and International Relations. A 2013 study by Samuel Alaba Akinwotu ties well into the political discourse analysis of this thesis "by examining selected political speeches as pieces of discourse with specific goals" (Akinwotu, 2013, p. 43). This investigation is "based on insight from J.L. Austin (1962) speech act theory" and "speech acts identified by Searle" (*ibid.*). The study uses speech acts to identify and analyze "some of the significant illocutionary acts that convey the intentions of [political] speakers […] in Nigeria" (*ibid.*). Although the Middle East is not the case study of Akinwotu's essay, its use of Searle's Speech Acts (and Austin) to understand the construction of discourse by political actors illustrates Searle's relevance to political discourse analysis and hence the relevance of Speech Acts to the methodology of this thesis.

In this essay, Akinwotu filters speeches given by Nigerian nominees running for president through five of Searle's Speech Acts. These include:

- Assertives: Speakers commit to the truth of a proposition, such as stating, claiming, reporting, announcing etc.

- Directives: Speakers attempt to bring about an effect through actions of listeners, e.g. by ordering, commanding, requesting etc.

- Expressives: Speaker expresses a psychological state such as thinking, apologizing, congratulating etc.

- Commissives: Speaker commits to a future action such as promising, offering, swearing etc. to do something

- Declarations: A speech act that, if performed successfully, transforms propositional content into reality, for example naming a building, resigning, dismissing. In the case of the Arab Spring, such a declarative act could involve a leadership considering demonstrations that demand the resignation of e.g. a minister and meeting this desire with the act of dismissing said minister (*ibid.*, p. 45)

Such a methodology filters select speeches to identify the aforementioned speech acts. Akinwotu's intent through such a framework is to examine what key speech acts are typically present in an acceptance speech for presidential nomination in Nigeria. Such nomination speeches are compared to presidential inaugural speeches to understand key differences between speech acts across the two examples of discourse. Akinwotu concludes that both inaugural and nomination acceptance speeches feature "assertive, expressive, and commissive acts" but that a key difference between the two types of speeches is that nomination speeches are often used as discourse to engage in mobilization strategies, naturally with speakers attempting to persuade listeners to cast ballots in their favor (*ibid.*, p. 50). Understanding the purpose of Akinwotu's analysis again allows for a difference in focus to be scrutinized. Akinwotu's framework seems designed to analyze nomination and inaugural speeches. This focus is different from the intention of this thesis to analyze how speakers justify non-democratic legitimacy. Further, Akinwotu's analysis is quantitative rather than a qualitative case by case analysis as intended by this author (*ibid.*, p. 46).

The second text identified by this author is one that applies Searle's Speech Acts to political and religious texts. Kadhim Haidar al-Jawali and Rufaidah Kamal Abdu-Majeed's article examines promises within the context of specific Muslim and Christian texts "in an attempt to fill a gap in Searle's speech act theory" (al-Jawadi and Abdul-Majeed, 2007, p. 287). What is interesting about the approach taken by the authors is that "selected sayings of Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H.) and Jesus Christ (P.B.U.H.)" are filtered through a modified version of Searle's Speech Acts. As explained by the authors, these "modifications make the conditions of the speech act of promising appropriate for sincere promises made by the Messengers of God since they deliver their Messages of God but they are unable, as Messengers, to fulfill God's promises which they make as part of their Messages" (*ibid.*). The focus on religious texts certainly links back to Bulliet's Religious Legitimacy and illustrates how Searle is relevant to not only political discourse analysis but the religious element of non-democratic legitimacy significant to this thesis.

However, such a focus through Searle's Speech Acts remains solely on promises with the assumption that no promises given can be insincere. Further, modification of Searle's explanation of promises allows promises to be made on behalf of another actor (God) rather than on behalf of the speaker. Such an approach is problematic if applied to the case studies of this thesis. As previously discussed, the Arab Spring saw unprecedented demands for social justice and accountability of rulers. Hence, examination of relevant discourse must consider promises made by leaderships that are assumed to be carried out by the speakers/rulers themselves rather than promises made by speakers on behalf of other actors.

Both aforementioned texts harbor limitations in methodology. However, the existence of such articles further validates the use of Searle within the context of political discourse analysis and Religious Legitimacy.

Further examination of extant literature on the Arab Spring does reveal an essay that parallels the investigation of this thesis: namely, discourse analysis of speeches given by Arab leaders in response to the Arab Spring. Wala' al-Majali's 'Discourse Analysis of the Political Speeches of the Ousted Arab Presidents during the Arab Spring Revolution using Halliday and Hasan's Framework of Cohesion' matches the focus on political discourse analysis of this author's own thesis on the Arab Spring.

At the same time, this essay also reveals research gaps that will be filled by the author's own research project. First, al-Majali's text does not use Searle as a basis for methodology. Second, analysis of political speeches is limited to ousted republicans, including Tunisia's Ben Ali, Egypt's Mubarak and Libya's Qathafi (al-Majali, 2015, p. 96). This latter element evidences a research gap that will be filled by this author's hypothesis that will examine both republics and monarchies.

al-Majali's methodology filters speeches through elements of grammatical structure, lexical cohesion, the use of repetition and synonymy (*ibid.*, pp.99, 100). The purpose of such a methodology is to address al-Majali's research objectives, namely to investigate "the language used in the speeches of the ousted Arab presidents during the Arab Spring Revolution and the major characteristics of the words, structure and grammar" and to examine "the distinctive linguistic features of such speeches as well as the context (conditions and circumstances) that led the presidents to provide such speeches" (*ibid.*, p. 97)". These objectives help al-Majali answer his two research questions:

- "What is the language used in the speeches of the ousted Arab presidents during the Arab Spring Revolution and what are the major characteristics of words, structure, and grammar?

- "What are the distinctive linguistic features of such speeches as well as the context that led the presidents to provide such speeches?" (*ibid.*)

Understanding al-Majali's research objectives illustrates that the methodology of al-Majali's work is not suitable for the research purposes of this author's own thesis, namely to explore how Arab leaders use discourse to justify non-democratic legitimacy and Religious Legitimacy and to address the hypothesis that monarchs will justify non-democratic authority through religion while republicans will do so through the ruling bargain.

4.4 Data Collection

The required speeches and constitutions to be analyzed have all been obtained as English translations from the public domain. It is necessary to use English translations rather than original Arabic texts due to regional variation of Arabic dialects. Hence, the last address given by former Tunisian President Ben Ali was found online on the website for the United Nations Association of Greater Boston (https://msmunatunagb.wikispaces.com/file/view/The+Last+Official+Address+of+Ben+Ali.pdf), while Hosni Mubarak's final address was provided as an English translation available online through the BBC (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12427091). For analysis of an address given in response to protest by Jordan's King Abdullah II, the speech in question has been found as an official English translation from King Abdullah's official webpage (https://kingabdullah.jo/en/speeches/during-gathering-national-public-figures). Finally, the chosen speech given by Bahrain's King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa in response to protest has been found as an official English translation on the website for the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (http://www.bici.org.bh/indexc971.html?news=speech-of-hm-king-hamad-bin-isa-al-khalifa-on-23rd-november).

In addition to the aforementioned speeches, constitutions from each case study will also be analyzed. These too have been sourced through the public domain. It is worth mentioning that finding constitutions for each respective case study has been challenging as each

country may have more than one available constitution. For example, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has two versions of its constitution. The first was valid from 1952 until 2009, while the second was amended in 2011 and is still in use as of writing (Khair Bani Doumi, M., 2018. Available at: https://www.omicsonline.org/open-access/public-freedoms-in-the-jordanian-constitution-rhetorics-and-realities-2165-7912-1000384-104185.html, accessed 4 April 2019); Constitution Project (2018) *Jordan's Constitution of 1952 with Amendments through 2011*. Available at: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Jordan_2011.pdf, accessed 12 October 2016).

This author has sourced constitutions for all four case studies as English editions. For Tunisia, it has been possible to locate the 2010 edition of the Tunisian constitution as an English translation from the Official Printing Office of the Republic of Tunisia (Publications of the Official Printing Office of the Republic of Tunisia (2010) *Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia*. Available at: http://www.tunisie-constitution.org/sites/all/downloads/constitution-tunisienne-anglais.pdf, accessed 3 June 2017). The 2010 edition of the constitution is appropriate for analysis as it marks the year that the Arab Spring began, as discussed in Chapter 2. For Egypt, the author has found an English translation of the constitution from 1971 with amendments made in 2007 (Constitution Net (2016) *The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 1971 (as Amended to 2007)*. Available at: http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/Egypt%20Constitution.pdf, accessed 3 June 2018). It should be noted that these amendments increased presidential powers and were regarded by many as a key reason Egyptians began to demonstrate against Mubarak (El Masry, 2012). Finally, the constitution of Bahrain has been sourced as an English translation officially provided by the Bahraini government. This constitution was last amended in 2002, three years after King Hamad ascended to the throne (International

Constitutional Law Countries (2002) *Bahrain Constitution*. Available at: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ba00000_.html, accessed 3 June 2018).

4.5 Using Searle's Speech Acts

For the main analysis of this thesis, the author will use Searle's Speech Acts. As previously discussed, Searle's Speech Acts focuses on how communication is provided by a speaker to listeners under mutually understood rules, akin to the notion of a social contract. Further, Searle's analysis of how speakers use speech acts and to what extent these acts have a desired effect on listeners is also transferrable to the main analysis of each case study, as the author of this thesis intends to explore whether attempts to defend non-democratic legitimacy and Religious Legitimacy via discourse had the intended effect on recipients within the context of the Arab Spring. In addition, Searle's analysis of sincerity and promises can augment main analysis within the context of political legitimacy and whether Arab rulers recognized that their mode of governance was under threat. The notion of speech act abuse through insincere promises and false statements is certainly relevant to non-democratic regimes and comparing promises made in analyzed speeches to the reaction of listeners toward their sincerity or insincerity can further bolster the investigation of this thesis.

Hence, using Searle's Speech Acts as a basis, speeches will be analyzed through Searle's essential and preparatory conditions (context of speech and each speaker's political status as state leader) (Searle, 1965, p. 15). Occurrences of the preparatory condition can include speakers providing the political and/or historical context of the speech and asserting their legitimacy through non-democratic achievements and/or religion. These forms of legitimacy will include Peter's Beneficial Consequences and Bulliet's Religious Legitimacy, such as the use of religious titles, links and any mention of upholding Islamic laws and customs. Once preparatory conditions have been analyzed, the author will look for evidence of speakers using Searle's essential condition, in which the speaker leverages

the legitimacy assertions of his preparatory conditions to justify acts he wants fulfilled from his listeners (here defined as all national citizens). The author will compare the requested acts from speakers with the reaction of crowds/protestors to determine whether the speakers' requests were fulfilled, which will in turn reveal to what extent the non-democratic legitimacy of such leaders remains accepted within the context of the Arab Spring. Finally, the author will analyze acts of promises for their sincerity and insincerity and again compare such promises with protestor reaction to determine whether listeners considered such promises legitimate.

The author will also examine the constitutions of each case study's country. For the sake of parity, examination will be limited to the preamble of each text. An exception to this approach will be that of Jordan's constitution, the preamble of which is too brief to be examined for discourse. Hence, specific sections of the Jordanian Constitution will be referred to. These specific sections and the preambles of remaining constitutions will be analyzed for evidence of Bulliet's Religious Legitimacy, including enforcement or protection of Islamic laws/practices and the use of religious titles and privileges for rulers. Further, each document will be analyzed for evidence of the nature of expected governance, nature of executive powers and any other evidence of non-democratic authority, linking back to Peter's Beneficial Consequences. These elements will then be treated as preparatory conditions, allowing the author to re-examine each related speech for evidence of whether such constitutional elements were referred to, emphasized or otherwise upheld. The use of Searle's Speech Acts will further strengthen the two-tier approach to legitimacy discussed in Chapter 1.5. To reiterate, this two-tier approach examines legitimacy from the perspective of Arab leaders (in select speeches) and measures such perspectives against common factors of perceived legitimacy between current and ousted leaders. Such a comparison augments examination of the legitimacy of remaining governments and their likelihood of survival.

This chapter has outlined the significance of Searle's Speech Acts as a methodology that will strengthen the thesis' aim of understanding non-democratic legitimacy by allowing main analysis to explore Arab leaders' discourse and use of persuasion in validating non-democratic rule. Chapter 5 provides an overview of each case study to provide the relevant historical and political context that traces main political events of each case study's leadership leading up to the Arab Spring.

5. Case Studies

5.1 Introduction

As this thesis seeks to contribute original knowledge by analyzing political legitimacy in the Arab world, it is necessary to use specific case studies to understand to what extent political legitimacy may be uniform or diverse across the MENA region. As mentioned in Chapter 1, four case studies have been chosen to ensure parity by covering states that compose the majority of the MENA region.

A profile of each case study is thus required to place Religious and Political Legitimacy within the context of each Arab government's ruling style. Such a context will provide a deeper understanding of each leader's rhetorical response to the Arab Spring and domestic unrest, allowing more specific analysis of each case study in the succeeding chapters. Further, this chapter seeks to place each profile within the context of the research question: What are the factors Arab leaders use in discourse justifying their rule within the context of the Arab Spring? To what extent does this discourse support a (socio-economic) ruling bargain and Religious Legitimacy? It is for this reason that case studies in this and subsequent chapters will not be presented according to the chronology of the Arab Spring but rather in the order of how strongly they correspond to or challenge the hypothesis and provide factors for analysis that directly address the research question. Such restructuring will highlight thematic analysis of each case study, including Religious Legitimacy and a socio-economic ruling bargain. To reiterate, this thesis uses the similar cases system within the context of two sets of cases (republican and monarchical) rather than four uniform cases with dissimilar outcomes Hence, the order of selected case studies is:

- Jordan, the last stable Levant state and the author's site of residence from 2012-16 and the strongest confirmation of the thesis hypothesis

- Bahrain, the Gulf case study of this thesis and the strongest example of a socio-economic ruling bargain that contrasts with hypothesis expectations that republicans will draw on the ruling bargain due to being the result of coups rather than established familial rule

- Egypt, the most populous nation in the Arab world (Central Intelligence Agency) that contrasts with hypothesis expectations that only monarchies will draw on Religious Legitimacy

- Tunisia, the origin of the Arab Spring and the weakest conformation of the hypothesis regarding republicans justifying rule through a socio-economic ruling bargain

5.2 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

"You know, […] when I reached my 10-year anniversary, I remember sitting down with members of my family and my close friends and saying, 'I don't want to do this anymore'. […] I was so depressed because of all the forces I was dealing with on the inside. It wasn't the outside—the outside, I understood. It was inside. […] Two steps forward, one step back. […] Institutions I had trusted were just not on board. It was the *mukhabarat* [secret police] […] and the old guard. […] [If there is a revolution,] [my] character is, I won't shoot. I don't think we as [the] Hashemite [ruling family] shoot. If you, as a monarch, have created a situation in which half the population rises up and wants you out, then you've done something wrong. […] The monarchy is going to change. When my son becomes of age and becomes king, the system will be stabilized and … it will be a Western democracy with a constitutional monarchy. [But] even with all the changes I'm doing here, there is still going to be a monarchy. I hope [my successor] works hard, but not with the same pressures" (Goldberg, 2013).

King Abdullah II of Jordan gave a rare glimpse into the political and geostrategic pressures facing the monarch of a land-locked nation without the oil wealth of proximate Gulf sultans and sheikhs. In a 2013 interview (later condemned by Abdullah as misinterpreting his statements), he discussed the antiquated notion of monarchy, the social contract

between tribe and throne with its "coldly transactional quality" and how it is "not necessarily good to be the king of a Middle Eastern country that is bereft of oil" (Miller, 2013; Goldberg, 2013).

At the same time, the role of religion provides a political advantage not enjoyed by King Abdullah's peers. While republican presidents-for-life may attempt to manipulate Islam and their association with the majority faith (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011), King Abdullah and his Hashemite kin share direct descendance from the Prophet Muhammad. This form of Religious Legitimacy may not compensate for the barrenness of Jordan's deserts, yet it provides Abdullah with an intrinsic confidence. "It gives you a sense of calm," he claimed in the same interview. "Obviously there's a tremendous sense of responsibility. It makes you feel very sure of yourself. I'm very comfortable in myself. I inherited this from my father, and he inherited it from his father" (Goldberg, 2013).

As will be revealed in Chapter 6, Religious Legitimacy is a key theme of analysis. To reiterate, the hypothesis of this thesis assumes that monarchies will draw less on a socio-economic ruling bargain and more on traditionalism and length of rule, with traditionalism including religion. The main analysis of Chapter 6 will show that Jordan's Abdullah II is the strongest example of this hypothesis, and it is for this reason that Jordan is presented first out of the four case studies. Chapter 5.2 hence discusses the role of religion while also discussing tribalism or *'asabiyya* as a form of social inclusion/exclusion that may have deepened as a political tactic in response to the Arab Spring (Valbjørn, 2019, p. 127). The prospect of tribalism as a form of political inclusion/exclusion and the parallels between Jordan's *'asabiyya* and Bahrain's sectarianism will be further explored in Chapter 5.6.1.

The legacy of religion was politicized by the history of Hashemite rule and leadership since before Jordan's birth as a nation. For the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was the long-term result of Hashemite resistance against the Ottoman Empire in the Great Arab Revolt (1917). This act against the Ottomans was a response of Arab nationalism, resisting

Arab cultural and political persecution by imperialists now pursuing a policy of secularization at the expense of its subjects (The Economist, 2016). King Abdullah's great, great grandfather, Sharif Hussein bin Ali already enjoyed Religious Legitimacy as the Emir of Mecca (Royal Hashemite Court. 2001, *The Great Arab Revolt*). By leading Arab armies into successful battle against the Ottomans and ensuring his sons also acted as commanders, Ali built upon his Religious Legitimacy to create a platform for political rule under the Hashemite banner, ensuring that such rule could be dynastic yet legitimate by striving to uphold Arab traditions, customs and faith (*ibid.*).

Under his son, Abdullah I, Jordan would be birthed as a Hashemite land. However, nationalism would be hindered by British desires to contain any patriotism that could resent British presence and influence in-country (Alshboul and Oudat, 2010, p. 68). Further, nationalism would be constructed through the incorporation of powerful but disparate Bedouin tribes. The deserts of nascent Jordan were populated by rival clans that "loathed central authority" (*ibid.*). Hence, nationalism would be built on cooption of such tribes into a social contract between the tribes and the monarchy. Jordan's political system therefore ignored the concept of national inclusion and instead promoted a system of regime loyalty "based on the desire to defend both the honour of the tribes and the institution of the monarchy" (*ibid.*, p. 66). At the same time, tribes were also incorporated into the state Arab Legion as a form of regime security that defended the throne while also enforcing law and taxation (Royal Hashemite Court, 2001, *The Making of Transjordan*). Jordan's nationalism thus ensured the protection of the crown by tribal elites now united in monarchical loyalty in exchange for "rewards or economic security" but excluded "a notion of the Jordanian nation" (Alshboul and Oudat, p. 66).

Tracing the Hashemite lineage and path to power, Islam must not be overlooked. For although the social contract between throne and tribes is socio-economic, religion and Religious Legitimacy was an important starting point in uniting hostile clans. Hashemite lineage to the Prophet Muhammad is a significant factor in explaining support for king (not

country) in a culture "whose loyalties are fractured by *'asabiyya* (clannishness)" (Shryock, 1995, p. 346). As explained by Muslim historian Ibn Khaldun, "the Bedouins are [not] […] willing to subordinate themselves to each other, as they are rude, proud, ambitious and eager to be leaders. […] But when there is religion (among them) through prophethood […], then they have some restraining influence among themselves. […] When there is a prophet or a saint among them who calls upon them to fulfill the commands of God, […] they become fully united and acquire superiority and royal authority" (*ibid.*).

Whether tribal unity was ultimately enforced through shared faith or not, by the time of Emir Abdullah I's grandson, King Hussein (1952-1999), tribalism was an entrenched political culture. This culture was ultimately an "authoritarian bargain that offered [tribes] and key interest groups economic security in exchange for loyalty" (Greenwood, p. 94). Such a patronage system was financed almost solely from external aid, which was then distributed "to key constituencies as patronage, often in the form of subsidies and employment" (Robinson, 1998, p. 391). Atop this rentier distribution network was the framework of political elections and its link to tribalism. Indeed, the social contract between throne and tribe has often encouraged monarchical control of parliament and manipulation of the voting system "by the government to favor tribal gatherings at the expense of political parties" (*ibid.*, p. 397). This latter shift in the 1993 elections may have been a top-down process, however it built on the cultural fact that even in previous multiple-vote elections it was common for Jordanians to "cast their 'first' vote for a clan member and then cast their 'second' vote on ideological grounds" (*ibid.*).

Deepening pro-regime elections up to the present day has been the ostensible buying of votes, as claimed by local NGOs given observer status during parliamentary elections (Fahim, 2013). In addition to encouraging a tribal voting pattern through direct and indirect means, a Bedouin Control Law administered influential tribes under a separate legal status (Shyrock, 1995, p. 328) until 1976, when this special law was abolished. Such annulment did not reflect a changing attitude within tribal politics. Rather, as Hussein's reliance on

the tribes deepened, the customs of the tribes simply "worked [their] way firmly into civil jurisprudence, and today government judges […] will decide a case involving tribespeople only after the dispute has been settled by customary means" (*ibid.*, p. 328).

On the other hand, the fact that "the state does not officially sanction any of these procedures" is a reminder that tribalism under the Hashemites is permitted within a framework of ruler and subject, with the dominant Hashemite monarchy supported by influential tribes tied to the regime (*ibid.*). Hence, Hashemite bureaucrats ensure that administration of key sectors, including education are not bequeathed to loyal tribes but governed by members of the ruling family (*ibid.*, p. 353). Returning to the notion of tribes being united by Islam, it must be noted that the Hashemites were not born and raised in what is now Jordan. Rather, they hail "from another genealogy and another region. They came from the Hijaz [now Saudi Arabia]. They have a history of their own; they have ancestors and origins of their own" (*ibid.*). In other words, in a culture that is wary of external actors, the Hashemites were originally outsiders. However, their religious lineage and a controlled, centralized narrative allowed the Hashemites to be accepted "as a breed of 'super shaykhs' who have the power to impose their own history on others" (*ibid.*).

The "dynastic nationalism of the Jordanian state" means Hashemite control of "an immemorial past" that serves as the narrative of the present (*ibid.*, p. 354). For this reason, government portrayals of Jordan's history make "not a single reference to any of the nation's tribes" (*ibid.*, p. 353). Ultimately, the rise of the Hashemites in Jordan is the official tale of the perennial kingdom and "the history […] students [should] know about and admire" (*ibid.*).

The narrative of Hashemite unity was tested after the 1967 War with Israel and Jordan's subsequent loss of the West Bank (Culcasi, 2016, p. 9). From 1948-67, Jordan had already absorbed almost 800,000 Palestinian refugees, including displaced persons and West Bank settlers (*ibid.*). With Israel annexing the West Bank from Hussein's kingdom in 1967, a

further 140,000 Palestinian refugees were now absorbed into a truncated Jordan that until 1988 preached the motto ""Jordan is Palestine and Palestine is Jordan". By this period, it was estimated that as "a result of both granting citizenship and natural demographic growth, […] more than 50% of Jordan's total population was of Palestinian origins" (*ibid.*). The growth of a Palestinian populous had ominous implications for Jordan's nationalism.

Losing the West Bank seriously dented King Hussein's Religious Legitimacy. With Hashemite custody of Mecca now taken by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Jordan's monarchs had at least enjoyed custodianship of Jerusalem's holy sites (Said, 2018). The most significant of these Jerusalem sites was Al Aqsa Mosque, which held strong connections to the Prophet Muhammad, and where a young Prince Hussein witnessed the assassination of his grandfather, Emir Abdullah I in 1951 (AFP, 2014). With the 1967 annexation of the West Bank, the Hashemite family lost the prestigious title of Custodianship over Holy Sites in Jerusalem. For this reason, the 1967 loss of the West Bank is commonly referred to in Jordan as *al-Nakba* or The Disaster of 1967 (Stead, 2018).

At the same time, although most Palestinians were granted Jordanian citizenship, they were not treated as well as their East Bank counterparts. The original Jordanian tribes of the East Bank were part of a generous social contract that saw them enjoy socio-economic benefits in exchange for supporting the Crown (Alshboul and Oudat, p. 66). Palestinians, however, were viewed as external refugees and with suspicion. Indeed, local literature written by Bedouin authors symbolized East/West Bank tensions by portraying a 'Bedouin patriotism' that emphasized "a privileged form of national identity which only Jordanians of tribal descent can claim" (Shyrock, 1995, p. 325). Such patriotism excluded Palestinian-Jordanians and popularly "echoed long-standing concerns that the growing Palestinian population would weaken the position of East Jordanians who saw themselves as the original inhabitants of Jordan" (Culcasi, p. 9).

The darkest stain of Hashemite rule and Jordanian nationalism are inevitably linked to the East Bank-West Bank relationship. Under King Hussein and especially after 1967, there was a national dialogue of internal division. Despite sharing the same passport, East and West Bankers co-resided "as two different nationalities within the Jordanian state and social structure, the question of national allegiance lying at the heart of [being Jordanian]" (Gallets, 2015, p. 117). The refugee flood of 1967 brought not only innocent refugees but hardened militant groups loyal to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) (*ibid.*). Jordan's adjacent position to Israel and increasingly numerous Palestinian intake encouraged militias to see Jordan as a launching base for future attacks against Israel (*ibid.*, p. 118).

Influential groups loyal to the PLO and operating under the umbrella branch Palestinian Resistance Movements (PRM) infiltrated conspicuous refugee camps. Much as Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood or *Ikhwan* had gained popularity through providing welfare services (Nagarajan, 2013, p. 33), the PRM militias offered welfare and education to camp inhabitants. The *Ikhwan* expected votes in return for such socio-economic services (al-Awadi, 2005, p. 67). For PRMs, camps gladly accommodated their offices, training facilities and recruitment centers. King Hussein tacitly referred to a Natural Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Palestine, implying eventual West Bank unity and Palestinian return (Culcasi, p. 13). In the meantime, PRMs "in the Wahadat and Husseini refugee camps" were growing in strength and support until they became popularly known as independent republics. With their own 'mini-state' structures and increasing clashes between their militias and the military, it was clear that Hashemite control was weak in the camps that now stood as combative headquarters of popular resistance movements (Gallets, 2015, p. 118).

A civil war was simmering. By 1970, PRMs were operating with brazen disregard for Jordanian law, engaged in open militant activity and a "constant cycle of making agreements with the government before breaking them shortly afterwards" (*ibid.*, p.120).

Reflecting two years later on what was to become the conflict of Black September, King Hussein was frank in his assessment. "Right to the very last possible second, we tried to prevent the clash from occurring. But Jordan had unfortunately turned into the battlefield of […] different ideologies. […] [T]hen came a time when I nearly lost control" (Thames TV, 1972). That loss of control rang out with the sudden attempt on Hussein's life.

On 1st September 1970, the prevalent Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) attempted to assassinate Hussein (Gallets, 2015, p. 118). In a 1972 interview, King Hussein described his brush with death in vivid detail. "[T]here was a military-police check-post. We found that one side of the road was closed. And the other side was blocked by an Army lorry. No one inside. We stopped […] and at that precise moment, heavy machine gunfire opened [upon] us. […] I was stunned for a little while and angered. And then I realized what had happened, so I jumped out of the vehicle and rolled into a ditch and we fired back" (Thames TV, 1972).

The King claimed in the same interview that he has never feared death (*ibid.*). Nevertheless, the attempt on his life and the hijacking and detonation of three planes two weeks later hardened his stance to the Palestinian militias. The Jordanian Armed Forces responded to the buildup of militia operations "by shelling the Wahadat and Husseini refugee camps, which housed the PRM headquarters and was their primary bastion of support" (Gallets, 2015, p. 118). By the end of fighting on 27th September 1970, Palestinian deaths totaled around 3,400 (*ibid.*). By the summer of 1971, Jordan had taken a page from the PDM book and ignored an agreement to allow Palestinian militias to remain in Jordan. All Palestinian Resistance Movements had been expelled by 18th July (*ibid.*). In addition to cracking down hard on such militants, Hussein's government would shift its policy from accommodating West Bankers to purging them from the political sphere (*ibid.*).

A month after the events of Black September, Hashemite loyalist Wasfi al-Tal was appointed for his third term as Jordan's Prime Minister (*ibid.*, p. 118). While previous governments had distinguished between Palestinian refugees and residents versus the need to expel militants, al-Tal's administration considered the entire Palestinian populous as potentially problematic. al-Tal effectively oversaw the 'Jordanization' of Hashemite bureaucracy and the start of political segregation inside the kingdom. Within the state structure, al-Tal's policy directed the dismissal of Palestinians from government posts, including health, education and tourism appointments. Jordanians loyal to the Crown replaced them. The Armed Forces and *mukhabarat* or intelligence services were subjected to the same purge (*ibid.*, p. 119). Further, civil society was reined in under al-Tal's purview. All NGOs under Palestinian leadership were co-opted by the state and scrutinized, while Palestinian-run or pro-Palestinian papers were shut down. In an effort to present this reshuffle as a positive affirmation of Jordanian nationalism, two Jordanian papers were established under government supervision (*ibid.*).

King Hussein also encouraged the partnership of Palestinian and Jordanian activists under the Jordanian National Union in an attempt to ease further tensions after the clashes of Black September. While not an enduring structure, the Union seemed to succeed in preventing escalated hostility between West and East Bank communities (*ibid.*, p. 120).

The purging of the *mukhabarat* was especially pertinent to the long-term political landscape of the Hashemite Kingdom. While Egypt's Hosni Mubarak relied on military might, Hashemite rule in Jordan loosely paralleled security developments in Ben Ali's Tunisia. Ben Ali's Constitutional Democratic Rally party and marginalized police forces had engineered coup rumors under the so-called Barrakat Essahel Affair (Grewal, 2016, p. 4). However, King Hussein's early years saw the very real fomentation of dissent within the ranks. Stoked by Gamal Abdel Nasser's Arab nationalism and the perceived dependence of Jordan on Britain, leading military figures had conspired to overthrow the Hashemite dynasty in the spring of 1957 (Cavendish, 2007). The early intervention of

loyal officers allowed King Hussein to detain coup leader, General Ali Abu Nowar and tour the main military base in Zarqa, eleven miles from Amman. There, "he was mobbed by excited supporters, hugged and embraced" (*ibid.*).

This event not only deepened the importance of tribalism to regime security but also paved the way for the rise of Jordan's secret police (*ibid.*). The *mukhabarat* became a pervasive shadow of state surveillance, mirroring their status in Ben Ali's Tunisia (Sadiki, 2002, 'The Search for Citizenship', p. 506). The purge of Palestinians from the *mukhabarat* was all the more significant when considering the tools of control assigned to the secret police. In time, the *mukhabarat* would have the means to arbitrarily detain any Jordanian for vague offenses and strip them of their passport (The Economist, 2003). Further, no Jordanian citizen could pursue employment or higher education without a reference of good character from the state's secret police—a document that can be withdrawn for any supposed offence (*ibid.*). In addition, it is interesting that the *mukhabarat* offers scholarships to the most active informants, allowing officers to penetrate, inter alia, the education sector, a sphere dominated by Palestinian bureaucrats before Black September (*ibid.*).

In the final decade of Hussein's rule, the *mukhabarat* stood as one buttress out of several in Hashemite security. These 'power partners' included business elites that, mirroring Mubarak's management style were co-opted over time. By 1989 the ruling class was composed of:

- The monarchy and its regime elite

- The military and *mukhabarat*

- Business elites and East Bank tribal leaders (Robinson, p. 387)

Although coexisting with the Armed Forces and tribal and commercial circles, the *mukhabarat* continues to exercise both surveillance and political control over the public

sphere. As business elites are co-opted, so too are political candidates vetted by the *mukhabarat* during elections to ensure that, no matter the choice of the people, no victory can threaten loyalty to the Crown or create a parliament unwilling to comply with monarchical will (Human Rights Watch/Middle East, 1997, p. 21; Robinson, p. 406).

Although elections may be manipulated, the existence of parties has traditionally allowed groups like the Muslim Brotherhood to enjoy open engagement with the public sphere rather than furtive operations as in Egypt before Mubarak (al-Awadi, p. 73). The Muslim Brotherhood was not only legalized by King Abdullah I but enjoyed exclusive status as "the only tolerated public political grouping in Jordan for decades" (Robinson, 1998, p. 401). Under King Hussein's rule, cooption of the Muslim Brotherhood became a tool to counter the rising fervor of Nasser's anti-monarchical Arab nationalism. This tactic was, of course, in contrast to the banning or marginalization of the Muslim Brotherhood by three of Egypt's presidents (*ibid.*). However, what Egypt's pharaohs and Hashemite monarchs had in common was leveraging the Muslim Brotherhood to contain radical fundamentalists. This latter element was all the more important in Jordan. Many Muslim Brotherhood members hailed from "well-established political families" and would therefore oppose rather than join revolutionary or anti-monarchical cells (*ibid.*).

Despite the utility of the Brotherhood, the state has been wary of including them in any democratization process. The fear behind this policy is twofold. First, by using the *Ikhwan* to sideline more radical parties, the regime had inadvertently created a situation in which the Muslim Brotherhood would be the most organized political opposition to regime policies. This opposition became quite real from the late eighties to the mid-nineties. By that time, the Muslim Brotherhood's exclusive social contract with the regime (i.e. fending off radical political groups in exchange for open political engagement) made them "the only significant power in Jordan that [could] strongly oppose the two most significant policies driving the [Crown's] democratization campaign: the IMF-mandated austerity measures […] and the normalization of relations with Israel" (*ibid.*, pp. 401-402).

Second and especially after the Peace Treaty with Israel, there was the deep fear shared by regime supporters and democratic parliamentarians that a majority of the Brotherhood in parliament would threaten further liberalization. As one parliamentary official put it: "[We] fear democracy may be a vehicle only, for one group to reach the number-one status; one group which sees all truth in one book. Then there will be room for no other book, no other view. If that happens, where will I be? It will be time for people like me to go, […] but one cannot say this here. One would be accused as a *kafir* [non-believer] or as so many Salman Rushdies. It could be the democratic path to authoritarianism" (Ryan and Schwedler, 2004, p. 142).

This fear of the Brotherhood's Islamic Action Front (IAF) party using democracy to subvert liberalization and/or Hashemite plans encouraged their marginalization. The manipulation of tribal lines during elections was complemented by regime loyalists forming coalitions in parliament to dilute involvement of elected Islamists. Such measures also included using regime loyalists to block Muslim Brotherhood appointments and to minimize their involvement in cabinet activities and deals (Robinson, p. 392).

Overall, it cannot be denied that elections in Jordan have served as a form of window-dressing, as with Ben Ali's Tunisia (Driesbach and Joyce, 2014) and Mubarak's Egypt (Nagarajan, pp. 30-31). Jordan's political liberalization program began at a time when the kingdom was attempting to gain access to IMF credit (Robinson, p. 140). Further, it appeared that the liberalization process was initiated as a form of 'defensive democratization' for the regime. In other words, democratic transition has not been a bottom-up process but a regime-controlled response to socio-economic pressures. Returning to the ruling bargain, the Hashemite elite gain support from key circles in exchange for socio-economic benefits (not political openness). Hence, Jordan's liberalization program was a response to a fiscal crisis that affected the Crown's ability to maintain the rentier cash-flow required for their ruling bargain (Robinson, p. 389). As with Egypt, financing for patronage networks and basic subsidies was drawn externally and

when such aid from proximate Gulf States declined in 1990, the resultant financial gap provoked a severe economic downturn (*ibid.*, pp. 389-391). It was this downturn that encouraged a liberalization program amid royal pleas to access IMF loans (*ibid.*). IMF demands for austerity measures meant the regime would need to partially withdraw subsidies, "thereby indirectly attacking key bases of its support" (*ibid.*, p. 391).

Rather than meet IMF criteria solely through the withdrawal of elite gift-giving, the Hashemite Crown also imposed taxation upon the masses. This shift in the social contract (i.e. taking rather than providing financial benefits) meant that by "relying more on its citizenry than on external rents for its government revenues, [the monarchy] was simultaneously compelled to incorporate a greater public voice in decision-making" (*ibid.*).

In reality of course, the monarchy and its pillars of power were very aware that the deeper the liberalization and democratization process, the greater the risk to the existing ruling structure (*ibid.*, p. 390). As explained by Glenn E. Robinson, this balancing act set against financial frugality presented a socio-political challenge. "Societal depolitization is a hallmark of rentier states. Conversely, if a rentier state is compelled by budgetary realities to permanently extract greater resources from its own society (i.e. through taxation), then demands for greater inclusion and substantive political restructuring would be difficult to resist" (*ibid.*).

Returning to the main pillars of regime security, the austerity measures of IMF loan requirements actually gave the regime a chance at further cooption. Wasfi al-Tal's earlier purge of the public sector inadvertently had the long-term effect of driving West Bankers into the business elite of the private sector. Knowing that subsidy cutbacks would provoke East Bank resentment that could be directed toward Palestinian businesses, the Crown easily co-opted dominant business elites in exchange for protection from possible "East bank retaliation" as East Bankers suffered from IMF austerity measures while West Bankers "benefited the most from IMF structural adjustment in Jordan" (*ibid.*). Hence,

cooption allowed regime control of the business elite, ensuring they would "champion economic, but not political, liberalization" (*ibid.*).

In addition to regime cooperation with West Bankers of the business elite, election results were often countered if not in the regime's favor. On top of manipulating tribalism to ensure votes were often cast along clan rather than ideological lines, the monarchy also installed strong regime loyalists as parliament speakers and in some cases also appointed retired *mukhabarat* leaders as prime ministers. This two-tier reaction emphasized control over what should ideally be a pliant parliament (*ibid.*, p. 392). Furthermore, the involvement of *mukhabarat* figures as early as the first democratic elections of 1989 foreshadowed the increasing role of the *mukhabarat* and its infiltration of the liberalization program. Knowing the dangers of democratization and balancing mass approval with retained privileges, the regime used the *mukhabarat* for a policy of contained liberalization. One former PM argued it was for containment that "[n]othing, nothing is decided on any topic without the *mukhabarat*. No policy, political or otherwise, is uninfluenced by them" (Ryan and Schwedler, 2004, p. 143).

While the attacks of 9/11 gave Mubarak and Ben Ali a chance to exploit the War on Terror against domestic enemies (Thaler, 2004, p. 98; Sadiki, 2002, 'Democracy by non-Democratic Means', p. 75) this did not appear to be the case in Jordan. Across the Jordan River, while some Palestinian militants expressed satisfaction with injury done to the imperialist Americans, the majority of Palestinians saw 9/11 as a hijacking of both Islam and related Arab causes for unjustifiable murder of innocent civilians (Thaler, p. 117). At the same time, 9/11 happened amid an atmosphere in Jordan of multiple election postponements that lasted from November 2001 until June 2003 "in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war and in the context of attempts to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process" (Ryan, 2004, p. 47). In addition, the 1994 Peace Treaty with Israel had, among other things, encouraged further control or even reversal of freedoms linked to the liberalization process. For the *mukhabarat* especially, "the events of September 11 did not

so much change the course of domestic politics in Jordan as accelerate them by providing a Washington-friendly justification for increased political repression" (*ibid.*).

Islamists in Jordan did not seem to find any advantages or major policy shifts to be undertaken in the aftermath of 9/11. However, the Arab Spring presented an interesting example of cooperation between Jordan's Islamic Action Front and the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo. According to King Abdullah II, Mubarak's overthrow strongly influenced Brotherhood instructions from Cairo for the IAF to boycott Jordan's January 2011 elections. "I think they thought the revolution was going to happen in Jordan, and they didn't need to be part of the national [dialogue]," explained the King. "They thought they'd won. They had decided that they'd won" (Goldberg).

Between September 11th 2001 and Jordan's brush with the Arab Spring in 2011, the most pressing challenge was the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. The impending invasion placed deep pressure on the kingdom's economic ties with Iraq's Saddam Hussein. Not only was Iraq Jordan's sole source of hydrocarbons, the Hashemites also enjoyed the "lucrative nature of the specific Jordanian-Iraqi oil deal", which effectively meant that "half of [Iraq's supply to Jordan] was provided for free while the other half was provided at severely reduced prices (usually half price)" (Ryan, p. 46). Nonetheless, the combination of 9/11 and the U.S. stance on Iraq provided Jordan with an opportunity to leverage their indirect support for U.S. policy in exchange for aid. Returning to the monarchy's tactic of patronage distribution, key external donors included not only proximate Gulf States but also Western supporters, especially the United States (*ibid.*, p. 45). Hence, the kingdom played a delicate balancing act between the anti-U.S. stance of its Arab brethren and providing minimal logistical support for the invasion (Greenwood, 2003, p. 106).

The starting date of U.S. operations in Iraq was March 2003. By May of that year, Jordan was rewarded with the U.S. "release of $700 million in emergency aid to compensate […] for the negative economic impact of the war in Iraq", bringing total U.S. aid to Jordan to

"the highest level of economic aid ever given to Jordan by the United States" (*ibid.*, p. 107). Further, a new investment agreement was signed between the Hashemite Kingdom and the United States Republic that would increase American investment in Jordan, while U.S. allies in the Gulf were to provide Jordan with oil "free of charge until July 2003" (*ibid.*, p. 107).

Aid has always been linked to patronage, and the 2003 U.S. package was no exception to the ruling bargain. A Hashemite Fund for Jordanian Development was established in June 2003. With a combination of the aid package and "$4.2 million of [the King's] own personal funds", the purpose of such Hashemite generosity was to increase job creation and patronage to key tribal leaders. The result of increased economic pledges and security was "high levels of voter turnout among the regime's rural Transjordanian supporters in the upcoming elections", with "candidates emphasizing 'services' over ideology" securing votes. In the process, it did not hurt the regime to know that the Islamic Action Front received diluted votes that ultimately marginalized their presence in parliament (*ibid.*).

Within the context of the Iraq War and maintaining nationalism in the face of East/West Bank division, King Abdullah II launched the Jordan First campaign. Jordan First was announced as early as 2002. While officially "shifting national discourse […] to actively unite Palestinian-Jordanians and East Jordanians living to the east of the Jordan River (Culcasi, p. 7)", it is no coincidence that the government-led movement was launched at a time when "Abdullah [was] working for a diplomatic solution to the critical situation in the region of the US-Iraq conflict" (Alshboul and Oudat, p. 84). Furthermore, Jordan First gave King Abdullah II a new platform for foreign policy with regards to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Under the patriotic slant of Jordan First, Abdullah was able to publicly attack opposition parties with regional political ties (including to Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath party). As argued in his own words: "[the] programs, objectives, membership and financing of every party operating in Jordanian territory ought to be purely Jordanian…In recent decades, Jordan has given priority to Arab interests and not to its national

interests…We have a right to be concerned first for our own people, as every country in the world does, which is where our 'Jordan first' slogan comes from" (Ryan, p. 55).

In other words, any political opposition with loose ties to external parties can be branded as unpatriotic. Indeed, in 2002 the logic of patriotism encouraged arrests of journalists, scholars, activists and the shutting down of media stations critical of the regime and its support for U.S. policies (*ibid.*, p. 56).

Jordan First ultimately emphasized regime security under the guise of national unity. The narrative of national cohesion triumphing over regional troubles allowed the regime a veneer of legitimacy in altering laws for the 2003 elections. Subsequently, in addition to jettisoning ideology in favor of increased welfare, many elected candidates "emphasized local and national issues over regional ones" (Greenwood, 2003, p. 107) in the aftermath of "increasing […] military deployments in civilian areas" to pre-empt public discontent regarding U.S. involvement in Iraq and other regional crises (Ryan, p. 51).

As the self-immolation of Bouazizi spread across the region, Jordan found itself under pressure once more. By February of 2011, street protests had spread across the capital, with marches in late February attracting up to 6,000 participants (and 3,000 police officers for deterrence) on Amman's so-called 'day of anger' (Gavlak, 2011). Demands that year included a reduction of Abdullah's powers but also employment and price restrictions on basic goods (*ibid.*). The socio-economic aspect of protests was further emphasized in the autumn of 2012. Amid Hashemite efforts to secure a $2 billion credit line from the IMF, necessary cuts to fuel subsidies provoked price rises and popular resentment (al-Khalidi, 2012). By 2014, Jordan's proximity to warring Syria had flooded the Hashemite state with over 600,000 refugees. In a kingdom of 6.3 million, Syrians comprised 10% of the population that year, worsening competition for already scarce access to public services, including schools and healthcare. The pressure of refugee absorption and willingness of

Syrians to work for less in semi-skilled labor provoked sporadic protests in the summer of 2014 (Hartlaub, 2014).

Scattered protests have continued into 2017 amid further austerity measures (Williams, 2017). Nonetheless, it would appear that the monarchy has been stirred but not shaken. Why? The answer to this question is a multi-layered strategy of Hashemite survival that draws on financial aid from external parties while also exploiting ostensible weaknesses, namely Jordan's geo-strategic position amid revolutions, instability and the refugee crisis. As one Jordanian journalist put it, Jordan has escaped the Arab Spring by taking advantage of "the chaos in the region to guarantee the perpetuation of the status quo" (Murad, 2014).

From a regional perspective, both King Hussein and the current King Abdullah II have relied heavily on external aid to continue the ruling bargain for patronage networks. Indeed, within six months of his father's passing the young monarch "visited the leaders of […] the Group of Seven (G-7) states – the world's seven most industrialized and most wealthy countries" that, in turn, have strong links to global money lenders such as the IMF (Ryan, p. 45, 44). In addition, Abdullah also visited proximate oil states, including Libya and naturally the Gulf States that buttressed Hussein's patronage network until the Gulf War in the 1990's (*ibid.*, p. 45).

Both Gulf Wars in Iraq brought streams of refugees into the Hashemite Kingdom. By 2007, UNHCR figures placed them at 500,000 or almost 10% of Jordan's population (UNHCR, 2007, p. 3). After the outbreak of Syria's civil war, refugees fleeing Assad's violence also sought shelter in Jordan. By 2016, the Hashemite Kingdom was hosting up to 1.2 million Syrian nationals (Ghazal, 2016). In time, the intake of refugees would become a tactic to ward off serious discontent during the Arab Spring. However, in the years between 9/11 and the Arab Spring, the monarchy has ruled through temporary laws and partially-managed protest movements via a licensing regime. This system officially tolerated protests if written permission had been obtained from the government three days

in advance. In practice, however, few such permits were granted (Ryan and Schwedler, p. 144-145).

Amid socio-political demands from 2011-12, the King has complemented a partial reversal of liberalization with a pattern of dismissing prime ministers and cabinet members, placing blame for nepotism, corruption and socio-economic malaise upon their shoulders (Tobin, 2012). Indeed, this tactic seems to have been somewhat successful, as certain protests in 2012 concentrated anger against then-Prime Ministers Samir Rifai and later Marouf Bakhit, calling for their successive resignations in a climate of "rising food and fuel prices, inflation and unemployment" (*ibid.*). In addition, the government has not underestimated the symbolism behind public spaces where protests have occurred. As Jillian Schwedler explains, there is a political science behind not only regime security but popular discontent. "Protestors want to operate in places that will make the most impact. A heavily populated […] neighborhood […] becomes a [prominent] space to disrupt" (Schwedler, 2012).

The importance of symbolism and popular public spaces was attacked early on during Jordan's containment of the Arab Spring. As witnessed by a university student, authorities responded quickly to protests held in *Dakhlia* Square in the populous Jebel Hussein area. "[It happened in] 2011, right when the [A]rab [S]pring began. The night after those protests were shut down [in Jebel Hussein] the government immediately rebuilt the [*Dakhlia* Square] making it not fit for crowd gatherings. The next morning the plaza or the square that held people was turned into fountains and they planted trees and other plants and they made passages in between […] fit for [only] 3 people walking side by side" (Facebook, 2017, *Personal correspondence with student from University of Jordan*).

In addition, new development projects like the shopping district of Abdali Boulevard (close to Jebel Hussein) are transforming large swathes of public space into "private commercial spaces, which can be policed and controlled more stringently, as citizens have no right to be there. If you are not buying a $4 coffee in an upscale café, you are not really

welcome in that space. This elitism helps the government, because it keeps those who do not 'belong' (those who might protest) out [of conspicuous public areas]" (Schwedler). It is perhaps a peculiar coincidence that the now-open Abdali Boulevard "stands near the site of the old *Mukhabarat* Building […] [,] literally being built on the foundations of a security state" (*ibid.*). Abdali Boulevard stands as a new symbol of regime security meeting tourism and global investment. The glitter of high-price malls and luxury developments fosters a simulacrum of generic but safe materialism, in which "foreign investors can go to the sushi bars and beautiful hotels and get to their places of work" (*ibid.*).

Returning to the influx of refugees, their plight has added to the regime's resources for crowd control. At the start of protests in 2011, Iraqis who had fled Baghdad in 2003 warned of the consequences of overthrow in their homeland (Tobin). The fear of instability provoked by the presence of Gulf War victims was exacerbated by the Syrian civil war. Absorbing more Syrians than Iraqis by 2016, "Jordanians [became] fully aware that this is no time for their domestic concerns", with increasing refugees a constant reminder of what awaits should the status quo crumble. As one human rights activist explained, fear of instability means that Jordan's "ruler is best served by the status quo. The regime is comfortable today and is sitting on its podium surveying the scene. It doesn't need to make any serious effort to fix or improve [things] because the status quo is stable" (Murad).

Tracing Hashemite rule from Hussein to today's Abdullah II reveals a multilayered form of regime security that draws heavily on external aid. While it is true that the Hashemites may boast some Religious Legitimacy though lineage to the Prophet Muhammad, their ultimate survival comes from the trappings of a patronage network and the ruling bargain of a rentier state financed by proximate oil sheikhs and access to global aid bodies through powerful Western allies. This ruling bargain is heavily linked to tribal support, which in turn has influenced manipulation of elections and the infiltration of the pervasive *mukhabarat* to ensure any democratic opening does not threaten elite interests. At the same

time, King Abdullah seems to express a desire for democratic openness and some regret for inheriting the electoral tactics of his father.

During 2013 election campaigns, Abdullah met with leaders of the National Current Party only to discover that "what the party stood for […], beyond patronage and the status quo, was not entirely clear" (Goldberg). Emphasizing his disappointment in how such parties were approaching the democratic vote, Abdullah explained that he "read [their] economic and social manifesto, and it scared the crap out of me. [It made] no sense whatsoever. If [they're] going to reach out to the 70 percent of the population that is younger than me, [they've] got to work on this. [The party manifesto] […] didn't have anything. It was slogans. There was no program. Nothing. […] It's all about 'I'll vote for this guy because I'm in his tribe'" (*ibid.*).

Such sentiments and the public desire of Abdullah for "a Jordan where [the people] love the monarchy, just like […] the outpouring toward Queen Elizabeth in England" may very well be genuine (*ibid.*). However, in a desert kingdom dependent on external aid and rentier agreements, it would seem that the Hashemite tribe continues to practice regime survival above all else, exploiting regional chaos rather than pushing sincere reform. Their goal: to stay afloat and keep the state under their name.

An overview of Jordan under the Hashemites explains further how Jordan as a monarchical case study is strongly tied to the hypothesis assumptions of this thesis. Jordan's dependence on external aid highlights the nature of a limited socio-economic ruling bargain, with 'defensive democratization' linked to Korany's discussion in Chapter Two of how the ruling bargain is not static and can change or become politicized when material distribution is limited. In addition, Jordan's history under the Hashemites emphasizes Religious Legitimacy, which is strongly emphasized in Abdullah II's speech in response to the Arab Spring, as will be discussed in Chapter 6. The major themes of Religious Legitimacy and the ruling bargain are most apparent in Jordan as a case study and from

Abdullah's speech, with Chapter 7's analysis of political factors from Jordan's Constitution further bolstering rule through traditionalism and religion.

5.3 The Kingdom of Bahrain

"Our dear people[,] […] [National Day] is in recognition of your outstanding performance

and achievement […], producing common values of co-existence, tolerance and

enlightenment. [We] should proudly recall memories of those who had set sails up and

planted palm trees, and excavated for oil […] in order to implement prosperous life on

each inch of […] Bahraini soil. Our appreciation goes as well to […] the Bahrain Defense

Force (BDF) and other security bodies who safeguard gains, freedom […] and stability of

the nation. […] The march of welfare, reform and modernization will never be halted"

(Bahrain News Agency, 2004).

A celebration of monarchy, oil wealth, regime security and welfare benefits. Thus, was the 2004 National Day announced by King Hamad bin Issa al-Khalifa. It is the emphasis on oil wealth that will be examined as a major theme in Chapter 6's main analysis. To reiterate, the hypothesis assumes that republics will emphasize the socio-economic ruling bargain as the main source of their non-democratic legitimacy in response to the Arab Spring, due to most republics being the result of coups rather than established familial rule. Consequently, many republican rulers have weaker ties to traditional (religious) institutes and popular support and rely on a ruling bargain to maintain legitimacy. Monarchs, on the other hand, will draw on Religious Legitimacy more than the ruling bargain due to their longevity and ties to traditional institutions and accepted socio-cultural norms. However, Bahrain's oil wealth and monarchical system present a partial reversal of this hypothesis. As will be expanded upon in Chapter 6 and discussed in this chapter, Bahrain is a monarchy but one that draws on oil wealth to ensure consistent welfare provisions. Such a factor of political legitimacy provides a case study of monarchical rule that emphasizes a socio-economic ruling bargain. Yet, as with its Jordanian counterpart, Bahrain is also a

case study that draws on religion, albeit via the divisive lens of sectarianism. It is this mix or themes of traditionalism and oil wealth that places Bahrain after Jordan when addressing the hypothesis and answering the research question: What are the factors Arab leaders use in discourse justifying their rule within the context of the Arab Spring? To what extent does this discourse support a (socio-economic) ruling bargain and Religious Legitimacy?

In 2002, Bahrain's ruler had transformed the island state into a kingdom. A 2001 constitutional amendment had re-crowned the former emir as king by 2002, an ostensible move toward constitutional rather than absolute rule (Henderson, 2017, p. 2). This progressive image was in keeping with the nascent period of King Hamad. Ascending to the throne in 1999, the mature monarch was a rumored reformer (Diamond, 2013, p. 85). Deep rather than cosmetic reforms were offered as concessions by the new king, intended to mark a departure from a restrictive predecessor. Akin to the pragmatic Mubarak and soft-spoken Ben Ali, Hamad released up to 320 political prisoners and pardoned political dissidents (Wehrey, 2013, p. 118). Tight security laws were revoked. In addition, civil society was tentatively awakened under a new right to form political 'associations' and the creation of a parliament with up to forty elected members (*ibid.*, pp. 118-119).

The aforementioned changes seemed indeed to lead to a less absolute autocracy. In 2001, Hamad's National Action Charter formally called for Bahrain to progress into a constitutional monarchy. The same document also deepened citizen relations with the state and their political involvement through parliament. An elected lower house would complement an appointed upper house, kept in check by an independent judiciary. As Ben Ali presented himself as an advocate for women (Hawkins, 2011, p. 45-46), Hamad called on the engagement of Bahrain's females in the political sphere and gave men and women over twenty the right to vote (Wehrey, p. 119). The National Action Charter was overwhelmingly endorsed when put to vote in February 2001 (*ibid.*). Verily, the island nation "and particularly its large numbers of relatively impoverished [Shia'as], worked itself into a state of near-euphoria over these initiatives" (*ibid.*).

Such excitement was short-lived, however. By 2002, many of these initiatives had been reversed. Amid renewed press censorship, King Hamad also sought to severely reduce the legislative rights of the elected lower house (*ibid.*). Already in these early days of power, it was becoming clear that Bahrain's monarchy was not progressively constitutional but a firm family affair. While other Gulf States centralize rule around one head, Bahrain's House of Khalifa is distinguished by a triumvirate. This ruling arrangement sees King Hamad as the premier decision-maker, seconded by his elder uncle as Prime Minister (Henderson, p. 2). This partnership is followed by Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa as the third ruling member and a moderating presence against royal hardliners who "oppose any concession toward the country's [Shia'a majority]" (*ibid.*).

Reform reversal seemed to garner little international outcry. Indeed, years of human rights gaps and political regression did not seem to draw attention from the power corridors in London or Washington D.C. (Diamond, p. 85). As put by American geopolitical firm Stratfor, "Bahrain's importance to [the West] as a regional ally in the Middle East is inversely proportional to the kingdom's size" (Stratfor Enterprises, LLC, 2017). Bahrain's proximity to Iran provides the oil kingdom with a "geostrategic trump card" akin to Jordan's politically sensitive location in the Arab world (Diamond, 2013, p. 85). For the United States, access to the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean has encouraged naval bases on Bahraini shores since 1947. By 1995, this presence had been expanded to include the U.S. Fifth Fleet and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command. With a population of almost 10,000 American military, DoD and civilian staff (including family members), the Fifth Fleet has been a U.S. entry-point into MENA conflict participation since shortly after the reform regression of 2002. Hence, Bahrain became the "[primary] naval base for U.S. War in Afghanistan" and in 2003 complemented Jordan's logistics support geography by becoming the primary Gulf base for the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Stratfor, 2017).

In addition to strong U.S. ties, Bahrain and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan share British relations as another commonality. Rulers of both states received military training at the

U.K.'s prestigious Sandhurst Royal Military Academy (BBC, 2014, 'Sandhurst Sheikhs'). Known as the Sandhurst Sheikhs, past graduates include Gulf and Levant monarchs. Both King Hussein and current King Abdullah II of Jordan attended the "grueling 44-week course testing the physical and intellectual skills of officer cadets and imbuing them with the values of the British Army" (BBC, 2014, 'Sandhurst Sheikhs'). Such values extend to an "Officer Commissioning Course [that] covers counter-insurgency techniques and ways to manage public disorder" (*ibid.*). The Sheikhs of Sandhurst are also ruling sheikhs in their home countries, with the majority of Sandhurst's royal graduates heads of GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) states. In addition to training Jordan's Hashemite kings, Sandhurst also trained "King Hamad of Bahrain, Sheikh Tamim, Emir of Qatar, [late] Sultan Qaboos of Oman [and] […] Sheikh Saad, [fourth] Emir of Kuwait [until 2006]" (*ibid.*).

Common factors between Jordan and Bahrain are contrasted by one resource taken in the Gulf for granted: oil. However, Bahrain's oil reserves remain modest compared to its GCC brethren. As of 2016, proven crude volume stood at 100 million barrels with a production capacity of 50,000 barrels per day (CIA World Factbook, 2017; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2016, *Bahrain*). Along with Oman, Bahrain is the only Gulf State that does not belong to OPEC and stands as the smallest oil producer in the GCC (Energy Information Administration, 2016). With a population of around 1.3 million, Bahrain's energy outlook is easily rivaled by its neighbors Kuwait and Qatar (CIA World Factbook, 2017). As of 2016, Kuwait boasted 102 billion barrels of proven crude reserves and a population of just under 4 million (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2016, *Kuwait*; World Bank, 2015). Qatar, on the other hand, enjoys proven oil reserves of 25.7 billion barrels for a population of around 2.2 million (Oxford Business Group, 2017; World Bank, 2015). Naturalized citizens number a fraction of this total. While recent official estimates are lacking, a 2010 survey by the Qatar Statistics Authority placed the natural populous at around 240,000 (Winckler, 2015).

In addition to its one onshore field, Bahrain shares a second offshore field with Saudi Arabia. Known as the Abu Safah field, the partnership between the two kingdoms sees Bahrain refine and market half the field's output, while Saudi Arabia oversees all production. Profits are split evenly between the House of Saud and the House of Khalifa. Nevertheless, the dominance of Saudi production involvement symbolizes an asymmetric political relationship between both Gulf States. This unequal partnership would prove pivotal during Bahrain's Arab Spring (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2016).

Since the 1970's, Bahrain has emphasized economic diversification, building up a regional base for industry, Islamic banking and global appeal as a foreign investment hub and global banking center in the Middle East (Hamdi and Sbia, 2013, p. 119). Nonetheless, oil profit remains the principle source of state income, accounting for up to 87.85% of revenues in 2011 (*ibid.*). In addition, the government appears to draw on oil wealth, however meager, to maintain a high level of expenditure. This expenditure includes development projects for long-term infrastructure and raising living standards, linked to welfare and Beneficial Consequences under the ruling bargain (*ibid.*). High expenditure on long-term goals draws heavily on hydrocarbon riches, making expenditure vulnerable to oil price fluctuations. At the same time, state commitment to long-term projects and spending almost prevents a reduction in expenditure if and when oil prices decrease (*ibid.*). This conundrum is framed within the context of the ruling bargain and Beneficial Consequences expected by GCC citizens, with governing tactics straddling "the need to build modern state institutions [with] the [government's] urge to retain control over the political and public sphere" (Sika, 2013, p. 7).

Government control through the ruling bargain, as in many Arab states, is primarily solidified through subsidies and welfare benefits. Subsidies often target daily consumer goods and other items that affect living costs and standards. Hence, the monarchy provides total or partial subsidies for:

- Commercial petrol

- Basic foodstuffs, including fresh meat

- All utilities

- Prescription medicine

In addition to the aforementioned subsidies, healthcare and education are provided to the populous free of charge and the state constantly intervenes in domestic markets to keep prices stable and sheltered from any economic shocks that can alter the cost of (imported) consumer goods (Epstein and Miller, 2015, p. 29). The importance of such constant Beneficial Consequences appears to supersede long-term infrastructure projects on e.g. roads, bridges and even schools and hospitals. Indeed, it would seem that while the state attempts to shelter its citizens from economic shocks through price control, any spike in oil demand sees an across-the-board increase in grants, subsidies and wages as opposed to the bulk of increased profits being invested (Hamdi and Sbia, 2013, p. 123).

At the same time, Bahrain's leadership appears to understand the curse of finite resources. Four years before the Arab Spring, a royal decree established the Future Generations Reserve Fund (FGF). The Fund was ostensibly founded to strengthen long-term fiscal management and preserve what little remains of Bahrain's oil wealth. However, the Fund's coffers are lined by oil profits only when receives for hydrocarbon exports are higher than predicted. The fact that oil profits are consistently spent on subsidies while the Fund's growth assumes non-projected surplus implies that maintaining the ruling bargain and related benefits takes precedent (*ibid.*).

Oil wealth is not given to all, however. Just as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is ruled by a minority and populated by a majority of Palestinian origin, so too does Bahrain suffer from its own sectarianism. The Sunni al-Khalifas are a minority elite ruling a population that is 70% Shia'a (Wehrey, p. 116). The fear of a Shia'a takeover buttresses Bahrain's

relations with the rest of the Gulf, especially the Saudi Kingdom. As a Sunni government, Saudi Arabia contains its own Shia'a minority in the oil-rich eastern provinces (*ibid.*, p. 124). Hence, Saudi Arabia fears not only its own minority but how political reform in Bahrain may empower local Shia'as to the extent that a challenge to Sunni rule is possible (Henderson, p. 4). Such a shift in Bahrain's political relations would in turn inspire Saudi Arabia's Shia'as to seek the same liberation from their Sunni masters (*ibid.*). It is for this reason that Saudi Arabia attempts to hold political sway in Bahrain. In addition to oil income, the al-Khalifas enjoy Saudi oil subsidies (*ibid.*, p. 118). This economic penetration of Bahrain symbolizes deeper political involvement, under which Saudi Arabia acts as "the al-Khalifa family's chief economic and political patron" (*ibid.*, p. 123).

It would seem that Saudi Arabia exercises its own ruling bargain over the al-Khalifas. In exchange for Saudi financial and political backing, the conservative Saudi Kingdom is granted dominant influence in Bahrain's parliamentary affairs. As with Mubarak, Saudi Arabia considers true liberalization dangerous but welcomes "*calibrated* political reform as a means to release pressure and marginalize more hard-line elements of [Shia'a] opposition" (*ibid.*). As such, Riyadh's strategy since 2006 has been to shape and limit the political path of Bahrain's parliament. Saudi Arabia funded the Sunni Islamist al-Asala group in 2006 while also welcoming the participation of moderate Shia'a groups in elections. At the same time, while such moderates may be manipulated to counter militant Shia'a groups in Bahrain, Riyadh has also sent Sunni voters with dual citizenship to cast votes in Bahrain, complementing al-Khalifa tactics of naturalizing foreign Sunnis for ballots during elections (*ibid.*, pp. 120, 123-124). By the time of Bahrain's Arab Spring, naturalized Sunnis were referred to as 'mercenaries' for being granted citizenship in order to augment Bahrain's Sunni population (al-Rawi, 2015, p. 35).

While Egypt and Jordan have seen the *majlis* become an arena of (Sunni) Islamist-government collaboration (al-Awadi, p. 63; Robinson, p. 401), Bahrain's own parliament augments such relations through the fragile lens of sectarianism. Returning to the 2002

reversal of reforms, a subsequent rise in public cynicism toward al-Khalifa rule punctuated a year of increasing restrictions. The weakening of parliament's elected lower house and subsequent strengthening of the royally-appointed upper council was presented as a necessary step for national stability. As explained by an upper house member, the parliamentary framework was revised "so it couldn't be hijacked by extremists. We don't want a forty-person elected house composed of religious clerics who will ban alcohol, forbid women from driving, take Bahrain backwards, and drive away the foreigners who enjoy our liberal society" (al-Rawi, p. 119).

However, when the weakening of the lower house was combined with fixed elections, it was increasingly obvious that more important than mitigating religious conservatives was the continuation of Sunni political dominance (*ibid.*). The subsequent boycott of 2002 elections by Shia'a groups strengthened the numbers of Sunni Muslim organizations in parliament, including Muslim Brotherhood affiliate al-Minbar and the Salafist al-Asala. The strengthening of ties between the regime and (Sunni) Islamists is in contrast to the persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood in the nascent years of the Egyptian Republic (Nagarajan, p. 33). However, it is also a collaboration tactic utilized by the Hashemite kings of Jordan, intended to strengthen not only cooperation between the regime and mainstream Islamists but also as a strategy to marginalize fundamentalists. In Bahrain, however, the same political stratagem illustrates the use of Religious Legitimacy through empowering the Sunni minority elite. A strong Sunni bloc in parliament and their rapport with Hamad would eventually weaken Shia'a involvement twofold.

First, such a Sunni partnership would ensure that Shia'a entrance into parliamentary elections in 2006 would face the de facto obstacle of fewer seats and hence diluted political clout. Second, such marginalization from 2002-06 fragmented Shia'a opposition regarding involvement in elections. The moderate al-Wifaq group decided to participate in 2006 elections, while the militant al-Haq group refused. Compared to other Arab regimes, Bahrain's Sunni-Shia'a divide affects parliamentary partnerships between parties and the

regime. Hence, al-Khalifa collaboration with parliament ensures the political dominance of Sunni moderates. At the same time, King Hamad allows Shia'a representation and political activity through al-Wifaq, the candidates of which are "backed by senior Shia'a clerics" (al-Rawi, p. 119). This Sunni-Shia'a relationship provides a veneer of religious tolerance in the political sphere while in reality fragmenting Shia'a political opposition. The split between moderate al-Wifaq participation and al-Haq refusal ensure that any elected Shia'a members are "still short of the majority needed to pass laws" (*ibid.*, p. 120).

In addition to manipulating Shia'a numbers in parliament, the Shia'a majority face other forms of discrimination. Such marginalization can be divided into political and religious forms. Political discrimination includes underrepresentation not only during elections but in national surveys and district representation. This form of populous manipulation carries hidden discrimination for Shia'a communities. Underreported district numbers guarantee reduced aid and benefits, forcing Shia'a leaders to fill a services gap. While Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood had the luxury of plugging such a gap to gain popularity, Shia'a leaders find their political opportunities reduced as they "must sacrifice the basic work of governing in order to respond adequately to the citizens they represent" (ADHRB, 2015, p. 19).

Returning to the previous discussion of naturalized Sunnis, the regime complements this practice by denying citizenship to eligible (Shia'a) residents. At the same time, the monarchy has not hesitated to strip Shia'a activists and clerics, even youth, of their passports to further augment Sunni numbers (*ibid.*, p. 20). Equally telling when it comes to distribution of power has been work discrimination, with Shia'as routinely barred from government positions, including police and military (Wehrey, p. 125). Much as Jordan's similar treatment of Palestinians was meant to ensure East Banker and royalist dominance in the public sector, Bahrain's own hiring practices are intended to preserve Sunni dominance and the elite status of the ruling minority (*ibid.*).

Older still and perhaps less covert is religious discrimination toward the Shia'a populous. It is ironic indeed that the ostensible equal rights of Hamad's National Action Charter encouraged many exiled Shia'a clerics to return (ADHRB, 2015, p. 23). The political openness of the Charter saw many such clerics band together to form the Shia'a al-Wifaq group that became Bahrain's largest political organization and Shia'a opposition. After 2002, openness became authoritarianism with reform reversal, and since 2011 religious discrimination of Shia'a leaders has worsened. After the start of February protests that year, the regime arrested and tortured prominent Shia'a clergymen before sentencing them to several years or life imprisonment. Their crimes: insulting the ruling family and guilt by association (*ibid.*).

To complete retaliation against the Shia'a majority, government forces have also targeted landmarks and sites of cultural importance to Shia'a' Bahrainis. Throughout 2011, up to 38 Shia'a mosques were demolished across the country, some up to several hundred years old. The majority of such structures appear to have been crushed due to their public visibility and/or proximity to Shia'a neighborhoods (*ibid.*, p. 24).

The bulldozing of Shia'a shrines and physical violence toward Shia'a clergy punctuated the regime's sectarian response to protests in 2011. However, these acts also symbolize Shia'a discrimination and the dangerous balancing act of sectarianism that was present years before such demonstrations. The strongest symbol and source of failure has been the parliament amid flirtations with reform that reverted to authoritarianism. Amid these reversals were the alteration of the 1973 Constitution and the legislative powers of the elected lower house. As discussed, this shift was intended to preserve power for the royally-appointed upper house but also deepened "a government strategy of using the legislature to incite sectarianism so that the monarchy could play the role of arbiter" (Wehrey, p. 125).

By 2006, the regime tactic of playing mediator was having harmful effects on Bahrain's political outlook. The partnership between the regime and Sunni Islamists provoked increasing sectarianism that, in turn, created a weakened parliament. Amid regional tensions that highlighted Sunni-Shia'a hostility, the sectarian squabbling in parliament and inability of al-Wifaq to push reforms was provoking growing frustration among Bahrain's younger Shia'a majority (*ibid.*, p. 120). Regional tensions filtered into Bahrain's parliament to the point where legislation became highly politicized. As explained by GCC scholar Frederic Wehrey, "[in] the wake of the 2006 Lebanon War and Iraq's Sunni-Shia violence, Bahraini MPs adopted increasingly sectarian positions on the dramatic events unfolding around them. Instead of legislating reforms that might improve the lives of their constituents, deputies tried to pass parliamentary expressions of solidarity with the defenders of Fallujah, Najaf, or Beirut. During loud and heated debates, Sunni MPs [exchanged insults with] their Shia'a counterparts and were called 'al-Qaeda' in return" (*ibid.*, p. 121).

Examples of sectarian impasse such as the aforementioned cases were used by the monarchy as proof that only the House of Khalifa could truly rule Bahrain and, as mediators of sectarianism, prevent the island nation from descending into the chaos of the next Iraq or Lebanon (*ibid.*). Yet, while claiming to be arbiters of sectarianism, the regime was also pushing al-Wifaq into a corner over a significant parliamentary issue that contributed to protest: corruption. Unfortunately for al-Wifaq, corruption was one of the few political issues it could fight as a way of promoting both itself and what should have been non-sectarian interests. However, as in Jordan's parliament, such a campaign threatened to interfere with royal socio-economics and provoked the monarchy into a caustic response. One year before Bahrain's Arab Spring, Shia'a activists found themselves at the mercy of mass arrests, loss of citizenship and jail terms. The most prominent victims of this campaign were Shia'a clerics and cabinet members. By portraying the accused as Iranian agents, the al-Khalifas once again framed political issues

in deeply sectarian terms, while also issuing a warning to MPs: examining how the royal family uses public funds or lands was crossing a red line (*ibid.*, p. 122).

This real threat against political investigations emphasizes al-Khalifa power in a parliament that is ultimately disempowered. Since the 1990's, Bahrain's political life has been subject to the same 'reforms' as the parliaments of Ben Ali's Tunisia and Mubarak's Egypt. Cosmetic changes marked the 1990's, which saw the creation of the unelected *majlis* in 1993 (*ibid.*, p. 118). The promise of true democratic progress was cut short with the 2002 reversal of reforms. This period of revived authoritarianism preceded the 2006 sectarian tensions in parliament amid Saudi influence and vote manipulation.

Sectarianism punctuated the al-Khalifa strategy of keeping parliament weak. It would also punctuate their successful attempts to quash revolution. On 14th February 2011, protestors inspired by the movements in Tunis and Cairo gathered to make their own demands known. Their requests included non-sectarian albeit generalized ideals such as freedom, democratic transition and equality, with Bahraini Sunnis (outside the royal circle) participating in demonstrations for such universal values (Diamond, 2013, p. 85). The regime's response would not only be brutal but utilize regional allies and media as the al-Khalifas hijacked Bahrain's protests to transform them into sectarian threats that emphasized internal differences over political unity.

Initial protests began to coalesce around February 14th, 2011. On February 17th, Bahrain security forces sent a brutal message. As Jordan's *Dakhlia* Square became a rallying point and symbol for unrest, so too did Bahrain's Pearl Roundabout in the capital, Al Manama become a symbol of resistance to authority (al-Rawi, p. 25; Wehrey, p. 122). And just as Jordan's monarchy was quick to deconstruct *Daklia* Square, the al-Khalifas responded in kind. A pre-dawn raid of the Roundabout saw the immediate deaths of four sleeping protestors amid a flurry of "rubber bullets, birdshot and tear gas" (*ibid.*). The act and subsequent arrests, killings and denial of medical care were justified by the state as a

necessary response to sectarian threats (*ibid.*). One day after what became known as 'Bloody Thursday', government forces tore down the (in)famous pearl that had become the symbol of protest at the Pearl Roundabout (Bronner, 2011). Officials claimed the move was intended to ease traffic congestion in an often-crowded part of the capital. However, it is impossible to accept this explanation if analyzing the shifting meaning of symbolism.

The pearl sculpture was originally a defining landmark symbolizing GCC unity and Bahrain's relations with "the six gulf states whose economic life was based, before oil, on pearls" (*ibid.*). By 2011, however, the same symbol loomed over the tent-camp of popular protest movements "with free food and a carnival atmosphere modeled on Tahrir Square in Cairo" (*ibid.*). For demonstrators, the pearl monument had become a defining rallying point, changing the symbolism of the Pearl Roundabout from a government-controlled GCC narrative to one of popular resistance. Indeed, Bahrain's Foreign Minister at the time, Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa contradicted excuses of easing congestion. "We did it," he explained, "to remove a bad memory". Referring to the protests, Sheikh Khalifa went on, "[the] whole thing caused our society to be polarized. We don't want a monument to a bad memory" (*ibid.*).

In addition to expunging altered symbols of national unity, the regime also paid attention to how social media was presenting Bahrain's Arab Spring. Of note has been the use of popular video search engine Youtube, often used by Bahraini activists to spread their filmed activities (al-Rawi, p. 25). However, activists were not the only political actors to use social media to spin their own narrative. While protestors in Al Manama may have brought universal demands, underlying sectarianism turned Bahrain's troubles into a public opportunity for regional and domestic groups to frame the island nation's divide as a Sunni-Shia'a split for their own political motives. This opportunistic hijacking of the protest narrative would slowly aid the al-Khalifas in their own media campaign (*ibid.*, p. 26).

The al-Khalifas were assisted in their campaign by fellow GCC allies, who framed the demonstrations as the work of Shia'a "traitors [who were] supporting an Iranian agenda" (*ibid.*). In addition, Qatar-owned Al Jazeera was accused of under-reporting protests and presenting a Sunni-biased slant of unfolding events. Four of Al Jazeera's employees ostensibly resigned over the lack of neutral reporting (*ibid.*, p. 27). At the same time, Al Jazeera's biased coverage and the Sunni support of GCC partners was contrasted by the coverage of Shia'a satellite channels, including those of Iranian origin. This was especially true of the Iranian Al-Alam station, which devoted much time to coverage of 'Shia'a protests' in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Al-Alam encouraged dissent against monarchy in both the al-Khalifa and Saudi kingdoms, an alarming fact considering that Al-Alam is watched by up to 90% of Bahrain's Shia'a populous (*ibid.*, p. 27). Al-Alam's supposed voicing of Shia'a concerns at the expense of objectivity allowed the regime and its GCC allies to frame the protests as a sectarian threat and activists as Iranian agents. The fact that such Sunni accusations were linked to real broadcasters in Iran gave the government's sectarian campaign partial legitimacy (*ibid.*).

The government's campaign of sectarianism spread to social media to deepen the religious chasm so vital to the al-Khalifa narrative. In particular, regime operatives traced Bahraini users of Facebook and Twitter, constantly monitoring political expressions "using sophisticated and expensive equipment provided by Western companies" (*ibid.*, p. 30). Traced activists faced jail terms or worse in state-run social media campaigns that were, in some cases, disturbingly overt. One Facebook page ostensibly linked to authorities encouraged visitors to reveal the name and workplace of Shia'a activists "and let the government take care of the rest" (Voice of America, 2011). Another page seemed designed to intimidate, boasting photos of individual demonstrators. Each photo would be checked off once the person in question was detained by authorities (*ibid.*).

The regime's manipulation and monitoring of social media was effective in sowing sectarian distrust online. Sunni and Shia'a users became suspicious of one another,

ensuring that rather than national unity (against the regime), Facebook and Twitter became arenas for fueling sectarianism, creating "suspicion between people who work together or live together or are in the same society or club" (*ibid.*). The ease of monitoring Twitter and Facebook drove many activists toward posting their narratives on Youtube. As of 2015, no reported arrests had been linked to Youtube posts (al-Rawi, p. 31). However, this supposedly 'safer' online platform was not immune to sectarian divide. Even on Youtube, activists appeared split into pro or anti Shia'a communities (*ibid.*, p. 36). Indeed, Youtube activity saw Bahrain's protests take on a regional and even global slant that reflected al-Khalifa-Saudi relations and the interest of GCC states and the West.

In a 2015 analysis of Youtube videos posted by Bahraini activists, it was revealed that seven channels sharing just over 3,500 videos on protests had garnered over 12 million views and over 14,000 subscribers (*ibid.*, p. 32). Further analysis of video comments exemplified regional and Western interest in Bahrain's woes. 41.4% of examined comments were from inside Bahrain. However, over 20% of video comments came from Saudi Arabian users and 4.1% from Kuwait (*ibid.*). Interestingly enough, only 0.2% of comments were from Iran, with U.K. comments providing 3.6% and comments from the United States just behind Saudi Arabia at 20.3% (*ibid.*).

Complementing regional involvement was the act of 'flaming' or insulting another person based on, inter alia, religious and political affiliation. The act of 'flaming' is often topic sensitive but also thrives on anonymity, which may encourage uninhibited online behavior (*ibid.*). The greater anonymity of Youtube users when compared to Facebook and Twitter may also have contributed to the hurling of insults across videos (*ibid.*). Returning to al-Khalifa accusations of Iranian interference, Youtube comments made on Bahrain's Shia'a populous appear linked to Iran, implying the supposed conspiracy and regime fear that Shia'a communities sought the overthrow of Sunni royalty under Iranian influence (*ibid.*, p. 34).

On the other hand, comments also provided an interesting example of Religious Legitimacy. While the Hashemite monarchy of Jordan drew on lineage to the Prophet Muhammad, in Bahrain it appeared to be the protestors who saw themselves as blessed by their links to their faith. Comments are often laced with common religious phrases such as 'Allah's blessing', 'by Allah' and 'my Allah' (*ibid.*, p. 32). These religious supplications are linked to anti-government phrases such as 'down with Hamad' and other slogans used by overwhelmingly Shia'a users and protestors (*ibid.*, pp. 33-34). In other words, protestors see their cause as just under God, with some users going so far as issuing 'Allah's curse' against King Hamad and also Saudi Arabia (*ibid.*, p. 34). At the same time, the phrase 'Allah's curse' is also directed by some users toward 'Bahraini Shiites'. Such comments seem provoked as a counter response to anti-Hamad comments and appear to stem from "hardline Sunnis" in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia (*ibid.*, p. 35). Countering anti-Shia'a comments, some 'flaming' took a politico-economic as well as religious slant through frequent use of the term 'mercenaries'. The word 'mercenaries' was used to refer to naturalized Sunnis in Bahrain and the al-Khalifa strategy of providing foreigners with Bahraini citizenship to augment Sunni numbers, reflecting demands of Shia'a protestors to end said practice and revoke citizenship of such 'mercenaries', who are also accused of being incorporated into Bahrain's security forces (*ibid.*).

In addition to violent crackdowns and manipulating sectarianism, it is possible to return to the ruling bargain to understand why Bahrain's Arab Spring never blossomed. The ruling bargain includes subsidies and free benefits (healthcare, education) that are associated with general living costs. It must be recalled that many movements under the Arab Spring were provoked not only by political suppression but by the desire for bread, which came before freedom, social justice and human dignity (Pin, p. 3). As mentioned earlier, Bahrain's government ensures fixed food prices and hence controls consumer expenses linked to living standards—for, as Bouazizi himself put it, citizens will not tolerate being unable to

make a living. In the case of a Gulf ruling bargain, oil wealth may create expectations for a subsidized living, however (Epstein and Miller, p. 2, 8).

The subsidies and welfare benefits of Bahrain's ruling bargain represent a constant service that should be maintained by the state in exchange for political support or at least apoliticism. Clearly, Bahrain's unrest illustrated that for many, especially the marginalized Shia'a, this agreement was not enough. Indeed, Shia'a discontent is a reminder of their discrimination and receiving less of such benefits than their Sunni counterparts (ADHRB, 2015, p. 19). When oil benefits, albeit unevenly spread, did not prove enough, the state responded with the manipulation of sectarianism and the brutal crackdown that became known as 'Bloody Thursday'. However, such violence did not stem demonstrations. In less than a week, over 100, 000 Bahrainis or 15% of the population occupied the streets of Al Manama once more, in honor of the victims of 'Bloody Thursday'. King Hamad offered concessions in response that were "too modest, too late. […] Bahrain's aroused majority would settle for nothing less than a purely constitutional monarchy, and militants were calling for an end to the monarchy altogether" (Diamond, 2013, p. 86).

Bahrain is a tiny kingdom, but its neighbor is not. The media campaign of sectarianism pushed by Bahrain was not the only countermove supported by Saudi Arabia and the GCC. On the morning of March 17th, the Pearl Roundabout was once again invaded by 5,000 soldiers, tanks and aerial assault vehicles. In a tragic twist of irony, this crackdown was also on a Thursday, deepening the violent memories of 'Bloody Thursday' just a week before. Further, Bahraini troops were supported by soldiers of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Around 1500 GCC troops entered Bahraini soil, thus complementing the online sectarian warfare led by the al-Khalifas with military force. Saudi Arabia especially was eager to extinguish the fires of rebellion due to the event taking place next door to their own Shia'a populous (Mcevers, 2012).

The King Fahd Causeway connects both nations, symbolizing Saudi-Bahraini unity (perhaps under Saudi leadership) and is enjoyed regularly by Saudis seeking a Friday night in less uptight Bahrain, where they can "drink alcohol in bars and clubs" (Mabon, 2012). However, the Causeway also serves as a strong political symbol of Saudi concern regarding Iran and Bahrain's Shia'a majority. The Causeway's primary political purpose is therefore not to increase Saudi-Bahraini economic ties (or 'tourist trips' to bars and clubs) but rather "to engender easier access [for Saudi Arabia] in case of trouble for the [al-Khalifas]" (*ibid.*). This political motive accelerated completion of the Causeway after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, reflecting "suspicion of Iranian interference […] within Bahrain […] and [suspicion of] Khomeini's desire to export the revolution". A worst case scenario for the House of Saud is that Iranian interference and subsequent "increasing Shia power in Bahrain may lead to an empowered Shia community in [Saudi Arabia's] Eastern Province" (*ibid.*).

And so it was that on March 17th, 2011 Saudi troops crossed the border with ease, with the King Fahd Causeway also welcoming "police and troops from the UAE and Qatar" (*ibid*). Under a GCC-crackdown, resistance to al-Khalifa rule began to buckle. Completing the media war and militarized repression was socio-economic retribution (Diamond, p. 86). Just as Jordanian authorities have been willing to revoke citizenship of disloyal subjects, Bahraini activists suddenly found themselves stripped of their passports (Amnesty International, 2016). Worse still, some victims found that revocation of citizenship was only the first stage, followed by deportation. Expulsion appeared to be an increasingly favored method of silencing dissent by the spring of 2016 (*ibid.*).

Amid sectarian-framed crackdowns bolstered by GCC military might, King Hamad appeared to remember his initial image of reform. In the summer of 2011, a royal decree established the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI). On the one hand, this act went deeper than the democratic window-dressing of Ben Ali and Mubarak. A report by BICI concluded that security forces during 2011 events were guilty of systemic abuse,

torture and other forms of physical and psychological harm amid "a culture of impunity for the perpetrators" (Diamond, 2013, p. 88). Such outspokenness indeed makes the BICI appear independent. On the other hand, few of the reforms suggested by the BICI have been implemented (*ibid.*). Moreover, the BICI's suggestions seemed solely focused on government responses to protests. Its report lacked any mention of how to address structural issues of long-term governance, in particular the weak parliament that played a large part in provoking protests by shielding the al-Khalifas from public accountability (Wehrey, p. 117).

With GCC and Saudi support, it would appear that the al-Khalifas have countered the Arab Spring through a sectarian media campaign that framed state brutality as a necessary evil against Iranian and Shia'a threats. As the BICI report found Bahrain's security forces acting with impunity, so too has the al-Khalifa family been able to freely press sectarianism as a dividing tactic under the guidance of Saudi Arabia and the GCC's military arm, aptly named the Peninsula Shield Force (Obaid, 2014, p. 13). It would seem that sectarianism is taking on a new political tint in Bahrain. As of 2017, regime officials were pursuing previously permitted political organizations in the name of national security (Middle East Eye, 2017).

In 2016, al-Khalifa administrators took a hard line with Shia'a opposition groups, banning the al-Wifaq organization it had been willing to work with in parliament (*ibid.*). Later bans extended to secular opposition groups. In an official statement about the liquidation of the Waad group, formally the National Democratic Action Society, authorities claimed said group incited hatred against the state and against "factions of society" (ADHRB, 2017). Outside observers, however, argue that GCC might and Saudi military assistance has emboldened the al-Khalifa administration to engage in a "de facto ban on all opposition" (Middle East Eye, 2017).

An overview of Bahrain's history as an oil monarchy punctuates the importance of welfare and the manipulation of sectarianism. These themes partially contrast the hypothesis assumption that monarchies will rely on traditionalism as opposed to a socio-economic ruling bargain. However, the overview of Bahrain's politics also emphasizes how the use of oil can be used to justify non-democratic legitimacy precisely through a socio-economic ruling bargain. This notion will be further explored in the main analysis of Chapter 6.

5.4 Mubarak's Egypt

"I swear by Almighty God to sincerely safeguard the republican system, respect the Constitution and law, fully look after the people's interests and safeguard the independence of the fatherland and the integrity of its territory (Farrell, 15 October, 1981). The time for work has come [.] […] Egypt is for all – it is not a community of the privileged few who would monopolize influence and impose a guardianship on the people. […] Every national of this country should know that the home front is quite safe, and the institutions of this country are quite on the alert and dedicated to protect this country (Farrell, 9 November, 1981). […] We shall build and not destroy, we shall protect and not threaten, we shall safeguard and not dissipate. Guide me, God Almighty, and may God guide you all"

(Farrell, 15 October, 1981).

Mubarak's succession to Egypt's presidency was provoked by the violent consequences of a militant plot. A week before Mubarak's ascendance, President Sadat was gunned down by fundamentalists posing as officers during a military parade. Seated next to Sadat at the time, Vice President Mubarak escaped unharmed (BBC, 2017). The attempt was brief, successful and plunged the parade into chaos. As one eyewitness reported, "[within] seconds of the attack, the [Armed Forces] review stand was awash in blood. […] Screams and panic followed as guests tried to flee, tipping over chairs. Some were crushed underfoot. Others, shocked and stunned, stood riveted" (Farrell, 6 October, 1981).

The element of threat was quickly seized upon by the uncharismatic Mubarak. An emergency law was imposed that was to last until the end of his regime, allowing his government to target any potential rivals for the sake of security (Shehata, 2011, p. 28). At the same time, Mubarak needed to create a name for himself and mark the new presidential era as his own. As with Ben Ali, Mubarak hence started his term by creating the image of a more contemporary and liberal leader than his predecessors. Mubarak wanted to be his own president and not in the shadow of Egypt's first republican head, Nasser or the balding Sadat. "'I am neither Gamal Abdel Nasser nor Anwar el Sadat,'" he insisted shortly after inauguration. "'My name is Hosni Mubarak'" (Nagarajan, p. 28). Political prisoners were released in the thousands and the press enjoyed fewer restrictions. Even civil society appeared to be welcomed, with NGOs flourishing (*ibid.*, p. 29).

But the reality of ruling Egypt was a far cry from Mubarak's self-image and pragmatic optimism. For Mubarak could not escape that he was third in a line of modern pharaohs and as such, he inherited Egypt's growing socio-economic burdens that originated in the curse of Nasserism (Shehata, p. 27). The Arab Republic of Egypt was not built on political liberalism but on a skewed ruling bargain by the military elite. Nasser's popularity after overthrowing the monarchy was not due solely to charisma but his apolitical "ruling bargain with labor and the middle class. All political parties were banned and all civil-society organizations […] came under the direct control of the regime. In return, the state provided social and welfare services in the form of government employment; subsidies for food, energy, housing, and transportation; and free education and health care" (*ibid.*).

This generous social contract in one of the Arab world's most populous and poorer states could not last without pushing governments deeper into debt and structural difficulties. Indeed, economist K.V. Nagarajan points out that "[the] system ran into difficulties within a few years. [Under Nasser], [while] consumption continued to rise, domestic savings and investment failed to materialize, leading to a huge fiscal gap. To cover the gap, the state had to resort to massive external borrowing. On top of that, […] a severe balance of

payments crisis also developed" (Nagarajan, p. 24). Under Sadat, debt continued to rise while economic progress stalled. Sadat's liberalization initiatives to spur private sector activity had little effect and a desperate Sadat turned to the 1973 war with Israel as a socio-political distraction that could restore government support. While successful in provoking national pride, military operations also increased Armed Forces expenditure at the expense of an already exhausted civilian economy (*ibid.*, p. 26). Hence, while Mubarak would try to step out of the shadows of his predecessors, he would ultimately fail to do so. Mubarak would inherit Egypt's growing debt and an unsustainable ruling bargain that could not bridge the wealth gap or address the eventual concerns of domestic and external forces. How Mubarak would attempt to address such concerns and his inability to escape the legacies of Nasser and Sadat would in turn define his relationship with Islamism, Egypt's powerful Armed Forces and ultimately the nation itself (*ibid.*, p. 29).

The history of Egypt's socio-economic ruling bargain connects with the major recurring theme of material Beneficial Consequences as a key aspect of the ruling bargain, as examined through the hypothesis assumption that republicans will emphasize a socio-economic ruling bargain as a key source of non-democratic political legitimacy. At the same time, Chapter 6's analysis reveals limited religious references in Mubarak's final address. The context of a republican partially drawing on religion challenges the hypothesis assumption that only monarchs will draw on traditionalism. This context and Egypt's history of a material ruling bargain as a republican state provides a case that emphasizes the socio-economic themes of a ruling bargain while also providing a minor example of Religious Legitimacy. It is for this reason that Egypt is presented as the first republican case study, ahead of Ben Ali's Tunisia.

Muhammad Hosni Sayyid Mubarak had much in common with his predecessors. Like them, he was a military man, and it was thanks to Sadat that he made the transition from military to statecraft (BBC, 2017; Al Jazeera, 2011, *Profile: Hosni Mubarak*). In 1972, Sadat appointed Mubarak as Air Force commander. By 1975, Mubarak found himself in

the post of Vice President and also a senior head of the National Democratic Party (Al Jazeera, 2011, *Profile: Hosni Mubarak*). Just as Ben Ali had been PM before gaining national leadership (Grewal, p. 2), so too Mubarak found himself in a position of high governance before tasting real power (*ibid.*). However, while Ben Ali was to turn his back on the military and craft a police state, Mubarak heralded from a military elite that could not be marginalized (*ibid.*, p. 4). After all, Egypt's 1952 Revolution and republican birth was a product of the Armed Forces. Nasser's ideological mission and socialist policies placed military officers in the ranks of government (Nassif, 2013, p.511). Sadat used the military as a tool to ensconce himself and isolate political competitors (*ibid.*, pp. 513). Mubarak's leadership, on the other hand, lacked ideological vision and his new post was devoid of entrenched political rivalry. A depoliticized military meant little competition in a simplified system of apolitical officers, but the Armed Forces still expected reward (*ibid.*, pp. 513).

Lengthening a page from Nasser's book, Mubarak wedded military and government through "the *carrots* of material largesse, rather than the *sticks* of permanent purges and reshuffles" (*ibid.*, p. 515). In other words, Mubarak would not focus on Nasser's ideational link with the army or Sadat's arbitrary redistribution of disloyal competitors. He would instead focus on how his predecessors used financial reward to intertwine the Armed Forces to the personage of the president. In particular, Mubarak deepened "the promotion of the military elite's private interests" under a "system of control [that] was built on a promise of the accumulation of pecuniary rewards and a postretirement career for officers who had remained reliable throughout their tenure" (*ibid.*, p. 516).

Table 1: Mechanisms of Controlling the Egyptian Armed Forces, by President

Era	Promoting the Material Interests of Senior Officers	Ideational Links	Frequent Purges in the Officer Corps	Frequent Reshuffles of Armed Forces Commanders
Nasser (1952–1970)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Sadat (1970–1981)	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Mubarak (1981–2011)	Yes	No	No	No

Source: *ibid.*

Within a year of Mubarak's tenure, military spending rose exponentially and accounted for 26% of GDP (Owen, 1983, p. 18). New and junior officers began their careers enjoying free health care and housing arrangements reserved exclusively for the Armed Forces. As they climbed the ranks, they knew that loyalty to Mubarak would mean profitable appointments that allowed unchecked opportunities for wealth building and even direct cash payments (Nassif, 2013, p. 516). Under such a system, officers knew "their turn could come if they complied with the system" (*ibid.*). Hence, Mubarak created a separate social contract between ruler and military, outside of the general arrangement between ruler and ruled. The fact that such a contract rewarded personal loyalty and represented the private interests of the Armed Forces illustrates how necessary military might was to political power. Abandoning Nasserism and other ideology was fine by the military elite, but no president of Egypt's Republic could remain pharaoh without offering economic privileges to the top brass (*ibid.*, p. 509).

The parallel social contracts of subsidies for the masses and wealth for the Armed Forces were a drain on public expenditure (Nagarajan, p. 22). As Ben Ali created a democratic image of Tunisia, so too did Mubarak manipulate the existence of NGOs for the same purpose: access to external aid. Under Mubarak, the NGO sector was actually expanded. From 1993-2011, NGOs in Egypt grew from 14,000 to over 30,000. This growth model was akin to Ben Ali's controlled liberalization or a form of governance termed as a

'liberalized autocracy' (Herrold, 2016, p. 192). In other words, the expansion of NGOs was supervised by Mubarak as a form of civil society cooption, which itself was part of a scheme of (skewed) economic restructuring (*ibid.*, p. 195). As charities, NGOs were expected to provide bread and related foodstuffs to the poor, lowering state expenditure on basic subsidies and providing the required image of democratic progress. This cooption tactic allowed Mubarak access to the World Bank and other external lenders for much-needed credit (*ibid.*).

At the same time, cooption was as much political as financial. Restrictive laws minimized NGOs to social welfare work, ensuring apolitical activity (that still required government approval and supervision). NGOs with a desire to promote human rights were not officially recognized, required to register as civil companies or law firms and often harassed to ensure their marginalization (*ibid.*, pp. 196-7). As civil bodies often become the locus for political opposition, limited and fragmented dissidence was tolerated to the extent that any such NGOs "[served] as the release valve of society, providing 'opposition groups a way to blow off steam […without] undermining the regime's ultimate control'" (*ibid.*, p. 192). Mubarak thus controlled civil society, ensuring NGOs existed as part of his window-dressing campaign for external aid but also allowing the state to keep an eye on the masses and any collective action that could be perceived as a challenge to the regime (*ibid.*).

While Ben Ali's Tunisia saw the state control NGOs to minimize Islamist involvement in welfare projects (Sadiki, 'Democracy by non-Democratic Means', p. 59), the reverse was initially true in Mubarak's Egypt. Under Nasser the Muslim Brotherhood had been persecuted and following Sadat's assassination, countless members were arrested for suspected involvement (Nagarajan, p. 33).

However, Mubarak's need to begin a stable rule turned state scorn into cooperation. As part of his 'liberal' policy to release political prisoners, the Muslim Brotherhood found their members free and their group recognized in the political and civic arena (al-Awadi, p.

63). As a socio-political group, the Muslim Brotherhood were known for their welfare activities and extended network across Egypt's vulnerable social classes. Hence, during Mubarak's nascent period of political diversity, Mubarak was happy to use the Muslim Brotherhood both as a shield against more radical Islamist groups and as a socio-economic 'partner' that could ease state weaning of subsidies through their own welfare program, including "schools, health clinics and financial aid" (Nagarajan, p. 33).

This tactic of transferring welfare responsibility to the Muslim Brotherhood was a socio-political balancing act, allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to flirt with political legitimacy. After all, as Islamists the Muslim Brotherhood were not apolitical. On the one hand, the Brotherhood or *Ikhwan* had to be regarded by the masses as politicized to a moderate degree in order for Mubarak to utilize their moderation against more extreme Islamists (al-Awadi, p. 62). On the other hand, the *Ikhwan* had their own (religious) views on what it meant to be a good Egyptian. For the Muslim Brotherhood, nationalism held two elements. As with Nasser and successive Arab nationalists, the Brotherhood regarded "nationalism [as] a response to Western imperialism and the rule of European colonists", allowing Brotherhood and government to agree on an Egypt First policy and the belief that Western interference had to end (Liu, 2008, p. 71). However, since its inception the *Ikhwan* had been a political body rooted in fundamentalism. Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Brotherhood declared that Islam was the "all-embracing system which regulates all aspects of human life. [...] [It] is religion and state; and Q'uran and sword" (Ansari, 1961, p. 7).

Indeed, while Mubarak used the Brotherhood for welfare, the Brotherhood used the state for indirect legitimacy. The Muslim Brotherhood had historically been acutely aware of the socio-economic needs of the masses. This awareness was, ironically, a partial result of their suppression by the state. Unable to gain votes in the political sphere, they resorted to charity and welfare activities to gain loyalty from the poor and underprivileged, a majority of Egypt's classes (al-Awadi, p. 63). Hence, when Mubarak offered an open-door policy towards the *Ikhwan*, it allowed them to make already active services more conspicuous and

better organized. Rather than mobilizing their network to provide furtive charity in hidden city quarters, the Brotherhood enjoyed "the opening up of social, political, and economic spaces and opportunities, which [they] at once began to utilize" (*ibid.*).

By penetrating the major spheres of society, the Brotherhood began to engage with the masses and adjust their image accordingly. Gone were the traditional Islamic body robes and beards, replaced with the Western suits and jeans modern Egyptians seemed to favor. Obvious talk of religion and political aims was suppressed in order to focus on their ability to service the needs of major social groups from all backgrounds (*ibid.*, pp. 63-4). The *Ikhwan* may not have been welcome in parliament, but by addressing student and teacher needs, they began to proliferate in student and teacher unions across Egypt, in some cases securing majority seats at Cairo University and other major institutes (*ibid.*, p. 64). The Brotherhood organized student-run healthcare schemes and even pushed for affordable housing for teaching staff (*ibid.*, p. 65).

Internally, the *Ikhwan* restructured their organization, decentralizing management so as to better spread themselves across Egypt's major cities and provinces. By allowing regional branches to make decisions rather than take orders at the top, coordination of services improved, and the Brotherhood was able to informally partner with local unions, social clubs and civic organizers without drawing state alarm (*ibid.*, pp. 67-8). As they built up social endorsement, the Brotherhood maintained a professional, not political veil. "In the initial years of our presence […]," confirmed one member, "we did nothing but services, services, services. We did not speak politics, because we realized that if we did so from the outset, people would not listen. We needed to provide services first. As a result, people began to gather round us. It was only then that we could talk to them about our political views. We would expect them to support us, since by then they knew us better" (*ibid.*, p. 67).

Indeed, just as Mubarak had an exclusive social contract between himself and the Armed Forces, so too did the Muslim Brotherhood develop their own tacit contract between themselves and the beneficiaries of their generosity. Hence, "students who benefitted from the Brothers' services on university campuses were expected to vote for them in student union elections, and also, if [possible in the future] vote for them in parliamentary elections" (*ibid.*, pp. 69-70). With their own understanding of nationalism and the ability to build up informal or social legitimacy, it started to become clear to the state that cooption of the Brotherhood through open tolerance was a tight balancing act. Mubarak was aware of the risk that the Brotherhood could gain more popularity than the state. While tolerating Muslim Brotherhood involvement in social spaces, student unions and civic organizations, Mubarak ensured that all such bodies were ultimately governed through the state's own control mechanisms, thus allowing the use of the Muslim Brotherhood for welfare dispersion (and alleviation of state spending) while monitoring their interaction in social and political spaces (*ibid.*, p. 70).

By 1992, it became clear to the state that the Brotherhood was growing, both in terms of popularity and politicization. The early nineties saw both American involvement in the Gulf War and an Islamist victory in Algeria's elections (that was to prompt civil conflict) (*ibid.*, p. 71). Having built support across several socio-political arenas, the Brotherhood now made their political views public. Their influence ensured multi-party boycotts of Egypt's 1990 elections, "an approach that particularly angered Mubarak" (*ibid.*). The Brotherhood also publicized their opposition to U.S. involvement in the Gulf War, a position that was popular among the masses, allowing the *Ikhwan* to use "student unions, university teachers' clubs, syndicates, and [their] organized network to mobilize their constituencies against the [pro-Western] policies of Mubarak" (*ibid.*, p. 72).

The final straw for Mubarak came during the 1992 Earthquake Disaster that wreaked havoc across Cairo. The greatest disaster for the Mubarak regime was not the human casualties but rather how the event became "an interesting example of how the *Ikhwan*

merged services with political propaganda" (*ibid.*, p. 73). The vast social network of the Muslim Brotherhood allowed for a rapid response in victim rescue that was "notably superior to and surpassed that of the state", a fact addressed by domestic press and "the Western media, whose coverage highlighted the growing impact of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, in contrast with the receding role of the state" (*ibid.*). The Brotherhood used such publicity to present their political core. All relief offices, tents and related buildings controlled by the Brotherhood proudly displayed their slogan 'Islam is the Solution' (i*bid.*).

It was the combination of politicized welfare and statements challenging regime policies that condemned the Muslim Brotherhood to Mubarak's wrath. The state had allowed the *Ikhwan* to operate openly under the assumption that Brotherhood activities would be apolitical and charitable. In other words, there was (from the government's perspective) a tacit social contract between the state and the *Ikhwan*. The Brotherhood could plug the state's 'welfare gap' with their social services, in exchange for tolerance in various socio-political spheres. By not only politicizing its welfare services but also organizing political committees to publicly condemn Mubarak's policies, the Brotherhood broke this contract, using its social legitimacy to directly challenge the political standing of the state and "undermine the legitimacy of Mubarak's leadership" (*ibid.*, p. 72). Retrospectively, Brotherhood members themselves agreed that their increasingly provocative stance against state policies incited repercussions. One member recalls: "I consider the second statement that condemned the Egyptian involvement in the [Gulf War] to have been the straw that broke the camel's back. I remember that […] we wrote it in a provocative manner. I think that after we issued the statement, the regime said to itself: 'That is enough. The [Muslim Brotherhood has] crossed the red line'" (*ibid.*).

The result of the Muslim Brotherhood's provocation was that its rhetoric on the Gulf War was used against its members. Mubarak labeled the *Ikhwan* as disloyal, funded by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and thence proceeded to end his honeymoon with the

Brotherhood through mass arrests (*ibid.*, p. 73). Egypt's nationalism was not for the Brotherhood to decide. Nationalism was not mosque and country, as al-Banni declared. Rather, nationalism was the state. It was the military and its might that "courageously took part in war and peace" (Menshawy, 2017, p. 120). In time, as Brotherhood influence was forcibly reduced, nationalism would also be a return to subsidization, launched under Nasser's modern republic. "[Egypt must] abandon any talk of abolishing subsidies," Mubarak declared long after the *Ikhwan* were crushed. "Subsidization will remain an established right for Egyptians. We will never abolish subsidies or reduce them" (Nafaa, 2010).

Under Mubarak's emergency law, systemic attempts were made to abolish the Brotherhood. Prior to September 11th, Mubarak attempted to control the Muslim Brotherhood as part of his "symbiotic relationship with the opposition mainstream Islamist movements" (Thaler, p. 98). Such control was not solely via cooption but also "legal manipulation and internment of the movement's leaders" (*ibid.*). As Ben Ali used 9/11 and the War on Terror to pursue his political opponents, so too did Mubarak exploit said events and "the imminent war on Iraq to stifle dissent by arresting opposition figures" (*ibid.*). Such actions were often pre-emptive, intended to target potential protestors that voiced opposition to regime policies. In addition, countless Brotherhood supporters were detained right before 2002 legislative elections on charges of "rioting, illegal gathering, and attempting to hinder public balloting, among other things" (*ibid.*).

At the same time, 9/11 appeared to have a conspicuous effect on Islamist groups themselves. Previously militant organizations like *Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya* publicly denounced the use of violence and even *takfir*, "the act of accusing the government of apostasy" (*ibid.*, p. 99). This decision to renounce both terror tactics and government clashes "was [ostensibly] based on a careful, exhaustive review of Islamic law and [appeared] to be an authentic revision of [the group's] ideology" (*ibid.*). However, Mubarak's initial openness with other Islamic groups and willingness to accommodate

their apolitical existence may have convinced *Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya* that a social contract with the regime, however skewed, could mean that "operating within the existing institutional framework is a more effective way of achieving its long-term goals" (*ibid.*).

Mubarak's uncharismatic succession in a line of militant pharaohs saw him continue the core management techniques of his predecessors. The military elite had to be appeased, subsidies for the poor maintained the social contract between ruler and ruled, and apolitical accommodation of Islamist forces balanced both welfare needs and, at least in theory, Islamist aggression. Finally, the appearance of democratic willingness, as with Ben Ali gave Egypt access to external aid to ensure economic growth. Mubarak's Egypt was hailed by external lenders, including the IMF for its implementation of economic structural adjustment programs in exchange for credit. "Egypt […] is a remarkable success story. […] Egypt's economy has come a long way since the 1980s. Growth is recovering and confidence is rising. Tough macroeconomic policies and deep structural reforms are doing the trick," insisted one IMF policy maker (Nagarajan, p. 30). Mubarak projected the image of a prosperous Egypt that, under his leadership, could balance differing interests and still carry the nation down a path of moderate prosperity. As with Ben Ali, however, Mubarak's days were numbered.

Ultimately, Mubarak could not serve as an effective political manager in two roles: President of Egypt and Senior Chairman of the National Democratic Party (NDP), Egypt's ruling political faction (Heiss, 2012, p. 156). As head of the NDP, Mubarak led a forum for Egypt's political elite. This forum allowed Mubarak to present Egypt with a face of political unity for his rule. In addition, the NDP served as a cooption model for the business elite. The National Democratic Party was "an exclusive political apparatus that […] [became] the only vehicle for attaining financial, political or social success" (*ibid.*, p. 157). Hence, the NDP ensured not only Islamists but rising business tycoons were co-opted. This arrangement allowed Mubarak to extend political control into influential

economic and commerce spheres. All moguls and industrialists "were forced to comply with NDP desires and expectations to gain additional power" (*ibid.*, p. 159).

The NDP also bolstered Mubarak's image of political strength by creating a portrait of a president supported by a cohesive and powerful political elite (*ibid.*, p. 165). In reality, of course, the NDP was not always unified by Mubarak but instead split into one or more factions, often the old guard of politicians that had been active since Nasser and the new guard of foreign-educated and business savvy young bloods. As Mubarak attempted to leverage the Muslim Brotherhood against other political groups to dampen Islamist threats, the same fragmentation tactic was applied to party politics. Hence, he sided with "the old guard (his peers and long-time allies) and the centrists (his son, Gamal and his supporters)" in order to "secure his legacy as president by installing his son as president after his death" (*ibid.*).

The NDP not only represented a shell for Mubarak's political authority among the elite. It also served as the 'talent pool' from which all government administrators had been drawn since the 1950's. Hence, any appointments to the state bureaucracy often meant a revolving door of aged political elites that drew not on new talent but the same loyal members of the NDP. This endless cycle of antiquated appointments in a nation of growing youth would present a blow to Mubarak's political support base during the 2010 protests. Under intense pressure to prove he could oversee real change, a cornered Mubarak felt that only by disbanding the NDP could he calm popular aggression. However, his "last-ditch efforts to stay in power betrayed every principle and assumption of his managerial strategy" out of fear of what was to come: his overthrow. By disbanding the NDP, Mubarak partially realized his own downfall. Disbanding both government and party meant the end of "his key supporting institutions" (*ibid.*, pp. 167-8).

The final blow of party disunity and collapse of political support came atop larger structural economic gaps that gradually pushed Egypt to breaking point and Mubarak off

his throne. Indeed, the IMF's praise for Mubarak's performance could not have been more wrong, for Egypt's IMF-led Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) hid liabilities rather than assets to the regime. On paper, Egypt's fiscal performance was stabilizing throughout the nineties and beyond. Mubarak's macro-economic slant curbed inflation from 21% in the early nineties to 7% by 1996 (Nagarajan, p. 30). The introduction of sales tax in 1991 meant extra revenue that allowed Egypt to eliminate trade barriers and join the World Trade Organization (WTO). Finally, a state-supervised auction of cellular networks illustrated a willingness to privatize sluggish sectors and netted "$1 billion in revenues, $3 billion in foreign direct investment and [encouraged developments in] the latest technology". Ironically, the same technological progress "would play a major role in [coordinating protests and] bringing down the Mubarak regime in 2011" (*ibid.*, p. 31).

Mubarak, as with Ben Ali, did not focus on long-term prosperity for the masses. Rather, eyeing access to IMF and other external loans meant a slanted focus on using macro-economic policies to satisfy the "short-term fiscal parameters" of external lenders (*ibid.*). In other words, Mubarak's ability to satisfy superficial economic criteria gave him financial credit but "did nothing to boost productivity of the economy and increase [resource] supply which is needed for long-term prosperity for Egypt" (*ibid.*). Worse still, the sole macro-economic focus of the SAP ignored the plight of ordinary Egyptians to the extent that poverty levels were rising. More alarming were World Bank reports that noted how rising food prices were barring many families from the "minimum cost diet", which by the early nineties had "increased by 216 percent in urban and 242 percent in rural areas" (*ibid.*). Despite the awareness of such social ills by external lenders, Mubarak seemed all too happy to oblige only the short-term targets of the SAP, while IMF evaluators themselves "rarely touched the [urgent] subjects of employment, unemployment and human development" (*ibid.*, p. 32).

While the regime appeared to respond to World Bank concerns with a Social Fund for Development, such moves were not enough to undermine the entrenched corruption of

domestic statecraft. The Social Fund itself was internationally financed yet vulnerable to political manipulation by public officials (*ibid.*). Furthermore, while the military elite drained the nation's resources through their own social contract with the state and the NDP acted as a gentlemen's club for quid pro quos rather than public service, the privatization of state assets was also to blame. Just as Ben Ali ensured his family and associates dominated the business economy (Driesbach and Joyce, 2014), so too did Mubarak permit "the emergence of family-owned huge conglomerates" that catered "to the rich elite who formed about 5 to 10 percent of the Egyptian population" (*ibid.*). While the masses existed in a "triangle of poverty", Mubarak allowed subsidized property deals and other auctions that created the illusion of stable financial growth through "a frenzy of speculation and quick profit schemes", each gamble being played in a financial sector that "was bailed out by the government to avert defaults and bankruptcies [of the elite]". In other words, "government intervention was shoring up the fortunes of the rich and the politically connected, [while] the rest of the population was facing withdrawal of government support and erosion in their standard of living. […] The ranks of the poor were swelling" (*ibid.*).

The increasing wealth gap acted as a contrasting reminder of the basic social contract between state and subjects since Nasser. While the rich could get richer, it was expected that Mubarak at least continue the legacy of subsidies implemented by his predecessors. How ironic that such socialist generosity had been started by Nasser both for political support and "to raise the living standards of people in the lower rungs of the economic ladder" (Nagarajan, p. 24). By Mubarak's time, subsidies and military gift-giving had set Egypt on the road to an economic crisis, while Mubarak also faced the long-term prospect of being challenged by the Muslim Brotherhood. Though Mubarak used the *Ikhwan* to plug social services gaps, he was aware of their building support. When the Brotherhood began to raise a political voice against the regime, Mubarak felt forced to crack down on them, which also meant that the state could no longer rely on them to plug the gaps in welfare for the masses (al-Awadi, p. 75).

With rising poverty, entrenched corruption across all political spectrums and withdrawal of efficient and much-needed social services, the stage was set for the pharaoh to fall. As Tunisia's spark was provoked by state mistreatment, so too did Egypt see its own Spring blossom in a similar manner. In the summer heat of 2010, twenty-eight year old Khaled Said was targeted for his ostensible exposure of police corruption. In June, the baby-faced activist was "dragged out of an internet café and set upon by [officers] in the northern city of Alexandria" (BBC, 2014, 'Egypt Police Jailed over 2010 Death of Khaled Said'). As video footage of Bouazizi's self-immolation galvanized Tunisia, so too did the images of Said's body shock Egypt. At the hands of police, his close-cropped hair and oval face had been reduced to a battered corpse, open mouth revealing smashed teeth and scarred lips (Meky, 2014).

The leaked evidence of his broken body contrasted with the state's post-mortem investigation, which "concluded that he had died of suffocation after trying to swallow a packet of drugs he had been carrying" (BBC, 2014, 'Egypt Police Jailed over 2010 Death of Khaled Said'). The blatant implausibility of the regime's explanation for his death prompted the creation of a Facebook page, 'We Are All Khaled Said'.[4] The page was dedicated to Said's memory and campaigned against police corruption. Hundreds of thousands rallied to its cause and followed its message to "participate in the nationwide anti-government demonstrations on 25 January 2011", which would in time force Mubarak's resignation (BBC, 2014, Egypt Police Jailed over 2010 Death of Khaled Said').

The regime's stubbornness and loss of elite support are key to understanding Mubarak's defeat. It is obvious that Mubarak's skewed economic policies and revolving door of ageing NDP members for governance alienated youth and the poor (in other words the bulk of the population). However, there were several opportunities missed by Mubarak to

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[4] As of April 2017, this page remains active on Facebook and holds just under 300,000 likes. Source: Facebook (2017)*We are all Khaled Said*. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/elshaheeed.co.uk?filter=3 (accessed 21 April 2017).

minimize political damage and perhaps even salvage his position to retain power. First, while it is true that many attended protests at Tahrir Square, political opposition groups were not united in their political agendas (other than freedom from detainment, the emergency law and other basic factors). Indeed, some movements were even "divided over whether to participate in demonstrations" (Shehata, p. 30). Further, even when protests intensified, they were composed of large political groups with opposing agendas "that had previously competed with one another—Islamists and secularists, liberals and leftists" (*ibid.*, pp. 30-31). It is thinkable that had Mubarak negotiated compromises with the largest of these groups instead of stubbornly refusing "to make any real concessions" while continuing violent crackdowns on gatherings, the movement against him would fragment and "the protests would begin to lose steam" (*ibid.*).

Second, Mubarak placed himself in a position of overdependence on his Armed Forces. While the military had backed Mubarak, they had also showed restraint against their fellow Egyptians. In other words, the Armed Forces had teetered between ruler and ruled for a reason shared by the protestors: neither the traditional elite nor the masses wanted a dynastical presidency through the succession of Mubarak's son, Gamal (Hiro, 2013). While Mubarak did remove Gamal from his influential position at the NDP, Mubarak did so by disbanding the party and government, leaving only the military as the last buttress of his rule. The removal of two thirds of his supporting system left him in a very precarious position. The third and fatal mistake Mubarak made also revolved around succession and was the tipping point that united protestors and the military against their 'father'. Rather than giving the nation time to absorb Gamal's removal and that of his cronies from key socio-economic positions, Mubarak waited less than twenty-four hours to declare that he himself would not step down until elections in September. Immediately after this announcement, "security forces and hired vigilantes violently cracked down on the protestors—11 were shot and killed in Tahrir Square alone" (*ibid.*, p. 31). These orders of violence were hardly the actions of a ruler who intended to reverse ambitions of succession

or listen to popular demands. With increasingly bitter protestors urging the military to side with the people, Mubarak's departure was imminent.

On the 10th of February 2011, Vice President Omar Suleiman spoke to Egypt's millions through a televised address projected in Tahrir Square:

"In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. [Citizens], during these very difficult circumstances Egypt is going through, President Hosni Mubarak has decided to step down from the office of the president of the republic and has charged the high council of the armed forces to administer the affairs of the country. May God help [us all]" (New York Times, 2011).

From a sixty second speech, Tahrir Square and Egypt "prayed, wept and chanted […] [in] a deafening roar" (McGreal and Shenker, 2011). The Armed Forces would go on to administer Egypt on and off until their 2013 coup against elected Islamist President Mohamed Morsi (Elmasry, 2015). This move acted as a reminder of Egypt's militant nationalism and the role of the powerful military elite in national governance. Further, the coup marked a transition in how the Armed Forces perceived this role. Under former General and now President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, the military has emerged "from behind the curtain of influence to openly [govern] Egypt" (Aziz, 2016).

An overview of Egypt under Mubarak reveals the importance of a socio-economic ruling bargain, especially through subsidies, which connects with the hypothesis assumption that republicans will rely on a socio-economic ruling bargain. In addition, Chapter 6's analysis of Mubarak's speech will also examine his use of Religious Legitimacy.

5.5 Ben Ali's Tunisia

"In the name of God, the Clement, the Merciful. […] The great sacrifices made by the Leader Habib Bourguiba, first President of the republic […] for the liberation and development of Tunisia, are countless. […] But the onset of his senility and the

deterioration of [his] health […] called us to carry out our national duty and declare him totally incapable of undertaking the tasks of President of the Republic. […] We shall see that the law is correctly enforced in a way that will proscribe any kind of iniquity or injustice. […] We shall give Islamic, Arab, African and Mediterranean solidarity its due importance. […] Fellow citizens, [by] the Grace of God we are entering […] a new era of efforts and determination. Love of our country and the call of duty requires this of us.

Long live Tunisia! Long live the Republic!" (Ben Ali, 1987)

The 'self-inauguration' of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in 1987 appeared to highlight social justice for all and Islamic unity. Yet, underneath Ben Ali's words lay a complex transition that was provoked by numerous socio-economic failings during President Habib Bourguiba's tenure and his inability to address them through his personal management style (Ware, 1988, p. 587).

Ironically, it was precisely these failings that gave Ben Ali his chance to become the new president, albeit with the consequence of also inheriting them. Bourguiba's original legitimacy and right to rule drew heavily on his leading role in Tunisia's anti-colonial movement. Upon liberation from France, Bourguiba relied on his political credentials to draft the independent state's constitution and assume its presidency (Hawkins, pp. 39-40).

Nonetheless, his past successes as an anti-colonialist were nullified by Bourguiba's refusal to accommodate Islam as a public platform and by his failure to ensure minimal economic growth. When it came to Islamist movements and their desire to be given a political voice, Bourguiba appeared to be quite the violent reactionist. While supportive of Tunisia's Islamic faith during French oppression, upon independence Bourguiba declared Islam the state religion yet also "spoke out against the fetters of traditional religion as retarding modernization" (*ibid.*, p. 39). Bourguiba's hatred of politicized Islam crystallized the year of his overthrow. In response to a 1987 hotel bombing, Bourguiba arrested leading figures of Tunisia's Al-Nahda party (then known as the Islamic Tendency Movement or MTI). A

show trial against the party's leader, Rashid Ghannouchi backfired when the defense convincingly portrayed the MTI as a moderate group and any extremist cells as being the result of Bourguiba's suppression of political Islam (Ware, p. 589).

Bourguiba's personal ruling style was a double-edged sword, for personal control also meant the masses were more likely to place responsibility for failure at his feet. Bourguiba's refusal to acknowledge his involvement in radicalizing fringe MTI members did much damage to his public image. Worse was yet to come, however, as his Tunisia continued to struggle with economic uncertainty. A young populace demanded work and higher wages at a time when European market crashes had drastically cut down tourist numbers to Tunisia and when steady but weak GDP growth did not raise living standards but ironically barred Tunisia from external aid earmarked for underdeveloped states (*ibid.*). In a further twist of irony, Bourguiba's expanded education programs developed unemployed youth with increasingly higher aspirations that could not be fulfilled (*ibid.*).

The pressures on Bourguiba would unite to give Ben Ali his path to power. Ben Ali was not a fervent nationalist and anti-colonialist. Rather, he was a quiet military man (*ibid.*, p. 6). His career rise in such a capacity was aided by security incidents that provoked Bourguiba to expand Tunisia's Armed Forces. The post-independence coups across the MENA region had convinced Bourguiba to confine Tunisia's military might. The formation of the Tunisian Armed Forces (1956) was thus somewhat haphazard and with limited staff. A 1961 coup attempt entrenched Bourguiba's belief that the military should be apolitical and weak (Grewal, p. 2). However, poor economic performance and external threats soon changed his mind.

A nationwide worker's strike in 1978 was followed only two years later by a 1980 rebellion instigated by Libya's adjacent Muammar Qathafi (Ware, p. 589). Both incidents were soon followed by widespread riots over price rises in basic foodstuffs. Taking note of how overwhelmed police had been in such instances, a panicky Bourguiba reversed his

military stance. It was time to enlarge Tunisia's Armed Forces. By the mid-eighties, "[m]ilitary spending quadrupled and arms imports—especially from the United States—skyrocketed" (Grewal, p. 2).

The 1980's saw not only the rising significance of the military but the increasing influence and authority of Ben Ali. Already appointed to the Directorate of Military Security in 1964, Ben Ali became Director General of National Security in 1977 (*ibid.*, p. 3). Relations between Ben Ali and Bourguiba were ambiguously distant. Ben Ali flirted with displeasure on two occasions, resulting in exile in 1977 and 1980. However, the 1984 bread riots saw Ben Ali hastily recalled from Poland amid Bourguiba's military expansion (Reich, 1990, p. 79). His appointment as Secretary of State that same year was soon followed by the post of Interior Minister in 1986 and finally Prime Minister in 1987 (Grewal, p. 2).

The peak of Ben Ali's authority under Bourguiba coincided with continued socio-economic unrest and Bourguiba's increasing impulsiveness that seemed to push the elderly statesman toward forging his personal legacy while ignoring mounting resentment (Ware, 1988, p. 590). In less than a year, Ben Ali deposed Bourguiba. Despite his military background, the move was regarded by some as "hardly […] a "coup de force", or even a "coup de théâtre"" (Ware, p. 592). Rather, it was a soft coup justified by the existing constitution against a nationalist mentally unfit to lead (*ibid.*, Grewal, 2016, p. 3). As explained by Ben Ali in a French interview one year later, "[on] the seventh of November [1987], [...] I had to re-establish law and order. I did what I had to do." For Ben Ali, his decision was less a military coup than a 'medical coup'. "[Bourguiba] was sick," Ben Ali insisted at the time. "His poor health prevented him from governing" (Press TV Doc, 2016).

Ben Ali carefully crafted the image of a liberal leader during the beginning of his rule, in contrast to his predecessor. This image included emphasizing both a break with Bourgubism through the formation of a new government and implying a temporary role as

a 'caretaker' president. The latter was hinted at by two elements. First, the Tunisian Constitution at the time held clauses that would ensure Ben Ali held "[...] legal power until 1991, when legislative elections [would] once again take place" (Ware, p. 592). Second, Ben Ali promised constitutional revisions that would expunge both lifetime presidency and "the automatic succession of the prime minister to the presidential post" (*ibid.*).

As for Islam's public role, Ben Ali had learned from the mistakes of his predecessor. While Bourguiba had emphasized secularism to the point of alienating Islamists, Ben Ali increased the presence of faith in politics and daily life. Such measures included increasing the legal protection of mosques and religious sites and implementing the broadcast of the *athan* or call to prayer on T.V. and radio (*ibid.*, p. 599). In addition, Ben Ali adopted formal Islamic introductions in his speeches, a mark of religious respect that gave Islamists a reminder of his piety both as a fellow Tunisian and as head of state (*ibid.*, p. 592). Further, Ben Ali borrowed from Bourguiba's anti-colonialism by switching from French to *Fusha* or Formal Arabic. This shift could be regarded as both anti-colonialist and nationalist but also implied stronger connections to Islam, as *Fusha* is the language of the Quran (Hawkins, p. 40).

Despite talk of pluralism and political inclusiveness, Ben Ali was still a military man and in the early days of his rule it clearly showed. Upon seizing power, Ben Ali ensured that the military gained more political influence. This transition was signaled not only by the promotion of fellow officers but by his creation of the military-led National Security Council, a forum that met weekly with the ambiguous aim of "safeguarding internal and external state security" (Grewal, p. 3). Under Ben Ali, the military had experienced a reversal from barracks to bureaucracy. Even traditionally civilian posts were filled by Ben Ali's comrades (*ibid.*, pp. 3-4). However, such a shift would not last long. The rising influence of the Armed Forces would provoke rival institutes into engineering a conspiracy to transform Ben Ali's Tunisia into the police state it was to become until the Arab Spring.

A 1991 'discovery' by the Interior Ministry of a coup plot against Ben Ali was broadcast, using the coerced testimony of one Captain Ahmed Amara, who outlined the plot on live television (*ibid.*, p. 4). Captain Amara confirmed that Ben Ali's beloved military was in cahoots with the Islamist Al-Nahda party, supposedly meeting to advance their goals at the coastal town of Barrakat Essahel. The Barrakat Essahel Affair was nothing more or less than a fabricated rumor instigated by sidelined police forces and Ben Ali's own Constitutional Democratic Rally party. Nonetheless, it resulted in the arrest of 244 officers, including senior soldiers connected to the Army Chief of Staff (*ibid.*, p. 4). The scandal had its intended effect: Ben Ali's trust in his comrades was permanently shattered. The President responded by assuming personal command of the Armed Forces as its Chief of Staff and curtailing senior posts that would allow coordination between the army, navy and air force (*ibid.*).

Personal oversight of the military did not give the military a second chance. From 1991 until his overthrow, Ben Ali starved the Armed Forces of funds and armaments, retiring any remaining generals or colonels in senior political posts and appointing no further officers in positions of power. Instead, Ben Ali turned his trust to the police and Ministry of Interior, as both had planned. From 1992 until Tunisia's Arab Spring, the Interior Ministry was lavished with 165% of the defense budget, morphing Tunisia into the 'modern' police state (*ibid.*; Sadiki, 'The Search for Citizenship', p. 506). The resultant increase in police officers over military staff, in addition to budget cuts would come to haunt Ben Ali in 2010. Popular resentment among the military was a key reason troops did not come to his aid during the uprising against him (Grewal, pp. 4-5).

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among the military was a key reason troops did not come to his aid during the uprising against him (*ibid.*, pp. 4-5).

In his first year, Ben Ali had hinted that democratic pluralism would become a greater reality. One year after the September 11th Attacks, the MENA region appeared to undergo a shift nudging autocracies toward keeping pluralist promises. Access to uncensored satellite television and other forms of global information were spreading at a time when Arab regimes appeared to concede to either the succession of younger leaders or structured parliamentary elections (Sadiki, 'Democracy by non-Democratic Means', p. 57).

For Ben Ali's Tunisia, the trend of increasing parliamentary elections would be tailored rather than openly followed. Hence, the illusion of democracy was headed by Ben Ali under what Sadiki termed "tightly controlled liberalization" (*ibid.*). This form of pseudo-liberalization saw Ben Ali ensure political pluralism that was diluted and artificially birthed, preventing any opposition from altering his oversight of core state institutions (*ibid.*). This method of the regime permitting yet dominating the electoral process allowed Ben Ali to compose the façade of democratic choice while retaining all power. This carefully tailored balancing act was intended to ensure domestic, regional and international political legitimacy.

Monopolizing the electoral process and co-opting potential rivals allowed Ben Ali to claim pluralism without fear of losing power to political competition. Rival candidates were often hand-picked by the regime and limited parliamentary seats for opposition party members ensured "the veneer of democracy without having to be democratic". Hence, Ben Ali controlled all major policies and political processes against a weakened opposition. No checks and balances or power sharing was necessary (*ibid.*, p. 64). Further, Ben Ali's media mouthpiece *Le Renouveau* would reproduce quotes from Arab neighbors abroad favorable to the regime in order to demonstrate the regional legitimacy of Ben Ali's Tunisia. This tactic also allowed for regional legitimacy by comparison, as the regime

often highlighted Tunisia's stability in contrast to the impulsive militancy of Qathafi's Libya and the civil bloodshed of adjacent Algeria (*ibid.*, p. 67). Finally, Ben Ali reversed the 'aid contradiction' inherent under Bourguiba. While Bourguiba's tenure saw weak growth that barred the country from receiving external aid, Ben Ali's democratic façade was constructed to specifically meet International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank criteria for aid à la Mubarak that no doubt lined his own coffers and maintained his inner circle (*ibid.*, p. 64).

At the same time, Islamists would see a reversal in fortunes just before Ben Ali's downfall. While the new President appeared to embrace the public role of religion in his early years, post-9/11 this openness was no longer the case. The image of fundamentalism linked to Islamists gave Ben Ali the excuse required to increase already extensive policing and related activities (*ibid.*, p. 68). By definition, such a strategy required the marginalization of Islamists, both politically and publicly. Indeed, Algeria's civil war allowed Ben Ali to publicly justify his attack on Islamists by arguing that "'greater democracy does not lead to greater liberalism, because it leaves the way open to the rule of Islamic fundamentalism'" (*ibid.*). The hostility toward Islamism also extended to the charity sector. Knowing full-well that Islamist parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood traditionally used charity to gain support from the masses, the regime took "no chances with welfarism" and thus monopolized charity events, suppressing the existence of any NGOs (*ibid.*, p. 59). It appeared that Ben Ali was more than aware of the fact that non-state pluralism "in this domain opens up space for not only proactive Islamist-led grassroots social engineering, but also for all kinds of other non-State activism" that could threaten the regime's controlled pace of liberalization (*ibid.*). Complementing his aggressive turn on Islamists, Ben Ali also took advantage of the War on Terror by cooperating with French authorities to detain and extradite exiled opponents, often under false accusations of illegal activities (*ibid.*, p. 75).

Yet, the role of men and women in Tunisia's Islam was not entirely sidelined but used by the regime for validation in contradictory ways. Ben Ali's donning of religious garb allowed him to argue that Islam still held sway in Tunisia and also allowed him to merge Religious Legitimacy with paternalism. In many portrayals of the faithful President, traditional attire is used to construct piety and generosity. Hence, "Ben Ali often appears as a paternal figure, receiving the thanks of aid recipients or sagely listening as they describe their lives and problems" (Hawkins, 2011, p. 45-46). On the other hand, women are often constructed by the state as models of Tunisia's modern secularism. Hence, religious garb worn by elderly females is often accepted as a form of (religious) tradition, but younger women are expected to embrace clothing that is modest yet without obvious religious connotation (*ibid.*, pp. 45-46). Under Ben Ali, the hijab was thus banned at public institutions and state images of female youth often rendered educated *hijabis* invisible (*ibid.*, p. 46). As education is linked to secularism in the state's narrative, the very existence of pious but educated female youth "represents a challenge to the state's model of modernity" while also risking that the public visibility of Islam encourages its politicization (*ibid.*, p. 46).

As with any dictatorship, Ben Ali's Tunisia had gaps in governance that went unsolved by democratic window-dressing and associated balancing acts. The most arresting of such gaps was how Ben Ali tailored economic growth laws to benefit himself and his circle at the expense of the masses. Such laws allowed Ben Ali's family to control up to 21% of private sector profits through 220 firms that provided 3% of economic output (Driesbach and Joyce). All competition was blocked, while business ownership regulation also allowed Ben Ali to ensure familial ownership of Tunisia's largest media outlets, guaranteeing political censorship of anything that cast doubt on the regime (*ibid.*). Any legal revisions during Ben Ali's tenure only served "the interests of his family and those close to him to the detriment of the rest of Tunisia" (*ibid.*). Ben Ali's corruption would eventually be reflected in his final speech. It is that speech's scant references to the socio-

economic ruling bargain that places this case last as the weakest confirmation of the hypothesis assumption that republicans will rely on a socio-economic ruling bargain for non-democratic legitimacy. This fact will be further analyzed in Chapter 6.

Adding insult to injury was the practice of regional favoritism, both politically and economically. While the tourist-friendly coastal regions (and the birthplace of Ben Ali and Bourguiba) enjoyed lavish development, the interior regions suffered from socio-economic neglect and unemployment (Arieff, 2011, p. 18; Grewal, p. 4). Further, until the Barrakat Essahel Affair, enlargement of the military drew upon officers from Ben Ali's Sahel region along the eastern coast. The towns of the region "mounted to just 24 percent of Tunisia's population yet claimed nearly 40 percent of the officers promoted […] under Ben Ali" (Grewal, 2016, p. 4). The combination of socio-economic and political isolation no doubt fueled interior resentment that exploded in 2010 (*ibid.*).

When the Arab Spring sparked in the interior and spread to the capital Tunis, Ben Ali urged calm. "Citizens, citizens," he declared, "[t]hese incidents are the work of a small group of hostile elements who are offended by the success of Tunisia and who are filled with resentment and grievance, because of the progress and development achieved by the country" (Ben Ali., 2010). Ben Ali was right to recognize the dangers of resentment and grievance but unable to understand not only the extent of popular anger but how he had sowed the seeds of his own downfall. While widespread discontent and Bouazizi's self-immolation sparked the Arab Spring, it was resentment within the Armed Forces that dealt the final blow to his regime. Still remembering the injustice of the Barrakat Essahel scandal and the favoritism bestowed upon coastal officers, the majority of troops in Tunisia's Armed Forces felt no loyalty toward their President and no remorse upon his ouster (Grewal, p. 5).

As the origin point of the Arab Spring, Tunisia remains a litmus test for the transition out of dictatorship. In yet another reversal of fortunes considered "a healthy phenomenon for

Tunisia's young democracy", the military received a state apology for the Barrakat Essahel Affair and has begun to play a more politicized role in governance (*ibid.*, pp. 1, 11). This role has allowed experienced military officers to address security gaps, including terrorist threats and the dismantling of Ben Ali's *mukhabarat* (government spying) apparatus, bringing Tunisia out of its police state (*ibid.*, p. 1). At the same time, Islamists were given a second chance in the public sphere, with their 2011 election under a tripartite government, in partnership with two secular parties (*ibid.*, p. 6). Inclusion is indeed at the center of democratic belief. Nonetheless, as a state with a legacy of secular-religious tension and almost 30 years under dictatorship, both the involvement of Islamists and the Armed Forces will be carefully observed (*ibid.*, p. 2).

5.6 Understanding MENA Monarchies

An overview of each case study should reveal how the monarchical nations of the Levant and the Gulf have survived the Arab Spring, with King Abdullah II of Jordan and King Hamad of Bahrain still perched on their thrones. It is therefore imperative to further explore the nature of monarchical systems in the Middle East. Are they truly different from their republican counterparts? Do they possess a gravitas or political leeway that presidents-for-life do not?

Of note across MENA monarchies has been greater promises of reform (economic or otherwise), especially in non-oil states such as Jordan (Tobin, 2012). These reforms include limited economic liberalization to increase working class purchasing power while also allowing for controlled political speech. Yet this process is often accompanied by a revolving door of government officials that are hired and fired at Abdullah's behest to deflect blame during protests (*ibid.*). At the same time, such promises may or may not be met. Moreover, they may or may not cover comprehensive popular political desires, which can include the transition from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy (King, 2011,

p. 4). The option of such a transition is a path unavailable to republics led by a single leader and remains an exclusive choice for monarchies (*ibid.*).

Critics like Linz *et al.* argue that such a transition can be measured and formalized. Taking the older European monarchies as a model, Linz *et al.* explain that such monarchies evolved over time from absolute ruling monarchies under which only the monarch "forms and terminates government" to constitutional monarchies under which the "formation and termination of government needs support of both the monarch and elected parliament" (Linz, Minoves and Stepan, 2014, p. 37). While monarchies are typically seen as falling into one of these two categories, Linz *et al.* further argue that European monarchs have transitioned to the third and final classification of democratic parliamentary monarchy, under which only "the freely elected parliament forms and terminates government" (*ibid.*). The European connection to understanding Arab monarchy is most pertinent, as many Arab states established monarchical constitutions upon independence that were based on European legal structures (Brown, 2001, p. 62).

Linz *et al.* argue that these transitions away from autocracy and toward constitutional and in time democratic parliamentary monarchy are encouraged or undermined by five key factors:

- Political pressure from the masses for a transition to constitutional monarchy or democratic parliamentary monarchy can increase the chances of such a transition taking place. However, the likelihood of transition is itself affected by the remaining criteria

- Monarchical family: differences between small ruling families and large dynastic families can affect how a monarch responds to political pressure for transition from subjects. Under small families, a single monarch often rules alone and can make the decision to accept a constitutional or democratic parliamentary system. However, in a large dynastic family as seen in the Gulf (and Bahrain), relatives often fill high-ranking and influential posts and if

transition threatens their power, they will form internal coalitions to block the current ruler from yielding to popular political demands

- Taxes or no taxes: The more taxes a monarchy needs, the more vulnerable their political position. This situation can be linked to earlier discussions of Jordan's defensive democratization, in which the Hashemites responded to socio-economic pressures through a controlled, top-down liberalization process after imposing taxation. This shift in the social contract and "relying more on its citizenry than on external rents for its government revenues, [meant the monarchy] was simultaneously compelled to incorporate a greater public voice in decision-making" (Robinson, p. 391). By contrast, a Gulf oil sheikhdom can ignore and even retaliate against popular political demands through the carrot of well-funded welfare as part of the ruling bargain and the stick of well-equipped security services

- Ethnic and religious division: As with differences between dynastic and single monarchies discussed above, the likelihood of a transition to constitutional or democratic parliamentary monarchy hinges on access to political power. If transition will quell sectarian/ethnic conflicts by increasing e.g. political representation, it may be considered by the monarchy. However, if such a transition is considered by a minority elite as augmenting the political position of an ethnically or religiously marginalized majority, it will be resisted by said elite, as illustrated by Bahrain's sectarianism (Middle East Eye, 2017)

- International actors: A monarchy's link to international political actors can also influence transition. Global political allies hostile to transition will empower monarchies to resist popular political will, while influential global allies that value democracy may pressure monarchies into accepting transition (Linz, Minoves and Stepan, 2014, p. 39). The importance of international allies and their promotion of democracy is again illustrated by the Western response to the al-Khalifa crackdown on Bahrain's protests. As a geostrategic

ally of Western powers hosting the U.S. Fifth Fleet, King Hamad received little pushback from the Whitehouse, with diplomatic officials more concerned with preserving good relations with both Bahrain and its patron Saudi Arabia (Birnbaum and Warrick, 2011; (Linz, Minoves and Stepan, p. 38)

Linz's explanation and factors of monarchical transition also connect with Huntington's discussion of 'the king's dilemma'. In his 1968 book *Political Order and Changing Societies*, Huntington argues that traditional society undergoing modernization benefits from the leadership of a centralized monarchy (Lucas, 2011). Centralized administration can maximize progressive development, but modernization will also see the creation of groups that are not fully incorporated by traditional monarchy (*ibid.*). The king's dilemma is considered within the context of the Arab Spring by Lucas (2011), with youth as the product of modernization heretofore excluded from incorporation by traditional leaderships, a key factor of the Arab Spring (*ibid.*). As with Linz, Huntington considers how a monarch may respond to discontent due to the creation of new groups that are not incorporated by traditional institutes. These include:

- Abandoning absolutism for rule as a constitutional monarch

- Reversing modernization and reasserting authoritarianism (as considered in Bahrain)

- Institutionalizing popular participation under a system of monarchical sovereignty (perhaps through parliamentary votes, as considered in Jordan) (*ibid.*)

This struggle between traditionalism and popular participation may also be linked to Weber's sources of legitimacy from Chapter 3. To reiterate, Weber's tradition draws legitimacy from acceptance of rule through established custom, while Weber's legality draws legitimacy from acceptance of a regime that rules through rationally created rules that establish said regime as 'functionally competent' (Weber, 2009, pp. 78-79). As considered by Huntington's king's dilemma, modernization may result in a tug of war

between traditionalism and constitutionalism for monarchical rule, and it is possible that (monarchical) rulers are responding to the Arab Spring with a transition from Weber's tradition to legality as a manner of bolstering their non-democratic credentials (such as Religious Legitimacy) rather than abandoning absolutism altogether and fully embracing constitutionalism. Such a prospect will be further discussed in chapter 6.

Returning to Linz's conditions of political transition, they can also be considered within the context of the ruling bargain. As has been previously addressed in Chapters 2 and 3, the ruling bargain varies from state to state. Nonetheless, it is intended to be apolitical in nature and can therefore be seen as a hindrance to any political transition toward constitutional monarchy or democratic parliamentary monarchy (Peter, 2016). This can certainly be true of Gulf States where oil wealth allows such a bargain to remain strong by providing the masses with Beneficial Consequences in the form of welfare and related socio-economic gifts, which can be augmented in response to potential unrest (Hertog, p. 401). Non-oil states like Jordan may be forced to engage in 'defensive democratization'; however, such a move is still limited in its political liberalization and indeed intended to block full political transition, going hand-in-hand with a patronage network and ruling bargain supported by donor states (Robinson, pp. 389-391). The ability to maintain a ruling bargain is a strong incentive to preserve the status quo and hence resist political transition (Linz, Minoves and Stepan, p. 38).

In addition to the ruling bargain, it is appropriate to return to the role of Religious Legitimacy and how religion is drawn on to defer or neutralize serious constitutional transition. Both Jordan and the Kingdom of Morocco are non-oil monarchies. They can hence both be described as 'lynchpin' kingdoms that attract much-needed external aid to maintain a less-than-lavish rentier model of "modest amounts of public spending and subsidies" (Bank, Richter and Sunik, 2014, p. 165). Indeed, Jordan and Morocco may also share models of regime legitimation. These monarchies survive through a combination of "military and financial support by external actors combined with religious-traditional

legitimacy claims" (*ibid.*, p. 167). At the same time, symbols of Religious Legitimacy are often centralized around a single ruler in non-oil states rather than their family (as in the Gulf), making manipulation of traditional religious symbolism far more successful as a leadership ploy (Brumberg, p.10).

Further, it would appear King Abdullah II of Jordan was influenced by his Moroccan counterpart in his response to the Arab Spring. When protests broke out in Morocco in March 2011, King Mohammed VI announced constitutional reforms (King, p. 4). While these reforms were considered substantial, they also augmented his Religious Legitimacy by reasserting "his supreme position as 'Commander of the Faithful'" and his leadership authority to "keep Islam as the basis of national identity" (Brumberg, p. 10). Within months, King Abdullah II announced his own constitutional amendments under a commission appointed by himself (Bank, Richter and Sunik, pp. 170-171). In addition, a later address by Abdullah in October 2012 during further protest highlighted the King's "honour of being a descendant of our forefather Prophet Muhammad" (Abdullah II, October 2012). Just as Morocco's Mohammed VI assented to (controlled) constitutional reforms while reasserting his Religious Legitimacy, Abdullah II of Jordan used unrest as an opportunity to balance constitutional reform with a reminder of his religious credentials (*ibid.*).

Returning to Linz *et al.*'s discussions of factors for transition, it is worth mentioning that while the fourth factor of ethnic and religious divisions can influence or deter transition, unlike sectarian Bahrain, Morocco and Jordan enjoy a united Sunni populace, making assertions of religious authority more effective, as ruler and ruled are of the same Muslim branch (Brumberg, p. 10).

Understanding Arab monarchies through the lens of political transition does illustrate potential differences between kings and their republican counterparts. Monarchs, as hereditary rulers can gracefully yield to the pressure for transition to constitutional or

democratic parliamentary monarchy. The trade-off for such a long-term survival option is a reduction of royal power, be it personalized (Morocco and Jordan) or familial (the Gulf) "while maintaining considerable prestige, popularity and relevance" (King, p. 4). Nonetheless, it would appear that most if not all monarchs across the Arab world have rejected this option. For the Gulf States, oil wealth has allowed the continuation of a carrot-and-stick method or the ruling bargain, with little incentive to embrace transition. This seems especially true of dynastic or familial monarchies, under which many family members occupy influential political posts, preventing the monarch from considering transition at the expense of relatives who compose the political elite. On the other hand, even non-oil monarchies are not incapable of prioritizing a ruling bargain mixed more heavily with the use of Religious Legitimacy. Morocco's Mohammad VI acceded to popular demands for constitutional reform but also used the opportunity to augment his Religious Legitimacy, specifically his religious title as Commander of the Faithful. Jordan's Abdullah II runs a modest ruling bargain funded by external donors, including fellow Gulf monarchs. At the same time, Abdullah appears to have followed a similar pattern to his Moroccan cousin by introducing constitutional reforms through a panel under his own control. As with Morocco's Muhammad VI, these reforms were put in a (belated) context of Religious Legitimacy and Abdullah's public reminder of his lineage to the Prophet Muhammad. In Bahrain, however, the tactic of drawing on religion has been fragmented by sectarianism, which gives King Hamad a different form of religious manipulation that, along with Saudi support, bolstered heavy repression.

5.6.1 Bahrain's Sectarianism and Jordan's Tribalism

As kingdoms, Jordan and Bahrain provide interesting parallels regarding how authoritarian rule may practice the inclusion of some groups and the inclusion of others, whether through the Sunni/Shia'a divide (Bahrain) or East Bank/West Bank discrimination (Jordan). The practice of such political segregation has been questioned within the context of the Arab Spring, with authors like Valbjørn exploring whether the Arab Spring has

encouraged a deeper manipulation of sectarianism and ethnic differences as a regime response (p. 127).

To reiterate, Jordan's populous consists of original Jordanian tribes of East Bank origin who have enjoyed socio-economic privileges in exchange for loyalty to the throne (Alshboul and Oudat, p. 66). From 1948 onward, Jordan absorbed Palestinians of West Bank origin (Culcasi, 2016, p. 9). The growth of Jordan's Palestinian populous was mirrored by concerns over their potential political clout as their numbers increased within the Hashemite kingdom and encouraged citizenship without the same privileges as their East Bank counterparts (*ibid.*). Such discrimination hardened during Amman's brush with the Arab Spring. While recognizing popular unrest as being led by East Bankers, some movements were attacked by the regime "[…] as being led by disloyal Palestinians and Islamists who wanted to overthrow the Hashemite monarchy in favour of Palestinian Islamist rule (Valbjørn, p. 142)". In Bahrain, the Sunni minority elite have historically blocked Shia'a numbers in parliament and reduced public services in Shia'a areas (ADHRB, 2015, p. 19). During the Arab Spring, the al-Khalifas fueled sectarian fears to successfully sow mutual distrust between Sunni and Shia'a neighbors, friends and colleagues (Voice of America, 2011).

The social phenomenon of political inclusion and exclusion can be addressed by Ibn Khaldun's *'asabiyya* (clannishness). *'Asabiyya* can be considered an element of Ibn Khaldun's framework for political relations, bolstered by religion and political institutions (Ra'ees, 2004, p. 159). According to Ibn Kaldun, religion is the highest good and when combined with *'asabiyya* encourages political and institutional transformations and state foundation, with the dominant force vacillating between religion and *'asabiyya* (*ibid.*, p. 167). However, *'asabiyya* encompasses different types. These types can include natural *'asabiyya* encouraging strong bonds among family and tribe but also rational *'asabiyya* or social bonds among the ruling elite, who are meant to prioritize a common good but also the interests of the ruler (*ibid.*, pp. 171-172). This latter aspect can connect with the

monarchies of Jordan and Bahrain, including through a combination of rational *'asabiyya* and religion. If rational *'asabiyya* creates a bond among only the ruling elite, then there must be exclusion of those who are not of the ruling class (*ibid.*, p. 172). Such exclusion can link to Bahrain's religious discrimination and Jordan's ethnic discrimination, respectively. In Manama a ruling Sunni elite practice inclusion/exclusion along religious lines, with Shia'a discriminated against and decried as Iranian agents during the Arab Spring (Wehrey, p. 122). In Amman, a monarch with lineage to the Prophet Muhammad maintains a ruling bargain with East Bank Jordanians while also coopting Palestinian business elites during times of reduced aid and hence patronage cuts for the tribal elite (Robinson, p. 391). Jordan's model of rational *'asabiyya* is arresting as the fluctuation of the ruling bargain can mean that the ethnicity of the ruling elite can expand and contract according to cash flow (*ibid.*). However, the scapegoating of Palestinian protestors during the Arab Spring is a reminder that under rational *'asabiyya* the core of the ruling elite is monarchy and East Bankers (Valbjørn, p. 127). On going Shia'a discrimination in Bahrain and ethnic discrimination in Jordan may reveal that the Arab Spring is strengthening such *'asabiyya* or clannishness as another form of regime security, with religion and ethnicity manipulated for regime survival.

5.7 Conclusion

A detailed overview of the four case studies for this project provides an understanding of how political legitimacy has been traditionally crafted in North Africa, the Levant and the Gulf. Republics and monarchies have drawn on democratic window-dressing and controlled parliaments to ensure the flow of aid into their coffers and the protection of their needed elite. In addition, both forms of government have manipulated religion and the image of piety to varying degrees. For Ben Ali's Tunisia, this included images of a pious but modern president, augmenting a state narrative of Islam being second to an educated youth that should regard Islamic garb as traditional rather than progressive. In the Levant, the Hashemites have enjoyed the stronger Religious Legitimacy of lineage to the Prophet

Muhammad and also the related guardianship of holy sites in Jerusalem. In a twist of faith, however, Bahrain's al-Khalifas have seen the Shia'a masses draw on their own Religious Legitimacy, with many protestors decreeing their actions blessed by Allah.

Despite sharing strategies of manipulating religion and parliaments, the survival of family rule has been mixed across the Arab world. The old republics in Tunisia and Egypt have crumbled, ending the era of Mubarak and Ben Ali. At the same time, the nascent republics being birthed in Tunisia and Egypt are seeing the military take center stage. For Tunisia, such a shift in a previously marginalized Armed Forces may actually help shape a stable democracy, as experienced officers address security gaps and help deconstruct Ben Ali's feared *mukhabarat*. In Egypt, however, the emergence of military rule has not expunged the suppression under Mubarak but rather enlarged it under President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, who now leads Egypt's Armed Forces as the new pharaoh of the land.

Republics may rise and fall, yet it seems that monarchies remain. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is the last bastion of the Levant less for its religious lineage than for its ability to maintain the status quo through manipulation of tribal lines, regional fears and even the Arab Spring itself. Although King Abdullah II may want to transition the state toward a constitutional monarchy, it is clear from his public confessions that even he cannot alter the forces of the old elite, powerful tribes and his own *mukhbarat*. Further, he is limited in his reforms by the simple need for Hashemite survival, under which external aid and rentier bargains ultimately serve regime security. In the Gulf, the al-Khalifa monarchy of Bahrain appears to have also extinguished their own Arab Spring. Rather than exploiting regional threats, King Hamad has called on regional allies in the form of Saudi Arabia and GCC partners. A hard crackdown in the island state amid a smear campaign intended to deepen sectarianism appears to have been successful in sowing mutual distrust between Sunni and Shia'a. Just as Ben Ali and Mubarak engaged in democratic window-dressing, the establishment of the BICI did little to change the ruling tactics of the Sunni minority. Protected from accountability by parliament and the Peninsula Shield Force, the recent

liquidation of political groups by an empowered monarchy illustrates a kingdom where survival of family rule continues in a regional atmosphere of impunity.

Chapter 5 has provided an historical overview of each case study relevant to this thesis. Understanding the relevance of Religious Legitimacy and the (fiscally) utilitarian nature of the ruling bargain helps augment the main themes of the thesis, namely understanding non-democratic political legitimacy as utilitarian while also examining the political role of religion as a phenomenon unique to the MENA region and the Arab Spring. Chapter 5 thus provides a detailed chronology of non-democratic political power as an established framework (albeit under the partial guise of democracy and/or civil society across all case studies) and how this framework was challenged by the Arab Spring. Such a detailed overview serves as an expedient analysis of the major political factors that are to be analyzed in Chapter 6, in which this thesis explores how Arab leaders defended non-democratic legitimacy in public discourse in response to the Arab Spring.

6. Main Analysis: Speeches

6.1 Introduction

As explained in Chapters 4 and 5, this thesis seeks to generate original knowledge by using discourse analysis to examine cases relevant to the Arab Spring and to address the following research question: What are the factors Arab leaders use in discourse justifying their rule within the context of the Arab Spring? To what extent does this discourse support a (socio-economic) ruling bargain and Religious Legitimacy? The discourse aspects of the research question allow the analysis of speeches from each case study to be most relevant in addressing the research question: What are the factors Arab leaders use in discourse justifying their rule within the context of the Arab Spring? To what extent does this discourse support a (socio-economic) ruling bargain and Religious Legitimacy? Analysis of select speeches given by Arab leaderships in response to the Arab Spring has been chosen to augment original knowledge contribution, as existing literature does not extensively analyze such speeches within the context of understanding non-democratic legitimacy (see Chapter 2). Consequently, the use of discourse analysis is most appropriate to address the research question. Further, as the Arab Spring can be regarded as a socio-economic movement or series of movements provoked by, inter alia, poverty and corruption (as discussed in Chapter 5), understanding how Arab leaders addressed the ruling bargain in their political discourses amid widespread discontent will allow the author to examine the hypothesis of this thesis: that is, republics will emphasize the socio-economic ruling bargain as the main source of their non-democratic legitimacy in response to the Arab Spring, due to most republics being the result of coups rather than established familial rule. Consequently, many republican rulers have weaker ties to traditional (religious) institutes and popular support and rely on a ruling bargain to maintain legitimacy. Monarchs, on the other hand, will draw on Religious Legitimacy more than the ruling bargain due to their longevity and ties to traditional institutions and accepted socio-cultural norms.

To complement the analysis of speeches and discourses, the present work also focuses on the constitutions from each case study in relation to the speeches. This investigation in Chapter 7 will ascertain what political processes of legitimacy are formally accepted, to what extent these processes are democratic or non-democratic forms of legitimacy (or processes of Religious Legitimacy) and whether these written processes are referred to in the speeches given by Arab leaders justifying their rule in response to the Arab Spring.

To reiterate, these constitutions include:

- Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

- Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain

- Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt

- Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia

6.2 Speeches of Legitimacy during the Arab Spring

6.2.1: *The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan's Abdullah II*

"In the name of God, the Most Merciful, the Compassionate. My brothers and sisters, I would like to welcome you all to your home, the home of all Jordanians. I wanted to meet with you today for a sincere talk at this particular stage in our beloved country's history, in order to highlight our reform roadmap" (Abdullah II, October 2012)

A discourse analysis of Jordan's Abdullah II reveals greater use of Religious Legitimacy than that of ousted republicans, while still highlighting the ruling bargain and socio-economic aspects of said bargain. At the same time, there is a turn toward political elements that appear to acknowledge that the non-democratic ruling bargain was limited since before the Arab Spring.

Abdullah II's speech opens with a Quranic phrase, "[…] [in] the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate" (*ibid.*). The use of a phrase familiar to all Muslims is

arresting and can be linked back to Searle's mention of any speech act requiring mutual rules (Searle, 1965, p. 3). The notion of mutual rules conveyed by Abdullah II as speaker can be compared and contrasted with the similar attempts of President Ben Ali in his address. For Ben Ali, the mutual rule between speaker and listeners is "[…] the language of Tunisians" (Ben Ali, 2011). For Jordan's King Abdullah II, however, the mutual rules are ones of religion. Here, Abdullah's opening passage indicates that he as a monarchical ruler may turn to religion more so than his republican counterparts (Abdullah II, October 2012).

Hence, religion can be regarded as the first preparatory condition and is followed by an interesting juxtaposition against Mubarak's paternalism. For the Egyptian President, his final address was "[…] a father's dialogue with his sons and daughters" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011). For Abdullah II, citizens of Jordan are not his sons and daughters but "[…] my brothers and sisters" who he invites not for "[…] a father's dialogue with his sons and daughters" as Mubarak does but for a "[…] sincere talk at this particular stage in our beloved country's history, in order to highlight our reform roadmap" (Abdullah II, October 2012). This 'reform roadmap' refers to political reform programs that were launched "[…] a year and a half ago […] [for] the home of all Jordanians" (*ibid.*). Such a preparatory condition is arresting.

Abdullah opens his address by (re)iterating political promises. As discussed in Chapter 5, the workings of the ruling bargain in Jordan have not always been apolitical. Reliant on regional and other external aid, Jordan has seen fluctuations in cashflow affect the non-democratic relations between monarchy and masses. The requirement of the Hashemites to maintain their patronage network by imposing taxation has meant that the maxim *no taxation, no representation* has been reversed at times, with the socio-economic shift in the social contract prompting citizens to demand a political voice (Robinson, p. 391). Abdullah II's reference to ongoing political reform can be understood as a reflection of this reality, allowing the preparatory conditions of Religious Legitimacy and democratic reform to act

as a balance that is unseen in republican speakers: Abdullah II is not drawing purely on non-democratic factors and seems to understand the fact that the ruling bargain can change, as Jordan's history has revealed (*ibid.*).

At the same time, the fact that such promises are "[…] for all Jordanians" allows them to be restrictive within the context of Jordan's history. Again, as examined in Chapter 5, Jordan's geostrategic location has not only attracted fluctuating donations from Western powers but often leaves the Hashemite Kingdom "[…] between Iraq and a hard place", as described by the King himself when interviewed before the Arab Spring erupted (Lower, 2013). Jordan has endured waves of refugees since 1948, beginning with Palestinians after the creation of Israel and during the 1967 skirmish between Jordan's King Hussein and Israeli forces, which cost Hussein the East Bank and Jerusalem (including the loss of Muslim holy landmarks). Both Gulf Wars brought further refugees from Iraq and current events in Syria have augmented Jordan's refugee population to the point of sporadic unrest, as Jordanians began to fear for their socio-economic prospects. Within the context of continuing refugee flow, Abdullah's preparatory conditions of political promises for "[…] the home of all Jordanians" may act as a reminder that the ruling bargain's political elements prioritize Jordanians loyal to monarchy and of East Bank origin, while those of Palestinian and other origins may enjoy limited privileges or even be excluded from the ruling bargain, even if they have attained Jordanian citizenship (Culcasi, p. 9).

As Abdullah continues to make political promises, he does so while addressing citizens as equal "[…] brothers and sisters" who have "[…] focused on enhancing citizens' rights to participate effectively in the decisions that impact them and their future, and I am committed to guaranteeing this right for all" (Abdullah II, October 2012). Note the description in this passage of "[…] citizen's rights", again implying that democratic or political factors of the ruling bargain are not for all but only for those in Jordan who enjoy citizenship. At the same time, Abdullah draws attention to the enhancing of rights for

citizens, implying that there is democratic political legitimacy in his rule and that the ruling bargain must acknowledge the political participation of citizens.

Abdullah also appears to engage, like Mubarak, in Democratic Approval through talk of constitutional reform and constitutional laws (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011). Although political reforms include constitutional changes to "[…] make the people a true partner in the political process", King Abdullah II reminds Jordanians that he is the head of a "[…] constitutional monarchical system" and that hence his legitimacy is buttressed by "[…] our constitutional process" and that his very regime exists "[…] under the umbrella of the Constitution" (Abdullah II, 2012). Returning to discussions of Peter's Democratic Approval in Chapter 3, it is possible to consider the use of democratic proceduralism to formally validate a regime and its political decisions. Common institutions representing such Democratic Approval include the *majlis* or parliament, often used by Middle East monarchies. Abdullah emphasizes the role of parliament in his constitutional system, describing elections for parliament as representing "[…] the will of the people" and that reforms will be overseen "[…] under the dome of Parliament" (*ibid.*). This latter quote is arresting, as it merges Democratic Approval with Religious Legitimacy. The image of the parliament being under a dome will, for many Jordanians, evoke their faith and associations with the mosque. This image of Abdullah's parliamentary system being 'holy' is augmented by the fact that domes are a central element of all mosques and related holy sites in Islam, symbolizing access to Heaven (Grupico, 2011).

Religious imagery associated with parliamentary procedure is significant in the context of Abdullah's speech. For Abdullah's preparatory conditions regarding political reform and Religious Legitimacy link directly with the essential condition issued to Jordanians: Abdullah does not desperately call for a halt to protests. Rather, he urges patience so that reforms already underway are "[…] allowed enough time for justice to take its course". More important than patience is his instruction that if citizens "[…] want to change Jordan for the better, […] that chance is through the upcoming elections, and there is a way [for

democratic involvement] and that way is through the next Parliament" (Abdullah II, October 2012). When compared to the speeches of his republican counterparts, Abdullah's essential condition can be considered more strongly tied to Jordan's ruling bargain: with a history of fluctuating aid, there is a formal recognition that Jordanians expect to be a part of the political decision-making process if (non-democratic) socio-economic benefits are reduced or unavailable. It would appear that Abdullah tacitly acknowledges this political aspect of the social contract, as his discussion of political reform is followed by a detailed account of Jordan's (recent) economic troubles. Indeed, in one passage Abdullah highlights that subsidies remain in place "[…] for some basic commodities" while contrasting this commonality across most ruling bargains with Jordan's "[…] increase in deficit and public debt", brought on, in part, by regional turmoil, including the end of subsidized oil agreements with Iraq and costly "[…] disruptions in the supply of Egyptian gas [to Jordan]". The effects of regional shifts have meant that regional aid "[…] barely covered the additional deficit" (*ibid.*).

With an admission of Jordan's financial difficulties, Abdullah seems to invite Jordanians to have a political voice in decision making, thereby returning to Chapter 5's discussions on how the Hashemites have encountered political expectations from citizens when unable to deliver Beneficial Consequences of a socio-economic nature. However, this image of a more democratic social contract must be balanced with Jordan's tribal and political history. As discussed in Chapter 5, election results have often favored tribalism, royalists and leading *mukhabarat* figures due to electoral manipulation and gerrymandering. Considering Jordan's political profile and Abdullah's speech returns discussion somewhat to Korany's framework of the three Ms discussed in Chapter 2: the Military, the Mosque and the Masses (2014, p. 256). In Abdullah's case, perhaps the three Ms are the *Mukhabarat*, the Mosque and the Masses, as Jordan's Hashemites have augmented the role of the security services more than the military when it comes to politics, while Abdullah draws on religious imagery and "[…] the honour of being a descendant of our forefather

Prophet Mohammad" to represent his strong Religious Legitimacy to the masses (Abdullah II, October 2012).

Nevertheless, Abdullah seems to use Democratic Approval to remain aloof from socio-economic and political pressures. Returning to talk of political reform and elections, Abdullah outlines key "[…] policies and additional reforms" that an elected government should address. These include:

- Tackling poverty and unemployment

- Managing Jordan's debt and budget deficit

- Ensuring that the taxation system is adequately reformed

- Developing a more comprehensive voting system (linked to Abdullah's invitation for Jordanians to participate in the political process)

- Ensuring an improvement of public services, including health, transport and education (*ibid.*)

A detailed list of reform goals that connect with Jordan's socio-economic challenges and fluctuating ruling bargain differs markedly from the speeches of Ben Ali and Mubarak, as both offered last-minute reforms that involved vague political freedoms (of the press or the internet) and ambiguous promises for transitions of power. Nonetheless, Abdullah does not take responsibility for said reforms. As King, he is committed to the "[…] constitutional process" but political reforms themselves are left to the political parties that are campaigning for election (*ibid.*). In other words, Abdullah uses Democratic Approval to stay aloof from political demands, pushing such responsibility onto the next elected government while he himself will oversee the formalities of "[…] our constitutional process" and "respect the opinion of the majority" vis-à-vis whichever party is elected to government (*ibid.*). Such aloofness allows Abdullah's essential conditions to be understood in a new light. When Abdullah implores Jordanians to be patient with the

parliamentary system and allow "[…] enough time for justice to take its course", his aloofness implies that even he as ruler must show patience alongside his Jordanian "[…] brothers and sisters" (*ibid.*). Again, this image can be linked to the notion of equality between ruler and citizens rather than paternalism. However, as discussed in Chapter 5 Abdullah's pushing reform and related demands onto successive governments must also be acknowledged as a common tactic used by the Hashemites to deflect popular discontent unto a revolving door of prime ministers (Milton-Edwards, 2017). Hence, Abdullah's use of Democratic Approval must be understood in such a context; legitimacy through proceduralism, as discussed by Peter, while also being used as a strategy to deflect blame.

Further, it is interesting to examine how Abdullah II acknowledges protests. Ben Ali describes demonstrations as "[…] protests against social conditions" (Ben Ali, 2011), while Mubarak did not even use the word 'protest' but preferred to address Tahrir Square's demonstrations as "[…] the new Egyptian generation calling for a change to the better" that he, as father, could be proud of (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011). Neither president appears aware of demonstrations calling for their overthrow. Contra to the republicans downplaying unrest, Jordan's Abdullah II acknowledges demonstrations and speaks "[…] frankly today about some slogans raised by a limited number of protestors – 'overthrow the regime'" (Abdullah II, October 2012). In this passage, Abdullah takes the opportunity to draw on Religious Legitimacy in order to differentiate between positive opposition and negative opposition. Positive opposition plays "[…] a legitimate and needed role" by conforming with Abdullah's essential condition: showing patience and participating in the electoral process. Negative opposition, however, can be linked to specific Islamic concepts of disobedience that Abdullah draws on as a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. Such opposition, Abdullah insists, does not "[…] serve the reform path, nor the country's future" and "[…] attempts to incite chaos and *fitna* (sedition)" (*ibid.*).

The religious concept of *fitna* links back to Chapter 2 on how Muslim rule evolved through a social contract that included religious protection. Muslim jurists have discussed the notion that rebellion against a pious leader is forbidden, as such rebellion can threaten the community of believers. To engage in such specific rebellion is hence a sin in Islam known as *fitna* explored in Chapter 2 and by the idea of Political Quietism or fatalism explained by Brown (2000, p. 67).

Muslims must accept non-democratic rulers as long as they protect the Muslim faith and related territories or *Dar al Islam*. At the same time, such reliance on Religious Legitimacy can be merged with Jordan's geopolitical situation. As discussed in Chapter 5, Jordan's location next door to unstable Iraq, conservative Saudi Arabia and warring Syria has meant that the fear of Jordan's collapse has provided the monarchy with the ability to exploit the status quo. Hence, the mention of *fitna* conjures not only religious connotations of protecting Islam through obedience to a pious ruler but also indirectly serves as a reminder of the chaos Jordan is surrounded by, especially as the Hashemite Kingdom continues to absorb increasing refugees from its neighbors.

Focusing further on Religious Legitimacy, Abdullah II has invoked Islamic sayings ("In the name of God, the Most Merciful, the Compassionate") and his lineage to the Prophet. The latter echoes Bulliet's discussions in Chapter 2 on Muslim leaders invoking Islamic titles and privileges, in this case the honor and subsequent (religious) authority of descending from the messenger of Islam (pp. 1, 12). In addition, the religious associations of *fitna* and Muslim territory connect with Bulliet's discussion of pious rulers maintaining territory that allows Muslims free practice of their faith (*ibid.*; Ayoob, p. 9). Finally, it is worth mentioning that, unlike Ben Ali and Mubarak, Abdullah II makes references to the Quran. Such references include deftly weaving Quranic verses and related religious concepts with non-democratic factors such as security and familial rule. Especially, Abdullah refers to the "[…] many martyrs" his family has sacrificed for Jordan's stability,

while implying that he is ruler not out of choice but out of a sense of duty and the (divine) legitimacy of the Hashemite legacy (*ibid.*).

Moreover, before discussing acceptable and non-acceptable roles of the opposition, Abdullah paraphrases a Quranic quote, arguing that the Hashemites "[…] have to be objective and uphold the truth when we interpret things, and be honest in our words" (*ibid.*). This statement can be linked to Muslim critics of the Quran, who argue that honesty and truthfulness are natural and therefore exulted virtues (in the Quran). Hence, by linking his evaluation of the opposition to the Quran, Abdullah's message is that he is pious and therefore honest, while those who wish to overthrow him are, in contrast to his piety and honesty, guilty of *fitna* (Shahrur, 2009, p. 46)

Returning to Abdullah's promises and essential condition, reforms are discussed in his address as already underway and Abdullah argues that those "[…] who want additional reforms" can gain them by again meeting his essential condition: participating in the voting process. It must be noted that although some critics consider Jordan to be ultimately stable due to the concern of outside powers over its geostrategic location, public reaction to Abdullah's instructions were mixed (Hawthorne, 2016). The month after King Abdullah addressed the nation, protestors clashed with police over the lifting of fuel subsidies (Warrick, 2012). This event came atop relatively peaceful and sporadic unrest but emphasized that widespread discontent was as much about socio-economics as it was about any desire by Jordanians for political involvement (*ibid.*). At the same time, the promised parliamentary elections went ahead in early 2013. Voter turnout was higher than expected. At 56.5%, the 2013 election turnout enjoyed greater popularity than the 2010 election, which had boasted only 52% (Greenfield, 2013). The 2013 turnout can be partially regarded as revealing that the Hashemites, after making political promises, continued to enjoy some approval that linked back to the ongoing reform process and hence maintained political legitimacy that merged non-democratic elements such as

Religious Legitimacy and Democratic Approval with more democratic elements such as a parliamentary system.

Nonetheless, observers of the 2013 election concluded that voter turnout had less to do with democratic and political reforms and more to do with "[…] tribal loyalty and fears about regional instability" (*ibid.*). The latter element again augments previous comments that the Hashemite monarchy is exploiting regional chaos to maintain the status quo in Jordan and hence selling security as a further non-democratic factor that bolsters their legitimacy.

Abdullah II's address contrasts the speeches of republican counterparts in North Africa. As a monarch with direct lineage to the Prophet Muhammad, King Abdullah II draws much more on Religious Legitimacy than republican rulers. Further, his address provides preparatory conditions and essential conditions that are more strongly correlated and appear to take a long-term view. While Presidents Ben Ali and Mubarak make last-minute political promises and claim to offer moderate socio-economic incentives, they do so only with the aim of stopping unrest (Ben Ali, 2011; British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011). Abdullah, on the other hand, claims that political reforms are already underway and hence his promises and preparatory conditions reiterate an ongoing process, which can be linked to Peter's Democratic Approval. These promises are linked to Abdullah's essential condition or instruction: that Jordanians vote and participate in the political process rather than simply cease protesting. Moreover, the latter aspect differs markedly from Mubarak's use of Democratic Approval that is linked to constitutional amendments rather than an invitation for Egyptians to participate in political decision making (*ibid.*). Further, Abdullah does not draw heavily on paternalism as Mubarak does, yet the Jordanian monarch merges the image of being equal to his 'Jordanian brothers and sisters' with reminders of rule through tradition, describing how the Hashemite monarchy has provided stability long enough to offer "many martyrs", a reminder of the length of his family's rule that also uses religious language (Abdullah II, October 2012).

Analysis of Abdullah's speech reveals an address that shows a monarch drawing more heavily on Religious Legitimacy and tradition than the ruling bargain when compared to his republican counterparts. However, it must be noted that Abdullah's address devotes considerable time to explaining Jordan's fiscal problems and growing debt, thus acknowledging the socio-economic aspects of the ruling bargain and the expectation that a weaker socio-economic benefit structure should mean greater political participation for citizens through the voting and reform process, as discussed earlier in Chapter 5 by Robinson (p. 389). At the same time, promises of political reform and citizen participation must be balanced against a voter turnout that some argue was encouraged by the same old tribal politics and the fear of instability rather than genuine democratic openings. From such a perspective, Jordan's King Abdullah II draws more greatly from non-democratic aspects, with heavy emphasis on Religious Legitimacy and Democratic Approval and the Beneficial Consequence of security amid a ruling bargain that relies on fluctuating external aid. Despite struggling socio-economics, an analysis of Abdullah's address appears to confirm the hypothesis of this thesis: that monarchs draw more heavily on Religious Legitimacy than their republican counterparts.

6.2.2: *The Kingdom of Bahrain's Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa*

"[The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry] report deals with controversial matters of importance. You have sought to establish the true facts of a period of painful unrest which has affected all of us. You have understood the unprecedented challenges faced by our authorities as they confronted relentless provocation, from hostile sources both inside and outside the country" (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011)

King Hamad's address contrasts that of his fellow Jordanian monarch by containing few religious references (Abdullah II, October 2012. Furthermore, Hamad's speech seems to address several diverse listeners rather than be only for domestic consumption (*ibid.*). Hamad's preparatory conditions are based on the findings of the Bahrain Independent

Commission of Inquiry, a panel funded by the Bahraini government and headed by an Egyptian-American international law expert (BBC, 2011, 'Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry excerpts'). Hence, much of Hamad's monologue forms a lengthy preparatory condition that encompasses ongoing promises of political reform and also further efforts toward ensuring security, a Beneficial Consequence (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). The fact that the address is based on conclusions from an independent investigation into Bahrain's unrest is a contrast to Ben Ali's address.

Ben Ali promises an independent investigation into Tunisia's upheaval and the corruption of nameless officials (Ben Ali, 2011). However, Bahrain's Hamad has already launched an independent investigation and is building promises of political and security reform upon this independent report. Such reform can also be regarded as a form of Democratic Approval, akin to Mubarak's address in which Mubarak promises constitutional amendments after reviewing a report in response to Egyptian unrest (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011). Like Abdullah of Jordan, Hamad argues that political reforms are already ongoing and that even "[…] before receiving [the Inquiry's] Report, we have introduced proposals to amend our laws to give greater protection to the valuable right of free speech; and to expand the definition of "torture" to ensure that all forms of ill treatment are sanctioned by our criminal laws" (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). Claiming to reform existing laws before being prompted (as Abdullah also insists in his address) augments the use of Democratic Approval. However, Hamad's speech draws the most on the Beneficial Consequence of security as a strong preparatory condition (*ibid.*).

Peter's Beneficial Consequences are purely utilitarian and can therefore consider factors such as security for citizens, even at the expense of liberties (Peter, 2016). What is interesting about Peter's view on Beneficial Consequences is that liberty can be all the more restricted if the stability the state provides in exchange does not only protect its

citizens but possibly extends to larger collectives outside the state's own borders (*ibid.*). This notion of 'regional security' can be linked back to Hamad's address.

Hamad uses promises of security as a consistent preparatory condition. Of note is the fact that Hamad does not begin references to security with a focus on Bahrainis but rather the entire Gulf and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), of which Bahrain is a member. Regional security is placed within the context of an external threat, in this case Iran. Hamad admits to the Bahrain Commission of Inquiry that "[…] the Government of Bahrain was not in a position to provide evidence of links between Iran and specific events in our country this year" (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). However, in the same paragraph Hamad argues that Iran's propaganda and its influence on Bahrain's protests is "[…] an objective fact to be observed by all who have eyes and ears and can comprehend Arabic", implying that accusations against Iran are intended for a local and regional audience (*ibid.*). According to Hamad, Iran's influence and subsequent Bahraini unrest "[…] not only directly challenges the stability and sovereignty of our country, but also poses a threat to the security and stability of the GCC countries" (*ibid.*). In other words, if Bahrain is under threat, so too is the entire Gulf region (*ibid.*).

Hamad also takes this opportunity to address Bahrainis under the preparatory condition of security. He admits that security violations took place and assures citizens that "[…] we do not want, ever again, to discover that any of our law enforcement personnel have mistreated anyone" and that "[…] we are determined, God willing, to ensure that the painful events our beloved nation has just experienced are not repeated", implying that there has been a violation of the social contract's Beneficial Consequence of security that will be rectified (*ibid.*). At the same time, Hamad insists that "[…] we cannot fail to extend our gratitude to our armed forces and law enforcement agencies who restored public order in the face of intimidation and violence" and ends his speech by asserting that the House of Khalifa is committed to "[…] ensuring the safety and security of our nation and its people" (*ibid.*).

Again, it is emphatically apparent that security is being sold by the al-Khalifa monarchy as their main Beneficial Consequence (*ibid.*). This brief passage intended for domestic consumption leads to Hamad's essential condition for Bahrainis: continue to accept the ruling bargain in exchange for apparent security reforms but also "[…] a range of [financial] remedies, including the newly established Victims Compensation Fund" (*ibid.*). This socio-economic sweetener differs markedly from the address given by Jordan's Abdullah. Abdullah lists Jordan's financial struggles, increasing debt and reminders of its need for regional and Western aid, hence promising political participation during a period of socio-economic strain for the Hashemite Kingdom. Hamad, on the other hand, rules a kingdom of oil, allowing for a compensatory attitude that emphasizes the socio-economic aspects of the ruling bargain, again linking to Peter's Beneficial Consequences. It would seem that Hamad's speech emphasizes security and (financial) welfare as the main pillars of Bahrain's ruling bargain (*ibid.*).

Yet, Hamad's dedication to discussing security within a domestic context is somewhat brief. In the same passage in which he thanks the armed forces, he devotes more time to thanking "[…] our GCC allies who participated in protecting key installations by deploying the Peninsula Shield Force" (*ibid.*). Again, Hamad's comments on security appear to be taking a regional context. Ironically, expressing gratitude to the Saudi-led Peninsula Shield Force can be read as a tacit admission that the al-Khalifa monarchy cannot provide security without outside assistance from Saudi Arabia (Obaid, p. 13). However, the risk of such an image may also be why Bahrain is blaming unrest on external forces like Iran, which is regarded by Saudi Arabia and the GCC as a long-term political competitor (*ibid.*, p. 8). In other words, an external threat requires external support (*ibid.*).

The notion of Bahrain's regional cooperation for stability can be linked to Peter's Political Cosmpolitanism or the belief that there can be an international legitimacy that is state-based. States will cooperate in an international system that prioritizes the stability of sovereign states over the rights of citizens of individual states (Peter, 2016). Peter's

Political Cosmopolitanism links back to Chapter 3's discussion on Ahram and Lust's 'The Decline and Fall of the Arab State'. In it, the pair emphasize how sovereignty is an artificial construct that requires the legitimation of an international system (Ahram and Lust, 2016, p. 8). It is such international legitimacy that Hamad seems to prioritize in his address (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011).

Complementing Hamad's comments on regional security are extensive passages discussing Bahrain's involvement with international organizations. As Bahrain suffers from the influence of "[…] hostile forces both inside and outside the country" Hamad is able to use security as a connecting point to Bahrain's involvement with the international community (*ibid.*). Hamad compares the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry to the European Court of Human Rights and its powers to "[…] frequently sanction European States for violations of human rights" (*ibid.*). Through the report issued by the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, Hamad draws attention to his preparatory condition and promise to the international community: that Hamad will "[…] reform our laws so that they are consistent with international standards to which Bahrain is committed by treaties" (*ibid.*). Hamad builds further on this promise with preparatory conditions that emphasize Bahrain's place in the international community. Hamad reminds listeners that Bahrain "[…] has taken the initiative to contribute to collective international action by providing facilities for multilateral organisations" and has received "[…] Mr. Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations" (*ibid.*). During said trip, Hamad reminds global listeners that "[…] we dedicated a significant plot of land in our capital Manama to serve the community of the United Nations; it now houses a regional office of the UN Development Programme" (*ibid.*). Hamad builds on Bahrain's relationship with the United Nations to imply that Bahrain enjoys international legitimacy through recognition from the United Nations and to introduce an essential condition to an international audience: that Bahrain "[…] would welcome other UN agencies" and hence Hamad invites the United Nations to deepen their already established relationship with the al-Khalifa family (*ibid.*).

The invitation to extend UN presence in Bahrain again links back to Peter's Political Cosmopolitanism by illustrating that the al-Khalifa regime is recognized by an international body (Peter, 2016). However, it also serves as a preparatory condition for a larger essential condition proposed by Hamad to the international community. Hamad proposes that Bahrain lead "[…] the creation of an Arab Court of Human Rights to take its proper place on the international stage" (*ibid.*). In this passage, Hamad merges the wish to deepen regional legitimacy with international legitimacy, desiring that Bahrain lead a regional court that will have international recognition. Returning to Peter's Political Cosmopolitanism, Hamad's approach illustrates an emphasis on state sovereignty within an international system. More important than domestic recognition of his regime is the fact that all states exist under a system of mutual recognition and from such recognition derive their legitimacy on the world stage (Peter, 2016). This consideration is augmented by the fact that Bahrain enjoys strong relations with Western states and United Nations members, including Britain and the United States, hosting the US Navy's Fifth Fleet in the Gulf since 1995 (BBC, 2018, *Bahrain country profile*); Saab, 2018).

An overview of Hamad's address reveals a speech that draws little on religion. This may hardly be surprising when taking into account Bahrain's sectarian nature and the fact that the ruling Sunni minority govern a Shia'a majority (*ibid.*). Rather, Hamad emphasizes security as a Beneficial Consequence of his rule and promises to address violations with appropriate (security) reforms. Further, the socio-economic nature of the ruling bargain is more apparent in this oil monarchy than in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The fact that Bahrain established a Victims Compensation Fund for Bahrainis augments the socio-economic rather than political reaction to unrest: the al-Khalifas are keen to enforce the ruling bargain and with oil wealth can afford to.

Hamad's instruction that Bahrainis accept compensation appears to have been partially successful. With his address given in late 2011, there seemed to be few major protest movements for the rest of the year (BBC, 2018, *Bahrain country profile*). Anti-government

protests did occur in the spring of 2012; however, unrest was often sporadic and outside of the capital, Manama. Such demonstrations often blossomed in villages and were contained by security forces before they could spread (Mcevers). Nonetheless, 2012 and 2013 saw spikes in demonstrations (*ibid.*). It is worth noting that within the context of Hamad's November 2011 speech and Bahrain's relative stability before renewed protest in 2012, Hamad's emphasis on the Victims Compensation Fund does not automatically explain decreased unrest. Hamad's gratefulness in his speech to the Peninsula Shield Force is a reminder that protestors were not simply bought off but also confronted by a Saudi-led intervention that was the largest regional military deployment for the GCC (Wahba, 2017). The intervention of a regional force would explain Hamad's emphasis on regional legitimacy during his speech (*ibid.*).

Such a context of external intervention illustrates that Hamad's legitimacy for a domestic audience is drawn primarily from the socio-economic ruling bargain and welfare (or in this case compensation) as a Beneficial Consequence. Indeed, it is worth mentioning that the structure of the Victims Compensation Fund seeks to reinforce a non-political social contract that emphasizes socio-economic benefits. The Victims Compensation Fund was complemented by a two-year economic program that would pay out over one billion USD in wage increases for government employees (Reuters, 2011). In addition to the Victims Compensation Fund, a further fund was created in 2012 to compensate all victims of unrest, including expats (Trade Arabia, 2012). It is with this fund that the emphasis on legitimacy through the ruling bargain is augmented, as applicants of the fund must agree to drop any court cases against the Bahraini government to receive compensation (*ibid.*).

The fact that victims seem to have accepted buyouts under such circumstances illustrates that Hamad and the al-Khalifas have been able to maintain a non-democratic ruling bargain through material benefits (Kingdom of Bahrain, 2012). In addition to emphasizing the socio-economic ruling bargain, the creation of such funds also links back to Political Cosmopolitanism and international legitimacy. This is apparent from the fact that the

compensation funds and related payouts were created upon the recommendation of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry and in accordance with UN principles on redress for human rights violations (*ibid.*). Once again, there is an emphasis on Hamad's appeal to the international community (*ibid.*).

Returning to Political Cosmopolitanism and international legitimacy, it would seem that Hamad's frequent references to international organizations and UN approval of Bahrain had the intended effect. Hamad's proposal that his nation lead the establishment of an Arab Court of Human Rights was met with approval by the Arab League, which selected Bahrain itself as the headquarters of such a court (Dickinson, 2013). Further, more recent events in 2018 saw Bahrain elected to the UN Human Rights Council (Arab News, 2018). As of writing, this election has proved an interesting turn of events. For Hamad sought regional and international legitimacy, what Peter would call Political Cosmopolitanism. While there have been no further concrete steps toward Bahrain hosting an Arab Court of Human Rights, it would appear that Hamad gained the international legitimacy his address seemed to emphasize (*ibid.*).

Finally, Bahrain's accusations of Iranian interference in Hamad's speech should be addressed. In his speech, Hamad emphasizes Bahrain's international status and links to regional security, especially the Saudi-led Peninsula Shield Force. Such a preparatory condition merges Political Cosmopolitanism with his accusations of Iranian interference. The Shia'a Iran is regarded by most Gulf monarchies as a threat to their Sunni rule. However, Bahrain's majority Shia'a population and Sunni minority rulers provides a far more sensitive context (BBC, 2011). While Hamad does not draw on Religious Legitimacy, a further difference between Jordan and Bahrain is sectarianism in the Gulf kingdom. Rather than relying on religious credentials as Abdullah II does, Hamad plays on sectarian fears by accusing the Shia'a Iran of influencing unrest, even though this goes against the findings of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). Sectarian fears linked to Iran's interference

are framed as a threat not only to Bahrain but "[…] the security and stability of the GCC countries", again invoking the fear of a Shia'a dominance across the Gulf that is felt by Bahrain's fellow monarchies (*ibid.*). Stoking such fears allows Hamad to reach out to fellow kings for military assistance through the Peninsula Shield Force but also serves as a warning to Iran that ties to Hamad's essential condition for the Islamic Republic: that Iran "[…] abandon [its] policy of enmity and discord […] inciting our population to engage in acts of violence, sabotage, and insurrection" (*ibid.*).

The actual involvement of Iran during 2011 protests has not been verified. However, Iran shares a history of tension with its Sunni counterparts, and it is this tension and the fears of a Shia'a spread into Bahrain that Hamad's address manipulates (Mabon, 2012). From this perspective, Hamad's essential condition for Iran can be regarded as a moot point. More important than whether or not Iran complies with Hamad's essential condition (or whether they did indeed influence unrest) is Hamad's use of Iran and the fear of sectarianism as another preparatory condition for a regional audience. Though not explicitly mentioned in the speech, Hamad's preparatory conditions that describe Iran as a threat and the importance of "[…] our GCC allies who participated in protecting key installations by deploying the Peninsula Shield Force" build up to an unspoken essential condition: that the GCC must buttress Bahrain's ruling family (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). The fact that the Saudi-led intervention occurred before Hamad's November address illustrates that sectarian fears in the region are real for the Sunni monarchies (Butler, 2011).

Hamad's address draws on the socio-economics of the ruling bargain to placate domestic audiences with some success, as the Victims Compensation Fund and related programs show. Security is also presented as a Beneficial Consequence, yet the fear of insecurity is used to reach a wider audience. More attention is given to regional and international listeners. Unlike republicans or Jordan's King Abdullah, there is little emphasis on Democratic Approval through extensive reforms or political changes (British Broadcasting

Corporation, 2011). Hamad draws far more heavily on regional and international legitimacy, linked to Peter's Political Cosmopolitanism. Sectarianism is linked to security fears to secure regional support, which Bahrain appears to enjoy even as of 2018 with a 10 billion USD cash injection from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait (Gambrell, 2018). Moreover, Hamad's emphasis on UN involvement in his country and Bahrain's links to the international community in general during his address appear to have also been successful, with Bahrain elected to the Human Rights Council in 2018. Such international legitimacy comes despite Amnesty International accusations of torture, arbitrary detention and the stripping of citizenship as common practices against Bahraini activists (Amnesty International, 2018).

Analysis of Bahrain's Hamad and his speech in response to unrest goes somewhat against the hypothesis that monarchs will rely on traditional values and religion above the socio-economic ruling bargain. Hamad draws on sectarianism rather than Religious Legitimacy to emphasize security as a Beneficial Consequence, while also linking security to a regional context. This context is augmented by his appeal to the international community and references to hosting the UN, which links back to Peter's Political Cosmopolitanism or a form of international legitimacy. Further, the establishment of more than one compensation fund that demands legal charges be dropped by applicants in exchange for a payout reinforces the socio-economic ruling bargain even more, illustrating how type of rule, be it monarchical or republican, may not be as important as oil wealth.

6.2.3: *Egypt's President Mubarak*

"I am addressing the youth of Egypt today in Tahrir Square and across the country. I am addressing you all from the heart, a father's dialogue with his sons and daughters" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011)

When compared to Ben Ali's final address, Egypt's Mubarak also uses religion sparsely (*ibid.*). However, there are greater factors of non-democratic legitimacy drawn on than in

the speech by his Tunisian counterpart (*ibid.*). Returning to Searle's preparatory conditions and mutual rules, Ben Ali addressed his citizens "[…] in the language of Tunisians" (Ben Ali, 2011), reflecting Searle's belief that mutual rules govern clear communication and should ensure that the listener can thus provide transparent preparatory conditions that should maximize comprehension of essential conditions/instructions, with such instructions then being obeyed (Searle, p. 15). Rather than speak to his youth in 'the language of Egyptians', Mubarak frames the address as "[…] a father's dialogue with his sons and daughters" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011). The fact that Mubarak turns to paternalism rather than mutual (linguistic) rules is arresting. Mubarak frames his address through a non-democratic factor, paternalism. As discussed in Chapters 1, 2 and 5, paternalism can be regarded as a non-democratic aspect of political rule common in the Arab world. Mubarak's invocation of paternalism thus sets the stage for his monologue on unrest to defend non-democratic legitimacy rather than offer desperate political reforms (that entail a change to the ruling bargain) à la Ben Ali (Ben Ali, 2011).

Mubarak acknowledges unrest and demands for reform early in his speech. However, such acknowledgment is mitigated by Mubarak's fatherly attitude toward such demands. "I am proud of you," he insists, "[my children] calling for a change to the better, dreaming and making the future" (*ibid.*). Paternalism marks the early passages of his speech and also serves to foreshadow how Mubarak downplays the political and democratic nature of popular demands (*ibid.*). While an acknowledgment of protests may serve as a preparatory condition and reference point, paternalism acts as a manner for Mubarak to attempt to portray demands as apolitical in nature (*ibid.*).

Contrary to Ben Ali's address, Mubarak's monologue appears less pleading in tone, as it does not begin with promises of political reform (Ben Ali, 2011). For his preparatory conditions, Mubarak asserts paternalism before making promises that reflect another non-democratic trait: security as a form of Peter's Beneficial Consequences. "I will hold those who persecuted our youth accountable with the maximum deterrent sentences," he insists,

implying that as the head of state he will ensure that those who threaten citizen security will be punished (*ibid.*). Again, this promise is presented as paternalistic, Mubarak explaining that, as father of the nation, he mourns the victims of unrest as much as "[…] the families of those innocent [children]" and that is why he must punish those who harm them (*ibid.*).

Mubarak's paternalism seems to overshadow his comments that "[…] [protest] demands are just and legitimate demands" (*ibid.*), with promises of punishing those who breach security and the 'promise' that protests are being acknowledged as legitimate acting as preparatory conditions for the essential conditions: Mubarak wants Egyptians to accept that "[…] mistakes can be made in any political system" and subsequently stop protesting and "[…] return the Egyptian street to its normal everyday life" (*ibid.*). Mubarak's instructions mirror those of Ben Ali's: stop protesting (Ben Ali, 2011). However, Mubarak's preparatory conditions and attempts to defend non-democratic legitimacy are more complex than those of his Tunisian counterpart. Mubarak repeatedly points to the need for security from (external) threats and his military accomplishments in defending Egypt's "[…] soil and sovereignty" from "[…] foreign pressure" (*ibid.*). Further, Mubarak alludes to the religious notion of *Dar al-Islam* or defending Muslim territory, as discussed in Chapter 2. Mubarak emphasizes his "[…] lifetime defending [Egypt's] soil and sovereignty" while reminding his audience that his sacrifices have defended an Egypt that boasts "[…] the unity and cohesion […] of Muslims and Christians" (*ibid.*). This reference to Religious Legitimacy expands on Bulliet's discussions that an Islamic ruler must protect Muslim territory and the practice of Islamic laws and customs by reminding listeners that interfaith coexistence is a Muslim requisite for any pious ruler, as Christians are considered protected religious equals according to the Quran (Vajda, 2012).

Greater than Mubarak's turn to religion or security as a Beneficial Consequence is his discussion of constitutional amendments, which can be linked to Peter's Democratic Approval (Peter, 2016). Indeed, an entire section of Mubarak's speech is dedicated to

constitutional reforms (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011). This section of Mubarak's address sees the aging President engage in Democratic Approval as a form of non-democratic legitimacy. This strategic discourse allows him to both validate his non-democratic rule according to Peter and push blame for mismanagement upon Egypt's constitution (*ibid.*). It is important to note that although constitutional amendments have been discussed by a panel of independent "[…] experts in constitutional law and judges", it is ultimately Mubarak himself who will approve any and all constitutional amendments (*ibid.*). This aspect of the address highlights Mubarak's continuing leadership that is reliant on non-democratic legitimacy and circular via Democratic Approval (Peter, 2016). Mubarak justifies his leadership through security, religion (albeit minimal) and uses Democratic Approval as a form of non-democratic legitimacy, with constitutional amendments led by himself providing democratic proceduralism (and supposedly correcting "[…] mistakes […] made in [constitutional aspects] of [Egypt's] political system") that justifies his continued rule (*ibid.*).

Mubarak's reliance on Democratic Approval and promises of security contrast with Ben Ali's desperate offers of political reform. However, Mubarak appears to have a moment of clarity in his address and the brief cognizance to recognize the political nature of unrest. In a short passage, he promises his "[…] brother citizens" that he "[…] will not run for president in the next elections" (*ibid.*). It is interesting to note that in this (political) promise, Mubarak changes his tone of paternalism to one of equality. Suddenly, the Egyptian people are not his children but "[…] brother citizens", implying an equal relationship (*ibid.*).

An overview of Mubarak's speech reveals a greater reliance on non-democratic elements than Ben Ali's address. These include promises to punish perpetrators of violence and reminders of sacrifices Mubarak ostensibly made to ensure Egypt's security from external threats. The punishment of violent criminals is especially arresting, as it highlights the promise to restore security, a Beneficial Consequence of non-democratic rule. Religious

Legitimacy is briefly alluded to, another (minor) difference from Mubarak's Tunisian counterpart (Ben Ali, 2011). Further, Mubarak engages extensively in Democratic Approval. The essential conditions of Mubarak's and Ben Ali's addresses are the same: they want protests to stop. However, their respective preparatory conditions differ. While Ben Ali hastily makes promises for political reform (indirectly implying that the ruling bargain has failed due to economic mismanagement) (Ben Ali, 2011), Mubarak emphasizes security and democratic proceduralism far more markedly.

Returning to Peter in Chapter 3, such proceduralism encompasses bureaucracy and related processes linked to the formalizing of democratic politics but can be de-facto non-democratic (Liden, pp. 52-53). In focusing on security and democratic proceduralism, Mubarak failed to address the political and socio-economic sources of popular unrest. Returning to Chapter 5, it must be recalled that Egyptians had become increasingly reliant on subsidies while struggling with widening wealth-poverty gaps. This fact is arresting, as Mubarak himself had insisted earlier in his career that subsidies were an established right that could never be abolished. He understood the socio-economic aspect of the ruling bargain when competing with the Muslim Brotherhood for political influence. Yet, in his final address there is no reference to be found to subsidies or the lowering of basic food prices. Ben Ali himself had ensured at least one reference to the lowering of food prices 9Ben Ali, 2011), a reminder that the early rallying cry of the 2011 revolution was "Bread, Freedom, Social Justice, and Human Dignity" (Pin, 2016, p. 3).

A further point of discussion is the differences in attitude toward paternalism between Ben Ali and Mubarak. As discussed in Chapter 5, Ben Ali did play with the image of a paternal leader. However, equally significant were his efforts to construct modern feminism as secular, permitting elderly women to wear traditional garb while female youth were expected to project an image that expunged faith from the notion of being educated and progressive (Hawkins, pp. 45-46). Hence, any emphasis on paternalistic discourse would clash with Ben Ali's constant depiction of 'modern feminism', which he emphasized more

than paternalistic leadership (*ibid.*). It is likely for this reason that Ben Ali did not draw on paternalism during his final address (Ben Ali, 2011). Mubarak, however, engages heavily in paternalism as a form of non-democratic legitimacy in his final address.

This emphasis can be linked to the historical role of the state in Egypt and what Ashraf El-Sherif terms 'authoritarian guardianship'. The state centralized political administration of a society regarded as underdeveloped, with a populous that could not form politically aware and assertive individuals (El-Sherif, 2014, p. 6). Under such an ideal, the relationship between citizens and government was destined to be skewed. The military administrated all politics and regarded themselves as "[…] the guardians of the people", encouraging a paternalistic ruling style that disregarded individual rights and saw citizens as "[…] objects of state public policies" (*ibid.*). With Mubarak a military man who inherited such a skewed governance system, his tone of paternalism in his final address is hardly surprising.

Nonetheless, continuing a tradition of paternalism was a fatal mistake. Mubarak underestimated the political nature of the protests and the urgency of demands that he resign. He insisted that the "[…] current moment is not to do with myself, it is not to do with Hosni Mubarak" and had hence limited political promises regarding his transition out of power (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011). Perhaps it was for this reason that his promises were disbelieved. Mubarak presented non-democratic credentials, including stability, Democratic Approval and to an extent Religious Legitimacy, with socio-economic Beneficial Consequences undiscussed and a timeline for his transition out of power mentioned in passing. In exchange for these credentials and promises, Mubarak delivers his essential condition: the end of unrest. The fact that protests continued, forcing Mubarak to resign one day after his final speech illustrates that his promises and credentials were not regarded as sincere by the millions of Egyptians in Tahrir Square (Al Jazeera, 2011, 'Timeline: Egypt's Revolution').

6.2.4: *Tunisia's President Ben Ali*

"People of Tunisia: I am speaking to you today, to everyone, both inside and outside Tunisia. I speak to you in the language of Tunisians. I am speaking to you now because the situation demands deep change. Yes, deep and comprehensive change" (Ben Ali, 2011)

Ben Ali's final address contains scant references to religion. Only twice is religion mentioned, including as a way of ending his speech in a manner that mimics his first address to the people in 1987 (Ben Ali, 2011). In addition, there are few references to non-democratic factors of legitimacy, such as the ruling bargain and related socio-economic measures of political legitimacy, as discussed by Peter (2016). Examining Ben Ali's last speech through Searle's theory of Speech Acts, it can be argued that Ben Ali establishes the preparatory conditions of his address by highlighting social unrest and also by switching to the Tunisian dialect to "[…] speak to you in the language of Tunisians" (*ibid.*). As a preparatory condition is defined as a speaker's starting point, providing appropriate historical, cultural or political context for the speech, this latter aspect echoes Searle's discussions of communication being done through mutually comprehensive rules (Searle, 1965, p. 3). In other words, by communicating in the local Tunisian dialect as opposed to the colonial era French or formal *Fusha*, Ben Ali's address should be understood and his instructions also comprehended (*ibid.*).

Immediately after referring to social unrest, Ben Ali admits that "[…] the situation demands deep change" (Ben Ali, 2011) before plunging into promises. It is possible to consider Ben Ali's promises as being part of the preparatory condition, as they are stated early on (Ben Ali, 2011). Moreover, a closer examination of his promises reveals their political nature. "I have understood everyone," the President pleads, "the unemployed, the needy, the politician and those demanding more freedoms" (*ibid.*). The latter element of "those demanding more freedoms" implies that Ben Ali's promise of listening to such demands will require a change in the (apolitical) relationship between ruler and subjects (*ibid.*). This implication has consequences for how Ben Ali can justify his political

legitimacy through non-democratic factors, which is reflected in his weak references to non-democratic criteria.

Returning to Peter's Political Legitimacy, a non-democratic regime may be considered legitimate if it can prove that it provides benefits to its citizens (Beneficial Consequences), often of a socio-economic nature (Peter, 2016). Ben Ali engages in a list of personal accomplishments that can be considered preparatory conditions before reiterating his instructions for protests to come to a halt (Ben Ali, 2011). "I have spent more than fifty years of my life in service to Tunisia," he explains. "[F]rom the National Army to various other responsibilities, and twenty-three years as head of state. Every day of my life has been and continues to be in the service of the country" (*ibid.*). In this passage, Ben Ali attempts to justify his rule as providing Beneficial Consequences. His reference to positions in the National Army certainly connects with later references to security and stability, which could be considered a non-democratic benefit and one that has been espoused in the speeches of other Arab leaders such as Bahrain's King Hamad (Peter, 2016; Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). In addition to security being part of Ben Ali's ruling bargain, he also suggests that education is another Beneficial Consequence of his rule, explaining that because of unrest "[…] children today have stayed home and did not go to school" (Ben Ali, 2011). Further, Ben Ali promises that he will "[…] reduce the prices of basic commodities and foodstuffs", reflecting the economic core of the ruling bargain through subsidies, as discussed in Chapter 5.

However, Ben Ali's attempts to draw on non-democratic legitimacy (including security, subsidies and education as part of a ruling bargain) are overshadowed by his constant promises for political reform and contradictory messages regarding Tunisia's security. For although Ben Ali attempts to construct security as a legitimate provision by the state and hence part of a ruling bargain, he contrasts this position with assertions that ordinary Tunisians are responsible for security and stability. In reference to unrest, Ben Ali insists that "[…] each one of [you] is responsible, from their positions, for restoring [Tunisia's]

security" and that rather than the state responding to "[…] gangs who have robbed and looted and assaulted people" it is "[…] [the] citizens, all citizens [who] must stand up to them" (*ibid.*).

It is possible to regard Ben Ali's speech as circular; preparatory conditions and promises are given before the essential condition is (re)iterated and further preparatory conditions issued to emphasize the same essential condition: unrest and all forms of protest should come to an end. Again, from the perspective of non-democratic legitimacy, Ben Ali's address is weak as it does not attempt to systemically defend non-democratic factors of his legitimacy. Instead, Ben Ali continually promises political reforms "[…] for freedom of political expression" and an independent investigation into corruption and violence against protestors (*ibid.*). Such promises imply that Ben Ali's non-democratic legitimacy was always weak; shifting the responsibility of security to citizens implies that Ben Ali's regime can no longer provide this Beneficial Consequence, and if promises of political reform overshadow claims of other non-democratic Beneficial Consequences, then according to Peter, the non-democratic ruling bargain is no longer valid because Ben Ali's regime is unable to evidence benefits of its non-democratic rule for its populace (Peter, 2016).

Ben Ali's promises of political reform and investigation into corruption in exchange for an end to protests may have worked against him. By making such promises, Ben Ali was indirectly admitting that he was aware of corruption and aware that there was an unmet desire by his people for democratic involvement (Ben Ali, 2011). At the same time, mass reaction to his address reveals a populace that saw his promises as anything but sincere. Ben Ali's final speech was given January 10th, 2011. Within days, increased unrest in defiance of security crackdowns pressured Ben Ali into leaving Tunisia for exile in Saudi Arabia (BBC, 2011, 'Tunisia: President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali forced out'). Amid his hasty exit, soldiers were stripping portraits of Ben Ali from all government buildings, expunging him from public view (*ibid.*).

Had Ben Ali's promises been believed and regarded as sincere, it is unlikely that protestors would have continued with their resistance to the point of compelling Ben Ali to flee (*ibid.*). Further, the lack of religious references and greater promises of political reform (in essence cancelling an apolitical ruling bargain) than assertion of non-democratic accomplishments or Beneficial Consequences cannot be ignored. Ben Ali's non-democratic credentials are weak against the tacit or indirect admission that he was aware of corruption and violence toward protestors (BBC, 2011, 'Tunisia: President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali forced out'; Joyce and Dreisbach, 2014). The fact that he ends his final address as an almost verbatim copy of the end of his 1987 speech shows a man out of touch with the reality that any ruling bargain can be forced to change, as discussed earlier in Chapter 2. Ben Ali was overthrown by "[…] the unemployed, the needy" and the youth of Tunisia's future who saw him as their past (Ben Ali, 2011).

Detailed analysis of speeches given in response to unrest across Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Bahrain allow for a structured focus on the nature of political rule in the MENA region within the context of the Arab Spring and the main hypothesis of this thesis: that republics will emphasize the socio-economic ruling bargain as the main source of their non-democratic legitimacy in response to the Arab Spring, due to most republics being the result of coups rather than established familial rule. Hence, many republican rulers have weaker ties to traditional (religious) institutes and popular support and rely on a ruling bargain to maintain legitimacy. Monarchs, on the other hand, will draw on Religious Legitimacy more than the ruling bargain due to their longevity and ties to traditional institutions and accepted socio-cultural norms.

Tunisia's Ben Ali gave few religious references and did acknowledge subsidies and their importance, a link to the socio-economic ruling bargain. Security was a further theme shared by monarch and republican alike, which Ben Ali also mentioned in his address. However, his desperate promises of political reform overshadow attempts to justify non-democratic legitimacy through Beneficial Consequences, and Tunisian reactions to such

promises strongly imply they were insincere. Hence, while the hypothesis of republicans relying on the ruling bargain rather than religion is partially confirmed, Ben Ali's non-democratic credentials are weak and the turn to last-minute political reforms illustrates that he was unable to maintain a ruling bargain.

Egypt's Mubarak, on the other hand, placed greater emphasis on security and external threats, much as Hamad of Bahrain would end up doing. Linked to security was Mubarak's brief reference to maintaining stable territory for Muslims and Christians, a link to the concept of *Dar al-Islam* as discussed in Chapter 2. Mubarak uses paternalism as a springboard to highlight his non-democratic achievements and related factors, including security and Democratic Approval through constitutional amendments. Democratic Approval is used as a preparatory condition to build to the same essential condition as Ben Ali: protestors should stop protesting. As Mubarak is overseeing and implementing such reforms, his Democratic Approval becomes a circular method to validate his rule. Mubarak's emphasis on these factors and vague discussion of political promises with his 'children' resulted in his resignation shortly after his final address, implying that his promises were not regarded as sincere and did not meet the political expectations of Egyptians. Interestingly, subsidies are not mentioned once in his address, an historically central pillar of former Egyptian rulers. Mubarak's address hence does not conform to the hypothesis of this thesis. Egypt's President does not draw heavily on a socio-economic ruling bargain (though perhaps he should have) and even makes tacit references to the religious concept of *Dar al-Islam*, a domain the hypothesis assumed would be exclusive to monarchs. On the other hand, security is emphasized as a Beneficial Consequence of his rule, presented within the context of paternalism that infantilized his subjects. This attempt to create "a father's dialogue with his sons and daughters" did not end well for Mubarak and is a reminder that the ruling bargain is not static and may need to coexist alongside political elements, especially if socio-economic welfare can no longer be provided by a

non-democratic regime. Such a situation is better explored by Bahrain's compensation for the Arab Spring atop existing welfare.

Bahrain's Hamad is a monarch ruling a sectarian kingdom. Hence, sparse religious references are no surprise. As with Mubarak and Abdullah, Hamad engages in Democratic Approval through the mention of ongoing reforms. And as with Mubarak, Hamad creates an external threat, also mimicking his fellow monarch by painting a picture of regional insecurity. However, while Abdullah draws on religion to legitimize his rule and de-legitimize opposition in the face of neighboring insecurity, Hamad pushes religious divides, playing on Bahrain's sectarianism and regional fears of Shia'a Iran. In a sense, Hamad does use or manipulate religion but rather than drawing on religion for unity between monarch and masses as the hypothesis assumes, Hamad draws on religion to sow division and prevent united unrest against his throne. By building on sectarian fears, Hamad sells security as a Beneficial Consequence to his domestic audience while also creating an essential condition for regional leaderships: fellow Sunni monarchies must continue to support the al-Khalifa crown.

Security is the strongest theme in Hamad's speech and more conspicuous when compared to other case studies. Indeed, reforms mentioned are less about political openness than correcting security violations and enforcing security as part of the ruling bargain. Hamad's speech focuses on reinforcing the ruling bargain through security and compensation, a reminder of the socio-economic aspect of the ruling bargain. Hamad seeks to keep the social contract apolitical and hence uses security, external threats and socio-economic payouts as preparatory conditions that build to Bahrainis continuing to accept (apolitical) rule by the al-Khalifa monarchy. Compared to Abdullah's address, this aspect is markedly different. While both monarchs create security as a Beneficial Consequence, Jordan's Abdullah invites citizens to political participation. Hamad, on the other hand, seeks to enforce an apolitical social contract.

A further difference between Hamad and the remaining case studies is Bahrain's focus on a regional and international audience. By mentioning the Peninsula Shield Force and how Bahrain is a lynchpin for stability across the GCC, Hamad draws on international legitimacy or Peter's Political Cosmopolitanism, which is further emphasized by Hamad's references to the UN and Bahrain's eventual election to the Human Rights Council. Indeed, given Jordan's reliance on external aid and Western relations, it is interesting that Abdullah's address did not appeal to the international community but seemed structured for a domestic audience.

The result of Hamad's address seems to be that Bahrainis accepted compensation, reinforcing the ruling bargain and with a seat on the Human Rights Council as of 2018, Bahrain continues to enjoy international support under the al-Khalifas. It must be noted that sporadic protests continued to occur after Hamad's address, with larger protests in Bahrain's capital also used to mark the anniversary of the original 2011 unrest (Regencia, 2018). Yet, intervention by the Saudi-led GCC even before Hamad's speech emphasizes that the al-Khalifa family maintains regional legitimacy in the face of sectarianism.

It is interesting to consider that republican discourse from Tunisia's Ben Ali and Egypt's Mubarak does not engage in a long-term view that espouses democratic elements. Instead, analysis of select speeches has revealed that the monarchies of Jordan and Bahrain are able to discuss long-term political themes that are commonly associated with democratic discourse, including reforms and elections. In both Abdullah's speech and Hamad's speech, reforms are mentioned as being part of ongoing programs as opposed to last-minute plea bargains, as issued by Ben Ali. This finding links back to the hypothesis: republicans have weaker ties to institutions and are often the result of coups rather than familial rule. Hence, any use of democratic discourse may act as an unwanted reminder that such republicans did not become presidents-for-life through democratic means. Monarchies, on the other hand, enjoy longevity and familial rule, including ties to traditional institutions and accepted socio-cultural norms. As such, stronger institutional

221

ties and socio-political legitimacy provide monarchies with the ability to consider long-term political views as theirs is a long-term familial rule rather than a one-man rule (Magen, 2013, p. 27).

Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 5 monarchies historically faced political threats at a time when republics were overthrowing kings across the Arab world (Cavendish). Abdullah of Jordan no doubt remembers the coup attempt against his father that was inspired by republican President Nasser of Egypt (*ibid.*). Within such an historical context, monarchies in the Middle East may go through periods of 'defensive democratization', during which democratic elements are carefully introduced to the ruling bargain in a regime-controlled process (Robinson, p. 389).

Finally, Jordan's Abdullah draws heavily on Religious Legitimacy and the image of family, feeding into the hypothesis' assumption of monarchical reliance on traditionalism and faith. His links to the Prophet Muhammad allow for him to frame the Hashemite dynasty as "martyrs" for the nation and effectively weave Quranic language into his address. The use of religion is apparent from the start of his speech. Rather than talk to Jordanians through the mutual language of colloquial Arabic, as Ben Ali attempted, Abdullah opens the speech with an Islamic blessing understood by all. Hence, religion can be regarded as the mutually comprehended rule Searle discusses in his Speech Acts. The consistent use of religion also allows Abdullah to paint some opposition as immoral or going against Islam by engaging in *fitna* through their resistance to a pious monarch. Further, religion is weaved into references to Beneficial Consequences such as security.

At the same time, Abdullah's address is, unlike Mubarak's, not paternalistic but does draw on familial language. Referring to his subjects as "Jordanian brothers and sisters" creates an atmosphere of greater equality, which can be linked to how his address focuses on ongoing political reforms. These reforms reveal a limited ruling bargain and Abdullah's essential condition: unlike Ben Ali and Mubarak, who simply want protests to cease,

Abdullah invites Jordanians to take part in the election process. It should be noted that religion is not reserved for only non-democratic factors. When encouraging voters, Abdullah refers to the dome of parliament, conjuring images of the mosque and hence equating his essential condition with being a good Muslim (Abdullah II, October 2012). Although both Mubarak and Abdullah seem to use Democratic Approval through the offer of amendments, Abdullah's focus on elections differs from his republican counterparts. Again, Abdullah recognizes that Jordan's ruling bargain relies on external aid and that in times of economic difficulty, citizens may expect to take part in political decisions as economic privileges are curtailed or taxes applied.

However, Democratic Approval is also used by Abdullah to push blame for political and socio-economic improvements upon (successive) elected governments and away from his throne. The use of Democratic Approval is a reminder of the limits to any democratic legitimacy the King may claim. Although election turnout after his address was just above half of registered voters, observers claimed that elections were influenced by traditional tribalism and, more conspicuously, fears of instability. The notion of insecurity can be linked to Abdullah's mention of *fitna*, pairing the risk of chaos with certain elements of the opposition. Insecurity is a shared factor across all four case studies; however, it is Bahrain's Hamad and Jordan's Abdullah who emphasize the fear of (regional) instability the most and only Abdullah who links security as a Beneficial Consequence with Islamic concepts.

In the case of Jordan's Abdullah, the Hashemite monarch draws far more on Religious Legitimacy than his republican counterparts. Further, the ruling bargain is actually de-emphasized in Abdullah's address, with the King mentioning Jordan's fiscal problems and Jordan having a history of the social contract being politicized during periods of socio-economic turmoil. At the same time, religion is used as a tool to emphasize fear of instability and security as a Beneficial Consequence, while Abdullah's image of brothers and sisters ties monarch and citizens in a social contract that may not be paternal but still

emphasizes a (traditional) familial image. Jordan as a case study hence presents a confirmation of the hypothesis that monarchies draw more on religion and traditionalism than their republican counterparts.

The Arab world illustrates a context of republican anti-monarchical nationalism and a history of monarchies in the Middle East providing carefully balanced democratic elements in their ruling bargains. It is hence no surprise that when kings saw their republican counterparts shying away from democratic discourse during the Arab Spring, they took the chance to discuss political reforms and democratic processes (albeit those of proceduralism) and to remind their citizens that, unlike their republican opposites, such reforms were not split-second plea bargains but part of an ongoing process that began before the Arab Spring.

While such democratic discourse can be linked back to parts of the hypothesis with regards to monarchies and their ties to traditionalism encouraging such discourse and 'defensive democratization', it must be remembered that there is a difference between democratic discourse and democratic practice. The analysis of this chapter has also considered the fact that Jordan's parliamentary elections did not necessarily reflect democratic openness but the ability of the Hashemites to play on fears of instability while enforcing tribalism and loyalist voting lines. Likewise, Bahrain's Hamad made promises of reform that must be put into the context of non-democratic practices: establishing a compensation fund to enforce the socio-economic aspect of the ruling bargain and of course Saudi Arabia's military intervention that ensured serious opposition to the ruling al-Khalifa family was crushed.

Moreover, promised reforms by both monarchs may be considered apolitical and not truly enforcing democratic practice. Abdullah's invitation for Jordanians to vote can be considered a form of democratic proceduralism, while Hamad's reforms emphasize restoring security as a Beneficial Consequence. Returning to Chapter 3's discussions of legitimation theory, it is interesting to consider Weber's sources of legitimacy: tradition,

charisma and legality. To reiterate, tradition is a form of legitimacy through "[…] ancient recognition and habitual orientation", charisma is a form of political recognition that rests on "[…] the authority of the extraordinary and personal gift of grace" and legality is defined as the belief in the "validity of legal statute and functional 'competence' based on rationally created rules" (Weber, pp. 78-79). Within the context of Weber's sources of legitimacy, analysis of select speeches by kings and republicans reveals a pattern. Monarchies may typically be considered to draw on Weber's tradition due to their longevity and ties to traditional institutions. However, with speeches that emphasize reform, it would seem that the Arab Spring has encouraged them to draw more from Weber's legality. This is certainly the case with Hamad of Bahrain, who complements reform with international recognition by the UN and draws on international legitimacy. Abdullah of Jordan not only presents reforms, thus also covering Weber's legality aspect of legitimacy but emphasizes his links to Islam and Prophet Muhammad, hence also drawing on charisma and of course Religious Legitimacy (*ibid.*).

Republicans, on the other hand, appear to follow Weber's legitimacy but from the path of charisma to legality (as opposed to tradition to legality). As discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, most republicans gained power in coups or inherited governments that were the result of military revolutions (as with Mubarak). Therefore, many such leaders would have started their rule by pushing Weber's charisma as a form of recognition to make them distinct from previous rulers and previous forms of governance. Mubarak for example introduced himself to Egypt as distinct from his predecessors. "I am neither Gamal Abdel Nasser nor Anwar el Sadat,'" he insisted shortly after inauguration. "'My name is Hosni Mubarak'" (Nagarajan, p. 28). However, the Arab Spring saw such republicans turning to Weber's legal definition of legitimacy through their promises of reform. While kings have kept their thrones after similar discourse, for republicans it was too little too late as their discourse on reforms did not address political demands and in some cases omitted socio-economic ones as well. Further, reform promises by republicans were last-minute rather than part of a

long-term context that monarchies seemed to consider. Perhaps when comparing presidents and monarchs, it's still good to be king.

Chapter 6 has presented the discourse analysis of select speeches intended to generate original knowledge on the Arab Spring by exploring how non-democratic legitimacy is defended when challenged by socio-economic unrest. Such analysis directly addresses the thesis hypothesis that monarchies draw more on traditionalism and Religious Legitimacy, with republicans lacking familial and traditional ties and thus needing to draw on a socio-economic ruling bargain to maintain non-democratic legitimacy. The hypothesis links to the research question: What are the factors Arab leaders use in discourse justifying their rule within the context of the Arab Spring? To what extent does this discourse support a (socio-economic) ruling bargain and Religious Legitimacy? Chapter 6 reveals that republicans and monarchs emphasize security and to an extent welfare as Beneficial Consequences to justify their non-democratic rule. However, it is oil rather than traditionalism that determines if welfare will be emphasized over religious credentials. In the case of monarchies, analyzed discourse strongly supports a ruling bargain under Hamad's hydrocarbon House of al-Khalifa, while Jordan's Abdullah draws heavily on religion rather than a socio-economic ruling bargain to justify his rule. In other words, Religious Legitimacy is emphasized over welfare. Nonetheless, as previously discussed ruling bargains are not static and may be politicized in a form of defensive democratization. Jordan's Abdullah seems to recognize this, though Bahrain's Hamad less so with the ability to provide financial sweeteners. Republicans, however, reveal discourse that fails to uphold a ruling bargain and that draws on Democratic Approval that does not recognize the political and socio-economic nature of unrest (Mubarak) or that desperately offers political reform, which indirectly acts as an admission of corruption and an inability to uphold the ruling bargain (Ben Ali).

As Chapter 6 has provided discourse analysis of select speeches to understand non-democratic rule and Religious Legitimacy, Chapter 7 will augment Chapter 6's findings by

considering non-democratic and democratic factors formalized in each case study's constitutions and to what extent such constitutional aspects were drawn on by each leader to justify their rule in the face of the Arab Spring. Understanding the link between constitutional legitimacy and non-democratic rule will deepen discourse analysis to address the original knowledge contribution of this thesis: analyzing to what extent non-democratic political rule can be justified through discourse and formal means.

7. Main Analysis of Constitutional Legitimacy and Speeches during the Arab Spring

7.1 Introduction

This investigation of the thesis examines the constitutions of each case study and their connection to each related speech. Analysis of speeches from each case study has used Searle's Speech Acts as a framework for understanding said speeches as the formal issuing of instructions from speaker to listeners. As such, there is a parallel between speeches and related (modern) constitutions as formal communication and the issuing of instructions. Both modern constitutions and the analyzed speeches can be regarded as political speech acts. The Arab Spring has provided a contemporary context for the analysis of speeches, which were the discourse responses of each leadership to unrest. This thesis' investigation into constitutions will analyze to what extent political factors of said speeches (democratic, non-democratic and religious) are present in the modern constitutions of each case study. Such analysis identifies the relevant political factors of each speech. Analysis will then compare such factors with their respective constitutions to examine whether leaders drew on any constitutional elements to emphasize their essential conditions. In such cases, political elements of each constitution that match the political factors of each respective speech will serve as preparatory conditions that augment the essential conditions of each speech. Discourse analysis of speeches across all four case studies has revealed a certain emphasis on Democratic Approval. Hence, comparing such discourse with written formalities will augment the original knowledge contribution of this thesis by exploring to what extent Arab leaders can further justify their legitimacy by drawing on constitutional elements in their public discourse addressing their rule within the context of the Arab Spring.

Furthermore, Chapters 3 and 6 have discussed Weber's sources of legitimacy and to what extent monarchs and republicans may have started their respective rules through charisma (extraordinary personal traits that can influence others) or tradition (authority that has

always existed) and are now drawing far more on Weber's legality (acceptance of rules) and Peter's Democratic Approval. In other words, there is the prospect that Arab rulers relied on their personal status and the notion of being respected as authority figures early in their rule but are now replacing this form of non-democratic legitimacy with proceduralism. Therefore, filtering constitutional factors through Weber's sources of legitimacy and discussing to what extent constitutional elements are present in the speeches of each case study will allow the thesis to maintain parity by providing consistent thematic analysis.

7.2 Constitutions, Speeches and the Arab Spring

7.2.1: *Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*

"We […] the […] King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in accordance with Article 25 of the Constitution, and in pursuance of the decision of the Senate and the House of Representatives, hereby approve the following amended Constitution and decree its promulgation" (Constitute Project, 2011).

Jordan's Constitution was first enacted in 1952. From that time up until 2011, no major amendments took place (Muasher, 2011). While 2011 amendments proposed limiting the political involvement of the *mukhabarat* or state intelligence services, monarchical authority was not curbed in any way (*ibid.*). This fact illustrates that, as with republican counterparts, centralized authority around a head of state would not be compromised, with Jordan's Constitution granting its kings sweeping powers from the beginning (*ibid.*). This is no surprise as the Constitution was drawn up not by the people of Jordan but by the ruling Hashemites (Jordan Times, 2018).

By September of 2011, King Abdullah had approved certain constitutional amendments. These included independent monitoring of elections and the establishment of a constitutional court (Haaretz, 2011). Such measures targeted electoral reform and political party involvement in such elections, but royal authority went untouched, along with

mukhabarat involvement in political affairs (*ibid.*). As discourse analysis for Jordan in Chapter 6 examined King Abdullah's 2012 speech in response to unrest, it is the 2011 edition of Jordan's 1952 Constitution (with the latest amendments as of 2012) that forms the basis of analyzing the political factors of Abdullah's discourse and whether such factors are present in the Constitution.

Tunisia's preamble mentions Islam specifically as a value that is protected in the Constitution (Official Printing Office of the Republic of Tunisia, 2010). In contrast, the preamble to Egypt's Constitution contains vaguer references to national objectives being blessed "[…] in the name of God" (Palataurus Center, 2007). Jordan's Constitution takes after its Tunisian counterpart. While featuring only a one sentence preamble, the Constitution's first chapter on "[…] The State and its Ruling Regime" immediately declares that "[…] Islam is the religion of the state" (Constitute Project, 2011). This declaration links both to Bulliet's Religious Legitimacy and Jordan's history as discussed in Chapter 5, especially the lineage of the Hashemites to the Prophet Muhammad (Bulliet, 2013, p. 17). By formalizing Islam as the state's religion, the Constitution creates a written social contract between the Hashemites and Jordanian citizens, solidifying the concept of *Dar al-Islam* and confirming the expectation that a pious ruler must protect Islamic law and customs.

In addition, the constitutional guarantee of Islam as a protected state religion allows a strengthening of Abdullah's speech in the face of unrest. Returning to Searle, it is possible to consider that Article Two of Jordan's Constitution hence acts as a preparatory condition that strengthens Abdullah's religious references in his address. As Article Two formalizes the state protection of Islam, it allows Abdullah to draw on Democratic Approval and constitutional legitimacy more so than his republican counterparts. Analysis of Abdullah's speech reveals far more references to Islam than those of Ben Ali or Mubarak (Abdullah, II, 2012). Placing such references within the context of Jordan's Constitution and its mention of Islam, Abdullah can be seen as drawing on constitutional legitimacy as a

preparatory condition that augments the other religious references in his speech, especially his "[…] honour of being a descendant of our forefather Prophet Mohammad" (*ibid.*).

The use of Democratic Approval by connecting the Constitution as a preparatory condition with his speech helps augment Abdullah's essential condition: not only to participate in elections but to remember that a state that protects Islam and is run by those of Muslim heritage is legitimate, and that to go from acceptable protest to chanting "[…] 'overthrow the regime'" is hence religiously unacceptable and a form of inciting "[…] *fitna* (chaos) [that should be] rejected by Jordanians" (*ibid*).

While the Constitution may strengthen Abdullah's Religious Legitimacy, it also outlines the social contract between the Hashemites and Jordanian citizens (Constitute Project, 2011). It is interesting to note, however, that the relevant chapter is entitled "[…] Rights and Duties of Jordanians", implying that the state controls the social contract between the monarchy and its citizens (*ibid.*).   On the one hand, this fact parallels discussion of Jordan's history in Chapter 5 and the fact that the political nature of Jordan's ruling bargain with its citizens has always been a top-down process rather than a transparent framework that includes citizens as stakeholders. On the other hand, this chapter of Jordan's Constitution, emphasizing citizen obligations to the state and government control augments Democratic Approval as a political strategy. Further, the chapter cannot help but create irony in Abdullah's speech, where he consistently portrays an equal partnership between himself and citizens, his "[…] Jordanian brothers and sisters" (Abdullah II, October 2012). As discussed in Chapter 5, the top-down process of 'defensive democratization' can illustrate an unequal rather than equal contract between state and citizens. However, another aspect of Jordan's historical ruling bargain has been tribal privilege in exchange for monarchical loyalty. This defining feature of Jordan's ruling bargain is not formalized by the Constitution, limiting Abdullah's ability to draw on constitutional legitimacy to augment tribal loyalty as a key theme of Jordan's social contract, which is not referred to in his speech.

Yet, the Constitution's chapter on Rights and Duties of Jordanians still provides the Hashemites with further constitutional legitimacy that feeds into regime security and Jordan's history under their rule. It is arresting that the first article in this chapter proclaims that the state has the right to define Jordanian nationality (Constitute Project, 2011). Returning to Chapter 5, Jordan's geostrategic location has resulted in the influx of refugees at several key points of regional conflict. The Constitution's emphasis on a state definition of citizenship acts as a reminder that refugees are not part of the ruling bargain and that Palestinians granted Jordanian citizenship may not enjoy the full benefits of being a Jordanian national (as Hussein's purge of Palestinians from the public sector implied). This constitutional stipulation of state-defined citizenship can again connect with Abdullah's speech and insistence that Jordan is only "[…] the home of all Jordanians" (Abdullah, II, 2012). Abdullah's indirect remark that the ruling bargain will prioritize Jordanian citizens—and of those, citizens loyal to monarchy and of East Bank origin thus gains augmentation through constitutional legitimacy/Democratic Approval.

Building on citizenship is the Constitution's insistence that all Jordanians must serve in the military (Constitute Project, 2011). The specific statement declares that "[…] the defence of the country, its territory; the unity of its people and the preservation of social peace are a *sacred* duty of every Jordanian" (*ibid.*, emphasis added). In this statement, the duty to effectively provide security (typically a Beneficial Consequence) is intriguing, especially when compared to Ben Ali's speech. Chapter 6's discourse analysis of Ben Ali's speech has argued that pushing security upon citizens as a factor they must provide for themselves may be regarded as a violation of the ruling bargain (Ben Ali, 2011). However, there are different factors to consider in Jordan's case. The use of the word 'sacred' gives religious connotation to "[…] the unity of […] people and the preservation of social peace" (*ibid.*). Such connotations can thus be linked to Abdullah's mention of *fitna* in his address to Jordanians, as *fitna* can be regarded as social unrest against a pious ruler (Brown, 2000, p.

67). Again, Abdullah is able to use constitutional legitimacy to augment his speech and non-democratic factors of his rule.

The same article that outlines the duties of Jordanians to the state also completes this social contract by mentioning state obligations to citizens, touching upon the ruling bargain (Constitute Project, 2011). Again, the article's wording appears to link directly to Jordan's political history and divide between East and West Bank. The state promises "[…] work and education within the limits of its possibilities, and [to] ensure tranquility and equal opportunities to all Jordanians" (Constitute Project, 2011). Work and education can be regarded as Beneficial Consequences. Education was certainly pushed under Bourguiba and Ben Ali in Tunisia, including in Ben Ali's final speech (albeit indirectly) (Ben Ali, 2011). In Jordan's case, unemployment and related socio-economic woes have been key factors in protests since 2011 (Tobin). On the other hand, education became a source of tension between Jordan's ruling Hashemites and Palestinian militias. As discussed in Chapter 5, while Mubarak may have contended with the Muslim Brotherhood's ability to provide public services, Hussein found that Palestinian militias offered education to buy loyalty from nearby residents (Culcasi, p. 13). Hence, formalizing the state's duty to provide education (and thus centralize its role as political administrator over non-state actors) is unsurprising (*ibid.*). However, these Beneficial Consequences are not categorically guaranteed by the Constitution; rather, the state should provide education and employment "[…] within the limits of its possibilities" (Constitute Project, 2011). For a kingdom without oil wealth, this stipulation is significant in how Abdullah can discuss the ruling bargain in his speech addressing protests.

In a sense, the constitutional cap on what the state should provide allows Abdullah to defend unemployment and related socio-economic problems by indirectly arguing that these problems extend beyond the limits of the state's possibilities. In his address he reminds Jordanians that the "[…] increase in deficit and public debt [is no longer] within reasonable ranges" while also emphasizing that despite these limits, the state continues to

"[…] raise salaries and pensions to protect the purchasing power of our citizens" and maintains "[…] subsidies for some basic commodities, and invest[s] in improving education and health services as well as infrastructure" (Abdullah II, October 2012). Again, it is possible to regard the Constitution's element on state duty to provide work and education as a preparatory condition. Because the state should provide employment and schooling "[…] within the limits of its possibilities", Abdullah can draw on this restriction to augment his discourse. By discussing Jordan's socio-economic struggles and how the state continues to invest in subsidies and education, he can once more draw on constitutional legitimacy to present a subtle message or essential condition: accept that the state is doing what it can, within the limits of (socio-economic) possibilities (*ibid.*).

Such a cap on socio-economic responsibilities and Abdullah's political immunity (Article Thirty, *ibid.*, p. 9) must be considered within the context of the ruling bargain. On the one hand, political immunity can be understood as a defining feature of non-democratic political legitimacy. As discussed through Peter's Political Legitimacy and in previous chapters, the socio-economic nature of the ruling bargain replaces political involvement of citizens and hence democratic accountability of leaders with Beneficial Consequences or material benefits that act as tangible proof of a leader's ability to maximize citizen (fiscal) wellbeing (Peter, 2016). Because such an approach emphasizes the utilitarian core of non-democratic legitimacy, Abdullah's immunity can be regarded as formalizing the apolitical nature of the ruling bargain.

On the other hand, such immunity must be placed within the context of the Constitution's limits on state responsibilities to citizens. If immunity is acceptable as part of the ruling bargain, this is due to the non-democratic and utilitarian nature of such a social contract (Peter, 2016). However, a state cap on Beneficial Consequences can be regarded as going against the material and utilitarian nature of the ruling bargain. The balance between apolitical benefits and political participation implies tension between sovereign immunity and limits on state benefits. As detailed in Chapter 5, Jordan's patronage network has not

been immune to financial strain and it is during such times that nationals have expected greater political participation if Beneficial Consequences are limited. From an historical perspective, there is hence a parallel between the Constitution's immunity versus state caps on benefits and the citizen demand for political participation when state benefits are limited. This parallel/tension also feeds into Abdullah's speech and his explanation of Jordan's fiscal woes due to proximate unrest (Abdullah II, October 2012). Abdullah does not invoke his constitutional immunity during his address but acknowledges benefit limitations and the need for citizens' political participation through elections (*ibid.*).

As Mubarak partially draws on constitutional rhetoric to address the masses 9British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011), so too does Jordan's King Abdullah II. Article Six describes the right of all Jordanians to found a family, arguing that family "[…] is the basis of society, the core of which shall be religion, morals and patriotism" (Constitute Project, 2011). The notion of the state defining family is significant, as it allows the Hashemites to define a good family as being pious and loyal to monarchy (*ibid.*). Returning to Chapter 5, equating patriotism with loyalty to Hashemite rule has been a defining feature of Abdullah II. The 2002 Jordan First campaign was regarded by some critics not as a promotion of equal citizenship but as a tool to brand criticism of the monarchy as unpatriotic (Ryan, 2004, pp. 55-56). Within such a context, the notion of family takes on a very politicized image. Abdullah's speech refers to "[…] brothers and sisters […] of the one Jordanian family" (Abdullah II, October 2012). While discourse analysis may regard such language as emphasizing equality between ruler and subjects, a different tone is apparent when filtering such references through constitutional legitimacy. If the state can formally define 'the Jordanian family', then Abdullah's references to family are not necessarily creating an atmosphere of equality. Rather, these frequent references draw on Democratic Approval to remind Jordanians that as family members they must be religiously pious and accept the rule of "[…] a descendant of our forefather, Prophet Mohammad" and not "[…] incite

chaos and *fitna* (sedition)" (*ibid.*). For to do so would be constitutionally unpatriotic (Constitute Project, 2011).

A last note on Jordan's Constitution must be that of how Democratic Approval enforces Abdullah's tactic of pushing blame for socio-economic struggles away from himself and unto successive governments (Tobin, 2012). Under Article Thirty of the Constitution, King Abdullah II enjoys what is termed "[…] Head of state immunity" (Constitute Project, 2011). A most specific clause, the article in question asserts that "The King is Head of State and is immune from every liability and responsibility" (*ibid.*). In addition to allowing Abdullah to draw on Democratic Approval when pushing blame for unrest upon a revolving door of government officials, such a clause also extends to Abdullah's speech, creating a further connection between his address and constitutional legitimacy (Abdullah II, October 2012). In his speech, Abdullah emphasizes the constitutional nature of his monarchy and his aloof relationship with the political framework of constitutional legitimacy. "My responsibility," Abdullah explains, "under our constitutional monarchy system, is to be committed to the outcomes that achieved consensus through our constitutional process" (*ibid.*). Again, Abdullah draws on Democratic Approval, as previously discussed in Chapter 6's main analysis of Abdullah's speech. However, when filtering such discourse through Jordan's Constitution, such Democratic Approval and even aloofness from political responsibility is augmented and granted constitutional legitimacy, as Abdullah can draw on constitutionally-approved immunity from "[…] every liability and responsibility", ensuring that he can make political decisions and draw on Democratic Approval without formally absorbing blame for unpopular results of those decisions (*ibid.*). As previously noted, Abdullah does not draw on constitutional immunity during his speech. Hence, although Article Thirty's immunity does not augment his speech, it is still worth noting as providing constitutional legitimacy for the Hashemite strategy of blaming successive governments, as discussed in Chapter 5.

Returning to Weber's legality and the notion that contemporary Arab rulers have transitioned from reliance on charisma to reliance on legality, Jordan's Abdullah proves more successful than his republican counterparts. Like Mubarak, Abdullah engages heavily in Democratic Approval. However, a key difference is that Abdullah does not make last-minute amendments to augment such Democratic Approval and enjoys immunity as head of state under Jordan's Constitution, providing aloofness from political tension between citizens and successive government figures. A further difference between Abdullah and republicans is the use of religion and even how religion is manipulated through discourse to augment a state-defined version of human dignity (Abdullah II, October 2012).

The notion that religion and human dignity are linked has been discussed in Chapter 2. There was an historic expectation that Islamic law would protect human dignity in the Muslim world (Pin, p. 3). Indeed, Islam has been regarded by some as espousing a specific form of social justice or *'adl* (Ibrahim, 2006, p. 7). Jordan's Constitution contains clauses specifying Islam as the state religion and the necessity of its protection (Constitute Project, 2011). Hence, Abdullah's references in his address to Hashemite links to "our forefather Prophet Mohammad" and his mention of the "martyrs" the Hashemites have offered to protect Jordan and Islam augment the constitutional legitimacy of religion as a state-protected right (Abdullah II, October 2012).

However, when placing such Democratic Approval within the context of dignity and religion being linked, Abdullah's speech creates a nuance from republican attempts to cling to power. This nuance is due to the fact that Abdullah builds his discourse on political reform by referring to ongoing promises of augmenting citizen rights and political participation, with such reforms initiated before the Arab Spring. Republicans, on the other hand, promised last-minute reforms as a direct response to unrest. The non-existence during their rule of reform no doubt damaged the credulity of such promises. Hence, filtering Hashemite religious credentials through Jordan's Constitution augments Abdullah's constitutional legitimacy (without the King resorting to last-minute

amendments that could risk creating specious Democratic Approval à la Mubarak). However, Abdullah also draws on images of family in his address (*ibid.*). As discussed in this analysis, constitutional definitions of family tie religion and dignity (morals) to Hashemite loyalty (Constitute Project, 2011). This link between monarchy and family confirms aspects of the hypothesis: that monarchs emphasize longevity and ties to traditional institutions, the image of family easier to manipulate in discourse due to their established familial rule.

Here lies a key difference between Abdullah and North Africa's fallen presidents. Through constitutional legitimacy, the Hashemites tie religion and human dignity together as part of 'the good Jordanian family'. In other words, while Ben Ali and Mubarak were disconnected from protestors' demands for dignity, the Hashemites draw on Democratic Approval or constitutional legitimacy to augment their Religious Legitimacy while also using the state-defined understanding of family to tie religion and dignity together under the umbrella of Hashemite loyalty (*ibid.*). Through a careful balancing act, Abdullah draws on constitutional legitimacy and religious credentials to create preparatory conditions that augment his speech's underlying essential condition to Jordanians: not simply to "[…] work from under the dome of Parliament and through the ballot boxes" but to also be good "brothers and sisters" (*ibid.*). A good family maintains religious dignity, as defined by the Constitution (Constitute Project, 2011). A good family remembers that they are ruled by a king who holds "the honour of being a descendant of our forefather Prophet Mohammad" and therefore the good Jordanian family avoids inciting "chaos and *fitna* (sedition), [which] are rejected by Jordanians" (*ibid.*).

7.2.2: *Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain*

 "In the name of God on high, and with His blessing, and with His help, we Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, Sovereign of the Kingdom of Bahrain, in line with our determination, certainty, faith, and awareness of our national, pan-Arab and international responsibilities; and in

acknowledgment of our obligations to God, our obligations to the homeland and the

citizens, and our commitment to fundamental principles and our responsibility to

Mankind" (Constitute Project, 2002)

Bahrain's current 2002 Constitution redefined the nation as a constitutional monarchy, with said Constitution being drafted and approved by the current King Hamad (Borgognone and Furlow, 2018). Although, as discussed in Chapter 5, the 2002 Constitution was based on the 2001 National Action Charter, under which Bahrainis voted for the transition to a constitutional monarchy, 2002 was the year in which many freedoms under the Charter were rolled back by Hamad (Wehrey, p. 119). As with Jordan's Constitution and the constitutions of analyzed republics, significant power is formalized in Bahrain's Constitution for the country's ruling regime (Freedom House, 2007). Hamad retains key constitutional authority over executive, legislative and judicial branches (*ibid.*). As with Jordan's Constitution, Bahrain's own Constitution was drafted by the nation's monarchy rather than its citizens (Khalaf, 2008). This fact can be linked back to earlier discussion in Chapter 6 of how monarchs may be using Weber's legality or the "validity of legal statute and functional 'competence' based on rationally created rules" that can be formalized in a legal document (Weber, pp. 78-79). As the 2002 edition of the Constitution is the latest edition, this version has been used in analyzing the political factors of Hamad's 2011 address and to what extent such factors are bolstered by said Constitution.

The theme of religion is continued by Abdullah's counterpart in the al-Khalifa monarchy of Bahrain. The Constitution's preamble emphasizes religion by assuming that the Constitution's values and amendments are formalized "[…] [i]n the name of God on high, and with His blessing, and with His help" (*ibid.*). At the same time, King Hamad is introduced not as 'His Majesty' or 'King' but as "[…] Sovereign of the Kingdom of Bahrain" (*ibid.*). The notion of sovereignty has been discussed in Chapter 3. Peter highlights that concepts of sovereignty are significant when addressing Political Cosmopolitanism. To reiterate, Political Cosmopolitanism outlines how globalization has

created a need for international legitimacy or the recognition of states by global actors (Peter, 2016). Peter discusses how Political Cosmopolitanism can emphasize individual rights within communities that are globally connected but also balances such recognition with recognition of international relations being principally among states (Peter, 2016). Hence, sovereignty within the latter context is significant as it emphasizes national boundaries and non-interference of international actors on the global stage (Peter, 2016). Further, such an argument that globalization must be balanced with state-centricism links back to Ahram and Lust's assertion that the Arab Spring was inevitable because state sovereignty has always been an artificial construct (Ahram and Lust, 2016, p. 7). Consequently, as the Arab Spring blossomed, states would turn to the international system and seek world recognition by global political actors to emphasize international legitimacy, another form of Political Cosmopolitanism (*ibid.*). This assumption is a significant factor in analyzing both Hamad's address and Bahrain's Constitution (*ibid.*).

Sovereignty and stability are key themes underlined in Hamad's address. In it, Hamad insists that Iran "[…] not only directly challenges the stability and sovereignty of [Bahrain] but also poses a threat to the security and stability of the GCC" (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). Previous analysis of this speech has discussed how Hamad presents security as a Beneficial Consequence and ties Bahrain to the GCC as a form of regional/international legitimacy. This key theme in Hamad's address can be regarded as a form of Democratic Approval and constitutional legitimacy. In Bahrain's Constitution, the preface acts as a declaration of Bahrain's "[…] affiliation to the great Arab nation, and their association with the Gulf Cooperation Council" (Constitute Project, 2002). This stipulation creates a form of constitutional legitimacy when Hamad refers to the GCC. Such legitimacy not only bolsters Hamad's attempts at regional legitimacy and emphasis that Bahrain's security is vital to the survival of the GCC but also indirectly augments the Saudi-led intervention against protestors, referred to by Hamad as protection of "[…] key installations by […] the Peninsula Shield Force, without any confrontation with civilians"

(Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). Because Bahrain's political identity is tied to regional legitimacy and closeness to the GCC, it would seem that Hamad's speech and elements highlighting security, regional legitimacy and Bahrain-GCC links are augmented (*ibid.*). Hence, the Constitution's mention of the GCC can be regarded as a preparatory condition that augments Hamad's essential condition in his speech: that Bahrain has regional legitimacy due to its GCC membership and that fellow (Sunni) monarchs must come to its aid as it plays a lynchpin role in regional stability (Constitute Project, 2002). As discussed earlier, the fact that protests were countered by a Saudi-led intervention illustrates that Hamad's essential conditions aimed at fellow monarchies were indeed met.

At the same time, it must be noted that Hamad's presentation of GCC intervention "without any confrontation with civilians" is indirectly false. While some commentators confirmed that Peninsula Shield Force members did not directly engage with Bahraini protestors, their presence freed up domestic soldiers to do just that (Whitaker, 2011). Therefore, Hamad's ability to draw on constitutional legitimacy or Democratic Approval within the context of providing security as a Beneficial Consequence and as a form of regional legitimacy through linkage with the Peninsula Shield Force is limited. Association with the GCC may be constitutionally approved, augmenting regional legitimacy but this does not include regional legitimacy through military alliances or the intervention of external actors to restore national security (Constitute Project, 2002). Indeed, nowhere in the Constitution is the Peninsula Shield Force even mentioned (*ibid.*). From this perspective, there is an interesting parallel between how ordinary Bahrainis rejected Peninsula Shield interference as illegitimate and the Constitution's non-recognition of said Force. Indeed, protestors in the street chanted against not only the al-Khalifa monarchy but against the Peninsula Shield force, shouting "[…] Bahrain is free, [Peninsula] Shield out" (Shehabi, 2013).

Chapter 5 has discussed Bahrain's ruling bargain and the luxury of oil benefits. Within such a context, it is interesting to note that the preface to Bahrain's Constitution expresses that the document is an "[…] implementation of the popular will […] [borne] out of our desire to complete the requirements of the democratic system of government" (Constitute Project, 2002). The notion of popular will implies a political ruling bargain with democratic legitimacy. However, Hamad does not mention popular will in his address (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). The constitutional assumption of a democratic system can be regarded as a form of Democratic Approval. Indeed, Chapter 2 briefly addressed the image of the Arab *majlis* or parliament as espousing a system of democratic decision making but in reality, providing merely Democratic Approval by acting as a rubber stamp for non-democratic rulers (Whrey, 2014, p. 322). In addition, Chapter 5 has discussed Bahrain's parliamentary system in detail, emphasizing how the National Action Charter presented parliament as a method of deepening citizen involvement with political decision making (Wehrey, p. 118).

However, as discussed in Chapter 5, parliament served as a vehicle for fixed elections that weakened opposition groups and emphasized sectarianism in order to dilute the political clout of non-royalists (al-Rawi, pp. 119-120). Thus, any attempt to draw on Democratic Approval through the Constitution must be balanced with the reality of a ruling bargain and parliamentary manipulation (*ibid.*). It is hence no surprise that Hamad's speech does not mention popular will or any democratic institutions and instead focuses on what may be considered non-democratic factors such as compensation and security (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011).

Returning to Beneficial Consequences, Bahrain's Constitution guarantees state pursuit of specific values on behalf of citizens. These values include "[…] greater welfare, […] stability and prosperity" (Constitute Project, 2002). As previously discussed, Beneficial Consequences are often regarded as utilitarian rather than moral; hence, (material) improvement in the lives of citizens justifies non-democratic rule (Peter, 2016). As

discussed in Chapter 5, welfare through subsidy of diverse goods has been a common expenditure from oil profits, consistently prioritized in Bahrain over investment or savings. Furthermore, Hamad's speech draws on both security and financial welfare as Beneficial Consequences (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). Again, Bahrain is mentioned within the context of being a lynchpin state in the Gulf and its stability being essential to the GCC, highlighting regional security (*ibid.*). For his fellow (Sunni) Gulf monarchs, Hamad can be regarded as drawing on constitutional legitimacy and its guarantee of security as a preparatory condition to again augment his essential condition that the GCC should protect the al-Khalifa Bahrain in times of need (*ibid.*).

However, Hamad's emphasis on security within the framework of international legitimacy may not be successfully augmented by Bahrain's Constitution. As discussed in Chapter 6, Hamad appears to draw heavily on international legitimacy. The Constitution's guarantee of security is intended to be a form of "[…] popular will [for] […] the citizen" (*ibid.*). In other words, provision of security should be guaranteed for nationals and cannot therefore be used by the state as an instrument of regional (rather than national) stability intended to bolster external intervention on behalf of the regime (*ibid.*). Hence, any attempt to bolster international legitimacy through Democratic Approval is weak at best (Constitute Project, 2002).

Returning to welfare, Hamad's speech does draw on this constitutional guarantee for Bahrainis. Hamad emphasizes material welfare and within the context of unrest promises "[…] a range of remedies, including the newly established Victims Compensation Fund" (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). Hamad's offer to effectively buy off protestors is arresting for two reasons. Like Ben Ali's last-minute (political) offers, Hamad's Victims Compensation Fund is a strategy specifically established in response to the Arab Spring and aimed at curbing unrest, albeit as a financial rather than political instrument (*ibid.*). On the surface, the ability of Hamad to draw on constitutional legitimacy for welfare provision would seem limited if such provision were not consistent.

Returning to Ben Ali, the President's offers of last-minute reform failed as they were a tacit admission of corruption and hence ironically emphasized that Ben Ali's rule had not exactly maintained the Tunisian Constitution's values of "[…] human dignity, justice and liberty" (Official Printing Office of the Republic of Tunisia). However, the key difference between Hamad and Ben Ali is that although both offer last-minute remedies, Hamad's Victims Compensation Fund comes atop already existing welfare arrangements (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011).

As discussed in Chapter 5, oil wealth has consistently allowed the government to provide total or partial subsidies for:

- Commercial petrol

- Basic foodstuffs, including fresh meat

- All utilities

- Prescription medicine (Epstein and Miller, p. 29)

In other words, Hamad's rule has consistently provided welfare, with the Victims Compensation Fund being an additional welfare channel and another Beneficial Consequence. Because al-Khalifa rule has consistently provided welfare (as guaranteed by Bahrain's Constitution), it is possible for Hamad to use the Constitution's preface to augment his address's reference to welfare. The Constitution's mention of welfare acts as a preparatory condition so that Hamad can draw on Democratic Approval to emphasize welfare provision in his address and the creation of the Victims Compensation Fund as a further form of welfare (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). In turn, such constitutional legitimacy allows Hamad to augment the essential condition or instruction of his address to Bahrainis: cease protest and accept the Victims Compensation Fund as an additional welfare outlet and a reminder of a successful ruling bargain (*ibid.*).

Finally, the place of Islam in Bahrain's Constitution must be addressed, especially within the context of not only Hamad's speech but Bahrain's history of sectarianism, as discussed in Chapter 5. Within its preface, the Constitution declares that Bahrainis and their ruler(s) are united through "[…] their adherence to Islam as a faith, a code of laws and a way of life" (Constitute Project, 2002). Returning to Bulliet and Religious Legitimacy, the mention of Islam as a religion of unity certainly ties into Bulliet's discussions of Islam as a "[…] religious-political community" that is headed by a pious ruler (Bulliet, p. 4). Further, such a connection enshrined in the Constitution without a hierarchical framework emphasizes Bulliet's argument that Islamic law is universal and applies to all, with the state acting as enforcer of Islamic law to maintain legitimacy (*ibid.*, p. 12). A further religious concept highlighted by the wording of Bahrain's Constitution is *Dar al-Islam*. As discussed in Chapter 2, the rule of territory often allowed a regime to use Islamic titles as a form of Religious Legitimacy over defined borders (*ibid.*, p. 5). Under *Dar al-Islam*, a pious ruler must allow freedom of religion and protection of the Islamic faith (Ayoob, p. 9).

Bahrain's Constitution does not mention *Dar al-Islam* specifically. Instead, there is an arresting form of semantics. Unity through Islam is defined under Bahrain's Constitution as one of "[…] the lofty values and great human principles" of Bahrain (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). Directly following Islamic unity is Bahrain's "[…] association with the Gulf Cooperation Council now and in the future" (*ibid.*). Mentioning the GCC immediately after a lengthy paragraph on Islamic unity allows the GCC to be indirectly included in such a religious union (*ibid.*). This concept plays with the notion of *Dar al-Islam* by emphasizing regional unity among Gulf Muslims (but without mentioning Sunni-Shia'a strains). Such an interpretation of Bahrain's Constitution, under which the GCC is part of Islamic unity and *Dar al-Islam* feeds Religious Legitimacy via Democratic Approval into Hamad's speech.

As already discussed, a central theme of Hamad's address was regional unity and international legitimacy (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). Further, Hamad emphasized Bahrain's role in maintaining this regional *Dar al-Islam* by insisting that unrest in Bahrain "[…] not only directly challenges the stability and sovereignty of our country, but also poses a threat to the security and stability of the GCC" (*ibid.*). Hence, the Constitution's preface and its marriage of Islam and the GCC act as a preparatory condition. Hamad draws on Democratic Approval to augment his essential condition via Religious Legitimacy: Bahrain acts as a lynchpin for a stable *Dar al-Islam*, the community of (Sunni) believers that also acts as a regional security buttress under the GCC and that hence, the GCC is obligated to intervene to keep Bahrain stable under the al-Khalifas (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011).

As previously addressed in Chapters 5 and 6, the GCC agreed to this essential condition and did indeed intervene through the Peninsula Shield Force. Although the Constitution's preface conveniently describes Islamic unity without reference to sectarianism, it is worth noting that any Religious Legitimacy Hamad drew on via Democratic Approval in his address was laced with sectarian fears that fed into GCC concerns over a so-called 'Shia'a Crescent' or Shia'a domination of regional politics (Black, 2007). Given the fact that the Constitution mentions only Islamic unity and does not even address Sunni or Shia'a branches, it is possible to conclude that Hamad's use of Religious Legitimacy through Democratic Approval is weakened by references to divisive sectarianism (Constitute Project, 2002). Perhaps this was why his regional audience, the GCC intervened but local Bahrainis chanted against the Peninsula Shield Force (Shehabi).

An analysis of Bahrain's Constitution reveals elements of the ruling bargain through promises of welfare, which can be regarded as a Beneficial Consequence (Peter, 2016). Of further note is the formalizing of religion and GCC relations in the same paragraph, conjuring the notion of regional legitimacy and *Dar al-Islam* intertwined (Constitute Project, 2002). When filtering Hamad's speech through such constitutional elements,

Hamad's mention of the Victims Compensation Fund can be regarded as an element of welfare provisions covered by the Constitution (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). Hence, Hamad's address draws on Democratic Approval to emphasize the socio-economic nature of the ruling bargain, a key element of the oil state as explained in Chapter 5.

On the other hand, the dominant theme of Hamad's speech is international legitimacy. Filtering this element of Hamad's speech through Bahrain's Constitution reveals weaker Democratic Approval for international legitimacy, religion and security. Returning to the Constitution's preface, stability is promised alongside welfare not as a regional guarantee but an individual right for "[…] the homeland and the citizen" (Constitute Project, 2002). In other words, security is for domestic citizens (*ibid.*). Therefore, when Hamad uses his address to target the GCC and international legitimacy by emphasizing Bahrain's lynchpin status (akin to Jordan's own geopolitics), he is not able to draw on Democratic Approval and any constitutional legitimacy between security and regional recognition is weak (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). Hence, while the GCC may have warmed to Hamad's caution of Bahrain's stability and the dangers of a 'Shia'a Crescent', domestic citizens, who are the beneficiaries of stability according to the Constitution, were less than impressed and ordered the Peninsula Shield Force out (Whitaker).

At the same time, the Constitution constructs an association between Bahrain and the Gulf Cooperation Council "[…] now and in the future" in the interests of maintaining "[…] justice, good and peace" (Constitute Project, 2002). Again, there is the notion of Hamad drawing on Democratic Approval for regional legitimacy and Bahrain's connections to the GCC, were such connections for regional "justice, good and peace" (*ibid.*). However, Hamad's flaw when compared to discussing welfare is that the GCC is not consistently mentioned as a partner of peace but rather referenced once within the context of the Peninsula Shield Force's intervention (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). Again, merging recognition of the GCC with regional security (at the expense of

domestic security, a constitutional guarantee) dilutes attempts at Democratic Approval (*ibid.*).

Lastly, constitutional references to religion go against Bahrain's sectarian history, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. It is no surprise that Hamad minimizes references to religion but instead feeds the fear of sectarianism and Iran to goad his fellow Sunni monarchs into protecting the al-Khalifa throne (*ibid.*). Ironically, the divisive references to sectarianism contradict the Constitution's message of Islamic unity, preventing Hamad from augmenting the image of *Dar al-Islam* and any Religious Legitimacy (*ibid.*).

Within the context of Weber's legality, Hamad's use of Democratic Approval is consistent on one point: welfare. As welfare is a constitutional guarantee and has been consistently provided by the state, Hamad's announcement of buying off protestors through the Victims Compensation Fund comes atop existing subsidies and other socio-economic sweeteners that serve as Beneficial Consequences. As previously addressed, most nationals accepted the offered money, proving that welfare remains the key element of Bahrain's ruling bargain as an oil state (Kingdom of Bahrain, 2012). In a sense, Hamad is the opposite of Jordan's Abdullah. Abdullah draws heavily on Religious Legitimacy and uses his links to the Prophet Muhammad to strengthen state definition of Jordanian citizens as pious royalists. Hamad, on the other hand, cannot pass such a test of faith against the backdrop of sectarianism. Instead, he resorts to a luxury that Jordan lacks: generous welfare drawn from oil wealth. It is through maintaining welfare that Hamad augments constitutional legitimacy and Democratic Approval, proving that the ruling bargain remains an apolitical pillar if the state coffers can afford to buy off citizens (*ibid.*).

7.2.3: *Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

"We, the people who in addition to preserving the legacy of history, bear the responsibility of great present and future objectives whose seeds are embedded in the long and arduous

struggle, with which the banners of liberty, socialism and unity have been hoisted along the great march of the Arab Nation" (Palataurus Center of Studies, 2007).

During Mubarak's administration, Egypt operated under the Constitution of 1971 (Brown, 2011). This period is significant, as the 1971 Constitution was introduced by President Sadat at a time when military rule was firmly entrenched after the anti-monarchical Nasser period (*ibid.*). As with Tunisia's 1959 Constitution, Egypt's 1971 document strengthened presidential powers (*ibid.*). Sadat amended the Constitution to allow some liberalism for political parties and religion (while balancing such openness with further executive authority). Mubarak, however, oversaw a reversal in such amendments. By 2007, his regime was supervising elections, controlling electoral candidates and barring the Muslim Brotherhood from eligibility while augmenting presidential powers further through so-called emergency measures (*ibid.*). Such a backdrop to understanding Mubarak's final address within the context of the 1971 Constitution no doubt feeds into Mubarak's circular Democratic Approval and why Mubarak's attempts to use this form of non-democratic legitimacy failed within the context of a Constitution that was already seen as unpopular after 2007 (*ibid.*). For these reasons, it is the 2007 edition of the 1971 text that is analyzed.

While Tunisia's Constitution is established by "the representatives of the Tunisian people" (Official Printing Office of the Republic of Tunisia), Egypt's Constitution features wording that creates the image of it being established by the people directly (*ibid.*). Indeed, the Constitution's preamble asserts the will, values and (political) objectives of "[…] [w]e, the people of Egypt" throughout, emphasizing the image of the Constitution's creation through the direct involvement of Egyptians (*ibid.*). While such discourse may clash with the reality of military influence behind the 1971 Constitution, this wording is significant when considering how Mubarak addressed protestors through paternalism. While Ashraf El-Sherif may argue that Egypt's social history encouraged 'authoritarian guardianship' in response to an apolitical populace, the wording of Egypt's Constitution challenges such an assumption (El-Sherif, p. 6; *ibid.*). Mubarak may have well seen his subjects as unassertive

children, yet the Constitution's wording and popular activism linked to it contrasts his belief. After all, an apolitical populace would not have connected with the Constitution's discourse as "the people of Egypt" and before Mubarak's 2007 amendments, Egyptian activists had faith in the popular will of the Constitution, as evidenced by attempts to revive liberal promises from the 1971 text (Brown, 2011). If Egyptians could not make their political will known or did not have a political will, they would not have lobbied to preserve a Constitution that included objectives as precise as world peace, (Arab) unity, human dignity (again a key driver of the Arab Spring) and socio-economic development (*ibid.*).

Nonetheless, certain linguistic elements of the Constitution are drawn upon in Mubarak's final speech. The people of Egypt are mentioned in the preamble as having "[…] the honour of defending this land" and that Egypt is a nation of "[…] immortal heritage" (*ibid.*). Mubarak attempted to tap into such patriotic discourse when claiming that he "[…] spent a lifetime defending [Egypt's] soil and sovereignty" and that he can continue to play a part in maintaining Egypt's "[…] immortal identity" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011). While not a form of Democratic Approval per se, it is still arresting that Mubarak mimics constitutional language, again reflecting an attempt to emphasize Weber's legality by connecting his speech's discourse with that of the Constitution (*ibid.*).

From an historical perspective, the mention of socialism and unity is a reminder of Nasserism, as discussed in Chapter 5. Gamal Abdel Nasser had birthed Egypt as a socialist republic, which was defined by Nasser as a state that would provide subsidies and related benefits to increase living standards (Nagarajan, p. 24). Hence, while subsidies are not specifically mentioned in the preamble it is apparent from Egypt's republican history that subsidies and related welfare were expected and even a constitutional right, listed under Article 122 of the Constitution (Palataurus Center of Studies, 2007). There is a certain irony, then that Mubarak partially lifted constitutional language in his final speech but

failed to address socialism and subsidies, despite their presence in the same Constitution that he formally ruled through.

The role of socialism also appears to come before that of religion. Mention of Egypt's socialist nature comes before that of God. However, it is worth noting that the Constitution outlines the objectives of the people and their political values as goals that can only be achieved "[…] in the name of God and with his assistance" (Palataurus Center of Studies, 2007). The assumption that God must 'bless' the efforts of Egyptians returns discussion to Chapter 2 and Brown's Political Quietism or the belief in fatalism that means Muslims balance efforts to realize (socio-political) goals with the notion that God more than human exertions shapes significant events (Brown, 2000, p. 3).

At the same time, invoking Political Quietism also acts as an indirect reminder that Egypt will only accept a pious ruler who protects Islamic customs and law (*ibid.*, p. 67). The notion of a pious ruler being legitimate if protecting Muslim territory (*Dar al-Islam*) is hence indirectly referenced in Egypt's Constitution, partially augmenting Mubarak's own references to religion in his final address. Mubarak's emphasis on defending the sovereignty of a nation with Muslims and Christians highlights Bulliet's Religious Legitimacy. Bulliet's discussion of a ruler maintaining Islamic laws is emphasized by Mubarak reminding listeners that the protection of Muslims and Christians is a Quranic obligation (Vajda). From this perspective, Mubarak's address can be regarded as drawing (indirectly) on Religious Legitimacy through constitutional references that highlight Peter's Democratic Approval and Weber's legality, more so than any constitutional references by his counterpart, Ben Ali.

When reviewing the political objectives set out in Egypt's Constitution, there are references to be found to drivers of the Arab Spring. World peace or "[…] [p]eace to our world" is the first objective enshrined in the Constitution, with emphasis on such an objective being achieved through social justice and the prevention of exploitation, "[…]

whatever its form" (Palataurus Center of Studies, 2007). Justice is not mentioned directly in Mubarak's final address. Rather, Mubarak discusses constitutional amendments that will be led by himself but advised by a committee of "[…] justice system and law experts that I have set up" (*ibid.*). As previously discussed, Mubarak's amendments serve as a form of Democratic Approval. With the Constitution demanding justice and Mubarak arguing that his reforms are led by justice specialists, there is an indirect form of constitutional legitimacy. However, as Mubarak is leading said reforms and makes no direct reference to justice (as outlined in the Constitution), this aspect of Democratic Approval does not draw on Egypt's Constitution but rather engages in a circular argument that he has legitimacy through Democratic Approval but is amending the Constitution in response to the Arab Spring (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011). Under Weber's legality, such an argument is weak. Had Mubarak drawn on constitutional elements more consistently, especially the political objectives outlined in the Constitution (and his ability to uphold them), an argument through Democratic Approval may have been strengthened.

Moreover, the prevention of exploitation is a constitutional element that was certainly not upheld by Mubarak's regime. Exploitation and corruption are never even addressed in Mubarak's last plea (unlike Ben Ali's final speech). Indeed, Chapter 5 has already explained how Mubarak's Egypt exploited economic resources and international aid and credit to placate the military elite and other political friends at the expense of Egyptian citizens, widening the wealth gap and creating the conditions of his overthrow. Mubarak certainly did not uphold the Constitution's demands for exploitation prevention, which forms a part of the Constitution's understanding of justice. No wonder that justice went unmentioned in his final address.

At the same time, Mubarak's exploitation of economic resources maintained a ruling bargain with the military elite. The importance and sacrosanct status of the Armed Forces is significant when examining the Constitution, which praises their role in "[…] the July 23rd Revolution [against the monarchy]" (Palataurus Center of Studies, 2007). The mention

of the Armed Forces in the Constitution is a reminder of the real authors behind it but also the fact that the military elite have historically enjoyed a privileged position, which Mubarak maintained through his separate ruling bargain with them (at the expense of the people), as discussed in Chapter 5. However, this brief mention of the Armed Forces must be balanced against the Constitution's lengthier references to social justice (*ibid.*).

Further emphasizing Mubarak's failure to maintain constitutional legitimacy is the Constitution's focus on "[…] Freedom for the Humanity of […] Egyptian(s)" (*ibid.*). This passage asserts that Egypt's progress is dependent on the individual's "[…] humanity and dignity", as the "[…] dignity of every individual is [a] natural reflection of the dignity of his nation" (*ibid.*). Such a detailed passage enshrining individual dignity is most ironic. While Mubarak mentions "[…] Egypt's dignity" in passing during his final speech, he fails to mention the dignity of the Egyptian and the context of individual dignity guaranteed by the Constitution (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011). Mubarak's focus on nationhood and territory combined with religion may connect with *Dar al-Islam* but the failure to provide the individualistic context of "Egypt's dignity" again limits Mubarak's ability to meaningfully connect his discourse with constitutional legitimacy (*ibid.*). Moreover, such a failure cannot but emphasize Mubarak's disconnect with the political nature of the protests against him and the fact that they were motivated by the need for dignity and respect.

This latter aspect is paramount in illustrating Mubarak's failure to successfully draw on Democratic Approval and constitutional legitimacy as defined by Weber. Egypt's Constitution asserts that sovereign law as a basis for legitimacy is constitutionally sound if such laws and constitutional practices act as "[…] a guarantee for the freedom of the individual" (Palataurus Center of Studies, 2007). Again, Chapter 5 clearly illustrates that Mubarak, like Ben Ali did not prioritize maintaining the dignity of his citizens but allowed corruption and the wealth gap to grow. If discussing why Mubarak's speech engages heavily in Democratic Approval, it is worth noting that the Constitution does state that constitutional legitimacy is "[…] the sole basis for the legality of authority". Hence,

Mubarak could have drawn on constitutional elements as preparatory conditions and connected them with essential conditions or instructions related to constitutional legitimacy. However, Mubarak's attempts to rely on Democratic Approval fall short as he fails to create preparatory conditions that could have created acceptable essential conditions related to constitutional legitimacy. This failure mirrors his regime's inability to draw on the strongest elements of the Constitution, namely justice and dignity. Instead, Mubarak resorted to self-serving amendments that did not connect with key constitutional elements, and he could not save his throne after all (*ibid.*).

7.2.4: *Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia*

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate,

We, the representatives of the Tunisian people, meeting as members of the Constituent National Assembly,

Proclaim the will of our people, who freed themselves from foreign domination thanks to their strong cohesion and their fight against tyranny, exploitation and regression" (Official Printing Office of the Republic of Tunisia, p. 5)

At the time of Ben Ali's final address, his regime operated under Tunisia's Constitution of 1959, which was formally drawn up by his predecessor, Habib Bourghuiba (Vandewalle, 1980, p. 154). Of note was Bourguiba's delay in formalizing Tunisia's Constitution until he was confident that he could limit its scope to ensure presidential domination over parliamentary processes, a reality later reflected by Ben Ali's democratic window-dressing (*ibid.*). Moreover, the 1959 Constitution was amended further to augment presidential powers even more by Bourguiba and later Ben Ali himself (The Carter Center, 2014, p. 4). The last of these amendments was affixed to the 1959 Constitution on July 28th, 2008, two years before Ben Ali's overthrow (Printing Office of the Republic of Tunisia, p. 13). The latest edition of the 1959 Constitution from 2010 is used for Chapter 7's investigation as it

reflects these amendments and is the final edition of the 1959 Constitution still printed in the last year of Ben Ali's rule (*ibid.*).

Unlike Ben Ali's final speech, the Tunisian Constitution immediately references Islam, declaring "[i]n the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate", indicating that religion and politics are intertwined in a constitution written by "[…] the representatives of the Tunisian people" (*ibid.*). The wording in such a sentence alludes to a social contract that is politicized and even democratic; if Tunisia is to be led by "representatives of the Tunisian people", it can be assumed that any leader should represent the popular will of Tunisians rather than offer an apolitical ruling bargain (*ibid.*). On the other hand, such a preamble can be regarded as a condition to formalize Democratic Approval (Peter, 2016). Peter argues that the existence of any constitution that is supposedly endorsed by most citizens means political legitimacy is automatically granted to the ruling regime. In other words, if the Constitution is written by those representing popular will ("the people") then it can be assumed that the Constitution itself is accepted by the same popular will, opening up the path for Democratic Approval and mere proceduralism (*ibid.*).

As previously discussed, Ben Ali's address does not mention democracy or popular will, avoiding what may have been an unwanted reminder that Ben Ali did not gain power through democratic means (Ben Ali, 2011). However, one commonality between the Tunisian Constitution and Ben Ali's last speech is the element of external threats and security. The Constitution declares that it represents "[…] the will of our people, who freed themselves from foreign domination" (Official Printing Office of the Republic of Tunisia, p. 5). The Constitution's highlighting of foreign intervention is arresting. Returning to Chapter 5, it should be recalled that modern Tunisia was founded on anti-colonialist nationalism under Bourguiba and so a constitutional reference to refusing foreign domination is not surprising (*ibid.*). At the same time, such a reference can be regarded as a preparatory condition for Ben Ali's portrayal of protest as vandalism that has been incited by foreign or external influence. "[The] events currently taking place in our country

are not part of us," he insists. "Vandalism is not part of the customs of Tunisians" (Ben Ali, 2011). Ben Ali, unlike Mubarak, does not directly refer to such 'vandalism' as foreign interference and hence the implication is weak at best. At the same time, this tenuous connection allows him to build his credentials on the Beneficial Consequence of security from external threats, with references to his various security and military positions "[…] in the service of the country", albeit all in vain (*ibid.*).

The preamble of Tunisia's Constitution also includes values of social justice that the "representatives of the Tunisian people" are expected to maintain (Printing Office of the Republic of Tunisia, p. 5). These values include "[…] human dignity, justice and liberty" (*ibid*). The notion of human dignity and justice links back to one of the strongest drivers of the Arab Spring: the simple desire for respect, as discussed in Chapter 2 (Fukuyama, 2012). Further, the mention of justice under the faith of Islam returns discussion to *'adl* or the concept of social justice specific to Islamic law (Ibrahim, 2006, pp. 6-7). None of these values are mentioned in Ben Ali's final speech. Ironically, they form part of his first address in 1987. During his 'inauguration' so many decades ago, he promised that "[…] the liberation and development of Tunisia [will be] countless" and that "[…] the law [will be] correctly enforced in a way that will proscribe any kind of iniquity or injustice" (Ben Ali, 2015).

A younger Ben Ali drew on constitutional elements that guaranteed justice and dignity; yet his final speech did not mirror these (broken) promises. Given the fact that he was popularly ousted, this irony was not lost on bitter Tunisians (Driesbach and Joyce).

Perhaps most contradictory with the realities of Ben Ali's rule is the Constitution's instructions "[…] to establish a democracy founded on the sovereignty of the people, and characterized by a stable political system based on separation of powers" (Official Printing Office of the Republic of Tunisia, p. 5). Again, such a stipulation can be filtered through Peter's Democratic Approval, as democratic elements can exist as mere proceduralism.

However, the mention of a democratic system goes against the apolitical ruling bargain discussed across this thesis. Ben Ali's final address does not mention any democratic elements of his regime and his rule was more corrupt than democratic, as discussed in Chapter 5. However, Ben Ali's last speech does mention reform and promises to acknowledge popular political demands while also promising to investigate "[…] corruption, bribery, and the mistakes of officials" (Ben Ali, 2011). Returning to the initial discourse analysis and setting aside Ben Ali's attempts to appear blameless, there is an interesting interpretation of connecting the Constitution's instructions with Ben Ali's 'mistakes'. Just as Ben Ali's admission of corruption indirectly implies he was aware of its existence, any attempt to offer reforms or investigations that return Tunisia to a democratic rule augment such guilt even further. Given the fact that the Tunisian Constitution was first published in 1959, Ben Ali cannot draw on democratic elements of the Constitution for legitimacy without revealing that his rule has not upheld the (democratic) values of the Constitution, illustrating a failure to draw on Weber's legality and even Democratic Approval as he has not upheld the political procedures of the Constitution.

Finally, the preamble of the Tunisian Constitution ends with a declaration of what the republican regime should constitute. This paragraph is tantamount to proclaiming the political nature of the regime, which feeds directly into this thesis' discussions of the apolitical ruling bargain and its links to Democratic Approval, Beneficial Consequences and constitutional legitimacy as discussed by Weber's legality (Weber, pp. 78-79). This passage defines the Tunisian regime as constituting:

- Respect for human rights and equality among citizens

- Guaranteeing economic development by using Tunisia's resources for the benefit of the people

- Ensuring citizens' right to work, healthcare and education (Printing Office of the Republic of Tunisia, pp. 5-6)

These factors present a mix of elements that can be considered political but also socio-economic. Unsurprisingly, Ben Ali does not mention human rights or citizen equality in his last address, nor in his first address for that matter. However, it is worth noting that two out of three of these factors are socio-economic rather than political or focused on human rights (*ibid.*). The final requirement that the state must ensure citizens have access to healthcare, employment and education is arresting. As discussed in Chapter 5, education and employment are typical promises of Beneficial Consequences delivered under the ruling bargain. At the same time, Tunisia became known for its emphasis on providing education (but not employment). Indeed, in Ben Ali's final speech, Ben Ali implies that education is a part of his ruling bargain and that protests and unrest have prevented the state from fulfilling this obligation ("[…] children today have stayed home and did not go to school" (Ben Ali, 2011).

The concept of education as a Beneficial Consequence is implied and hence augmented by its constitutional guarantee. In this respect, Ben Ali is partially resorting to legality. However, it is doubtful that Ben Ali is actively drawing on the Constitution given the indirect and single reference to education rather than a consistent approach (*ibid.*). Further, his mention of education as a Beneficial Consequence must be measured against what he does not mention in his final address: human rights, equal citizenship and the use of Tunisia's resources for economic development that will benefit nationals (Printing Office of the Republic of Tunisia, pp. 5-6). Again, as discussed in Chapter 5, Ben Ali did not use Tunisia's resources for sound economic development but plundered said resources, tailoring economic laws to benefit himself and his inner circle.

When comparing the Tunisian Constitution with Ben Ali's final address, there are few instances in which Ben Ali draws on any elements of the Constitution as preparatory conditions to further augment his essential conditions through Democratic Approval. Perhaps this is no surprise, given that discourse analysis has revealed that Ben Ali's last-minute reforms and tacit admission to (knowledge of) corruption reveal that his regime is

unable to justify a non-democratic ruling bargain when many Beneficial Consequences were not delivered. Returning to Weber's legality, Ben Ali does not augment his legitimacy through Democratic Approval, as he fails to reflect any constitutional elements in his address, the exception being an indirect reference to education. Returning to Ben Ali's promises of subsidies, a key element of typical ruling bargains, the Tunisian Constitution contains no references to state provision of subsidies (*ibid.*). Instead, the Constitution contains elements reflecting popular will, which can be interpreted as allowing Democratic Approval, as discussed by Peter (*ibid.*).

While it is true that Ben Ali engaged in democratic window-dressing, as discussed in Chapter 5, there are no references to democratic procedures in his final speech. Further, the key elements of Tunisia's Constitution include human rights, equal citizenship, social justice and sound economic development for the benefit of the people (*ibid.*). None of these factors are covered by Ben Ali's final speech, illustrating that even constitutional legitimacy of his regime was lacking. The irony of Ben Ali's fall is the contrast it presented to his beginnings and the discourse of his first address, which did reflect key elements of the Constitution, promising equality, justice and even emphasizing that "[…] there will be no more favoritism or indifference where the squandering of the country's wealth is concerned" (Ben Ali, 2015).

After twenty-three years in power, such irony had morphed into tragedy. A comparison between Tunisia's Constitution and the last words of President Ben Ali only emphasizes his failure to meet the political and socio-economic demands of Tunisians and his failure to employ Weber's legality as a republican who could not draw on tradition or rely on what so many dictators claim in their first years of power: charisma.

Filtering each case's speech through the respective country's constitution deepens the discourse analysis of this project and its original knowledge contribution by examining if democratic and non-democratic factors of legitimacy (including religion) have any

constitutional basis and to what extent such a constitutional basis is drawn upon in each related address. Further, filtering each speech through its respective constitution allows a deeper examination of Democratic Approval as an instrument of non-democratic legitimacy.

Tunisia's Ben Ali does not draw much on constitutional legitimacy. There is a thin link between the Constitution's mention of Tunisia's people freeing themselves "[…] from foreign domination" (Official Printing Office of the Republic of Tunisia, p. 5) and Ben Ali's emphasis on his military record and other political posts "[…] in the service of the country" (Ben Ali, 2011). However, such a link and Ben Ali's claim to serve Tunisians are countered by evidence of corruption and the other constitutional factors that his regime did not uphold, including liberty, justice and human dignity. There is a sad irony that such forms of social justice were promised in Ben Ali's 'inauguration' speech of 1987 (Ben Ali, 2015). Indeed, as expressed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 2, the need for human dignity was a driving force behind the Arab Spring (Fukuyama).

Ben Ali could not draw on Democratic Approval from the Constitution without indirectly reminding Tunisians of his failure to consistently uphold most of these values. This is especially true when considering the Constitution's existence since 1959 from before Ben Ali's 1987 beginnings until his overthrow in 2010. Hence, when filtering Ben Ali's address through Weber's legality, a comparison between Tunisia's Constitution and said speech augments Ben Ali's failure to draw on the Constitution for Democratic Approval by highlighting the full obligations between the state and Tunisians and Ben Ali's failure to fulfill all his constitutional obligations.

The thesis hypothesis assumes that republican presidents-for-life will draw primarily on the socio-economic ruling bargain as the main source of their non-democratic legitimacy. However, when analyzing the political factors of Ben Ali's speech and comparing them with related political factors of Tunisia's 1959 Constitution, it is clear that non-democratic

factors are not bolstered by said Constitution. Very few constitutional guarantees are drawn on in Ben Ali's address. Only security, free education, employment and economic development can be regarded as socio-economic and non-democratic factors of legitimacy. Ben Ali's address mentions education and subsidies but these constitutional guarantees are overshadowed both by his history of corruption and the democratic guarantees of the Constitution, including separation of powers and social justice that Ben Ali did not maintain. Because of this failure, a comparison of his address with Tunisia's Constitution does not buttress the hypothesis that republicans will rely on a socio-economic ruling bargain, as Tunisia's Constitution makes it clear that the social contract was intended to include political elements and not to support a purely utilitarian ruling bargain.

Understanding Ben Ali's failure to uphold the political elements of the Constitution and maintain a material ruling bargain (instead of indulging in corruption) can feed into and expand the hypothesis. The original hypothesis outlines that republics will emphasize the socio-economic ruling bargain as the main source of their non-democratic legitimacy in response to the Arab Spring, due to most republics being the result of coups rather than established familial rule. However, Ben Ali's inability to justify his non-democratic ruling bargain, as illustrated by tacit admission of corruption, failure to provide both education and employment and the political nature of protests against him beg the question of whether republicans who are challenged by unrest can successfully justify their rule if they recognize the need to politicize the ruling bargain (McClatchy Newspapers, 2011).

In other words, an extended hypothesis for further investigation may be: republics will emphasize the socio-economic ruling bargain as the main source of their non-democratic legitimacy in response to the Arab Spring, due to most republics being the result of coups rather than established familial rule. However, failure to justify non-democratic rule through tangible Beneficial Consequences should encourage such regimes to politicize the ruling bargain in a step-by-step manner, perhaps akin to Jordan's 'defensive democratization' rather than offer last-minute reforms that emphasize a regime's weakness

and knowledge of corruption (Ben Ali, 2011). In Tunisia after Ben Ali, 2018 protests have emphasized socio-economic grievances but not a desire to overthrow new governments (International Crisis Group, 2018). At the same time, political analysts have noted that opposition and rival political actors have attempted to inject such unrest with their own agenda and that any central government must address not only socio-economic gaps but politicize the social contract to prevent a return to dictatorship (*ibid.*). It would be interesting to apply the aforementioned extended hypothesis to regimes that replaced overthrown republics after the Arab Spring and determine if a politicization of the ruling bargain has allowed new regimes to survive ongoing unrest, though this approach is outside the scope of this thesis.

Egypt's Mubarak reveals a more complex relationship with Democratic Approval when his discourse is filtered through Egypt's Constitution. Mubarak draws on constitutional discourse (which is not the same as constitutional legitimacy), echoing the Constitution's praise of the Egyptian people's "[…] honour of defending this land" (Palataurus Center of Studies, 2007) with his own sentiments that he holds the honor of spending "[…] a lifetime defending [Egypt's] soil and sovereignty" (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011). His reference to "[…] Muslims and Christians" (*ibid.*) echoes the concept of *Dar al-Islam* and the Constitution's assertion that Egypt's territory exists "[…] in the name of God and with His assistance" (Palataurus Center of Studies, 2007).

However, Mubarak's paternalism, linked to the notion of 'authoritarian guardianship' contrasts with the notion that Egypt's Constitution is written not by representatives of the people (as in Tunisia) but "[w]e, the people of Egypt" (*ibid.*). Moreover, Mubarak's indulgence in Democratic Approval is circular, with promises of constitutional amendments that will ultimately be overseen by himself (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011). Mubarak does not draw on existing constitutional factors in his speech (*ibid.*). Like Ben Ali, this means that he avoids constitutional references to social justice and preventing exploitation (corruption), the latter being a hallmark of his own regime as much as Ben

Ali's, as discussed in Chapter 5. Again, reflecting Ben Ali's mistake and the fuel of the Arab Spring's fire, Mubarak does not address the notion of human dignity, augmented by Egypt's Constitution as an individual right because "[…] the dignity of every individual is [a] natural reflection of the dignity of his nation" (Palataurus Center of Studies, 2007).

As with Ben Ali, Mubarak's dismissal of the political nature of protests and the simple desire for respect proved fatal. Both Ben Ali and Mubarak could not draw on the political and human values of their respective constitutions, severely limiting the use of Democratic Approval and illustrating a failure to successfully conform to Weber's legality. The (limited) use of religion contrasts somewhat with the hypothesis that republicans will rely solely on the ruling bargain. However, Chapter 5 has discussed the importance of subsidies for North African regimes, especially in Egypt. Mubarak's failure to acknowledge the importance of subsidies in his final speech is arresting, especially when compared to Ben Ali's promises of subsidized food prices (Ben Ali, 2011). In other words, there is the implication that Mubarak's failure to recognize the socio-economic nature of unrest means that, like Ben Ali, he had maintained a weak ruling bargain, again illustrated by corruption and a growing wealth gap addressed in Chapter 5. Nonetheless, subsidies formed only one factor for Mubarak's overthrow and the inability to provide dignity and social justice, related drivers of the Arab Spring, is reflected in weak constitutional legitimacy that again fails to successfully draw on Weber's legality.

A comparison of political factors in Mubarak's speech with any similar factors from Egypt's Constitution reveals a weak link between the two and hence a disconnect from the hypothesis and assumption that the ruling bargain can be sanctioned by Egypt's Constitution as a form of non-democratic legitimacy. This disconnect is evident from the fact that Mubarak engages in circular Democratic Approval rather than drawing on the Constitution, despite his 2007 amendments that restricted previous liberties and strengthened his presidential authority. On the one hand, the Constitution's mention of subsidies could have been built upon by Mubarak in his speech to emphasize the utilitarian

ruling bargain. On the other hand, Mubarak shared Ben Ali's history of corruption and faced politicized protests, while technically still operating under a Constitution that guaranteed political and moral freedoms, including social justice, human dignity and the prevention of exploitation. It is curious that his 2007 amendments did not remove such politicized values from a Constitution that was intended to empower his regime. Despite their political nature, perhaps Mubarak recognized the popularity of such values, as evidenced by 2007 activism and faith in the 1971 Constitution's original liberties. In retrospect, comparing the Constitution with Mubarak's actions augments his failure to maintain expected political values, revealing that Egypt's Constitution cannot bolster the assumption that the republican President could gain constitutional legitimacy for an apolitical ruling bargain. Finally, the Constitution's protection of Islam as the state religion is drawn upon in Mubarak's discourse and the concept of *Dar al-Islam*. This link between Constitution and discourse contrasts with the hypothesis assumption that religion would be a non-democratic factor exclusively manipulated by monarchs. However, the few political factors Mubarak's speech could augment through the Constitution were not enough to save him or formally support a non-democratic social contract, in the light of protestors' political demands that were constitutionally guaranteed (such as dignity) and Mubarak's corruption, which went against constitutional promises of combating exploitation.

From Mubarak to monarchs, Hamad of Bahrain presents a strong example of the socio-economic ruling bargain when his address is filtered through constitutional factors. While Hamad's speech makes few religious references, constitutional references to Bahrain's unity with the Gulf Cooperation Council are arresting. The wording within Bahrain's Constitution ostensibly holds Islamic unity and identification with the GCC as equal values, conjuring images of *Dar al-Islam* as a regional concept. The notion of regional legitimacy and international legitimacy are central themes in Hamad's address and the GCC is a conspicuous element of the Constitution's preface. There is therefore the prospect of Hamad augmenting regional and international legitimacy through Democratic

Approval linked to Bahrain's Constitution. Indeed, Hamad's speech plays to more than one audience, not only Bahrainis but the international community and the Gulf's Sunni monarchs. Though Hamad's essential conditions aimed at the global community and the GCC appear successful, the Constitution does not serve as a preparatory condition for Hamad's international legitimacy.

Hamad's address presents security as a regional affair; Bahrain is a lynchpin that keeps the GCC stable and thus grants it regional legitimacy (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). This notion returns to Ahram and Lusts's thoughts on international legitimacy and Peter's Political Cosmopolitanism or the belief that there can be an international legitimacy that is state-based and that states will cooperate in an international system that prioritizes the stability of sovereign states over the rights of citizens of individual states (Peter, 2016). However, Bahrain's Constitution guarantees security as an individual right for Bahrainis, not as a regional right to allow Bahrain to be a lynchpin in the security of the GCC (Constitute Project, 2002). The same goes for the concept of *Dar al-Islam*. If the Constitution defines security as an individual right exclusive to Bahrainis, not a regional right, then the concept of Islamic unity in the Constitution is separate from (domestic) security (*ibid.*).

Therefore, any attempts by Hamad to draw on constitutional legitimacy as a form of Democratic Approval to augment regional legitimacy and *Dar al-Islam* through GCC stability would be weak. This weakness is evidenced by the chants of Bahrainis who wanted the swiftest departure from Bahrain of the GCC's military arm, the Peninsula Shield Force, a militia not recognized by Bahrain's Constitution (*ibid.*).

As with his republican counterparts, Hamad has not enforced (social) "[…] justice, good and peace" for Bahrainis, as evidenced by crackdowns on unrest and GCC military intervention (*ibid.*). However, Hamad has maintained consistent provision of welfare, augmented by the Victims Compensation Fund and by the constitutional guarantee of

welfare provision for Bahrainis (*ibid.*). From this perspective, Hamad can be regarded as conforming to Weber's legality but only through welfare provision. He lacks the extensive Democratic Approval of his Jordanian counterpart but boasts the one luxury Jordan lacks: oil wealth. In a sense, Hamad represents a reverse of this thesis' hypothesis for monarchies: that they draw on Religious Legitimacy more than the ruling bargain due to their longevity and ties to traditional institutions and accepted socio-cultural norms. In Bahrain's case, the ruling bargain remains the defining feature of al-Khalifa non-democratic legitimacy, with nationals accepting such an arrangement, as illustrated by their claiming of compensation from the Victims Compensation Fund (Kingdom of Bahrain, 2012). For Bahrain, money talks.

For Jordan, it's still good to be king. Returning to the heart of the Levant, discourse analysis of constitutional elements in Abdullah's speech has revealed the ability of Abdullah II to survive through Democratic Approval that draws on constitutional legitimacy far more successfully than his republican counterparts. The Hashemite Abdullah is not afraid to remind Jordanians of his direct links to the Prophet Muhammad and the fact that descendants of his throne have "[…] offered many martyrs" (Abdullah II, October 2012). Religious Legitimacy and religious discourse are augmented by Jordan's Constitution. Article Two formalizes Islam as the state religion and Abdullah successfully uses Democratic Approval within the confines of the existing Constitution to argue against unrest from the religious context of *fitna* rather than resort to last-minute political pleas or self-serving constitutional amendments. While previous analysis in this chapter and Chapter 6 has argued that Ben Ali failed to provide security as a Beneficial Consequence by telling citizens to fend for themselves, Abdullah can draw on the Constitution and its statement that Jordanians have a duty to defend the homeland, while also presenting this duty as a pious commitment to prevent *fitna*. Abdullah thus transforms security from a Beneficial Consequence into a patriotic and religious duty of Jordanians and does so through constitutional legitimacy. Hence, security as an element of the utilitarian ruling

bargain is bolstered by the Constitution, partially contrasting the hypothesis assumption that republicans rather than monarchs will rely on the ruling bargain as a (main) source of non-democratic legitimacy. On the other hand, presenting security as a sacred duty of Jordanians to prevent *fitna* merges security with religion, the latter of which has been assumed by the thesis hypothesis as a strong factor of non-democratic legitimacy for monarchs.

A blessing for Abdullah no doubt must be the Constitution's cap on the ruling bargain, with Beneficial Consequences to be provided to citizens by the state "[…] within the limits of [the state's] possibilities" (*ibid.*). This cap on the ruling bargain allows Abdullah to use his address as a lengthy explanation of Jordan's socio-economic woes linked to regional turmoil, defending lack of employment and limited welfare (Abdullah II, October 2012). Therefore, the Constitution acts as a preparatory condition to deliver Abdullah's essential condition: Jordanians must accept a limited ruling bargain in exchange for (limited) political involvement (*ibid.*).

While such involvement may seem political and go against the hypothesis' assumption of monarchies drawing on religion via traditional institutions as part of non-democratic legitimacy, there are two factors to consider. First, Abdullah's language during his discourse transforms elections into a religious symbol, with voting taking place "under the dome of Parliament" (Abdullah II, October 2012). Hence, what appears to be a political invitation now has religious connotations. Second, Chapter 5 has discussed Jordan's history of tribal voting alongside 'defensive democratization', with Chapter 2 describing the Arab *majlis* as a rubber stamp institution that serves as a forum for democratic window-dressing. Therefore, Jordan's Parliament can be regarded as a traditional institution, with Abdullah drawing on religion and traditionalism, bolstered by Abdullah's reliance on the Constitution for Democratic Approval as a method of deflecting blame (Tobin, 2012). From such a perspective, Abdullah's invitation to vote actually maintains the hypothesis' assumption that monarchs will rely on traditional institutions for non-

democratic legitimacy. This interpretation is augmented by the Constitution's immunity for Jordan's head of state, emphasizing that Abdullah's revolving door of elected politicians is constitutionally sanctioned while providing him aloofness from democratic accountability. This is a key difference between Mubarak and Ben Ali: while both may blame external factors for unrest and avoid constitutional references, Abdullah can augment his inculpability through constitutional legitimacy as it guarantees him an immunity his republican counterparts do not enjoy.

Mubarak's paternalism was apparent in Chapter 6. However, Abdullah's references to family and equal 'brothers and sisters' takes an ominous tone when filtered through Jordan's Constitution. If family is defined by the Constitution as loyalty to the Hashemites and piety, then Abdullah's references to his family can be regarded as less equal than paternal. The state defines family and Abdullah's address draws on this constitutional definition to remind his brothers and sisters that good Jordanians recognize his religious credentials and are loyal to monarchy, avoiding *fitna* by not spreading unrest. This protracted image of family in Abdullah's discourse is matched by constitutional definitions of family, strengthening the hypothesis' assumptions that monarchs will rely on ties to traditional institutions to bolster their rule. In Abdullah's speech and the Constitution, religion is intertwined with concepts of family and the socio-cultural norm in Jordan of familial rule under the Hashemites.

Ben Ali and Mubarak failed to address human dignity, the driver of the Arab Spring. Jordan's monarch avoids this pitfall through a Constitution that defines what dignity is. Dignity is a pious family loyal to the Hashemites (Constitute Project, 2011). As defined by the state, dignity and religion are part of 'the good Jordanian family' along with patriotism. Any good Jordanian cannot maintain their religion and dignity by going against a descendant of their Prophet (Abdullah II, October 2012).

As a monarchical case study, Abdullah conforms strongly to the thesis hypothesis that royals will draw on Religious Legitimacy more than the ruling bargain due to their longevity and ties to traditional institutions and accepted socio-cultural norms. What is interesting about Abdullah is that he draws on constitutional legitimacy to both augment Religious Legitimacy but also to minimize the ruling bargain, resorting to the 'defensive democratization' Jordan is known for. As a political leader who draws on Democratic Approval via the existing Constitution rather than self-approved amendments, Abdullah presents a successful case of Weber's legality. At the same time, his success in drawing on constitutional legitimacy is aided by constitutional immunity from "[…] every liability and responsibility", a luxury his republican counterparts do not share (Constitute Project, 2011). Such immunity exists amid a backdrop of strong religious credentials and fears of regional instability that encourage the status quo.

An overview of the four case studies and their speeches, understood within the context of each respective Constitution illustrates that only one out of the four case studies strongly upholds the thesis hypothesis. Jordan's Constitution and Abdullah's discourse confirm the notion that Religious Legitimacy and traditional ties are heavily drawn upon by monarchs when defending non-democratic legitimacy. However, the same cannot be said for Bahrain, in which the socio-economic ruling bargain defines non-democratic legitimacy. Welfare is drawn upon by Hamad in discourse responding to the Arab Spring and is a constitutional right, augmenting the ruling bargain more so than Religious Legitimacy and traditional ties. While this result contrasts with the hypothesis assumption that Religious Legitimacy and traditionalism is drawn upon heavily by monarchs when justifying non-democratic rule, it comes as no surprise in the context of Bahrain's oil wealth. Finally, the republican case studies of Tunisia and Egypt reveal weak ties between discourse and Constitutions. Tunisia's Ben Ali could not draw heavily upon political factors from Tunisia's Constitution without revealing that he had not maintained the overwhelming political values of the Constitution such as social justice and equality. Tunisia's

Constitution hence does not augment the hypothesis assumption that republicans will rely on a socio-economic and apolitical ruling bargain as their main source of non-democratic legitimacy, as the Constitution contains democratic and related political elements, including a separation of powers. The political nature of Tunisia's Constitution is also reflected in Egypt's Constitution, which guarantees individual human dignity and freedom from exploitation for citizens. Again, Mubarak's ability to draw on political factors from the Constitution in his discourse during unrest was limited, as Egypt's Constitution does not formally support a socio-economic ruling bargain. The Constitution's brief reference to subsidies was not echoed by Mubarak in his speech, a reminder that, as with Ben Ali, protests were politicized amid a backdrop of corruption.

Chapter 7's analysis of constitutional factors in select speeches has expanded on Chapter 6's discourse analysis to explore how non-democratic legitimacy may be formalized and to what extent such factors are drawn on by Arab leaders in discourse justifying non-democratic rule in the face of the Arab Spring. This approach has deepened the original knowledge contribution of this thesis by revealing that constitutional legitimacy can augment the socio-economic ruling bargain and Religious Legitimacy for Bahrain's Hamad and Jordan's Abdullah, respectively but fails to strengthen non-democratic justifications of republicans, who resorted to tacitly admitting corruption and avoiding references to a Constitution that formalized democratic factors (Ben Ali) or attempting to use Democratic Approval to push constitutional amendments (Mubarak). The fact that non-democratic factors are often lacking in republican constitutions illustrates that republicans struggle more than monarchs to draw on Weber's legality and may have little to no constitutional basis for upholding an apolitical ruling bargain. Although Egypt's 1971 Constitution mentions subsidies, Mubarak's failure to draw on this factor and reliance on Democratic Approval through constitutional amendments coupled with Ben Ali's desperate political offers, tacit admission of corruption and inability to refer to Tunisia's Constitution for his right to rule illustrates that for republicans, non-democratic

legitimacy through constitutional factors is weak. From such a perspective, the hypothesis that monarchies will draw on Religious Legitimacy, tradition and Weber's legality while republicans draw on a socio-economic ruling bargain and Weber's legality has been partially disproved. Monarchies seem able to employ constitutional legitimacy with greater success in their discourse than republican counterparts, using Weber's legality to bolster Religious Legitimacy and traditionalism (Jordan's Abdullah) but also the ruling bargain (Bahrain's Hamad), the latter aspect assumed to be exclusive to republicans. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, republicans failed to uphold ruling bargains during their rule, leading to weak arguments when forced to defend non-democratic legitimacy and limited ability to draw on constitutional factors.

Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and summarizes how successfully this thesis has addressed the hypothesis: that republics will emphasize the socio-economic ruling bargain as the main source of their non-democratic legitimacy in response to the Arab Spring, due to most republics being the result of coups rather than established familial rule. Hence, many republican rulers have weaker ties to traditional (religious) institutes and popular support and rely on a ruling bargain to maintain legitimacy. Monarchs, on the other hand, will draw on Religious Legitimacy more than the ruling bargain due to their longevity and ties to traditional institutions and accepted socio-cultural norms. Chapter 8 also addresses how successfully the thesis has answered the research question: What are the factors Arab leaders use in discourse justifying their rule within the context of the Arab Spring? To what extent does this discourse support a (socio-economic) ruling bargain and Religious Legitimacy? Chapter 8 draws on the analysis of Chapters 6 and 7, discussing these findings within the context of the hypothesis and research question being successfully addressed.

8. Conclusion

This thesis has examined non-democratic legitimacy within the context of the Arab Spring through discourse analysis in the cases of Jordan, Bahrain, Egypt and Tunisia. The purpose of such an approach has been to address the research question: What are the factors Arab leaders use in discourse justifying their rule within the context of the Arab Spring? To what extent does this discourse support a (socio-economic) ruling bargain and Religious Legitimacy? The discourse analysis in Chapter 6 reveals that Jordan and Bahrain as monarchical case studies vividly illustrate Religious Legitimacy and a socio-economic ruling bargain, respectively. Discourse from Jordan's Abdullah II in response to protests highlights Jordan's socio-economic struggles as opposed to a socio-economic ruling bargain while drawing heavily on religious imagery, language and Abdullah's links to the Prophet. Conversely, Bahrain's Hamad treads carefully on religion due to Bahrain's sectarianism and instead emphasizes Bahrain's status as a lynchpin state for Gulf stability while reiterating welfare and offering financial compensation through the Victims Compensation Fund. Hamad's discourse hence emphasizes the socio-economic ruling bargain.

Republican discourse does not necessarily justify a socio-economic ruling bargain, with weak references to subsidies from Ben Ali and Mubarak. However, these former presidents-for-life do emphasize Beneficial Consequences such as security and stability, in addition to other material benefits such as education. Nonetheless, in both cases there is a weak argument for a successful socio-economic ruling bargain, as emphasized by Ben Ali's last-minute reforms (implying that his rule must be politicized). Mubarak, on the other hand, engages heavily in Democratic Approval, with discourse justifying his rule turning to formal proceduralism, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Either way, such discourse fails to strongly support a socio-economic ruling bargain. It is ironic, however, that Mubarak's discourse draws on concepts of *Dar al-Islam* and thus partially supports the notion of Religious Legitimacy.

Chapter 7 has analyzed the constitutions of the four cases and their connection to the speeches examined in the respective case study and revealed limited use of constitutional factors to bolster discourse justifying non-democratic rule across most case studies. Ironically, Jordan's Abdullah draws heavily on constitutional authority to enjoy immunity from political accountability as head of state. Furthermore, he is able to draw on the Constitution's definition of dignity and religion to emphasize his right to rule over his fellow Muslims and to attack those opposing him as engaging in un-Islamic *fitna*. Bahrain's Hamad draws on constitutional endorsement of the socio-economic ruling bargain, as the Victims Compensation Fund can be regarded as coming atop constitutional expectations of welfare. Hamad's attempts to link international legitimacy, religion and (regional) security to Bahrain's Constitution are weak, however, as the Constitution guarantees security and religious unity for Bahrainis and not for the Gulf region.

Egypt's Mubarak engaged heavily in Democratic Approval rather than drawing on constitutional elements to justify non-democratic rule. Brief references to Egypt's dignity in Mubarak's address partially echo the Constitution's mention of dignity. However, Mubarak's speech did not reflect the Constitution's full context of individual dignity and social justice. Like his Tunisian counterpart, Mubarak cannot draw extensively on constitutional elements without reminding the masses of his failure to uphold democratic values rather than impose non-democratic authority. Finally, Tunisia's Ben Ali made few references to Tunisia's Constitution in his address, as doing so may have acted as an indirect reminder of the democratic rather than non-democratic elements Ben Ali failed to uphold.

As discussed across this thesis, existing literature on the Arab Spring has addressed the role of social media in mobilizing protests (Bruns, Burgess and Highfield, 2013), the role of youth in popular resistance movements (Webb, 2017) and the notion of democratic transition post-Arab Spring (Paust, 2013). However, such literature has not addressed the notion of non-democratic legitimacy, including through not only a socio-economic ruling

bargain but Religious Legitimacy, as discussed by Bulliet. Further, this thesis has enhanced original knowledge contribution through a two-part discourse analysis. Chapter 6 uses discourse analysis to examine select speeches given by leaderships in response to the Arab Spring, with attention paid to how such speeches may emphasize divine rule, the role of religion and related political factors of non-democratic legitimacy, including not only welfare and a socio-economic ruling bargain but even domestic and regional security as justification for non-democratic power. Chapter 7 presents a discourse analysis of select constitutions, with analysis focusing on whether non-democratic political factors of legitimacy (including religion) are formalized in such constitutions. This focus then extends to understanding whether select speeches from Chapter 6 draw upon constitutional elements of non-democratic legitimacy to further explore the notion that non-democratic rulers may attempt to rely on Weber's legality as a source of legitimacy, whereas in the past such rulers (especially republicans) may have drawn heavily on charisma.

This two-part analysis was a structured attempt to address the thesis hypothesis: that republics will emphasize the socio-economic ruling bargain as the main source of their non-democratic legitimacy in response to the Arab Spring, due to most republics being the result of coups rather than established familial rule. Hence, many republican rulers have weaker ties to traditional (religious) institutes and popular support and rely on a ruling bargain to maintain legitimacy. Monarchs, on the other hand, will draw on Religious Legitimacy more than the ruling bargain due to their longevity and ties to traditional institutions and accepted socio-cultural norms.

The main findings of this thesis can be split twofold: discussing monarchies, it would seem the ruling bargain and related socio-economic benefits remain central in oil states as a response to the Arab Spring. The Bahrain monarchy did not resort to religion but compensation when faced with unrest, while Abdullah of Jordan did conform strongly to the hypothesis assumption that monarchs would resort to Religious Legitimacy. However, Abdullah's use of religion can be placed within the context of Jordan's oil poverty and

reliance on external aid, while Bahrain's sectarianism and moderate oil reserves encouraged financial sweeteners and minimized reference to religion by the ruling Sunni al-Khalifas presiding over a Shia'a majority. Hence, the religious element of this hypothesis has been partially proved to be correct but only if the ability to distribute material benefits is limited.

Analysis of Ben Ali's and Mubarak's speeches may have partially confirmed a link between republicans and the ruling bargain through subsidies. However, Ben Ali's desperate promises of (political) reform and tacit admission to corruption show a weak connection of his regime to a legitimate ruling bargain and further implies, as explored in Chapter 7, that failed ruling bargains may require regimes to politicize their social contracts in order to maintain legitimacy. Mubarak's speech also connected somewhat with the ruling bargain but emphasized external security threats and state protection from those threats as a Beneficial Consequence of his rule. This element can thus be regarded as feeding into the thesis hypothesis on republicans but allowing the ruling bargain to not be purely socio-economic. Further, Mubarak's use of *Dar al-Islam* partially contrasts the hypothesis assumption that drawing on religion is the exclusive domain of monarchs.

Examining each case study's speech within the context of constitutional factors shows that monarchies can draw on such factors to augment Religious Legitimacy and traditionalism when welfare distribution is limited, while the ruling bargain may actually be constitutionally guaranteed for oil states. This fact contrasts the hypothesis assumption that the ruling bargain would be reserved for republicans while also confirming that Religious Legitimacy is tied to monarchy (when material resources are limited). On the other hand, constitutional factors in republican case studies were lacking in analyzed speeches due to Tunisia's and Egypt's respective Constitutions formalizing democratic as opposed to non-democratic elements. The focus of both Constitutions on social justice, exploitation prevention and dignity prevented republicans from augmenting their (weak) justifications

of non-democratic rule with constitutional legitimacy, contrasting with the hypothesis that republicans will rely on the ruling bargain.

At the same time, the limitations of this thesis must be acknowledged. First, it is conspicuous that Syria is not addressed in this thesis. This absence is noticeable no doubt due to Syria's ongoing civil war as of writing. In addition, it is worth noting that, unlike his fellow republicans or monarchical counterparts, Assad used the term 'Arab Spring' directly in a 2014 'inauguration' address. Referring to the apparent voter turnout Assad insisted that the resilience of his supporters "[…] constituted the official obituary of what was falsely called the Arab Spring" (Voltaire Network, 2014). Nonetheless, this thesis selected four specific case studies to understand whether non-democratic legitimacy was used in discourse by leaderships responding to the Arab Spring, with the intent of addressing the hypothesis of republicans relying on ruling bargains and monarchs relying on Religious Legitimacy. These four case studies constitute an even split between republican and monarchical case studies. Further, main analysis examines two case studies of overthrown republicans and two case studies of monarchs who have kept their thrones. Hence, the addition of Syria would have affected the parity of analyzed case studies and also created an anomaly, as Syria's Assad has not been officially overthrown but remains entrenched in a protracted civil war.

Another limitation of this thesis has been the analysis of English rather than Arabic texts. The aim of the thesis has been to understand justification of non-democratic legitimacy through public discourse by specific Arab leaderships in response to the Arab Spring. The select speeches and constitutions are hence primary sources. However, such discourse has been analyzed in translated English editions rather than the original Arabic. For Arabic editions, the analyzed speech by Jordan's Abdullah II is available in its original Arabic as a video issued by official government sources (RHC JO, 2012). Finally, the address of Bahrain's Hamad is also available as an Arabic transcript from the same source as its English counterpart (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011). It is worth

mentioning that three out of four Arabic transcripts or videos hail from official or otherwise objective sources or from sources that match their English counterparts: Mubarak's Arabic address is available as a transcript from BBC Arabic, with the English translation also from the BBC. Hamad's Arabic speech is available as a text from the same source as the English translation, while Abdullah's Arabic speech is available from the Royal Hashemite Court as a video, with the analyzed English translation also released by the Royal Hashemite Court. Returning to republics, this author has found one video source of Ben Ali's speech (LyanOran, 2011) and one transcript source of said speech (Babnet, 2011). There is also an audio recording of Ben Ali's final address in the original Arabic (Abdulsalam, 2011). For Mubarak's final address, this author has identified several video sources (Mubarak TV, 2014, Omonoganees, 2011) and two transcript sources (Al Jazeera, 2011, BBC Arabic, 2011).The fact that these Arabic sources are from the same outlets as their English counterparts strengthens the validity and likely accuracy of the analyzed English translations.

Although Ben Ali's original Arabic transcript is not from an official government source, this is unsurprising as he was overthrown. However, the author has read the Arabic transcript and listened to the video and audio sources to ensure that these sources match the analyzed English translation by ensuring that key phrases in the English transcript are found in the same passages of the Arabic address. As discussed in Chapter 6, Tunisia's Ben Ali attempted to use his final speech to quell unrest by speaking to the masses "in the language of Tunisians" (Ben Ali, 2011). This passage is a reference to Ben Ali's speech being in the local Tunisian dialect rather than the formal Arabic known as *Fusha*. Hence, analyzing the linguistic elements of Ben Ali's speech being delivered in the Tunisian dialect (with the speeches of other case studies in *Fusha*) may have enhanced the original knowledge generation of this thesis further. However, the diversity of Arabic dialects and the lack of a structured writing system for such dialects presents a challenge for a non-native speaker to measure select speeches at the advanced linguistic level required for

discourse analysis. In addition, because constitutions are written in *Fusha* while related speeches may have been given in a specific dialect, for reasons of parity analysis has been conducted using English translations of speeches and constitutions.

Moreover, it would be most interesting to have attempted to understand if such public discourse matched what the analyzed leaderships truly thought of the Arab Spring and non-democratic legitimacy. However, such an approach would require direct access to each respective leader. Such access for interviews would have enhanced the project's original knowledge generation but would be unrealistic due to access limitations.

As with the speeches of each case study, constitutions of each case study were also analyzed in English in order to facilitate in-depth analysis. The author has attempted to ensure that the original Arabic versions of all constitutions exist and match their English counterparts. Jordan's 1952 Constitution with 2011 amendments was used as an English translation for Chapter 7's investigation. An Arabic edition has been located from the same publisher (Constitute Project, 2011), also based on the 1952 Constitution of Jordan with amendments up to 2011. Again, there is a direct match between the English and Arabic versions. Bahrain's 2002 Constitution in English was used for the final case study in Chapter 7's investigation of constitutional factors of legitimacy. An Arabic edition has been located from a governmental source (Kingdom of Bahrain Shura Council, 2002). Despite the different sources, the Arabic edition is also from the same year as the English edition. Given that neither the English nor Arabic edition have any amendments and the fact that the author has searched the Arabic edition's preamble for matching phrases from the English edition, it is safe to assume that the analyzed English edition of the Constitution matches its Arabic counterpart.

For Tunisia's Constitution, the English edition is a 2010 publication that acted as the final edition of the original 1959 Constitution, including amendments up to 2008. A matching Arabic edition has been found, also as a 2010 edition and released by the same publisher as

the English edition (Official Printing Office of the Republic of Tunisia, 2010). Lastly, for the Egyptian Constitution case study, the 1971 English edition of the Constitution was used, reflecting amendments up to 2007. The Arabic edition of this Constitution has also been located, matching the inception year of 1971 and the final amendments of 2007 (Al Jazeera, 2019). It is worth noting that the publisher of the Arabic edition (Al Jazeera) differs from the publisher of the English edition (Palataurus Center of Studies). However, both texts are copies of the 1971 Constitution with amendments up to 2007 and hence match.

Finally, as the Arab Spring can be regarded as an ongoing event that is now pressuring newly elected or created governments in, inter alia, Tunisia and Egypt, it is worth mentioning that this thesis addresses a limited period of the Arab Spring, namely 2010-13 and has not analyzed political events related to the Arab Spring beyond this timeline, with the thesis itself being written in 2019. This limitation can be linked back to the specific case studies and the thesis' attempt to understand non-democratic legitimacy in the face of unrest that peaked with the overthrow of decades-long governments (Tunisia's Ben Ali and Mubarak's Egypt) or that saw protests diminish at a time when it was expected that the Arab Spring would spread through a domino effect (Jordan's Abdullah and Bahrain's Hamad). This approach of a limited timeline again feeds into the hypothesis' focus on monarchies surviving through traditionalism and Religious Legitimacy and republicans emphasizing the ruling bargain. The need for parity in analyzing overthrown republics and surviving monarchies within the same timeframe explains why governments that were formed after the end of republicans-for-life have not been analyzed. Further and as mentioned in Chapter 7, as some new governments may be regarded as politicizing the ruling bargain, using newly formed regimes as case studies would not connect with the main aim of this thesis, which is to examine non-democratic and effectively apolitical legitimacy within the context of the Arab Spring.

In addition to generating original knowledge by examining non-democratic legitimacy within the context of the Arab Spring, this thesis has demonstrated structured use of diverse theories. Peter's Political Legitimacy has been utilized alongside Weber's sources of legitimacy and Bulliet's Religious Legitimacy to create a new theoretical framework for case study analysis. Peter's Beneficial Consequences adopts a utilitarian approach to understanding how material benefits can be used as a measure of non-democratic political legitimacy. However, Peter's original theory cannot consider religion as a Beneficial Consequence. It is for this reason that Peter's Political Legitimacy was merged with Bulliet's Religious Legitimacy to treat religion as a Beneficial Consequence and part of the utilitarian factors of non-democratic political legitimacy. Utilitarianism as a form of political legitimacy has been discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 and confirmed in Chapter 4, and this thesis has taken a utilitarian approach to political legitimacy. It was hence necessary to keep Peter's theory as the dominant framework, with Bulliet's Religious Legitimacy absorbed into Peter's Beneficial Consequences and its utilitarian approach.

The need for a utilitarian approach to political legitimacy explains why Bulliet's Religious Legitimacy did not become the dominant theoretical framework, despite the significance of religion to the politics of the Arab world. Nonetheless, the significance of religion and Islam's political role has been addressed throughout this thesis and as a key aspect of main analysis. Hence, this thesis has merged Western theoretical models with non-Western case studies and attempted to ensure that religion is understood as a political factor unique to the politics of the Arab world. This approach emphasizes the importance of religion intertwined with politics, a combination significant to the MENA region. The key original contribution of this thesis to knowledge is its exploration of non-democratic regime justification within the context of the Arab Spring. In the process of exploring regime justification, this thesis has created a novel theoretical model by merging Weber, Peter and Bulliet as a framework that explains non-democratic legitimacy and treats religion as utilitarian. Moreover, Chapter 7's investigation, which examines relevant constitutions has

encouraged a further turn to Weber's sources of legitimacy. This investigation thus allows the thesis to deepen its theoretical approach with a third theory that is connected to the speeches of each case study to address the notion that leaders who relied on charisma at the beginning of their rule are resorting to Democratic Approval and related formalities that can be linked to constitutional legitimacy (or legality to use Weber's term).

Future research into the Arab Spring can build on this thesis. As discussed in Chapter 7, findings from the main analysis have led to the prospect of an extended hypothesis: republics will emphasize the socio-economic ruling bargain as the main source of their non-democratic legitimacy in response to the Arab Spring, due to most republics being the result of coups rather than established familial rule. However, failure to justify non-democratic rule through tangible Beneficial Consequences should encourage such regimes to politicize the ruling bargain in a step-by-step manner, perhaps akin to Jordan's 'defensive democratization' rather than offer last-minute reforms that emphasize a regime's weakness and knowledge of corruption. The limited scope of this thesis has prevented such an extended investigation into post-Arab Spring governments. Therefore, any research project building on this thesis can consider the political legitimacy of governments that have replaced regimes overthrown during the Arab Spring. Such a project could examine unrest during the era of post-Arab Spring governments and official discourse from such leaderships as a response to unrest, with the aim of understanding to what extent political legitimacy has become more politicized.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Remarks by His Majesty during a Gathering with National Public Figures

In the name of God, the Most Merciful, the Compassionate

My brothers and sisters,

I would like to welcome you all to your home, the home of all Jordanians.

I wanted to meet with you today for a sincere talk at this particular stage in our beloved country's history, in order to highlight our reform roadmap.

I fully realise, my brothers and sisters, that every modernisation and change initiative is accompanied by anxiety and uncertainty. This is natural. Popular demands over the last year and a half have focused on enhancing citizens' rights to participate effectively in the decisions that impact them and their future, and I am committed to guaranteeing this right for all.

The trajectory of the political reform roadmap under which this phase was launched was agreed upon a year and a half ago. It included constitutional reforms to make the people a true partner in the political process, and its most notable components were the Constitutional Court, the Independent Elections Commission, laws governing political life such as the Elections and Political Parties Laws, in addition to holding early elections, which will bring a new Parliament and pave the way to piloting parliamentary government.

Here, I would like to assure you that our country is on the right track towards the reform we aspire to, and I would like to reiterate that we will have a new Parliament by the new year, following parliamentary elections that will be conducted with the highest degree of integrity and transparency.

And as I stated before, my message to you and to all political parties and forces is this: If

you want to change Jordan for the better, there is a chance, and that chance is through the upcoming elections, and there is a way, and that way is through the next Parliament.

As for those who want additional reforms or want to develop the Elections Law, they can work from under the dome of Parliament and through the ballot boxes, which are the true representative of the will of the people.

My brothers and sisters,

My responsibility, under our constitutional monarchy system, is to be committed to the outcomes that achieved consensus through our constitutional process and to respect the opinion of the majority, as I am for all segments of society, be it the 'herak,' the opposition, or the silent majority, and I regard them all as working in the service of our country.

It is citizens' vote in this election that will determine the make-up of the next Parliament and the next parliamentary government, thus determining the policies and decisions that will affect the life of every citizen. Therefore, citizens must not allow anyone to deprive them of their right to vote and affect change.

Political parties and lists should organise themselves as quickly as possible, build their electoral platforms for the next four years and explain to voters what policies and additional reforms they seek. To cite a few examples:

How will candidates, political parties, and lists address the challenges of poverty and unemployment? How will they tackle the challenges of debt and budget deficit?

What is the best tax reform?

How will they further develop the voting system?

How will they meet the water and energy challenges of Jordan?

How can the quality of services such as health, education and transport be improved?

For citizens have the right to get clear answers to these and many other questions, through practical programmes that are realistic and not just theoretical, so that voters can make the best choice at the ballot boxes. For the larger the participation, the greater will the change be.

The next Parliament is the gate to comprehensive reform. It is the institution constitutionally mandated to continue achieving true change and overcoming national challenges, by consolidating a democratic approach, the culture of dialogue and the highest standards of constructive debate.

My brothers and sisters,

It has become necessary to distinguish between national constructive opposition and positive 'herak', on the one hand, and negative opposition and 'herak', on the other hand, which do not serve the reform path, nor the country's future.

Constructive opposition and positive 'herak' play a legitimate and needed role, while negative 'herak', with empty slogans and attempts to incite chaos and fitna (sedition) are rejected by Jordanians. We should always remember that catchy slogans are not the solution, and backward and radical intolerant mentalities cannot be trusted with the future of our children.

Let us pause and think of the slogans that have been raised against corruption. I agree with you on the need to counter corruption. Enormous efforts are being exerted to uproot and deter corruption, and cases are currently before the courts and the Anti-Corruption Commission. These institutions must be allowed enough time for justice to take its course.

But, regrettably, there is another category of such slogans, based on personalisation, defamation, slander, and prejudgment, which results into trial by public opinion at the expense of justice.

As for the budget deficit and public debt, let us remember that we used to receive oil from

Iraq at subsidised prices until 2003, at less than US$30/barrel. Today, we buy oil at over US$100/barrel.

The increase in deficit and public debt was previously within reasonable ranges, rising annually as a result of steady rises in oil and food prices, the state's initiatives to raise salaries and pensions to protect the purchasing power of our citizens, continue subsidies for some basic commodities, and invest in improving education and health services as well as infrastructure. These all contributed to a reasonable increase of debt in absolute terms.

But, in addition to all this, and over the past two years particularly, there was an unprecedented increase in debt and deficit due to disruptions in the supply of Egyptian gas, which cost us till now around US$4 billion in additional annual deficit and debt for the past two years. Even the support from our brothers in Saudi Arabia during the last year - and we are extremely grateful to them - barely covered the additional deficit resulting from the disruption in Egyptian gas supply in 2011.

Therefore, we have to be objective and uphold the truth when we interpret things, and be honest in our words.

We believe in the opposition's right to be an active and genuine partner in the political process, steering away from opportunism and empty slogans, and from manipulating economic hardships and people's sentiments. But no group is allowed to claim that they hold a monopoly over the truth and that they represent all Jordanians.

The opposition's role, as I envisage it, is to have a vision and practical programmes, to participate in Parliament, so that it can carry out its legislative mandate and oversight role in monitoring parliamentary governments.

My brothers and sisters,

A small group of those in top decision-making posts, responsible for policies, programmes and temporary laws, some of whom have even benefitted from providing consultancy and

legal services, we see them today criticise policies and decisions and defend their experiences and performances, although they are the ones who formulated, at their complete discretion, these same programmes, policies and laws that they are today criticising. So does this mean that when they are in a position of responsibility, everything is alright and rosy, but when they are out of these positions, everything becomes wrong and bleak?

Let us speak frankly today about some slogans raised by a limited number of protesters - "overthrow the regime" - and it is regrettable that some very limited number of the 'herak' protestors have raised this slogan. Let us pause and cross the t's and dot the i's.

First, what is the "regime"? The regime is the state in all its institutions and agencies, under the umbrella of the Constitution. The regime is the values and the principles these institutions and agencies are founded upon. The regime is also the cadres who operate such institutions, which actually encompass all segments and components of our Jordanian society. No one has a monopoly over the components of the state. The regime is the organisations and citizens. Every individual in this society is part of the regime. This country, which only relies on its people and their determination, has managed to overcome the impossible through unforgettable sacrifices. This Jordanian state is not the accomplishment of a single individual, or a single entity or party - it is the cumulative achievement of every Jordanian across generations.

If the intention behind these slogans was to undermine the Hashemite umbrella of this country, then let me be absolutely clear: Governing for us Hashemites was never at any point a gain that we sought, but rather a responsibility, a duty and a sacrifice that we have been carrying out in the service of this nation and in defence of its causes and interests – a cause to which we have offered many martyrs. Moreover, governing was never for us about holding a monopoly over authority, nor about power and its tools, but about supporting state institutions run by Jordanians from all segments of society, according to

the provisions of our Constitution.

This is the path we have adhered to since the time of our great-grandfather, the founder of the nation, and to this very day.

As for me, personally, Abdullah ibn Al Hussein, I will continue true to this path. Being king to me is not a gain I seek, it is a responsibility, "for only to Allah belongs all dominion." What I cherish the most is the honour of being a descendant of our forefather Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). After this honourable lineage and what it entails in terms of commitments, I am honoured to be a Jordanian and to share with this noble and genuine people their stances and great sacrifices. After this, comes my duty to shoulder my responsibilities and foster the interests of my people and my beloved country. Al Hussein, may God bless his soul, taught me and taught us all that pleasing God and serving this country are our sole purpose in this life. You all know that I am the son of the Jordan Armed Forces and the Arab Army - this Army that is made of all elements of our Jordanian society. In this Army, I have spent my youth, between Zarqa, Qatraneh, the Badia, and every other place in Jordan. Hence, I know my people, I have lived amongst them like one of them, I know their concerns, their ambitions and since the first day that I was honoured to serve in the Arab Army, I have dedicated myself to the service of my country, which deserves the best from each of us, and all that we can give.

My brothers and sisters,

Sons and daughters of the one large Jordanian family,

I call on you all to take part in the upcoming elections, so that we can achieve the desired change and reform, and to stand united in the face of those who try to undermine the achievements of the Jordanian state or threaten its unity, or thwart its progress, or jeopardise the country's security and stability.

The path is open in front of all, including those in the opposition, to be in the next

Parliament. The path of political participation remains open to all segments of society, to all those who are truly concerned about Jordan's interests, in deeds and not only in words. I'm certain that the future that we seek for our people and future generations will be bright, God willing.

My brothers and sisters,

As we are about to celebrate Eid Al Adha, I would like to congratulate you, the sons and daughters of our beloved Jordan, on this blessed occasion.

Kullu 'am wantum bikheir.

God's peace and mercy be upon you.

Source: *Remarks by His Majesty King Abdullah II during a Gathering with National Public Figures, Amman, Jordan*. Available at: http://kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/speeches/view/id/507/videoDisplay/0.html (accessed 21 October 2016. Inaccessible since 2019, saved as a pdf by author)

Appendix 2: Speech of HM King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa on 23rd November

Your Highnesses, Excellencies,

Professor Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, Chair of the Commission,

Distinguished Commissioners,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Distinguished Guests,

Having heard the important speech of the Chair of the Independent Commission of Inquiry, we extend our sincere thanks to the Chair and the Commissioners, as well as their staff, for their remarkable efforts. You merit our deep appreciation. Your Report is of profound value to us. By taking to heart your findings and recommendations, the people of Bahrain can make this day one that will be remembered in the history of this nation.

Your Report deals with controversial matters of importance. You have sought to establish the true facts of a period of painful unrest which has affected all of us. You have understood the unprecedented challenges faced by our authorities as they confronted relentless provocation, from hostile sources both inside and outside the country. You have recognised the need for our authorities re-establish public order in the face of violence and intimidation against ordinary people as well as against the essential institutions of this nation. At the same time, you have also identified serious shortcomings on the part of some organs of our Government, particularly in failing to prevent instances of excessive force and of the mistreatment of persons placed under arrest.

Some may wonder why we asked a commission of foreign experts to examine the events of February and March 2011 and their subsequent ramifications. The answer is that any Government which has a sincere desire for reform and progress understands the benefit of objective and constructive criticism.

There are many examples of this around the world. For example, in Europe, we see that the leading national governments are routinely criticised by external institutions which they have themselves created. The European Court of Human Rights frequently sanctions European States for violations of human rights. Leading European powers, notwithstanding their long traditions of human rights, have been condemned in literally hundreds of cases for denial of justice, and for the torture and ill treatment of detainees.

And yet the governments of these countries do not denounce the European Court. They do not protest or boycott the judges who have criticised them. To the contrary, they are grateful to the Court for having identified the ways in which they must improve if they are to be in harmony with international law and morality. Nor does the international community conclude that these are oppressive governments. They are seen to follow a path of wisdom, acknowledging that they benefit from neutral investigations and from trusting their own capacity to use criticism constructively in the interest of their people.

The question is then, Members of the Commission: what will we do with your Report, so that we derive maximum benefit from it?

The answer is that we are determined, God willing, to ensure that the painful events our beloved nation has just experienced are not repeated, but that we learn from them, and use our new insights as a catalyst for positive change.

We do not want, ever again, to see our country paralysed by intimidation and sabotage. We do not want, ever again, to learn that our expatriate work-force, which makes such valuable contributions to the development of our nation, has been repeatedly terrorised by racist gangs. We do not want, ever again, to see
civilians tried anywhere else but in the ordinary courts. We do not want, ever again, to experience the murder of policemen and the persecution of their
families for the work they do in protecting us all; nor do we want, ever again, to discover that any of our law enforcement personnel have mistreated anyone.

Therefore, we must reform our laws so that they are consistent with international standards to which Bahrain is committed by treaties. Even before receiving your Report, we have introduced proposals to amend our laws to give greater protection to the valuable right of free speech; and to expand the definition of "torture" to ensure that all forms of ill treatment are sanctioned by our criminal laws. Both of these proposals would place our laws in full conformity with international human rights standards. We have addressed

issues of due process in criminal trials, in particular for the medical professionals who are now being re-tried in ordinary courts. We have reviewed, and are continuing to review, the circumstances of job dismissals and expulsions from educational institutions. In addition to retrials and reinstatement, affected persons have access to a range of remedies, including the newly established Victims Compensation Fund.

And of course, as I said on the day your Commission was established, we do not tolerate the mistreatment of detainees and prisoners. We are dismayed to find that it has occurred, as your Report has found, and we will not accept any excuse based on national exceptionalism.

Distinguished Members of the Commission,

Your Report is lengthy and detailed. We must study it with the care it deserves. As a first step, a working group of members of the Government will immediately be asked to conduct an in-depth reflection on your findings and recommendations. This working group will then urgently propose concrete responses to your recommendations. We intend to waste no time in benefitting from your work. Your Report provides an historic opportunity for Bahrain to deal with matters that are both serious and urgent. Officials who have not been up to their task must be held accountable, and be replaced. Above all, we must conceive and implement reforms that satisfy all segments of our population. That is the only way to achieve reconciliation, to heal the fractures in our society. In order to ensure that there is no return to unacceptable practices once the Commission has left Bahrain, we have decided to engage international organizations and eminent individuals to assist and advise our law enforcement agencies, and to improve their procedures.

We trust that all will understand that this day, this day which turns a new page of history, has been made possible by the grace of God and because we have had the confidence to resort to an objective and impartial body. To repeat: the nations of Europe are routinely held accountable before the European Court in Strasbourg. That Court, through its

hundreds of judgments, has set the standards for modern international human rights. The same is true of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Costa Rica. The whole world benefits from the jurisprudence of these Courts. Surely, this shows us that there is something missing. Surely, the Arab nations, with our ancient transitions of fairness and justice, also have something to contribute. Surely, we too need to show that our officials are subject to a higher law, and that we can be proud of our traditions of respect for human rights.

Bahrain was an immediate supporter of the Arab Charter of Human Rights 15 years ago, but in truth this text has not created a system like those of Europe and the Americas. I will propose to our fellow Arab states that we now move concretely toward the creation of an Arab Court of Human Rights to take its proper place on the international stage.

The Kingdom of Bahrain assumes its international responsibilities seriously. Indeed, it has taken the initiative to contribute to collective international action by providing facilities for multilateral organisations. In 2009, during the visit of Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, we dedicated a significant plot of land in our Capital, Manama, to serve the community of the United Nations; it now houses a regional office of the UN Development Programme. We would welcome other UN agencies, perhaps, for example, by the establishment of a regional office of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

Such international cooperation will of course not replace national initiatives. Just the day before yesterday, we announced that the National Institution for Human Rights is henceforeth established as an independent body possessing its own organic law, to operate in accordance with the Paris Principles, which embody international human-rights standards relevant to the functioning of national institutions.

As for the Government's responses to the findings and recommendations of your Report, I say again that they involve fundamental issues, and must be dealt with urgently.

All of this being said, we cannot fail to extend our gratitude to our armed forces and law enforcement agencies who restored public order in the face of intimidation and violence; to our GCC allies who participated in protecting key installations by deploying the Peninsula Shield Force, without any confrontation with civilians; and to the multitude of ordinary Bahrainis who took a stand against the forces of violence and sectarian division.

We have every sympathy for those who sincerely and peacefully seek reforms within a pluralistic society where the rights of all are respected, but not for those who seek to impose totalitarian rule. Our desire for liberal reform goes hand in hand with our deep disappointment, after having extended so many times a hand of friendship toward the Islamic Republic of Iran, by the around-the-clock broadcasts in the Arabic language by Iranian state-controlled radio and television stations, inciting our population to engage in acts of violence, sabotage, and insurrection. Iran's propaganda fuelled the flames of sectarian strife – an intolerable interference in our internal affairs from which Bahrain has suffered greatly. As you have just correctly said, Chair of the Commission, the Government of Bahrain was not in a position to provide evidence of links between Iran and specific events in our country this year. But this propaganda, an objective fact to be observed by all who have eyes and ears and comprehend Arabic, not only directly challenges the stability and sovereignty of our country, but also poses a threat to the security and stability of the GCC countries. We hope that the Iranian leadership will reflect, and abandon this policy of enmity and discord.

We affirm our commitment to ensuring the safety and security of our nation and its people, and our commitment to reform, and to the rectification of errors in all transparency. We urge all our people to reflect upon their own attitude and intentions, to address their mistakes, and to do their civic duty to contribute
to national unity within a community characterised by tolerance. Our highest objective, after pleasing God, is to promote brotherhood, harmony, and
tolerance among all our people, within the environment of a pluralistic, cohesive, and

prosperous society; a society that guarantees the rule of law and

human rights; a society that ensures the tranquil pursuit of opportunities and fulfillment for

everyone.

We thank you all for joining us here on this historic day for our beloved nation.

Source: http://www.bici.org.bh/indexc971.html?news=speech-of-hm-king-hamad-bin-isa-al-khalifa-on-23rd-november

Appendix 3: Egypt Unrest: Full Text of Hosni Mubarak's Speech

I am addressing the youth of Egypt today in Tahrir Square and across the country. I am

addressing you all from the heart, a father's dialogue with his sons and daughters.

I am proud of you as the new Egyptian generation calling for a change to the better, dreaming

and making the future.

First and foremost, I am telling you that the blood of your martyrs and injured will not go in

vain. I assure you that I will not relent in harshly punishing those responsible. I will hold

those who persecuted our youth accountable with the maximum deterrent sentences.

I tell the families of those innocent victims that I suffered plenty for them, as much as they

did. My heart was in pain because of what happened to them, as much as it pained their hearts.

I am telling you that heeding to your voice, your message and demands is an irretraceable

commitment.

I am determined to live up to my promises with all firmness and honesty and I am totally

determined to implement (them), without hesitation or reconsideration.

This commitment springs from a strong conviction that your intentions are honest and pure

and your action. Your demands are just and legitimate demands.

The mistakes can be made in any political system and in any state. But, the most important

is to recognise them and correct them as soon as possible and bring to account those who have committed them.

I am telling you that as a president I find no shame in listening to my country's youth and interacting with them.

The big shame and embarrassment, which I have not done and never will do, would be listening to foreign dictations whatever may be the source or pretext.

'Defined vision'

My sons, the youth of Egypt, brother citizens, I have unequivocally declared that I will not run for president in the next elections, satisfied with what I've offered my country in over 60 years during war and peace.

I declared my commitment to that, as well as my equal commitment to carrying out my responsibility in protecting the constitution and the people's interests until power and responsibility are handed over to whoever is elected in next September, following free and candid elections with guarantees of freedom and candour.

This is the oath I took before God and my country and one which I will keep until we take Egypt and its people to a safe harbour.

I have set a defined vision to come out of this crisis and to carry out what the citizens and the youth have called for in a way which would respect the constitutional legitimacy and not undermine it.

It will be carried out in a way that would bring stability to our society and achieve the demands of its youth, and, at the same time, propose an agreed-upon framework for a peaceful transfer of power through responsible dialogue with all factions of society and with utmost sincerity and transparency.

I presented this vision, committed to my responsibility in getting the nation out of these

difficult times and continuing to achieve it first, hour by hour, anticipating the support and assistance of all those who are concerned about Egypt and its people, so that we succeed in transforming it (the vision) into to a tangible reality, according to a broad and national agreement with a large base, with the courageous military forces guaranteeing its implementation.

We have started indeed building a constructive national dialogue, including the Egyptian youths who led the calls for change, and all political forces. This dialogue has resulted in a tentative agreement of opinions and positions, putting our feet at the start of the right track to get out of the crisis and must continue to take it from the broad lines on what has been agreed upon to a clear road map and with a fixed agenda.

From now to next September, day after day, we'll see the peaceful transition of power.

'Constitutional reforms'

This national dialogue has focused on the setting up of a constitutional committee that will look into the required amendments of the constitution and the needed legislative reforms.

It (the dialogue) also met about the setting up of a follow-up committee expected to follow up the sincere implementation of the promises that I have made before the people.

I have made sure that the composition of the two committees is made of Egyptian figures that are known for their independence and experience, experts in constitutional law and judges.

In addition to that, the loss of the martyrs of the sons of Egypt in sad and tragic events has hurt our hearts and shaken the homeland's conscience.

I immediately issued my instructions to complete the investigation about last week's events (the clashes between pro- and anti-Mubarak demonstrators) and submit its results immediately to the general prosecutor for him to take the necessary legal deterrent measures.

Yesterday, I got the first report on the top priority constitutional amendments proposed by the committee of justice system and law experts and that I have set up to look into the required constitutional and legislative amendments.

In response to the proposals in the committee's report, and in compliance with the prerogatives of the president of the republic, in conformity with Article 189 of the constitution, I have submitted a request today asking for the amendment of six constitutional clauses: 76, 77, 88, 93 and 189, in addition to the annulment of clause 179.

Moreover, I am asserting my readiness to submit, at a later time, an (additional) request to change any other clauses referred to me by the constitutional committee, according to the needs and justifications it sees fit.

These top-priority amendments aim to ease the conditions for presidential nominations, and the fixing of limited terms of presidency to ensure the rotation of power, and the strengthening of the regulations of elections oversight to guarantee their freedom and fairness.

It is in the judiciary's prerogative to decide about the validity and membership of MPs and amend the conditions and measures on the amendment of the constitution.

The proposal to delete Article 179 from the constitution aims to achieve the required balance between the protection of the nation from the dangers of terrorism and safeguarding the civil rights and freedoms of the citizens which opens the door to the lifting of the emergency law following the return of calm and stability and the presence of suitable conditions to lift the state of emergency.

'In one trench'

Brother citizens, the priority now is to bring back trust between Egyptians, trust in our economy and our international reputation, and trust in protecting the change and movement that we have started from turning back or retreating.

Egypt is going through difficult times which it is not right for us to allow continuing, as it

will continue to cause us and our economy harm and losses, day after day, which will end in circumstances which those youths who called for change and reform will become the first to be harmed by.

The current moment is not to do with myself, it is not to do with Hosni Mubarak, but is to do with Egypt, its present and the future of its children.

All Egyptians are in one trench now, and it is on us to continue the national dialogue which we have started, with a team spirit, not one of division, and far from disagreement and infighting so that we can get Egypt past its current crisis, and to restore trust in our economy, and tranquillity and peace to our citizens, and return the Egyptian street to its normal everyday life.

I was as young as Egypt's youth today, when I learned the Egyptian military honour, allegiance and sacrifice for my country.

I have spent a lifetime defending its soil and sovereignty. I witnessed its wars, with its defeats and victories.

I lived the days of defeat and occupation, I also lived the days of the (Suez) crossing, victory and liberation.

It was the happiest day of my life when I raised the flag of Egypt over Sinai.

I faced death many times as a pilot, in Addis Ababa, and numerous other times. I never succumbed to foreign pressure or dictations.

I kept the peace. I worked towards the stability and security of Egypt. I worked hard for its revival and for its people.

I never sought power or fake popularity. I trust that the overwhelming majority of the people know who Hosni Mubarak is. It pains me to see how some of my countrymen are treating me today.

'Immortal Identity'

In any case, I am completely aware of the seriousness of the current hard turn of events as I am convinced that Egypt is crossing a landmark point in its history which imposes on all to weigh in the higher interests of our country and to put Egypt first above any and all considerations.

I saw fit to delegate presidential jurisdictions to the vice-president as defined by the constitution. I am certain that Egypt will overcome its crisis.

The will of its people will not break. It will be back on its feet with the honesty and loyalty of its people, all its people.

It will return the machinations and glee of those who were gleeful and machinated against it.

We, Egyptians, will prove our ability to achieve the demands of the people with civilised and mature dialogue.

We will prove that we are no-one's servants, that we do not take instructions from anyone, and that only the demands of the citizens and the pulse of the street take our decisions.

We will prove all this with the spirit and tenacity of Egyptians, through the unity and cohesion of the people, and through our commitment to Egypt's dignity as well as its unique and immortal identity, for it is the essence and the base of our presence for more than 7,000 years.

This spirit will continue to live within us for as long as Egypt and its people are present. It will live in every one of our peasants, workers and intellectuals. It will remain in the hearts of our old men, our youth and our children, Muslims and Christians. It will remain in the minds and conscience of all those yet unborn.

I say again that I lived for the sake of this country, preserving its responsibility and trust. Egypt will remain above all and above everyone.

It will remain so until I hand over this trust and pole. This is the goal, the objective, the responsibility and the duty. It is the beginning of life, its journey, and its end.

It will remain a country dear to my heart. It will not part with me and I will not part with it until my passing.

Egypt will remain immortal with its dignified people with their heads held high. May God preserve the safety of Egypt and watch over its people.

May peace be upon you.

Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12427091

Appendix 4:   The Last Official Address of Ben Ali

People of Tunisia:

I am speaking to you today, everyone, both inside and outside Tunisia. I speak to you in the language of Tunisians. I am speaking to you now because the situation demands deep change. Yes, deep and comprehensive change.

I have understood you. Yes, I have understood you. I have understood everyone: the unemployed, the needy, the politician, and those demanding more freedoms. I have understood you. I have understood you all. However, the events currently taking place in our country are not part of us. Vandalism is not part of the customs of Tunisians—civilized Tunisians, tolerant Tunisians.

Violence is not part of us, nor is it part of our conduct. This trend must stop, with the concerted efforts of everyone: political parties, national organizations, civil society, intellectuals and citizens. Hand in hand, for the sake of our country. Hand in hand for the sake of all our children's security.

The change I am announcing now is in response to your demands, to which we have reacted. We have felt deep pain at what has occurred.

My sadness and pain are great, for I have spent more than fifty years of my life in the service of Tunisia, in different positions: from the National Army to various other responsibilities, and twenty-three years as head of state. Every day of my life has been and continues to be in the service of the country. I have offered sacrifices, which I do not like to recount as you all know them, and I have never accepted, and do not accept still, the shedding of a single drop of Tunisian blood.

We felt pain for the victims who fell and the persons who suffered damage, and I refuse to see more fall as a result of the continuation of violence and looting.

Our children today have stayed home and did not go to school. This is a shame and a disgrace, because we have become fearful for them from the violence perpetrated by gangs who have robbed and looted and assaulted people. This is a crime, not protest. This is abhorrent. The citizens, all citizens, must stand up to them. We have issued instructions, and we rely on everyone's cooperation, to distinguish between these gangs and groups of deviants who are taking advantage of the circumstances, and peaceful, legitimate protests, to which we do not object.

My sadness is very great and very deep. Very profound. Enough with violence! Enough with violence!

I have also issued instructions to the interior minister, and I have repeated, and today I confirm: do not use live ammunition. Live ammunition is not acceptable. It is not justified, unless, God forbid, someone tries to disarm you or attacks you with a firearm, or the like, and forces you to defend yourself.

I ask that the independent commission—I repeat, the independent commission, which will investigate the incidents and the abuses and the regrettable deaths—to delineate the responsibilities of all sides, without exception, in all fairness, integrity and objectivity.

We expect every Tunisian, those who support us and those who do not, to support the efforts to restore calm and to abandon violence, vandalism, and depravation. Reform requires calm. The incidents that we have witnessed were at the outset protests against social conditions, which we had made great efforts to fix, but we still require greater efforts to redress shortcomings. We all have to give ourselves the chance and the time required for all our important measures to materialize.

In addition, I have tasked the government—I called the prime minister—to reduce the prices of basic commodities and foodstuffs—sugar, milk, bread, etc.

As for political demands. I told you that I have understood you. Yes, I told you that I have understood you. And I have decided on full freedom for the media, in all its forms, and not shutting down Internet sites, and rejecting any form of censorship on them, while ensuring the respect of our morals and the principles of the journalistic profession.

As for the commission that I announced two days ago to look into corruption, bribery, and the mistakes of officials, this commission will be independent—yes, independent—and we will ensure its fairness and integrity.

The field is open, from this day onward, for freedom of political expression, including peaceful demonstrations— organized and orderly peaceful demonstrations, civilized demonstrations. That is fine. If a party or an organization wishes to organize a peaceful demonstration, they are welcome. But they should notify [us] of it, set its time and place, and organize it, and cooperate with the responsible parties to preserve its peaceful character.

I would like to assure you that many things did not happen the way I would have liked them to. Especially in the areas of democracy and freedoms. Sometimes, some misled me, by hiding the truth from me, and they will be held accountable. Yes, they will be held accountable.

Therefore, I reiterate to you, in all clarity, that I will work to promote democracy and to put pluralism into effect. Yes, to promote democracy and to put pluralism into effect.

And I will work to preserve and respect the country's constitution. And I'd like to reiterate here, in contrast to what some have claimed, that I have pledged, on November 7, that there would be no presidency for life. No presidency for life. Therefore, I renew thanks to all who have urged me to renominate myself in 2014, but I refuse to violate the age condition for candidacy for the presidency of the republic.

We want to reach the year 2014 in a framework of genuine civil consensus, and an atmosphere of national dialogue, with the participation of all national parties in assuming responsibilities.

Tunisia is the country of all of us. The country of all Tunisians. We love Tunisia and all of her people love her. We must protect her.

Let the will of her people remain in its hands and in the faithful hands that it will choose to continue the journey that began since independence and that we have continued since 1987.

To that end, we will set up a national commission headed by an independent national personality, with credibility among all the social and political parties, in order to review the electoral code, the press code, and the law of associations, etc. The commission will suggest the necessary provisional ideas until the 2014 elections, including the possibility of separating legislative elections and presidential elections.

Tunisia belongs to us all. Let us all preserve her. Her future is in our hands. Let us all safeguard it. Each one of us is responsible, from their position, for restoring her security, her stability, and for healing her wounds, and for ushering her into a new era that would better enable her to have a brighter future.

Long live Tunisia. Long live her people. Long live the republic. May peace and God's grace be upon you.

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