“NEVER A NEUTRAL EMPTINESS”: THEORY, HISTORY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SILENCE IN THE SOUND FILM

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Abstract

The advent of the sound film created unprecedented possibilities for creative use of the soundtrack. Much like its sonorous counterparts speech, sound, or music, the use of silence in film is a deliberate choice by filmmakers and requires the same in-depth analysis to be fully understood. The aim of this thesis is to provide a history of how silence is used in film and a theoretical framework to analyse this use. Silence in the sound film has hardly been addressed systematically. A general overview of the different uses of silence is lacking in sound and film studies. The few current theoretical discussions of silence focus only on silence in a single scene or film. These analyses rarely go further than stating that silence represents death or the oppression of a character. This thesis remedies this gap by asking what silence is, how is it used in film, and how can the experience of silence be analysed. First, it plots how silence is used in cinema from the early days of sound to the present. This history builds on the empirical analysis of over thirty films of the past ninety years. It shows how the use of silence varies in type, genre and time. The use of silence in different film eras is often influenced most by the emergence of new sound technologies. Second, this thesis seeks to provide a theoretical framework to analyse how spectators can experience meaning and affect through silence. This framework builds in part on semiotic theories of Peirce and the affective philosophy of Deleuze. Bergson's concept of durée ultimately helps to discuss how meaning and affect work together in the temporal experience of film. A film and a spectator create their own temporal realities wherein they engage both rationally and emotionally. This thesis does not only add a completely overlooked aspect of soundtrack history to cinema scholarship, it also establishes a framework that makes it possible to analyse both meaning and affect, rational analysis and the emotional experience, in a single unified experience.

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Introduction

In December 2017 the eighth and penultimate film in the Skywalker family saga was released: *Star Wars: Episode VIII – The Last Jedi* (Johnson 2017). The instructions for cinemas screening this film included a peculiar note:

Theater / Projectionist Alert:

> "Star Wars: The Last Jedi" contains a sequence at approximately 1 hour and 52 minutes into the movie in which **ALL sound stops for about 10 full seconds**. While the images continue to play on the screen you will hear nothing. This is intentionally done by the director for a creative effect. Please take note that there is nothing wrong with your DCP or audio system. We wanted to make sure you are aware of this. Thank you for your attention and have a great run on the movie! (Garcia, n.d., emphasis in original)

A few AMC theatres in the USA decided to relay this warning to their audiences. Signboards and posters were put up with abridged variations of the note. Some notices repeated the first three sentences of the above message verbatim, including the timestamp, whilst others reformulated the warning in broader terms:

> PLEASE NOTE: There is a creative choice where there is an extended period of silence during the movie. Rest assured this is not a technical issue. Thank you. (ibid.)

These warnings caused a bit of uproar as they were considered to be a "spoiler", a piece of information revealing something about the film to those who have not seen it yet. It is interesting that it was even deemed necessary to include this warning with the instructions to projectionists. A silence in film can be a technical issue, of course, but silence is hardly an unknown phenomenon in Hollywood film. The kind of silence used in *The Last Jedi*, which is used at an emotionally laden point in the film and in a scene where the images show shots of space, is a common application of this sonorous aesthetic. This particular silence is quite long, granted, but not unreasonably long. It pales in comparison to the lengthy silences in Stanley Kubrick's *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968). *Interstellar* (Nolan 2014), released just three years before *The Last*

Jedi, has instances of complete silence that approximate the silence in this *Star Wars* in length. The very first *Star Wars* film (Lucas 1977) even starts with nine seconds of a completely silent soundtrack during the "A long time ago in a galaxy far far away" opening titles. John Williams' iconic theme music only comes in when the STAR WARS title appears (see Appendix). The decision to give projectionists and audiences such a warning is puzzling, as audiences have encountered and grown accustomed to silence in the sound film in one way or another for nearly a century.

An interesting contradiction arises here. Silence has been present in some form or another in Hollywood cinema since the release of the first successful sound films in 1927 (see Chapter 2, §*The Jazz Singer*, pp. 44-47). Yet ninety years later Hollywood conglomerates still do not trust their audiences to be able to cope with such intentional silences. Silence is indeed, in the words of The Walt Disney Company (who currently own the Star Wars franchise), not a technical issue but, rather, an artistic choice. Silence is deliberately implemented by the film's creators. In particular in the world of audio-visual media such as film, where each sound and image is carefully selected to be part of the film's world, silences are more than mere temporary breaks between the auditory information offered to the spectator.

Silence is an integral part of soundtrack design and requires critical and in-depth analysis to be understood, much like its sonorous counterparts speech, sound, or music. Although silence has been part of Hollywood sound cinema for nearly a century, scholarly soundtrack analyses rarely discuss it in depth. Silence is often given a perfunctory mention at most (see Chapter 1, §Silence in film, pp. 21-30). Common analyses of silence include descriptions of silence as death or infinity. These are metaphorical analyses, however, and do not offer a broader understanding of why a single concept, silence, can mean different things or affect us in myriad ways.

This thesis seeks to remedy the lack of a general understanding of silence in film and music scholarship by providing a systematic approach to the comprehension of this elusive concept. The central question throughout this thesis is "What is filmic silence?". The answers provided here can largely be divided into two parts. Part one discusses the definition of silence in film, whether silence in film is always the same, and the development of silence and its functions over time. Part two focuses on the interpretation and analysis of silence. Together, these parts provide an in-depth understanding of silence, its history, and its possible scholarly approaches.

Chapter 1 is completely devoted to the question of definition: what is silence? Nigel Andrews answers this question as follows:

> In broadcasting it is "dead air". In Trappist monasteries it is a vow. In school exam rooms it is the law. In poetry it is eternity (or a favourite symbol of it). In cinema it is the past that the talking picture moved beyond, 80 years ago, with the arrival of synchronised sound. (Andrews 2006)

Silence can be many different things, as Andrews notes, but to state that silence in film is something of the past is perhaps overly dramatic - the warnings for *The Last Jedi* indicate otherwise. If silence is still present in the sound film, how can it be defined? Is it the absence of all sound in film, or is the muteness of a character also a form of silence? What are the different forms of silence that can occur in film? This chapter discusses the many forms of silence that have been put forward in music and film studies, as well as the relation of silence in film to its counterpart in reality. How does a silence in film differ from a silence that we encounter in real life? This chapter builds on previous work on silence by Isabella van Elferen and myself, as well as on the many different ways silence has been discussed in film and music scholarship.

Chapter 2 discusses the history of silence. This chapter seeks to answer whether silence in modern films is used in the same fashion as silence in the early sound films. If the use of silence evolves or changes throughout the sound film's history, then what brings about these changes? Are the different uses of silences aesthetically motivated or are there other influencing factors? This chapter builds on empirical analyses of over thirty Hollywood films released from 1927 until 2017 where I minutely recorded every instance of silence that occurs in film (see Appendix). These findings are subsequently analysed in light of societal, technological, and economical changes to provide a history of silence.

These two chapters comprise the first part of this thesis: what is silence, and which ways did its use and function in cinema develop? The second part of this thesis provides a framework to understand and analyse the experience of silence in film. Why can one concept have many meanings, how can silence affect spectators unconsciously, and how do they understand silence both rationally and emotionally in the same film experience?

Chapter 3 analyses why and how silence can mean different things. Some silences represent death and others represent zen-like tranquillity. Sometimes silence

is a direct representation of something, e.g., the absence of sound in space, and many other times silence is a metaphorical expression. This chapter uses Peirce's semiotics to frame silence's function as a single sign-vehicle for vastly different meanings.

Chapter 4 provides the required complement to chapter 3's semiotic approach. Silence is not always interpreted rationally as a sign. Silence also affects the audience unconsciously, steers them in their emotional response and sets a mood. Film spectators experience silence in a film often without actively paying attention to it and engage with such a silence unknowingly. This chapter uses affect theory and Deleuzean concepts to analyse these unconscious encounters between silence and the film spectator.

The affective experience and the rational semiotic interpretation of silence are two completely different theoretical approaches, and yet the experience of silence in film can be affective and signifying at the same time. Chapter 5 seeks to understand how both the rational, semiotic interpretation of silence and its unconscious affective process combine in a single film spectator experience. This chapter puts forward Henri Bergson's concept of *durée* (duration) as a way to combine both the rational and affective in a unified analysis.

Together, these five chapters provide a theoretical and historical understanding of silence in film and a framework to analyse the experience of such filmic silences. Some restrictions apply, however, as this thesis is necessarily limited in scope.

1. Narrowing the focus of research

It is not feasible to analyse all films from all cinematic traditions in one PhD thesis. The two largest restrictions are cultural and historical limits. The cultural limitation restricts the focus of this thesis to mainstream Hollywood films. The goal of this thesis is to provide a broad and general understanding of silence to film and music scholarship. Most audiences in the Westernised world watch Hollywood films and will be exposed to silence as it is used in mainstream Hollywood films. There are many national cinematic traditions but none is as omnipresent in the world, for now, as the American film.

Cultural restrictions: Hollywood versus other cinematic traditions

The United States is still the biggest film market worldwide (Statista 2018), although the Chinese film market is quickly catching up. The second and third runners-up, Japan and India, each have about one fifth of the American revenue. More important than revenue, however, is which films are screened. When looking at the country of origin of the films screened worldwide, the United States dominates the world's cinema undisputed – at least in those countries where data is publicly available. According to data collected by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, the United States was the top country of origin in all but six of those countries in 2015.

The exceptions to the rule are Azerbaijan, Iran, Cyprus, Laos, Senegal, and Uzbekistan. In Azerbaijan, Iran, and Uzbekistan the United States does not reach the top five countries of origin, in Senegal the American presence accounts for only three percent of national screenings, in Laos only twelve percent of all screenings are American films, and in Cyprus American films account for one quarter of all film screenings. In Morocco, the only other country where American films account for less than fifty percent of all screenings, American screenings top the nationality chart with a forty-three percent share (UIS, "Origin of top 5 countries of all feature films exhibited", data.uis.unesco.org).

Important caveats to consider here are that the UNESCO data is extracted from one year, and that notable exceptions in the data collection for 2015 include China, Korea, Japan, India, and Nigeria. It is still safe to say that the lion's share of the world's cinema screenings are American productions. As my intention is to analyse the use and the experience of silence, it should come as no surprise that I focus on Hollywood productions as most of the films seen in Westernised countries are of American origin. This does not necessarily mean that Hollywood is the largest producer of sound films. In terms of production, India tops the chart undisputed, producing more films annually than the two runners-up, Nigeria and the United States, combined. It does mean that most cinema audiences will experience silence in the sound film as it is produced in Hollywood.

Early sound film history

The second restriction to the scope of this thesis is historical in nature. Kathryn Kalinak describes how most, if not all, discussions of sound in film start with "debunking the old chestnut that silent film was never truly silent" (2015, 9). This phrase, or a variation

of it, is more often than not one of the first sentences in chapters on the silent cinema or the early sound film (e.g., Maltby 2003, 238; Reay 2004, 5; Cooke 2008, 1). There is no way to include the different practices of accompanying the silent film in this thesis, but it is interesting to note that provisions for the use of silence existed.

Screening a film in silence was “an unforgivable offense that calls for the severest censure” (George Beynon, as cited in Kalinak 1992, 49). *Moving Picture World*, a trade journal of the American film industry, dictated a maximum allowable use of ten seconds of silence (ibid., 50). My research here, however, focuses on the use of silence in the synchronised soundtrack. The silent film uses a different idiom from the sound film, even with accompanying sound, as it does not portray the world of the film itself, i.e., the diegetic layer of the film, in sound (see also Chapter 1, §Silence in film and reality, pp. 32-34).

It is the sound film that gives rise to the deliberate use of silence in the soundtrack. The history of the sound film does not start in 1927 with the success of *The Jazz Singer*, but forty years earlier with the first synchronisation of sound and image in 1889 (Cook 1996, 239). The history I recount in chapter 2, however, skips these four decades and starts in 1927. The release and success of *The Jazz Singer* is a symbolic starting point that heralds the commercial viability and mainstream acceptance of the sound film. This success was only possible after four decades of technological innovation.

Three different synchronisation systems were exhibited at the Paris World Exposition of 1900: the Phonorama, the Chronophone, and the Phono-Cinéma-Théâtre. The Vivaphone was developed in Great Britain, and in the United States the Edison Corporation developed both the Cinephonograph and the Kinetophone (Cook 1996, 239). None of these systems, nor other systems developed in later years such as the German Tri-Ergon system, lead to the sound film’s popularisation. They all shared similar drawbacks: “poor synchronization, lack of amplification and the need to change sound cylinders or discs every five minutes or so” (Cooke 2008, 9). All the above techniques recorded sound on either a disc or a cylinder, which had very limited recording space. The playback systems of both discs and cylinders lacked any serious amplification – other than large horns to project the sound – and had no way of automatically synchronising sound playback with image playback. Edison’s Kinetophone was briefly successful as a novelty, but soon the audience “howled in

derision when the sound got out of synchronization" and Kinetophone was never further developed. (Millard 2005, 116).

The sounds of the silent film proved to be too much competition for these early sound systems. The proliferation of different techniques, combined with the lack of a standardised system, rendered these synchronisation systems not commercially viable (Cooke 2008, 9). Different systems could not be used interchangeably, and there was no single dominant system. These systems provided pre-recorded music, but not sound effects or speech. The film exhibitors were not willing to invest in the technological equipment necessary for sound reproduction, and more often than not they had musicians, from single pianists to grand orchestras, that "could do the job much better than recorded sound" (Millard 2005, 151).

Problems with the lack of amplification were resolved with Lee De Forest's invention of the audion amplifier in 1906. This proved to be such a crucial invention that Kenneth MacGowan describes De Forest as the father of the talking picture (MacGowan 1955, 136). De Forest's invention of the vacuum tube first led to the development and success of radio. Eventually, De Forest turned to sound cinema "as an area into which he could expand his rights to exploit the vacuum tube" (Crafton 1997, 10). It would not be until the early 1920s that De Forest and his fellow engineers introduced talking pictures to the world, but they did not achieve enough commercial success to interest the Hollywood studios. The quality and possibilities of the sound film were so limited that in 1924 D.W. Griffith, the "pioneer of narrative cinema", stated that "when a century has passed, all thought of our so-called speaking pictures will have been abandoned" (ibid., 26). He would be proven wrong only three years later.

The first successful sound films

The first studio to show a successful sound film was the relatively small film studio that belonged to the Warner brothers. They purchased Western Electric's Vitaphone system in 1925 and developed pre-recorded musical accompaniment, which was showcased a year later at a grand presentation of their new feature *Don Juan* (Crosland, 1926) (Cooke 2008, 49). Warner Bros. was not interested in talking films but in making money. If they recorded and published their own music, they did not have to pay royalties on film music. It was never even their intention to publish films with synchronised soundtracks, they merely wanted pre-recorded orchestral

accompaniments to their films (Millard 2005, 151-152). Synchronised dialogue was certainly never their goal. Harry Warner expressed their interest in the Vitaphone as follows: “Who the hell wants to hear actors talk? The music – that’s the big thing about this.” (Harry Warner as cited in ibid.). Control over the music meant that the film studio now owned both image and sound, which meant that profits no longer had to be shared. The success of the Vitaphone was most evident in the short sound clips that accompanied *Don Juan*.

Don Juan was immensely successful. It premiered in August 1926 and ran for eight months. In October of the same year the Warner Brothers’ second Vitaphone production, *The Better ‘Ole* (Reisner 1926) premiered with a synchronised music and sound effects. The short musical items accompanying the main feature turned out to be much more popular than the actual feature itself (Reay 2004, 8). The Warner Brothers took notice of the popularity of these shorts and quickly released a feature-length film the next year with songs performed by one of the decade’s most popular performers, Al Jolson. This film, *The Jazz Singer* (Crosland 1927), also included dialogue.

Although *The Jazz Singer* was only part-talkie and still had intertitles, it is nonetheless widely regarded as the first true sound film and a watershed moment in the history of the cinema (e.g., MacGowan 1955, 144; Williams in Altman 1992, 129-131; Grainge, Jancovich, and Monteith 2007, 150). *Don Juan* and *The Better ‘Ole* were both published in 1926 and featured synchronised background music and sound effects, but it was *The Jazz Singer*’s success that heralded the arrival of the sound age in 1927. A year later the Warner brothers received an honorary Academy Award in 1928 “for producing *The Jazz Singer*, the pioneer outstanding talking picture, which has revolutionized the industry” (Academy Awards, 2019).

By the end of 1928 the major film studios started producing sound films. With all of the studios now turning to sound and investing in sound technology, innovation and the installation of sound equipment in film theatres quickly accelerated. Warner Bros.’ investment in the Vitaphone, the sound-on-disc technique, ultimately backfired as all the major studios switched to sound on film, or optical soundtracks, initially only used by Fox in their Movietone system. Fox released a Movietone sound film in 1927 as well, *Sunrise: A Song of Two Humans* (Murnau 1927), but it was nowhere as successful as their Warner Bros. competitor. Although a critical success and winning three Academy Awards, *Sunrise* was an absolute flop at the box-office (Crafton 1997,

525). Nevertheless, Fox's use of sound on film was cheaper, more reliable, and provided better quality playback (Millard 2005, 156; Cooke 2008, 54). With all major film studios switching to sound-on-film and investing in the installation in film theatres, Fox was able to achieve feature length success similar to *The Jazz Singer* only two years later in 1929 with *Sunny Side Up* (Butler 1929), which grossed well over $3 million as well (Maltby 2003, 241). In 1930 Warner Bros. started to produce films with sound-on-film technology as well (Cooke 2008, 52). By 1936 an industry standard was finally established and accepted with the optical variable-area soundtrack (ibid., 54).

As it is impossible to analyse all sound films for this research, a choice is necessary even among the earliest successful sound films. *The Jazz Singer* was commercially more successful than *Sunrise*, but the latter was lauded by critics. Ultimately *The Jazz Singer* has the benefit of being more successful as well as being lauded by the Motion Picture Academy in 1928 for heralding the sound age. The film is not undeserving of its mythical status and hence serves as a symbolic starting point of the history and analysis of silence (see Chapter 2, §*The Jazz Singer*, pp. 44-47). The story of silence as told in this thesis is built on empirical analyses of a selected group of films because analysing all sound films is simply impossible.

Selecting the corpus

Although *The Jazz Singer* is a symbolic starting point, the other selected films are a result of careful consideration and an attempt to adhere to some common criteria shared by all these films. From the outset I was determined to avoid what John Ó Maoilearca calls a "transcendental choice of film", which is the selection of source material "in light of the theory or film in question", already affirming and guiding any subsequent theoretical work before any analysis has been undertaken (Ó Maoilearca 2009, 5). It would have been much easier to focus on avant-garde films or the work of specific directors such as Jean-Luc Godard, to prove something or to attribute certain characteristics or importance to silence in the sound film (see also Chapter 1, §The problem of meaning attribution, pp. 31-32). The goal of this thesis is to provide a systematic and general understanding of silence in film, and the selection of films should reflect this. The films in the corpus were selected based on three criteria:

mainstream Hollywood or English language films[1], a spread of the selection over time to account for a century of sound film history, and a focus on successful films that would have either reached large audiences due to box office success, or influenced many other films due to their critical acclaim.

Narrowing the focus of this thesis to silence in the films of Steven Spielberg or Sam Mendes, or on silence in films released after 1977, would only result in a partial study of silence. Sound technology changed significantly throughout the sound film's history and I am interested in seeing whether this would result in different uses of silence. Tracing the use of silence throughout time also allows me to see whether certain uses of silence become more popular over time, and thus are experienced more by film audiences. Akin to my motivation for not falling for a transcendental choice of film, this thesis focuses on the general history of silence in the Hollywood sound film in the hope of painting a relatively neutral picture and drawing conclusions from as broad a dataset as possible.

The combination of the first and second criteria results in a selection of all Hollywood sound films from its earliest development onwards: according to the Internet Movie Database this would result in over 80,000 feature films (excluding adult films) (imdb.com). The third criterion for selecting films focuses on renown and success. Renowned films are more probable to influence later filmmakers, and successful films reach greater audiences. In order to safeguard the feasibility of my empirical analyses, I settled for a cross-indexing of box-office success, critical reception (not always as easily identifiable), and accolades. Practically, this resulted in most of the films here being drawn from the American Film Institute's top film lists[2] and a choice for commercially successful features as indicated by box-office revenue. *Sight and Sound* also published top film lists, but these include many foreign language films and are of less use for the research at hand.

A final consideration in the choice of films was narrative and aesthetic film categories. I intentionally do not use the term genre, as it invites a discussion I wish to

[1] The distinction between American, Hollywood and non-Hollywood films is easy to make *geographically*, but not *culturally*. *Gravity* (Cuarón 2013), the Star Wars franchise, and lots of other films feature a mixture of British and American actors and directors, financial backing, shooting locations, and production companies. A geographical restriction to Hollywood, California also excludes defining American films: *Citizen Kane* (Welles 1941) and *King Kong* (Cooper and Schoedsack 1933) were produced in New York rather than in Los Angeles, for example. The American Film Institute includes "British" films like *Lawrence of Arabia* because it had an American producer. The distinction is hard to make and I have mostly followed the American Film Institute in my selection of films.

[2] See note 1.

avoid. Publications on genre theory focus on defining what a genre is or which approach to genre to follow (cf. Neale 1990, Neale 2000, Moine 2008), and even then "practitioners and the general public make use of their own genre labels (*de facto* genres) quite apart from those of academic theorists" (Chandler 1997, 2). Moreover, some genres are not consistently present in the criteria I outlined above. Although the western genre was a defining genre in the early sound film (sometimes comprising up to thirty percent of all films made in a year), it does not enjoy the same popularity throughout the sound film's history. Including a discussion on genre would be beyond the scope of this thesis.

In my first selection of films I opted for a choice of fifty films to represent nearly a hundred years of sound film history. From these fifty films I subsequently selected five categories that appeared to persist throughout Hollywood's history: the crime film (including film noir, detectives, gangster films and neo-noir films); the drama film; action, adventure, and epic films; fantasy and science-fiction films; and horror and thriller films. I then selected six films for each of these five categories, resulting in a corpus of thirty films. I later added comedies as this type of film was noticeably lacking, ultimately resulting in the thirty-six films of the corpus (see Appendix). Still, the list of films selected for the corpus is far from ideal. Sometimes a year is represented twice (1941), sometimes a film received more critical acclaim and financial success but was not included in the list because either the director was already represented by two or three films or the genre that particular film belongs to was already overrepresented. Concessions always have to be made and the only ideal list to discuss the history of silence would be an analysis of all the 80,000 films produced after 1927. The final problem with the criteria outlined above is that renown and influence are difficult to measure for the most recent films. For the films released after 2000, box-office, director, and accolades were the important criteria. Admittedly, one transcendental film choice slipped into the corpus of films: Sam Mendes' 2002 film *Road to Perdition*. One of the scenes in *Road to Perdition*, the final confrontation between Michael Sullivan (Tom Hanks) and John Rooney (Paul Newman), was partly the inspiration for this research. The other thirty-five films in the corpus were not a transcendental choice of film, however. *The Jazz Singer* was the symbolic start of my corpus, bringing the final amount of films in the corpus to thirty-seven films.

2. A final note on analysis and interpretation

Armed with a selection of thirty-seven films and a clear goal to provide a systematic analysis and understanding of the use and experience of silence, the actual research of this thesis can begin. It should be noted that in cases where interpretations of silence are made, I always consider myself to be the hypothetical ideal film spectator. Analyses of meaning and affect are always personal interpretations, although a film's context can guide these interpretations. Analyses of the occurrence of silence, i.e., the empirical analyses that are found in the appendix, are as objective as I can make them. These analyses simply note the presence of any of the silences I discuss in chapter 1.

The first question that needs to be answered, before analysis can even begin, is what exactly the object of analysis is. What is silence in film? Silence can take on different forms and interpretations depending on context, as each chapter in this thesis will show. An understanding of what should or should not be considered as filmic silence is necessary before a history and framework based on analyses of such silences can be written. Chapter 1 discusses this question at length and puts forward the definitions that are used throughout the rest of this thesis.

Chapter 1 – A Definition of Silence

What is silence?

One answer to this question is the dictionary definition of silence: an absence of sound. Silence is usually much more, however, than a mere absence of sound. It can be a metaphor for death, eternity, the past, and so much more. The metaphorical interpretation of silence has a long and varied history. Edmund Burke, writing in 1757, describes silence as great and terrible at the same time, a "powerful cause of the sublime" (Burke 1823, 96-97). Silence is so much more than an absence of sound.

Silence defined as an absence of sound immediately begs two follow-up questions: an absence of sound for whom, and by whom or what? A critical analysis of silence in film cannot presume that each film spectator has the same power of hearing or even the same level of attentiveness to the soundtrack. Such an ideal spectator is but a hypothetical subject of critical analysis (cf. Plantinga 2009 on spectatorship, and Mulvey 1992 on this "ideal subject" being male). Not only does the ideal listener not exist, an ideal listening environment cannot be presumed either. Some films are never even shown in cinema theatres with the latest Dolby surround system and high-end loudspeakers, but are streamed directly from Netflix or Amazon to domestic television or mobile phone screens and played over mobile phone speakers. The level of audible detail between loudspeakers a few inches wide and those that are a few feet wide is not to be dismissed. This thesis analyses silence in films from 1927 until the present, a time frame in which loudspeaker technology evolved and audiences grew accustomed to listening to films in different manners. Two people might disagree on whether they heard something in a soundtrack. Even the same person might judge a film differently depending on the technology used to reproduce and listen to the soundtrack. The definition of silence as an absence of sound raises more questions than it answers.

A different approach to silence is needed, then, to avoid problems of definition in later chapters. This chapter seeks to outline what silence is or how it can be defined in general, and then discusses silence in film and television and the problems that these art forms bring with them. Silence in film can take on many different forms and shapes. Some of these types of silence will be discussed here, but in light of the following

chapters it is necessary to eventually formulate but a few limited yet clearly identifiable types of silence that are broadly applicable.

1. What is silence?

This question was addressed by Isabella van Elferen and myself in an earlier publication (2015) and I will largely build on the answers provided there. In that article we distinguished five different forms of silence; five different ways in which silence can be distinguished from itself in concept and application: a metaphorical form of silence, two different phenomenological forms of silence, an ontological form of silence, and a metaphysical form of silence. I will discuss each of these forms separately, without going into detail as to how they relate to one another. This would be beyond the scope of this research and introduce methodologies and theories not used elsewhere in this thesis. What ultimately matters is how these forms relate to silence in film.

Metaphorical silence

The use of silence as a metaphor is without a doubt the most widespread and common of all forms of silence. It is the eerie, beckoning, deafening, or ominous silence that has become a trope in so many genres and art forms. The metaphorical use of silence in literature, films, video games, and music is a space where spectators and listeners are invited to seek meaning beyond the literal, beyond the mere absence of sound. It is a space where they can seek or even create meaning: a space where their anticipation or interpretation of the art at hand is exposed to them. The subjective experience of metaphorical silence in art is one where readers, spectators, and listeners "fill in the blank", as it were, guided by contextual clues.

Metaphorical silence can be part of any genre, though it is perhaps best known in the genres of Gothic and horror. Silence, or the absence of sound, indicates a presence of invisible, intangible beings in these genres. Silence is a sonic announcer of an otherworldly presence, an "auditory metaphor for the unknown" (2015, 263). The dark, ghostly, and above all silent halls, churches, graveyards, and ruins of Gothic and horror have become tropes in their own right, transcending their genres and permeating all kinds of different arts and minds. Someone playing a cartoony first-person shooter game on their computer or gaming console will instantly recognise the

sonorous tell of a soundtrack suddenly going quiet: something is not right. Something *else* must be going on here, something dangerous.

A sudden silence, whether it appears in a video game or a film, usually announces something else. It is such a successful trope that it keeps reinforcing itself: if the soundtrack goes silent, a listener pays more attention to what will happen next. This expectancy is resolved more often than not in a jump scare. The spectator is startled, and will be apprehensive the next time a silence occurs: something scary is about to happen. This type of silence is a sonic announcer for its own resolution.

Silence is not necessarily or always a metaphor for that which lurks in the void, or for that which resolves the silence. In general, metaphorical silence represents an absence. It is part of the written, the visual, and the multi-medial arts as well as a common metaphor in day-to-day life.

A teacher's plea for silence during class is not only a request for the absence of sound, but also a request for order. It would not be to the teacher's satisfaction if pupils continue to riot and cause chaos but do so without making a sound. In religion, whether it be Zen-Buddhism or the vow of silence in a Catholic cloister, silence represents balance, serenity, and an absence of sin or desire.

In film and television silence does not always resort to the Gothic trope of eeriness either, but it can represent absence or effacement as well. In one particular scene in the sixth episode of the Netflix Original series *The Alienist*, for example, a sudden silence briefly and beautifully penetrates the soundtrack without being intrusive. The person with whom I was watching the series was captivated by the scene but had not registered the silence there. *The Alienist* tells the fictional story of a series of murders of young boy prostitutes in late 19th century New York, and the people trying to solve these murders. In this particular scene, the audience follows Captain Connor (David Wilmot), a former detective of the New York Police Department, as he chases a suspect to the top of an unfinished bridge. Connor, shown earlier in the show to possess both a quick temper and a deep hatred of homosexuals, corners the murder suspect and holds him at gunpoint. The murder suspect tries to reason with Connor but the police captain is having none of it. The police captain's eyes seethe with hatred and the music echoes this building rage in its crescendo. He mutters "dirty sodomite" through clenched teeth and with that, all sound disappears from the soundtrack. Connor aims and shoots the suspect in the head, the gunshot resounding violently through the sudden silence before it.

The silence in this scene represents the effacement of any rational thought or logic from captain Connor's mind. His hatred for homosexuals takes over and causes him to shoot an unarmed and, as is later shown, innocent man whose only crime was to be attracted to other men. The former police captain's mind just goes blank, represented by a sudden absence of sound, as he shoots the suspect.

Silence can represent an absence of sound, of life, of emotion, of presence of mind, and of language. If a spectator, reader, or listener cannot immediately fill in the blank of a metaphorical silence, it takes on what is perhaps the most confrontational metaphor of all: it presents our lack of knowledge to ourselves. It is a gaping abyss of which we can only say "I do not know what this is." Unresolved silence is like looking in a mirror without seeing your own reflection: it reflects a world you experience, but one of which you are no part. It threatens to show that if you cannot see beyond the void, then perhaps you are the void. It is terrifying and haunting because it reveals the unknown in ourselves to ourselves.

Susan Sontag describes the paradoxical nature of silence in her 1967 essay *The Aesthetics of Silence* as seeing "the ghosts of one's own expectations" (2013, chap. 3). Following John Cage (1968, 51), Sontag considers the experience of silence to be impossible – as long as we live, our bodies make sounds – and discusses silence only as an aesthetic metaphor and part of a dialectic. She goes on to describe that the use of silence can only result in either "utter self-negation", or silence as "heroically, ingeniously inconsistent" (ibid., chap. 5). The ingenious inconsistency of silence is but one of the reasons for this research. Silence is used as a metaphor in myriad ways because it allows itself to be used time and again without settling on a single use or meaning.

Silence by negation

One of the reasons for the widespread use of metaphorical silence is that silence, as in the complete absence of sound, cannot be experienced by humans. Our own bodies produce noise through breathing and the beating of our hearts. The ear itself can produce spontaneous otoacoustic emissions. The complete and utter absence of any sound would necessarily mean the complete absence of any living thing or body as well. Still, there are plenty of examples to be found, as shown above, where silence is used to describe a human experience: from the eerie descriptions of quiet and dark

halls in Gothic literature to my own perception and description of the scene in the TV-show *The Alienist*.

The imagined experience of silence is what gives rise to the metaphorical use of silence. Although it is impossible for any living body to experience utter silence, our mind can trick us into believing that there is no sound. A more apt description of this phenomenon would be quiet: a spectator or listener perceives quietude and calls it silence. This perception of silence is only possible because of the negation of other sounds. In our day-to-day lives there are many more sounds than often realised: from the busy street ignored by the people living next to it, to students ignoring the rhythmic sounds of their own tapping fingers when typing essays.

This type of silence exists only in and because of the negation of our sensory perception. It is completely invented by the human mind. This does not mean that the complete absence of sound cannot exist. Rather, it expresses the inability of living bodies to experience the complete absence of sound and how our mind copes with this by presenting us with ever-morphing states of silence by negation. Live next to a railway or hammer away at your keyboard for long enough, and the mind will focus not on the sounds that are either continuously or predictably present but rather on the silence that exists within those sounds.

Actual silence

Actual silence is the silence that both defines sound and, in turn, is defined by sound. It is the emptiness preceding and following a sound. Actual silence is the silence from which sound can be born, and it is the silence where sound goes to die. This silence finds its own existence defined by the utterance of sound: where there was nothing, there now is something. When the sound ultimately recedes into nothingness, it is actual silence defining that there is no longer sound where there previously was. It is the limit of sound, both before and after it.

The most important aspect of actual silence is that it can exist within other sounds. It is not silence by negation, however: rather than a phenomenological form of silence that exists because our mind plays a trick on us, actual silence is an ontological form of silence. It *is* the limit of sound, and sound is the limit of actual silence. Actual silence also exists within other sounds when more sounds appear where there previously were none. These new sounds reveal that there was a layer of silence

accompanying the already present sounds. This layer of silence preceding new sounds can, on repeated listening, give a listener a sense of anticipation.

One simple but powerful example of this is British band Queen's well known stadium anthem *We Will Rock You*. The song start with its world-famous motif of a double quaver bass drum followed by a crotchet hand clap. This repeats eight times until singer Freddie Mercury joins in ("Buddy, you're a boy, make a big noise.."). For the first four bars Freddie Mercury's voice is absent. The silence accompanying the bass-bass-clap motif is actual silence.

We Will Rock You continues like this for a while: the first ninety seconds of this song consist of bass drum, hand clapping, and vocals. It would not be strange for someone listening to *We Will Rock You* for the first time to think that this repetition is all there is to the song. Its eponymous chorus is simple and contagious enough to understand its appeal as a stadium chant around the world, but for anyone that already knows the song, the true joy of listening lies within that *other* actual silence accompanying the music in those first ninety seconds. Freddie Mercury joins in quite quickly, but guitarist Brian May and bass player John Deacon only join in much later. When they do join, however, they give the song that little extra it needs to transform from interesting gimmick (bass-bass-clap with powerful vocals) to a world-famous rock anthem.

It is in these ninety seconds of actual silence preceding Brian May's entrance into the song that my ear resides, awaiting that brilliant first note announcing his arrival. A peculiar side effect of this is that actual silence can build tension and anticipation with repeated listening by mere virtue of *not being* the sound a listener is waiting for. It is not a sudden silence cutting off other sound, it is not an eerie sonic announcer or a metaphor, but it is simply the silence preceding a not yet present sound. It is in the knowledge that this silence will eventually make way for Brian May's guitar that anticipation lies and grows for the listener. In a way, *We Will Rock You* consists of bearing ninety seconds of actual silence whilst being entertained – for the time being – by Freddie Mercury's powerful vocals.

Virtual silence

The previous two forms of silence both represent silence within sound. The first of these forms, silence by negation, is a silence that subjects create for themselves by ignoring the sounds that are present both exterior and interior to their listening bodies.

Actual silence, on the other hand, is created by the arrival of new sonic actors. It is the silence that precedes and follows new sounds and defines – and is itself defined by – the beginning and end of these sounds.

The fourth form of silence, virtual silence, is closely related to both of these forms. This type of silence is induced through hallucination, dream, or technology. Virtual silence is the silence of an imagined world. This world can be a dream, a hallucination, and it can be created through technological means. Film in particular is a clear example of a virtual world with its own unique subjective experience regarding the presence or absence of sound. It is possible to experience silence in film whilst someone else in the cinema is fumbling with a bag of crisps or determined to find the last bit of soft drink in their cup by checking every nook and cranny with their straw. The world of film has its own sonorous universe.

The defining aspect of these worlds is that they are imagined by the spectator or listener; the means through which they are created does not really matter. They are worlds within worlds with their own space and time (see also Chapter 5, §The reality of film, pp. 152-153). When spectators or listeners lose track of time during a film or when playing a computer game, they are simply engrossed by this other universe. They might, however, know exactly how much time has passed in their imagined world.

One side-effect of these imagined spaces is that all other forms of silence can be present in virtual silence. When a new sound suddenly makes its appearance in this sonorous bubble, it is preceded by actual silence. Sounds in this virtual space can be ignored, giving the impression of virtual silence by negation. These virtual spaces are created in a subject's listening experience, they are sonic universes with their own set of rules. Virtual silence is the product of a deeply personal perception, a sonic subjectivity we create for ourselves in an imagined world.

Absolute silence

The fifth and final form of silence is the one silence true to its deceptively simple definition: it is the absence of sound. Not only is absolute silence the absence of sound, it is the absolute impossibility of sound. It is the silence of deep space, where the space between vibrating atoms is too vast to allow sound waves to travel. Absolute silence is the form of silence against which the other four forms of silence are defined. None of the four other forms of silence (metaphorical, negated, actual, and virtual) can ever be completely and utterly devoid of sound to the point of impossibility, and it is this

characteristic that ultimately defines each of the four other forms of silence. Absolute silence is unattainable. It is the impossible absence of sound that forces us to engage with four other forms of silence lest we find ourselves in the emptiness of deep space, or – and these terms are certainly not mutually exclusive – dead.

These five forms of silence attempt to define what silence is, and what it is not. Absolute silence is the great beyond, the complete and utter impossibility of any sound. This impossibility presents a firm and ultimate limit to our experience. Silence by negation and virtual silence both deal with the subjective experience of silence. Silence by negation is the go-to trick we play upon ourselves on a daily basis. It is the ignoring of any and all sounds until we can accept the illusion of silence. The human mind is so good at this that it is absolutely amazing how ignorant someone can be of the sounds that surround them. Virtual silence is similar: it creates the illusion of silence. Virtual silence is part of dreams, hallucinations, or created through technological means. The sound world a film creates is a bubble, a cocoon spectators wrap themselves in when they immerse themselves in the film.

Actual silence is the silence that defines and is defined by any sound. It is the silence preceding and following the sound so that it becomes possible to speak of a sound's beginning and ending. This also means that actual silence, like silence by negation and virtual silence, can be present *in* sound. The example of Queen's *We Will Rock You* explains how the ninety seconds before Brian May's guitar comes in are actual silence. This song also elucidates how actual silence can build tension and anticipation by merit of not being the sound a listener is waiting for.

Metaphorical silence is the use of the impossibility to experience absolute silence in order to create meaning. It is the application of the unattainable. Metaphorical silence is so powerful and ubiquitous because it invites the reading, watching, or listening subject to resolve the paradox of a "presence of nothing" by projecting their own interpretations upon this void. The question remains how these forms of silence relate to the subject matter at hand, i.e., film, and what silence in film is, or is not.

2. Silence in film

Silence in the sound film, seen through the forms Van Elferen and I put forward, is always a virtual silence. It is a silence created through technology. It is the silence of a virtual world spectators immerse themselves in. This virtual world contains its own life, nature, death, images, sounds, and silence. This is why virtual silence can contain all forms of silence in itself. A film can contain its own metaphorical, actual, and negated silence. It can also contain its own virtual silence, although extensive portrayals of worlds-within-worlds are rarely seen in Hollywood cinema.

Filmic silence can also contain a special type of silence when it breaks the fourth wall: the film silences itself and the spectators outside of the virtual film world are addressed directly (see Chapter 3, §Silence of the film itself, pp. 106-107). Video games create a world of their own as well, but a direct address of the player functions differently from a film silencing itself and breaking the fourth wall as videogames require constant interaction with the person playing the game. Silence in film, on the other hand, allows spectators to immerse themselves and, most importantly, forget themselves when watching film.

The forms of silence described above are not specifically focused on silence in film. They deal with generalities and although every silence, including cinematic silence, can be analysed through these forms, this general framework is not necessarily the right tool for the job at hand – a point I shall return to later in this chapter. Cinematic silence has been discussed by other scholars as well, and an analysis of their approaches here serves a twofold purpose: on the one hand their specific focus on silence in film might produce more nuanced analyses than the five general forms of silence discussed above, and on the other the different approaches by these scholars can highlight pitfalls that arise with the discussion of filmic silence.

Béla Balázs describes the power of silence as one of the sound film's "most specific dramatic effects" (1970, 205). Balázs argues that silence is specific to film because he juxtaposes film to the theatre stage and argues that the theatre stage is too small to register silence's "great emotional experience" (ibid., 206). Only the sound film can give silence the space it needs, as the experience of silence is also an experience of space. The sound film, as opposed to the stage, can take advantage of infinite virtual space. The more space there is, the greater the effect of silence (ibid.). The infinite space silence finds in the sound film, and consequentially the infinite

depth, is only one of the reasons why the sound film and silence are so beautifully paired.

The other reason that silence and film pair so well is the seemingly paradoxical effect a film has on silence: it gives it a tangible quality. The sound film is a medium of movement, of continuation. Any prolonged stasis disrupts this basic principle and threatens to disrupt a spectator's experience (see Chapter 5, §The temporality of silence in film, pp. 157-159). This, in contrast to the sound film's infinite space, is similar to a stage production. The action continues constantly. A long shot of a seemingly endless desert is accompanied by descriptive music. The film's sound maintains the illusion of movement. Conversely, the visible action on screen continues even if the sound track is silent. This has the effect that silence is no longer an anonymous, abstract concept, but rather it is immediately linked to the images at hand. Balázs calls this the face of silence: "In the film, silence does not halt action even for an instant and such silent action gives even silence a living face" (ibid., 207). Silence is given a "living face"; it becomes a palpable reflection of the images it accompanies. This is another reason why silence cannot be so easily dismissed as the mere absence of sound in film. It is of course an absence of sound, but more specifically it is a deliberate absence of sound that accompanies a chosen set of images.

The living face that film gives to silence offers even more possibilities to play with what Sontag called silence's "ingenious inconsistency". Different images give silence different meanings, as do different sounds preceding or following silence. The sudden silence before a murderer strikes down a victim is, in its pure physicality, the same absence of sound as the solemn silence accompanying a mourning family, yet interpreting both silences in the same way only leads to semantic confusion. Silence can have different meanings in different situations. Silence can also take different forms: it can be the silence of a character, the absence of music, or the relative quietude after an explosion.

The complete absence of sound in film is rare. A prolonged silence would break the cinematic illusion. Film creates a virtual sound world consisting of different layers and different sound effects. There is sound in the film world (diegetic sound), sound originating from outside the film world (non-diegetic sound), and the augmented sound effects (the so-called "Wilhelm scream"[3], overly loud gunshots or overly quiet

[3] A specific stock sound effect in use in Hollywood since the early 1950s. The stereotypical "aaaaargh" scream appears in over four hundred films, television episodes, and games. For an exhaustive list, see

“silenced” gunshots, the enhanced fleshy sound of a bout of fisticuffs). Film has more sound than real life in a way and, consequentially, more silence. Silence’s protean identity is reinforced by the different images it accompanies as well as by the different parts of the soundtrack it replaces. Completely silent sequences are rare in Hollywood film, but there are subtypes of silence in the soundtrack that are surprisingly common.

Writing shortly after Balázs, Noël Burch commented on the different “colors” of silence: “a complete dead space on the sound track, studio silence, silence in the country, and so forth” (Burch 1981, 100). Burch briefly mentions silence in a chapter on the structural use of sound, stating that these are but a few of the possible structural uses of silence. The occurrence of different types of silence in the soundtrack, each with different meanings and applications, has been described slightly more extensively in part by Paul Théberge (2008) and Gerry Bloustien (2010). Bloustien discusses modes of silence as a narrative function in a television show (*Buffy the Vampire Slayer*), whereas Théberge discusses different categories of silence in a more or less taxonomic approach. Claudia Gorbman (1987) succinctly describes three types of silence in film as well. She writes on silence in more general terms than Bloustien but less extensively than Théberge, as her discussion of silence is but a minor side-step in her seminal book on film music.

Bloustien’s modes of silence

Gerry Bloustien distinguishes four different modes of silence: interrupted speech flow, wordless silence, empty silence, and reflexive silence (2010, 93-96). Interrupted speech flow is the occurrence of short intermittent silences in a character’s speech as “pauses, stuttering, and faltering dialogue” (ibid., 93). These are “mini-silences”, often meant to be endearing or humorous (ibid.). They can also indicate a loss of self-control or self-possession. Bloustien explains the use of interrupted speech flow as a contrast to perfect speech and representation often found in mainstream teenage drama series. These make characters more identifiable and human, as opposed to the usual dreamy, inhuman perfection of the ideal protagonists in other American television series. The mini-silences serve to highlight the personal social anxiety of characters, which in turn humanises them.

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the Internet Movie Database (https://www.imdb.com/search/keyword/?keywords=wilhelm-scream&sort=moviemeter,asc&mode=detail&page=1).

Bloustien's second mode of silence, wordless silence, occurs "when all dialogue is removed, replaced by diegetic and non-diegetic sounds" (ibid., 94). These silences serve to express both unconscious desires and that which is "too frightening to articulate: that which has been 'silenced'" (ibid., 95, 101-102). Closely related to this mode of silence is her fourth mode of silence, reflexive silence. Reflexive silence is not a silence at all, but rather a revelation of or reflection on a taboo, on something which has been kept silent (ibid., 96). Bloustien's third mode of silence, "empty silence" is the complete absence of all sound. This is quite rare in television and she brushes over this mode rather quickly, stating that it is untenable for a long period of time (ibid., 95).

Bloustien discusses three modes of silence that require quite a bit of interpretation on the viewing subject's part, and only one mode of silence that is clearly distinguishable. It is unclear how she relates the metaphorical nature of reflexive silence as the revelation of something that was taboo or unspoken to the unspoken implications of wordless silence. The mini-silences she describes in interrupted speech flow are open to interpretation as well. Is a pause for breathing a mini-silence? Is the silence of one character in dialogue with another part of interrupted speech flow? Her third mode of silence can lead to confusion as well: even a complete absence of sound in film is of course never an "empty" silence, but rather one full of meaning and contextual relations. Bloustien's modes of silence are subjective in use and interpretation, but perhaps this is because she discusses one television show in particular, *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, rather than a general approach to silence. Bloustien's modes do highlight the ambiguity of silence and the difficulty of trying to capture this fluctuating concept in words, let alone develop a methodological framework applicable to the analysis of silence.

Gorbman's three types of silence

Claudia Gorbman briefly mentions three types of silence in her seminal book on film music. She writes that "the effect of the *absence* of musical sound must never be underestimated" (Gorbman 1987, 18, emphasis in original). Her discussion of silence is unfortunately all too brief, yet one of her types of silence directly influences one of Paul Théberge's categories of silence.

The first type of silence Gorbman mentions is "diegetic musical silence", where the "absence of that Muzak-like overlay so often thrust on the spectator's

consciousness" makes the diegetic action more immediate (1987, 18). She describes this type of silence as "diegetic musical", although the "Muzak-like overlay" is typically not part of the diegetic world. Gorbman's diegetic musical silence is the absence of film music, but the presence of other sounds. Gorbman's second type of silence is "nondiegetic silence". For Gorbman, non-diegetic silence occurs when "the soundtrack is completely without sound" (ibid.). In contrast to her first type of silence, here all sounds in the soundtrack are absent. Gorbman's last type of silence is structural silence. This indicates the absence of a musical leitmotif. It occurs "where sound previously present in a film is later absent at structurally corresponding points" (Gorbman 1987, 19). The audience is trained in Pavlovian fashion to link certain events or structures with certain sounds. Structural silence is the subversion of this Pavlovian reaction; it is a play of expectation.

Gorbman's first two types of silence are descriptions of form, where certain silences or sounds are either present or absent. Her last type of silence is the description of a narrative function, rather than form.

Théberge's categories of silence

Paul Théberge uses a more general approach to silence than Bloustien and Gorbman. He puts forward a first category of silence against which all his other categories are juxtaposed. This category, the complete absence of sound in the soundtrack, is both rarely encountered and impossible to sustain for a longer period of time. Théberge's other categories are inspired by Michel Chion's remark that silence is always the "product of a contrast" (Chion 1994, 57). Unlike Chion, who was speaking of sounds previously heard or imagined, Théberge broadens this contrast to all sounds in the film: silence is "always relative, and relational to sounds heard in the context of the film itself" (Théberge 2008, 53). Silence, for Théberge, is almost always silence *in* sound.

Relative silence

Relative silence, the first of Théberge's categories of silence, is the reduction of the soundtrack or parts of the soundtrack to near silence (ibid., 54). The possibility of doing so is greatly improved by technological advancements in sound production and reproduction, especially since the arrival of Dolby surround technology. The reduction of the soundtrack to near silence is used much more than a complete silence of the soundtrack.

The Exorcist (Friedkin, 1973), for example, uses a few instances of complete silence (see Appendix), but more often than not the soundtrack is *nearly* silenced. A few minuscule sounds drive the near-silence forward. In a scene towards the end of the film Chris MacNeil (Ellen Burstyn), the mother of the possessed child, and Father Karras (Jason Miller) are sitting downstairs in near silence. Karras is exhausted, recovering from the most recent attempt at exorcising the demon possessing the little girl. He sits at the bottom of a stairs with Chris sitting across the hall. The only audible sound is the ticking of a clock, which could be drawn directly from Béla Balázs' discussion of silence: "Silence is when […] the ticking of a clock smashes time into fragments with sledgehammer blows" (Balázs 1970, 206). Time is running out for both the child and Karras. Chris asks him whether her daughter is going to die, to which Karras answers with an emphatic "No." He stands up and turns about, during which the rustling of his cassock is briefly heard, and heads back up the stairs accompanied solely by the "sledgehammer blows" of the ticking clock. Tick… tock…., Father Karras, tick… tock….

The widespread use of relative silence as the approximation of silence through sound, rather than actually using silence, can frustrate people in the film business as well. Director Mike Figgis has always been drawn by the idea of using complete silence (Figgis 2003, 1). Each time he thought of doing so, however, he was told by sound people that it could not be done. Complete silence should be approximated through room tone, through a "quiet white noise" (ibid.). "There are two things you can't do in film", he writes: "one – never look into the lens directly […]. And the other thing you can never do is have silence" (ibid.). As time went on and he began to wonder why, Figgis was told that "you've got to have something on the soundtrack that tells you it's silence, but it's got to be a noise" (ibid.). Relative silence, therefore, can be described as the paradoxical use of sound to express silence.

Diegetic silence

Théberge's other categories of silence deal with specific parts of the soundtrack. The first of these is the removal of all diegetic sounds, leaving only non-diegetic sounds and music to accompany the action. Théberge calls this "diegetic silence" and describes it as "something of a cliché in Hollywood cinema" (Théberge 2008, 57). Diegetic silence is used to represent "the inner life of characters, their dreams, fantasies, or moments of mental anguish, but also […] any moment in which reality

exceeds our expectations, when the real becomes the surreal" (ibid.). Diegetic silence is not only a form of virtual silence, Théberge ascribes it a function quite similar to virtual silence as well. Of course, it should come as no surprise that the removal of all sounds from the film's world has an effect similar to a dream, a fantasy, or the surreal.

Diegetic silence is used to express the effacement of time and distance as well. A travel montage is often portrayed in diegetic silence, for example in the iconic opening scene of *Easy Rider* (Hopper, 1969). The diegetic silence in this scene is introduced by Wyatt (Peter Fonda) taking off his wristwatch and tossing it away. This quite literal removal of time is a bit specific perhaps, but the gesture serves a purpose: it is the visual expression of what follows in the soundtrack. As Wyatt and Billy (Dennis Hopper) drive off into the distance, time and space cease to matter. All diegetic sounds disappear and the only thing that matters is the wind in their hair and the road ahead, expressed in the soundtrack through the non-diegetic presence of Steppenwolf's *Born to be wild*: "Get your motor running…".

Musical silence

The second relational silence Théberge discusses is "musical silence", which is the absence of accompanying non-diegetic music (ibid., 58). In contrast to diegetic silence musical silence often goes unnoticed. It is less obvious because the sounds of the film world continue. Théberge attributes musical silence with a "kind of stark realism" (ibid., 59; see also Chapter 3, §iconic silence, pp. 98-100). A sudden eruption of violence can seem much more intense when non-diegetic music abruptly disappears and only the act of violence is present in the soundtrack. Quentin Tarantino might be known for his ironic use of popular music paired with violence (the Stealers Wheel *Stuck in the Middle with You* torture scene from *Reservoir Dogs* comes to mind), but Tarantino often uses musical silence to full effect as well.

In *Pulp Fiction* (Tarantino 1994) Butch Coolidge (Bruce Willis) tries to get away after failing to uphold his deal with a local gangster, Marsellus Wallace (Ving Rhames). He takes a last look on his house and drives off, singing along to The Statler Brothers' *Flowers on the Wall*. Butch comes to a stop at a red light and, while still singing along with the radio, suddenly sees Marsellus before him crossing the junction at a leisurely pace and carrying a box of donuts and some coffee. Marsellus seems to realise that something is off and slows down. He turns to look at Butch and sees him singing in his car. Marsellus exclaims a heartfelt "motherfucker" and, as The Statler

Brothers reach their third verse ("It's good to see you, I must go"), Butch hits the gas pedal and runs over Marsellus. The music, although previously diegetic, is suddenly gone. The abrupt lack of music gives the sudden eruption of violence even more intensity. This intensity is coupled in the images: as Butch runs over Marsellus the editing changes to a quick succession of cuts.

Théberge posits that musical silences are "subtle and may go largely unnoticed" because we are not accustomed to music being present all the time in most films, whereas diegetic silences "tend to be relatively obvious because they break so completely with the dominant representational mode of Hollywood realism" (2008, 58). It is of course not the amount of silence or music that matters, but rather how it is used. The contextual and narrative relations linking to both silence and sound define whether these are obvious or subtle. Musical silence is often used where the presence of music would be too obtrusive, e.g., during important dialogues. It also lends a more realistic, gritty feel to the scene, e.g., during action scenes. Musical silence is frequently used when information or continuity is otherwise present and engaging.

Diegetic silence, on the other hand, can be largely divided into two categories. In the first category diegetic silence is used subtly and it can pass by as unnoticed as musical silence. In the other category, diegetic silence focuses the attention on itself and on the characters or action it is silencing. Subtle diegetic silence is commonly used for the effacement of time and space. This is the type of silence used in travel montages, like in the example of *Easy Rider*. More often than not the diegetic silence is complemented by music in the soundtrack providing continuity, combined with long shots and a montage. The other type of diegetic silence is complemented by music as well, but it focuses the spectator's attention at the action that is silenced on screen. More often than not this type of diegetic silence is used for either a scene of mourning – typically expressed visually by slow-motion images – or a scene depicting terror, shock, awe, or oppression.

One example can be found in Alfred Hitchcock's 1958 classic *Vertigo*. As Judy (Kim Novak) prepares to go out with John (James Stewart) in a scene near the end of the film, she puts on a specific necklace whilst talking with John. The sight of the necklace triggers a sudden realisation for John. Ominous music appears in the soundtrack alongside diegetic silence when John suddenly experiences a flashback and realises he has been deceived by Judy. His shock is expressed by diegetic silence and

a zoom on the necklace, after which the image zooms out and reveals where John has seen the necklace before. John is shocked and briefly lost for words.

Dialogue silence

The next relational silence Théberge puts forward is “dialogue silence”. This silence is quite similar to Bloustien’s description of wordless silence and equally ambiguous. It is the absence of dialogue or a momentary silence in dialogue. Théberge notes that these silence are more “theatrical in character” as they can appear to be “a function of the script or to have been produced by actors in the context of performing a particular role or scene” (2008, 59). The question remains whether a spectator will pick up on this kind of silence as relevant for either narrative or structure, or whether it is simply a character expression and not related to the other sounds in the soundtrack. It is quite subjective, and consequently this ambiguity makes it difficult to use this silence consistently in analysis.

Gorbman and Théberge’s generic silence

The last category of silence that Théberge describes is based on one of Claudia Gorbman’s silences: structural silence. Théberge expands Gorbman’s structural silence into a “generic silence”, which is broadly applicable. This is a silence “specific to particular film or television genres” (Théberge 2008, 62). It is part of how audiences recognise genre conventions and categorise different kinds of films. One example Théberge offers is the absence of music during interrogation scenes in police dramas or detective films. This type of silence can be analysed as musical silence as well, highlighting the information otherwise present on screen or in the soundtrack as well as offering a realistic feel to the scene. The same is true for Gorbman’s structural silence: a leitmotif or genre cliché can be analysed as a specific type of silence in addition to its recognition as a trope.

Hearing the forest for the trees

These many different terms and classifications of silence show that discussing silence in film can be quite confusing. Gerry Bloustien puts forward the concepts of interrupted speech flow or mini-silence, wordless silence, empty silence, and reflexive silence. Paul Théberge distinguishes absolute silence, relative silence, relational silence, diegetic silence, musical silence, dialogue silence, and generic silence. Claudia Gorbman mentions diegetic musical silence, non-diegetic silence, and structural

silence. These different definitions and interpretations of silence may describe the same type of silence but call it by another name, and other times they use similar names for different silences. Silence fluctuates in both definition and meaning. Sometimes it is the silence of a dialogue, sometimes it is the absence of music, other times it is the perceived difference in volume of one sound versus another, and when it is neither of these it can still be myriad different things. Yet, for all their differences, all of these types of silence share one crucial trait: each of these silences is used as a metaphor. They each describe the use of silence *as* something.

The sole focus on metaphorical silence brings with it some immediate concerns. The first is that only meaningful silence is addressed. The possibility of a non-meaningful silence is ruled out from the start. A pause in the dialogue cannot be simply the natural flow of speech, but it is a dialogue silence: it becomes meaningful by definition alone. This allows for many forms of soft or absent sounds to be branded as a meaningful silence, but it stops short of addressing the underlying mechanics and relations that silence brings about when it is used. Pointing to the engine of a car and stating that this engine is what makes the car moves explains absolutely nothing of how it makes the car move or why, and it does not differentiate between a running engine and one that is turned off. Simply painting silences as meaningful is the same: some silences can be meaningful and their meaning is interesting, but how and why does this meaning arise?

An additional problem is that many of these silences are subjective in nature or they presume an ideal spectator-listener who identifies the absence of certain sounds as silence. In particular, defining silence as mini-silence, dialogue silence or relative silence depends on making a large number of assumptions. In order to focus on the history, theory, and analysis in the following chapters and forego otherwise unavoidable problems of semantics, it becomes paramount to outline the types of silence discussed in this thesis.

3. Analysing silence in film

Silence in film is not quite the same as silence in our daily reality. They are similar in that they can both be defined as that which they are not, i.e., sound. Silence in film, however, will always be a mechanical reproduction. This means that audiences will

experience silence in film differently from its real counterpart.[4] Walter Benjamin, when discussing film as a mechanical reproduction of art, wrote that "[e]vidently a different nature opens itself to the camera than opens to the naked eye – if only because an unconsciously penetrated space is substituted for a space consciously explored by man" (Benjamin 1968, 236-237). The same is true for the sound of the film: even the most minute sounds in film can be rewound, played back, and analysed. Silence in reality avoids attention more easily, whereas any silence in film can be attributed meaning or importance in film analysis. This is a dangerous pitfall that occurs all too often in analysis.

The problem of meaning attribution

The attribution of meaning to every silence in film is one of the problems that comes with the many types of silence put forward by Bloustien, Gorbman and Théberge. Their exhaustive approach to capturing all kinds of different silences in typologies turns each silence into a metaphor in analysis. Dialogue silence is a clear example of this. A brief silence during a dialogue is part of the natural flow of speech. It can be a meaningful symbol for oppression or power relations if context and narrative support this analysis. Discussing dialogue silence as a separate type, however, runs the risk of turning every silence during dialogue into a necessarily meaningful metaphor lest this typology no longer "works". This subverts the typology and turns it into a meaningless, hollow denominator. Every silence in film is part of a carefully constructed world, but not every silence is meaningful. Benjamin's warns against over-attributing importance to the most minute details in the conscious exploration of silence in film.

The possibility to focus on every silence in film analysis and treat it as a metaphor leads to another problem, namely that of generalisation. Whereas some of the typologies put forward by Bloustien and Théberge over-analyse the smallest difference in where silence occurs (in dialogue, in music, in volume level), other approaches focus solely on the metaphor part of analysis and turn to generalisation. Sontag's discussion of silence above comes to mind, but she is still constrained in her description of silence. A more recent and obvious example can be found in Des O'Rawe's discussion of silence. He gives examples of different silences as "aesthetic modalities, new ways of configuring alienation and fragmentation, absence and the

[4] This is true for the traditional film experience where someone watches a film on a screen. Emerging technologies like Virtual Reality might challenge this notion.

asynchronicities of Being" (O'Rawe 2006, 403). The problem here is that O'Rawe does not discuss how or why silence offers new ways of configuring fragmentation. The idea of silence as an "asynchronicity of Being" is seemingly sufficient as conclusion. The capitalisation of "Being" might lead to a Heideggerian interpretation of O'Rawe's intentions, but he makes no mention of Heidegger either. The question of why silence would be any of these things, or how, does not matter as much as the conclusion O'Rawe is able to draw from his analysis.

This type of analysis is often accompanied by what John Ó Maoilearca calls a "transcendental choice of film" (Ó Maoilearca 2009, 5). It is the practice of choosing films or examples in light of the theory the author wishes to put forward. Silence is seldom discussed as a concept capable of being all of the above examples, but more often as a specific type of silence in certain films chosen in advance (cf. Degli-Esposti 1994 on Fellini; and Fawell 1990 on Tati). These transcendental choices are only possible due to film's artificial nature; the conscious exploration of film allows analysts to pick and choose, to rewind, and to compare different silences in film.

Attributing too much meaning and importance and reducing each silence to a metaphor is the first and most obvious consequence of Benjamin's conscious exploration of film space. Generalisation of silence as a concept or cherry-picking films and silence to further a theory are other problems that follow from the same notion. All these tendencies reduce silence in film to its mere properties as reproduction, ignoring any relation to reality. The concept of silence in the age of mechanical reproduction nonetheless shares a lot of qualities – and one crucial difference – with its counterpart in reality as it is described in the first part of this chapter.

Silence in film and reality

Silence in film is, without exception, always a virtual silence in Van Elferen and my own definition. It is completely engendered by technology, as are the other visual and sonic components of the film. The physicality of the measures of tape or the bits and bytes making up the film clearly delineate the film's start and finish. As soon as the physical film starts, moreover, something quite peculiar happens: the artefact of the film gives rise to a virtuality that consists of the film's narrative world on the one hand, i.e., the diegetic world, and a layer of sound outside of this diegetic world, i.e., the non-diegetic part of a film. Sound and silence can belong to either part of the

soundtrack; they can find themselves in a grey zone in-between the diegetic and non-diegetic, and they can shatter the imagined separation of the virtual world and address the audience directly by breaking the fourth wall.

Silence in film can also be actual silence. The presence of music in some scenes and its absence during other scenes is but one simple example of an actual silence in film. Audiences can also ignore the music, focusing all their attention on the dialogue or action taking place in the scene. This type of silence is a silence by negation. Both of these examples are also virtual silence, so they would be virtual actual silence and virtual silence by negation.

There is one crucial difference between silence in reality and silence in film. Absolute silence, i.e., the absolute impossibility of sound, is not reproducible with our current film technology. The impossibility of sound can be reproduced only by completely removing the soundtrack on a physical level. This, however, would also defeat its own purpose and would not be absolute silence. Absolute silence is the impossibility of sound in a reality where sound exists. In our reality absolute silence is found some hundred kilometres away in outer space. Removing the soundtrack from a film on a physical level renders the film silent, but is no longer a silence *in* film.

The impossibility of a virtual absolute silence is the fundamental difference between silence in reality and silence in film. Silence in film is always a reproduction, a virtuality (see Chapter 5, §The reality of film, pp. 152-153). It is a silence that will always, without fail, lead to its own resolution. It is a temporary void that is soon dissolved either by the reappearance of sound in the film or by the end of the film. Silence in film will always end. Absolute silence, conversely, will never end. Worse still, absolute silence will still be there, cold and lonely, after all life on earth ends. In that way, silence in film is perhaps the furthest removed from silence in reality. Silence in film is but a temporary construct, a brief reflection of its counterpart in reality. It is never absolute, and always virtual.

The world of film creates its own virtual reality, and silence in this world can be analysed through the different forms Van Elferen and Raeymaekers put forward. This silence will always be virtual. It can also be negated, it can be actual silence, and it is all too often analysed as a metaphor. The virtuality of film leads to a combination of these forms that turns analysis into a cumbersome process, especially when these forms are combined with the types of silence put forward by Bloustien, Théberge, and Gorbman. One example will suffice to show both the impracticality of incorporating

all of these forms and types of silence in analysis, and the aforementioned problems of attribution of meaning.

The theory in practice

Ridley Scott's 1982 science-fiction epic *Blade Runner* opens with the interrogation of a man named Leon by a blade runner (a hunter of rogue androids) named Holden. Holden subjects Leon to the Voight-Kampff test in order to determine whether Leon is a replicant (an android) or not. This test takes the form of questions the subject must answer as quickly as possible. As the test is about to start Holden mentions Leon's address and before Holden can continue Leon interrupts him by saying "That's the hotel." Holden is visibly agitated by this interruption. He turns to Leon and asks: "What?". "Where I live," states Leon plainly. A brief dialogue silence is present as realisation dawns with Holden. He musters a smile and asks "Nice place?". "Yeah sure, I guess," Leon answers. "Is that part of the test?", he asks Holden in return. "No, just warming you up that's all," Holden responds. This earns a grumble from Leon. As Holden is about to ask the first question Leon continues: "It's not fancy or anything." The conversation is over for Holden, however, and he does not respond. He looks up at Leon from his test papers, draws a breath and then reads the first question of the test to him. The scene continues with the test but in this brief dialogue there are already a few dialogue silences.

Two of these dialogue silences stand out. The first of these is Holden's brief silence as he realises that Leon is talking about his hotel. Holden's confusion concerning the interruption gives way to understanding. Holden had just told Leon to answer all questions as quickly as possible. Holden then reads the address more to himself than to Leon, but Leon quickly gives the correct information. Yes, that is his hotel.

This silence can be analysed in a number of ways. It is a dialogue silence, accompanied by the absence of music. It is therefore also a musical silence. Like all silences in film, it is by nature a virtual silence. The scene's sonorous makeup, like the rest of the film, consists of intricate and subtle soundscaping. The delicate background sounds might just as well be ignored by some audience members captivated by the dialogue. This would turn it into a silence by negation. It is also the silence after Leon speaks, and before Holden breaks the silence, which makes this an actual silence as well. This first brief silence can thus summarily be analysed as a virtual actual dialogue

silence accompanied by a virtual musical silence. It can also be a virtual dialogue silence by negation.

This silence showcases Holden’s apparent contempt for Leon as well. Holden’s smile after he realises Leon is talking about the address Holden just read aloud is not a friendly smile. It is the condescending smile reserved for the dim-witted by those who consider themselves superior. Leon is portrayed as a simple working class man whereas Holden is the intelligent blade runner dressed in a bespoke suit. Holden realises Leon is following the order just given: to answer all questions as fast as possible. The reading of the address was not a question perhaps, but Leon is happy to give answers where he can. Holden’s contempt for Leon is even more clear in the second dialogue silence.

This silence occurs when Holden does not respond to Leon saying his hotel is not fancy. It is, once again, a virtual actual dialogue silence accompanied by a virtual musical silence. The symbolism of this silence is even more clear than the first example. Holden just turns to Leon with a condescending look on his face and then continues with the first question of the test. This silence is an obvious metaphor. Holden deems Leon not even worthy of a response. Leon is silenced, he is but an interrogee and Holden is there to do a job so all niceties are done and over now. The power balance is obvious: Holden is the superior, Leon is the inferior. This silence is a metaphorical virtual actual dialogue silence accompanied by a virtual actual musical silence. Depending on the spectator it can also be a metaphorical virtual dialogue silence by negation accompanied by a virtual actual musical silence.

This is but one example to show that these definitions, although perhaps technically correct, are overly specific to the point that they become too narrow and subjective to contribute meaningfully to a critical discussion of silence in film. In theory all but one of these forms and types of silence can be found in film, yet in practice the plenitude of silence types becomes a problem. Some of these types overlap, some describe the same thing with different names, and others are simply too subjective to use as a basis for the fundamental and critical analysis of silence in film. In order to avoid these dangers of definition it becomes necessary to distinguish and identify which specific types of silence shall be used throughout the rest of this thesis.

Defining silence for analysis

The types of silence I propose aim to be both less subjective in nature and more broadly applicable than the many types put forward above. These types need to be clearly distinguishable to not distract from the complex theories that follow in later chapters. The goal with proposing these types of silence is that their simplicity and relatively objective nature will allow them to be used in general discussion and in specific theoretical discussions on semiotics, affect theory, and temporality.

The film soundtrack can, by and large, be separated into two parts: the sounds that belong to the narrative world of the film and the sounds that do not belong to this narrative world of the film.[5] Sounds that belong to the narrative world of the film are diegetic sounds, e.g., speech, a gunshot, wind, or footsteps. Sounds that originate from outside of this world are non-diegetic sounds, e.g., accompanying music. From these two parts, the diegetic and non-diegetic, it is possible to distinguish three different silences: an absence of sound from the narrative world of the film, an absence of sound not originating from this world, and a complete absence of all sound in the film.

This thesis, then, will employ three terms to denote these three different types of silence. The absence of sound originating from the world of the film is a *diegetic silence*. It is a silence of and belonging to the diegetic world. A scene with only accompanying music but no other sounds would be a diegetic silence. Conversely, the absence of sound not originating in the film world is *non-diegetic silence*. It is the silence of the non-diegetic space in the soundtrack. A scene of two people talking without accompanying music or other non-diegetic sounds would be an example of non-diegetic silence. Finally, a *complete silence* is the absence of any and all sound in the film.

These silences can be identified at least somewhat objectively, they are applicable to all genres and forms of television and film and they cover both the complete absence of sound as well as silence within sound. A theoretical framework discussing these silences is also applicable to all of the smaller and more specific types of silence put forward by Bloustien and Théberge. Finally, using but three types of

[5] This distinction follows Claudia Gorbman's diegetic / non-diegetic separation as put forward in her seminal *Unheard Melodies* (1987). This distinction is firmly embedded in soundtrack analysis but not without its criticism. For a contemporary evaluation of these terms see, e.g., Neumeyer 2009. Cf. Kassabian 2001 for a point of view at odds with Gorbman's binary distinction.

silence allows for a simple and clear terminology that does not hamper but, conversely, facilitates complex discussion.

The relation of these three types of silence to their counterparts in reality is another reason to opt for their simplicity. This relation is so obvious that the mention of the realistic forms of silence becomes superfluous. Diegetic silence, non-diegetic silence, and absolute silence are all filmic silences. This means that they are all, always, a virtual silence. As this thesis deals with sound film and not silent film, each of these silences will be, at some point, resolved by sound. They are therefore also all actual silences. When these three silences are interpreted as having meaning, they are also metaphorical silences. This is usually the case, but there are plenty of silences that do not mean anything. They can be part of the natural flow of sound or speech. Discussing every silence that does not mean anything or that does not relate to other parts of the film is not particularly interesting, so most if not all of the silences that will be discussed in the other chapters can be presumed to be metaphorical in nature. Silence by negation is too subjective to include in the analyses in this thesis: it can trick spectators into perceiving even more silence than there actually is. The theories and analyses in the following chapters deal solely with silence present in the film, not silence that might be perceived. Any silence by negation experienced by spectators can still be analysed as one of the three types of silence I put forward. Finally, as already discussed above, silence in film can never be absolute. This is also the reason that the absence of all silence in film is defined as *complete* silence: I use a different term to clearly distinguish it from absolute silence.

As the other chapters of this thesis add incrementally abstract theories, this clear and concise terminology keeps the focus with the theory and application rather than with whether or not some absence of sound is a meaningful or affective silence, and whether it is also recognised, interpreted or experienced as such by the audience. The next chapter describes the history of how silence is used in Hollywood films.

When is silence (non-)diegetic? – a note on the analyses in the appendix

The history of silence as described in chapter 2 is largely based on the analysis of how the three types of silence I put forward here occur in different films throughout Hollywood's history. All the analyses of these types in different films can be found in the appendix.

These analyses gave rise to a final question regarding the occurrence of silence in film: when does diegesis start and end in film? Any attempt to analyse silence according to Gorbman's binary diegetic and non-diegetic distinction is only possible once it is clear when exactly this distinction is possible to make. This question is related to problems of film narrative and performance: what is the narrative space of a film? What is the role of spectators in viewing the film: are they active or passive? What is music's performance space? Approaches to these questions from film and music scholars can be found in, e.g., Bordwell 1985, Branigan 1992, and Small 1998, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis to address these questions as well. The approach I took to solve this problem is more practical than theoretical in nature.

The minute mathematical analyses based on Gorbman's dichotomy that serve as the foundation for much of the following chapters leave little room for abstraction but call for concise concepts that are precisely applicable. The basic question for these analyses is simply whether or not a specific sound belongs to the narrative world of the film. Such a detailed approach cannot take into account that this world might start as soon as someone hears rumours about a film, or when the lights dim in the film theatre. These analyses rely, rather, on the physicality of the film's artefact that contains sound and the attribution of any of these sounds to a diegetic or non-diegetic classification.

It is only possible to make this binary classification once diegesis has started. Before diegesis, any and every sound originates from outside of the film world. There are two main reasons not to classify these sounds as non-diegetic. The first reason is that the denominator non-diegetic makes little sense in this context if it is not opposed to its diegetic counterpart. The second reason is that the inclusion of such non-diegetic sounds would impact any comparison between films. For example, the black screen before and after the film[6] and the production companies' logos are not yet part of the film's narrative world. The well-known studio themes from 20th Century Fox, Columbia, or Metro Goldwyn Mayer are all sounds that generally precede diegesis. Including these sounds as non-diegetic in the analyses creates the impression that a film contains more diegetic silence than it actually does. It skews the results unevenly.

Many earlier films also have an overture, but not all of them are equal in length. 1939's *Gone with the Wind* and 1962's *Lawrence of Arabia* have a similar runtime,

[6] Although this distinction is rather ironic when compared to the discussion of actual silence earlier, it is unfortunately necessary.

yet *Gone with the Wind*'s overture is three minutes long, and *Lawrence of Arabia*'s overture is over four minutes and a half long. A comparison between these films that includes these pre-diegetic sounds would imply *Lawrence of Arabia* has already more diegetic silence before their respective narratives have started.

The analyses in the appendix note when diegesis starts for each film and it is only after this point that any occurrence of diegetic or non-diegetic silence is taken into account. Similarly, once diegesis stops at the end of the film – usually with the appearance of "The End" or the end credits, the exit music or music accompanying the credits is not taken into account for the same reasons. The history of silence in the next chapter therefore only discusses silence in diegesis, based on the binary distinction between diegetic and non-diegetic.

Chapter 2 – A History of Silence

– Hey, is this the moving picture ship?
– The Venture? Yep. You going on this crazy voyage?
(Opening dialogue in King Kong)

In retrospect, the opening dialogue of *King Kong* (Cooper & Schoedsack 1933) is a wonderfully multi-faceted metaphor. It achieves three goals simultaneously: it serves as narrative exposition, it invites the audience on the journey of a lifetime, and it serves as a metaphor for the film industry in general and the sound film in particular. This brief exposition and the dialogue following it introduces the audience to Carl Denham, "that crazy fella running it", who is the male protagonist in the film. Denham's thirst for shooting adventurous and exotic pictures would make a sane man turn away from this journey. These first spoken lines also invite the audience, albeit that they are only addressed indirectly, on an adventure filled with thrills and discovery. They embody a sense of wonder and amazement, apt for the time.

King Kong was released in 1933, a mere six years after the first successful sound films. It was a tumultuous time in both Hollywood and in the United States in general. 1933 would be the last year of the Prohibition era. The Great Depression after the stock market crash of 1929 was reaching ever-new heights. In Hollywood, sound carriers were competing to see which format would become the industry standard. Where at first the Great Depression seemingly did not affect cinema visits, by 1933 "[t]he film industry, which had been considered to be depression-proof, had finally run out of paying customers" (Millard 2005, 165).

Some studios survived these difficult times due to their specialties, in particular Universal Studios. The early 1930s in film were the heyday of Universal Studios' monster films: *Dracula* and *Frankenstein* were released in 1931, *The Mummy* in 1932, and in 1933 *The Invisible Man* was released. Sequels, crossovers, and new monsters such as the Wolf Man would follow, keeping Universal Studios thriving in this era. Universal was but one of the minor studios at the time, but its achievements in horror were nonetheless groundbreaking (Cooke 2008, 70).

King Kong was not a Universal Studios production but it was made by RKO. This is surprising as RKO specialised in musicals and film noir (ibid.). *King Kong*'s

lush scenery and modern art-deco style stands out against Universal's more gothic style of the time, and yet *King Kong* would go on to become one of the greatest monster films ever made. Its opening dialogue does not just invite the audience on the adventure of a lifetime in this one film, it also expresses the crazy voyage of the moving picture ship, i.e., Hollywood, in general. *King Kong* opened a mere six years after *The Jazz Singer*'s breakthrough moment for sound film.

In the grand story that is history, six years is but an infinitesimally small amount of time. Yet Hollywood transformed itself from producing almost exclusively silent films to primarily producing sound films, in a template that is still in use today, in this short time span. *King Kong* marked a culmination of different, already existing factors in a truly proper *sound track*, complete with sound effects, dialogue, and a thematic musical score. It was not the first film to feature original music, but it was the defining model "that Hollywood film music would follow for the next several decades" (Wierzbicki 2009, 130).

King Kong is often studied as the film that "almost single-handedly marked the coming-of-age of nondiegetic film music" (Cooke 2008, 88). This view is not completely unchallenged, however (cf. Slowik 2013 for an attempt to bring nuance to this view). The fact remains that *King Kong* was one of the earliest films to feature a wholly original thematic score, composed by Max Steiner. Its success and popularity established a soundtrack template that remains in use today. John Williams, Ennio Morricone, Hans Zimmer, and their colleagues still score films like Max Steiner did. Steiner himself said that what he was doing was no different from Wagner's use of the *leitmotif,* going as far as stating that if Wagner would have been his contemporary he "would have been one of the greatest picture composers that ever lived" (Schreibman and Steiner 2004, 46).

The landmark status attributed to *King Kong* is a perhaps romantic view of film music history, one that primarily serves to sustain *King Kong*'s mythos. Still, it is an incredibly important film. It brought film sound and music to the audience in a hitherto seldom encountered manner. Perhaps the film is not the actual origin story of film music, but it did firmly establish film music and film sound in the industry's and audience's mind. *King Kong* offered the full experience of the sound film as we have come to know it and truly launched the sonorous moving picture ship on its voyage. It is easy to see why *King Kong* remains so iconic: not only is it a great film, it also

established the mould that many films in the following century still follow, and all this in a relative short time after the first sound film successes.

The Jazz Singer (Crosland 1927), released but six years prior to *King Kong*, is at least as iconic as *King Kong*. It shares, in a way, a similar mythology: it was not the first moving picture to feature spoken dialogue (a few shorts released a year before have this honour), but it serves as the focal point of sound film's origins and history. Al Jolson's signature line, and one of the most cited lines in sound film history, helps to establish this mythical status: "Wait a minute, wait a minute! You ain't heard nothing yet!". It is a beautiful metaphor for the start of sound film history; it is one of the first spoken lines in cinema history and it reassured the audience that there will be plenty more to hear. Andrew Sarris' (1998) history of the early sound film even takes its title from this line. Corin Willis describes the tendency in film history to reduce *The Jazz Singer* to this line and status: "Today, […] *The Jazz Singer* remains a film to steal a line from, an emblem of the industrial shift from silent to sound cinema, rather than anything of intrinsic value" (Willis 2005, 133). Willis continues with an attempt to analyse *The Jazz Singer* in a positive light, discussing the use of Vitaphone and songs as narrative tools. The analysis I provide below discusses Crosland's use of sound and silence in *The Jazz Singer*, and how this use reflects the two idioms the film uses (silent film and sound film).

The technological changes leading to the success of the sound film have already been discussed in the introduction (pp. 5-8). This chapter focuses on the time after this pioneering period. It describes the history of sound and silence in the sound film from its early successes to the present. The tables comparing the thirty-six core films in the appendix do not include *The Jazz Singer* as it is still a hybrid between silent film and sound film. Its use of sound and silence cannot be compared to other films due to this mixture of idioms. *Frankenstein* (Whale 1931) is included as it is a complete sound film, although one lacking a musical score for the most part.

This underlines *King Kong*'s landmark status: it was not the first of anything, but it was "a greater composite soundtrack that broke considerable new ground both technically and aesthetically" (Cooke 2008, 88). The success of this composite soundtrack filled with diegetic dialogue, sound effects, and non-diegetic music firmly established the three silences discussed in the previous chapter as well. Without the presence of both diegetic and non-diegetic sound it is impossible to speak of diegetic and non-diegetic silence. *King Kong* is thus not only the film that launched a thousand

moving picture ships, it also firmly established silence as a tool to be used in the soundtrack: now that film can have diegetic and accompanying sound, where do filmmakers choose to use these sounds?

This chapter traces the journey the sound film has undertaken in the last ninety years. It follows its travels through changing socio-cultural contexts and emerging technologies, looking at the use of silence in particular. This history is based primarily on the analysis of thirty-six sound films from different times and genres (see Appendix), hoping to encompass most of what Hollywood has had to offer until now. This chapter combines the results of these analyses with an informed reading of the socio-economical, cultural, and technological contexts of the different films. History rarely conforms to the nicely demarcated periods we imagine it to be; a nicely ordered, straightforward sequence of logical interpretations and consequences. The history written here is no different.

1. 1927-1933: The silence of the early talkies

The history of the early Hollywood sound films as I have told it thus far, and as it can be found in a myriad of histories, is one example of such a logical sequence. First there was the silent film, and then there was the sound film. It might describe the period between 1927 and 1933 as tumultuous and one of drastic change, but this is a mere romanticised view after the fact. It fails to describe where and how sound film originated. This view also treats the emerging sound film as a kind of Other to the silents, a Homo Sapiens that eradicated the Neanderthal that was silent film. The sound film was far from a completely different species. In truth the visual and narrative style of the early Hollywood sound films was the same as that of the silent films of the twenty years before, and sound in film was not a radical new discovery. *The Jazz Singer* is an emblematic case in point; the combination of two different idioms – silent film and sound film – does not produce a grotesque monstrosity filled with inner contradictions. Stylistically, the film is fairly standard.

***The Jazz Singer*: where silent and sound idiom meet**

The Jazz Singer is only part-talkie, and its peculiar mixture of idioms make it difficult to convincingly analyse the film's silences. The majority of the film belongs squarely to the silent film idiom. There are only a few key scenes with synchronised sound.

These few scenes with sound are nonetheless the main reason for the film's major success and mythical status. In these scenes the clash of synchronised sound and the silent film idiom results in a grey area where no clear boundaries can be drawn to mark a silence as either part of the silent film idiom or as diegetic.

The first silence seemingly not belonging to the silent film idiom in *The Jazz Singer* appears around fifteen minutes into the film (counting intro music), when cantor Rabinowitz (Warner Oland) is singing a hymn. The music accompanying the silent film idiom disappears and the audience is apparently left with diegetic music and singing. Upon closer inspection, however, it is clear that the cantor is lip-syncing. Whilst the song and music might be considered diegetic, the sound here is still part of the silent film idiom. The hymn is actually sung by the film's star, Al Jolson, not by Warner Oland. It can be argued that this silence is diegetic because the synchronisation gives the audience the illusion of diegetic sound. The soundtrack lacks any other diegetic sounds, which, as the image cuts to young Jake (Bobby Gordon) in his parents' apartment, would make the silence in this scene simultaneously the first diegetic silence in the film as well. As young Jake enters his parents' apartment he closes the door, walks around, takes up a photograph, looks at it, and puts it back, and all this in apparent silence. The only sound in the soundtrack is still Jolson's rendition of *Kol Nidre* (the cantor's hymn). The interesting question here is not whether this silence is diegetic or belongs to the silent film idiom, but rather whether it is possible to speak of sonorous diegesis in the silent film idiom at all.

The first silence clearly no longer belonging to the silent film idiom appears when Jakie Rabinowitz (Al Jolson), performing as his alter ego Jack Robin, sings two cabaret songs in a bar: *Dirty Hands, Dirty Face* and *Toot, Toot, Tootsie (Goo'Bye)*. Intertitles announce his performance, and as the last intertitle before his performance appears ("Wish me luck, Pal – I'll certainly need it."), applause appears in the soundtrack and the synchronous music accompanying the silent film disappears. When Jack takes to the stage the music present in the soundtrack is played by the small orchestra behind him and his singing is clearly diegetic. The songs Jolson sings in the film were recorded live on set (Cooke 2008, 51). The big shocker for contemporary audiences came in between the songs, when Jolson utters his by then signature line "Wait a minute! Wait a minute! You ain't heard nothin' yet!" and turns to talk to the orchestra, instructing them to play *Toot, Toot, Tootsie* and telling them he will whistle the third verse. Cooke describes the effect as "not so much of *hearing* Jolson speak as

of *overhearing* him speak" (ibid., emphasis in original). Although Jolson's "Wait a minute!" line is often commented upon and sometimes described as prophetic (MacGowan 1955, 144), Cooke suggests that it was the other lines of dialogue that surprised audiences. The "Wait a minute! You ain't heard nothin' yet!" line was, by then, a signature line of Jolson, one he always uttered during his stage act. It was a tag line in the vaudeville tradition, similar to Bugs Bunny's "What's up, Doc", and audiences might have commented if the film had *not* featured this line (ibid.). As Jolson speaks these lines there is no music present in the soundtrack. This is the first time in the film that there is no synchronised music, placing the sonorous focus with Jolson's lines and reinforcing the idea of overhearing him speak to the audience and the orchestra. This is no longer a performance and a signature line that can be interpreted as a direct address to the audience, but this is actual dialogue: Jolson turns away from the audience and he continues to be heard.

The mixture of the silent film idiom and the then not yet established sound film idiom gives rise to some confusing silences in *The Jazz Singer*. In particular the scene where Jakie goes back to his parents' apartment and reunites with his mother (Eugene Besserer) is quite puzzling in this regard. The scene starts as a traditional silent film scene with synchronised music and dialogue shown on intertitles. Jolson's signature line returns here as an intertitle: "Mama -- you ain't heard nothing yet!". With the last intertitle of their conversation ("I'll sing you one of the songs I'm going to try out-") the synchronised music disappears and the spectator is left in silence. The next two seconds we see Jake acting out the intertitles, confirming this silence as part of the silent film idiom. In the subsequent five silent seconds he leads his mother to a chair and Jakie starts singing while accompanying himself on the piano. As there is no sound in the soundtrack of footsteps or of Jakie and his mother sitting down, it can be argued that the five silent seconds preceding this singing are still part of the silent film idiom. It is only with the first piano sounds that this idiom is challenged. Halfway through his rendition of *Blue Skies*, Jolson engages in an actual dialogue with his mother while pianissimo continuing the left hand piano part of the song, effectively providing background music for the dialogue himself. All sounds here are diegetic, establishing the absence of other sounds as non-diegetic silence.

Suddenly Jakie's father walks in and yells "Stop!" while he is playing and singing for his mother. Here the mixture of silent film idiom and diegetic sound becomes truly confusing. For no less than sixteen seconds after this exclamation there

is a complete absence of sound in the film, which is echoed by a visible stillness with Jakie, his mother, and his father intently staring at each other but not moving much. After sixteen seconds, we see Jakie's father mouthing some words, confirming the spectator that the film has returned to the silent film idiom rather than staying in diegesis. Synchronised music returns, and the silent film idiom remains unchallenged until the final fifteen minutes of the film when Jolson performs his often discussed blackface songs (cf. Rogin 1992, which focuses on the relation between racism, blackface, and being Jewish in the 1920s).

The two silences surrounding the scene where Jakie reunites with his mother and sings for her are emblematic of the challenge to the silent film idiom. Although these are both complete silences, the absence of all sound in the soundtrack floats between the silent film idiom and that of the newly arriving sound film. The prolonged silence after Jakie's father yells "Stop!" is particularly effective as it clearly serves a dramatic purpose: Jakie's singing and playing are silenced and the dialogue with his mother is ended. It is telling that from its very inception the sound film would utilise silence as a dramatic tool. A year after *The Jazz Singer* the first full talkie was released and with the switch of Hollywood to the sound-on-film technique and the recording of the soundtrack on set, the silent film idiom started to disappear. It is with the disappearance of the silent film that silence materialised and arrived on set as an integral part of the soundtrack.

The apparent irony in the above statement that silence only appears after the expiry of the silent film is due to the apparent misnomer of the latter: the audience's experience of these films was never silent (cf. Introduction, pp. 5-6). *The Jazz Singer* is a perfect example of this: instrumental scores accompanying the silent film parts existed before the sound film and audiences were not surprised by this use of music at all. It was the act of "overhearing" the actors that was truly shocking to audiences at the time. Stylistically, both the visual style and the use of symphonic accompaniment in *The Jazz Singer* and the sound films that would follow it were well established in the silent film idiom. Nevertheless, the use of synchronised sound-on-film did have a direct and immediate effect on the sound cinema's aesthetic compared to its silent counterpart.

Changing sound technologies

None of the technical innovations from the silent film era initially survived as the production process completely changed by 1930. Recording the optical soundtrack was initially only possible on set, simultaneous with the camera recording the visual image (Cooke 2008, 52). This brought other technical problems with it, directly impacting the sound film's visual and sonic style. Cameras were bulky and noisy, and microphones were omnidirectional: they picked up all sounds on set. To prevent the microphones from picking up the whirring of the cameras as they filmed, the big cameras were put in massive sound-proofed booths. These booths had wheels and the cameras could be moved, but the primary use of moving the cameras was to place them between setups. They were generally "too noisy and awkward for tracking shots" (Thompson and Bordwell 2003, 198). The big booths remained stationary during filming, but the cameras could move a little inside of the booths. A first influence of the new sound technology on the visual style of film was that short pans became more prevalent than during the silent era (ibid.). Wider pans or moving shots were difficult with the large camera booths. Hollywood's switch to sound resulted in a change from moving camera work to static indoor work on sets (Maltby 2003, 241).

This is one of the reasons that the sound film was initially met with resistance and disapproval from film makers and critics: the primitive recording technology required a largely unchanging camera view. Imaginative use of the camera was "abandoned in favour of static, theatrical blocking of the action in which everything was dependent on the location of the fixed microphones" (Cooke 2008, 54).

In the early years of sound film mixing multiple sound tracks together was impossible. All the sounds of a single scene had to be recorded simultaneously. If music or sound effects were required, they had to be played near the set as the scene was filmed. The microphone's placement dictated the action on screen. These microphones were not only omnidirectional, they were also insensitive. Studios increasingly required actors to "take diction lessons and speak slowly and distinctly" (Thompson and Bordwell 2003, 196-8).

Two other aesthetic factors resulting from the switch to sound are more directly related to the research at hand. The synchronised and diegetic soundtrack gave rise to the possibility of dramatic use of silence. Indeed, by 1930 filmmakers began using "passages of silence [that] were different from the silence of the part-talkie because they used the absence of dialogue for dramatic contrast" (Crafton 1997, 16). Crafton

is talking about diegetic silence, but this would, at the time, be the same as a complete silence.

The other influence from early sound technology on the sound film's aesthetic was that non-diegetic sound was (temporarily) abandoned. Cooke attributes the avoidance of non-diegetic sound to "disappointing recording fidelity" and an interest in realism, where "music that appeared to emanate from the motion picture itself could [...] be better justified if it were strictly diegetic in origin" (2008, 56). Interestingly, the avoidance of non-diegetic sounds (i.e., non-diegetic silence) is still strongly linked to a sense of realism in contemporary films (see also Chapter 3, §Iconic silence, pp. 98-100). This is also one of the reasons for the emergence of the musical as genre: it combined the presentation of diegetic songs and music with the narrative of the feature film.

The avoidance of non-diegetic sound to present realism cannot explain the success of Universal's horror films, however. On the contrary, Michael Slowik discusses Hollywood's early use of music in terms of other worlds, meaning either geographically exotic locations or the world of dreams and fantasy and describes how these horror films would seemingly be ideal vessels for non-diegetic music:

> while Universal horror films like *Dracula* (February 1931) or *Frankenstein* (November 1931) would seem to be good candidates for nondiegetic music because of their presentations of supernatural scenarios, the films' relatively low budgets likely explain their avoidance of this device. Instead, [...] other elements like muteness and the separation of voice and body helped convey a sonic 'uncanny' or 'otherworldliness' (Slowik 2014, 228)

Slowik offers budget constraints as a reason, rather than fidelity or, certainly less applicable to horror films, an interest in cinematic realism. Whatever the reasons might have been, the films released between 1929 and 1933 rarely featured non-diegetic sound apart from introductory music and exit music.

A few important technological advances in the early 1930s changed sound film production for the better (cf. Thompson and Bordwell 2003, 196-220; and Purcell 2007, 9). Separate tracks of sound could now be recorded and mixed together in a single, final soundtrack. Unidirectional microphones were developed which could be pointed at specific sound sources, resulting in quieter sound tracks that could be mixed

together more easily. Arc lights became quieter so they could be used in sound film, resulting in a better image. The adaptation of the Moviola editing device for sound film allowed for greater control and synchronisation. The use of edge numbers on both image and sound negatives resulted in even better synchronisation. Fine-grain film stock resulted in both better looking prints and better sounding soundtracks. All these changes took place in a relative short time span and would remain standard practice for the next few decades (Purcell 2007, 9).

Non-diegetic sound firmly returned by 1933. Max Steiner's 1933 film score for *King Kong* is "one of the most analyzed and revered scores in film history", and for many scholars "definitely and single-handedly marks the emergence of the classical Hollywood score" (Slowik 2014, 229-30). By 1933 the three types of silence I am concerned with were firmly established. Whilst *King Kong* does not feature any complete silence, it does use both diegetic and non-diegetic silence for dramatic effect. From *The Jazz Singer* to *King Kong* is but six years, but in terms of aesthetic and technological changes the sound film in 1933 is hardly recognisable from its early successful iterations. Even the changes from 1931 to 1933 are quite telling. *King Kong* featured a wholly new, up-to-date approach to sound and its combination of thematic music, sound effects, and diegetic sound appears much more modern than *Frankenstein*, despite the fact that the latter was released but two years prior to the former.

A comparison of *Frankenstein* and *King Kong* shows the impact of these rapid changes in sound technology on the use of silence in the sound film. The early 1930s saw the first uses of silence in dialogue as dramatic contrast, as opposed to the ever silent dialogues of the silent film. The silence in *The Jazz Singer* after Jakie's father yells "Stop!" is quite dramatic as well, but it cannot be stated with certainty whether this silence belongs to the silent idiom or the sound idiom. The few scenes in *The Jazz Singer* featuring diegetic sound are all comprised of diegetic sound without accompanying non-diegetic music. This was due to technical limitations and, sound quality notwithstanding, makes these scenes sound quite a bit like the use of sound in *Frankenstein*.

Frankenstein (1931)

Mark Cousins describes *Frankenstein* as "hugely influential" and "early cinema's greatest essay in prejudice" (2012, "The new American sound genres"). This might be

true for its impact on horror and the career of Boris Karloff, but the use of silence and sound in the film is not as influential. There is only a single instance of diegetic silence during *Frankenstein*'s runtime and it does not accompany any narrative imagery: one minute of diegetic silence is present during the opening titles, which appear after diegesis has already begun. This is because the film opens with Edward Van Sloan appearing from behind a curtain. He, on behalf of the director, warns the audience in a direct address that what they are about to see is truly horrifying – the audience has been warned. The actual opening titles then commence, featuring about a minute of music. The music then disappears, only to return during the end credits. Non-diegetic silence is constantly present during the narrative, sometimes changing into complete silence. The lack of any accompanying music makes it difficult to consider the non-diegetic silences as truly meaningful. It is perfectly possible that the film's director wanted to convey a sense of realism, as Cooke might argue – although it is doubtful whether the fantastical nature of *Frankenstein* supports a realistic approach. The absence of non-diegetic music is more likely due to a combination of budget constraints, as Slowik argues, and technological limitations.

There are ten moments in the film when the ever-present non-diegetic silence turns into a complete silence as any diegetic sound disappears. The shortest of these silences is but two seconds long, and the longest lasts a respectable thirty-eight seconds. All in all the complete silences comprise slightly less than three percent of the film's runtime, a little under two minutes total. Of these ten complete silences, the first four accompany either establishing shots and/or cuts between scenes.

The first complete silence appears with a shot of the "Goldstadt medical school" plaque, a good six minutes into the film. It is both a cut from the scene with grave robbers as well as an establishing shot of where the next scene takes place. The next three complete silences are again present with longer black cuts that separate scenes. Modern films would feature less black transition screen, if any at all, and more suturing sound. Each of these cuts features a sometimes lengthy black screen and a still shot opening the new scene. It is likely that the editing was under budgetary constraints as well.

The fifth complete silence in the film, on the other hand, is very interesting. It does not accompany a black screen transition between scenes, but it is present during a few rapid cuts in the middle of a scene. It is the first, possibly meaningful, complete silence in the film and one that works as well in 1931 as it does in modern horror films.

As Henry Frankenstein and doctor Waldman debate the former's creation, the creature is heard coming up the stairs. Frankenstein says "here he comes", and both turn to the door. The only audible sounds are heavy, thumping footsteps as the monster comes up. Frankenstein's creation enters the room backwards, dragging his feet and slowing down before it turns around. Still, the only audible sounds are these footsteps, resounding ever slower in its surrounding silence like the funeral tolling of a bell. The monster turns around and stops and with it any diegetic sound is now gone. Silence engulfs the audience as the monster's face comes into view for the first time. The image then abruptly cuts to a close up, and then immediately to an extreme close-up of the monster's face in complete silence. The effect is quite startling. The silence surrounding these cuts intensifies the visual shock of the monster's disfigured and distorted face. This is, in this corpus of films, the first silence accompanying a horrific moment. This example is not unlike the use of silence in modern horror, where silence still accompanies or announces frightening moments. In fact, this specific coupling of jarring close-ups and silence is copied almost exactly in Sam Raimi's 2009 horror film *Drag Me To Hell* (it appears a good 32 minutes into the film).

Shortly after this scene Frankenstein's monster is shown in complete silence again, when Henry opens a shutter and the monster tries to grab the light. The silence accompanying this particular moment is the longest of the film and reinforces the eerie nature of bringing this unnatural creation into the light of the outside world. The next complete silence is once again present with a scene transition: it accompanies a cut to an establishing medium-long shot of the monster as it is examined. The silence briefly after this one is peculiar as well: doctor Waldman is examining the monster and writes his findings down in a book. The writing is shown in close-up of a pen writing on paper so that the audience can read, but no sounds are heard. Similar scenes in *Gone with the Wind*, released eight years later in 1939, are accompanied by non-diegetic music. The absence of music in this scene might simply be due to the limited budget of the film.

Sounds return as the scene continues and doctor Waldman walks back to the monster. The doctor soon moves his head to the monster's chest. The last complete silence of the film appears as the doctor holds his head close to the monster. Unbeknownst to him, the monster slowly raises its arm behind the doctor's back. No sounds are audible as the audience is witness to the doctor's impending doom. This silence serves as a sonic announcer of death, a function and type often repeated in later horror films. The silence only recedes when the monster grabs the doctor by the neck.

There are no sounds of struggle, only the last futile grasps of breath of the dying doctor pierce the ominous silence as the creature strangles him.

It is interesting to see that *Frankenstein*, despite a tight budget and few options for the creative use of sound, is still able to use at least two rather convincing complete silences for dramatic effect. The silence accompanying the close-up and extreme close-up of the monster's face is truly unsettling. The last complete silence warning of the doctor's impending demise is similar to the manner in which silence is still used in horror today. Most of the other silences accompany black screen transitions and cuts to new scenes. *King Kong*, released but two years later, features a completely different soundtrack. The technological advances brought with them greater control over the film's soundtrack, and the differences with *Frankenstein* are striking.

King Kong (1933)

The biggest difference between *Frankenstein* and *King Kong* is the absence of any complete silence whatsoever in the latter. This is perhaps partly due to the presence of non-diegetic underscoring, filling the sonorous void when diegetic sounds disappear. It is probably also due to the absence of any prolonged fades into black as they are found in earlier films like *Frankenstein*. Scene transitions in *King Kong* are generally solved with dissolves. Diegetic sounds do not disappear and the sounds from the next scene follow the sounds of the previous scene rather effortlessly. This already showcases the tremendous improvement in soundtrack editing; the sound engineers now had much greater control over where and how they implemented sound and silence.

King Kong is the breakthrough soundtrack that combines music, dialogue, and sound effects. The presence of music is almost overwhelming. Non-diegetic silence comprises only a third of the film. This is quite a bit under the average for the past ninety years. The music in *King Kong* can even be tiring at times as it is almost incessantly present. Although the empirical data indicates that only two-thirds of the film features non-diegetic accompaniment, a closer look shows that the placement of music in the film is heavily skewed.

After the opening titles the intro music fades away and non-diegetic silence is present for over eighteen minutes. The whole first act of the film that takes place in New York, where Denham searches for his leading lady, lacks any musical backing. Non-diegetic music only reappears as the moving picture ship has sailed and their

crazy journey has begun. For the rest of the film, musical underscoring is constantly present. This ranges from orchestral non-diegetic music, to mickey-mousing certain movements, to transitioning into or blending with “native” diegetic music on Skull Island. From the moment that they sail from New York, any illusion of reality is done away with as music is nearly ever-present.

There are a few key moments when the music does halt for a moment, and two scenes where music is absent for a prolonged period of time (nearly three minutes in both scenes). These key moments are brief pauses in the otherwise foregrounded musical score, giving the impression of silence piercing the unbreakable wall of sound that is present for the most part. One of these brief non-diegetic silences appears when the dinosaur the crew encounters eats one of their crew members. The man was trapped in a tree and while the dinosaur attacks him, the music crescendos and then suddenly stops. As the dinosaur devours him, only the cries and wails of the crew member resound in the sudden void of non-diegetic silence. This silence lasts but a few seconds before the music goes into a cadence, offering closure on the crew member’s death, before continuing.

The next brief non-diegetic silence is a similar scene. Kong chases two crew members onto a tree log that spans a gorge below. The music swells and mimics Kong picking up the tree and shaking it. The first crew member falls off while the music still crescendos. The music then stops and non-diegetic silence appears. Kong throws the tree log into the ravine below, killing the second crew member. Once again the final cries of the crew member pierce the sudden musical silence.

There are two interesting non-diegetic silences that are much longer. The first of these appears as Ann Darrow (Fay Wray) is attacked by the Tyrannosaurus Rex and Kong comes to her rescue. Kong’s fight with the T-Rex fully takes place in non-diegetic silence, reinforcing the grittiness of the fight between the two giants. The adventurous notion of the expedition is done away with as the music stays absent for nearly three minutes. This is a fight to the death between two magnificent beasts. One fights for food, but the other for love. The absence of music during gritty fights is a notion that returns in a lot of later films and it is one of the many tropes that can be associated with silence. Only after Kong finally emerges victorious and stands tall as king of Skull Island’s jungle, beating his own chest, non-diegetic music slowly fades in again.

A similar scene takes place near the end of the film. Kong flees up the Empire State Building in New York, his climb shown in an extreme long shot in diegetic silence. Soon after he reaches the towering peak aeroplanes start attacking him. Music once again recedes and a prolonged non-diegetic silence of nearly three minutes reinforces the despair of Kong's ultimate fight. These are Kong's final throes. The displaced king of Skull Island cannot survive in New York's urban jungle. Music returns as the dying Kong tenderly puts Ann down before falling down the Empire State Building. The non-diegetic silence reinforces the urgency of Kong's fight to the death in the same way it underscored Kong's fight with the T-Rex.

The presence of musical underscoring for most of the film allows the filmmakers to use diegetic silence as well. The first diegetic silence in the film takes place during the establishing shots of the first scene as the intro music comes to its conclusion. The second diegetic silence is quite a bit more interesting. It appears after Denham and the crew find Ann missing, kidnapped by Kong. They organise an expedition to search and retrieve Ann. Diegetic sounds disappear for the next two shots as the crew is shown running through the jungle in two different shots. This diegetic silence accompanies a brief erasure of time and space. It is a short montage, sutured together by the non-diegetic music. It is quite interesting that the first meaningful diegetic silence in *King Kong* already features this use of silence, as the use of diegetic silence during a montage to reflect an unnatural flow of time and space becomes standard practice in later films.

A similar diegetic silence appears much later in the film, after Denham and his crew have captured Kong. Denham promises riches to his crew and states that in a few months' time Kong, the eighth wonder of the world, will be put on display for the whole world to see. Diegetic silence then accompanies the dissolve to the next scene. It shows "Kong, the eighth wonder of the world!" on the front of a theatre, with shots of crowds lining up for Denham's amazing catch. Indeed, a few months have suddenly passed and the crew is back in New York again with Kong.

Frankenstein and *King Kong* share some similar themes in their use of silence. Silence as a sonorous metaphor for death in particular, or impending doom, stands out in both films. *Frankenstein* uses complete silence to announce the death by strangulation of doctor Waldman. In *King Kong* the different deaths of crew members is accompanied by sudden non-diegetic silences piercing the otherwise omnipresent musical score. *King Kong* features a more complex soundtrack and, by extension, a

more varied use of silence. Especially the use of diegetic silence during a montage and the use of non-diegetic silence during two gritty fights to the death is striking, as these are tropes still found in modern films. It is of note that the use of complete silence disappears in *King Kong* as the distinction between diegetic and non-diegetic sounds and silence becomes more readily available for use. *King Kong* is as important for the history of silence as it is for the history of sound: common tropes like a semblance of reality, the use of silence during a montage, grittiness, and death are all present this film already. For much of the next ninety years these themes will count among the most common applications of silence in the sound film.

2. 1933-1958: Business as usual

The changes in sound technology of the early thirties had a lasting impact on sound production and editing in Hollywood. After this initial period of rapid change and innovation, sound editing will not "substantively change for more than 20 years" (Purcell 2007, 9). The 1930s is "the decade that established principles of multitrack sound that still govern film production" (Balio 1993, 124). Despite constant improvements in technology, the style of Hollywood never really changes. Why would it? The people working in Hollywood are still the same people that worked there before, they are simply using new technologies.

Max Winkler, credited with the invention of the cue sheet which allowed live music to be played more or less in sync with silent films, remembers the impact of emerging sound vividly. His entire stock of music for the silent films becomes all but worthless almost overnight, but the film industry does not radically change at all:

> And then the talkies, which had dealt me so crushing a blow, helped me to catch my breath. The film companies soon realized that nobody could better help them with their new, uncharted task of fitting music to the sound track of pictures, than the men who had done the same type of work for silent pictures. [...] And what was more logical than for [these men] to fall back on the material they had used in the past and knew so well – the mood music, dramatic and incidental, that would fit the situation in sound pictures as it had fitted the situation in silent ones? (Winkler 2012, 12)

The new sound film offered the same visual narrative continuity as the silent film, and the sounds it produced are inherited from the silent tradition as well. The improvements in sound technology simply “reinforced the basic assumptions of Hollywood’s stylistic tradition” (Balio 1993, 125). After the rapid changes between 1927 and 1933 the dust settles, and what emerges is simply more of the same.

King Kong is the case in point of this evolution: it became the industry standard for the combined soundtrack of dialogue, sound effects, silence, and music. Its soundtrack is revered, its status mythical (see above). It established a format that remains largely unchanged in the following decades: it was the film that defined what Hollywood would look and sound like. Its visual style, however, was hardly new. Visually, *King Kong* builds on films like *The Lost World* (Hoyt 1925). *King Kong*’s music was composed in the same symphonic style that accompanied the silent films. Steiner never shied away from discussing the similarities in his use of underscoring to earlier composers like Wagner and their use of the *leitmotif*. It should come as no surprise that, by and large, the films of the next few decades use silence in a manner similar to *King Kong* as well. There is one genre of films that does establish a completely different approach to silence: comedy.

Silence in comedy

The Marx Brothers’ *A Night at the Opera* (Wood 1935) was released two years after *King Kong*, although its editing style is more reminiscent of *Frankenstein* than of *King Kong*. Scenes frequently fade to a black screen as transition to the next scene, this fade accompanied by complete silence. The film features very little non-diegetic music. The large presence of non-diegetic silence might also be due to the rapid-fire dialogues and witty humour, where the choice to abstain from music was made to allow the audience to focus on the comedy. All attention is focused on the diegetic sounds and dialogue, so accompanying music is hardly needed. The greatest difference between *A Night at the Opera* and the other films discussed so far is the use of silence, and complete silence in particular, after punch lines.

There are a lot of complete silences in the Marx Brothers’ film, and these silences often come after the punch line of a joke or visual gag. In a way, these silences are a direct address to the audience: yes, you can laugh now. This direct address is sometimes echoed by the actions of the characters, where a character looks directly into the camera after making a joke. This type of silence is interesting, and quite

different from any other use of silence, because it incorporates the audience in the soundtrack. The film makers clearly calculated in the laughter of the audience and allowed them a few seconds to appreciate a joke before continuing with the film. These "punch line silences" are present in later humorous films as well.

Aside from these punch line silences there is little meaningful silence in *A Night at the Opera*. Non-diegetic silence is continuously present, and diegetic silence is hardly every present. The few diegetic silences that are present are of note, however, particularly those in scenes where Tomasso (Harpo Marx) plays an important role. Harpo Marx never speaks in his roles, in contrast to the verbal humour of his brothers. This is reflected in the diegetic silence in scenes where his character Tomasso is important. Tomasso's pantomime style does not require diegetic sounds; it is perhaps even stronger without them, and thus these sounds are absent. The diegetic silence reflects his comedy style and allows his character to shine in what he does best. Tomasso's silence even becomes a plot device at a certain point in the film when it gets them into trouble.

1944's *The Miracle of Morgan's Creek* (Sturges) is a screwball comedy released almost ten years after *A Night at the Opera*. Twelve minutes into the film it is clear that this film uses punch line silences as well. They are not as frequently present as in the Marx Brothers' film, but the film does not hide its attention to and incorporation of the audience. As Emmy Kockenlocker (Diana Lynn) makes her father the butt of a joke, all sounds disappear after the punch line. Her father then turns to the camera in silence and places his hands in his side as if to gesture to the audience: "Can you believe this?"

The second complete silence in this film appears with a visual gag. Norval (Eddie Bracken) is waiting for Trudy (Betty Hutton) to return with his car, and the music is mickey-mousing his actions. Norval paces around and decides to sit down on a bench. As he sits down the music abruptly stops and Norval jumps up in complete silence: he sat on something! The music then continues mickey-mousing his actions. Rather than verbal comedy, this complete silence highlights a visual punch line. The third complete silence combines the already established trope of shocked silence with a visual gag. Norval accidentally fires a gun and is visibly shaken. After the gunshot a complete silence underscores Norval's shock and intensifies his visual reaction to the shock as he walks inside with funny and erratic movements.

The diegetic silences in *The Miracle of Morgan's Creek* are also interesting. They appear quite a few times to express sadness or pensiveness, underscored by minor key music. This might come as a surprise considering the film is a comedy, but these scenes express the often dire outlook of Trudy and Norval's situation. In modern films this use of silence is commonplace as well. It usually occurs in scenes where grief or despair is expressed and often combines diegetic silence with slow-motion images (see Chapter 3, §The symbol, pp. 91-93).

The other diegetic silences in the film are already established uses of silence: they accompany montages or appear with newspaper headlines (akin to the use of diegetic silence with text on paper for the audience to read). One montage does stand out among the others. It takes place near the end of the film, as Trudy is giving birth to her children. Around the ninety minute mark Norval and Trudy's family are pacing around in the hospital, waiting for her childbirth to end. The image turns a clock and as the diegetic sound drops away the clock hands suddenly move very quickly. In this scene both image and sound express the erasure of time.

Abbott and Costello's peculiar *Abbott and Costello Meet Frankenstein* is released four years later, in 1948. The film is a strange combination of two genres: it is part horror and part comedy. It is not exactly horror-comedy, as in a funny film with horror characters. It is more a combination of two different films: the first half of the film is a comedy, whereas the latter part of the film belongs more in the horror style of Universal Studios' other monster films. The use of silence in this film reflects this strange marriage as well.

The first part of the film features punch line silences with Abbott and Costello's typical humour: "I'm a union man, I only work sixteen hours a day. –What are you talking about, a union man only works eight hours! –I belong to two unions!", after which a few seconds of complete silence underscore the punch line. The music frequently underscores visual humour in the first half of the film, mickey-mousing the characters' movements with plenty of diegetic silence during these visual gags.

In the second half of the film both the visual and sonorous styles turn towards the horror genre rather than comedy. Punch lines are less frequently present and no longer underscored. Diegetic silence is now predominantly used with weird or supernatural events. This silence appears when Dracula (Bela Lugosi) hypnotises someone, when he turns into a bat to fly away, or when Talbot (Lon Chaney Jr) turns into the Wolf Man. The use of silence to convey a psychic occurrence or a sense of

otherworldliness occurs much more in the horror or thriller genre than it does in comedy. As the film switches dominant genre, so does its use of silence. The second half features almost none of the earlier examples of silence in comedy films and displays rather traditional use of silence, similar to that found in other non-comedic genres.

Silence in classical Hollywood

Gone With The Wind (Fleming 1939) was released eight years after *King Kong* and was scored by Max Steiner as well. The use of diegetic silence in this film is quite reminiscent of *King Kong*. Close-ups of letters for the audience to read are underscored by music and diegetic silence. This type of silence is also present with the many intertitles advancing the story. Right before the intermission starts, a longer diegetic silence is present in the film underscoring the despair of Scarlett O'Hara (Vivien Leigh) as she looks for food. She ultimately finds a root and eats it. Diegetic sounds then return as she launches into her short but determined "as God is my witness, I'll never be hungry again" monologue. This marks the end of the first part of the film and an intermission follows. The only complete silence in the film marks the transition into the intermission here: as the screen fades to black all sounds disappear before the intermission music starts.

Not too long after the intermission a Yankee invades Scarlett's home. As he walks up the stairs and advances on Scarlett, she points a rifle at him and pulls the trigger. The non-diegetic music abruptly cuts off and the gunshot resounds loudly in the sudden non-diegetic silence. The violence of the shot reflects Scarlett's plight: in the brutal American civil war even Southern Belles like Scarlett O'Hara are confronted with violence.

A familiar diegetic silence appears at two hours and eleven minutes into the film: when Scarlett's father dies, all diegetic sounds disappear to underscore his demise, and a montage in the next few cuts takes advantage of this diegetic silence. The use of silence to express death is used again later in the film, only this time it is the threat of death that accompanies silence. After Scarlett attacks Rhett (Clark Gable), she falls down the stairs. Diegetic sounds disappear as Rhett rushes after her. In Max Steiner's typical fashion the music follows Rhett down the stairs in a descending arpeggio. The diegetic silence in this scene reinforces the impact of the cut to a close-up of Scarlett's possibly lifeless face.

By 1939 the use of different types of silence to underscore specific situations is already quite commonplace. Silence is used with themes like death, grittiness, a sense of reality (or conversely, a sense of the supernatural), and the erasure of time and space in a montage. In the following years, films in a variety of genres would continue to use similar silences. Even films like *Citizen Kane* (Welles 1941), famous for its innovative use of sound and deep-focus photography (Altman 1994, 19), are not as innovating in their use of silence.

Altman describes *Citizen Kane* as “the first effective meeting place of the century’s two most powerful media, broadcasting and film. As such, it is in a sense the first modern movie” (ibid., 25). This might hold true also for the use of volume levels as discursive tools. The film sounds and looks indeed both jarring and groundbreaking, but this does not hold true for its use of silence. In fact, the film hardly uses any meaningful silence at all. Silence is present in different forms quite frequently, but it is usually the traditional dramatic counterpoint to dialogue, seldom metaphorical or symbolic in itself. This would be quite understandable if Welles had made the same film a quarter century later. Welles’ use of sound and silence is much more akin to the way sound and silence was used in the seventies. In 1941, the technology required for this use of sound and silence was not yet in use, unfortunately. Welles could not use room tone or extremely soft sounds to express quietude and contrast. This is of course also the reason for the film’s renowned status: Welles used sound in a manner that would only become standard much later. His use of silence, however, was hardly revolutionary.

The noir films of this era feature quite standard use of silence as well. Shots of newspapers are accompanied by diegetic silence, as are scene transitions. Non-diegetic silence allows the audience to focus on the dialogue. Both *The Maltese Falcon* (Huston 1941) and *Sunset Boulevard* (Wilder 1950) display similar uses of sound and silence. *Sunset Boulevard* does have one interesting prolonged complete silence. As Norma Desmond’s servant (Erich von Stroheim) says to Joe Gillis (William Holden), the protagonist of the film: “if you need help with the coffin, call me”, Joe freezes for a moment. This reference to death gives the protagonist pause and is echoed by about eight seconds of complete silence. Death features quite often in film noir, but it is seldom underscored in such an explicit manner.

Death is one of the themes that is expressed by all three types of silence. It is perhaps the most common theme to be associated with silence, and returns in all genres

and films. In *On the Waterfront* (Kazan 1954), for example, the first diegetic silence after the exposition appears as Father Barry (Karl Malden) and the corpse of a dock worker are raised up in solemn silence. The second quite long diegetic silence underscores Terry (Marlon Brando) and Edie (Eva Marie Saint) finding the corpse of Terry's brother.

The Searchers (Ford 1956) displays a rather vivid example of shock and terror relatively early in the film. The Edwards farm is attacked by Comanche and when Lucy (Pippa Scott) is told to flee by her parents, the camera zooms in to a close-up of her frightened face. All sounds disappear and Lucy's haunting look of terror is portrayed in complete silence. Her terrified scream then pierces this silence, and the family tries to flee the advancing Comanche.

The other uses of sound and silence in this film are fairly standard. The music displays a lot of mickey-mousing and brief non-diegetic silences puncture the score as dramatic or comedic counterpoint. There is only one diegetic silence in *The Searchers* between the introductory exposition and the final fade to the end credits. This diegetic silence takes place when Martin (Jeffrey Hunter) is negotiating with a Native American to buy a blanket. The scene takes place in diegetic silence with only music underscoring the negotiations. The music is quite humorous in nature as well. This diegetic silence expresses the language barrier between Martin and the Native Americans. They do not speak each other's language so they must communicate in silence. These negotiations are performed by pantomime only. Interestingly, Jeffrey Hunter's acting in this scene is quite reminiscent of silent film acting, with its exaggerated movements and expressions, and quite unlike the rest of the film. The reason for the rather humorous underscoring becomes clear in the next scene. Martin thinks he bought a blanket for a few hats, but instead he bought a Native American wife.

Vertigo (Hitchcock 1958), the penultimate film of this time period, is almost a culmination of all of the silences mentioned above, save for punch line silence. It features diegetic silence during montages, in scenes with a death like when Madeleine (Kim Novak) falls off the tower, and to display shock, like John's (James Stewart) shocked silence after Madeleine falls. It takes a few seconds, with only non-diegetic music playing, before John's breathing comes back into the soundtrack as the only audible diegetic sounds. Many, if not all of *Vertigo*'s long shots feature diegetic silence as well to convey inaudible distance. The film also features an interesting and

relatively long diegetic silence during John's rather psychedelic nightmares. The absence of diegetic sounds acts to reinforce the absence of reality, culminating in the gaping black hole of a grave through which John falls. The next scene then suddenly presents quite the contrast: John is in an asylum, seated in chair while listening to Mozart on the record player. Orderly and structured diegetic music has replaced the insanity of the previous scene.

Not much changed in film production from *King Kong* until the sixties, but this was not for lack of innovation: "Often the production sector's pursuit of novelty and spectacle would exceed exhibitors' willingness to adapt. Such innovations as the widescreen, 3-D, and stereophonic sound, all introduced during the 1930s, could not be developed on a large scale" (Balio 1993, 122). When things did finally change in Hollywood in the 1960s, innovation played but a small part in the evolution of Hollywood music. The application of new technology was, however, the driving change behind a small but significant change in the way silence was used in Hollywood.

3. 1958-1977: Post-classical Hollywood

James Wierzbicki's (2009) history of film music divides Hollywood's history of film music into an early period (1894-1933), a "classical style" period of symphonic scores (1933-1958), and a post-classic period (1958-2008). The changes in Hollywood music from the fifties onward represent a clear break in tradition. Elmer Bernstein attributes these changes primarily to the increasing use of popular music in soundtracks and the influence of jazz (ibid., 190). Mervyn Cooke adds the increasingly present modern compositional techniques to the causes behind the diversification of Hollywood music in what he calls the "watershed decade" of the 1950s, as well as "the growth of newer genres such as science-fiction and fantasy, both of which by their very nature demanded imaginative music that was out of the ordinary" (2008, 183).

1958 is the year that marks the collapse of the Hollywood studio system (Monaco 2001, 109). The dominance and consistency of Hollywood's symphonic "sound and idiom" (Wierzbicki 2009, 189) had to make room for these new influences, but the style did not disappear. Ultimately the many changes in Hollywood's musical idiom did not impact Hollywood's use of silence, which remained rather consistent.

There is another factor influencing Hollywood's changes in the 1950s: television. The increasing rate of domestic ownership had a large impact on cinema visits. Ticket sales dwindled from ninety million movie tickets sold in 1949 to half that amount in 1956. By 1969 ticket sales had dropped to fifteen million, a fraction of the amount sold in 1949 (Cooke 2008, 183). The big studios were in decline, and independent filmmakers were on the rise. Hollywood had to adapt, and it evolved "toward a broader spectrum of film types and spectator choices" (Lev 2003, 217). One attempt to draw audiences back to the movie theatres was the production of big-budget epics.

Lawrence of Arabia (Lean 1962), one such epic film, already displays some interesting statistics despite being released relatively shortly after the aforementioned changes. Compared to the other films in the corpus it has a higher than average use of all three silences: complete silence, non-diegetic silence, and diegetic silence. *Lawrence of Arabia* has the highest amount of non-diegetic silence since 1935, as well as the highest amount of complete silence save for *Citizen Kane*. Contrary to what this data might suggest, the uses of meaningful silence are few and far between in *Lawrence of Arabia*. A rare example of a traditional use of silence can be found when Lawrence's (Peter O'Toole) Bedouin guide through the desert is shot while they pause at a water well. A complete silence dominates the soundtrack after the gunshots fade out. His servant is dead and the silence reflects this.

The film features quite a few complete silences. They are, for the most part, dramatic counterpoint without an immediate anchor point. Music in the film is not overused and the soundtrack is allowed to be silent. Silences in the film's dialogue can last for several seconds, or an actor's reaction can take up to thirteen seconds of silence during which no other sounds are heard. The use of sound and silence in *Lawrence of Arabia* is an exquisite exercise in balance. The frequent silences in different scenes and in different sound layers give the film room to pause, reflect, and breathe.

This increasing use of silence is a trend that started in 1958 and lasted little over a decade. In particular, the use of diegetic and non-diegetic silence increased significantly. Between 1962 and 1976 the use of non-diegetic silence does not drop below the average use of the past ninety years. The presence of diegetic silence rises starkly in 1958 and it maintains a strong presence until 1970. Interestingly, diegetic silence then drops down to all-time lows after 1970.

These changes are part of a changing sonic style towards a more natural aesthetic of silence. If the people in a room make no sound for a while, films will reflect this by not necessarily filling up the silence. The quiet of night and sleep is reflected in this way as well. Long shots have an already established relation with diegetic silence to convey distance and the impossibility to immediately hear sounds so far away. This natural aesthetic of silence is made possible by increasingly better recording equipment. The development of magnetic recording and the launch of the Nagra III tape recorder had a large influence on sound production.

Magnetic recording was introduced in the 1940s and was a drastic change in the world of recorded sound in the post-war period (Millard 2005, 201). It offers amateurs the same advantages as professionals in the studio: it is easy to use by a broad public, it offers a longer recording time than shellac discs as well as better possibilities to edit the sound (ibid., 210). It comes as no surprise that Hollywood will soon capitalise on these possibilities as well. In particular the 1958 launch of "the lightweight Nagra III transistorized tape recorder, which could be synchronized with a movie camera, revolutionized location sound work, both in terms of its operation convenience and superb recording fidelity" (Cooke 2008, 190). The Nagra recording equipment was sturdy and reliable, operated on cheap batteries, and was lightweight and portable (Monaco 2001, 105). Sound could now easily and comfortably be recorded on location. This, coupled with better editing techniques like ADR (automatic dialogue replacement, which allows for the easy rewinding of tape and re-recording of dialogue), turned Hollywood films away from "the controlled environments of Hollywood studios and backlots" (ibid., 106).

Location filming grew rapidly in popularity during the 1960s. This coincided with the increasing presence of silence. The recording equipment is not perfect and it does not record all sounds. The examples from *Lawrence of Arabia* show that if the actors in a room or whilst sleeping outside are silent, the soundtrack is silent as well. The microphones do not pick up every minute sound, and the filmmakers allow these silences to remain present in the soundtrack. This increasing presence of silence does not mean that the soundtracks of these films sound jarring or otherworldly, far from it. It is an almost natural way for silence to appear. In a way, the location recording equipment is acting similarly to how our brains trick us into believing we are experiencing silence by negation (see Chapter 1, pp. 16-17). Some sounds are just not picked up on.

This situation changed drastically by the end of the 1960s as Hollywood filmmakers increasingly turned to so-called "Foley artists" to fill these gaps. The Foley system was developed in the late 1940s by Jack Foley to create sound imitations to be added to soundtracks. The system found little use during the 1950s. The rise in location shooting and recording created an environment where Foley artists are in increasing demand to create sounds in post-production to fill these gaps in the soundtrack (Monaco 2001, 106). The use of Foley and location recording produced new possibilities for filmmakers to create soundtracks dense with sonorous information. This trend "exploded onto soundtracks in the 1970s" (Kalinak 2015, 7). It is particularly noticeable in the use of diegetic silence. Most of the films produced in the 1970s represent an all-time low presence of diegetic silence. Quiet rooms or the silence of night are now manipulated by Foley artists. The diegetic silences are replaced by sound effects. Soundtracks evolve "from an aesthetic of naturalism toward a more artificially crafted and manipulated motion-picture sound design" (Monaco 2001, 106). Where the 1960s was the standout decade of diegetic silence, the 1970s represents the other side of the coin.

Hollywood's film style in the 1970s is influenced heavily by young filmmakers and a non-traditional editing style as found in foreign films of the 1960s, but the use of silence remains in line with the established tradition. The next big change for silence will occur several years later, at the end of this new age in Hollywood.

Silence in the New Hollywood

The end of the 1960s saw a change in Hollywood aesthetic under the influence of a "new wave of films and filmmakers that came to critical attention from the mid-to-late 1960s to the mid-to-late 1970s, a phenomenon also labelled as the Hollywood 'Renaissance'" (King 2002, 3), new Hollywood, or "Auteur Renaissance" (Kalinak 2015, 7). Although the period from the end of the 1960s until the 1980s is considered to be a "renaissance" driven by "auteurs" by some historians, this is only part of the story. Other historians see the "auteur renaissance" as a short phase and consider "the establishment of a New Hollywood order" (Cooke 2008, 455), indicating the arrival of blockbusters and new ways of film financing, to be the defining change of the 1970s. Geoff King discusses the "bewildering and contradictory range of features of Hollywood cinema" that have been attached to the label "New Hollywood" (2002, 1). This contrast in terms is interesting as the blockbuster definition represents a "brand

of filmmaking almost entirely the opposite to that of the Hollywood Renaissance" (ibid., 3).

Ultimately, the differences in style and definition do not matter all that much for silence. Silence in the 1970s suffered under the popularity of Foley post-production. The presence of diegetic silence reached all-time lows, superseded by the presence of post-production sounds to hide the gaps in the soundtrack and to recreate complete universes of sound.

1967 is often marked as a "turning point for the American cinema" in history (Monaco 2001, 182). The style-oriented definition of New Hollywood uses 1967 as a symbolic starting point. Three "landmark movies" (ibid.) were released in this year: *Cool Hand Luke* (Rosenberg), *Bonnie and Clyde* (Penn), and *The Graduate* (Nichols). Of these three films, Mike Nichols' *The Graduate* is perhaps still best known, as well as the more successful and critically acclaimed film. Its soundtrack features music by Simon and Garfunkel in a "new and different" sound for a film soundtrack, although the purpose of these songs still "remained strongly narrative" (ibid., 115).

The use of silence in *The Graduate* is quite traditional as well. Complete silence is used to convey shock, for example when Elaine (Katharine Ross) yells at Ben (Dustin Hoffman) to get out and throws the door in his face, silencing him. It is not Ben but Mrs. Robinson (Anne Bancroft) who breaks the silence, bidding him goodbye. Complete silence is also used in a sort of mix between punch line and shock, fitting the film's tragic and comic nature. In the scene when Mrs. Robinson and Ben find themselves alone in a room for the first time, she tries to reassure him that being afraid of being inadequate when having sex for the first time is nothing to be ashamed of. Ben yells out "Inadequate!?" and then finds himself lost for words. This silence reflects his shock and also underlines his response, much like the punch line silences in older comedy films.

The Graduate also uses montage frequently, usually with diegetic silence present (and often accompanied by a non-diegetic Simon and Garfunkel song). There is one montage where diegetic silence is not used, but all sounds disappear for a few seconds. Near the end of the film Ben tells Elaine he wants to marry her and follows her into her university. A bell rings and all students enter their classrooms, including Elaine. Ben is left standing before her classroom door in complete silence. After a cut the bell rings again, and all students come out. This complete silence is the erasure of time: suddenly a whole class has passed.

The very last diegetic silence in the film is interesting – and famous – as well. As Simon and Garfunkel's *Sound of Silence* begins playing again, Ben and Elaine's initial joy of escaping the wedding fades away, and so do their smiles. They sit together in diegetic silence as the bus drives off into the distance and the film ends. Ever since the film's release over half a century ago this final scene has divided the audience: will Elaine and Ben overcome their parents' mistakes and can they live together in happiness? Dare they disturb the sound of silence, or will that final silence, like a cancer, grow? The diegetic silence here is not resolved and serves as the blank slate on which the couple can start their own future. This silence is an extended dramatic counterpoint, one much longer than in previous films. Its presence reinforces the ambiguity of the scene.

Aside from this final diegetic silence, all other silences in *The Graduate* can be considered to be relatively standard practice. Visual and narrative styles might change in the Hollywood Renaissance, and new music is increasingly used in the soundtrack, but the use of silence does not change at all. Even in the so-called auteur films, the use and presence of silence remains quite traditional. Silence is not the only part of the soundtrack that hardly changes. The use of Simon and Garfunkel's music might offer a new sound, its practical application is still to produce narrative continuity.

There is one big exception to all this, as is immediately evident from the data in the appendix, which is Stanley Kubrick's *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968). Kubrick's film features the highest percentages of complete silence and diegetic silence by far. It is such a huge outlier that it uses nearly double the percentage of complete and diegetic silence as the runners-up in each category (*Frankenstein* and *The Shining* respectively). The presence of non-diegetic silence in the film, however, is about perfectly average. One reason for this might be that Stanley Kubrick, as one of the arriving auteurs in Hollywood, had a very strong idea about how and where to use sound and silence. Another reason, and one that not necessarily excludes the impact of Kubrick's auteurship, is that the large presence of both diegetic and complete silence is more related to the film's genre. *2001: A Space Odyssey* is a science-fiction film, and perhaps Kubrick's style as auteur shows itself in a desire for an "authentic" representation or feel of one of the most important environments in the film: outer space. Space is not simply the setting for a large part of the film's action; it is given a prominent place in itself. This prominent place is evident from the film's opening

sequence where Earth and the sun rise in alignment behind the moon, underscored by the famous introduction to Richard Strauss' *Also Sprach Zarathustra*.

Silence in *2001* is not strictly related to space however, as is obvious from one of the first scenes in the film: after a tribe of great apes is chased away from a watering hole by a rival tribe, they encounter a black monolith. They approach it and touch it. Soon after they touch the monolith one of the tribe's members is rummaging about in some animal bones and grabs a big thigh bone like a club. His imminent discovery is announced by *Also Sprach Zarathustra*'s introduction sequence, which reappears in the soundtrack. The ape discovers he can smash things with the bone and starts trying out his newfound tool, albeit hesitant and unimpressed at first. While *Also Sprach Zarathustra* crescendos the ape holds his arm high above his head and smashes the bones around him with all his might. The diegetic sounds of bones crushing disappear from the soundtrack and the image continues in slow motion. The ape grabs the bone with both arms and comes crashing down onto an animal skull, his face contorted in a bloodthirsty and savage grimace. The image cuts to a close-up of the animal skull being bashed in in slow motion as *Also Sprach Zarathustra* reaches the introduction's climax, all in diegetic silence. The violent actions stand in stark contrast to and are magnified by the diegetic silence and slow motion images. The scene after this one features the inverse use of silence and displays a more traditional application: as the tribe goes back to the watering hole with its newfound arsenal, only diegetic sounds are present in the soundtrack. They attack their rival tribe and mercilessly club down one of the opposing tribe's members with their weapons. The non-diegetic silence present in this scene is a common application of silence, reinforcing the grittiness or reality of the violence.

Kubrick is certainly not afraid to use silence, in either diegetic or non-diegetic form. The film features a few extremely long passages of diegetic silence: the longest of these lasts more than seven minutes. Critics at the time complained about the film's elliptical narrative and its lack of dialogue: the film's dialogue amounts to less than forty minutes of its 140-minute runtime (Monaco 2001, 195). Even when the film does not use diegetic silence, there are often stretches where the characters hardly speak. The audience sees them act instead, e.g., pilot a spacecraft, eat, jog, or perform maintenance on their ship.

Two long passages of diegetic silence in the film's first half are accompanied by Richard Strauss' *The Blue Danube*. Both scenes are depictions of spaceships

travelling through space. The combination of Strauss' waltz and diegetic silence makes the space travels, and by extension space itself, a serene, almost soothing experience. Space takes on silence's identity: it is the blank slate upon which the waltz projects its meandering melody. The serenity of these images is strengthened by the lack of cuts. Some shots are seemingly endless and stable images of a spaceship calmly traversing the great unknown.

When space is shown in this way and underscored by Strauss' waltz, space can be tranquil and meditative, open to exploration. The inverse is true as well, as Kubrick shows the audience later in the film. When HAL kills Frank (Gary Lockwood), non-diegetic and complete silence alternate in the soundtrack whilst the images show brief shots, cut in quick succession. The result is frightening and unnerving. Space takes on silence's identity as well here, but this time HAL and the alternating non-diegetic and complete silences are the primary influences. There is no waltz soothing the audience's ears in these scenes that last a good twenty minutes. Space becomes a silent killer just like HAL; a cold, lonely, and above all deadly place that refuses to comply with the astronauts' pleas.

Other silences in *2001: A Space Odyssey* are much more traditional. Diegetic silence is used with montages, non-diegetic silence to convey realism, and the film even contains a complete silence of a few seconds during a cut and scene transition, which is basically the oldest silence in Hollywood history. Kubrick does not need silence to engender a jarring feeling. The film's music works hard to achieve this effect as well. The film entertains the audience with Strauss' charming music, lulling their ears into a sense of safety only to assault them later with appearances of Ligeti's music. The audience should have considered themselves warned, as the use of Ligeti as introductory music is already quite unsettling. The film was scored not by a composer but by using "found music"; it was "essentially scored by relying on director Stanley Kubrick's record collection and his idiosyncratic tastes" (Monaco 2001, 114). In this sense *2001* is a product of its time, an example of the new sounds the new Hollywood auteurs bring to their films.

The sounds and silences in *2001: A Space Odyssey* and the following decade are not as revolutionary as the name Hollywood Renaissance might indicate. Despite the radical changes in some aspects of the Hollywood film during the 1960s and the 1970s, like editing or visual style, film sound did not change significantly. Overall, Hollywood sound production "remained a craft widely considered subsidiary to the

main elements of production" (Monaco 2001, 102). Sound recording and production still largely followed the same rules as during the forty years before. The role of sound and silence did not change radically either. Whilst the presence of Foley post-production grew and forced diegetic silence to the background for a good decade, silence was still used in familiar themes and tropes.

Sound production in the 1970s will ultimately undergo its own revolution by the end of the decade. Sound designer Walter Murch noted how *The Godfather* (Coppola 1972) "was produced and exhibited in the early 1970s following virtually the same criteria employed in 1939 for *Gone with the Wind*" (Grainge, Jancovich and Monteith 2007, 446). Sound and music are still primarily used to drive the narrative. Technological innovation in sound production did not have large effects on the style or use of sound and silence.

The Nagra III recorder and magnetic tape opened up new possibilities in the 1960s. Kalinak describes how "[s]ound was one of the ways postwar Hollywood fought back" (2015, 6) to recover from dwindling sales and changing industry practices, but this is not really the case until the late 1970s. Partly this is because the use of magnetic sound never really became an industry standard. Sound recordings on magnetic tape allowed for "far more flexible editing techniques", but they "continued to be converted into optical soundtracks for theatrical release prints until the end of the century" (Cooke 2008, 190). Some historians lament the fact that this conversion persisted. John Belton writes how the "'failure' of 35mm magnetic sound to become an industry standard" is one of the "great setbacks" of the technological revolutions of the late 1950s and 1960s, "unnecessarily depriving motion picture spectators of high quality, state-of-the-art sound in the theater, and delaying 'the process of motion-picture engineering'" (Belton 1992, 156). The "failure" of magnetic tape to break through is, unfortunately, not the only problem plaguing high quality cinema sound in the 1970s.

Any experimentation in sound of the 1960s and 1970s ran into the same problem: what the audience heard in the cinema "remained severely compromised by inadequate investment in, and advancement of, actual theater sound systems" (Monaco 2001, 109). The lack of high quality sound in film theatres was perhaps the biggest problem of the film industry in the 1970s. Robert Altman placed the blame for this with the theatre owners: "Most of the problems with sound in film today are in the reproduction. Sound in theaters [...] is just terrible. The acoustics, the speakers,

everything. You just cannot police the exhibitors" (Altman in Schreger 1978, 37). This is partly because the Hollywood majors were prohibited in 1948 from continueing to directly own film theatres by the United States Supreme Court, in an effort to combat their giant monopolies. This in turn resulted in a lack of investment, however, culminating in the 1970s when "there was a better sound system in the average American teenager's bedroom than in the neighborhood theater" (Stephen Handzo as quoted in Monaco 2001, 104).

Perhaps it is not as surprising that the use of silence did not change all that much in post-classical Hollywood or New Hollywood. Sound is still used primarily to drive forward the narrative, and the use of silence resorts to established tropes for the most part. There are, of course, always exceptions to this rule. The final silence of *The Graduate* comes to mind, as do the prolonged and ubiquitous stretches of silence in *2001: A Space Odyssey*. For the people working with sound and silence actual change only arrived near the end of the 1970s. Any experimentation that might be attempted in the creative use of sound and silence before this change was held back by the abysmal projection of sound in theatres. This situation might also partly explain why the use of sound and silence hardly changed. Filmmakers at the time were well aware that the "standards for sound recording and playback during the 1970s had not kept pace with advances in cinematography" (Cook 2000, 386). Why experiment with sound or silence if it will not be projected correctly to audiences? Things do change for the better near the end of the decade.

4. 1977-2017: Dolby and the digital age

Murch, who compared the similarities in production of *The Godfather* and *Gone with the Wind*, already employed new technology in "a radically different approach" for the film *Apocalypse Now* (Coppola 1979), released but five years after *The Godfather* (Grainge, Jancovich and Monteith 2007, 446). This new technology, which was the "principal innovation" in sound production of the 1970s, was Dolby sound (Thompson and Bordwell 2003, 517). This system was developed by physicist Ray Dolby in the 1960s, but it would only reach theatres more than a decade later (Monaco 2001, 104). The arrival of Dolby does seem to indicate a certain reappraisal of silence.

The new technology allowed Murch to use silence more effectively. For Murch, "the creative use of long stretches of relative or absolute silence is one of the unique characteristics of cinema" (Murch 2003, 95). He gives an example of one such silence in *Apocalypse Now* during the helicopter raid on the Vietnamese village with Wagner's *Ride of the Valkyries* blasting from speakers installed on the helicopters. The image cuts to a quiet schoolyard and Murch chooses to place a sudden silence there "for the visceral effect" of a sudden change in loudness, but also to help the audience "share the point of view of the Vietnamese, who are shortly going to be overwhelmed with the noise and violence coming at them" (ibid.). Dolby gave Murch the possibility to implement this dynamic use of sound and silence and he immediately applied it in *Apocalypse Now* (cf. Chapter 3, §Functions of silence, p. 103-104).

Paul Schreger also describes the possibilities that Dolby offered regarding the creative use of silence. He particularly thinks of the missed opportunity for films of the past: "Imagine how much more dramatic the quiet moments in *2001* would have been if Dolby had been available to Kubrick in 1967. Silence, as well as sound, is clearer with Dolby" (Schreger 1978, 36). It is remarkable how quickly Dolby made an impression. Schreger was writing but one year after Dolby's breakthrough but the impact it had and would have is clear to both audiences and professionals at the time.

The turning point for Dolby technology was its use in *Star Wars* (Lucas 1977), the first wide-release Dolby stereo film "whose epoch-making success was understood to depend at least partially on its high-powered, high-quality sound track" (Cook 2000, 386). *Star Wars*' phenomenal success was so influential that is has been named as Dolby's *The Jazz Singer* (Schreger 1978, 36), with the period after *Star Wars*' release labelled as "the Second Coming of Sound" (ibid.; and Cook 2000, 386). Theatre owners were quick to adapt to *Star Wars*' success: by Christmas of the same year the number of theatres equipped for Dolby had doubled to 200, and by the end of the following year it had quadrupled to 800 (Cook 2000, 386). Within eight years of *Star Wars*' release nearly all Hollywood film releases would switch to Dolby tracks (ibid.).

This was partly due to the superior sound quality of Dolby technology, but was mostly due to the increased revenue from Dolby theatres: "Dolby-equipped theatres significantly outgrossed non-Dolby ones" (ibid.). The economical motivation makes the comparison between *Star Wars* and *The Jazz Singer* quite apt. Both films are responsible for huge shifts in Hollywood sound, and Hollywood followed mostly due to these films' financial successes. Once again it was not so much technological

innovations that changed Hollywood, but financial motivations. For Richard Maltby, money is the biggest driving force throughout Hollywood's history by far:

> Hollywood's technological development is one of opportunism driven by economic motives. Rather than being a technological innovator, the movie industry has routinely adapted the inventions of others, assimilating them into Hollywood's existing aesthetic and institutional system (Maltby 1995, 264)

Maltby's description of how Hollywood assimilates existing technologies rather than driving innovation itself is quite interesting. It indicates Hollywood's preference to stay the course rather than innovate itself. The rise of New Hollywood as an industry investing large amounts of money in blockbusters from the middle 1970s onward (the *other* kind of New Hollywood, see above) eagerly followed *Star Wars*' success and adopted Dolby for its big budget productions. These productions follow tried and true Hollywood narrative traditions, and so does their use of sound. The soundtracks may use Dolby technology with amazing fidelity and clarity, but it is not a revolution in style, far from it. John Williams, the composer of the music for *Star Wars* and many other blockbusters, has even been credited with "single-handedly restoring to the modern cinema a robust symphonic style that harked back to Golden Age structural principles" (Cooke 2008, 456).

The 1977 release of *Star Wars* is an important moment for Hollywood film sound. For some historians it also marks the point where public discourse and popular cinema in the United States "underwent a crucial shift in emphasis"; the complex narratives of the 1970s and late 1960s "started to recede behind the phantasms of a neoconservative discourse of re-mythologisation, re-evangelisation and re-militarisation, gradually disappearing from view altogether in the course of the Reaganite era" (Horwath 2004, 9). Clearly, the period after *Star Wars*' release does not cause excitement for all historians. At the time, however, most audiences and people working in Hollywood sound production were quite excited and hopeful for what was to come:

> we can be forgiven for feeling the sense of excitement audiences must have experienced a half-century ago. Today, though, the sound is clean and clear – and more provocative developments are imminent. Perhaps we are entering a period in film history that will someday be labeled [sic] the

> Second Coming of Sound. But, for now, we can hear an older sound in our ears: the voice of Al Jolson promising that "you ain't heard nothin' yet" (Schreger 1978, 37)

Looking back at *Star Wars*' almost unbelievable impact on the spread of Dolby technology and the improvement in sound quality that goes with it, it is hard to imagine what developments Schreger thought could be even more provocative. Despite Schreger's certainty that the future of sound was bright, the question to be considered here is whether the same was true for silence. Does *Star Wars* also herald a renewed appraisal or radical shift in the use of silence?

No, no it does not. The film uses less than average amounts of silence in all three categories. The only complete silence in the film appears in the beginning of the film with the "A long time ago in a galaxy far, far away..." opening title. After this title the score comes in with its brass announcing the epic heroism to follow, and complete silence shall not be heard again. Diegetic silence is also sparse, which is surprising for an epic set in space. There are only four short shots of spacecraft flying through space that are underscored by diegetic silence. The shortest of these lasts a mere two seconds, and the longest shot lasts eight seconds. This is quite different from Kubrick's five long minutes of diegetic silence paired with *The Blue Danube* nine years earlier. *Star Wars* is rather inconsistent with its space shots: it also uses a low frequency drone to represent the Imperial space ship cruising through space, even though sound cannot travel in space.

The other silences in *Star Wars*, both diegetic and non-diegetic, are all traditional and common use of silence. They underscore dialogue, long shots, and even one view of death. This last scene is striking because the bombastic score continues as Luke Skywalker (Mark Hamill) sees the burnt corpses of his aunt and uncle. Although Luke pauses and diegetic silence appears, the music does not halt and continues its narration. The film does pause the music at times, for example to use non-diegetic silence as punch line silence when the film's protagonists escape from Imperial stormtroopers by jumping down a garbage chute, or to convey shock and terror after a whole planet is instantly destroyed.

It should come as no surprise that *Star Wars* does not herald a new age for silence. Hollywood discovers a new technology and adopts it because it is profitable, but it assimilates the technology in the familiar Hollywood aesthetic. This aesthetic

does not suddenly change with watershed moments. The empirical data in the appendix indicates as much: there are no big changes in the use of silence. There are some outliers, like the use of diegetic silence in *The Shining* (Kubrick 1980), or the lack thereof in *The Silence of the Lambs* (Demme 1992). Kubrick uses non-diegetic silence to great effect as jarring punctuations in scary scenes, and to represent visions or hallucinations where there is no more reality to represent in sound. *The Silence of the Lambs*, conversely, builds on the tradition from the 1970s to represent silence as softly present "natural" sounds like wind, rustling leaves, or chirping birds. Its soundtrack is quite dynamic in its use of loudness, but never silent in the diegetic layer.

What is perhaps most surprising is that the films from *Star Wars* onward rarely achieve the average use of non-diegetic silence. More often than not these films have quite a lot of non-diegetic music present, in stark contrast with the period between 1962 and 1977. *Blade Runner* (Scott 1982) and *The Fellowship of the Ring* (Jackson 2001) stand out for their extremely sparse use of non-diegetic silence. *Blade Runner* uses intricate soundscaping to create a wonderfully strange science-fiction world filled with sounds that are alien to us, whereas *The Fellowship of the Ring* is an epic fantasy with music underscoring nearly every action. Most modern films, especially blockbusters, feature an almost omnipresent musical score (always available for purchase as well) and little non-diegetic silence. In this respect, Schreger's second coming of sound is primarily a return of the Golden Age musical soundtrack, underscoring the film's actions.

The omnipresence of the soundtrack goes hand in hand with the new possibilities offered by Dolby. Sound engineers can make better use of a dynamic presence of sounds and are not restricted to using either sound or silence. Some parts of the soundtrack can be silenced whilst others continue to sound in the background. This manner of using sound is very much an existing Hollywood tradition established in the earliest days of sound production, harking back to a fear of "losing naturalness" and the primacy of narrative continuity: "*adding* a continuous background allows one to *emphasize*, or *create*, a sonic continuity that parallels and supports the constructed continuities of the image" (Lastra 2000, 206, emphasis in original). *Blade Runner* in particular is a stellar example of this practice.

Thomas Elsaesser points to the continuity principle as Hollywood's quintessential marker of identity. It represents both Hollywood's practice of narrative continuity in editing, and also "continuity as 'the show must go on' resisting change

while implementing change; [...] adapting to new technologies, while keeping the experience the same" (2012, 82). Paul Monaco expresses a similar notion by summarising Hollywood's history in the twentieth century in the English translation of Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr's *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*: "The more things change, the more they stay the same", although he does offer the opposite view for the corporate history of Hollywood (2010, 335).

The story of silence does not begin nor end with *Star Wars* and Dolby. The implementation of Dolby for film sound may not have changed much, if anything at all, for silence, but change does happen. It just happens slowly and over time. It fits with Elsaesser's description of change in Hollywood: it is implemented, but the overall experience is kept the same. For now, it is impossible to pinpoint a specific and decisive moment for a change in silence's aesthetic, but it gains momentum somewhere around the turn of the century. The biggest contributing factor to this change is likely to be the switch to digital editing in the early 1990s.

Silence in the twenty-first century

Paul Schrader describes the switch to digital editing with the arrival of the Avid/1 Media Composer as the "biggest technological change in the history of editing [...] – it might just be the biggest game changer in film history" (2014, 52). This is mainly due to a "disincentive to experiment" in traditional linear editing: you can only cut a film so much and every time you cut a film, it stays cut (ibid., 52-53). Digital editing and the nonlinear editing process opens up myriad new possibilities:

> A director today can be simultaneously working with multiple editors on multiple cuts with opposing editorial strategies. You can put an experimental cut together in the morning and discard it after lunch. Before the Avid, you screened your film every 10 weeks. Now you screen it every two days (ibid., 53)

The impact of the Avid was immedetialy clear to the industry. In 1994 and 1998 the developers of the Avid Media Composer were honoured by the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences for their outstanding Science & Technical achievements. During the 1990s audio editing switched to digital as well. Avid's Pro Tools is still the industry standard, increasingly expanding its capabilities in the twenty-first century: from 64 tracks in the early 2000s to over 800 in 2013 (Kalinak 2015, 14). Not everyone

is as happy with these developments as critics and sound engineers were after Dolby's breakthrough.

Kathryn Kalinak describes the transition to digital soundtracks as having "several unfortunate consequences, including the tendency toward complicated and busy soundtracks with literally hundreds of sound effect tracks" (ibid.). This is a bit pessimistic perhaps, as the soundtracks of today can hardly sound busier than *Blade Runner* with its brilliant soundscaping. The soundtracks of Hollywood's classical period, for example that of *Gone with the Wind*, play less with dynamical sound than modern soundtracks. Classical Hollywood sound is much more foregrounded, which is quite tiring for the ears. Modern blockbusters like *Star Wars* have the option to offer a dynamical musical experience.

Kalinak's pejorative "busyness" of the soundtrack is not the problem. The art of building a soundtrack reveals itself in how well filmmakers hide those hundreds of sound effect tracks in and behind each other without creating a dense, impenetrable wall of sound where the ear cannot find rest. Silence, as well as dynamic loudness, helps with offering the ear rest whilst navigating the complex modern soundtracks. Perhaps the possibility to experience and the need to hide sound both contribute to the current trend of using silence, a trend that is slowly differentiating itself from the use of in the twentieth century.

Writing a history of silence of the last two decades is difficult whilst building on a dataset that encompasses almost a century and is intended to show general trends and tendencies. Still, small changes in silence's use and aesthetic indicate a renewed appreciation for the power of silence. The use of diegetic silence in particular is increasingly aesthetic or meaningful, in addition to still being used as a trope in other places. Even complete silence makes aesthetic appearances. The extended complete silence in *Star Wars VIII* (see Introduction, p. 1) is a very recent example. Some film theatres did warn audiences for this silence, however, so it appears that the revival of silence is not clear to everyone yet.

Perhaps it is incorrect to speak of a revival, as some uses of silence after the turn of the century are quite different from earlier periods in Hollywood, and they occur more often. It might just be the case that, after conquering both image and sound with the turn to digital editing, editors and directors finally set their sights on silence – the last great bastion of resistance to Hollywood's continuity editing. Use silence too long, and the audience may disconnect from the film. Use it too short, and it is hardly

noticeable. Digital editing and the possibilities it offers to experiment – make a cut in the morning and discard it after lunch – plays a large role in allowing editors to play around with silence.

The choice to use silence more often and in a more stylised way is quite peculiar when taking into account Hollywood's general history of implementing change. There is no real increased financial profit to be made from using silence. There is no distinct turning point for silence as there was for sound and, much later, Dolby. It is not the goal of this chapter to mark such a defining moment for the increased presence of aesthetic or meaningful silence either.

It is possible to trace the creative use of silence when comparing it to the increased presence of subjective sound. The dynamics of sound and how shifts in loudness are used to portray subjective perspectives is quite comparable to the use of diegetic silence after the turn of the century. It is possible that the increased aesthetic use of silence is simply trailing the success of subjective sound perspectives. If this is the case, then the film that changed the general public's appreciation of subjective sound perspectives does in fact mark the watershed moment for silence as well. This new era's silence's *The Jazz Singer* would then be Steven Spielberg's 1998 war epic *Saving Private Ryan*.

The first battle scene in this film in particular is an impressive twenty-two minutes long scene with only diegetic sounds that express different points of view. The use of non-diegetic silence in this scene is quite traditional: it reinforces the realism of the scene and makes it more visceral. The dynamics of the diegetic sounds portray different worlds and perspectives. As the soldiers jump out the landing craft and try to make it ashore the camera follows them underwater. The sonorous perspective shifts with the camera and portrays these two different worlds as well. Above water chaos reigns in a cacophony of battle sounds, yet under water the sound resembles a cocoon of sound in a world of its own, hardly penetrated by the war raging above and around it. Captain Miller's (Tom Hanks) shellshock sequence is perhaps even more interesting. Millard finally makes it ashore alive but is shocked by the hell that awaits him. The sound is almost completely muted, all the audience hears is the sound inside Miller's mind. The same perspective is used in the final battle of the film again, creating a balance and a sort of closure to the film's battle scenes. The use of this subjective sound perspective helps audiences connect with Miller and allows them to see and hear the same experiences. A study on location gaze that tracked audience eye

movements during this particular scene noted the increased attention and concentrated fixation on Miller's face when this scene was shown with the subjective sound, versus the same scene shown without sound (Redmond et al. 2016). The subjective sound perspective helps the audience connect with the narrative and visual experience on screen (cf. Chapter 3, §Chion's null extension, pp. 105-106; and Chapter 5, §The temporality of silence in film, pp. 157-159).

The increasingly aesthetic application of diegetic silence is not always a subjective sound experience as this would mean the utter negation of a character or diegetic element. It is an elongated and stylised application of silence as dramatic counterpoint in a manner rarely heard before in Hollywood. A case in point is the sixty-three seconds long diegetic silence in Sam Mendes' *Road to Perdition* (see Chapter 3, §Symbolic silence, pp. 101-103). This silence harks back to Kubrick's use of diegetic silence to intensify the violence of the bone smashing underscored by Strauss' *Danube* waltz, but it is even longer, and, more importantly, it appears in a film much more in line with traditional Hollywood storytelling, both in editing and narrative.

A prolonged diegetic silence similar to *Saving Private Ryan*'s subjective sound perspective can be found in Paul Thomas Anderson's *There Will Be Blood* (2007). It is a diegetic silence of nearly one minute long that appears in the soundtrack around seventy minutes into the film. The diegetic silence, accompanied by Johnny Greenwood's rhythmic violin score, portrays the point of view of H.W. (Dillon Frasier) after he is deafened by a gas explosion.

The traditional applications of silence are still more prevalent than the newer, more stylised use of silence. *Ocean's Twelve* (Soderbergh 2004) has a long shot of someone running through the Interpol buildings with diegetic silence depicting the distance between spectator and character. *Free State of Jones* (Ross 2016) uses diegetic silence when young boys are hung at the gallows to portray death. *Downsizing* (Payne 2017) portrays the last sunset the characters will ever see in silence. *The Big Short* (McKay 2015) uses diegetic silence with a shot of an abandoned Wall Street office, creating a stark contrast with the usual incessant bustle of the stock exchange. This silence reinforces the impact of the 2007 financial crisis and creates a very effective counterpoint to the beginning of the film and the usual sounds associated with the financial world.

Silence's reappraisal and changing aesthetic is far from finalised. *Interstellar* (Nolan 2014) is an excellent example of how Hollywood resists change. The ambitious

science-fiction film reminds the spectator of *2001: A Space Odyssey* in its use of imagery and sounds. Certain shots, like those of the ship *Endurance* spinning in space and docking, and certain uses of sound, like the diegetic silence present in this scene, or the silence during the protagonist's journey after being saved from his predicament near the end of the film, are almost copies of scenes, visuals, and applications of sound and silence from Kubrick's film. *Interstellar* is a far more tame film than *2001*, however, both in sound and visuals. It is a big-budget blockbuster that clearly loves and admires Kubrick's style but dares not go as far.

The future will show whether the changing aesthetics influence the common uses of silence, or that the experimentation from the turn of the century onward will disappear again from Hollywood's vanguard productions. For now, all that is left to do is to try and understand how silence works. What does silence mean and how is this one concept applied in different ways to convey different meanings? How does silence impact us emotionally, or unconsciously? The rest of this thesis will turn to these questions in an attempt to understand what silence is, and how the film audience experiences it.

Chapter 3 – The Meaning of Silence

The title of this thesis is partly derived from a quote by Michel Chion. "Silence is never a neutral emptiness," writes Chion (1994, 57), describing the silence that can occur in the soundtrack of a sound film. In contrast with the silent film idiom, silence in the sound film becomes an intentional part of the soundtrack (cf. the discussion on and analysis of both idioms in *The Jazz Singer* in Chapter 2, pp. 44-47). The director, sound designer, and composer make deliberate choices on where to include sound, music, or silence in the soundtrack. There is no such thing as an accidental silence in a sound film. Every silence is a choice, an element in the composition of both soundtrack and film. This is what Chion means when he states that silence is never a neutral emptiness. These composed silences are all part of the audience's experience of a film.

This does not mean that all silence in a sound film is necessarily meaningful. This problem is addressed in chapter 1 already (§The problem of meaning attribution, pp. 31-32). It relates to Walter Benjamin's conscious exploration of silence in the sound film and the risk of over-attributing meaning to each and every silence. Aside from over-attributing meaning to every silence, Chion's quote and the description of every silence as a deliberate choice by the filmmakers can also lead to questions of intention. It is important to keep in mind that the director's intentions are of no importance when discussing the creation of meaning. Meaning is created in the spectator's experience. Not every spectator can or wants to analyse a film, but each spectator interprets a film in their own manner.

This chapter analyses how this interpretation comes to be. The possible meanings of silence are discussed and analysed through a semiotic framework, yet it is important to keep in mind that these meanings are mere possibilities. They are not set in stone. Ultimately, meaning is created by the audience's interpretation of the film. This chapter serves to show how silence enters into the semiotic process, how it plays with the creation of meaning and how this can be analysed.

Silence is not always meaningful, but it does often partake in the semiotic process. It is these silences that are discussed in this chapter. The silences in this chapter play a specific role as a function of their context within the film. The film as a whole and its narrative are the overarching structures of importance in the meaningful experience of film, whereas silence plays a supporting role and engages in meaningful

relations with its direct sonorous and visual context within the function of this overarching narrative.

The revolutionary new possibility of a meaningful interplay between sound and silence was already explored in the earliest sound films. The discussion of the mixture between silent film idiom and sound film idiom in *The Jazz Singer* serves as a case in point. Even in this mixture of idioms, silence is already used as a dramatic tool. The sixteen seconds of silence after Jakie's father yells "Stop!" to silence Jakie's singing are particularly interesting. Jakie's father has not only silenced his singing, but the whole soundtrack as well. The visible stillness of the imagery reinforces this ambiguous impasse: just as Jakie is unsure of how to react, the soundtrack seems unsure of how to continue. After sixteen seconds, we see his father mouthing words, re-establishing the silent film idiom. This whole scene might be understood as metaphor for the whole film and its industry. Jakie's father represents the silent film tradition, trying to keep his son (the sound film) from expressing himself in the way he wants to.

This is, naturally, but one interpretation. The silencing of a character is one of many possible uses of silence in a soundtrack (cf. the many modes, types, and categories of silence discussed in Chapter 1). This chapter discusses some of these applications of silence and focuses on the process of how silence engages in a meaningful relation with sounds, the imagery, and the spectator, rather than the actual meanings of silence which belong to the individual spectator's interpretation. Any mention of possible meaning shall therefore be my own, and serve only as a single interpretation to illustrate how meaning can be created. This process of the creation of meaning is analysed using a semiotic framework.

Semiotics is the study of signs and how signs create meaning. Signs are succinctly described by Umberto Eco, paraphrasing Peirce, as anything "by which we know something more" (Eco 1986, 2). A sign is anything that tells us something else. Semiotics originated as a linguistic system: it grew out of studies in logic and language, developed independently by both C.S. Peirce and Ferdinand de Saussure.

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) was an American logician, one of the founders of American pragmatism, and a prolific writer on subjects from both the mathematical and physical sciences and the humanities and social sciences. Peirce's recognition came primarily posthumously, starting in 1930 with the edited publication

of his collected works. His semiotics are grounded in his ideas on logic, pragmatism, and realism (Peirce 1955, 14-24).

Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) was a Swiss linguist and a contemporary of Peirce. In contrast to Peirce, Saussure "himself wrote nothing of general significance" (Culler 1986, 17). Saussure's influence comes from his teaching, in particular his courses on general linguistics. Like Peirce, Saussure enjoys primarily posthumous fame as the founder of modern linguistics. His teachings and lectures were written down by students and colleagues after his death (ibid.).

1. Film language and semiotics

The first problem that arises with using a linguistic system, i.e., semiotics or semiology, is its applicability to film. In other words: is film a language? This problem has been addressed by many film scholars and perhaps the most in-depth exploration of this question can be found in Christian Metz's *Film Language* (1974).[7] Metz writes that "[t]he concepts of linguistics can be applied to the semiotics of the cinema only with the greatest caution" (1974, 107). Note the way he words this, however: Metz recognises the signifying structure of cinema, but cautions for a direct application of linguistic concepts on film.

Saussure's semiology

This is partly due to the fact that Metz is building on Ferdinand de Saussure's approach to semiology, which discusses two structures in semiotic systems: *langue*, the abstract, underlying systematic structure of concepts, rules, and conventions; and *parole*, the particular instances and uses of this underlying structure. The problem in applying this framework to film is that the underlying structure, the grammar, is absent. James Monaco posits that"[f]ilm is not a language in the sense that English, French, or mathematics is. It is, first of all, impossible to be ungrammatical in film. And it is not necessary to learn a vocabulary. [...] But film is very much like a language" (1981, 121).The absence of a filmic grammar does not mean that there are no conventions in film, far from it. These conventions, however, are hardly binding and every film can

[7] Metz followed with a psychoanalytical approach in *The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema* (1982). For a cognitive approach to this question, see Warren Buckland's *The Cognitive Semiotics of Film* (2000).

use, change, or ignore them at will. Signs in film are part of these conventions. Some of these signs and conventions are used so often that they become tropes, e.g., silence before a stinger (a jump scare). A filmic sign must be considered within the film itself to be understood. An audience creates meaning through the reading of different filmic signs and structures, and yet each film uses its own signs. These signs do not necessarily mean the same thing when they are used in other films. This is especially true for silence, as shall be shown throughout this chapter.

Film might not strictly be a language, but it is very much like one. The question remains whether film sound and the soundtrack can be analysed through linguistic systems. The soundtrack is where silence originates. Sound in general is a medium, but not a language. There is no syntax or grammar in sound, nor a vocabulary which has to be learned and understood in order to sound – all it takes is some pressure on the vocal cords. Whilst the application of a linguistic system to the analysis of sound might seem strange, it is nonetheless possible in cases where the sound specifically leads to a recognition of it as a sign.

The same question stands for music as well, as it is a particular use of sound. Whilst the question of whether music is a language depends on the definition used for what constitutes music and a language, neurological research suggests that we perceive music and speech in a similar manner (cf. Hausen, Torppa, Salmela, Vainio, et al., 2013; Asano and Boeckx, 2015; Peretz, Vuvan, Lagrois, and Armony, 2015). Sound, music, and silence work in tandem with the imagery at hand in film. These individual elements might not be a language, but together they create something which is very much like one.

Besides the lack of a structural system underlying film, a second argument for using a semiotic system different from Saussure's is the terminology in Saussure's theory. He considers a sign to consist of a signifier and a signified: a dichotomy which is "intimately linked and [wherein] each triggers the other" (Saussure 1983, 66). These two elements are "wholly interdependent, neither pre-existing the other" (Chandler 2002, 17). Two problems arise here: the interpretation by a spectator, which is bypassed in a Saussurean model, and the use of identical signs with different meanings in different films.

Spectator interpretation is not as important in Saussure's semiotic analyses, as his theory places the emphasis on how individual instances are the product of underlying structures. Spectator interpretation is the result of how the spectators and

the films are a product of societal values and structures. A personal interpretation is a product rather than individual agency. This chapter focuses explicitly on personal interpretation of film signs and how this interpretation can be meaningful. As attested to above, any meaning is deeply personal, unrelated to directorial intention, and meaning is not always created by everyone. Whilst the focus on the relation between underlying structures and individual utterances can perhaps be interesting in other approaches, the analyses of this chapter are not strengthened by structuralist views.

The other problem of a Saussurean approach is the use of a single sign that fluctuates in meaning, as silence does. One example of this can be found in Stanley Kubrick's 1968 classic *2001: A Space Odyssey*. A complete silence is present with shots of space, there is absolutely no sound in the soundtrack. This silence is a sign reinforcing the imagery of space where no sound is possible. In one particular scene, however, the same complete silence is used when HAL (voiced by Douglas Rain) uses the pod to launch Frank Poole (Gary Lockwood) into space. The image shows Frank frantically trying to reattach a severed tube, presumably his oxygen supply, and the soundtrack remains silent. This silence is no longer the silence of space, but becomes the silence of Frank suffocating in space. This example shall be discussed in more detail below. While both of these signs can be interpreted in this manner, it is nonetheless important to realise that they need to be read as such by the spectator of the film.

Barthes' signifiance

Roland Barthes' discussion of *signifiance* goes beyond the rigidity of Saussure's signifier-signified dualism and offers an escape from "the tyranny of meaning" (Barthes 1977, 185). It explores the separation between signifiers and signified and focusing on "the plane of production, of the enunciation" (ibid., 10). The process of meaning creation in *signifiance* is infinite (Barthes explicitly relates *signifiance* with cinema for this reason), but it also entails a "loss" of the subject because in the struggle with meaning the subject is "deconstructed" (ibid.). *Signifiance* is an interesting tool to discuss the fluidity of meaning, or even the "depletion" of fixed meanings (ibid., 62) because it "outplays meaning – subverts not the content but the whole practice of meaning" (ibid.).

Barthes' *signifiance* is important in this discussion because it offers a way for the Saussurean dualism to escape the structuralist confines, but in doing so it explodes

in its infinite possibilities. The end result is that, once again, the basic process of meaning creation and the spectator's role herein is quite literally "lost" (ibid., 10) in this separation of signified and signifier and the void of infinity that appears between them. Silence, as shall become clear, is infinite in meaning in itself. It is ambiguous. The solution to understanding how meaning is created from infinite possibilities is, for the purpose at hand, not to explore this infinity but rather to anchor it, to offer it solidity. If the signifier (silence) offers infinite signifieds, it becomes paramount to place more importance on the interpretation of the signifier as signified, which is done by the spectator. Whereas Barthes explores the escape of meaning into infinity in *signifiance*, this chapter analyses the focus of infinite possibilities into a solid signified.

The infinite possibilities are resolved and focused when a spectator creates meaning from silence as a sign. The spectator doing the interpretation is the anchor offering stability to silence's ambiguity. In contrast to Saussure's implicit incorporation of interpretation, the spectator is an explicit and important factor in the creation of meaning. For this reason it is not Saussure's dichotomy and Barthes' *signifiance* that offer respite, but rather the semiotic approach as it is developed by Charles Sanders Peirce.[8]

2. Peirce's semiotics

In Charles Sanders Peirce's semiotics the reader of the sign is explicitly present. His semiotic theory consists of a trichotomy: that which is represented (the object), e.g., this is a dead-end street; how it is represented (the sign, or sign-vehicle), i.e., a No Through Road sign; and how it is interpreted (the interpretant), e.g., this is not the right way to the grocery store so I better turn back. In terms of terminology this can get quite confusing, especially when compared with Saussure's terminology. For Saussure, the sign consists of signifier equals signified, and this equation makes up the sign. For Peirce a sign consists of the sign-vehicle, the object, and the interpretant. This is because rather than being concerned with structure, Peirce's sign is one of relation: all three elements, including the interpretation, must be present in this relation. It is a medium of communication (Peirce 1998, 477), rather than structure.

[8] This brief discussion focuses on the use of Saussure's semiology for the analysis of silence. For a general comparison between Saussure's semiology and Peirce's semiotics, see, e.g., Sendera Mohd. Yakin and Totu 2014, and the introductory remarks in chapter 3 of Gorlée 1994 (31-35).

Peirce defines a sign as "anything which is so determined by something else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby *mediately* determined by the former" (Peirce 1998, 478, emphasis mine). In the example of the dead-end street, I think of turning back because the road ahead is a dead-end, which is communicated to me through the road sign. This, for Peirce, is semiosis, the semiotic process. This mediation can take many forms, which in turn can give rise to all sorts of signs and different categories of relations between the sign, object and interpretant. Peirce's most well-known semiotic classification is the icon-index-symbol trichotomy. This is a classification of the relation between a sign and its object. The icon, index, and symbol each describe how what we see as a sign is related to what it represents.

The icon

The first category is that of the icons, or Likenesses as Peirce originally calls them (Peirce 1984, 56), "which serve to convey ideas of the things they represent simply by imitating them" (Peirce 1998, 5). The relation between an icon and the object it represents is a "mere community in quality" (Peirce 1984, 56). This means that the sign possesses a certain quality, which is present in its object as well. Peirce gives a few examples of icons: imitative sounds, imitative gestures, and pictures. While these examples are primarily of a visual nature, the imitative nature of the icon can be found in music as well.

Andrew Goodwin describes musical resemblance in his semiotic discussion of music videos as "one that involves onomatopoeia: guitars emulating police sirens [...], vocal performances that suggest sexual acts [...], rhythm sections that emulate a train" (1992, 58-59). Thomas Turino's anthropological account of musical signs gives as examples of musical iconicity "[m]otivic unity and most aspects of musical form" (1999, 227). These sonic signs are "typically not processed in terms of language-based thought but are simply felt because of a direct identity established by resemblance between the musical signs and other expressions of excitement" (ibid.). Turino writes that these signs are "simply felt", yet it is important to note that the musical expression is only an icon-sign if it evokes the right interpretant in the listener. The same is true for film and the spectator.

In Jewison's 1973 film *Jesus Christ Superstar* the title character, Jesus (Ted Neeley), sits down with his apostles to have supper, which will turn out to be his last.

As they seat themselves, Jesus and his disciples remain motionless for roughly ten seconds and create a *tableau vivant* (living picture). The last supper has a rich pictorial tradition, and in this case the tableau vivant resembles the poses of Jesus and his disciples in Leonardo da Vinci's mural painting *The Last Supper* (ca. 1495-1498).This type of intertextuality is often used with icons (Goodwin 1992, 59). The tableau vivant alludes to da Vinci's mural, but it is not an exact copy. If the scene would be a point-by-point copy of the mural, like a photograph, Peirce would classify it as an index. The recognition of an icon as a sign requires subjective interpretation, whereas the photograph is an objective representation (Robins 2014, 4). The tableau vivant is more akin to a portrait than to a photograph. It is an impression of its object, rather than a copy. In addition to resemblance, an icon is also "[t]he only way of directly communicating an idea" (Peirce 1955, 173). Peirce gives as example a painting in itself, lacking legend or label. It is an image of an idea.

The index

The second category of sign-object relations is the index. An index is a sign that denotes its object "by virtue of being really affected by that Object" (Peirce 1955, 169), and the relation of the index to its object is "a correspondence in fact" (Peirce 1984, 56). It is "in dynamical (including spatial) connection both with the individual object, on the one hand, and with the senses or memory of the person to whom it serves as a sign, on the other" (Peirce 1955, 177). In other words: there is a direct, objective, and dynamical relation between the sign and its object.

Some of Peirce's classic examples are the weathercock, which indicates the wind direction, and the clock, which indicates the time. The dynamical connection of the index also includes signs such as gestures or exclamations to grab someone's attention (Peirce 1998, 8). Goodwin describes how, in music videos, a musician's gestures can seem to create the sound, or how the act of scratching reflects the physicality of the DJ at the turntable (1992, 59). TV tunes can serve as an index as well (Turino 1999, 227), announcing the start of someone's favourite show or the six o'clock news.

In film music the leitmotif, a recurring musical phrase which represents a character, mood, or emotion (Thomsett 2012, s.v. leading motif), is similarly used as an index. In George Lucas' *Star Wars* films the instrumental *Imperial March* (Williams 1977) is used to announce Darth Vader or when a scene is showcasing

Imperial power. When the audience hears the famous first starting notes of the Imperial March, they know the evil Empire is announcing its entrance in the scene. The sound directs our attention to the object it is accompanying, namely the Empire or its representatives.

Interestingly enough this object does not have to be known known necessarily by the spectator. When someone is startled by a loud sound, e.g., an explosion, the source of this sound might be unknown, at least at first. And yet, "[a]nything which startles us is an indication, in so far as it marks the junction between two portions of experience" (Peirce 1998, 8). The link between the sound and its cause is immediately made. These "two portions of experience" are crucial to understanding the index.

Whereas the icon resembles something else through qualities it possesses itself, the index requires two elements. The icon would still be the same if the object it resembles does not exist. It would not be an icon, then, but the sign-vehicle would still be the same. The resemblance to its object is an inherent quality of the icon. Whereas the icon is a self-contained resemblance and does not require a causal link with its object, the index "is essentially dyadic, as a footprint, for instance, would not exist without the foot which planted it" (Legg 2008, 208).The icon resembles its object in itself, and the index indicates its object through a direct connection in a causal or dynamic relation.

The symbol

The symbol, finally, is the indirect representation of an object: "Symbols are *signs about* other things, whereas icons and indices are *signs of* identity (resemblance, commonality) and direct connection" (Turino 1999, 228, emphasis in original). Symbols are signs of convention, "which have become associated with their meanings by usage" (Peirce 1998, 5). Most words are symbols. Chair, book, and bird do not resemble their meaning, nor do they have a direct connection to them. Onomatopoeic words are icons, on the other hand, as they do resemble what they mean.

In music, guitar solos can be symbolic for machismo and virility (Goodwin 1992, 58), and "grunting" timbres can be symbolic for power. Fans of specific genres will recognise and engage with much more symbolism in their music than the occasional listener, for they learn the symbols through repeated listening.

The same is true in film: symbols – because of their convention and usage – can sometimes be classified as tropes, although this usually happens in derogatory

dismissal. The silence before a jump scare in horror films becomes a symbol for something bad, often deadly, which shall soon befall the unlucky film character currently present in the shot. Another example is the "male gaze" shot, starting down from a woman's lower legs and tilting upwards, taking ample time to show all the woman's features. These are examples of sonorous and visual symbols, and there are symbols in editing as well.

In Peter Jackson's 2001 film *The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring* the wizard Gandalf (Ian McKellen) falls into an abyss in the mines of Moria after fighting with a dreadful monster of old: the Balrog. The fellowship of protagonists escapes the mines but believes Gandalf to be dead. As they exit the mines, slow-motion is used to emphasize their grief and despair. In the same film it returns later on when Boromir is shot, now showing the reactions of fellowship members Merry and Pippin in slow-motion. Slow-motion is often used for emphasis and paired with silence. Slow-motion and silence are also coupled in the two minutes long intro to Martin Scorcese's *Raging Bull* (1980).

Another common editing symbol is the "training montage", in which a protagonist is shown training and becoming increasingly better at something. These montages are usually accompanied by equally symbolic music, signifying power and perseverance. The training montage in all but one of the *Rocky* films, all accompanied by Bill Conti's *Gonna Fly Now* (1977), is a case in point.

The usage of symbols in film makes them prime targets for parody as well. Films like *Airplane!*, the *Austin Powers* films, and most of Mel Brooks' films thrive on subverting the conventions of symbols. This kind of humour is only powerful if the parodied conventions are known to the spectators. This also exemplifies the intertextuality of symbols: they are signs about other things, which can be other films, other media, or cultural conventions or practices.

One more subtle example of such a parody can be found in 1992's *Wayne's World* (Spheeris), when Wayne Campbell (Mike Myers) and Cassandra (Tia Carrere) are sitting on a roof discussing Wayne's ex-girlfriend. After Wayne impresses Cassandra with his limited knowledge of Cantonese and Wayne's ex-girlfriend comes up hoping to make him jealous with a random stranger, Wayne and Cassandra continue the conversation in Cantonese. At one point Wayne responds to Cassandra with four Cantonese syllables spoken in little over a second, after which fourteen seconds of dialogue silence follows. The audience sees Wayne and Cassandra sitting together and

looking around, clearly waiting for the subtitles to finish. The subtitles for the four Cantonese syllables just spoken by Wayne need all of the fourteen seconds to translate what Wayne supposedly said: “I’ve made a confident declaration in defence of my rights ...but it does not seem to do any good. If I help her out of feelings of obligation, I may find myself resenting her. Besides, she’s a psycho hose beast.” Wayne looks around impatiently, and looks directly at the camera twice, breaking the fourth wall (see below), as if to ask the audience whether they get the joke already. By the end of the fourteen seconds, Wayne looks at his watch and nods that they can continue now, after which Cassandra continues the conversation.

The humour here is quite interesting. The interpretation of this scene depends on how the spectator sees it. While the actual subtitles end on a humorous note, this scene can also be seen to parody the effort to subtitle foreign films or the richness of Cantonese in contrast to the monotony of English where everything you want to say has to be completely spelled out. This all depends on whether the spectator knows these things and recognises them as such. If that is not the case, it is just a bit with funny subtitles. The usage of symbols is arbitrary, and their conventions must be learned (Legg 2008, 208), for they lack the resemblance of the icon or the direct connection of the index.

Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness

The icon, index, and symbol represent Peirce’s categories of *Firstness, Secondness,* and *Thirdness*. He calls these three categories modes of being (Peirce 1955, 130), or states of mind (Peirce 1998, 4). They are his “three most basic categories for all phenomena” (Turino 1999, 231). These categories permeate his thinking and an understanding thereof elucidates much of his semiotic theory.

Peirce first describes these categories as *Feeling*, *Reacting*, and *Thinking* (Peirce 1998, 4-5). Feeling, or Firstness, includes no reference to something else; it is solely “what there is”. The icon belongs to firstness: any resemblance or reference is included in the sign itself. Reacting, or Secondness, necessarily includes a reference or reaction to something else, but without reference to a third thing. The index is a sign of Secondness. There is smoke because of the fire; the weathercock turns because it reacts to the wind. Thinking, or Thirdness, is the mediation between two things through a third, usually the person thinking of and being affected by the interpretant of the sign. The symbol belongs to Thirdness. In the *Wayne’s World* scene described above the

subtitling of foreign languages is parodied by stretching it to the absurd (fourteen seconds of subtitles for about one second of speech).

Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness help to explain how "semiosis – the process of signs becoming signs – is qualified and cognized by way of semiotics – the process of rendering signs meaningful" (Merrell 2001, 32). The icon, index, and symbol tell us something of the sign-object relation. They are categories explaining how a sign is related to its object. Peirce also developed three categories for the sign itself, three different kinds of interpretants, three categories for the sign-interpretant relation (or how a sign is interpreted to represent its object), and two different kinds of objects. Through a combination of these subdivisions, Peirce ultimately developed ten different categories of signs (Peirce 1955, 188-192). It is not the goal of this chapter to discuss all of these different categories.[9] I consider the sign, object, and interpretant as the integral parts of the semiotic process without the need for their respective subdivisions. The sign, object, and interpretant explain something about each part of this semiotic relation. Their respective subcategories deal more with the sign itself rather than with how the sign works to convey meaning. The semiotic process, the relation between the different parts out of which meaning emerges, is of interest here.

Whereas the discussion of the icon, index, and symbol deals with how a sign is related to its object, the relation between the sign and the interpretant is expressed by the rheme, dicent, and argument. The rheme, dicent, and argument are expressions of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, similar to the icon, index, and symbol. They clarify how a sign is interpreted to represent its object.

The rheme, dicent, and argument

The rheme is a sign of qualitative possibility; it is the representation of "such and such a kind of possible Object" (Peirce 1955, 170). As it is a sign of possibility, it is not "judged as true or false" (Turino 1999, 229). James Liszka adds that "for a rheme its interpretation will be directed more towards the sense, the connotation or depth, of the sign" (Liszka 1996, 41). An icon is always a rheme. It represents a possible idea, without judgment on the veracity of what is depicted. If someone suddenly exclaims a curse word, it is a rheme-index. We are startled, or focus our attention to whoever suddenly cursed, yet cannot ascertain the reason behind the sudden exclamation.

[9] For a discussion of these categories, see, e.g., Weiss and Burks 1945, and Liszka 1996. For a discussion of these categories in relation to music, see Turino 1999.

A dicent, on the other hand, belongs to Secondness. It is "a Sign of actual existence" (Peirce 1955, 170). Similar to the index, a dicent points towards an actual thing. It is interpreted as "really being affected by its object" (Turino 1999, 229). Because of this, a dicent can never be an icon, which is a resemblance in itself and not directly connected to its object (Peirce 1955, 170). The weathervane is a dicent-index: it indicates the wind in actual co-existence and a direct physical connection. Dicent-indices are compelling signs. The dicent points to actual existence, as does the index. Due to both the dicent and the index pointing to actual existence, dicent-indices are often interpreted as truthful or natural (Turino 1999, 229).

An argument, finally, belongs to Thirdness. It is a sign of law, "understood to represent its Object in its character as Sign" (Peirce 1955, 171). In Peirce's classification of ten signs the argument is only connected with the symbol. It is never an icon or index. If a film parodies the examples above of symbolic slow-motion and montage, this parody would be an argument-symbol. It represents the sign itself, i.e., the slow-motion or montage and the laws associated with it. The parody stems from the subversion of the representation of the laws. It is an interpretation of the conventions used to represent an object that belongs to Thirdness, or thinking.

As a result of these classifications, the three categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness in the sign-object relation (icon, index, symbol) relate to the sign-interpretant relation in a peculiar manner. The sign-object relation can only contain the same or lower modes of being (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness) in the sign-interpretant relation. Note that the use of "lower" here merely points to one being less than two and two being less than three. It is not indicative of Firstness being a lesser mode of being than Secondness in any way.

In other words, this means that the mode of Firstness in the sign-object relation (icon) can only contain Firstness in the sign-interpretant relation (rheme). The mode of Secondness in the sign-object relation (index) can contain both Firstness and Secondness in the sign-interpretant relation (rheme, dicent). Thirdness in the sign-object relation (symbol), then, can contain both Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness (rheme, dicent, argument).

In short, an icon can only ever be a rheme. An index can be both a rheme and a dicent sign. A symbol can be a rheme, dicent, or argument. In any subsequent analyses the "rheme-" prefix would be superfluous when discussing the icon and it shall not be used. The division of a symbolic sign-object relation into rheme, dicent,

or argument shall not be used either. The symbol is a sign by convention, or law. It is a sign of "general meaning" (Peirce 1955, 184). Its subdivision in rheme, dicent, and argument is used to clarify degrees of generality without necessarily referring to actual instances or uses of the symbol (cf. Turino 1999, 230). This means that in the semiotic analyses to follow only the classifications icon, rheme-index, dicent-index, and symbol are used.

The question that remains is whether silence can be a sign. In the examples above I have readily discussed it as such: I used the iconic silence of the tableau vivant in *Jesus Christ Superstar*, the indexical silence in *2001: A Space Odyssey*, and the symbolic silence in *The Lord of the Rings* as examples of signifying silence. Silence in itself, however, does not seemingly stand in clear relation to any object other than sound. After all, it is only after a sound ends that silence might occur, or, conversely, silence is only defined by the sound that shatters it. Following Peirce's definition, however, anything can be a sign if it enters signifying relations with an object and an interpretant. Silence too, then, can be a sign. The real question is how silence engages in signifying relations.

3. The semiotics of silence

Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney classifies silence in speech as belonging to the category of the "zero signifiers", signifiers "without materiality, that is, without representation by linguistic labels or objects" (Ohnuki-Tierney 1994, 59). Zero signifiers may have no materiality, but their presence is "predicated by objectified signifiers, such as words, events, activities, drum beats, [...]" (Ohnuki-Tierney 1994, 66). These objectified signifiers are quite important, for the creation of meaning is a result of the dynamic interplay between material signifiers and zero signifiers.

Zero signifiers carry no meaning in themselves (Ohnuki-Tierney 1994, 71). In Ohnuki-Tierney's model, the material signifier and the zero signifier assign meaning to each other. The material signifier assigns meaning to the zero signifier, which in turn mirrors that meaning to the material signifier again. In film, silence as a zero sign takes its meaning from visual and sonorous signs around it. A symbolic use of silence before a jump scare takes its meaning from the coming jump scare. Silence becomes the unsounding announcer of what is to follow it. This helps to explain the strength of

the trope. The preceding silence is reinforced by the subsequent scare; the silence becomes scary after the first viewing. On repeat encounters this silence will be firmly established as being scary if this is confirmed by a jump scare following the silence. Silence in tense scenes becomes scary in turn because it might be confirmed as being a jump scare. The trope uses the built up anticipation of earlier encounters and established affirmations.

Although Ohnuki-Tierney is building on Saussurean semiology, this need not be a problem for the translation of her ideas into Peircean semiotics. Whereas Saussure's theory, as explained above, deals with structures, Peirce's semiotics deals with relations and the process of meaning creation. Precisely these relations allow for an implementation of Ohnuki-Tierney's concept into a Peircean model. The transferral of the material signifier's meaning onto the zero signifier is a structural event for Ohnuki-Tierney, but an application of the zero signifier in Peircean semiotics becomes a relational process. The zero signifier becomes a zero sign which is determined by an object and determines an interpretant. Meaning is the result of this process: the observer, affected by an interpretant, recognises the object through the sign. The zero sign is not a resemblance, a direct link, or an expression of convention in itself, however. It is in this object that the transgression of material signs upon the zero sign happens. Similar to Ohnuki-Tierney's concept, a zero sign in Peirce's semiotic relation receives meaning through its context.

Silence in film is not merely an absence of sound; its use as a zero sign can point to any contextual object. Silence is not the only zero signifier, of course. It can be argued that the presence of a drone (a continuously sounding tone), which does not always have a direct link to a material object, works much the same way. A crucial point in the conceptualisation of filmic silence as a zero sign is to understand where it differs from drone. A drone has materiality, which means it will enter into an active, transgressing relation with its context. Silence does not have materiality. Silence needs the transgression of a material signifier upon it in order to engage in meaningful semiotic relations.[10] A drone, on the other hand, will engage in inter-sign relations from the moment it is present. It is an active relation, whereas silence at first enters into a passive relation with its context. Due to silence's lack of material presence, it

[10] Although they are closely related, this is also one of the reasons that silence works better as a zero sign than as an example of Lévi-Strauss' floating signifier, cf. the discussion in Ohnuki-Tierney 1994, 60-61.

allows for its context to first impress a certain quality upon it. It is only after its context has partially defined silence that it actively engages with that context. Due to this passive nature, silence does not necessarily change the meaning of other signs but it can reinforce a meaningful contextual relation. Some of the examples above have already shown how silence can have a myriad number of meanings.

Silence's multiple possible meanings depend on its contextual use. Whilst this is true for many, if not all, sonorous signs, silence is peculiar in that it is a passive semiotic relation and requires an object to resolve its ambiguity. Whereas, for example, a military march stands for order and power in itself, silence refuses such certainties and presents us with a passive ambiguity forcing us to interpret it in its context to resolve the ambiguity. That is why silence is such a trope in horror films: it refuses to sonorously hold our hand but forces our mind to decide on the myriad possibilities of what it might mean, and our mind is all too happy to think of the worst things imaginable.

Silence itself never changes as a sign, but its context changes in each film, or even each scene. The different contexts wherein silence is used result in different objects entering into a semiotic relation with silence. This means that the sign-object relation is defined by context as well. It is only after this sign-object relation has been established that the semiotic process can continue towards an interpretant and the eventual recognition of the object through the sign. This brings us back to the icon, index, and symbol, which express the way a sign enters into a relation with its object. This relation is crucial to the analysis of filmic silence. Filmic silence considered in itself is a composed abyss of uncertain depth and width. The abyss needs to be anchored between cliffs in order to be gauged, to be understood. Silence is a passive construction uncertain in meaning. This uncertainty is resolved when a spectator rewrites the composed absence in function of its context. The gap in meaning is bridged and the film becomes a coherent whole.

Iconic silence

The icon is an expression of resemblance, of a community in quality. This community in quality is also sonorously present in the example of the iconic tableau vivant in *Jesus Christ Superstar* given above. As Jesus and his disciples move towards their positions, the disciples are singing of their trials and tribulations. The singing is diegetic, and the accompanying music is non-diegetic. As the actors freeze and form the tableau vivant,

the diegetic singing stops while the non-diegetic music continues. This results in a diegetic silence accompanying the tableau vivant for a few seconds. This diegetic silence is iconic. The lifelessness of the actors becomes the object of this silence, reinforcing in turn their iconic resemblance to da Vinci's mural. The visual stillness is copied in the soundtrack. Although it is impossible for an actor to be actually silent, as shown in the discussion of the five types of silence above, in a film it is but a matter of switching the volume off in the diegetic track to accomplish this kind of silence.

A rather different example can be found in *Blade Runner* (Scott, 1982) when Rick Deckard (Harrison Ford) chases Zhora (Joanna Cassidy), one of the replicants. A non-diegetic silence is present when he follows her into the busy city streets. The only sounds present are diegetic sounds of the urban chaos. The silence here is an icon which takes as its object the whole scene. The scene breathes chaos and realism (insofar as this is possible in a science-fiction film). The absence of any non-diegetic sounds or music is a resemblance of our experience of reality: there is no acousmatic music accompanying our daily activities either. Silence, in this case, is a reinforcement of reality. More precisely, it is an imagining of our experience of reality onto a fictional future reality: the chaos, grittiness and raw atmosphere of the city and the future is reinforced by presenting this scene without accompanying music.

An extreme example of the same principle can be found in *Cast Away* (Zemeckis, 2000), in which Chuck Noland (Tom Hanks) is stranded on a desert island miles away from anything resembling the inhabited world. The entirety of Noland's stay on the desert island is mimicked in the soundtrack by non-diegetic silence, which here takes the theme of the film – away from society – as its object. The absence of music resembles the island's isolation and the absence of civilisation. This is not a convention or law, which would make it a symbol, nor is it the absence of society acting upon the deserted island, which would make this silence an index. It simply is a reflection of the isolation of the island itself.

A final example, one of complete iconic silence in the soundtrack, is when silence is used to express the impossibility of sound, i.e., in space. Stanley Kubrick uses this kind of silence frequently in *2001: A Space Odyssey*. Kubrick removes all sound in the film no less than twenty-three times, each time resulting in a temporarily completely silenced soundtrack. These silences range in duration from two seconds to forty-nine seconds, for a total of six minutes and seventeen seconds of total silence in the film. These silences are invariably used with images of space. Space clearly is the

object of the silence in the soundtrack. These twenty-three silences are all iconic; they are representations of the impossibility of sound in space. They are not indexical, although they do express a connection. The key to understanding this difference is to think of it in terms of Peirce's three categories. The silence in the soundtrack is not reacting (Secondness) to its object (the imagery of space), it rather *is* (Firstness) the same as its object in some quality, i.e., an absence of sound. It is an expression of the same quality in both sign and object. An index, on the other hand, is always an "individual second" (Peirce 1955, 177).

Indexical silence

Indexical silence is present in one of the many completely silent shots in *2001*, namely when HAL uses the pod to launch Frank into space with what is presumably a severed oxygen tube. This scene starts with Frank leaving the space ship in the pod and subsequently exiting the pod to inspect a malfunction. The only sounds in the soundtrack at this point are those of some kind of high pressure, either of Frank's oxygen or the pod thrusters, and of Frank breathing while he is travelling through space. The pod then suddenly starts turning by itself, and extends it arms. A few quickly cut close-ups of HAL follow, after which Frank is suddenly shown tumbling through space frantically moving about. The image then cuts to Frank trying to reattach his oxygen tube. This image is completely silent, although Frank is still alive, and stands in stark contrast to the earlier shots where Frank's breathing was rather loudly present in the soundtrack. In this case, the silence is indexical rather than iconic. Now that he has lost the protection of his spacesuit, Frank is affected by the lack of oxygen and atmosphere in the void of space. More precisely, this silence is a dicent-index because it represents Frank being directly affected by space.

An example of silence as a rheme-index, which is a sign directly affected by the possibility of an object, can be found in *The Fellowship of the Ring*. The fellowship finds a tomb in the mines of Moria with a book detailing the last days of the dwarfs that used to populate the mines. Gandalf reads the final pages of the book aloud, which gives an account of how the dwarves were ultimately overrun. The book speaks of drums in the deep, and how the dwarves are trapped. By the time Gandalf has finished reading, Pippin (Billy Boyd) is distracted by an armoured corpse on the edge of a well. He twists the arrow sticking out of the corpse causing the head to fall in the well,

quickly followed by the corpse and a chain the corpse was sitting on, and finally also a bucket tied to the chain.

The sounds of these items falling reverberate quite loudly in the rather quiet soundtrack of that moment. During Gandalf's reading the music has disappeared and the fellowship quietened down to a whisper, becoming apprehensive of the possible danger they could find themselves in. After the sounds and echoes of the falling items fade away, the fellowship silently waits for a few seconds. The silence of the fellowship here is quite significant. The audience holds their breath with the fellowship (at least, I did). The fellowship listens attentively for any reaction to the fallen items. Their attentive silence is a reaction to the loud sounds, but the true object of their silence is to await the presence of the aforementioned drums in the deep. It is an expression of possibility. This possibility is soon resolved as Pippin's foolishness is seemingly without consequence, and with it the silence is resolved as well. After a few seconds, the fellowship audibly exhales and they berate Pippin. Their relief, however, is soon pierced by a drum in the deep.

Symbolic silence

Symbols are signs referring to something else with which they are not causally or dynamically linked. A very common example of symbolic silence is the diegetic silence during a montage, which is a symbol itself. In Sam Mendes' 2002 film *Road to Perdition*, Michael Sullivan (Tom Hanks) and his son Michael Sullivan Jr. (Tyler Hoechlin) are on the run from Michael's former employer and they leave for Chicago. Michael turns to Michael Jr. and tells his son to get some sleep, and as we see Michael Jr. drift off the diegetic sounds fade out. Only Thomas Newman's *Road to Chicago* is audible over the diegetic silence, while the imagery shows them driving in four different shots. The diegetic silence here is a conventional symbolic silence. It does not bear resemblance, nor a direct connection to the car driving through different landscapes. The object of this silence is the montage, and the effacement of time and space by proxy.

In the same film, another type of symbolic silence can be found when Michael ultimately decides to face his pursuers. The scene in question starts when John Rooney (Paul Newman), Michael's former boss, exits a store into the pouring rain accompanied by his henchmen. As they exit, most of the diegetic sounds fade out until only the sound of rain remains. Thomas Newman's *Ghosts* starts playing and as

Rooney walks to his car the sound of rain slowly fades out as well, leaving only diegetic silence and Newman's music. When he arrives at his car Rooney finds his driver dead behind the wheel with the doors locked. Puzzled, Rooney and his men stand around in the rain looking for clues as to what has happened until one by one Rooney's henchmen get shot down. As his men are killed, Rooney hangs his head and realises what is happening.

The diegetic silence is still present at this point: there are no sounds of gunshots or deaths cries or rain audible. It is only after all the henchmen are mowed down that Michael Sullivan emerges from his hiding place and slowly walks towards Rooney. The diegetic sound of rain softly returns in the soundtrack at this point. Rooney turns to Sullivan and says "I'm glad it's you." Sullivan looks at Rooney with a sad look in his eyes, raises his machine gun, and shoots Rooney at point blank range. These gunshots *are* audibly present in the soundtrack, and seem particularly loud after the previous diegetic silence which lasted for a minute and three seconds.

The slow pace of Thomas Newman's music and the absence of any diegetic sounds stand in stark contrast to the massacre of Rooney's henchmen. The violence of the henchmen's deaths, coupled with Rooney's resigned look, is the heroic conclusion of our protagonist's tale – at least for now. This violent conclusion, culminating in the subsequent death of Rooney at the hands of Sullivan, is the object of this silence. The henchmen's deaths are silenced because Rooney's death needs to be audibly emphasised. The short reminiscent looks the two men share before Sullivan kills Rooney reinforce the tragedy of this story. They shared an almost familial bond, as they were like father and son to each other, but it has to end here. As Sullivan raises his weapon and guns down Rooney, these gunshots resound loudly in both the current shot and through the previous silence. Rooney's death is the object of the previous silence. The silenced violence and deaths of the henchmen reinforce the powerful manner of Rooney's death: although a single bullet would have done the trick, Sullivan fires over fifteen rounds at point blank range.

There are many more symbolic uses of silence. Similar to the silence during a montage, diegetic silence is also often present with slow-motion. In the example of slow-motion in *The Fellowship of the Ring* above, diegetic silence is present whilst the different members of the fellowship are shown grieving and in despair after the presumed death of Gandalf. Another example of diegetic symbolic silence, so common that it actually has become a trope, is the silence before a jump scare or stinger. This

is usually non-diegetic silence accompanied by relatively quiet diegetic sounds. Any horror fan knows what to expect when a sudden silence surrounds a character. The character will either die, or it (and with it, the audience) will be scared by something quite soon. This trope is an example of what Rick Altman calls "the sound advance", as it functions as a sonic prediction of what is yet to come (Altman 1986, 50). Altman's concept of the sound advance is just one of many concepts applicable to silence to describe its function.

4. Functions of silence

The ambiguity of filmic silence allows it to function not only in different semiotic roles, but in different functional roles as well. The function of silence goes hand-in-hand with the meaning it helps to create. In many cases, the function of silence and the role it plays in the semiotic process will be similar. Like the semiotic process, most if not all of silence's functions are defined by context as well. Even silence's most basic aspects are completely defined by context: the form and volume of silence completely depend on what conjures or shatters silence.

In the case of form, it is both of these aspects: the start and end of silence are defined by sound. The form of silence, however, is not as functional as the volume of silence. It is quite a strange notion to speak of the volume of silence of course, but in a way silence inversely copies the dominating sound which precedes or follows it. A loud sound preceding or following silence tends to stress the interplay in dynamic between these volumes more than a softer sound. Note that this does not mean that louder sounds are necessarily more effective than softer sounds in engaging an audience. A soft whisper in a suspenseful silence can have just as much affective value, e.g., the "I see dead people" scene in *The Sixth Sense* (Shyamalan, 1999).

Cole Sear (Haley Joel Osment) lies in bed with Dr Malcolm Crowe (Bruce Willis) besides him whilst the scene is completely silent. Cole sighs, and after a few more silent seconds he quietly says "I wanna tell you my secret now". Crowe nods, says "OK" and waits for Cole to continue. An eerie string arrangement softly appears in the soundtrack, and Cole whispers "I see dead people". Whilst this has been known to the audience for some time, this reveal leads to the big twist of the film. The silence

in this scene is suspenseful, but the spectator's attention is not drawn to the differences in volume. The attention is drawn to the conversation between Cole and Crowe.

An interesting example of the interplay in dynamics between loud sounds and silence can be found in Francis Ford Coppola's *Apocalypse Now* (1979), when Lieutenant Colonel Bill Kilgore (Robert Duvall) performs a helicopter raid on a Vietnamese village suspected of sheltering Vietcong combatants. As the soldiers depart in the helicopters, Kilgore rhetorically asks his men "shall we dance?" He starts playing Richard Wagner's *Ride of the Valkyries* through the loudspeakers mounted on the aircraft, and for the next minute and fifteen seconds Wagner's music increases in volume up to the point that it all but drowns out the other diegetic sounds. The images meanwhile show the helicopters flying in formation and the soldiers eagerly anticipating the attack. After a minute and fifteen seconds, the image suddenly and unexpectedly cuts to the Vietnamese village and all sound abruptly disappears. Diegetic sounds slowly reappear in the soundtrack after little over a second of complete silence. It starts with dogs barking and then the voices of children talking and singing. The abrupt cut to the Vietnamese village in complete silence stands in stark contrast the loud music of the previous shots. The *Ride of the Valkyries* reappears in the soundtrack, softly at first, accompanied by the appearance of the helicopters in the distance. The village and its silence are soon obliterated by the combined power of Wagner's music, explosions, and gunfire.

This particular scene of *Apocalypse Now* serves as a clear case in point, yet the play in dynamics of this example is not as common. This dynamic use of sound and silence does become increasingly popular after the implementation of digital editing techniques (see Chapter 2, §Silence in the twenty-first century, pp. 77-81). The abrupt hard cut with a complete disappearance of sound is quite disrupting at first. It is only when *Ride of the Valkyries* reappears in the soundtrack that a suturing effect is achieved and the spectator is affirmed in their suspicion that this is indeed the village on which all sonic hell shall soon rain down.

A much more common example of this play with volume is the silenced perception of a temporarily deafened or shell-shocked character, usually after an explosion. This happens, for example, in the landing scene in *Saving Private Ryan* (Spielberg, 1998) when Captain Miller (Tom Hanks) hears nothing but muffled sounds for a bit after arriving on Omaha beach (cf. ibid).

Chion's null extension

The silencing of part of the filmic world in this way is an example of Michel Chion's concept of "null extension", which means that the sonic universe has shrunk to the sounds that only one character hears (Chion 1994, 87; cf. the discussion of subjective sound in Chapter 2, §Silence in the twenty-first century, pp. 77-81). Null extension is similar to, but not always the same as, meta-diegetic sound. Meta-diegesis refers to the sounds of a story within a story, a second diegesis within the original diegesis or a shift in perception (cf. the fantastical gap in Stilwell 2007). In film, this is often expressed by characters dreaming or hallucinating. Null extensions can express the same as meta-diegesis, but it can also be used in the normal diegesis. In *Saving Private Ryan* the soundtrack shrinks to what Miller hears, but it is definitely not a dream, hallucination, or a story within a story. The opposite of null extension is vast or ambient extension (Chion 1994, 87), which consists of the ambient sounds of the diegetic world.

Silence is used quite commonly with null extension, often in scenes where a character is dreaming or in a state of trance. The "spectacular" scene in *American Beauty* (Mendes, 1999) is but one example. As Lester Burnham (Kevin Spacey) lies in bed next to his wife, rose petals float down on him. The image then shows the origin of the rose petals: the object of Lester's frustrated desires, Angela Hayes (Mena Suvari), is lying on the ceiling, covered in rose petals. It becomes clear to the spectator that this vision is all in Lester's mind, as pretty neighbours normally do not float on the ceilings of bedrooms.

The vision is sonorously represented in the soundtrack. The only audible sound is Thomas Newman's composition *A Rose*, with diegetic silence present until Lester starts narrating. Diegetic silence then returns whilst Lester keeps watching Angela, until he speaks again about a minute later and simply says "Spectacular". The null extension of this dreamlike sequence is expressed by the diegetic silence in the scene. Lester's wife lies next to him in bed, but there is no sound of her breathing present, nor any sounds of the outside world.

When parts of the soundtrack are silenced in this manner, the audience identifies more with the character it sees and whose hearing it shares. Silence is used to clear the soundtrack of all other sounds. The only sounds present are those put forward by the character whose experience the audience is sharing. A moment of intimacy is created between the audience and the character whose mind it temporarily

shares. For a moment, the audience is in the character's mind. Everything else is silenced.

Another example, in which the null extension is also doubled in the imagery, is the dance scene in *Anna Karenina* (Wright, 2012). As Anna Karenina (Keira Knightley) and Alexei Vronsky (Aaron Taylor-Johnson) waltz through the room, the audience hears the rustling of dresses and shuffling of feet. The imagery at hand is more curious, however, as the other couples dancing in the room are still at first, halted in their dance movements and lifeless like statues, until Anna and Alexei move closer and the stilled couples continue dancing.

Alexei then lifts Anna and as he puts her down again all other dancing couples have completely disappeared. The room grows darker until only Anna and Alexei are illuminated. The rustling and shuffling have disappeared from the soundtrack as well. The only sound in the soundtrack is the music of the orchestra, and Anna and Alexei continue dancing completely alone in an otherwise empty room (not even the orchestra is shown).

The still couples frozen in their dance moves earlier in the scene already announce what the imagery and soundtrack now make clear: Anna and Alexei are oblivious to their surroundings, their perception is absolutely and completely focused solely on each other. What kind of silence is this then? Is it diegetic, as they continue dancing, or non-diegetic, as the room is empty otherwise? Is it indexical, as the room is now empty so there are no longer sounds of other people present, or symbolic, as a few seconds later the shuffling reappears in the soundtrack as the room slowly lights up again and the other dancing couples reappear in the soundtrack? Or is it both? In semiotic theory, signs can have multiple forms, which is one of the limitations of semiotics I shall address below. There are also a few silences that deserve mention as special cases, rare moments where the perspective of characters in the film shifts to the perspective of the audience outside the film.

Silence of the film itself: breaking the fourth wall and punch line silence

Breaking the fourth wall is perhaps the most obvious example where the perspective in the film breaks with the narrative continuity to directly address and include the audience in the film. One classic example of this is the post-credits scene in *Ferris Bueller's Day Off* (Hughes 1986) when the titular character, Ferris (Matthew Broderick), walks out into a hallway wearing a bathrobe. He strolls towards the camera

and, apparently quite puzzled, asks the audience: “You’re still here? It’s over. Go home.” He then walks off, glancing back over his shoulders, before waving the audience off with a final “Go!” Ferris’ speech is the only sound in this scene, which is accompanied by a non-diegetic silence (the music ended together with the credits).

Fourth wall breaks are much more prominent in comedy than in other genres. They often coincide with punch line silence in comedies. In *Spaceballs* (Brooks 1987) breaking the fourth wall is even used as a plot device, actually advancing the narrative at the same time as breaking the fourth wall. Most, if not all of Mel Brooks’ films are rife with punch line silence fourth wall breaks, as are the films of the Marx Brothers (see Chapter 2, §Silence in comedy, pp. 57-60), Mike Meyers (see the example of *Wayne’s World* above), and David Zucker.

The semiotic analysis of a fourth wall breaking punch line silence is quite interesting, in particular regarding the question of what the object of this silence is. In some cases it can be posited that the diegetic world of the film itself is silenced. This silence takes the film itself as its object. This is certainly the case in *Wayne’s World*, where the subtitles continue the narrative but Wayne is looking at the audience to see whether they get the joke already. The illusion of the film itself becomes the object of this silence. This is not necessarily the case in fourth wall breaks. In the examples of the Marx Brothers and Abbott and Costello, and certainly that of *Spaceballs* where it becomes a plot device, the narrative of the film continues uninterrupted and is a part of the direct address to the audience.

What is silenced in these examples is the frame itself, the invisible barrier between film and audience. The audience suddenly finds itself *in* the film world and is directly addressed by one of the film’s characters. They are only addressed briefly by this character, and by this character (or a few characters simultaneously) only. This is a meta-narrative temporarily superimposed on the ongoing diegetic narrative; the rest of the diegetic world remains blissfully unaware of the presence of the audience (as far as we know). I refrain from putting forward special terms to describe this use of superimposed meta-narratives to avoid the pitfalls regarding nomenclature described in chapter 1 (§Hearing the forest for the trees, pp. 29-30; and §The theory in practice, pp. 34-35). Silence during a fourth wall break is either a simple punch line silence, or it is rare enough to warrant a description and discussion in itself, rather than adding confusing terms to the framework for analysis.

5. The limits of semiotics

Semiotics is not a complete solution to all of the film scholar's problems, but it is a tool to be used in specific situations. Like all tools, semiotics has its limitations. The example of the silence in Anna Karenina, which could be both symbolic or indexical, is not atypical. It is not simply the ambiguity of silence that complicates matters, but semiotics itself as well. Peirce's Thirdness can contain Firstness and Secondness as well, so symbols can contain icons and indices (Peirce 1955, 184). According to Peirce, this should not be that much of a problem because "it is seldom requisite to be very accurate; for if one does not locate the sign precisely, one will easily come near enough to its character for any ordinary purpose of logic." (Peirce 1955, 194). William John Thomas Mitchell echoes Peirce's sentiment and generalises it, stating that we "find that there is no sign that exists in a 'pure state', no pure icon, index, or symbol" (Mitchell 2005, 261).

Mitchell's "impure" sign is also a post-structural critique of semiotics. A post-structural view on semiotic analysis is important to keep in mind. There is no single truthful analysis as each spectator's interpretation can differ, and the author's intention in creating an icon, index, or symbol does not matter. It is only in each subjective viewing of a film that a sign is recognised or not, regardless of the director's intentions. It is also one of the reasons I argued against the use of Saussurean semiotics: the very notion of silence as utterance of an underlying structure in film is too rigid to allow plausible analyses.

Any analysis must be understood in its cultural context as well.[11] Silence in a Western film might not mean the same thing for an audience from a different cultural background. By focusing on the semiotic process and its relations, rather than on the sign itself, it is possible to respect a post-structural critique on semiotics, namely that the very notion of a sign is unstable in itself. The focus on the semiotic relation takes this into consideration: each interpretant can recognise a different object through the sign, if one is recognised at all. This whole chapter is a post-structural approach to the semiotics of silence: there are no fixed meanings or conventions, each and every use

[11] Note that for Saussure cultural context is one of the underlying structures and is therefore implicitly present in his theory. Saussure sees this cultural context from a structuralist point of view, incorporating it in the utterance as a product of this context.

of silence can be subverted by other uses. In a way, due to its inherent ambiguity in the semiotic process, silence is the very embodiment of a postmodern sign.

The single most important factor to take into account when considering semiotic analyses is that sometimes silence simply does not mean anything. If it does not mean anything, it would be quite difficult to stick to a semiotic approach. Although silence in film is never coincidental, sometimes composed silence is simply silence. For example, non-diegetic silence can put the ear's focus with the dialogue, without further semiotic relation to the scene. This use of silence is found in many films, and just one example is *The Maltese Falcon* (Huston, 1941). Most of the dialogue in this film features no accompanying music. These non-diegetic silences are mostly without meaning. It could be argued, of course, that the director and sound engineer decided to incorporate this silence for this very purpose: to put the focus of the audience's ear with the dialogue. This is even most likely the case. In keeping with the earlier mentioned second most important factor, however, no meaning can be derived from any authorial intention. The quote by Chion I discussed in the beginning of this chapter, "Silence is never a neutral emptiness", might then be worded slightly differently: silence is hardly ever a neutral emptiness. Sometimes silence is just that: a neutral emptiness. Yet often it is not, and spectators understand a film by incorporating silence in their experience whether it means something or not.

Whilst the theory and examples in this chapter deal with silence in specific scenes, the question remains how silence relates to the whole of the film, or to other silences in other films. Semiotics offers no answer for these questions – taking the concept of contextual relations to include the whole film or even other films might just be a bit far-fetched for an analysis based solely on semiotics. Although a semiotic analysis is helpful to analyse silence in particular scenes, an audience still links these silences – even unconsciously – to other silences in other films. If not, the very idea of the cliché silence before a jump scare would be unimaginable. The next chapter explores this unconscious linking of silence: how does silence affect us, how does an audience experience silence without explicitly interpreting it as a sign? This also serves to broaden the focus on silence and steer away from the danger of logocentrism.

Semiotics and rational, logical analyses can serve as an antidote to silence's ambiguity and sometimes obfuscating analyses (cf. the myriad analyses of silence's modes, categories and types in Chapter 1). This does not mean, however, that the focus on logical analysis is the end-all answer. Semiotics has its shortcomings, and the next

chapter focuses on patching these by focusing on unconscious explorations of how silence in film works and affects us. As chapter 5 will also show, a rational or logical interpretation of signs is also far from the actual experience of film. Spectators place themselves willingly in the film, rather than judging and analysing the possible signs present in the film. This relates to Benjamin's conscious exploration of film as well: placing too much emphasis on semiotic approaches over analysing the actual experience of film can only result in reading too much into the film.

Chapter 4 – The Affect of Silence

Sometimes silence does not mean anything or its possible semiotic relation is not recognised. If a spectator or listener does not recognise the semiotic relations of a sign-vehicle, there is no signification, as the interpretation by a spectator is a necessary part of the semiotic process in Peirce's theory. Whilst the semiotic analysis can stop here, this does not mean that there is no unconscious experience of silence. Even if there is a meaningful interpretation after or during an encounter with silence, the unconscious exploration of silence before our rational interpretation takes over is still an important part of the experience of silence.

Brian Massumi critiques a purely semiotic approach and states that "[a]pproaches to the image in its relation to language are incomplete if they operate only on the semantic or semiotic level [...]. What they lose, precisely, is the expression *event* – in favour of structure." (Massumi 1995, 87, emphasis in original). This chapter analyses the expression event Massumi mentions: it discusses what this expression event might be and how it works by focusing on the notion of affect.

In what follows this affective event will be explored by looking at how affect and the expression event are discussed by Massumi, Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari. In reading and using Deleuze a danger resides in simplifying his concepts and cherry-picking concepts, applying them to other fields without accounting for other concepts that are intrinsically linked to them. Jean-Godefroy Bidima describes this as turning Deleuze's views into "a reservoir of slogans" (in Buchanan and Swiboda 2004, 193).

Similar to avoiding Ó Maoilearca's transcendental film choice (cf. Chapter 1, §The problem of meaning attribution, pp. 31-32), I intend to restrain from "sloganising" Deleuze. Ian Buchanan writes how "no single discourse, indeed no single component of [Deleuze and Guattari's] work, may be pulled out and used as an optic through which to view the whole. One must grasp the whole first, all at once, and use that to understand the concepts" (ibid., 2). This chapter cannot serve as an introduction to Deleuze and Guattari, however. Rather, this chapter shall take Massumi's "expression event" as the whole to be understood. Every concept is a multiplicity or a whole in itself (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 16) and the concepts used here can be understood as relating to this event.

This chapter starts with an exploration of the expression event and its unconscious encounters as the necessary complement to Peirce's semiotics. The goal of this chapter is to provide a counterweight to the purely logical or rational interpretation of silence of the previous chapter. The next chapter then discusses how the conscious and unconscious experience are two sides of the same coin and cannot be separated in an analysis of silence in film.

1. Affect and the expression event

The notion "expression event" suggests an ongoing process. Massumi states that this process of experiencing is missed in semiotic analysis, but Peirce's semiotics look at the interpretation of signs as a process as well. This seems to indicate two distinct processes, one affective and one rational, that are nonetheless part of the same event. The combination of the semiotic and the affective experience of the same event is explored in more detail in the next chapter (see Chapter 5, §Thinking in time, pp. 148-149), but for now the semiotic process-of-interpretation can be seen as the end-stage of the expression event.

Massumi posits that there is a gap between content and effect (or the interpretation of that content). There is a power, an intensity, that affects someone somewhere between their exposure to content and its interpretation. Massumi equals this intensity to affect (ibid., 88) and the gap between content and effect as the "the primacy of the affective" (ibid., 84). The semiotic process, the creation of meaning, is part of the effect of content and affect. It can only happen after the spectator is exposed to content and affected by it. Affect, for Massumi, precedes the creation of meaning. There is a power, an intensity, with which the spectator engages when watching a film and experiencing affect through silence.

Massumi follows Deleuze and Guattari's interpretation of affect (who, in turn, build on Spinoza) where affect is "not a personal feeling, a characteristic" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 240), but rather a "becoming" (ibid., 256), which is an expression of possibility (cf. ibid., 257). Affect, the expression of possibility, builds on notions of rhizomes and multiplicities. The rhizome goes directly against the semiotic approach (ibid., 11) because it cannot be confined to a single meaning, it does not allow itself to be overcoded (ibid., 9).

Overcoding, however, is exactly what a semiotic approach does: it limits the expression of possibility, the affective encounter, to a definitive meaning. It decides on one meaning over many possibilities. A semiotic interpretation starts from a concept, in this case silence, and then discusses it in logical terms. If silence appears with a corpse, it indicates death. Rhizomes, on the other hand, avoid this confinement to single definite meanings.

This is a crucial point for Deleuze and Guattari: what they call "arborescent thinking" (linear and causal thinking, mapping something to the form of a tree with branches and roots) "imposes the verb 'to be', but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction 'and... and... and...'" (ibid., 25). A rhizome is an anti-genealogy. Conversely, a semiotic analysis as performed in the previous chapter results in an arborescent imposition such as "silence is …" as the interpretation of meaning.

The creation of meaning is then a "power takeover by the signifier" (ibid., 8). It is the overcoding of endless possibilities to a single meaning by the sign as it is interpreted by the subject. The semiotic process is the overcoding of the affective process. It is the end-stage of the expression event wherein a subject takes the endless possibilities and attempts to structure them (make them arborescent) to become intelligible. It is the subject making rational sense of content, in this case silence in film, and how it affects them.

Affect and the affective experience are filled with possibility, and the rational interpretation by a spectating subject is the organising memory engaging with affect. The next chapter discusses how memory is key in understanding how the affective and semiotic experience can be combined. Whereas the semiotic end-process has been discussed in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the affective engagement with silence in film.

What is affect?

In the foreword to *A Thousand Plateaus*, Massumi describes affect as "an ability to affect and be affected. It is a prepersonal intensity" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, xvi). It can be found in the gap between content and effect. For Massumi, this gap is not a conceptual gap that expresses the event, but rather an actual, measured gap of half a second between the exposure to content and a subject's interpretation. This is what he calls "the mystery of the missing half-second" (Massumi 1995, 89), which he then uses as a cornerstone to assume the body's primacy in experience and its influence on

cognitive processes (see Leys 2011 for a critical response to Massumi's interpretation of this experiment).

Massumi's concept of affect is certainly influential, but it is not used consistently by affect theorists (cf. Hemmings 2005). Melissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth argue for the impossibility to separate affect from cognition (2010, 2-3) and Sara Ahmed goes as far to say that "affect is not something that stands apart or has autonomy, or can be shared as object of study" (Ahmed in Gregg and Seigworth 2010, 30), whilst others argue for exactly that: a study and theory of "affect-itself" (cf. Clough et al., 2007), or "autonomous affect" (Will Scrimshaw in Thompson and Biddle 2013, 30).

Gregg and Seigworth note that "in theory, the 'what' of affect often gives way to matters of 'how'", because the "engagement of affect and aesthetics is more a matter of 'manner' than of essence" (2010, 14). Discussing the engagement of affect and aesthetics is naturally a matter of how more than a matter of what, but it is problematic to discuss the 'how' of something when it is not clear at the outset 'what' exactly is doing the engaging.

In an attempt to avoid the confusion that arises from an inconsistent application or understanding of the concept of affect, I shall propose a working definition of affect as it applied to silence in film. Before it is possible to discuss such a definition two of the most common characteristics of affect need to be addressed first: its distinction from emotion and its relation to the body and embodiment.

Affect and emotion

The distinction between affect and emotion stems from the aforementioned notion of affect as a pre-personal intensity. Massumi considers emotion to be "subjective content, the socio-linguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that point onward defined as personal. Emotion is qualified intensity", where affect is inserted "into semantically and semiotically formed progressions, [...] into function and meaning. It is intensity owned and recognized" (Massumi 1995, 88). Affect cannot be the object or sign in the semiotic process as it is a pre-personal intensity, a capacity, or, in its rhizomatic definition, an expression of possibility. Emotion is qualified affect, it is subjectified intensity.

Affect and the expression event are expressions of immanence, which can give rise to "a despotic channel" and "transcendent model" (ibid., 20). Emotion is the

personal, despotic channel of affect, it is the qualified intensity captured in a tree model. This, in turn, can be an object in a semiotic process, because it is now qualified subjective content. The expression event is qualified and given a function and meaning through a subjective semiotic process. The semiotic process is the end-stage of the expression event. This minor change of emotion as an intermediate step between affect and meaning allows for Massumi's differentiation between emotion and affect to still lead logically to function and meaning, which he sees as the personalised effect of affect.

In psychology and the neurosciences there is no distinction between affect and emotion (cf. Brickman and Campbell 1971; Davidson, Jackson, and Kalin 2000; Diener, Lucas, Scollon 2006; Juslin, Liljeström, Västfjäll, and Lundqvist in Juslin and Sloboda 2010). Affect is used as a synonym for emotion. Neuroscientific research also shows that damage to the prefrontal cortex can alter the probability of an emotional reaction occurring (Davidson, Jackson, and Kalin 2000, 894). This means that physical damage to the prefrontal cortex can halt the triggering of certain emotions. Emotion is not simply rationalised affect.

The subjects in the experiments were unaffected by external stimuli. Moreover, damage to the amygdala results in a "specific impairments on tasks that tap aspects of negative emotion processing (ibid., 896), more specifically, a "dramatic attenuation of behavioural signs of fear" (ibid., 897). The amygdala is particularly interesting for the topic at hand, as it is "critical for learned fear responses" (Hassin, Uleman, and Bargh 2005, 62). The amygdala is key in research where "a neutral stimulus comes to acquire aversive properties by virtue of being paired with an aversive event" (ibid.). Silence, as a zero-form signifier or neutral affective potentiality, can indeed acquire properties related to fear (cf. the jump scare discussion throughout Chapter 3). It would be interesting to see how subjects with a damaged amygdala experience silence, as it forms the link "between the automatic physiological responses that occur with an emotional reaction and the neutral conditioned stimulus" (ibid., 65). The unconscious engagement with affect is very much influenced by a subject's physical possibility to experience certain stimuli.

These findings indicate that perception and experience are inseparably bound to the processing of external stimuli by the body and the brain and thus that in emotional experience there is no primacy of the body over the mind. Ruth Leys critiques Massumi's separation between the two as a "false dichotomy between mind

and matter" (2010, 457) and recognises this as a "constant tendency among the new affect theorists" (ibid., 458). It is particularly important to avoid this dichotomy here because silence is a physical limit of sound. It is not only physical in the sense of there being no sound (see Chapter 1, §Actual silence, pp. 17-18; and §Absolute silence, pp. 19-20), but also as an extreme limit of the body's affective and emotional experience of sound, with the other limit being the body's pain threshold (Heller 2015, 42).

This does not mean that the bodily turn in many of the humanities is without merit, but rather that the purported primacy of the body is a logical fallacy when discussing subjective experience. This could be a reason for some affect theorists turning to "affect-itself", as mentioned above. Neither does it mean that affect should be readily equated with emotion, because the concept of affect as a pre-personal intensity allows for a theorisation of the affective experience. The distinction with emotion is helpful because emotion can be used to theorise the qualification of affect. What is important in this discussion is that there is no primacy of the body as Massumi and some new affect theorists posit, nor of mind over body.

Towards a working definition of affect

Massumi describes the locus of affect as the gap between encounter and cognition: the gap between a subject's experience and the ability to put into words or feelings just what exactly was experienced. It is the gap between the sensorial and neurological experience and the cognitive expression of that experience. This does not mean that there is any primacy involved. If there is any primacy at all then the neuroscientific research described above would allude to the brain exercising an inhibiting primacy over the body.

The gap between experience and cognition describes an unconscious approach to experience. Emotion, in this reading, is the conscious experience, the end-stage of the qualification of affect. Massumi describes affect as the point of view of the virtual, the outside of our actual perceptions and cognitions (Massumi 1995, 96). The virtual returns in the next chapter when Bergson discusses it, but for now it should be noted that Massumi once again uses this to advance a sort of primacy of the body. It is, after all, "the individuated and living body" which is "the site of the condition of possibility of the virtual" (Pearson 2005, 1113). Massumi approaches the virtual as being *of* the body, but not *with* everything that the body brings with it.

Taking neuroscientific research into consideration renders most of these positions untenable. In the gap between experience and cognition there is still an encounter between the personal and the pre-personal. This encounter is not merely a matter of the subject's brain processing internal and external stimuli, but of learned behaviour grounded in a socio-cultural context as well. Richard Elliott describes it eloquently:

> When considering affect, the question of cultural allusion is an interesting one. How do we climb out of the moment to consider what cultural baggage we are bringing to it? We can't just dump the cargo at our feet (or in the cloakroom) while we hand ourselves over to the being-affected of the performance. Haven't we still got one eye on our bag, even as we dance around it? If the losing of the self in the trance moment is one that necessarily involves the forgetting of the socio-historical moment, of getting outside time and space (spatio-temporal removal), that does not alter the fact that time and space have brought us to that moment and that place. The cultural cannot be ignored. (Elliott in Thompson and Biddle 2013, 84-85)

Every affective encounter includes the socio-historical and cultural background of a subject as well. This is certainly true for the affective experience of a film soundtrack. Juslin et al. consider four of the seven brain regions associated with musical experience to be highly influenced by culture and learning (Juslin, Liljeström, Västfjäll, and Lundqvist in Juslin and Sloboda 2010, 947). The affective experience of music, sound, and silence in the soundtrack is at least partly grounded in culture.

The claim that affect is completely pre-personal is untenable, yet it can be pre-cognitive or pre-subjective. We can interpret or denote the personal here as qualified intensity. Affect is intensity that spectators experience but before it is qualified, before a spectator makes it their own, before it is personal, i.e., pre-personal. Still, in the unconscious engagement with a pre-personal affect, a subject immediately brings their personal neurological frame and socio-cultural mattering maps into the mix (cf. the false body-mind dichotomy above and Frith, Goodwin, and Grossberg 1993, 172 for more on mattering maps).

Affect is perhaps theorised better not as 'what', but as a process. Thompson and Biddle (2013, 7) and Gregg and Seigworth (2010, 4) describe affect as a process

as well, but in vague terms ("movement rather than stasis", ibid.). They allude to affect-itself being a process (it remains unclear what this process is doing), while I propose here that there is no affect-itself. There is a pre-personal intensity (e.g., silence in film), and the engagement with such an intensity by a subject. Affect, or the possibility to affect and be affected, arises from this engagement, this process.

The working definition for this chapter reflects this nuance and incorporates a subjective aspect: affect is a process wherein a pre-personal intensity engages with and is filtered by subjective unconscious neurological and socio-cultural frames. This allows for a discussion in which a pre-personal intensity is possible, but affect, as in the power to affect and be affected, exists only by merit of a subjective engagement with this pre-personal intensity. With this working definition it possible to start discussing silence in film, for the question that immediately follows this definition is how filmic silence features in this process.

2. The affect of silence

The pre-personal intensity that engages with a subject is not an easily defined object. A spectator might say that the use of a certain colour affects them when observing a Jackson Pollock painting, but is not simply the use of that colour. It is the thickness of the brush stroke, the spread on the canvas, the size of the canvas, the juxtaposition against other colours, and of course the myriad associations and relations it might conjure up – even unconsciously – in the spectator's mind.

Throughout this chapter I will offer examples with possible, but by no means conclusive affect relations. The pre-personal intensity need not even be a single or definitive thing. It can also be a continuous accumulation of intensities that engage unconsciously with a subject but are not fixed into cognitive thought, thus creating a mood (cf. the distinction between mood and emotion by Vladimir J. Konečni in Juslin and Sloboda 2010, 1073, where a mood is less causal than an emotion). These accumulations can also be fixed into cognitive thought as emotions.

The fold

Gregg and Seigworth describe the accumulation of intensities in affect as a "palimpsest of force-encounters" (2010, 2). They continue by calling these force-encounters in affect "folds of belonging to a world" (ibid., 3). For Deleuze, a fold is infinitely

variable: it is the ongoing relation between parts moving between different bodies (cf. Deleuze 1993, 6).

In the affective process of watching a film these force-encounters travel between the film and the spectator. Affect is not a mere passive receiving of a possible intensity from the film, but an active encounter between the film and the subjective unconsciousness of the spectator engaging with the film and projecting its own neuro-physiological and socio-cultural background into the film.

The affective encounter between film and the spectator creates an ongoing process of encounter, projection, and re-encounter with the film. This process of incorporation and projection is especially true for silence in film, which is an excellent example of a palimpsest: in the previous chapter silence was shown to be infinitely variable in its meanings, drawing from its context as an empty sign. In each interpretation silence is overwritten again, never fixed to a single meaning. The process of unconscious projection in the film is all the more important for silence in film because the audience is invited to overwrite the palimpsest of affective silence themselves.

Sara Ahmed puts forward the idea that "[t]he experience of something as being affective is to be directed not only toward an object, but to whatever is around that object" (Ahmed in Gregg and Seigworth 2010, 33). Similar to the contextual semiotic relations of silence as a zero-form signifier, the affective experience of silence incorporates its context as well. The experience of silence as affective is not the experience of an object, of course, but of an expression of relation. Silence connects contextual film relations and the spectator in the creation of affect, in the overwriting of its palimpsestic properties. Affect, then, is not only a folding between the film and the spectator, but also a folding between silence in the film and other objects in the film.

Spectators also encounter themselves in these folds with silence, in engaging with the film. The projection of the mind into the vast emptiness of silence is discussed in chapter 1 and chapter 3, and the fold helps to explain how this works. Deleuze argues that "the most general formula of the relation to oneself is the affect of self by self, or folded force. Subjectivation is created by folding" (Deleuze 1988b, 104). The fold is not merely the affective engagement, it includes the end-process of the expression event as well.

The rational, emotional, and affective are combined in the subjective fold and it is here that spectators encounter and know themselves. Badiou posits that "the subject (the inside) is the identity of thinking and being", paraphrasing Deleuze's "to think is to fold, to double the outside with a coextensive inside" (Badiou 2000, 89; Deleuze 1988b, 118). The fold incorporates the subjective totality without primacy or exclusion of mind or body.

Folds between folds

These affective folds of contextual relations between film and spectator are themselves situated between other folds, e.g., the whole of the film or the socio-cultural background of the spectator. A fold is "always between two folds" (Deleuze 1993, 13). Each fold brings together more folds, more worlds. The film world, the theatre, the audience, and the spectator's frame of mind are but a few of the different worlds occupied by an experiencing subject. These worlds need not be compatible and may very well even have opposing interests and organisations, but are folded together in affect.

Affect is the continuous meeting between these worlds, sometimes compatible and other times clashing, as they touch and are folded together in force-encounters. The affect of silence can then be found in the double fold between silence and whatever force-encounter it engages in to draw affect (and often, but not always, its subsequent meaning) from, and the force-encounter between silence and the spectator.

The role of silence in film is to mediate between all these folds. It can be compared to what Deleuze calls the *objectile*: a "single and unique variability" of which the goal "is no longer defined by an essential form, but reaches a pure functionality" (1993, 19). The infinite variability of this objectile "has lost notion of a center", and "now exists only through its metamorphoses" (ibid., 21). To understand these metamorphoses, this variability, it is important to place "point of view in the place of the missing center" (ibid.). Point of view, in turn, is "not what varies with the subject, at least in the first instance; it is, on the contrary, the condition in which an eventual subject apprehends a variation" (ibid., 20). Point of view is not the fact that each individual spectator has their own personal engagement in affect, but rather the manner in which each spectator apprehends filmic silence in its many forms. The point of view is not who sees, but how someone sees.

This manner of apprehension to silence, this point of view, can be manipulated in the process of affect. In film this manipulation is achieved through the combination of music, sound, silence, image, narrative, and the accumulation of affect in a mood that manipulates, or conditions, a spectator into a certain point of view. Silence and other contextual sonorous clues aid to direct spectators in their affective state (cf. Jarman in Thompson and Biddle 2013, 204).

In order to understand how affect works in, through, and with silence, it is necessary to understand how silence folds the conditioned subject into a desired point of view. This is the affect of silence in film: the process of folding contextual force-encounters and the point-of-view of a subject, which is conditioned by a film but also includes that subject's own neuro-physiological body and socio-cultural baggage. Silence distinguishes itself from music and sound in a film in that it mostly acts as a mediator between folds, drawing its affect from contextual relations – even if this contextual relation is only the spectator itself.

Sound and music can firmly present an affective experience by their own merit. Sound installations or music present a force-encounter to engage with, but in silence a listener only has their own self to engage with. This is also the danger of using affective silence in film: if filmic silence cannot draw from contextual relations in the film, spectators are only confronted with themselves and no longer with the film. This, in turn, risks breaking the illusion of film (cf. Chapter 5, §The temporality of silence in film, pp. 157-159). Silence in film needs contextual clues to fold with the spectator in order to shape the spectator's point of view, in order to create a state of apprehension that suits the film.

3. Shaping point of view: four examples

How does a film condition the point-of-view of a subject? The concept of the fold helps to understand how cinematic intensities work through silence and fold with the viewing subject's unconscious neurological and socio-cultural folds. The spectator is conditioned through accumulated affective folds that they incorporate, give a space in their emotional and thinking experience of the film, and then fold back with the film again.

This folding back into the film of contextual clues is a function of memory. I advocated against a primacy of the body over the mind above, and it is important to note that this function of memory is certainly not the mind taking precedence over the body. Memory is a crucial element in the film experience. It is explored more broadly in chapter 5 with Henri Bergson's concept of duration (*durée*), but put succinctly it can be stated that in "the absence of a consciousness to perceive it, there is no movement from one moment to the next, no *durée*, for there is no memory to retain and prolong a past-present into a succeeding present" (Bogue 2003a, 15). Memory is crucial in creating the film experience; it allows spectators to find, recognise, and enjoy a subjective experience of the film.

The importance of memory does not present a primacy of the mind but also confirms the importance of the body. The amygdala was already mentioned above, but for memory it is the hippocampus that is crucial. The "hippocampal memory system is necessary for forming lasting representations of the relations between the multiple cues that make up the learning context or episode" (Hassin, Uleman, and Bargh 2005, 65). Memory is not solely a function of the mind, it is dependent on the body just as much.

The accumulation of affect is guided by contextual clues, which spectators remember and fold back into the film. These clues need not be confined to the film. They work through the many worlds of the fold. The choice to watch a thriller film before actually sitting down and watching the film already conditions the spectator into a certain expectation. If someone has encountered crucial information pertaining to the film's narrative beforehand, so-called spoilers, this information can alter and sometimes ruin the way the film can condition the spectator. The accumulation of affect can take different forms, which shall be examined through examples.

Example 1: Linear affect accumulation in a scene

In the previous chapter I discussed the example of the silence in the Mines of Moria in *Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring*. The audience has followed the Fellowship into the abandoned Mines of Moria, which were rumoured to be a great place, built by proud Dwarves. The Dwarves have disappeared and the tomb of their last king is found. The Fellowship wonders what happened to the Dwarves and their king, as Gandalf starts reading a book left by the tomb: "They have taken the bridge and the Second Hall. We have barred the gates but cannot hold them for long. The

ground shakes...drums, drums in the deep. We cannot get out. The shadow moves in the dark. We cannot get out. They are coming." Pippin then drops the armoured skeleton in the well and the Fellowship holds their breath in silence. Nothing seems to happen after the clanging fall of the skeleton and so the Fellowship audibly sighs in relief. Their respite is short-lived, however, as drums in the deep suddenly pierce the soundtrack.

In this example, the contextual affect is built by the abandoned Mines, the finding of the tomb, and then Gandalf's reading of the book. The abandoned state of the Mines serves as the setting of the mood. It is the start of the accumulation of affect that will culminate in the attack on the Fellowship. The silence after Pippin drops the corpse is a first spike in this accumulation, as the Fellowship and the audience just heard Gandalf talking about drums in the deep and awaits a possible reaction to the clanging noise. The intensity mediated in silence's affect draws from the accumulated affects and Gandalf's reading of the book. This is an example of linearly accumulated affect, but silence's affect does not necessarily follow a linear pattern.

Example 2: Dispersed affect accumulation

In *Lawrence of Arabia* (Lean, 1962), the death of the title character (Peter O'Toole) serves as an example of quite the opposite. The film starts with music over a black screen, and after four and a half minutes the first image appears with the title screen. A motorcycle is shown and a man walks up to it and starts preparing it for a drive. After another minute and forty seconds the music fades out and the man departs. The man is then shown riding the motorcycle and the camera follows him for a minute and a half, until he suddenly has to avoid two bicyclists swerving across the road and he crashes his motorbike.

During the drive only diegetic sounds are audible. The image shows the motorcycle crashing in a bush with the driver thrown off off-screen, and cuts to his driving goggles hanging on a branch. The sudden silence in the soundtrack accompanying this image stands in stark contrast with the loud sounds of the motorcycle driving. It lasts only a few seconds before music reappears in the soundtrack as suture for the next scene.

At this point in the film, at the 7'42" mark, all the audience has seen are three minutes of a man preparing a motorcycle for a drive, driving the motorcycle, and subsequently crashing. The audience does not even know who this man is. Is it

Lawrence of Arabia, and is he already dead? The next image confirms his death: the image shows a bust for T.E. Lawrence, and two men watching it.

One of the men watching the bust says the first spoken words in the film to the priest next to him: “He was the most extraordinary man I ever knew.” The priest asks whether the man knew Lawrence well, and then says: “Well, nil nisi bonum. But did he really deserve .. a place .. in here?” As he says “in here” the priest looks up and the image cuts to the outside of the church, showing the west front of St. Paul’s Cathedral in London. While St. Paul’s Cathedral certainly elicits awe, the audience still does not know Lawrence and possibly still does not care one way or the other whether he died.

The death of Lawrence is not a culmination of affect because the affective encounter is ongoing. His passing is not yet much of an intensity to speak of, as the audience has not yet grown to know and love him. Lawrence’s accidental death is only one of the lingering intensities in the film. The first spoken words of the film, describing Lawrence as a great man, are another lingering affect. The title of the film is one too. It indicates that this epic biopic tells the story of Lawrence of Arabia, yet the end of the story is already shown. The film’s protagonist dies in the beginning of the film. Unlike that other famous film where the film’s protagonist dies in the beginning, *Sunset Boulevard* (Wilder 1950), Lawrence dies of an accident. At least the main character’s death in *Sunset Boulevard*’s opening scene adds to the mystery: why and how did he end up there? The voice-over in *Sunset Boulevard* explains that these questions will be addressed and promises to tell the audience “the facts. The whole truth.” Lawrence of Arabia does not use a voice-over or give the audience any indication that questions that are raised with this opening scene will be addressed. On the contrary, the film’s audience is left rather puzzled for the moment.

The film spectators are not the only ones unable to gauge Lawrence thus far, so it is revealed: a few more dialogues take place on the steps and the square in front of St. Paul’s Cathedral with people discussing Lawrence as a great man, but they all mention that they did not really know him. The puzzling feeling the audience has is only reinforced by these remarks; the audience can identify with the people in St. Paul’s. It is only after someone mentions that he had some minor function on the staff in Cairo that the image cuts to Lawrence in Cairo. The film only now begins the story of Lawrence’s adventures and the audience can start to get to know him.

At this point the film is running for about nine minutes and a half and whilst the audience knows Lawrence died and was considered to be a great and extraordinary

man but hardly truly known, there is still hardly any intensity to speak of. Moreover, the scene of his death is easily forgotten as the story of his life unfolds, showcasing Lawrence's strength, perseverance, and adventurous nature.

Over the course of the next three hours the audience gets to know Lawrence and his honesty, his love for the Arab tribes, and his best intentions for their future. In the final scenes of the film Lawrence is relieved of his command of the Arab tribes and he sees his all his effort turn into a political game. He tries to warn the tribes by saying that if they accept English help in rebuilding the infrastructure of Damascus, they will accept English government, but his warning falls on deaf ears.

Lawrence is promoted to Colonel and sent home, after which the sheik of the Arabs speaks of him as a sword with two edges, and asks the English general "We are equally glad to be rid of him, are we not?" Lawrence has nothing more to offer the politicians. He is driven to the airport and sits silently, sullen because his dreams of freedom and independence for the Arab tribes will never come true. A motorcycle passes them, and as Lawrence stares at the motorcycle driving away the audience is reminded of Lawrence's fate, and the film ends.

This is a melancholic ending in two ways: Lawrence's hopes will never realise, and the audience knows he will die in a motorcycle accident back home. The silence of Lawrence's death suddenly comes calling and claims its affect as the audience is left with a fadeout and the title music reappearing. What an adventure this was, indeed. In a way, the whole of the film is an accumulation of sufficient affect (as the engagement between the film's intensity and the audience) to allow for Lawrence's death to carry enough intensity that the audience too repeats the first spoken words of the film: "He was the most extraordinary man I ever knew."

This example is the opposite of the earlier example of *Lord of the Rings*. In *Lawrence of Arabia*, the affective intensity is found more than three hours after Lawrence's death is first shown. This example also showcases how affect and its semiotic interpretation need not be equal in magnitude or importance. The semiotic interpretation of the silence accompanying Lawrence's death is that of an indexical sign: the silence is dynamically linked to death. Its affect, however, carries the weight of the whole film, but only after the film has ended.

Affect does not care for linearity, temporality, or causality. The context from which silence draws its affect can be anything: it can be a linear narrative culminating in a moment, or the whole film projected back into a moment in its beginning. In *The*

Lord of the Rings the audience is conditioned by the mood, and by Gandalf's reading of the book. In *Lawrence of Arabia* the audience is conditioned by the extraordinary journey Lawrence takes them on.

Example 3: Linear affect accumulation throughout a film

Another film that takes its whole as intensity in the affect of its climactic ending is *The Usual Suspects* (Singer, 1995). In this film, the moment that Dave Kujan (Chazz Palminteri) realises that Verbal (Kevin Spacey) has been telling him a completely imaginary story (i.e., the whole of the film as seen by the audience) is marked by ominous music playing over diegetic silence.

Kujan drops his coffee mug in slow motion while he sees all the little clues on the board telling him he was just bamboozled. The music uses an ominous solo violin melody accompanied by short violin crescendos suggesting an accumulation of tension. At the same time, the image is shown in slow-motion and with diegetic silence. Kujan's coffee mug falls out of his hand and shatters, the shot repeated three times from different angles in slow-motion, finally revealing another clue (the name on the bottom of the coffee mug is the name Verbal used in his story for the lawyer of the imaginary antagonist).

In this diegetic silence the shock of Kujan is the same as the audience's surprise: throughout the film the actual antagonist was Verbal all along, sitting in the same room as Kujan, spinning him a fantastical tale of crime and betrayal. The affective context of this shock is indeed the whole film, but it is a completely linear accumulation. This kind of tension and affect building is typical for films that focus on a surprise ending, offering the audience a sudden plot twist near the end of the story.

Example 4: Interspersed linear accumulation of affect

A final example of affective accumulation, playing out in interspersed linearity, can be found in *The Silence of the Lambs* (Demme, 1991). Near the end of the film, the FBI team has identified the serial killer they have been pursuing as Jame Gumb (Ted Levine), and an assault team is closing in on his house. Meanwhile, Gumb's latest victim Catherine (Brooke Smith) has lured Gumb's dog, Precious, into the well in which she is imprisoned. She asks Gumb for a phone or she will kill the dog.

As Catherine and Gumb yell at each other, the shots of the assault team closing in on the house are shown in near diegetic silence. The footsteps of the assault team are only slightly audible, offering a relative silence that is juxtaposed with the

increasingly frantic behaviour of Gumb and Catherine in a series of six interspersed shots. The preliminary resolution comes only when a doorbell is rung by the assault team. Gumb goes to the door and opens it to Clarice (Jodie Foster) and not the assault team, which had incorrect information and is assaulting the wrong house.

During the shots that switch between the frantic standoff between Gumb and Catherine, and the assault team closing in on the house, the silence accompanying the assault team's approach draws its affect from Gumb and Catherine's increasingly frantic behaviour. The expected culmination would be Gumb opening the door to the assault team, but the audience is denied a resolution as it is Clarice who rang the bell and not the assault team. In the next minutes the accumulated affect upon which the silence drew lingers on.

Clarice soon realises Gumb is the serial killer and follows him into his basement. Gumb turns off the lights and puts on night vision goggles, and the only sounds heard in the next minutes are Clarice's nervous breathing. The lingering and accumulating affect creates a mood of tension and nervosity, only culminating when Clarice is finally able to shoot Gumb.

The affect of silence here is interspersed with the frantic behaviour of Gumb and Catherine and is denied a resolution, in turn setting the mood for the next scene. It is a broken linearity subsequently creating the intensity of the next scene. Affect does always need to be accumulated. It can appear suddenly, powerful enough in its immediate contextual relations to engage the spectator immediately (this kind of affect is often used in comedy). Thrillers and horror films do often use accumulated affect and denial of a resolution to accomplish their goal of keeping the audience frightened.

4. Conceptualising affective silence: mapping smooth spaces

The examples above elucidate how silence's pure functionality shapes or conditions the spectator's point of view. They help to explain how a subject can come to approach and experience silence's endless variations. Silence becomes a pure functionality in the affective process akin to Deleuze's objectile: it exists only through its infinite variations. It mediates between the many folds that make up film and spectator.

The working definition of affect proposed above can now be updated to include silence in film. The affect of filmic silence is the process of folding contextual force-

encounters and the point-of-view of a subject, which is conditioned by a film but also folds with that subject's own neuro-physiological body and socio-cultural baggage. This working definition describes the affect of filmic silence; it explains how silence works in film and what is possible through its infinite variations, and how a spectator can be conditioned in approaching these variations.

This working definition does not describe the difference between the affect of silence and that of music or sound in film. Silence, sound, and music all fold with their contextual relations. Silence does not mean anything in and of itself, and neither does music (Gallope 2017, 206; see also Genosko 2008). The difference between silence and its sonorous counterparts is that silence brings no material presence of itself into the affective fold. It exists only through its metamorphoses. Silence is a centreless pure functionality. Music or sound, in particular white noise or incessant drones, can have similar affective characteristics. The difference is that the materiality that either of these comparable elements bring into affective folding influences the affect by and of itself. Silence influences affect by its presence as well, but for different, non-material reasons that are discussed below (and in the next chapter). First, a thought experiment can sufficiently elucidate the difference between silence and sound.

Jaws (Spielberg 1975) is a blockbuster film about a giant white shark terrorising beachgoers. The musical motif used in *Jaws* is at least as famous as the film itself. The motif consists of an alternating chromatic pattern announcing the presence of the shark. Near the end of the film Spielberg surprises his audience, now conditioned to associate the shark with the musical cue, by allowing the shark to appear suddenly in silence with no musical announcement. In this example, both sound and silence accompany the same deadly shark. If we transpose the sound and the silence to a different film, silence loses its contextual relations because it has no intrinsic material link to them. The music, on the other hand, will always colour the affective experience in the same way due its intrinsic material presence and properties. Transposing the music and silence of *Jaws* to another film with a deadly sea predator is a case in point.

Free Willy (Wincer 1993) is a family film about a young rebellious boy who befriends an orca kept in captivity. The young boy, Jesse (Jason James Richter), first meets the titular orca, Willy, in an amusement park. One night Jesse falls in Willy's pool. The images show Jesse floating down in the water before cutting to a shot from above, showing the killer whale approaching the boy. Now imagine this scene with the music and silence of *Jaws*. The chromatic motif starts with the images of Jesse sinking.

The image cuts to a shot from above as the music speeds up and crescendos and there, finally, is the killer whale, that giant apex predator, approaching the young and innocent boy.

The silence of *Jaws* applied on this scene in *Free Willy* would not change much: the audience is shown Jesse drowning and Willy approaching the boy. The absence of sound or music accompanying the images creates an uncertainty, but not an immediate threat. The silence creates a possibility, but the presence of music directly influences the affective experience. Sound, music, and even drones or white noise partake in directing the affective experience along with the contextual relations and the interpretation by the spectators. Silence, on the other hand, is completely dependent on the spectator interpreting the contextual relations of the film. Of course, the example above makes use of a well-known connotation: the chromatic motif of *Jaws* is forever linked to a deadly white shark. This strong connotation creates a stark contrast with the silence of the same film, which does not share the same connection. The materiality of music or sound influences its contextual relations with its tempo, volume, or timbre. Silence lacks such a material centre.

Silence is much more dependent on the spectator's frame of reference. A horror aficionado might interpret the orca approaching Jesse in silence as tense or dangerous, a possibility of Jesse's impending demise. Someone who solely watches Disney family films will probably fear for the boy's life as well because the boy is drowning, but not because the boy is in the presence of a deadly animal. On the contrary, such a spectator might hope that the killer whale will save the boy so they can become friends.

The different interpretations of the same silence by different spectators points to a certain expectation of silence's resolution. Silence exists in near infinite variations and interpretations, and yet it can easily be recognised as trope or cliché according to the spectator's interpretation. Deleuze and Guattari's concepts of smooth and striated space can help to explain the interplay between silence's endless potential and its very specific applications, or its interpretation as cliché.

Smooth space, striated space

The Deleuze-Guattarian smooth space, or nomad space, is a space that is open to variability. It is a so-called "nomad" space because different meanings or applications traverse it, never being or becoming a single fixed entity. The smoothness of silence in film allows different affects and meanings to occupy it and give way to other affects

and meanings in turn. Striated space is the opposite of smooth space: it organises and produces order (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 478). Put simply, we can think of smooth silence as the theoretical infinity of its meanings and applications, and striated silence as the actualised and applied silence in its context.

Silence's infinite variability is purely theoretical. Smooth space does not exist as a distinctly identifiable space. In practice, silence is at least somewhat defined in its use. Deleuze and Guattari contend that "smooth space is constantly being translated, transversed into a striated space" (1987, 474). The opposite is true as well: striated space is constantly being smoothed (ibid.). The two spaces are "*de jure* oppositional", but "*de facto* they only exist in complex mixed forms" (Lysen and Pisters 2012, 1). Similarly, silence's endless potential is constantly organised into a distinct type, and this type in turn adds to silence's variability.

Even if smooth and striated spaces only exist in mixture (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 474-478), the theoretical nature of silence as smooth space is key to understanding its complex nature and potential. Deleuze and Guattari's smooth space is "filled by events or haecceities […]. It is a space of affects, more than one of properties" (ibid., 479). Silence's variability of affect is already discussed above. Deleuze and Guattari explain how all of the different affects are already a part of silence.

Silence is a haecceity, which is "a mode of individuation very different from that of a person, thing, or substance. [It consists] entirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles, capacities to affect and be affected" (ibid., 261). There is no need for silence to be defined as *being* (arborescent overcoding) a certain thing or substance. Its infinite variability is due to the fact that silence is certainly not a single thing, but it exists entirely of relations, of capacity to affect and be affected.

Whereas the pure, centreless functionality of silence as mediator between folds relates to its role in the process, the haecceity and smooth nature of silence help to explain the nature of affective silence itself. It is a concept of relations. Films and spectators tap into silence's smoothness, its infinite variability, and construct a practical mixture of smooth and striated space. This tapping into the smooth space of silence is the "mapping" of silence, where open-ended possibilities of relations are established which can in turn be made concrete, fixed. When this happens silence's potentiality is striated and confined into "tracings", rather than mappings.

Mapping and tracing

Deleuze and Guattari use the concepts of maps and tracings to discuss different logics of reproduction. A tracing is part of arborescent thinking, a binary logic, and is enclosed in itself (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 12). It is a structural reproduction. A map, on the other hand, is part of rhizomatic thinking. It is open and connectable (ibid.). Perhaps overly simplified, a tracing can be explained as a detailed and exact relation, whilst a map is an imagined relation, open for interpretation.

A film creates possibilities for relation and interpretation by using silence in specific ways. It maps the infinite variability of silence, but allows for open borders. It does not (or not yet) confine it. The roots of tracings, the "knots of arborescence" are nonetheless present in the rhizomatic nature of smooth silence and its maps (cf. ibid., 20).

In light of the current discussion, a map can be said to be part of affect whilst a tracing is part of cognitive thought and semiotic interpretation. A map "does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious" (ibid., 12). The unconsciously created relations between different silences are maps, whilst the cognitive and structured interpretations are tracings. When a tracing is created from a map, it "has organized, stabilized, neutralized the multiplicities according to the axes of signifiance and subjectification belonging to it" (ibid., 13). A map allows for the connection of open and unconscious relations in the force-encounter of affect, and a tracing neutralises these open connections by fixating them in a structure. The use of symbolic silence in comedy is an example of a tracing: when in Wayne's World the activity of dubbing is used in pastiche, it is a clear and immediate reproduction of the use of silence, albeit inversed and subversively used as comedy.

In genesis, silence in film can always be a map: it is open-ended and allows for various contextual forces to work through it. In practice many uses of silence are nonetheless readily interpreted as a tracing through repeated exposure to identical uses. Filmmakers can choose to use silence for a specific and established purpose they have in mind rather than allowing the audience their own interpretation (punch line silence, for example).When this happens, the tracing is practically handed to the spectator. It is still a mixture of mapping and tracing in that the potential for interpretation is there, and audiences can be fooled through a sort of faux tracing which turns the apparent tracing back into a map.

One example of this is the way in which the audience is denied resolution of the interspersed linear accumulated affect of silence in *The Silence of the Lambs* described above. Gumb opens the door and the audience is fully expecting the assault team to storm him. This tracing is unravelled. Clarice's appearance in the door frame instead of the assault team smoothes the tracing offered to the spectator. It renders the tension built by the previous use of silence and its interspersed accumulation of affect unstable and ambiguous: why is Clarice there, where is the assault team, and does Clarice know she is suddenly face to face with the murderer she has been looking for so desperately? The accumulated affect returns in force a few moments later when Clarice does indeed realise Gumb is the murderer and the scene continues with renewed and increased suspense.

Affective clichés and tropes

The audience can learn – even unconsciously – to recognise familiar accumulations of affect. The repeated experience of similar affects accumulating in a dispositional tendency through the repeated manipulation of point of view results in a recognition of affect. This, in turn, leads to the recognition of tropes and clichés.

In thriller and horror films in particular, a spectator sometimes just knows, just feels that something is about to happen due to a unconscious recognition of the accumulated affect, without even interpreting it immediately. This is due to the fact that each metamorphosis of silence can be linked to another, similar use. Silence is an affective palimpsest, and sometimes the affects used in earlier films shine through in the current version of the silence.

Silence accompanying death is one of these tracings. In the previous chapter I discussed the death of Boromir in *Lord of the Rings* and the death of Frank in *2001: A Space Odyssey*; the death of Lawrence of Arabia is accompanied by silence; in *On the Waterfront* (Kazan, 1954), silence accompanies the death of Joey Doyle (Ben Wagner); in *Chinatown* (Polanski, 1974) silence follows the death of Evelyn (Faye Dunaway); and silence as an announcer of death is one of the most well-known clichés of horror cinema.

In all these examples, it is perfectly possible for an audience not to recognise the use of silence with death, and then it is a map. It is an open possibility that helps in the process of affect, but not a definite meaning if it is not interpreted as such. In

analysis, however, these examples can readily be discussed as tracings: identical uses that recreate themselves.

Maps can be recognised through repeated exposure as well, but they operate on the level of affect in the unconscious process of force-encounters. Whilst the use of silence in a montage indicating the passing of time is readily recognised in analysis as a tracing, its abstract nature works more as a map in the ongoing film experience.

In the previous chapter the example of a montage in *Road to Perdition* was used, when Michael Sullivan and his son travel to Chicago. Travel montages use diegetic silence mostly, where the imagery and the accompanying music create the affect linked to a journey. The same is true in *Easy Rider* (Hopper, 1969). The opening titles begin with Wyatt (Peter Fonda) meeting with Billy (Dennis Hopper) as they are about to start their journey. Right before they depart, Wyatt takes a last look on his watch before he rips it off his wrist and dramatically tosses it aside. Time, he shows the audience, no longer matters. As he throws his watch away and departs, Steppenwolf's *Born to be Wild* (Mars Bonfire, 1968) kicks in, the diegetic sounds disappear, and a travel montage starts. Still, these montages are also readily recognised as tracings in analysis.

The use of maps becomes truly interesting when silences feel as somehow connected, but not readily recognised as such. This is the case where silence helps to create moods or atmosphere rather than specific and clear-cut tracings. These moods and atmospheres form relations between genres and Hollywood eras, without being able to capture them in a simple structural notion.

These relations are discussed throughout chapter 2: there are distinct eras where the use of silence feels the same, although specific examples and applications differ in nature. This relates to the smoothness and striatedness of silence as well. Classical Hollywood featured a few prominent tropes (silence as death, silence in comedy) and a generally similar feel of silence, where non-diegetic silence is often used with speech in order for the dialogue to be intelligible. Post-classical and New Hollywood share a feel of vibrancy where the soundtracks can be full of life. This is related to the introduction of portable sound recorders, and a subsequent all-time low in the use of diegetic silence. The soundtracks now contain minute sounds, often of nature, to represent silence rather than using actual silence. A current affective map of silence in the twenty-first century is its increasing aesthetic use, in particular to portray subjective sound perspectives.

Both maps and tracings are expressions of the accumulative power of silence's affect. In maps, affect works unconsciously, "constructing the unconscious" as Deleuze and Guattari state (1987, 12), by mediating between the current use of accumulated affect, and previously experienced affect accumulations by the spectator, resulting in a recognisable mood or atmosphere. In tracings, affect is readily recognised and interpreted. Tracings are part of the end-process of the expression event; they shape the cognitive interpretation of affect.

The concepts of folding affect, the conditioning of the subject, smooth and striated silence, and the maps and tracings of affect already allow for a reasonable understanding of how silence's affect in film works, but in order to cement the idea that affect is a process that incorporates all these things the notion of "process" or "event" itself remains to be discussed. Massumi used the term "expression event" to explain what is lost when using a purely semiotic approach, a term I used throughout this chapter as well. I have shown how semiotics can be seen as the end-stage of this event; the structured interpretation of a force-encounter.

The working definition of affect I proposed is still incomplete. The affect of filmic silence is the process of folding contextual force-encounters and the point-of-view of a subject, which is conditioned by a film but also folds with that subject's own neuro-physiological body and socio-cultural baggage. This description speaks of a process and yet it can be argued that in most of the analyses discussed above affect is also a culmination, a specific force-encounter rather than an ongoing process or event. The last part of this chapter discusses the underlying workings of affect, the base that allows force-encounters to meet and continue to meet.

5. The temporality of affect

A first problem that arises in discussing the underlying workings of affect in film is that of time and temporality. If affect is the expression of a force-encounter between a spectator and a pre-personal intensity, when did this pre-personal intensity come to be and when does a spectator engage with it? The event of affect is the engaging of spectator and film, it is the "common result" (Deleuze 1990, 8) of this encounter. This encounter lasts throughout the film experience, it accumulates and culminates. The question remains how affect exists through time, through the different moments that

make up the film experience. One answer was already hinted at above: the spectator's memory is crucial in prolonging engagement with force-encounters into affective states. The problem is that whereas a painting, a photograph, or a sculpture exist as a single state in time to the observer, a film cannot be reduced to such a single state to facilitate analysis.

A film exists in time, which is why timing and the question of "when" can be problematic in an analysis of cinema. It is possible in analysis to speak of moments like Lawrence of Arabia's death, but when is this moment? It cannot be reduced to, say, frame 248. This is because time, and movement in time, are the basis of film. Movement in time is "the essence of cinema" (Marrati 2008, 7). The reduction of a film to stasis would equal its death, because it takes away this core concept. Deleuze writes that movement in film has two sides: "it is the relationship between parts and it is the state [affection] of the whole" (Deleuze 1986, 19). The basis of film is movement: parts of a shot move (characters, or the landscape), this movement expresses a change in the scene, and this scene expresses a movement in the whole of the film. Film is irreducible to inertness. Even when a still shot is presented, it is presented for a duration, or, in other words, for a specific movement in time. If this stillness lasts too long, the danger arises that the image of film as a whole is shattered and reduced to that of a slideshow (cf. the analyses of *Raging Bull* and *Legion* in Chapter 5, pp. 145-153).

Movement is also the "sensible form (Gestalt) which organises the perceptive field" of a film (Deleuze 1986, 57). Deleuze describes the perceptive field as one of the two systems of reference in cinema (ibid., 63). These systems of reference are the contextual relations of the film relating to one another on the one hand, each shot and sound in relation to every other shot and sound in the film, and the perception and interpretation of the film by a spectator on the other. The spectator's perception can never capture the totality of these relations in the film because it ignores "that which does not interest us as a function of our needs" (ibid.). It focuses on a specific field of attention.

This perceptive field is organised by movement, and characterised by a gap. Deleuze, following Bergson, discusses the spectator's perception as "an interval, a gap between an action and a reaction" (ibid., 62). Any spectator reaction is necessarily a personal one: it is filtered through their perceptive field and qualified through the gap of their brain. This gap, this interval is not merely defined by action on the one hand

and reaction on the other, but it is occupied by affect (ibid., 65). In this interval, a subject also “experiences itself or feels itself ‘from the inside’” (ibid.). This is possible because the interval is partly occupied by action and pre-personal intensities, and partly by the subjective socio-cultural and neuro-physiological baggage brought to the encounter.

A spectator’s affective experience is a personalised perception of one of many possible affective experiences. The perception of film and the affect of film are but singular expressions of a whole range of possibilities, irreducible to a single instance. They are perceptions and affects of a movement of images in time. These movement-images form a separate “bloc of space time, a temporal perspective” (ibid., 68). The whole of the film operates on a bloc of space time which is different from “real Time” (ibid.).

Deleuze makes this distinction in order to discuss different images. His discussion of cinema is a “materialist identity of brain and screen”, a philosophy of images as consciousness (Ó Maoilearca 2014, 180). What is notably absent in Deleuze’s work on cinema is sound. If film exists outside of real time in a temporality of its own, then silence and sound are intrinsic parts of such a separate temporality as well. This temporality of sound and silence, which includes and combines both affective and semiotic experiences, is the focus of the next chapter.

Chapter 5 – The Time of Silence

In the previous chapter, the working definition of affect I propose describes affect as a process, and yet most of the analyses so far also discuss affect as a specific force-encounter or a culmination. This chapter deals with the differences between these two aspects by focusing on how they relate: the process of affect is an ongoing event of force-encounters, and we make sense of this continuous process by crystallising moments and treating them as separated instances, as bracketed pieces of time. A spectator is watching a film and is affected by a jump scare. The fear of the spectator can be traced (in the regular, non-Deleuzean sense of the word) to the jump scare, and how this jump scare as a force-encounter engages with the spectator. In the analysis of *Lawrence of Arabia* I demonstrated how the film's affect comes calling at the end of the film as a culmination, even though the protagonist's unfortunate end was shown in the first minutes of the film already.

On the one hand, affect is a continuous process, and on the other, it is a specific moment. Whether this moment is a sudden force-encounter, like the jump scare, or a culmination, as in *Lawrence of Arabia*, does not really matter. The difference between the continuous process of affect and these moments is one of time: the fluid, continuous process of time in flux versus the crystallised moments seemingly frozen in time. This juxtaposition will be the great divide in this chapter: our experience of time as a continuous flux, and, at the same time, our experience of distilled temporal moments.

The previous chapter ends with a discussion of the event of affect: how, when, or where does this process take place? What is the difference between the time of the film, the time of affect, real time, and the time of the spectator? Moreover, what is the spectator's experience of these different times? Although these questions definitely seem daunting, the process-of-time versus moment-in-time divide can help to explain these questions as well.

First, however, the notion of time itself must be addressed. For what, exactly, does it mean when I speak of time? The concept of time itself has a long and varied history in different scholarly fields. Philosophers, physicists, and social scientists all define time and temporality differently (cf. Munn 1992, Dostal 1993, Hodges 2008). Scholars working in the same field might not even see time the same way. Time does

not even need to be defined within the limits of disciplines. Some theorists argue for a notion of time as more era-bound, e.g., modern time or capitalist time (cf. Bear 2014). Time is not a simple matter, a quickly defined concept ready to be used in analyses. At the outset of this chapter, which will deal with time, affect, and eventually semiotics, it is thus necessary to take a moment and discuss precisely which theory of time will be used, namely Bergson's concept of time and duration (*durée*).

Henri Bergson (1859-1941) was a French philosopher of time, change, and creativity, and built his theories on a methodology of intuition, or common sense (see, for example, the introduction to *Matter and Memory*, 1896, where he posits common sense between realism and idealism).[12] He was well-known and celebrated in his lifetime, receiving the Nobel prize for literature in 1927. Stephen Linstead and John Ó Maoilearca give a compelling description of Bergson's influence: "For nearly two decades Bergsonism was at the forefront of European philosophy; for half of that time, from 1907 to 1917, Bergson was *the* philosopher of Europe with an influence spreading far beyond his own discipline and into the fine arts, sociology, psychology, history, and politics. The literature of Proust, Woolf and Stein, the art of the Cubists, and the music of Debussy all bear the mark of Bergson's philosophy of change" (2003, 11-12, emphasis in original). Although "by the end of the Great War, that influence was effectively over", Bergson is gaining in popularity again in recent times, which is partly attributable to Gilles Deleuze's use of Bergson (ibid., 12). Bergson's most commonly known concepts include *élan vital* (life force), and duration (*durée*), of which I will use the latter here.

Bergson's duration is a concept of time. It is, to be precise, a concept of lived time. It stands in contrast with spatialised time, which is measured, objectified time. Whereas a layman's understanding of time might see this measured objectified time as real time, the opposite is true in Bergson's conception of time. Reality is lived, experienced, and that is why "duration is real time, it is the time of conscious experience. It is heterogeneous, qualitative, and dynamic" (ibid., 6). The measured, objectified time of science, on the other hand, is a time that is projected on the concept of space, "which is an abstract construct that is homogeneous, quantitative and static"

[12] The terms intuition and common sense are also discussed and incorporated by Deleuze (Deleuze 1988a, 13). I do not use these terms in order to avoid confusion with Deleuze's application of these concepts, in particular common sense, or with Deleuze's discussion of Bergson's Intuition as philosophical method.

(ibid.). Measured time, for Bergson, is an imagined projection, a bracketing of the fluid real time. As a result of this, for Bergson "time actually comes in different varieties, when there is no one 'objective' time that can be taken as bedrock" (Ó Maoilearca 2010, 49). For Bergson, there is no such thing as a pure objective time.

These concepts might seem abstract, yet they need not be. Duration is the basic underlying principle of the film experience I wish to propose here – the interaction between the flux of time and crystallized moments in time – and merits a closer look. Ultimately, I hope to demonstrate a dual theory of applied duration in this chapter; an eternal folding of time, if you will, where the spectator's experience can be explained as both in flux and crystallized at the same time. This incorporates both affect and semiotics as well, which are discussed in the previous chapters. This chapter on time, and the final chapter in this thesis, tries to bring the different aspects of silence and our film experience together; our experience of film, silence, affect, and semiotics all combine through our experience of time.

I nonetheless try to come to this conclusion in a natural, fluid matter, rather than diving headfirst into the maelstrom of ideas I am circulating here, and thus this chapter begins with an extensive exploration of the concept of duration. Before attempting to answer what our experience of silence in film, of silence in time, or of film in time is, it is necessary to understand what time is, how we experience it, and how we think of ourselves in time.

1. Bergson's duration

The concept of duration deals with the lived, conscious experience of time. Concepts like consciousness and perception are central to an understanding of duration as well, but the basic tenet, the cornerstone on which any understanding of duration must necessarily be built, is the following simple statement: "The essence of time is that it goes by" (Bergson 1911, 176). This might seem logical, but it is necessary to keep this clearly in mind when dealing with any and all theorisations Bergson provides. It is all too easily forgotten or brushed over when speaking of time, whether this be in casual conversation or scholarly research. The essence of time is that it goes by. It flows, perpetually.

On the notion of 'the present'

Bergson continues this statement on the essence of time with some of its direct consequences and implications:

> The essence of time is that it goes by; time already gone by is the past, and we call the present the instant in which it goes by. But there can be no question here of a mathematical instant. No doubt there is an ideal present – a pure conception, the indivisible limit which separates past from future. But the real, concrete, live present – that of which I speak when I speak of my present perception – that present necessarily occupies a duration. (ibid.)

This quote already touches upon some of the more important aspects of Bergson's conceptualisation of time, and again, it builds from an intuitive logic: time goes by, continuously and endlessly. We call time gone by the past, time not yet gone by the future, and the present is the instant in which the future passes into the past. And yet, Bergson says, this is not how we experience it. Our experience of the present, the "real, concrete, live present", is not a sort of ideal, mathematical instant.

As time goes by and flows endlessly, our experience of the present moves continuously as well. In our live, conscious experience of time a notion of the present as an instant does not exist. Bergson explains that "[n]othing is less than the present moment, if you understand by that the indivisible limit which divides the past from the future. When we think this present as going to be, it exists not yet; and when we think it as existing, it is already past" (ibid., 193). As soon as someone thinks of the present, the ideal instant of a hypothetical 'now', this present has already passed. The present as it is "lived by consciousness", the present someone might mean when talking about a hypothetical now, "consists, in large measure, in the immediate past" (ibid., 193-194). It exists in the immediate past because the moment indicated by a possible present is already gone when indicating it. As I say "now", this "now" has already passed with me saying it.

The present as duration

Nonetheless, when approaching this little thought experiment of saying "now" with a good dose of practical understanding, it is easy to realise what is meant with a "present". It is the current moment, the moment that is going on. This is what Bergson means when he states that our live present, our present perception, "necessarily

occupies a duration". Duration is Bergson's intuitive theorisation of the present, of our conscious, lived experience in and of time.

Time, then, is a succession of durations that seamlessly transform into each other, and exist within each other. I can speak of this moment, when I am thinking about time and typing this text, which exists within and permeates the moment that I am sitting in a room, different from the one you are in now. These moments, these durations, constitute time.

It should be noted, however, that this is an idealised view of duration. It is what Bergson calls "pure duration": "Pure duration might well be nothing but a succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another, without precise outlines, without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to one another" (Bergson 1910, 104). This is pure duration because it is the theorised ideal and not how humans consciously experience duration, how we live in time. Our consciousness does have a tendency to create precise outlines and it does put moments in relation to one another. Our lived experience might very well be that of qualitative change without precise outlines, but our conscious understanding thereof places these qualitative changes into quantitative representations of once, then, that time, and now. This distinction is the distinction between Bergson's concepts of time and space, which must be addressed for they permeate and define much of his theorisations.

Time and space, or qualitative heterogeneity and quantitative homogeneity

In keeping with a sensible approach to Bergson's concepts it might be helpful to describe time as that which goes by, continuously and endlessly, and space as that which creates distance, or that which allows us to place things side by side in juxtaposition. Time is the seamless succession of qualitative changes, whereas space is "what enables us to distinguish a number of identical and simultaneous sensations from one another; it is thus a principle of differentiation" (ibid., 95).

In the idealised pure duration, there is no differentiation. Space, however, allows us to distinguish between two different things. When we think of particular moments in time, we are projecting time onto space, we are delineating it, isolating it from its duration. Because it is isolated from its duration, Bergson states that time, as represented by the reflective consciousness and "in the sense of the medium in which we make distinctions and count, is nothing but space" (ibid., 91). The time in which we count and distinguish has nothing to do with our actual, lived experience of time.

This dualistic opposition between time and space has some important consequences for the way in which we think of time, of our experience of time, and of our selves.

Contradictory as it might seem, our day-to-day conception of time is not that of our day-to-day experience of duration. Rather, we think of time in notions of space: "Our ordinary conception of duration depends on a gradual incursion of space into the domain of pure consciousness" (ibid., 126). In order to make sense of the time we experience, we frame it in differentiation. We place one moment against another. We create precise outlines, and in doing so take duration out of our actual experience and place it in space. We are not dealing with pure duration.

Pure duration, Bergson states, would only be possible "for a being who was ever the same and ever changing, and who had no idea of space. But, familiar with the latter idea and indeed beset by it, we introduce it unwittingly into our feeling of pure succession; we set our states of consciousness side by side in such a way as to perceive them simultaneously, no longer in one another, but alongside one another; in a word, we project time into space" (ibid., 101). Even though our experience of time is a duration, we cannot help but to conceptualise it in terms of space. We think of experiences as alongside one another in order to draw comparisons from them.

The problem of space

This way of thinking results in "two different kinds of reality, the one heterogeneous, that of sensible qualities, the other homogeneous, namely space. This latter, clearly conceived by the human intellect, enables us to use clean-cut distinctions, to count, to abstract, and perhaps also to speak" (ibid., 97). The human intellect needs this projection into space in order to draw conclusions from it, to think rationally. The spatial projection becomes problematic, however, when dealing with our experience of time, for our experience of time is one of duration. It is a problem because a side-by-side comparison is not congruent with our lived experience of time continuously going by. Our conscious intellect creates a static double of our fluid experience, because "we have eliminated from it the element of real time" (Bergson 2007, 3), i.e., we have eliminated duration from our experience, and from our selves.

We understand the world through our selves. If we wish to think of who we are in our experience of time, we must merely look to our own existence, according to Bergson (ibid., 1). We find then, that we "pass from state to state", changing ceaselessly (ibid., 2). And yet, by projecting time into space, our conscious intellect

imagines “a formless ego” upon which “it threads the psychic states which it has set up as independent entities [...] set side by side like the beads of a necklace” (ibid. ,2). The image Bergson provides here is telling: we think of ourselves as different psychic states threaded upon some sort of formless ego. We thread state after state onto the necklace of our being.

The problem here is that although it helps our intellect to think of our different psychic states, it also presupposes firstly a sort of stable thread and secondly clear-cut differentiated psychic states, beaded onto the thread. In differentiating between these beads on the necklace of our being, we turn our experience of real time, of duration, sideways.

Becoming-present

Thinking about who we are in the experience of real time is not like beading psychic states onto a necklace, but more like continuously creating a stick of candy floss. The floss of time is continuously flowing. We constitute, in our very real experience, the ever-growing candy floss of being in duration. We grow and change without ceasing, and there can never be a stable state. Rather, our “mental state, as it advances on the road of time, is continually swelling with the duration which it accumulates” (ibid., 1). This accumulation of duration constitutes our ever-changing self.

Yet, if we *think* practically about the present, it is clearly possible to say, e.g., I am now myself in the present. This is because “[t]here can only be, at a given moment, a single system of movements and sensations. That is why my present appears to me to be a thing absolutely determined, and contrasting with my past” (Bergson 1911, 178). This single system of movements and sensations is our body. It is the locus of our being, a single system of movements and sensation that is one and many at the same time, a multiplicity. The body “represents the actual state of my becoming, that part of my duration which is in process of growth” (ibid.). To return to the statement “I am now myself in the present”, this means I am now myself, in the present, through my body. Our body is the “conductor” (ibid., 86) of duration, of our sense of self, of our sense of the present. We experience the present through our body. It serves as the organised single system of movements and sensations through which we continuously change.

This change is an interplay between body and consciousness: each of our states, at the moment of its issue, modifies our personality, being indeed the new form that

we are just assuming. It is then right to say that what we do depends on what we are; but it is necessary to add also that we are, to a certain extent, what we do, and that we are “creating ourselves continually” (Bergson 2007, 5). With each movement, each thought, each experience, we are creating ourselves in the present. Moreover, “consciousness cannot go through the same state twice” (ibid., 4), because we are continuously creating ourselves. The state of consciousness I have now might be the same as the one just an instant ago, but it is prolonged in time. It is “one instant older than the other” (ibid., 1). I am constantly creating myself in time, in each instant that is already passed. I am always becoming-present in duration.

Memory

As each state of consciousness is always already an instant older than the other and we grow and change continuously, I do incorporate these past moments in my sense of the present, in duration: “[m]y memory is there, which conveys something of the past into the present” (ibid.). We live in the present through our memory. This means that duration, Bergson’s intuitive approach to our conscious, lived experience of time, is “the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances” (ibid., 3). This has some profound consequences for our perception of reality, time, and the present. We constantly incorporate the past moments in our present, in duration.

This also means that our perception is influenced by memory, because our “perception, however instantaneous, consists then in an incalculable multitude of remembered elements; and in truth every perception is already memory” (Bergson 1911, 194). Our conception of the present, as discussed above, does indeed exist only in the immediate past because as soon as we think of a moment, of a present, it has already passed. The role of memory is crucial, then, as the quote in the beginning of this chapter illustrates: “Practically we perceive only the past, the pure present being the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future” (ibid.). In practice, because the essence of time is that it goes by, we only perceive moments that have already passed, however instantaneous. Memory, then, is this past. Pure perception might be actual, and pure memory is the virtual, but in the creative act of living our memory bridges this gap (cf. Bergson 1911, 193-197; and Linstead and Ó Maoilearca 2003, 7, for a more in-depth differentiation between virtual, actual, recollections, and memory).

Our memory gives us the possibility to experience duration, to experience our living of and in time. The present, then, is not "that which is", but rather simply "what is being made" (ibid., 193). We continuously, and effortlessly, create the present and create ourselves in the present. Duration is the "continuous life of a memory which prolongs the past into the present" (Bergson 1912, 44). Our lived time, our lived experience of time is actually the lived experience of memory. In this creative act, we actualise the virtual past in the actual present.

It is important to note that Bergson does not dispute the immediacy or even primacy of our senses. Similar to pure duration, however, pure perception is an idealised, hypothetical perception, which would "exist only by giving up every form of memory, by obtaining a vision of matter both immediate and instantaneous" (Bergson 1911, 26). Our conscious perception of things is greatly influenced by memory and our creation of the present. "Memory [...], covering as it does with a cloak of recollections a core of immediate perception [...], constitutes the principal share of individual consciousness in perception, the subjective side of the knowledge of things" (ibid., 25). There is, indeed, a core of immediate perception, but in our conscious experience thereof it is already covered by the "cloak of recollections" of past moments. Memory, then, is "inseparable in practice from perception" (ibid., 80), or, as Bergson puts it even stronger: "Memory thus creates anew the present perception" (ibid., 123). Our interpretation of our senses is coloured by past moments, by memory.

This is the crux to understanding our experience of the present: time goes by, and in this heterogeneous succession of qualitative changes we create the present, we create our lived experience of time, coloured through memory.

2. Temporalities of experience

We experience the present in durations, which are created through memory. The notion of memory might indicate a kind of recollection, but this is not what Bergson means. Our perception of the world is radically different from creating a kind of recollection of the world, for "the reality of things is no more constructed or reconstructed, but touched, penetrated, lived" (Bergson 1911, 75). This means that even though memory is crucial in understanding duration, the importance of memory does not indicate some passive form of living. On the contrary, we touch, penetrate, live this reality. We create

ourselves, our reality, our present. Living in time is very much a fluid and creative process.

Our lived, experienced reality is a creative act, and also a personal one. Our perception is coloured by memory, covered by the cloak of recollections, but, as we are but mere humans and not hypothetical ideal beings, we necessarily select from perception and memory the things we deem interesting. We cannot pay attention to every object. "Living beings are 'centres of indetermination': their mere presence is equivalent to the suppression of all those parts of objects in which their functions find no interest" (ibid., 28). In other words, we each create our own reality. This should come as no surprise to postmodern scholars in the humanities, of course, but it also means we each create our own time.

Although the essence of time for Bergson remains that it goes by, we each create our own temporality in duration. What is surprising is that this concept is also found in the empirical sciences. Now, Bergson would of course immediately comment that measuring time, projecting it onto space, is not actually real time, but spatialised time. If we each create our own real time, the projection thereof onto space must also be a personal projection. The results from the empirical sciences seem to confirm this, and whilst an agreement on so-called 'objective time' might not be found, the concept of 'subjective time' seems to cross disciplines.

Subjective time

The term subjective time also indicates that our perception of the continuous flow of time, its "going by", is not a neutral objectivity but rather a personalised experience. Time sometimes seems to fly by, and other times a duration can seemingly take forever. Our experience of time can be influenced by numerous factors.

One study posits that genetics and ethnicity can influence time perception and estimation (Bartholomew, Meck, and Cirulli 2015, 14), but the ethnic correlation disappeared when restricting the test group to a college student population (ibid.). It is, then, also possible that these differences are more cultural than ethnic.

Another factor influencing time is language, and it does so on two ways. The language we speak or think in influences our world view (cf. Carruthers 2002, Bylund and Athanasopoulos 2017) because it influences the way we create schemas to think of time. Language also influences our temporal experience if temporal clues are given in different languages (Bylund and Athanasopoulos 2017, 914). This means that

listening to different languages alters time perception as well, even though we are not thinking in those languages; not creating a schema.

The most widely studied factor that influences our temporal experience is, perhaps less surprisingly, emotion. Emotion has a large influence on time perception (cf. Hanoch and Vitouch 2004, Droit-Volet and Meck 2007, Droit-Volet and Gil 2015). Happy subjects perceive time passed as shorter (Di Giovinazzo and Novarese 2016), whereas fear lengthens time perception (Droit-Volet, Fayolle, and Gil 2011). The study into the effect of emotion on time perception has some interesting results for the experience of sound and silence in film.

The experiments of this study provided mood-inducing images or sounds to their subjects, such as film or music. Auditory signals, in these experiments, are judged with greater precision than visual signals (cf. Noulhiane et al. 2007), but repetitive auditory signals skewer this precision and lead to a subjective perception of shortened time (cf. Wackermann, Pacer, and Wittmann 2014). Mood congruence, where the sound matches the image in expressed emotion, leads to a better remembering of film information than mood incongruity, and directs the viewer's attention to the images more than to the sound (cf. Boltz, 2004). Less emotional information also has a greater effect on information processing, including judgments on time perception, than a larger presence of emotional information (cf. Hanoch and Vitouch 2004). Lastly, stimulus intensity also has a large effect on time perception. Surprising and intense stimuli have a greater effect on time perception than low-level and repetitive stimuli, because the subjects do not suffer from neural fatigue when experiencing surprising and intense stimuli (Matthews 2015, 175). These experiments suggest that less information leads to an improved interpretation of the film, mood congruency between sound and film directs spectators more towards the images than the sound, and that sonorous information is received more precisely than visual information (while watching a film). The results of these studies help to explain why some of the cliché silences that were discussed in previous chapters, like silence accompanying death, or slow motion, work so well.

It should be noted that the above findings use experiments that deal primarily with, in Bergsonian terms, spatialised time. Even experiments on emotion and language clues might test the effect on our experienced time, on duration, but they ultimately ask their subjects to express themselves in quantitative terms and juxtaposition, which is, again, spatialised time.

Thinking in time

Bergson describes this thinking in spatialised time as a function of our mind. Thinking about time is something completely different from experiencing time. For Bergson, reality, and duration, is mobility. It is "not things made, but things in the making, not self-maintaining states, but only changing states" (2007, 65). Our mind, however, "seeks for solid points of support, has for its main function in the ordinary course of life that of representing states and things. [...] It substitutes for the continuous the discontinuous, for motion stability, for tendency in process of change, fixed points marking a direction of change and tendency. This substitution is necessary to common-sense, to language, to practical life" (ibid., 65-66). Not only does Bergson recognise spatialised thinking as the main function of our mind, he also says it is necessary for our day-to-day lives. I described above how these two ways of thinking result in two different kinds of reality (cf. Bergson 1910, 97), but it is important to note that both realities are necessary. One reality constitutes our very real experience, and the other allows us to think of this experience. We live in two realities simultaneously, living and thinking at the same time.

What is truly fascinating regarding this idea, is that empirical research on perception appears to draw the same conclusion. Seymour Epstein writes that "it is important that we learn how we do think. How we do think, I believe, is *with two minds, experiential and rational*" (1994, 721, emphasis mine). Epstein calls this the Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory (CEST). Epstein is certainly not the only one to write on this, and the different theories on this idea are commonly grouped together as "dual-process theories of cognition", or sometimes also as "dual-system theories" (for an overview of many different existing models, cf. Smith and DeCoster 2000, 124; Evans 2008, 257).

Not all authors agree on the finer points of dual process theory. Some authors propose humans have two distinct memories (e.g., Smith and DeCoster 2000), which would make a comparison with Bergson even more striking, whilst others propose that there is but one memory and that one of the two systems (the experiential system) does not need memory (cf. Evans 2008). There are also authors that find the idea of two distinct processes too rigid, or an oversimplification, and suggest a single process, but one that consists of rapid continuous feedback between "tendencies to respond and consciousness" (cf. Wason and Evans, 1974). Although the different authors might not agree on all points, the basic idea behind every dual-process theory is that there are

two systems at work in our cognition. The first system works fast, automatically, and unconsciously, whereas the other is slow, effortful, and conscious. Emotions, perception, and memory belong to the first system; rational and systematic thinking belong to the second. It is certainly not my intention to discuss all the intricacies of the dual-process theory of cognition here.

What is striking about this theory is that both Bergson and the empirical researchers seem to come to a similar understanding of how we experience reality, albeit from different viewpoints. The first, "fast", system can be likened to duration, whilst the "slow" system is akin to Bergson's concept of space and spatialised time. Although Bergson discusses spatialised time as a construct of our intellect, he also sees it as a functional reality in order to make sense of the world in our mind.

Keeping these realities in mind, it becomes easier to understand how we experience film, which is a temporal reality in its own right, and how affect and semiotics each play their roles in our temporal experience. I shall address affect and semiotics in our general temporal experience of the world first, before turning to film.

Temporal affect

In the previous chapter, I discussed affect as the ongoing engagement between a pre-personal intensity and our own subjective unconscious neurological and socio-cultural frames. Thinking about affect as intensity and unconscious subjectivity places it in duration. It is a qualitative change rather than a quantitative state. As it is part of duration, it is also part of perception. Indeed, for Bergson, "[t]here is no perception without affection.[13] Affection is, then, that part or aspect of the inside of our body which we mix with the image of external bodies" (1911, 60). Affect is, similar to memory, an integral part of perception. It is "what we must first of all subtract from perception to get the image in its purity. [...] Affection is not the primary matter of which perception is made; it is rather the impurity with which perception is alloyed" (ibid.). The seemingly negative words Bergson chooses to describe affect do not

[13] Bergson does not explicitly distinguish between affect and affection. This distinction is made by Massumi in his foreword to Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987, xvi). Massumi writes here that affect is the ability to affect and be affected, the passage from one experiential state to another. Affect is a process, as described in the previous chapter. Affection, in Massumi's distinction, is each state in this process. I am not concerned with single states here, and Bergson is neither. For this reason affection in Bergson's terms shall be considered to be the process of affect as discussed in chapter 2, which fits with this discussion of affection as that with which pure perception is alloyed. Indeed, it is the encounter between the ongoing experience and our personal socio-cultural and neuro-physiological frames. In Gregg and Seigworth's *The Affect Theory Reader* (2010), the term "affection" is not even mentioned, whereas Bergson is mentioned multiple times.

indicate a negative opinion on affect. He speaks in these rather pejorative terms (what we must strip, impurity) because he is discussing pure perception.

Pure perception is impossible because, similar to memory, affect colours our perception. Whereas memory is a consequence of consciousness, affect, conversely, is a consequence of our body for Bergson. The body is the conductor of our temporal experience. "My perception, in its pure state," writes Bergson, "does not go on from my body to other bodies; it is, to begin with, in the aggregate of bodies, then gradually limits itself and adopts my body as a centre. And it is led to do so precisely by the experience of the double faculty, which this body possesses, of performing actions and feeling affections" (ibid., 64). Affection colours our perception because we experience duration through our body. The body, for Bergson, is also the one distinct thing we know not only "from without by perceptions, but from within by affections" (ibid., 1). Not only is our perception coloured by affect, we also get to know ourselves, our bodies, through these affections.

It is clear now why one of the questions the previous chapter ended with, "what is the time of affect", was impossible to answer there without first discussing what our experience of time is. Affect, which I proposed to be the process wherein a pre-personal intensity engages with and is filtered by subjective unconscious neurological and socio-cultural frames, is a part of our perception, an integral part of our ongoing present.

Temporal semiotics

The same question of temporality still stands for semiotics, which I discussed in chapter 3 as contextual relations. It should, after these extensive discussions on our experience of time, come as no surprise that semiotics is rooted squarely in spatialised time. Bergson's attitude to sign theory is, unsurprisingly, similar to his attitude concerning spatialised thinking. Linstead and Ó Maoilearca describe Bergson's point of view succinctly: "Bergson is suspicious of language and symbolic representation because of their effect of alienating us from our own constantly unfolding experience" (2003, 5). Indeed, semiotics is part of the functional reality of spatialised time. Bergson would rather have us focus on our continuously evolving present, on our real, actual time rather than our virtual time.

Bergson sees symbolic representation, similar to spatialised time, as the inverse relation of our mind with reality. He writes that "perception ends by being merely an

occasion for remembering, [...] that it is our interest to regard as mere signs of the real those immediate intuitions which are, in fact, part and parcel with reality" (1911, 71). If we think of things and states as the "beads on a necklace", if we think in signs as contextual relations drawn, necessarily, from the past (as each moment, each relation has already passed), then our experience of the present, our ongoing perception, ends.

This, for Bergson, is the way our mind works, but not the way we should see the world. Our consciousness, he states, cannot help but create separate states and "substitutes the symbol for reality, or perceives the reality only through the symbol" (Bergson 1910, 128). If we only think of the world and ourselves in separation then we are thinking in a virtual reality, a reality represented through symbols, no longer in the present.

Our mind tricks us into thinking of the world through symbols and this has a severe consequence on our selves: There are two different selves, the fundamental self and its external projection, its spatial and social representation (ibid., 231). We rarely grasp our fundamental self, however, "[t]he greater part of the time we live outside ourselves, hardly perceiving anything of ourselves but our own ghost, a colourless shadow which pure duration projects into homogeneous space" (ibid.). If we wish to understand ourselves and our experience of the world, we must heed the fact that we live in two worlds, of which one, for Bergson, is the projection of the other (the dual-process theories mentioned above seem to suggest that these worlds exist side by side, equally relevant and not the one projected into the other).

It should be clear by now that Bergson above all wants us to focus on the actual experience of time rather than the virtual, on our fundamental self rather than our virtual self. For the research at hand, however, both aspects of the temporal experience are of equal importance. We live, breathe, and experience in duration, in real time, but we think of it, we reconstruct it intelligibly, in its spatialised representations. Semiotics and affect take place in different realities, but we inhabit and both these worlds, and our lives fold and unfold continuously in both temporalities.

3. The temporality of silence in film

I can now finally turn to our experience of film and silence. The question that remains is how the two realities through which we know the world interact with the film

experience. This question is complicated through a film's own reality, which seems to replace our reality in the viewing experience. There are plenty of theories on how film creates a reality of its own (cf. Rushton 2011 for a Deleuzean approach; Cowie 2011 for a Lacanian approach). I shall, but briefly, address the Bergsonian approach that John Ó Maoilearca takes, in keeping with the rest of this chapter.

The reality of film

Ó Maoilearca describes the reality effect of a film as lying in its ability to fabricate fact, but also in "fabricating time, bringing to the image (constructed in the past) the 'illusion of the present tense'" (2010, 184). In other words, film fabricates (the illusion of) its duration. As real time's origin lies in its movement, in its going by, so does the illusion of a film's time. The "phenomenon of apparent movement", which also creates perceived time, is "indeed the 'hard-wired' [i.e., cognitive] basis for the medium as such, its most fundamental condition of possibility" (ibid., 134).

Although this phenomenon of apparent movement might be the basis for a film's movement, both in terms of the mechanical movement of a film in the projector and in our subsequent cognitive understanding of this movement as film, as duration, Ó Maoilearca shifts the attention more towards movement "*in* the film on screen, rather than *of* the film in the projector" (ibid., emphasis in original). These two movements Ó Maoilearca differentiates, "are two related, but still different, processes: the former depends on the latter as its necessary, but not sufficient, cause" (ibid.).

The movement *of* the film creates the possibility of movement *in* the film, but it is not the sole contributor to the film's reality effect. "If the story, acting, camerawork, editing or music is *deemed* 'poor' [...], *this* too will interfere with the reality effect, and even more so *at the level through which we immerse ourselves in a film*" (ibid., emphasis in original). Each component in the film contributes to change, to duration, in the film, and builds on the movement of the film.

Put more simply in the visionary words of Samuel Coleridge, intuitive *avant la lettre* (first published in 1817) as they are: each component of the film seeks "a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination that *willing suspension of disbelief*" for the moment which constitutes filmic faith (Coleridge 2009, 270, emphasis mine).

Film creates its own reality, its own temporality, but how do we experience this? How does it relate to the two realities discussed above, and to the semiotics and

affect of silence? This reality, the one the audience engages with when it suspends its disbelief, must find its origin somewhere. Perhaps it can be found at the start of a film's essence, at the start of its movement, although pinpointing a specific starting point is not all that interesting for the discussion at hand (cf. the engagement with different folds in Chapter 4, §Folds between folds, pp. 120-121).[14]

A willing suspension of disbelief

Ronald Bogue, writing on Deleuze's reading of Proust, explains how Deleuze reads in Proust that "every work of art is a beginning of the world", and adds to this that "a beginning of the world entails a beginning of time" (Bogue 2001, 8-9). A film creates its own time, immediately at its beginning. When we go to watch a film, we submit ourselves to this newly created time. We willingly suspend our disbelief and allow the film's time to constitute our reality. That we *willingly* suspend our disbelief is a crucial point to make here, for our experience of the film's time and our own, normal experience of time differ in one important aspect.

When we go about our daily experience, when we experience duration, we inhabit two worlds simultaneously. The present we live in is duration and we make sense of it, we thread beads on the necklace of our being, by projecting it into space. The important difference with the film experience is that in the film experience we do not really *want* to make sense of the film's duration. Or, at least, we do not want to realise that there is a me, a self, that is making sense of the film. Rather, we would have the film overcome this thinking me, replacing it with the film itself. The willing suspension of disbelief means that we push the structuring function of our intellect into the unconscious, and point our consciousness towards the real time of the film, towards its duration. In our film experience, we attend to the present in the manner Bergson advocates.

By suspending the ordering, spatialising function of the mind, we enter the film. If I experience the film from within, if I allow its time to be my time, I attribute to the film "an interior and, so to speak, states of mind; I also imply that I am in sympathy with those states" (Bergson 1912, 2). Then, as the film "adopts one movement or another, what I experience will vary" (ibid.). This movement of the film I experience "will depend neither on the point of view I may take up in regard to the

[14] Of course, I do make this distinction explicit when performing empirical analyses, as per the discussion on the beginning of diegesis in chapter 1, §When is silence (non-)diegetic? (pp. 37-39).

object, since I am inside the object itself, nor on the symbols by which I may translate the motion" (ibid., 2-3). Rather, I grasp the movement "from within", and, in doing so, I attain "an absolute" (ibid., 3). This absolute Bergson mentions, is the complete identification of myself with the film. Ó Maoilearca describes this experience as "putting the usual direction of our thinking into reverse so that it can sympathize with the movement and 'very life' of other things" (2010, 166). Indeed, the suspension of disbelief is a reversal of our usual way of thinking by focusing on the actual rather than the virtual.

The reversal of our way of thinking implies that we are completely in the present. The complete identification with the film shifts our attention from structuring spatialised time to experiencing duration. The two realities we inhabit have shifted: we now consciously attend the present. We are "in the now", we are *within* the film with this reversal of experience.

This can also help to explain why films can feel more than real, hyperreal. Baudrillard's hyperreality discusses levels of simulation where the simulation is not just a copy of reality, but it is so good that it becomes the producer of a reality of its own (Lane 2000, 30). The power of this hyperreality is of "such psychological presence that it can almost divorce itself from the means of representation" (Murray 2016, 103). It is the absolute, the pure identification of ourselves with and within the film.

It is an experience of reality we normally seldom encounter, because we experience this reality unconsciously, and our consciousness projects it into spatialised time. There are moments that we do experience such a kind of reality, and that is when we are "in the zone", or "in the flow". The psychology of flow, as developed by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, shows striking similarities to Bergson's "absolute", the complete attention to a present.

Bergson's absolute; or the flow of experience

Csikszentmihalyi describes the phenomenology of flow to reflect "attentional processes" (2014, 243). Research into flow focuses on "optimal experiences" (ibid., 221). One of the more interesting results of flow research is that the self is hidden during a flow experience (ibid.). It should be noted here that what Csikszentmihalyi means with the self is the rational, thinking self. It is the self of our intellect, our spatialised reality. According to flow research, our structuring function of the mind

which creates this reality is hidden during a flow experience. Self-awareness during an activity that is freely, voluntarily chosen is associated with a negative experience, because it interrupts our complete involvement in that activity (ibid.). A flow experience alters our experience of time as well (ibid., 231).

Understanding the psychology behind flow, it becomes possible to see why a rupture in the reality effect of a film can dismantle Bergson's absolute. It would cause us to no longer suspend our separating function of the mind and re-establish our own consciousness against the film's consciousness that we were just experiencing from within. This clash of consciousnesses is also a clash of time. We are taken out of the film's time and into our spatialised time. Elizabeth Buhe calls the clash between an "object's time" and "human time" an "anxiety of temporal uncertainty" (Buhe 2011, 118). We come out of a mode of attention to duration, and switch back to the structured spatialised time of our mind.

If a film can keep us "in the flow", however, if it can keep us from breaking our attention to the ongoing present within it, we experience Bergson's absolute. We completely identify with the film and the film's time becomes our own time. In our complete attention to the present, we "hide" or suspend our structuring self, and our unconscious processes, our duration, takes over. This also means that we are completely surrendered to affect, which, as I have shown above, is situated in duration. Flow research seems to confirm this: flow has a positive influence on the experience of affect (cf. Cseh, Phillips, and Pearson, 2015).

This complete attention to duration also clarifies how the accumulation of affect works, which I touched upon in the previous chapter. In the example of *Lawrence of Arabia*, it was only at the end of the film that the affect related to Lawrence's death came collecting its due, building up throughout the film from the beginning. Affect is a qualitative change, and if we are completely absorbed in the present, these qualitative changes endure in duration. We do not separate it, thread it upon the necklace of spatialised states, but rather this affect lingers and mingles throughout the whole film with other qualitative changes, until it is only at the end of the film that it takes over as the dominant quality in duration.

The question remains how semiotics feature in film experience, especially if we suspend our structured, spatial reality. If the suspension of disbelief, experiencing the absolute from within the film, is a reversal of our way of thinking, then perhaps it helps to reverse our way of thinking on semiotics as well. Outside of film, in our

normal experience of duration, our conscious experience creates fixed states out of continuous change. We perceive this change, continuously, but we project it into spatialised time and create distinguishable moments. Conversely, in film, our attention is focused on the present, on the continuous passing of time. This perception of the filmic present is still coloured by both affect and memory, like our perception of real non-film time. The audience sustains the cinematic illusion in their creative support of the film's duration.

The experience of film from within

It is here, in this creative act of focused attention on the filmic present, that our memory bridges the gap between the signifying processes of the film's duration. The structuring self is suspended in the flow of watching a film, but we still have access to it. The trick to sustaining the cinematic illusion consists in accessing the rational memory only briefly, so as not to allow ourselves to break our own suspension of disbelief. Even if we are focused on change, on duration, we might see familiar variations, familiar shapes. It is in recognition of these notions of familiarity that we briefly access our structuring self to see if we can make sense of such a variation or shape.

Deleuze writes that each sign "has a line of privileged time that corresponds to it. But there is also the pluralism that multiplies the combinations. Each kind of sign participates in several lines of time; each line of time mingles several kinds of signs." (2000, 17). Ronald Bogue expands on this, writing that interpreting signs, "the act of explicating the sign, of unfolding its hidden sense, is inseparable from the sign's own unfolding, its own self-development. In this sense, the search for truth is always temporal, 'and the truth, always a truth of time'" (2001, 5). The semiotic interpretation of film is inextricably bound to its temporal experience. Benjamin's warning against the conscious exploration of film is a warning against interpreting film outside of this temporal experience. Pausing, rewinding, and watching a scene multiple times in analysis can lead to increasingly complex semiotic interpretations that do not necessarily arise in a regular, unfolding viewing of the film.

There are two realities we inhabit in a film experience. The reality of real time, of duration, becomes the reality of hyperreal time of the film, of the film's duration in our submission to the film experience. This is also the primary reality we focus on. The reality of our separating mind, our intellect, is largely suspended yet this reality can still be consulted. The virtual, spatialised idea of the film is never consulted for

too long or too hard, or our submission to the object's temporality, to the flow of the film, disappears and with it the duration of the filmic experience. Thinking rationally about a film while we are experiencing the film, is not an absolute experience of the film from within. In creating states, in separating spatialised moments of the film and analysing the film while it plays, we never insert ourselves into the film and allow for it to overtake our realities. The experience of film and silence exists as submission to a film's temporality, with brief punctures of rational interpretation, brief moments of ordering the film's beads on its temporal necklace when necessary. Silence, however, can threaten to disrupt this creative sustain of the film's duration.

The temporality of silence in film

The use of silence in film skirts the threshold of connection that binds spectators to the film's temporality. The willing suspension of disbelief and submission to the temporal flow of the cinematic object is a continuous encounter between film and audience. Silence is tolerable for a while, but if silence is present for too long without a renewed anchoring of the spectator to the film experience the risk of losing the connection between film and spectator arises. Silence places the required effort to sustain the sonorous cinematic experience completely with the audience. Silence in the soundtrack allows the audience to fill in the blanks, to create their impression of what the sonorous film experience would be. This can be exhilarating, challenging, and creative when used right, allowing the audience partly to confront their conditioned selves in the film. But it can also be tiring and contribute to a concentration fatigue if the audience has to project their own ideas into the film for too long.

The use of silence in film draws the spectator into the actual experience, into the sonorous immediacy because suddenly part of the film's information is missing. A real risk exists in that audiences might start asking what part of the film's information they are missing, and why. The uncertainty created by the lack of sonorous information needs to be confronted by the spectators in order to uphold the cinematic illusion. Silence focuses the attention to what is happening in the film in a temporarily increased effort by the spectator to sustain the film experience. This attentive state needs to be resolved because the spectator cannot continue to bear the sonorous burden of silence for too long.

Usually, and when used correctly, this process is not too demanding on the audience. The flow of the film has a positive influence on the experience of affect, and

the film's affect can continue its encounter with the spectator without sonorous input for a short while. This risk that accompanies a lack of audible information is perhaps least present with the absence of non-diegetic sound. A case in point is the prolonged non-diegetic silence in *Cast Away* for as long as Chuck is stuck on the island.

Conversely, too much sonorous hand-holding erases any necessity for engaged attention by the audience. This helps to explain why classical Hollywood soundtracks can sometimes be boring to our modern ears. These soundtracks contain hardly any sonorous challenge to speak of, let alone any challenging silences that require the audience's attention. Soundtracks with too much sonorous information completely explain every detail to their audience and hardly leave room for personal interpretation.

Analysing silence in film needs to take into account this temporal tension that accompanies it. The audience engages with a film willingly, from within the film experience in an approximation of Bergson's absolute experience of time. In doing so, the structuring mind is disregarded in favour of the actual experience. An analysis of silence that restricts itself to or starts from a rational interpretation is the opposite of the actual experience of silence and film. It is certainly possible to watch a film disinterestedly, detached, as often happens in analysis. This is not a folding of film and spectator, however, as such a fold requires a submission to the film's temporality.

Bergson's duration, his philosophy of time, shows how we experience the two realities we inhabit. By using his philosophy and applying it to our experience of film, we can understand how a film creates its own reality and how we subsequently experience it. The concept of duration and all that it implies allows for the combination of the signifying process and the affective process in a single, temporal, experience of film. The previous chapters on semiotics and affect are like Deleuze's two floors of a fold, communicating, folding, through time. In silence we recognise these floors. Affect and semiotics reinforce each other. Affect draws us in and sustains the film experience because it is an ongoing process. The absence of sound does give us pause and a peculiar semiotic tension is created. This is a tension that temporarily reinforces both the affective *and* semiotic engagement, but it is also a tension that needs to resolve itself. If this tensions is not resolved, it runs the risk of dissolving the audience's affective connection with the film.

4. A dual analysis of silence in film

Semiotics and affect are the two floors of this thesis, and of our experience, that constantly communicate in our experience of film. Silence can be dangerous to this experience. Silence focuses our attention by means of starving us of sonorous information. A prolonged silence pushes this starvation too far and breaks the bond between spectator and film. Interesting applications of silence in film are those that maintain both the affective and semiotic relations with its filmic contexts, intensifying those contexts without explicitly calling attention to them. An analysis of these uses needs to take both affective and semiotic relations into account, or the analysis tells only half the story (usually the semiotic, consciously explored half of the story). The last part of this chapter will serve to elucidate how semiotic and affective relations work together through silence in an analysis of some silences that have not yet been mentioned in this thesis.

Not all of the films that make up the empirical corpus make an appearance in this thesis because the use of silence is not always interesting or meaningful, which is not a critique of the films in question but merely an observation. *MASH* (Altman 1970), for example, uses quite a lot of diegetic silences. These silences are all accompanied by loud brass band marching music to reinforce the military atmosphere of the film. These diegetic silences are not particularly interesting. This does not mean that *MASH* does not feature any interesting silence at all, for there is one use of silence in the film that has not been mentioned in this thesis. The night before being discharged, lieutenant Dish (Jo Ann Pflug) spends the night with captain Painless (John Schuck) in order to cure the latter's depression over a moment of impotence. As the lieutenant lifts the blanket covering Painless, non-diegetic music appears in the soundtrack and all diegetic sounds disappear. The next morning Painless' depression is miraculously cured.

The diegetic silence that appears in the soundtrack accompanies the implication that the lieutenant and the captain have sex. Although sex, and in particular the feeling right after an orgasm, is sometimes called *la petite mort* ("the little death"), it seems more plausible that the presence of silence here indicates either the passing of time (evening to morning) or a form of sonorous censorship. Silence hinting at sex also appears in *Raiders of the Lost Ark* (Spielberg 1981), but Indiana (Harrison Ford) falls asleep. Neither *MASH* nor *Raiders* features particularly interesting silences otherwise.

Most of the other films that are not mentioned in this thesis use fairly standard examples of silence (usually a diegetic or complete silence accompanying death). There are two films that merit an analysis of their particular applications of silence to elucidate the importance of combining affect and semiotics: Stanley Kubrick's *The Shining* and Martin Scorsese's *Raging Bull*, both released in 1980.

The Shining

The Shining features plenty of diegetic silence (second only to Kubrick's 1968 film *2001: A Space Odyssey*) and these silences reinforce the tense atmosphere of the film. *The Shining* follows the Torrance family as Jack (Jack Nicholson), his wife Wendy (Shelley Duvall), and their son Danny (Danny Lloyd) move into the Overlook Hotel for the winter as custodians.

The second diegetic silence (the first one accompanies the main theme and opening titles) appears roughly eleven minutes into the film. Danny is brushing his teeth and asks his imaginary friend Tony why he does not want to go to the Overlook Hotel. After some insistence, Danny's eyes grow wide. A sudden crescendo of non-diegetic music and a diegetic silence accompany the cut to one of the film's many iconic images: an empty hallway with two elevator doors. Massive amounts of blood start running out of the elevator doors and flooding the hallway. The image then cuts abruptly to two twin girls standing in a different corridor, dressed in blue and holding hands. This image lasts only for a few seconds, before cutting back to the elevator lobby where blood is still flowing in in large amounts. Another abrupt and jarring cut shows a close-up of Danny in a black void, screaming in silence. A final cut back to the flooding hallway shows the blood now reaching the camera, covering it, and drowning the image in darkness.

Similar scenes return later on in the film. The twin girls, the Grady twins, reappear less than ten minutes later. Once again a diegetic silence accompanies their presence. The twins smile at Danny and walk away before any diegetic sounds return. Some twenty minutes later Danny is cycling through the hotel's many corridors when he suddenly stops before a specific room (room 237). The music grows dissonant and ominous again and diegetic silence reappears. Danny moves his hand to open the room and suddenly the image cuts to the Grady twins standing in a corridor again. Danny thinks better of it and cycles away as diegetic sounds reappear in the soundtrack.

Some ten minutes later the Grady twins make their most impressive appearance. Danny is cycling the hallways again and he suddenly stops after turning a corner. Right in front of him, at the end of the corridor, stand the Grady twins holding hands, seemingly waiting for him. Danny looks a bit scared and for the first time the Grady twins speak, their voices hollow and reverberating: "Hello Danny," they say. "Come and play with us. Come and play with us, Danny." After the twins utter the last line the image cuts to a different view of the corridor. Blood covers the walls and the twins' lifeless bodies lie on the floor, bloodily slaughtered with a large axe. The image cuts back to the twins holding hands as they slowly say "For ever, and ever, and ever." With each pause the image cuts to an increasing close-up of the twins before finally showing their slaughtered corpses again. Danny screams in silence, the music hits another crescendo, and Danny throws his hands before his eyes. The first diegetic sounds now reappear in the scene. Danny opens his eyes to peer through his fingers and sees only an empty hallway in front of him. The twin girls have disappeared.

The silence in this scene is a diegetic silence. The voices of the twins are meta-diegetic sounds in Danny's mind and the diegetic world is silenced until Danny covers his eyes with his hand, ending the illusion. The girls and their voices are not part of the real diegetic world, which is briefly silenced in this scene. *The Shining* follows the descent of Jack into madness, and almost every supernatural event or sign of psychosis is accompanied by a diegetic silence. The scene in room 237 is accompanied by a prolonged diegetic silence. The scene with 500 pages of "All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy", a clear sign of Jack's madness, features diegetic silence as well. The blood in the elevator hallway also makes a few reappearances in diegetic silence.

A semiotic analysis of these diegetic silences can clearly differentiate between imaginary occurrences and the real diegetic world. The diegetic world is silenced when either Danny's visions or signs of Jack's madness appear in the film. The sound echoes the reality of the film: when the diegetic reality is briefly suspended, so is the sound. This semiotic coupling should make watching the film a rather trivial affair because it is easy to recognise what is real or not, and yet *The Shining* is one of the greatest psychological horror films ever made. It is such a great film because silence draws from its context and reinforces both the affective and semiotic relations and these relations reinforce each other – if silence reflects what is not real, why does it still affect us? Can we be certain that what is happening is not real? A purely rational or semiotic analysis does not reflect the actual film experience at all.

Kubrick's varied use of unnerving music and sounds, abrupt and jarring cuts, close-ups, and bouts of diegetic silence all create an extremely effective affective encounter for the spectator. The affect is strong enough for the film to keep its audience glued in their seats despite the haunting psychological terror it unleashes on them. Rational reflections on the film during a viewing cannot break this affect and only serve to reinforce it because the very certainty of what is real and what is not real is brought into question. A semiotic analysis of these diegetic silences as portraying temporary suspensions of reality is nowhere near sufficient to express how effective they are. These silences draw the spectator into the film and focus the attention on what sonorous and visual information is left. This information is often a horrific visual or unnerving music. Kubrick uses these diegetic silences to force the audience to engage with the context of silence working through it and this context is jarring and unsettling.

Conversely, a solely affective analysis of these diegetic silences misses much of what makes them terrifying. It is because these silences portray psychosis and a suspension of reality that they work so effectively. The audience is forced to call its own perception into question and this in turn helps to accumulate affect throughout the film.

Raging Bull

Martin Scorsese's 1980 film *Raging Bull* tells the life story of Italian-American boxer Jake LaMotta (Robert De Niro). The film is a sports drama and does not feature psychosis or supernatural events, but it uses diegetic silence to portray suspensions of reality as well. The use of silence in suspensions of reality is hardly new, of course, as a (travel) montage is frequently accompanied by silence. The use of silence to depict a momentary suspension of realistic time or space in a montage has been standard practice since *King Kong*, but Scorsese applies this silence in a fascinating manner in a montage spanning nearly three minutes.

The montage appears after a scene where Jake LaMotta loses a boxing match against Sugar Ray Robinson by judge decision. Scorsese shows LaMotta sitting in his dressing room after the fight. All diegetic sounds fade out and the barcarolle from Pietro Mascagni's opera *Silvano* appears as non-diegetic music. What follows is a peculiar montage where Scorsese juxtaposes still images from six different boxing matches with vintage looking home videos. These home videos are the only images in

colour in the whole film, creating an even starker contrast in a constant alternation between black and white stillness and moving colour. The montage covers a period of three years, from January 14, 1944 until some time after March 14, 1947, when the last fight of the montage takes place. The use of diegetic silence in a montage where time and distance are suspended is quite commonplace, but Scorsese's juxtaposition of still images and colourful home videos merits a closer look.

Six fights in total are shown during this montage, each fight preceded by a black screen with white titles announcing the year, place, and Jake's opponent. Still images follow this screen. The number of images differs in each fight; for one fight Scorsese shows his audience only two stills. The black screen with white titles and subsequent still images are reminiscent of a highlight reel or slide show. As always, the possibility of breaking the bond with the spectator lurks in the use of silence. The audience is drawn to the auditory and visual information that is left, but what the audience sees is a sequence of still images. This montage silence can be analysed semiotically as signifying the erasure of time and space. The use of stills creates an additional semiotic problem. When the images of the film stop moving, the question that arises is whether diegesis is still sustained (see the analysis of *Legion* below for an expansive and in-depth analysis of this problem and the implications it brings to silence). The use of Mascagni's barcarolle serves as suture throughout the montage and Scorsese uses the still images only briefly. The diegetic silence accompanying the stills threatens to turn the sequence into something resembling a slide show or highlight reel, but the stills are quickly alternated with colourful home videos.

The colourful yet vintage looking home videos (complete with scratches and grainy image) are also accompanied by a diegetic silence. As the only moments of colour throughout the whole film, these home videos stand out starkly. The different videos depict Jake having fun with Vickie (Cathy Moriarty) and marrying her, the marriage of his brother, and finally the families of Jake and his brother barbecuing together with their respective children. All in all these are vibrant moments of happiness in Jake's life. The victories in the boxing ring and the happy family life are both underscored by the sweet barcarolle and a diegetic silence.

A semiotic analysis of the silence in this scene as simply depicting the erasure of time and space is clearly insufficient. The silence reinforces the documentary feel that this montage has. The affect of the film, however, plays a large role in subverting this view. *Raging Bull* begins with an old and fat Jake LaMotta talking to himself in a

mirror. How did he end up there, the audience is left wondering. For the next two hours *Raging Bull* tells LaMotta's story and this montage shows what might be the only time that Jake has ever been happy. His victories are indeed a highlight reel, and the home videos of Jake and his family are perhaps the only colourful moments of his life. Scorsese's choice to show the happy moments of LaMotta's life in a brief montage is quite interesting. The film is a portrayal of how Jake sabotages himself throughout his whole life, and the diegetic silence in this montage creates a distance from that portrayal, allowing this montage to show the bittersweet two minute highlight of Jake's life. LaMotta's anger and frustration seep through in this montage. The affect completes the semiotic view: this is not a sweet and lovely montage but a heartbreakingly bittersweet period of happiness that Jake will probably never see again.

This montage is an excellent example of how the actual and virtual experience of film complement each other, and why both the affective and semiotic analysis are important to understand silence completely. A semiotic analysis of this silence can be fairly straightforward: this silence is a symbolic erasure of time and space, condensing a period of three years to three minutes. An affective analysis can relate the diegetic silence to its visual and sonorous context. This silence directs the audience into a conditioned point of view: a highlight reel of victories and the happy life Jake leads with his wife, brother, and children. The actual experience of this film's duration, however, is coloured by the virtual, spatialised earlier moments that linger in spectators' memories. The audience remembers Jake's struggle, his frustration, how he sabotages himself, and how he ends up overweight and a shadow of his former self. The diegetic silence creates the necessary distance and gap in filmic information that forces spectators to fill in the blanks, to project just that little bit more virtuality of their memory into the film, rendering the happiness of the montage bittersweet and fleeting.

The examples of *The Shining* and *Raging Bull* show how the actual and virtual experience of film combine into something that is greater than a semiotic or affective analysis can sufficiently describe by itself. Both of these examples are diegetic silence, but the same can be true for a complete or a non-diegetic silence. Although it is perhaps not a coincidence that, of all the silences in the empirical corpus that were not yet discussed throughout this thesis, these two examples stand out. Diegetic silence is often the more interesting of the three silences because it can be used more effectively

than the other two silences. Diegetic silence can be used longer than a complete silence, giving the audience more time to fill in the blanks and focus their attention to what visual or sonorous information is still present. Diegetic silence engages the audience also more effectively than a non-diegetic silence. The example of *Cast Away* comes to mind again where most of the film takes place in non-diegetic silence, but this absence of accompanying music is less forceful or penetrating than a prolonged diegetic silence.

The actual and virtual experience of silence combine to great effect because the virtual and spatialised contextual relations are more explicitly, but still unconsciously, incorporated into the experience of film. This explicit projection of the spectator into the actual experience is also the danger that interesting uses of silence bring with them. It can be fatiguing for the audience to focus on the little sonorous and virtual information that is left in the presence of silence. The strain of sustaining the willing suspension of disbelief can break the connection between film and spectator (cf. Claudia Gorbman's suture in Gorbman 1987, 58).

The example of still images in *Raging Bull* brings additional complexity to the experience and analysis of silence because the film's temporality is briefly suspended. This is a compelling concept that deserves a postscript to this thesis because it also lays bare a crucial difference between television and film. The below postscript to this thesis is an analysis of temporal suspension in television silence and serves three goals: it points to some differences between silence in film and silence in television; it tests the applicability of this thesis on television; and most importantly the postscript explores the relation between silence and temporality in more depth, as an extension to the example of *Raging Bull*. The danger of using silence for too long before it breaks the audience's disbelief is a danger of temporality. Silence is an expression of the suspension of time and the example analysis below explores this concept in depth.

5. Postscript: a note on silence in television

The examples and analyses in this thesis focus on silence in Hollywood film for the most part. The use of silence in television follows many of the same conventions, tropes, and contextual relations as silence in film. The postscript to this thesis tests the possible applicability of the framework I put forward on silence in a television show.

A direct application of this framework is only possible with one important stipulation: a comparison between the use of silence throughout television's history and its use in film history (as discussed in Chapter 2) is impossible, as the data I collected to discuss the history of silence is limited to empirical film analyses (see Appendix). I discuss a single example here to showcase how silence in a television series might be discussed, analysed, and interpreted with the framework put forward in this thesis. This example is particularly interesting when compared to the analysis of *Raging Bull*.

Example: Legion, "Chapter 23"

Legion was a television series on American pay television channel FX. It ran for three seasons, from 2017 until 2019. It is a television show about mutants and over the course of its three seasons the main themes *Legion* deals with are memory and identity. In the fourth episode of its third season ("Chapter 23"), time itself becomes unstable due to repeated time-travel by two of the show's main characters. Because of this instability, time also becomes under attack by time-eating demons that break free when time becomes unstable.

About eighteen minutes into the fifty minutes long episode, three of the main characters decide to take the fight to the time-eating demons. Farouk (Navid Negahban), Kerry (Amber Midthunder), and Clark (Hamish Linklater) are standing in a hallway when Farouk asks the other two to join him. The three suddenly disappear, and a few seconds later the scene ends with the images dissolving into the next scene. The show continues and the audience only finds out where the three have gone about thirteen minutes later. The show continues, showing the plight of David (Dan Stevens) as he is trapped by the time monsters and attempts to fight them. He cannot reach the time monsters and is teleported back to his starting point each time. The images and sounds thus far in the episode are not out of the ordinary. A few seconds before the scene with David trying to reach the time monsters ends, a high-pitched ringing appears in the soundtrack and the cut to the next scene is accompanied by a muffled, low-pitched *woosh* transition sound. The next scene, however, is far from ordinary.

The high-pitched ringing and the transition sound accompanying the cut fade out as the image track shows a still frame of a wide, desolate landscape. The only audible sound is a sort of hollow, atmospheric soundscape that sounds a lot like the reverberating overtones of echoing sound (cf. Alvin Lucier's *I Am Sitting In A Room*, 1969). The image, meanwhile, is still the same still frame. This frame is stylised to

look like a vintage photograph, grainy and a bit off-colour. The shot lasts for only four seconds, before cutting to another still frame. This shot also shows a desolate landscape. The hollow sounds still continue reverberating in the soundtrack. Again, this shot lasts for four seconds. The next two shots are more of the same: still frames of a desolate, barren landscape accompanied only by the atmospheric soundscape. The TV show has suddenly switched from fairly standard use of sounds and images to something resembling a slide show or live action comic book panels. The vintage look only adds to this perception.

The cut to the fifth shot is once again accompanied by the transition sound. The fifth shot is the same still frame as the fourth shot, but with the three characters that disappeared earlier reappearing in the show. These characters only appear after sixteen seconds, and only four different shots and still images are shown so far. The sixth shot is the same still frame again, only slightly zoomed-in. The image now clearly shows the three characters standing on one of the hills in the landscape. All these shots are slides, still images. There is no movement in the image track. The next shot is a still of a medium shot showing Kerry looking up. The first movement in this sequence appears in the sixth shot. This shot appears to be a still frame with a flickering sun. The flickering is actually two hands of a clock that faintly appear and disappear inside the sun, as if they are glitching in and out of existence.

It is only by the ninth and tenth shots, about thirty seconds into this scene, that this strange sequence is clarified a bit. The ninth shot is a still frame of a medium shot of Clark. After about a second speech titles appear next to Clark: “Where are we?”. The tenth shot then finally gives an answer to what this scene is. It cuts to a medium-long still frame of Farouk with speech titles next him: “In the time between time.” One shot later Farouk is shown with a slightly altered pose, still a still frame, a slide as it were, with new speech titles: “They should have no advantage here.” The cuts between the eighth, ninth, and tenth shot are accompanied by faint “click” sounds, again reinforcing the slide show resemblance. These shots are the next slides in the sequence.

This slide show continues for a good hundred seconds in total, divided in thirty-one different slides, or shots of still frames. The only visible movement throughout this slide show is made by the flickering clock hands in the sun that reappear in some shots, and a few shots have the camera zooming in very slowly on the still frames. A complete discussion of each shot is not my intention here, but some noteworthy aspects deserve mention in light of the analysis below.

Shots fourteen to seventeen show the three travelling. The soundtrack is still comprised of the atmospheric reverberation, but now a sound of something threading gravel appears as well. A second before the cut to shot eighteen a sound advance appears of something tearing. Shot eighteen shows the corpse of an animal with what appears to be Farouk holding a knife, gutting the animal. This shot is accompanied by fleshy, visceral sounds. Shot twenty-one is a still frame of a camp site. Clark is sitting in a chair, reading a book. Farouk is leaving a tent. Kerry is standing to the side, next to a large chest, looking away. An indefinable piece of animal meat is being roasted over a fire. The sounds of someone eating and chewing also appear in the soundtrack. How long have they been in this desolate land of time between time? Where did the camping gear come from? These questions are not answered.

Shot thirty-one is the final still frame of this sequence. It is a medium shot of the three characters looking at a tunnel in the distance, with the camera very slowly zooming in. Three shots earlier, eleven seconds ago, a new continuous high-pitched sound appeared in the soundtrack, next to the indefinable soundscape. In this final still frame the high pitch is now at a recognisable sound level. The sound is made by *grave* (extremely slow) strings playing a single note. New strings appear in the soundtrack in the penultimate shot as well. These strings rise to about the same sound level as the *grave* strings (*mezza voce*) in the final shot, but they are playing an *allegro* (fast tempo) melody that suddenly provides a stark contrast. It is the first real movement of the past hundred seconds. The music (both *grave* and *allegro* strings) appears to crescendo over the four seconds of this still frame. After four seconds the show continues with normal moving images, cutting to a scene with two different characters. Only eleven minutes later do we revisit the time between time.

Farouk, Kerry, and Clark now find themselves in the lair of the time monsters. The still frame shots reappear again, but the show's director (Daniel Kwan) now chooses to increase the speed with which they appear. This creates the effect of a flipbook, which is reinforced by the animated flipping of a page accompanying each different still frame. The frames are sped up to show the three characters fighting the time monsters. The action is still displayed as flipping pictures, still frame stop motion, rather than continuous film or television speed. The soundtrack is also completely different from the earlier portrayal of the time between time. A pop song (The Beta Band, *Squares*) now accompanies the action, and fighting sounds like grunts, punches, and gunshots pierce the soundtrack as well. At the end of the fight, as the action slows

down, the flipbook slows down again as well. A few more still frames appear, similar to the time between time scene. The show then cuts back to the main character, David, and resumes in standard fashion.

Example analysis: Legion, "Chapter 23", the time between time

This scene is an excellent example of what happens when film or television push our willing submission to their temporality to an extreme. I purposely avoided mentioning silence in the above description of the time between time scene in *Legion*. When the series switches from continuous movement to the slide show presentation, the predominant audible sounds are located in the atmospheric soundscape. These sounds do not appear to stem from the diegetic world. At first glance this indicates a diegetic silence with non-diegetic sounds. A few sounds directly attributable to the diegetic world appear some shots later: footsteps on gravel, the flickering sounds of the clock hands in the sun, animal skin being torn, and someone eating. These sounds are foregrounded in the soundtrack; they are quite loud in comparison with the hollow reverberations. They appear somewhat otherworldly, in particular because the images remain still frames while the sound continues. The soundtrack is carrying the filmic illusion at this point: the only movement is that sonorous beckoning telling the spectator that although the images might have stopped, the show is certainly not over.

This produces an interesting conundrum: if the characters and the diegetic world are no longer moving, no longer continuous in time, then who or what is producing the ongoing sound in the soundtrack? The answer to this question reveals the importance of our reversal of the analysis of the experience of film and television. An analysis of the experience of the scene in the flow, in duration, can follow the scene's affective success and can describe the scene as it is experienced. Conversely, a semiotic analysis of our virtual projection and interpretation of the scene raises important questions (e.g., what is the object of this sonorous sign?) and such an analysis produces a completely different result.

The still images of the scene, i.e., the diegetic world, are placed outside of time. The show's imagery is lacking movement and a temporal continuity. Sound, however, cannot exist outside of temporal movement. The diegetic world should, logically, not produce any sound (neither diegetic nor non-diegetic). Snapshots of the images are possible and produce a slide show effect, but sound cannot be reduced to a snapshot outside of time. Any slice of sound, even a sound cut infinitesimally short, needs a

duration in time to exist. The sounds of footsteps on gravel or the sounds of people eating cannot stem from the world between time that the three characters find themselves in. If diegetic sounds cannot exist, the non-diegetic layer of sound finds itself in existential crisis as well because the counterpart that defines it is suddenly absent. The sounds that an audience attending a slide show might hear are not non-diegetic, but simply the sounds of their reality. The otherworldly footsteps or chewing sounds are not from our reality, however, and it is very much the question whether these sounds are non-diegetic.

These sounds, rather, are the show's reflection of what spectators might need to imagine to maintain their willing suspension of disbelief. The sound effects are part of an extremely prolonged suture in an imagined meta-silence of both the diegetic and non-diegetic layers of the soundtrack. The soundtrack now portrays the spectator's mind rather than the film in a form of sonic hand-holding. This silence of the film and use of imagined sound is rather creative, but it is also the ultimate trivialisation of the spectators' rational interpretation by helping the audience perhaps too much and telling them exactly what they should be imagining to hear during this scene.

The effectiveness of the audience's affective conditioning clearly shows itself in this scene. *Legion* started out as an interesting mixture of superhero science-fiction and psychological thriller. Over the course of its three seasons the tone of the show became increasingly erratic and weird. The affect in this episode, which is the fourth episode of the third season, has been steadily building for three seasons. The show's regular audience is conditioned into a receptive state to accept such a new and weird portrayal as par for the course. The show's affect is much stronger and more adhesive than the brief semiotic ruptures that might occur in questioning the origin of the sounds in the soundtrack.

Television can build a regular viewer base and condition its audience. The affective build-up throughout multiple episodes and seasons is a powerful tool. The analysis of this scene from *Legion* shows the possible applicability of the framework put forward in this thesis on television. A comparison between film and television's historical use of sound and silence is impossible to make without the same data. This postscript does underline the importance of including affect in media analyses. An analysis of the audience's experience of film (and perhaps also of television) should start from *within* that experience, from within the willing suspension of disbelief and inside the affective encounter. A semiotic approach is the necessary complement to

such an affective analysis, but it is important to keep in mind that a rational interpretation is only ever a virtual projection of the actual experience. The analyst should therefore heed Benjamin's warning against the conscious exploration of cinema and the over-attribution of meaning (see Chapter 1, §The problem of meaning attribution, pp. 31-32). Sound and silence can be extremely interesting metaphors, but sometimes silence is simply a brief absence of sound.

Conclusion

What is silence?

This deceptively simple question originated as a brief detour in a discussion between Isabella van Elferen and myself on listening and the identity of the listener. It is an intriguing question because every answer to it raises more questions. The answers sought by Van Elferen and myself resulted in a discussion of different types of silence as they can be identified in reality (see Chapter 1, §What is silence?, pp. 14-20). This discussion laid the groundwork for the follow-up question for film, but applying the results proved to be a cumbersome process lacking a few necessary distinctions (see Chapter 1, §Silence in film and reality, pp. 32-34; and §The theory in practice, pp. 34-35).

"What is silence in film?" then became the point of departure for this thesis. This is certainly not the first time that silence in film is addressed, but the collected works on silence in film do not comprise an extensive corpus (see Chapter 1, §Silence in film, pp. 21-30). When silence is discussed in an analysis of film, it usually takes one of two forms: in some cases, silence in film is mentioned briefly in passing, as an afterthought or a side track in a larger discussion on other aspects or parts of the soundtrack. In other cases, silence is discussed as a specific example, usually as a transcendental choice to confirm certain arguments or attributes the author wants to ascribe to silence (see Chapter 1, §The problem of meaning attribution, pp. 31-32).

The existing literature on silence in film does not share any common ideas on what silence is, what it can mean or how it functions, how and when silence is used and how this use varies throughout the sound film's history, or what the spectator experience of silence in film might be. A general approach or understanding of the term is non-existent. Once again that all-too simple question "what is silence" proved to be quite elusive, providing few answers and only raising more questions. Current film and music scholarship has hardly addressed the concept of silence systematically. This thesis set out to provide answers where there previously were none.

The central research question of this thesis evolved into "what is silence in film and how can it be analysed", in part because of the many different theories and

conceptualisations of silence. Answers to these questions can only be provided by a thorough and systematic approach that can provide relatively neutral answers. This thorough and methodical study of silence can be divided into two parts.

The first two chapters discuss what silence in film is or is not, and how the concept of silence changes and evolves throughout the history of the sound film. The first chapter discusses what silence in film can or cannot be, and which terms can be used to discuss it. This includes an overview of existing approaches, where they fall short, and how their shortcomings can be remedied. The second chapter describes how silence has been used throughout the sound film's history. In order to avoid transcendental choices and to understand how the general Westernised public usually comes into contact with silence, this history of silence focuses on mainstream Hollywood films. An empirical analysis of thirty-seven films in different genres from the past ninety years serves as the basis for this history. This chapter also includes the technological changes that occurred in film and sound production in the past century, and how these influence the use of silence. Together, these first two chapters clarify existing, arbitrary descriptions of silence. They describe how silence can be discussed objectively in broadly applicable types, and how silence in film has been used throughout the sound film's history.

The second large part of this thesis creates a framework to answer the question of how silence in film can be analysed. How does silence work: how does silence convey emotional and rational implications? What is the role of the spectator in the experience of silence? Chapter 3 discusses how meaning can be created through silence, building on Peircean semiotics. Chapter 4 subsequently sets out to discuss the affective impact of silence as this is not a part of semiotics, yet the affective experience is nonetheless integral to the experience of silence. Chapter 5 then discusses how the spectator combines both the affective and rational experience with Bergson's concept of duration.

The theoretical framework concludes that a discussion or analysis of silence best follows the spectator experience: a thorough analysis of silence starts from within the film. It discusses silence from the ongoing experience to the rational realisation, interpretation, and projection back unto the ongoing experience. The experience of film, and of silence in film, is a reversal of our usual, measured, experience of time. It is perhaps the closest we can come to Bergson's absolute experience of time. Silence plays with this absolute experience of time, stretching it and testing our willing

suspension of disbelief. It can be very powerful when used wisely, or it can completely rupture our absolute experience of filmic time.

Ultimately, this thesis has become more daring, and at times daunting, than I ever intended. I originally wanted to focus on understanding and analysing the different applications of silence in film. How can such a single concept vary so widely in use and meaning? The lack of both consensus and thoroughly critical work on silence in film forced me to create a methodical study of silence myself, covering all aspects of it and laying the groundwork for future critical analysis of sound and silence in film. And so this thesis evolved.

The question of what silence in film is, is a deceptively simple question that only raises more questions and thus requires more than a simple answer. In these last few pages I revisit these questions and the answers this thesis provides. Ultimately, this thesis first puts forward clear and distinct terms we can use to describe silence in film, second it describes the history of silence since the first commercial successes of the sound film, and third it creates a framework to analyse silence and the spectator experience thereof.

1. What is silence (in film)?

The discussion in chapter 1 on how to define or approach silence in film builds on both previous work by Van Elferen and myself, and on how silence has already been discussed in soundtrack analyses. The work on silence by Van Elferen and myself proved to be less suitable for the analysis of silence in film because, in accordance with the five different forms of silence we put forward, silence in the sound film is always a virtual silence. It is a silence completely engendered through technology. This brings with it problems and restrictions regarding nomenclature and comprehension.

The medium of film can create and use metaphorical silence, actual silence, virtual silence in the film itself, and silence by negation. These silences would always be, for example, virtual actual, or virtual silence by negation. Applying these forms of silence in analysis creates complex compositions, as in the example of *Blade Runner* with its metaphorical virtual actual silence and metaphorical virtual silence by negation (see Chapter 1, §The theory in practice, pp. 34-35). The use of these forms of

silence in analysis is perfectly feasible, but it can result in an overly specific categorisation that runs the risk of being too narrow and subjective to contribute to a larger discussion on filmic silence.

Choosing the right tool, or in this case term, for the job is a reccurring problem in the scholarly work on silence in film. Nobody seems to agree on what exactly silence in the soundtrack is and authors subsequently invent and use their own terms to discuss their analyses of silence. An overview of the terms put forward by different authors illustrates this problem of nomenclature: silence can be interrupted speech flow, wordless silence, empty silence, reflexive silence, diegetic musical silence, nondiegetic silence, structural silence, generic silence, relative silence, diegetic silence, musical silence, and dialogue silence.

These multiple terms and classifications are quite confusing. Some of these concepts are subjective, others are counterintuitive, and all of them presume an ideal and apparently passive listener. Another troublesome problem with these terms, aside from their subjective nature, is that they are, for the most part, solely focused on meaningful silence. Silence, in these cases, is always metaphorical. It always *means* something.

The problem of silence and meaning is complex. The title of this thesis, “never a neutral emptiness”, is taken from the quote by Michel Chion that also features in the beginning of chapter 3 (p. 83). Silence, like all parts of the soundtrack, is a deliberate choice by the filmmakers. This does not, however, automatically infuse silence with meaning. The use of the terms above is problematic because the possibility of a meaningless silence or the spectator’s role in creating meaning or experiencing silence are excluded in advance. The process of the spectator’s immersion in and interpretation of silence is crucial to an analysis of silence, as the later chapters on theory show. These theories can get quite complex so clear and concise terms are needed to avoid confusion.

To avoid problems of subjectivity and ambiguous definitions, I propose three terms of my own to denote different silences. These silences can be identified rather objectively, they do not possess a priori connotations, and they are broadly applicable. These three silences are diegetic silence, non-diegetic silence, and complete silence.

The terms I propose are derived from the two distinctive layers of the soundtrack: the diegetic layer, which includes all sounds from the narrative world of the film; and the non-diegetic layer, which includes all sounds that do not originate

from this narrative world (the musical score is often non-diegetic). Diegetic silence, then, is silence of the diegetic layer. It is the absence of all sounds that originate in the world of the film. Conversely, non-diegetic silence is the absence of all sound from outside the world of the film. Complete silence is the absence of all sound of the film. These three silences together capture nearly every use of silence in film.

The sole exception to the applicability of these three silences occurs when the whole of the film is (seemingly) silenced. This only occurs in extremely rare situations that benefit more from case-by-case analyses than from the invention of yet another umbrella term or a misleading description of these cases as diegetic silence (cf. Chapter 3, §Silence of the film itself, pp. 106-107; and Chapter 5, §Example analysis: *Legion*, pp. 169-171). Aside from these special cases, the three terms I put forward are broadly applicable.

Restricting the discussion to diegetic, non-diegetic, and complete silence has some important advantages over choosing all too specific or subjective terms. First, these terms are relatively neutral, in particular when compared to the myriad other options mentioned above. These three terms only describe the timing of silence's occurrence in the soundtrack and they do not presuppose any meaning or function. They can be applied to all genres and films, and they can be transposed to analyse the use of silence in television. Second, these three silences are concise. Their simplicity does not hamper complex theoretical applications. On the contrary, this simplicity actually facilitates discussion. These terms are easy to understand and do not distract the scholar or reader needlessly when paired with other, more complex, theories. Third, the three silences I put forward automatically invite an analysis of silence in its context. These silence are general terms that do not indicate meaning or function. As such they reflect the manner in which silence builds on other parts of the film and even on the spectator to create meaningful or affective relations (see Chapter 3, §The semiotics of silence, pp. 96-103; and Chapter 4, §Folds between folds, pp. 120-121).

Silence consists of complex contextual relations, and the clear and concise terms of diegetic, non-diegetic, and complete silence allow us to focus on theory, application, and analysis rather than on questions of denomination. First, however, it is necessary to understand how these three silences are used in film. Once we understand how silence is used, it becomes possible to create a framework for its analysis. Chapter 2 describes the use of silence throughout Hollywood's history. I necessarily restrict this analysis of silence's history to mainstream Hollywood films to limit the scope of this

thesis at least somewhat, and to understand how most Westernised audiences encounter silence.

2. What is the history of silence in film?

The specific question on which the second part of this thesis focuses, is how silence, i.e., the three types of silence put forward above, is used in mainstream Hollywood sound films from its earliest successes until the present day. The corpus of films on which this history is primarily based consists of thirty-seven films from 1927 until 2017. There are sound films produced before 1927 (see Introduction, §Early sound film history, pp. 5-7), but none of these experiments are really successful. The history of silence, as described in chapter 2, starts in 1927 with the success of *The Jazz Singer*.

Lacking an overview or systematic understanding of how silence is used in film, chapter two sets out to describe the use of silence throughout the history of the Hollywood sound film. This history largely follows the history of sound technology until 1977. There are temporary trends that stand out in this period, such as the use of punch line silence or the influence of portable sound recorders. The portable recorders initially give rise to an increased use of silence to portray natural quietude. Soon, however, Foley post-production sounds are implemented to fill these sonorous voids. The release of *Star Wars* in 1977 is not nearly as important for silence as it was for the soundtrack and the implementation of Dolby sound. The real revolution in the use of silence begins two decades later when digital editing brings with it new and unprecedented uses of silence from the 1990s onwards. *Saving Private Ryan* in particular is notable for popularising the use of subjective sound and subjective silence.

The history of silence and its three neutral denotations help to elucidate how and where silence is used in film, but this is only part of the story of silence. The use of the three definitions of silence in analysis immediately begs a follow-up question. These concepts can indicate where silence is used in the structure of a film, but subsequently rely on contextual analysis to understand how meaning and affect can be created in different situations. Silence can vary in meaning and affect from film to film and from spectator to spectator. The second part of this thesis then focuses on the analysis of silence. How can spectators create different meanings and experience varying emotions through the same basic concepts, and how can this be analysed?

3. A theoretical framework for the analysis of silence in film

The second half of this thesis is itself divided into three parts. These correspond to core questions regarding the experience of silence. Chapter 3 discusses the first obvious question: how is meaning created through silence? The process of meaning creation is analysed with Peircean semiotics and a conceptualisation of silence as a zero-form signifier, which is a sign that only exists in its contextual relations. The use of semiotics serves as an antidote to the vague and arbitrary descriptions of silence in chapter 1, as well as to the danger of slipping back into such descriptions in the later chapters. Semiotics only explains part of the experience of silence, namely the rational interpretation of silence as a sign-vehicle for something else. It cannot explain how silence can unconsciously affect us, create emotional responses, or direct our attention.

This affective experience of silence is discussed in chapter 4. An analysis of the affective process explains how silence works as a pure functionality, bringing the film and the spectator closer together and guiding the spectator into a desired point of view on the film. Silence acts as a mediator between the folds of the film and the folds of the spectator; it brings together the ongoing film, the spectator's internalisation thereof and subsequent projection back unto the film. The rational interpretation of silence, i.e., the semiotic analysis, is the end stage of the affective process. This is not as clear cut as it sounds, however, because this falsely indicates a cause and effect analysis. The unconscious experience and the rational interpretation are almost opposed approaches to analysis, but they can be combined in an analysis of the temporal experience of silence.

Chapter 5 discusses this temporality of silence, the time of its event. To understand how the affective process combines with semiotic interpretation it is necessary to analyse how a spectator experiences silence in the ongoing event of watching a film, simultaneously open to affective experience and interpreting this experience rationally whilst undergoing new affective experiences as the film continues unrelentingly. Bergson's model of duration elucidates how spectators experience an affective and rational reality at the same time.

The semiotics of silence

How do we derive meaning from silence? Silence in itself is usually defined in terms of what it is not. It is an absence of sound, a sort of emptiness. By borrowing a term

from linguistics (the zero-form signifier), it is possible to theorise how silence creates meaning in film (see Chapter 3, §The semiotics of silence, pp. 96-103). A zero signifier has no materiality in itself but it draws upon the presence of other signifiers.

Silence as a zero signifier also helps to explain its ambiguity. It can mean different things in different films. Its meaning often depends on its function, which varies with context, but this does not mean that silence always has a function or that its function is always related to meaning. It can be used to express the erasure of time and space, announce impending doom or death, show personal or fantastical points of view, or simply to allow the audience to hear dialogue.

A semiotic analysis of silence expresses only a part of the filmic experience of silence. Semiotic analysis alone runs the risk of finding too much correlation in what Walter Benjamin called the conscious exploration of film (see Chapter 1, §The problem of meaning attribution, pp. 31-32). If spectators search for meaning, they are bound to find it. The ongoing experience of silence in film, or how an audience engages with and is affected by the film it is watching, is explored in the fourth chapter as a necessary supplement to the semiotic approach.

The affect of silence

The affect of silence can be described as the process of folding contextual force-encounters and the point-of-view of a subject, which is conditioned by a film but also folds with that subject's own neuro-physiological body and socio-cultural background. Silence is a mediator between folds. The different backgrounds and experiences of a spectator and the film as it proceeds are all folds, infinite variabilities that continue to change whilst watching the film. As a mediator between these folds silence can have a very peculiar function, a single and unique concept that has no form but only functionality. It can shape the audience's point of view, conditioning it into a desired state of receptiveness. Silence often functions as a culmination point for the affective process, bringing together the unconsciously accumulating affect and the spectator into a point of view shaped by the film.

This shaping of the spectator's point of view and accumulation of affect help to explain how audiences can recognise tropes and clichés even without consciously interpreting silence as such, as would be the case in semiotic discussions of clichés. If silence is used time and again to evoke the same point of view, audiences can recognise

these applications of silence even unconsciously. The ominous silence heralding impending doom is not only a semiotic relation, but also very much an affective one.

This also shows how affect and semiotics are inseparable parts of the experience. They are wholly different in their theoretical approach, analysis, and discussion of silence, and yet both are incomplete without one another. The last chapter helps to explain why and how the rational and affective interpretations and experiences of silence are intrinsically linked in the spectator experience of film. The key to understanding how both combine lies in understanding the experience of film, and silence in film, as temporal, as an ongoing experience of an interpreted reality created by film.

The temporality of silence

The simultaneous experience of actual and virtual time explains how affect and semiotic interpretation can occur at the same time. The affective process takes place in actual time whereas semiotic interpretation is a part of virtual time. This is an important distinction because if we only live and experience through rational interpretation, our actual experience of the present ends. Bergson always advocated for an increased focus on the actual rather than to live in the dominance of the virtual. The same is true for analysis. The symbolic representation in spatialised time is the inverse relation of our mind with reality. Spatialised time is a projection, a virtual representation of our ongoing experience. Our experience of time and reality is ever-flowing, ever continuing. The same is true of film and this is a crucial point in understanding our experience of film and silence in film.

Movement is the essence of film and it allows the medium to create its own time. Film creates its own reality due to this core feature, due to its movement in time. The ongoing film time becomes a new reality, a new actual, affective experience. Spectators immerse themselves in this new reality, in film's time, with a willing suspension of disbelief. We experience film close to Bergson's absolute experience of time, only attentive to the ongoing experience, to the flow of film, by placing ourselves willingly in film time and allowing it to become our new actual experience.

Rational interpretation or spatialised thinking is the inverse relation of our mind with this new reality. It is the interpretation and comparison of scenes as separate entities, signs of what might be. It is easy to get lost in this inverse relation, as Benjamin forewarns: in the conscious exploration of film there lies a real danger of

reading too much into the film, interpreting relations as clear quantitative indicators while perhaps in our actual experience these relations only remained qualitative experiences. The analysis of our experience of film should not run counter to our relation with the new filmic reality, but rather start from where we experience film: from within the film's time, as an actual ongoing experience.

This dual experience of time also explains how prolonged silence can disrupt our experience: our willing suspension of disbelief is tested. A prolonged or inappropriate silence threatens to displace us from film's time back into our own time by shutting down one of the crucial parts that make up a film, i.e., sound. We are forced to focus on other aspects of the film in order to stay engrossed within the film, to preserve our willing suspension of disbelief and to accept the film's time as our actual experience.

The analysis of silence in film can only be complete by focusing on the simultaneous experiences of filmic time. This starts from within the affective process, from within the ongoing film time, and subsequently it is possible to analyse how we understand this film time as it is filtered through our memory in the spatialised time of semiotic interpretation. We experience film in two minds, and an analysis needs both aspects to be complete.

Epilogue

The study of silence in film is far from finished with this thesis. I have only analysed silence in mainstream Hollywood films, because the analysis of avant-garde or outlying uses of silence cannot serve as a basis towards a general understanding of silence. Imagine, for example, this thesis with only conclusions drawn from examples of punch line silence. This would in all likelihood result in a completely different approach to defining and analysing silence. The history and the many uses and examples of silence that are described and analysed throughout this thesis can serve as a basis for comparison with less mainstream or non-Western uses of silence.

This thesis enables an answer to the original question that started it all: what is filmic silence? The answer is not an easy one, but it can provide a closed ending to the open-ended concept of silence, as it places it in relation to its context and narrows down its affect, meaning, function, and experience.

Simplified in the extreme, silence in film is the absence of sound in either the diegetic or non-diegetic layer of the soundtrack, or a complete absence of all sounds in the film that can be analysed by starting from the spectator's experience thereof in the film, i.e., by analysing how this silence serves to intensify affect and shape the spectator's point of view. It can be simultaneously rationally interpreted as a sign, and the affective and rational experiences of silence are internalised and projected back unto the film through the spectator's memory, continuously prolonging experiences into duration.

The analysis of the film experience as Bergson's idea of the absolute experience of time is certainly not revolutionary. The application of Bergson's ideas in a theoretical framework to analyse silence is innovative, however, and it immediately shows how an analysis of silence needs to include both the semiotic and the affective experience. The similarities between the semiotic and affective discussions of silence in chapters 3 and 4 are obvious. The zero-form signifier is a mediator between different contexts, folding with both signs and affect in the film and the spectator's willing suspension of disbelief that places them in the film as an active participant rather than outside the film as an onlooker.

This approach to analysing silence requires a description of silence as three clear and concise concepts rather than the counterintuitive or contradictory terms so often proposed and used. These terms make up the robust foundation on which analysis can be built, deterring arbitrary and vague concepts that only serve as transcendental choices to prove an argument. The analysis of how these three incisive types of silence are used throughout the sound film's history shows that silence has its own aesthetic, stylistic, and functional traditions that are not necessary related to the societal trends and changing aesthetics of music and sound. The history of silence as described in chapter 2 marks a first step towards understanding these traditions.

Silence is influenced more by money and technology than by musical or sonorous trends. In a way, the history of silence is also a history of sound technology and of possibility. There can be new and creative uses of silence that eventually become part of Hollywood's standard practice; as sound technology evolves, so will silence – at least, as long as it remains profitable.

Appendix

Empirical data for *The Jazz Singer* and the thirty-six sound films that make up the corpus. Preceded by four tables comparing the different silences.

See Chapter 1, §Defining silence for analysis, pp. 36-37, for an explanation of the three types of silence.

See Chapter 1, §When is silence (non-)diegetic?, pp. 37-39, for more information on the empirical analyses.

The 36 sound films

1931 Frankenstein
1933 King Kong
1935 A Night at the Opera
1939 Gone with the Wind
1941 Citizen Kane
1941 The Maltese Falcon
1944 The Miracle of Morgan's Creek
1948 Abbott and Costello Meet Frankenstein
1950 Sunset Blvd
1954 On the Waterfront
1956 The Searchers
1958 Vertigo
1962 Lawrence of Arabia
1967 The Graduate
1968 2001: A Space Odyssey
1970 MASH
1972 The Godfather
1973 The Exorcist
1974 Chinatown
1977 Star Wars
1980 Raging Bull
1980 The Shining
1981 Raiders of the Lost Ark
1982 Blade Runner (Final Cut)
1987 Moonstruck
1990 Goodfellas
1991 The Silence of the Lambs
1993 Schindler's List
1998 Saving Private Ryan
2001 The Fellowship of the Ring
2002 Road to Perdition
2007 There Will Be Blood
2009 Drag Me to Hell
2012 Skyfall
2014 Interstellar
2017 Logan Lucky


Overview of silence percentages
Complete silence
Non-Diegetic silence
Diegetic silence
100.00%
90.00%
80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
Frankenstein
King Kong
A Night at the Opera
Gone with the Wind
The Maltese Falcon
Citizen Kane
The Miracle of Morgan's Creek
Abbott and Costello Meet Frankenstein
Sunset Blvd
On the Waterfront
The Searchers
Vertigo
Lawrence of Arabia
The Graduate
2001: A Space Odyssey
MASH
The Godfather
The Exorcist
Chinatown
Star Wars
Raging Bull
The Shining
Raiders of the Lost Ark
Blade Runner (Final Cut)
Moonstruck
Goodfellas
The Silence of the Lambs
Schindler's List
Saving Private Ryan
The Fellowship of the Ring
Road to Perdition
There Will Be Blood
Drag Me To Hell
Skyfall
Interstellar
Logan Lucky


Comparison of complete silence percentages
Percentage of complete silence
Median
4.50%
4.00%
3.50%
3.00%
2.50%
2.00%
1.50%
1.00%
0.50%
0.00%
Frankenstein
King Kong
A Night at the Opera
Gone with the Wind
The Maltese Falcon
Citizen Kane
The Miracle of Morgan's Creek
Abbott and Costello Meet Frankenstein
Sunset Blvd
On the Waterfront
The Searchers
Vertigo
Lawrence of Arabia
The Graduate
2001: A Space Odyssey
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The Exorcist
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Star Wars
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The Silence of the Lambs
Schindler's List
Saving Private Ryan
The Fellowship of the Ring
Road to Perdition
There Will Be Blood
Drag Me To Hell
Skyfall
Interstellar
Logan Lucky


Comparison of non-diegetic silence percentages
Percentage of non-diegetic silence
Median
100.00%
90.00%
80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
Frankenstein
King Kong
A Night at the Opera
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
Comparison of diegetic silence percentages
Percentage of diegetic silence
Median
25.00%
20.00%
15.00%
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%
Frankenstein
King Kong
A Night at the Opera
Gone with the Wind
The Maltese Falcon
Citizen Kane
The Miracle of Morgan's Creek
Abbott and Costello Meet Frankenstein
Sunset Blvd
On the Waterfront
The Searchers
Vertigo
Lawrence of Arabia
The Graduate
2001: A Space Odyssey
MASH
The Godfather
The Exorcist
Chinatown
Star Wars
Raging Bull
The Shining
Raiders of the Lost Ark
Blade Runner (Final Cut)
Moonstruck
Goodfellas
The Silence of the Lambs
Schindler's List
Saving Private Ryan
The Fellowship of the Ring
Road to Perdition
There Will Be Blood
Drag Me To Hell
Skyfall
Interstellar
Logan Lucky

The Jazz Singer

Directed by Alan Crosland
Burbank: Warner Bros., 1927

Complete			**Non-diegetic**			**Diegetic**		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
00:44:06	00:44:12	00:00:06			00:00:00			00:00:00
00:46:58	00:47:18	00:00:20			00:00:00			00:00:00
01:28:04	01:28:08	00:00:04			00:00:00			00:00:00
01:33:24	01:33:28	00:00:04			00:00:00			00:00:00
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:34	Runtime:	1:36:15
Non-diegetic silences:	0:00:00	Start of diegesis:	0:05:32
Diegetic silences:	0:00:00	End of diegesis:	1:33:28

1. *Frankenstein*

Directed by James Whale
Universal City: Universal Pictures, 1931

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00	0:0:0	0:1:01	00:01:01			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:01:01	0:02:03	00:01:02
		00:00:00	0:2:03	0:6:40	00:04:37			00:00:00
0:6:40	0:6:49	00:00:09			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:6:49	0:9:22	00:02:33			00:00:00
0:9:22	0:9:29	00:00:07			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:9:29	0:14:08	00:04:39			00:00:00
0:14:08	0:14:10	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:14:10	0:25:21	00:11:11			00:00:00
0:25:21	0:25:26	00:00:05			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:25:26	0:31:15	00:05:49			00:00:00
0:31:15	0:31:19	00:00:04			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:31:19	0:32:07	00:00:48			00:00:00
0:32:07	0:32:45	00:00:38			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:32:45	0:35:21	00:02:36			00:00:00
0:35:21	0:35:25	00:00:04			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:35:25	0:41:58	00:06:33			00:00:00
0:41:58	0:42:12	00:00:14			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:42:12	0:42:16	00:00:04			00:00:00
0:42:16	0:42:34	00:00:18			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:42:34	0:43:01	00:00:27			00:00:00
0:43:01	0:43:16	00:00:15			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:43:16	1:09:07	00:25:51			00:00:00
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:01:56	Runtime:	1:10:10
Non-diegetic silences:	1:06:09	Start of diegesis:	0:00:00
Diegetic silences:	0:01:02	End of diegesis:	1:09:07

2. *King Kong*

Directed by Merian C. Cooper and Ernest B. Schoedsack
New York City: RKO Pictures, 1933

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:01:32	00:01:57	00:00:25
		00:00:00	00:02:13	00:20:40	00:18:27			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:27:46	00:28:15	00:00:29			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:28:49	00:28:52	00:00:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:29:00	00:29:02	00:00:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:31:04	00:31:06	00:00:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:33:28	00:33:31	00:00:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:35:02	00:37:50	00:02:48			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:41:33	00:42:18	00:00:45			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:45:17	00:45:41	00:00:24
		00:00:00	00:46:13	00:46:16	00:00:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:53:51	00:53:55	00:00:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:56:14	00:56:17	00:00:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:57:58	01:00:44	00:02:46			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:12:46	01:13:30	00:00:44
		00:00:00	01:14:14	01:14:41	00:00:27			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:20:03	01:20:21	00:00:18			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:20:21	01:20:38	00:00:17
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:20:50	01:20:59	00:00:09
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:23:08	01:23:14	00:00:06
		00:00:00	01:23:20	01:24:09	00:00:49			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:24:09	01:24:25	00:00:16
		00:00:00	01:24:25	01:24:33	00:00:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:24:42	01:24:59	00:00:17			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:25:09	01:26:05	00:00:56			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:32:45	01:33:16	00:00:31			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:33:28	01:33:47	00:00:19
		00:00:00	01:34:02	01:34:25	00:00:23			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:35:18	01:37:19	00:02:01			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:37:19	01:37:56	00:00:37
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:38:24	01:38:39	00:00:15
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:00	Runtime:	1:40:03
Non-diegetic silences:	0:31:25	Start of diegesis:	0:01:32
Diegetic silences:	0:03:32	End of diegesis:	1:39:40

3. A Night at the Opera

Directed by Sam Wood
Beverly Hills: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1935

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00	00:01:28	00:03:43	00:02:15			00:00:00
00:03:43	00:03:45	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:03:45	00:03:51	00:00:06			00:00:00
00:03:51	00:03:53	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
00:04:43	00:04:45	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:04:45	00:04:47	00:00:02
		00:00:00	00:05:06	00:05:56	00:00:50			00:00:00
00:05:56	00:06:00	00:00:04			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:06:00	00:13:35	00:07:35			00:00:00
00:13:35	00:13:51	00:00:16			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:13:51	00:14:36	00:00:45			00:00:00
00:14:36	00:14:38	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:14:38	00:14:59	00:00:21			00:00:00
00:14:59	00:15:02	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:15:02	00:16:03	00:01:01			00:00:00
00:16:03	00:16:06	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:16:06	00:16:34	00:00:28			00:00:00
00:16:34	00:16:37	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:16:37	00:17:26	00:00:49			00:00:00
00:17:26	00:17:30	00:00:04			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:17:30	00:20:29	00:02:59			00:00:00
00:20:29	00:20:30	00:00:01			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:20:30	00:20:39	00:00:09
		00:00:00	00:20:39	00:27:22	00:06:43			00:00:00
00:27:22	00:27:25	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:27:25	00:28:28	00:01:03			00:00:00
00:28:28	00:28:31	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:28:31	00:29:36	00:01:05			00:00:00
00:29:36	00:29:38	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:29:38	00:29:40	00:00:02			00:00:00
00:29:40	00:29:43	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:29:43	00:33:21	00:03:38			00:00:00
00:33:21	00:33:23	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:33:23	00:37:16	00:03:53			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:37:32	00:46:32	00:09:00			00:00:00
00:46:32	00:46:37	00:00:05			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:46:37	00:51:26	00:04:49			00:00:00

		00:00:00	00:51:30	00:51:55	00:00:25			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:53:20	00:54:01	00:00:41
		00:00:00	00:54:17	00:56:01	00:01:44			00:00:00
00:56:01	00:56:03	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:56:03	00:57:11	00:01:08			00:00:00
00:57:11	00:57:14	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:57:14	00:57:51	00:00:37			00:00:00
00:57:51	00:57:54	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:57:54	00:58:01	00:00:07			00:00:00
00:58:01	00:58:08	00:00:07			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:58:08	00:59:04	00:00:56			00:00:00
00:59:04	00:59:10	00:00:06			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:59:10	01:03:03	00:03:53			00:00:00
01:03:03	01:03:05	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:03:05	01:03:41	00:00:36			00:00:00
01:03:41	01:03:43	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:03:43	01:05:04	00:01:21			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:05:51	01:09:02	00:03:11			00:00:00
01:09:02	01:09:05	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:09:05	01:09:36	00:00:31			00:00:00
01:09:36	01:09:41	00:00:05			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:09:41	01:11:18	00:01:37			00:00:00
01:11:18	01:11:20	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:11:20	01:30:59	00:19:39			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:30:59	01:31:01	00:00:02
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:01:35	Runtime:	1:31:11
Non-diegetic silences:	1:23:07	Start of diegesis:	0:01:27
Diegetic silences:	0:00:54	End of diegesis:	1:31:01

4. Gone with the Wind

Directed by Victor Fleming
Beverly Hills: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1939 (Originally Culver City: Selznick International Pictures)

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:03:04	00:06:47	00:03:43
		00:00:00	00:08:55	00:09:20	00:00:25			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:12:24	00:12:43	00:00:19
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:25:04	00:25:31	00:00:27
		00:00:00	00:26:14	00:27:45	00:01:31			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:31:22	00:32:44	00:01:22			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:35:40	00:36:00	00:00:20
		00:00:00	00:36:17	00:38:08	00:01:51			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:39:10	00:40:10	00:01:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:42:22	00:44:15	00:01:53			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:45:34	00:45:49	00:00:15
		00:00:00	00:46:03	00:48:43	00:02:40			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:48:48	00:49:14	00:00:26
		00:00:00	00:49:42	00:52:01	00:02:19			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:52:01	00:52:11	00:00:10
		00:00:00	00:52:11	00:53:13	00:01:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:58:42	00:59:00	00:00:18
		00:00:00	01:00:03	01:10:24	00:10:21			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:11:08	01:11:29	00:00:21			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:13:10	01:15:14	00:02:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:16:15	01:18:22	00:02:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:18:53	01:20:55	00:02:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:31:45	01:33:20	00:01:35			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:37:59	01:38:04	00:00:05			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:42:05	01:42:38	00:00:33
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:43:44	01:44:10	00:00:26
01:44:10	01:44:15	00:00:05			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:44:15	01:50:05	00:05:50
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:50:42	01:50:55	00:00:13
		00:00:00	01:54:16	01:55:11	00:00:55			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:02:38	02:03:48	00:01:10			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:09:01	02:09:14	00:00:13
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:11:03	02:11:23	00:00:20
		00:00:00	02:11:23	02:22:21	00:10:58			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:22:29	02:22:39	00:00:10
		00:00:00	02:22:40	02:27:54	00:05:14			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:28:44	02:29:44	00:01:00			00:00:00

		00:00:00	02:32:11	02:42:52	00:10:41			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:46:13	02:53:10	00:06:57			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:57:19	02:59:08	00:01:49			00:00:00
		00:00:00	03:03:49	03:03:52	00:00:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00	03:03:08	03:08:46	00:05:38			00:00:00
		00:00:00	03:10:56	03:13:49	00:02:53			00:00:00
		00:00:00	03:14:31	03:16:55	00:02:24			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	03:18:42	03:18:53	00:00:11
		00:00:00	03:18:53	03:21:48	00:02:55			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	03:24:11	03:24:21	00:00:10
		00:00:00	03:24:22	03:26:26	00:02:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	03:48:27	03:48:42	00:00:15
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:05	Runtime:	3:53:00
Non-diegetic silences:	1:27:19	Start of diegesis:	0:03:04
Diegetic silences:	0:14:19	End of diegesis:	3:48:42

5. *Citizen Kane*

Directed by Orson Welles
New York City: RKO, 1941

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:00:34	00:02:09	00:01:35
00:02:09	00:02:15	00:00:06			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:02:15	00:02:33	00:00:18
		00:00:00	00:02:33	00:02:35	00:00:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:02:35	00:03:13	00:00:38
		00:00:00	00:03:13	00:14:27	00:11:14			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:14:38	00:17:15	00:02:37			00:00:00
00:17:15	00:17:19	00:00:04			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:17:19	00:17:28	00:00:09
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:18:35	00:19:05	00:00:30
		00:00:00	00:19:05	00:20:58	00:01:53			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:21:38	00:22:38	00:01:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:23:19	00:24:13	00:00:54			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:24:47	00:27:14	00:02:27			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:27:14	00:27:24	00:00:10
		00:00:00	00:27:25	00:29:42	00:02:17			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:29:48	00:32:59	00:03:11			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:33:01	00:33:08	00:00:07
		00:00:00	00:33:33	00:35:03	00:01:30			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:35:41	00:37:13	00:01:32			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:37:48	00:39:39	00:01:51			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:39:39	00:39:42	00:00:03
		00:00:00	00:40:42	00:46:25	00:05:43			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:46:51	00:47:36	00:00:45			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:48:04	00:49:23	00:01:19			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:49:23	00:49:35	00:00:12
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:53:53	00:54:07	00:00:14
		00:00:00	00:54:16	00:54:21	00:00:05			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:55:03	00:56:19	00:01:16			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:56:40	00:56:44	00:00:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:59:00	01:04:28	00:05:28			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:04:48	01:09:46	00:04:58			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:10:13	01:10:47	00:00:34			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:11:21	01:11:44	00:00:23			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:12:02	01:15:25	00:03:23			00:00:00
01:15:25	01:15:28	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:16:12	01:18:12	00:02:00			00:00:00

01:18:11	01:18:13	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:18:13	01:18:14	00:00:01			00:00:00
01:18:14	01:18:16	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:18:16	01:18:20	00:00:04			00:00:00
01:18:20	01:18:24	00:00:04			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:18:24	01:22:53	00:04:29			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:23:09	01:23:14	00:00:05			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:24:16	01:25:06	00:00:50			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:25:07	01:25:29	00:00:22
		00:00:00	01:25:33	01:34:38	00:09:05			00:00:00
01:34:38	01:34:46	00:00:08			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:34:46	01:35:26	00:00:40
		00:00:00	01:35:26	01:37:04	00:01:38			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:37:04	01:37:18	00:00:14
		00:00:00	01:37:54	01:38:13	00:00:19			00:00:00
01:38:13	01:38:20	00:00:07			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:38:20	01:38:29	00:00:09
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:40:13	01:40:41	00:00:28
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:41:44	01:41:54	00:00:10
		00:00:00	01:41:54	01:46:59	00:05:05			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:47:07	01:47:14	00:00:07
		00:00:00	01:47:15	01:48:16	00:01:01			00:00:00
01:48:16	01:48:37	00:00:21			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:48:37	01:50:15	00:01:38			00:00:00
01:50:15	01:50:22	00:00:07			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:50:22	01:50:23	00:00:01			00:00:00
01:50:23	01:50:31	00:00:08			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:50:31	01:50:37	00:00:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:51:30	01:54:42	00:03:12			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:54:52	01:55:48	00:00:56
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:56:02	01:57:03	00:01:01
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:01:12	Runtime:	1:59:24
Non-diegetic silences:	1:24:00	Start of diegesis:	0:00:34
Diegetic silences:	0:08:03	End of diegesis:	1:57:03

6. *The Maltese Falcon*

Directed by John Huston
Burbank: Warner Bros., 1941

Complete			**Non-diegetic**			**Diegetic**		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:00:57	00:01:40	00:00:43
		00:00:00	00:02:16	00:06:04	00:03:48			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:06:04	00:06:14	00:00:10
		00:00:00	00:08:38	00:09:49	00:01:11			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:11:04	00:13:20	00:02:16			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:13:20	00:13:34	00:00:14
		00:00:00	00:15:25	00:16:52	00:01:27			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:17:28	00:21:47	00:04:19			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:23:53	00:25:01	00:01:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:26:53	00:28:50	00:01:57			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:30:23	00:32:21	00:01:58			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:34:00	00:36:32	00:02:32			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:36:59	00:41:25	00:04:26			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:44:10	00:44:20	00:00:10
		00:00:00	00:44:20	00:49:14	00:04:54			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:51:41	00:54:57	00:03:16			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:54:57	00:55:20	00:00:23
		00:00:00	00:55:22	00:56:36	00:01:14			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:57:27	01:02:43	00:05:16			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:05:54	01:05:58	00:00:04
		00:00:00	01:06:00	01:06:58	00:00:58			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:12:53	01:14:23	00:01:30			00:00:00
01:14:23	01:14:28	00:00:05			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:14:28	01:18:26	00:03:58			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:19:12	01:22:46	00:03:34			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:22:53	01:23:05	00:00:12
		00:00:00	01:23:22	01:25:37	00:02:15			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:28:54	01:30:18	00:01:24			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:32:37	01:34:35	00:01:58			00:00:00
01:34:35	01:34:39	00:00:04			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:34:39	01:35:09	00:00:30			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:38:24	01:38:58	00:00:34			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:39:42	01:39:48	00:00:06
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:09	Runtime:	1:40:33
Non-diegetic silences:	0:56:23	Start of diegesis:	0:00:57
Diegetic silences:	0:02:02	End of diegesis:	1:39:48

7. *The Miracle of Morgan's Creek*

Directed by Preston Sturges
Hollywood: Paramount Pictures, 1944

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:00:21	00:01:13	00:00:52
		00:00:00	00:01:13	00:05:31	00:04:18			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:07:05	00:09:57	00:02:52			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:11:21	00:12:13	00:00:52			00:00:00
00:12:13	00:12:15	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:12:15	00:19:27	00:07:12			00:00:00
00:19:50	00:19:52	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:20:07	00:22:39	00:02:32			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:22:04	00:24:50	00:02:46			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:24:57	00:26:18	00:01:21			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:26:40	00:26:43	00:00:03
		00:00:00			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:27:07	00:28:11	00:01:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:29:32	00:30:40	00:01:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:31:15	00:32:41	00:01:26			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:32:44	00:33:25	00:00:41			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:35:30	00:36:13	00:00:43			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:37:46	00:37:50	00:00:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:38:52	00:46:14	00:07:22			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:47:59	00:49:54	00:01:55			00:00:00
00:49:54	00:49:56	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:49:56	00:50:26	00:00:30			00:00:00
00:50:26	00:50:30	00:00:04			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:50:30	00:52:07	00:01:37			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:52:07	00:52:12	00:00:05
		00:00:00	00:52:25	00:54:46	00:02:21			00:00:00
00:54:46	00:54:48	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:54:48	00:56:59	00:02:11			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:57:32	01:00:49	00:03:17			00:00:00
01:00:49	01:00:50	00:00:01			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:00:50	01:00:55	00:00:05
		00:00:00	01:01:32	01:10:11	00:08:39			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:10:26	01:10:34	00:00:08
		00:00:00	01:10:34	01:11:17	00:00:43			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:11:44	01:13:00	00:01:16			00:00:00
01:13:00	01:13:03	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:13:03	01:15:21	00:02:18			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:15:21	01:15:25	00:00:04

		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:15:28	01:15:33	00:00:05
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:19:02	01:19:04	00:00:02
		00:00:00	01:19:10	01:19:39	00:00:29			00:00:00
01:19:39	01:19:41	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:19:41	01:19:45	00:00:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:19:52	01:20:06	00:00:14
		00:00:00	01:20:08	01:21:53	00:01:45			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:21:55	01:22:06	00:00:11
		00:00:00	01:23:20	01:27:59	00:04:39			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:29:01	01:29:12	00:00:11
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:30:45	01:30:52	00:00:07
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:30:09	01:30:14	00:00:05
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:31:32	01:31:44	00:00:12
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:32:16	01:32:38	00:00:22
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:32:45	01:32:49	00:00:04
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:33:21	01:33:27	00:00:06
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:34:48	01:35:06	00:00:18
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:35:07	01:35:17	00:00:10
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:35:18	01:35:42	00:00:24
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:36:48	01:37:00	00:00:12
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:37:14	01:37:20	00:00:06
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:38:15	01:38:27	00:00:12
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:18	Runtime:	1:38:31
Non-diegetic silences:	1:06:05	Start of diegesis:	0:00:07
Diegetic silences:	0:04:18	End of diegesis:	1:38:28

8. *Abbott and Costello Meet Frankenstein*

Directed by Charles Barton
Universal City: Universal Pictures, 1948

Complete			Nondiegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00	00:02:23	00:05:04	00:02:41			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:05:17	00:05:30	00:00:13
		00:00:00	00:06:02	00:08:58	00:02:56			00:00:00
00:08:58	00:09:01	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:09:01	00:09:06	00:00:05			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:10:12	00:12:39	00:02:27			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:13:03	00:13:08	00:00:05
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:15:01	00:15:08	00:00:07
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:19:27	00:19:31	00:00:04
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:19:32	00:19:39	00:00:07
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:19:40	00:19:50	00:00:10
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:20:04	00:20:28	00:00:24
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:20:35	00:20:44	00:00:09
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:20:51	00:21:10	00:00:19
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:21:13	00:21:23	00:00:10
		00:00:00	00:22:32	00:23:04	00:00:32			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:23:22	00:24:08	00:00:46
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:24:13	00:24:16	00:00:03
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:25:06	00:25:13	00:00:07
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:26:36	00:26:39	00:00:03
		00:00:00	00:26:39	00:30:46	00:04:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:32:21	00:32:48	00:00:27			00:00:00
00:32:48	00:32:50	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:32:50	00:43:46	00:10:56			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:46:32	00:46:56	00:00:24			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:47:46	00:48:36	00:00:50			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:48:36	00:48:48	00:00:12
		00:00:00	00:49:37	00:50:45	00:01:08			00:00:00
00:50:45	00:50:49	00:00:04			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:50:49	00:51:56	00:01:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:53:11	00:53:24	00:00:13
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:53:29	00:53:39	00:00:10
		00:00:00	00:53:39	00:59:19	00:05:40			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:59:23	00:59:39	00:00:16
		00:00:00	00:59:42	01:00:42	00:01:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:00:57	01:01:05	00:00:08
		00:00:00	01:02:30	01:03:27	00:00:57			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:03:47	01:03:52	00:00:05

		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:03:53	01:03:59	00:00:06
		00:00:00	01:04:58	01:05:04	00:00:06			00:00:00
01:05:04	01:05:05	00:00:01			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:06:08	01:06:16	00:00:08
		00:00:00	01:06:42	01:10:07	00:03:25			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:11:40	01:13:08	00:01:28			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:13:34	01:13:41	00:00:07
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:13:43	01:14:02	00:00:19
		00:00:00	01:14:21	01:15:08	00:00:47			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:19:31	01:19:35	00:00:04
Complete			Nondiegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:10	Runtime:	1:22:48
Non-diegetic silences:	0:41:03	Start of diegesis:	0:01:33
Diegetic silences:	0:04:35	End of diegesis:	1:22:20

9. Sunset Blvd

Directed by Billy Wilder
Hollywood: Paramount Pictures, 1950

Complete			**Non-diegetic**			**Diegetic**		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:00:05	00:01:24	00:01:19
		00:00:00	00:03:23	00:04:10	00:00:47			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:05:14	00:08:10	00:02:56			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:09:06	00:09:50	00:00:44			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:10:31	00:10:36	00:00:05			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:12:53	00:13:05	00:00:12			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:14:07	00:14:09	00:00:02			00:00:00
00:14:09	00:14:16	00:00:07			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:15:22	00:15:34	00:00:12			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:16:15	00:17:35	00:01:20			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:18:01	00:19:11	00:01:10			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:21:19	00:22:40	00:01:21			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:23:22	00:24:15	00:00:53			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:25:32	00:25:41	00:00:09
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:25:47	00:25:54	00:00:07
		00:00:00	00:26:22	00:27:59	00:01:37			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:28:28	00:29:02	00:00:34			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:30:13	00:31:37	00:01:24			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:33:10	00:34:29	00:01:19			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:35:22	00:36:01	00:00:39			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:36:01	00:36:09	00:00:08
		00:00:00	00:37:47	00:37:50	00:00:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:39:32	00:49:54	00:10:22			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:52:28	00:52:41	00:00:13			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:53:25	00:53:30	00:00:05			00:00:00
00:53:30	00:53:40	00:00:10			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:53:40	00:53:44	00:00:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:54:01	00:55:35	00:01:34			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:56:56	00:58:15	00:01:19			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:00:29	01:01:25	00:00:56			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:02:14	01:06:04	00:03:50			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:08:34	01:08:39	00:00:05			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:08:58	01:12:12	00:03:14			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:12:42	01:14:48	00:02:06
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:13:09	01:13:39	00:00:30
		00:00:00	01:16:10	01:16:54	00:00:44			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:21:15	01:22:44	00:01:29			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:22:44	01:22:59	00:00:15

		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:23:56	01:24:03	00:00:07
		00:00:00	01:24:30	01:25:05	00:00:35			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:27:28	01:28:15	00:00:47			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:34:33	01:34:40	00:00:07
		00:00:00	01:38:36	01:38:41	00:00:05			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:40:26	01:41:29	00:01:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:44:16	01:44:19	00:00:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:45:01	01:45:18	00:00:17
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:17	Runtime:	1:45:46
Non-diegetic silences:	0:41:46	Start of diegesis:	0:00:05
Diegetic silences:	0:05:05	End of diegesis:	1:45:18

10. *On the Waterfront*

Directed by Elia Kazan
Culver City: Columbia Pictures, 1954

Complete			**Non-diegetic**			**Diegetic**		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:01:38	00:02:07	00:00:29
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:02:09	00:02:25	00:00:16
		00:00:00	00:03:35	00:11:19	00:07:44			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:12:20	00:17:26	00:05:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:18:19	00:24:33	00:06:14			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:26:28	00:29:36	00:03:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:31:19	00:33:28	00:02:09			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:34:18	00:35:35	00:01:17			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:37:48	00:42:05	00:04:17			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:43:41	00:56:30	00:12:49			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:57:15	00:57:41	00:00:26
		00:00:00	00:59:10	01:03:30	00:04:20			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:03:49	01:04:02	00:00:13
		00:00:00	01:04:42	01:10:07	00:05:25			00:00:00
01:10:07	01:10:08	00:00:01			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:10:08	01:10:17	00:00:09
		00:00:00	01:10:37	01:13:37	00:03:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:17:29	01:18:31	00:01:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:20:09	01:21:13	00:01:04
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:22:12	01:22:29	00:00:17
		00:00:00	01:22:29	01:24:43	00:02:14			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:26:19	01:26:50	00:00:31
		00:00:00	01:26:50	01:31:13	00:04:23			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:35:47	01:37:25	00:01:38			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:37:53	01:38:25	00:00:32			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:38:34	01:40:04	00:01:30			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:41:05	01:41:12	00:00:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:41:33	01:43:45	00:02:12			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:45:59	01:46:57	00:00:58
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:01	Runtime:	1:47:55
Non-diegetic silences:	1:09:07	Start of diegesis:	0:01:38
Diegetic silences:	0:04:23	End of diegesis:	1:47:35

11. The Searchers

Directed by John Ford
Burbank: Warner Bros., 1956

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:01:29	00:01:36	00:00:07
		00:00:00	00:03:23	00:04:33	00:01:10			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:07:38	00:08:24	00:00:46			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:09:18	00:13:09	00:03:51			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:14:55	00:16:52	00:01:57			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:17:13	00:17:17	00:00:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:19:08	00:19:28	00:00:20			00:00:00
00:19:28	00:19:31	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:19:31	00:20:47	00:01:16			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:22:38	00:24:03	00:01:25			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:25:43	00:27:03	00:01:20			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:27:23	00:30:01	00:02:38			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:34:56	00:34:59	00:00:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:35:00	00:35:02	00:00:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:35:56	00:36:53	00:00:57			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:37:55	00:38:16	00:00:21			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:39:14	00:40:11	00:00:57			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:40:29	00:41:28	00:00:59			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:42:06	00:42:16	00:00:10			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:44:55	00:45:15	00:00:20			00:00:00
00:45:15	00:45:19	00:00:04			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:46:09	00:53:26	00:07:17			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:54:15	00:56:59	00:02:44			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:58:23	00:58:26	00:00:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:58:57	00:59:11	00:00:14			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:59:19	01:01:36	00:02:17			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:02:09	01:02:51	00:00:42
		00:00:00	01:04:32	01:05:52	00:01:20			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:07:13	01:07:31	00:00:18			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:09:43	01:10:30	00:00:47			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:12:35	01:12:59	00:00:24			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:13:47	01:17:30	00:03:43			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:17:53	01:20:59	00:03:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:22:45	01:23:51	00:01:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:25:30	01:26:24	00:00:54			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:30:46	01:31:59	00:01:13			00:00:00
01:31:59	01:32:01	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00

		00:00:00	01:32:01	01:35:48	00:03:47			00:00:00
01:35:48	01:35:51	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:35:51	01:47:14	00:11:23			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:47:59	01:50:45	00:02:46			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:51:53	01:52:46	00:00:53			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:54:08	01:54:17	00:00:09			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:56:25	01:56:53	00:00:28			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:57:39	01:58:42	00:01:03
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:12	Runtime:	1:58:48
Non-diegetic silences:	1:03:38	Start of diegesis:	0:01:29
Diegetic silences:	0:01:52	End of diegesis:	1:58:42

12. Vertigo

Directed by Alfred Hitchcock
Hollywood: Paramount Pictures, 1958

Complete			**Non-diegetic**			**Diegetic**		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:03:25	00:03:30	00:00:05
		00:00:00	00:05:00	00:11:05	00:06:05			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:11:19	00:17:19	00:06:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:22:47	00:23:18	00:00:31			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:25:27	00:25:49	00:00:22			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:26:20	00:27:01	00:00:41
		00:00:00	00:27:41	00:28:05	00:00:24			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:29:29	00:31:06	00:01:37			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:32:22	00:37:51	00:05:29			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:38:20	00:40:26	00:02:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:41:02	00:41:06	00:00:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:44:45	00:45:21	00:00:36			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:48:11	00:52:24	00:04:13			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:55:27	00:56:56	00:01:29			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:57:55	00:58:12	00:00:17
		00:00:00	01:05:32	01:08:36	00:03:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:08:56	01:09:11	00:00:15			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:11:49	01:13:02	00:01:13
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:14:19	01:14:36	00:00:17
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:15:57	01:16:10	00:00:13
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:17:02	01:17:04	00:00:02
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:17:06	01:17:12	00:00:06
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:17:21	01:17:33	00:00:12
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:17:57	01:18:30	00:00:33
		00:00:00	01:18:41	01:23:31	00:04:50			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:23:48	01:25:33	00:01:45
		00:00:00	01:25:33	01:28:40	00:03:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:29:01	01:29:48	00:00:47
		00:00:00	01:30:05	01:30:23	00:00:18			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:31:47	01:32:02	00:00:15			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:33:45	01:38:10	00:04:25			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:38:10	01:39:11	00:01:01
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:39:22	01:39:56	00:00:34
		00:00:00	01:42:23	01:43:06	00:00:43			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:45:27	01:45:31	00:00:04
		00:00:00	01:46:04	01:50:47	00:04:43			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:52:07	01:52:24	00:00:17			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:55:32	01:57:32	00:02:00

<table>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>00:00:00</td><td>01:57:32</td><td>01:58:37</td><td>00:01:05</td><td></td><td></td><td>00:00:00</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>00:00:00</td><td></td><td></td><td>00:00:00</td><td>01:58:39</td><td>01:58:52</td><td>00:00:13</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>00:00:00</td><td></td><td></td><td>00:00:00</td><td>02:00:30</td><td>02:00:41</td><td>00:00:11</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>00:00:00</td><td>02:00:46</td><td>02:01:19</td><td>00:00:33</td><td></td><td></td><td>00:00:00</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>00:00:00</td><td>02:03:56</td><td>02:05:52</td><td>00:01:56</td><td></td><td></td><td>00:00:00</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td>00:00:00</td><td>02:07:36</td><td>02:07:44</td><td>00:00:08</td><td></td><td></td><td>00:00:00</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Complete</td><td colspan="3">Non-diegetic</td><td colspan="3">Diegetic</td></tr>
</table>

Complete silences:	0:00:00	Runtime:	2:08:26
Non-diegetic silences:	0:54:35	Start of diegesis:	0:03:25
Diegetic silences:	0:10:14	End of diegesis:	2:08:08

13. *Lawrence of Arabia*

Directed by David Lean
Culver City: Columbia Pictures, 1962 (Originally Horizon Pictures)

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		0:00:00			0:00:00	0:04:32	0:06:12	0:01:40
		0:00:00	0:06:12	0:17:44	0:11:32			0:00:00
		0:00:00			0:00:00	0:17:44	0:18:55	0:01:11
		0:00:00			0:00:00	0:19:25	0:20:20	0:00:55
		0:00:00			0:00:00	0:20:24	0:21:18	0:00:54
		0:00:00			0:00:00	0:22:04	0:22:16	0:00:12
		0:00:00			0:00:00	0:23:25	0:23:36	0:00:11
		0:00:00			0:00:00	0:25:48	0:26:03	0:00:15
		0:00:00			0:00:00	0:26:22	0:26:36	0:00:14
		0:00:00	0:26:38	0:34:47	0:08:09			0:00:00
0:30:13	0:30:14	0:00:01			0:00:00			0:00:00
		0:00:00			0:00:00	0:34:51	0:35:16	0:00:25
		0:00:00	0:35:32	0:35:39	0:00:07			0:00:00
0:35:39	0:35:46	0:00:07			0:00:00			0:00:00
		0:00:00	0:35:46	0:41:26	0:05:40			0:00:00
		0:00:00			0:00:00	0:41:26	0:41:40	0:00:14
		0:00:00	0:43:36	0:51:53	0:08:17			0:00:00
		0:00:00			0:00:00	0:54:35	0:54:55	0:00:20
		0:00:00	0:54:59	0:56:27	0:01:28			0:00:00
		0:00:00	0:56:34	0:57:43	0:01:09			0:00:00
		0:00:00			0:00:00	0:58:15	0:59:04	0:00:49
		0:00:00	0:59:05	1:01:41	0:02:36			0:00:00
		0:00:00			0:00:00	1:02:25	1:03:05	0:00:40
		0:00:00	1:04:30	1:05:05	0:00:35			0:00:00
		0:00:00			0:00:00	1:05:05	1:05:19	0:00:14
		0:00:00			0:00:00	1:06:30	1:07:15	0:00:45
1:07:15	1:07:20	0:00:05			0:00:00			0:00:00
		0:00:00	1:07:20	1:08:10	0:00:50			0:00:00
		0:00:00			0:00:00	1:08:10	1:08:23	0:00:13
		0:00:00			0:00:00	1:09:13	1:09:22	0:00:09
		0:00:00			0:00:00	1:10:00	1:10:08	0:00:08
		0:00:00	1:11:17	1:13:06	0:01:49			0:00:00
		0:00:00			0:00:00	1:13:50	1:14:05	0:00:15
		0:00:00			0:00:00	1:14:17	1:14:32	0:00:15
		0:00:00			0:00:00	1:15:15	1:15:21	0:00:06
		0:00:00			0:00:00	1:15:47	1:16:01	0:00:14
		0:00:00			0:00:00	1:16:17	1:16:21	0:00:04
		0:00:00	1:16:24	1:16:55	0:00:31			0:00:00
1:16:55	1:17:00	0:00:05			0:00:00			0:00:00
		0:00:00			0:00:00	1:17:12	1:17:24	0:00:12
		0:00:00			0:00:00	1:18:38	1:19:04	0:00:26
		0:00:00	1:19:04	1:19:26	0:00:22			0:00:00

		0:00:00			0:00:00	1:21:27	1:21:47	0:00:20
		0:00:00	1:22:56	1:33:15	0:10:19			0:00:00
		0:00:00			0:00:00	1:33:15	1:33:34	0:00:19
		0:00:00	1:35:12	1:39:46	0:04:34			0:00:00
		0:00:00	1:41:37	1:42:55	0:01:18			0:00:00
1:43:06	1:43:08	0:00:02			0:00:00			0:00:00
		0:00:00	1:43:08	1:48:27	0:05:19			0:00:00
		0:00:00			0:00:00	1:48:50	1:49:05	0:00:15
		0:00:00	1:49:05	1:49:20	0:00:15			0:00:00
		0:00:00	1:50:17	1:55:20	0:05:03			0:00:00
		0:00:00			0:00:00	1:55:20	1:55:33	0:00:13
		0:00:00	1:56:20	1:59:17	0:02:57			0:00:00
		0:00:00	2:02:25	2:02:30	0:00:05			0:00:00
		0:00:00			0:00:00	2:02:42	2:02:50	0:00:08
		0:00:00	2:02:55	2:11:54	0:08:59			0:00:00
2:11:54	2:11:56	0:00:02			0:00:00			0:00:00
		0:00:00	2:11:56	2:11:59	0:00:03			0:00:00
		0:00:00	2:13:56	2:17:39	0:03:43			0:00:00
		0:00:00	2:18:17	2:18:48	0:00:31			0:00:00
		0:00:00	2:23:41	2:34:54	0:11:13			0:00:00
		0:00:00	2:35:37	2:41:05	0:05:28			0:00:00
		0:00:00	2:41:58	2:42:49	0:00:51			0:00:00
		0:00:00	2:43:34	2:46:20	0:02:46			0:00:00
		0:00:00	2:46:50	2:51:22	0:04:32			0:00:00
2:51:22	2:51:24	0:00:02	2:51:24	2:51:26	0:00:02			0:00:00
2:51:26	2:51:39	0:00:13			0:00:00			0:00:00
		0:00:00	2:21:39	2:57:37	0:35:58			0:00:00
		0:00:00	2:57:53	2:58:26	0:00:33			0:00:00
		0:00:00	2:59:57	3:10:55	0:10:58			0:00:00
		0:00:00	3:11:13	3:12:13	0:01:00			0:00:00
		0:00:00	3:14:19	3:24:34	0:10:15			0:00:00
3:24:34	3:24:37	0:00:03			0:00:00			0:00:00
		0:00:00	3:24:37	3:24:49	0:00:12			0:00:00
3:24:49	3:24:54	0:00:05			0:00:00			0:00:00
		0:00:00	3:24:54	3:41:41	0:16:47			0:00:00
3:41:41	3:41:46	0:00:05			0:00:00			0:00:00
			3:41:46	3:43:20	0:01:34			0:00:00
		0:00:00			0:00:00	3:43:25	3:43:30	0:00:05
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:50	Runtime:	3:47:01
Non-diegetic silences:	3:08:20	Start of diegesis:	0:04:32
Diegetic silences:	0:12:21	End of diegesis:	3:43:30

14. *The Graduate*

Directed by Mike Nichols
Los Angeles: Embassy Pictures, 1967

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00	00:00:06	00:00:29	00:00:23			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:02:24	00:02:29	00:00:05
		00:00:00	00:02:50	00:36:07	00:33:17			00:00:00
00:36:07	00:36:11	00:00:04			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:36:11	00:36:15	00:00:04			00:00:00
00:36:15	00:36:18	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:36:18	00:36:19	00:00:01			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:36:19	00:37:37	00:01:18
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:38:37	00:39:49	00:01:12
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:39:52	00:40:02	00:00:10
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:40:03	00:40:52	00:00:49
		00:00:00	00:40:57	00:43:00	00:02:03			00:00:00
00:43:00	00:43:03	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:43:03	01:00:50	00:17:47			00:00:00
01:00:50	01:00:58	00:00:08			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:00:58	01:07:08	00:06:10			00:00:00
01:07:08	01:07:11	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:07:11	01:07:12	00:00:01			00:00:00
01:07:12	01:07:19	00:00:07			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:07:19	01:09:05	00:01:46
		00:00:00	01:09:05	01:10:17	00:01:12			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:10:17	01:13:16	00:02:59
		00:00:00	01:13:16	01:13:57	00:00:41			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:13:57	01:14:50	00:00:53
		00:00:00	01:15:17	01:17:02	00:01:45			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:17:02	01:17:41	00:00:39
		00:00:00	01:17:41	01:21:50	00:04:09			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:21:50	01:22:13	00:00:23
		00:00:00	01:22:15	01:24:40	00:02:25			00:00:00
01:24:40	01:24:42	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:24:42	01:26:22	00:01:40			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:27:03	01:30:02	00:02:59			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:31:03	01:32:20	00:01:17			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:33:15	01:34:09	00:00:54			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:36:32	01:37:23	00:00:51			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:37:48	01:40:08	00:02:20			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:40:08	01:41:02	00:00:54
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:30	Runtime:	1:45:00
Non-diegetic silences:	1:19:59	Start of diegesis:	0:00:06
Diegetic silences:	0:11:08	End of diegesis:	1:41:02

15. 2001: A Space Odyssey

Directed by Stanley Kubrick
London: Stanley Kubrick Productions, 1968

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:03:16	0:04:37	00:01:21
0:04:38	0:04:39	00:00:01			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:04:39	0:11:49	00:07:10			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:13:03	0:14:35	00:01:32
		00:00:00	0:14:35	0:15:19	00:00:44			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:16:16	0:16:58	00:00:42
		00:00:00	0:16:58	0:19:53	00:02:55			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:19:53	0:25:29	00:05:36
		00:00:00	0:25:29	0:33:47	00:08:18			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:33:47	0:41:07	00:07:20
		00:00:00	0:41:07	0:45:38	00:04:31			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:45:38	0:46:55	00:01:17
		00:00:00	0:47:00	0:49:09	00:02:09			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:49:09	0:49:52	00:00:43
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:50:55	0:54:25	00:03:30
0:54:42	0:54:44	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:54:44	0:56:13	00:01:29
		00:00:00	0:58:09	1:03:32	00:05:23			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:03:32	1:03:57	00:00:25
		00:00:00	1:07:22	1:27:51	00:20:29			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:30:09	1:32:19	00:02:10			00:00:00
1:32:19	1:32:21	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:32:21	1:32:25	00:00:04			00:00:00
1:32:25	1:32:35	00:00:10			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:32:35	1:32:37	00:00:02			00:00:00
1:32:37	1:32:51	00:00:14			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:32:51	1:33:22	00:00:31			00:00:00
1:33:22	1:33:29	00:00:07			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:33:29	1:33:35	00:00:06			00:00:00
1:33:35	1:33:47	00:00:12			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:33:47	1:33:51	00:00:04			00:00:00
1:33:51	1:34:09	00:00:18			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:34:09	1:34:16	00:00:07			00:00:00
1:34:16	1:34:29	00:00:13			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:34:29	1:34:33	00:00:04			00:00:00
1:34:33	1:34:43	00:00:10			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:34:43	1:34:52	00:00:09			00:00:00
1:34:52	1:35:02	00:00:10			00:00:00			00:00:00

		00:00:00	1:35:02	1:35:13	00:00:11			00:00:00
1:35:13	1:35:22	00:00:09			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:35:22	1:35:45	00:00:23			00:00:00
1:35:45	1:36:02	00:00:17			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:36:02	1:37:09	00:01:07			00:00:00
1:37:09	1:37:30	00:00:21			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:37:30	1:37:43	00:00:13			00:00:00
1:37:43	1:38:21	00:00:38			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:38:21	1:40:16	00:01:55			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:40:42	1:40:48	00:00:06			00:00:00
1:40:48	1:40:53	00:00:05			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:40:53	1:43:23	00:02:30			00:00:00
1:43:23	1:43:40	00:00:17			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:43:40	1:44:08	00:00:28			00:00:00
1:44:08	1:44:21	00:00:13			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:44:21	1:44:29	00:00:08			00:00:00
1:44:29	1:44:45	00:00:16			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:44:44	1:45:12	00:00:28			00:00:00
1:45:12	1:45:25	00:00:13			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:45:25	1:46:08	00:00:43			00:00:00
1:46:08	1:46:29	00:00:21			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:46:29	1:49:30	00:03:01			00:00:00
1:46:30	1:46:59	00:00:29			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:46:59	1:47:03	00:00:04			00:00:00
1:47:03	1:47:50	00:00:47			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:47:50	1:49:07	00:01:17			00:00:00
1:49:07	1:49:23	00:00:16			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:49:23	1:57:06	00:07:43			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:57:06	2:02:14	00:05:08
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:04:18	2:04:25	00:00:07
		00:00:00			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	2:14:32	2:18:54	00:04:22			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:18:54	2:20:33	00:01:39
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:06:01	Runtime:	2:28:52
Non-diegetic silences:	1:19:35	Start of diegesis:	0:03:16
Diegetic silences:	0:30:49	End of diegesis:	2:20:33

16. MASH

Directed by Robert Altman
Aspen: Aspen Productions, 1970

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:00:19	00:03:03	00:02:44
		00:00:00	00:03:06	00:03:25	00:00:19			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:03:25	00:04:44	00:01:19
		00:00:00	00:04:44	00:06:25	00:01:41			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:07:22	00:20:34	00:13:12			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:21:03	00:36:01	00:14:58			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:36:01	00:36:05	00:00:04
		00:00:00	00:36:56	01:03:53	00:26:57			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:05:18	01:05:48	00:00:30
		00:00:00	01:05:48	01:06:35	00:00:47			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:06:37	01:06:46	00:00:09
		00:00:00	01:06:46	01:19:45	00:12:59			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:19:45	01:19:56	00:00:11
		00:00:00	01:20:48	01:22:17	00:01:29			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:22:24	01:24:16	00:01:52			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:24:21	01:24:33	00:00:12
		00:00:00	01:25:11	01:26:16	00:01:05			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:27:46	01:28:41	00:00:55			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:28:46	01:37:19	00:08:33			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:37:19	01:37:26	00:00:07
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:37:27	01:37:34	00:00:07
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:37:36	01:37:51	00:00:15
		00:00:00	01:38:13	01:40:20	00:02:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:40:47	01:41:35	00:00:48			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:42:00	01:43:14	00:01:14			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:43:45	01:43:51	00:00:06
		00:00:00	01:43:52	01:44:27	00:00:35			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:45:12	01:47:44	00:02:32			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:48:16	01:49:42	00:01:26			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:50:56	01:55:48	00:04:52			00:00:00
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:00	Runtime:	1:55:55
Non-diegetic silences:	1:38:21	Start of diegesis:	0:00:19
Diegetic silences:	0:05:44	End of diegesis:	1:55:51

17. The Godfather

Directed by Francis Ford Coppola
Hollywood: Paramount Pictures, 1972

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00	00:01:16	00:27:04	00:25:48			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:27:12	00:27:26	00:00:14
		00:00:00	00:28:03	00:29:35	00:01:32			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:30:02	00:32:49	00:02:47			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:34:03	00:34:20	00:00:17			00:00:00
00:34:20	00:34:27	00:00:07			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:34:27	00:35:13	00:00:46			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:36:04	00:36:08	00:00:04
		00:00:00	00:36:08	00:39:52	00:03:44			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:40:44	00:43:26	00:02:42			00:00:00
00:43:26	00:43:29	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:43:29	00:45:48	00:02:19			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:46:16	00:47:13	00:00:57			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:47:28	00:52:38	00:05:10			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:53:29	00:54:25	00:00:56			00:00:00
00:54:25	00:54:27	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:54:27	00:54:48	00:00:21			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:54:48	00:54:51	00:00:03
		00:00:00	00:55:57	00:57:49	00:01:52			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:58:41	01:01:38	00:02:57			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:01:38	01:01:44	00:00:06
		00:00:00	01:04:40	01:06:45	00:02:05			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:08:39	01:10:23	00:01:44			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:10:23	01:10:31	00:00:08
		00:00:00	01:10:54	01:14:34	00:03:40			00:00:00
01:14:34	01:14:39	00:00:05			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:14:39	01:15:41	00:01:02			00:00:00
01:15:41	01:15:44	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:15:44	01:15:47	00:00:03			00:00:00
01:15:47	01:15:51	00:00:04			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:15:51	01:21:10	00:05:19			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:21:54	01:23:55	00:02:01			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:24:22	01:29:41	00:05:19			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:30:08	01:30:25	00:00:17
		00:00:00	01:30:25	01:37:07	00:06:42			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:38:18	01:38:30	00:00:12			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:39:59	01:40:26	00:00:27			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:40:58	01:43:54	00:02:56			00:00:00

		00:00:00	01:46:20	01:51:29	00:05:09			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:52:45	01:58:49	00:06:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:58:52	01:59:04	00:00:12
		00:00:00	01:59:36	02:06:35	00:06:59			00:00:00
02:06:35	02:06:38	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:06:38	02:13:20	00:06:42			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:14:58	02:15:19	00:00:21			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:16:29	02:16:31	00:00:02
		00:00:00	02:16:31	02:19:39	00:03:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:20:12	02:28:41	00:08:29			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:30:29	02:44:16	00:13:47			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:44:44	02:48:40	00:03:56			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:49:19	02:52:06	00:02:47			00:00:00
						02:52:54	02:53:04	00:00:10
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences: 0:00:27 Runtime: 2:57:09
Non-diegetic silences: 2:21:00 Start of diegesis: 0:01:16
Diegetic silences: 0:01:16 End of diegesis: 2:53:06

18. The Exorcist

Directed by William Friedkin
Burbank: Warner Bros., 1973

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:00:39	00:00:47	00:00:08
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:01:11	0:01:39	00:00:28
		00:00:00	0:1:59	0:4:02	00:02:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:04:20	0:09:19	00:04:59			00:00:00
0:09:19	0:09:32	00:00:13			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:09:32	0:09:38	00:00:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:10:29	0:15:26	00:04:57			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:16:10	0:27:13	00:11:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:27:53	0:32:51	00:04:58			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:33:54	0:38:59	00:05:05			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:39:09	0:43:40	00:04:31			00:00:00
0:43:40	0:43:43	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:43:43	0:52:19	00:08:36			00:00:00
0:52:19	0:52:24	00:00:05			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:52:24	0:54:18	00:01:54			00:00:00
0:54:18	0:54:25	00:00:07			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:54:25	0:56:36	00:02:11			00:00:00
0:56:36	0:56:44	00:00:08			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:56:44	0:57:43	00:00:59			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:58:04	0:58:24	00:00:20			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:59:30	1:00:26	00:00:56			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:02:24	01:05:31	00:03:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:06:41	01:08:08	00:01:27			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:08:27	01:10:26	00:01:59			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:11:51	1:30:03	00:18:12			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:30:58	1:36:40	00:05:42			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:37:51	1:39:59	00:02:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:40:57	1:42:55	00:01:58			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:44:28	1:52:16	00:07:48			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:52:28	1:53:56	00:01:28			00:00:00
1:53:56	1:54:01	00:00:05			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:54:01	1:55:04	00:01:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:55:28	1:55:33	00:00:05
		00:00:00	1:55:33	2:03:08	00:07:35			00:00:00
02:03:08	02:03:11	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
			02:03:12	02:06:31	00:03:19			
02:06:31	02:06:36	00:00:05			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	2:06:37	02:08:08	00:01:31			00:00:00
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:49	Runtime:	2:12:22
Non-diegetic silences:	1:49:55	Start of diegesis:	0:00:18
Diegetic silences:	0:00:41	End of diegesis:	2:08:16

19. Chinatown

Directed by Roman Polanski
Hollywood: Paramount Pictures, 1974

Complete			**Non-diegetic**			**Diegetic**		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00	00:01:56	00:08:17	00:06:21			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:09:36	00:11:49	00:02:13			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:12:49	00:14:55	00:02:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:15:49	00:21:15	00:05:26			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:21:25	00:22:08	00:00:43			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:22:38	00:33:15	00:10:37			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:33:21	00:38:00	00:04:39			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:40:04	01:00:06	00:20:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:01:04	01:08:56	00:07:52			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:09:46	01:19:44	00:09:58			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:20:32	01:23:02	00:02:30			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:23:44	01:24:00	00:00:16
		00:00:00	01:25:45	01:28:53	00:03:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:29:24	01:29:47	00:00:23
		00:00:00	01:32:03	01:35:24	00:03:21			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:36:24	01:37:42	00:01:18			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:38:21	01:38:33	00:00:12			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:39:15	01:39:23	00:00:08
		00:00:00	01:39:37	01:39:45	00:00:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:40:37	01:45:23	00:04:46			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:45:53	01:46:09	00:00:16			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:47:39	01:53:08	00:05:29			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:54:22	02:03:34	00:09:12			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:03:53	02:04:09	00:00:16			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:04:39	02:08:29	00:03:50			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:09:00	02:09:22	00:00:22
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:00	Runtime:	2:10:29
Non-diegetic silences:	1:44:23	Start of diegesis:	0:01:54
Diegetic silences:	0:01:09	End of diegesis:	2:09:22

20. *Star Wars*

Directed by George Lucas
San Francisco: Lucasfilm, 1977

Complete			**Non-diegetic**			**Diegetic**		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
00:00:21	00:00:29	00:00:08			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:00:29	00:02:06	00:01:37
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:07:06	00:07:08	00:00:02
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:07:22	00:07:29	00:00:07
		00:00:00	00:09:03	00:10:28	00:01:25			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:11:25	00:12:31	00:01:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:17:50	00:19:16	00:01:26			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:19:39	00:21:08	00:01:29			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:23:00	00:25:11	00:02:11			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:25:55	00:26:09	00:00:14
		00:00:00	00:27:22	00:27:46	00:00:24			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:28:21	00:28:37	00:00:16			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:29:10	00:29:14	00:00:04
		00:00:00	00:30:47	00:31:05	00:00:18			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:32:42	00:34:08	00:01:26			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:35:53	00:36:12	00:00:19			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:36:53	00:37:01	00:00:08
		00:00:00	00:37:09	00:39:07	00:01:58			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:40:26	00:40:55	00:00:29
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:42:32	00:42:38	00:00:06
		00:00:00	00:44:08	00:51:42	00:07:34			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:52:53	00:53:02	00:00:09			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:54:41	00:55:03	00:00:22			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:57:20	00:58:11	00:00:51			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:59:33	01:04:28	00:04:55			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:05:23	01:05:31	00:00:08
		00:00:00	01:06:11	01:07:14	00:01:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:09:07	01:12:32	00:03:25			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:16:27	01:17:08	00:00:41			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:19:10	01:22:16	00:03:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:22:52	01:22:57	00:00:05			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:24:35	01:25:00	00:00:25			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:29:13	01:29:16	00:00:03
		00:00:00	01:30:08	01:32:21	00:02:13			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:36:06	01:45:03	00:08:57			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:49:42	01:53:26	00:03:44			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:57:18	01:57:20	00:00:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:57:50	01:58:29	00:00:39			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:58:46	01:59:19	00:00:33
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:08	Runtime:	2:04:42
Non-diegetic silences:	0:50:29	Start of diegesis:	0:00:21
Diegetic silences:	0:03:31	End of diegesis:	2:00:14

21. *Raging Bull*

Directed by Martin Scorsese
Beverly Hills: United Artists, 1980

Complete			**Non-diegetic**			**Diegetic**		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:00:41	00:02:50	00:02:09
00:02:50	00:02:52	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:02:52	00:07:46	00:04:54			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:15:03	00:17:06	00:02:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:21:32	00:23:42	00:02:10			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:23:42	00:23:54	00:00:12
		00:00:00	00:23:54	00:24:18	00:00:24			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:24:58	00:25:59	00:01:01			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:26:52	00:27:56	00:01:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:31:24	00:33:20	00:01:56			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:39:11	00:41:02	00:01:51			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:41:07	00:43:56	00:02:49
		00:00:00	00:49:28	00:57:00	00:07:32			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:57:04	00:57:28	00:00:24			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:58:22	00:58:45	00:00:23
		00:00:00	00:59:11	01:02:43	00:03:32			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:02:55	01:03:08	00:00:13
		00:00:00	01:03:47	01:06:26	00:02:39			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:06:29	01:13:35	00:07:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:13:57	01:15:38	00:01:41			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:16:37	01:18:20	00:01:43			00:00:00
01:18:20	01:18:21	00:00:01			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:21:37	01:22:46	00:01:09			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:26:58	01:28:33	00:01:35			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:28:51	01:30:39	00:01:48			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:30:48	01:31:00	00:00:12			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:31:50	01:32:08	00:00:18			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:32:09	01:32:13	00:00:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:32:14	01:32:19	00:00:05			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:32:29	01:41:36	00:09:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:42:49	01:46:19	00:03:30			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:49:26	01:53:08	00:03:42			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:53:39	02:03:53	00:10:14			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:03:53	02:04:41	00:00:48
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:03	Runtime:	2:09:01
Non-diegetic silences:	1:11:44	Start of diegesis:	0:00:41
Diegetic silences:	0:06:34	End of diegesis:	2:04:41

22. *The Shining*

Directed by Stanley Kubrick
London: Hawk Films, 1980

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:00:14	00:03:04	00:02:50
		00:00:00	00:03:04	00:10:34	00:07:30			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:11:39	00:12:10	00:00:31
		00:00:00	00:12:14	00:17:38	00:05:24			00:00:00
00:17:38	00:17:43	00:00:05			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:17:43	00:17:59	00:00:16
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:19:20	00:19:44	00:00:24
		00:00:00	00:19:52	00:21:24	00:01:32			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:21:44	00:22:17	00:00:33
		00:00:00	00:22:21	00:27:22	00:05:01			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:28:06	00:34:11	00:06:05			00:00:00
00:34:11	00:34:14	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:34:14	00:38:13	00:03:59			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:40:29	00:40:32	00:00:03
		00:00:00	00:40:32	00:41:21	00:00:49			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:41:50	00:42:57	00:01:07
		00:00:00	00:43:54	00:46:01	00:02:07			00:00:00
00:46:01	00:46:05	00:00:04			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:46:05	00:46:15	00:00:10			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:46:25	00:46:56	00:00:31
		00:00:00	00:48:00	00:49:19	00:01:19			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:49:41	00:49:49	00:00:08
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:49:51	00:49:57	00:00:06
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:49:59	00:50:04	00:00:05
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:50:06	00:50:09	00:00:03
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:50:10	00:50:12	00:00:02
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:50:14	00:50:15	00:00:01
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:50:16	00:50:19	00:00:03
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:50:20	00:50:38	00:00:18
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:51:11	00:51:16	00:00:05
00:51:16	00:51:21	00:00:05			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:51:21	00:52:41	00:01:20			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:53:08	00:53:27	00:00:19
		00:00:00	00:57:05	00:57:21	00:00:16			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:58:08	00:58:28	00:00:20
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:58:30	00:58:42	00:00:12
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:58:56	00:59:00	00:00:04
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:01:56	01:02:11	00:00:15
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:02:45	01:02:54	00:00:09
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:03:14	01:03:27	00:00:13
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:03:30	01:03:54	00:00:24
		00:00:00	01:04:11	01:09:50	00:05:39			00:00:00

01:09:50	01:09:52	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:09:52	01:10:59	00:01:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:11:15	01:13:22	00:02:07
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:13:30	01:13:34	00:00:04
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:13:44	01:15:27	00:01:43
		00:00:00	01:16:14	01:19:09	00:02:55			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:19:44	01:19:51	00:00:07
		00:00:00	01:20:39	01:31:46	00:11:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:33:05	01:33:10	00:00:05
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:35:49	01:35:52	00:00:03
		00:00:00	01:36:35	01:41:21	00:04:46			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:42:23	01:42:36	00:00:13
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:42:37	01:42:40	00:00:03
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:42:41	01:43:09	00:00:28
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:43:11	01:43:16	00:00:05
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:43:50	01:43:56	00:00:06
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:44:16	01:44:19	00:00:03
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:44:20	01:44:30	00:00:10
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:45:22	01:45:24	00:00:02
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:45:33	01:45:36	00:00:03
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:45:40	01:45:43	00:00:03
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:45:48	01:45:53	00:00:05
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:54:23	01:54:35	00:00:12
		00:00:00	01:54:37	01:57:50	00:03:13			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:57:50	01:58:11	00:00:21
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:00:10	02:00:16	00:00:06
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:00:17	02:00:20	00:00:03
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:01:04	02:01:08	00:00:04
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:02:05	02:02:17	00:00:12
		00:00:00	02:04:42	02:08:40	00:03:58			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:08:50	02:09:00	00:00:10
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:09:29	02:09:49	00:00:20
		00:00:00	02:12:11	02:12:34	00:00:23			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:12:34	02:12:40	00:00:06
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:13:37	02:13:42	00:00:05
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:13:42	02:13:48	00:00:06
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:14:36	02:15:43	00:01:07
		00:00:00	02:15:43	02:15:47	00:00:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:18:13	02:18:48	00:00:35			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:19:38	02:19:41	00:00:03			00:00:00
02:19:41	02:19:43	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:19:43	02:21:25	00:01:42
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:21	Runtime (American cut):	2:23:46
Non-diegetic silences:	1:09:22	Start of diegesis:	0:00:14
Diegetic silences:	0:19:06	End of diegesis:	2:21:25

23. Raiders of the Lost Ark

Directed by Steven Spielberg
San Francisco: Lucasfilm, 1981

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:07:50	00:08:04	00:00:14
		00:00:00	00:09:48	00:10:49	00:01:01			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:12:44	00:12:51	00:00:07
		00:00:00	00:12:59	00:19:45	00:06:46			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:20:52	00:21:30	00:00:38			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:23:09	00:23:33	00:00:24
		00:00:00	00:23:36	00:28:09	00:04:33			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:29:41	00:29:43	00:00:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:30:58	00:33:41	00:02:43			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:33:41	00:34:04	00:00:23
		00:00:00	00:35:07	00:36:24	00:01:17			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:42:51	00:46:42	00:03:51			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:47:32	00:49:17	00:01:45			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:49:38	00:51:01	00:01:23			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:53:15	00:54:03	00:00:48
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:58:22	00:58:31	00:00:09
		00:00:00	00:58:40	01:00:01	00:01:21			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:10:44	01:11:24	00:00:40			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:12:02	01:13:21	00:01:19			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:15:39	01:16:27	00:00:48			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:20:49	01:21:32	00:00:43			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:29:37	01:32:29	00:02:52			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:33:41	01:33:50	00:00:09
		00:00:00	01:34:00	01:34:08	00:00:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:34:35	01:34:54	00:00:19			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:36:05	01:37:03	00:00:58			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:38:24	01:38:28	00:00:04
		00:00:00	01:40:00	01:40:46	00:00:46			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:42:22	01:44:01	00:01:39			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:48:27	01:48:38	00:00:11			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:49:14	01:50:08	00:00:54			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:50:52	01:51:02	00:00:10
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:00	Runtime:	1:55:16
Non-diegetic silences:	0:36:37	Start of diegesis:	0:00:12
Diegetic silences:	0:02:28	End of diegesis:	1:51:02

24. Blade Runner (Final Cut)

Directed by Ridley Scott
Hollywood: The Ladd Company, 1982

Complete			**Non-diegetic**			**Diegetic**		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:02:05	0:03:06	00:01:01
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:10:08	0:10:56	00:00:48
		00:00:00	0:11:08	0:13:19	00:02:11			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:16:55	0:16:58	00:00:03
		00:00:00	0:22:43	0:23:54	00:01:11			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:25:05	0:26:03	00:00:58			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:26:28	0:26:55	00:00:27			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:30:22	0:33:15	00:02:53			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:33:34	0:33:43	00:00:09
		00:00:00	0:37:59	0:39:20	00:01:21			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:40:54	0:41:17	00:00:23			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:42:00	0:42:27	00:00:27
		00:00:00	0:42:46	0:43:45	00:00:59			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:49:02	0:49:08	00:00:06
		00:00:00	0:55:17	0:57:42	00:02:25			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:57:54	0:58:48	00:00:54
		00:00:00	0:59:29	0:59:45	00:00:16			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:01:48	1:03:11	00:01:23			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:08:53	1:09:47	00:00:54
		00:00:00	1:12:42	1:13:05	00:00:23			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:27:13	1:27:39	00:00:26			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:28:13	1:28:57	00:00:44			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:35:28	1:36:06	00:00:38			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:47:26	1:48:18	00:00:52
		00:00:00	1:49:08	1:50:00	00:00:52			00:00:00
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:00	Runtime (Final Cut):	1:57:37
Non-diegetic silences:	0:17:30	Start of diegesis:	0:02:05
Diegetic silences:	0:05:14	End of diegesis:	1:52:22

25. Moonstruck

Directed by Norman Jewison
Beverly Hills: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1987

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:00:12	00:00:49	00:00:37
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:01:10	00:01:25	00:00:15
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:02:46	00:02:52	00:00:06
		00:00:00	00:02:52	00:04:03	00:01:11			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:05:06	00:05:55	00:00:49			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:07:52	00:08:44	00:00:52			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:09:02	00:09:06	00:00:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:09:18	00:13:41	00:04:23			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:15:49	00:18:47	00:02:58			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:19:25	00:20:13	00:00:48			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:20:50	00:22:54	00:02:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:23:18	00:23:31	00:00:13			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:24:03	00:24:17	00:00:14			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:24:42	00:25:30	00:00:48			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:25:48	00:29:40	00:03:52			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:30:40	00:31:08	00:00:28			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:31:26	00:32:43	00:01:17			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:34:03	00:36:03	00:02:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:36:43	00:38:54	00:02:11			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:39:59	00:40:05	00:00:06
		00:00:00	00:40:11	00:42:47	00:02:36			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:43:29	00:44:04	00:00:35
		00:00:00	00:45:01	00:45:51	00:00:50			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:47:53	00:54:02	00:06:09			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:54:20	00:55:24	00:01:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:56:01	00:56:57	00:00:56			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:56:57	00:57:37	00:00:40
		00:00:00	00:57:37	00:58:13	00:00:36			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:00:19	01:02:02	00:01:43			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:07:03	01:08:01	00:00:58			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:08:21	01:08:35	00:00:14			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:09:16	01:14:24	00:05:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:15:08	01:18:00	00:02:52			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:19:17	01:19:50	00:00:33			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:20:08	01:20:17	00:00:09			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:20:33	01:20:42	00:00:09			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:20:50	01:26:03	00:05:13			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:27:02	01:36:23	00:09:21			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:38:14	01:38:46	00:00:32
01:38:46	01:38:51	00:00:05			00:00:00			00:00:00
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:05	Runtime:	1:41:56
Non-diegetic silences:	1:02:43	Start of diegesis:	0:00:12
Diegetic silences:	0:02:51	End of diegesis:	1:38:51

26. Goodfellas

Directed by Martin Scorsese
Burbank: Warner Bros, 1990

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00	00:00:12	00:02:06	00:01:54			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:02:06	00:02:55	00:00:49
		00:00:00	00:06:02	00:06:20	00:00:18			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:06:20	00:06:36	00:00:16
		00:00:00	00:06:36	00:06:45	00:00:09			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:07:26	00:07:36	00:00:10
		00:00:00	00:09:44	00:09:53	00:00:09			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:09:53	00:10:04	00:00:11
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:12:08	00:12:16	00:00:08
		00:00:00	00:13:04	00:13:19	00:00:15			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:14:16	00:15:13	00:00:57			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:15:13	00:15:20	00:00:07
		00:00:00	00:19:42	00:26:10	00:06:28			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:31:11	00:31:33	00:00:22			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:34:05	00:35:11	00:01:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:35:45	00:36:47	00:01:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:37:14	00:41:12	00:03:58			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:41:24	00:41:40	00:00:16			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:44:27	00:45:52	00:01:25			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:47:44	00:48:30	00:00:46			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:48:56	00:49:29	00:00:33			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:49:41	00:50:01	00:00:20			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:50:15	00:50:21	00:00:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:50:35	00:50:45	00:00:10			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:50:57	00:51:16	00:00:19
		00:00:00	00:51:35	00:52:04	00:00:29			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:52:05	00:52:10	00:00:05
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:52:12	00:52:28	00:00:16
		00:00:00	00:54:49	00:55:35	00:00:46			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:57:10	01:00:22	00:03:12			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:01:10	01:01:22	00:00:12			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:01:27	01:04:57	00:03:30			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:05:46	01:06:19	00:00:33			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:07:49	01:10:46	00:02:57			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:12:32	01:14:12	00:01:40			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:14:30	01:18:30	00:04:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:19:10	01:20:03	00:00:53			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:22:53	01:25:38	00:02:45			00:00:00

01:25:38	01:25:39	00:00:01			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:25:39	01:26:40	00:01:01			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:27:07	01:28:13	00:01:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:32:55	01:33:21	00:00:26			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:37:28	01:37:29	00:00:01			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:37:53	01:38:14	00:00:21
		00:00:00	01:38:28	01:39:23	00:00:55			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:39:23	01:39:34	00:00:11
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:39:44	01:40:02	00:00:18
		00:00:00	01:41:53	01:42:26	00:00:33			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:43:04	01:43:13	00:00:09
		00:00:00	01:44:49	01:47:25	00:02:36			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:47:25	01:47:51	00:00:26
		00:00:00	01:51:14	01:52:41	00:01:27			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:52:57	01:53:11	00:00:14			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:53:15	01:53:22	00:00:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:53:22	01:53:30	00:00:08
		00:00:00	01:54:46	01:54:51	00:00:05			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:55:16	01:55:21	00:00:05
		00:00:00	01:55:37	01:55:44	00:00:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:55:47	01:55:52	00:00:05			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:02:09	02:02:45	00:00:36			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:03:13	02:03:56	00:00:43			00:00:00
02:03:56	02:03:58	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:03:58	02:04:11	00:00:13			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:04:23	02:05:29	00:01:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:06:08	02:09:00	00:02:52			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:09:09	02:12:39	00:03:30			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:13:31	02:14:31	00:01:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:14:38	02:14:46	00:00:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:14:49	02:17:29	00:02:40			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:17:48	02:18:18	00:00:30			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:18:38	02:18:49	00:00:11			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:19:03	02:19:24	00:00:21			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:19:52	02:20:35	00:00:43
Complete			Nondiegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:03	Runtime:	2:25:26
Non-diegetic silences:	1:03:44	Start of diegesis:	0:00:12
Diegetic silences:	0:04:42	End of diegesis:	2:20:35

27. The Silence of the Lambs

Directed by Jonathan Demme
Los Angeles: Orion Pictures, 1991

Complete			**Non-diegetic**			**Diegetic**		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00	0:3:47	0:05:12	00:01:25			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:06:19	0:09:49	00:03:30			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:12:40	0:16:27	00:03:47			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:17:40	0:18:24	00:00:44			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:19:36	0:19:54	00:00:18			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:21:44	0:24:37	00:02:53			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:27:59	0:30:29	00:02:30			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:31:39	0:32:48	00:01:09			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:35:09	0:38:18	00:03:09			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:38:27	0:40:07	00:01:40			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:41:15	0:44:46	00:03:31			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:46:15	0:46:35	00:00:20			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:47:08	0:48:22	00:01:14			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:49:44	0:53:55	00:04:11			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:54:59	0:56:06	00:01:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:57:43	0:58:21	00:00:38			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:02:55	1:04:50	00:01:55			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:06:12	1:12:05	00:05:53			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:13:48	1:16:45	00:02:57			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:17:36	1:19:04	00:01:28			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:21:55	1:22:30	00:00:35			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:25:11	1:25:48	00:00:37			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:26:12	1:27:03	00:00:51			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:28:43	1:29:03	00:00:20			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:33:17	1:37:33	00:04:16			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:37:57	1:41:04	00:03:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:44:06	1:47:59	00:03:53			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:51:01	1:52:03	00:01:02			00:00:00
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:00	Runtime:	1:58:32
Non-diegetic silences:	0:59:00	Start of diegesis:	0:00:31
Diegetic silences:	0:00:00	End of diegesis:	1:53:43

28. Schindler's List

Directed by Steven Spielberg

Universal City: Amblin Entertainment, 1993

Complete			**Non-diegetic**			**Diegetic**		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00	00:00:24	00:01:22	00:00:58			00:00:00
00:01:22	00:01:27	00:00:05			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:01:27	00:09:48	00:08:21			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:10:25	00:16:41	00:06:16			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:28:10	00:28:17	00:00:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:29:19	00:29:45	00:00:26			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:37:42	00:42:25	00:04:43			00:00:00
00:42:25	00:42:28	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:42:28	00:45:57	00:03:29			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:47:53	01:05:25	00:17:32			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:09:00	01:10:19	00:01:19			00:00:00
01:10:19	01:10:43	00:00:24			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:10:43	01:19:39	00:08:56			00:00:00
01:19:39	01:19:42	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:19:42	01:33:28	00:13:46			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:33:38	01:33:43	00:00:05
		00:00:00	01:34:34	01:44:22	00:09:48			00:00:00
01:44:22	01:44:25	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:44:25	01:44:39	00:00:14			00:00:00
01:44:39	01:44:42	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:44:42	02:07:12	00:22:30			00:00:00
02:07:12	02:07:14	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:07:14	02:08:15	00:01:01			00:00:00
02:08:15	02:08:16	00:00:01			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:10:29	02:10:40	00:00:11
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:12:31	02:12:40	00:00:09
		00:00:00	02:12:40	02:15:04	00:02:24			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:18:08	02:18:12	00:00:04
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:18:13	02:18:16	00:00:03
		00:00:00	02:19:49	02:20:42	00:00:53			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:22:52	02:27:57	00:05:05			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:30:42	02:31:32	00:00:50
		00:00:00	02:31:35	02:36:59	00:05:24			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:37:09	02:37:33	00:00:24
		00:00:00	02:39:26	02:49:07	00:09:41			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:53:54	02:54:25	00:00:31
		00:00:00	02:54:40	02:55:23	00:00:43			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:55:31	02:55:52	00:00:21
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:56:49	02:57:03	00:00:14
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:57:08	02:57:36	00:00:28
		00:00:00			00:00:00	03:00:07	03:01:06	00:00:59
03:01:06	03:01:08	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:46	Runtime:	3:06:54
Non-diegetic silences:	2:03:36	Start of diegesis:	0:00:24
Diegetic silences:	0:04:19	End of diegesis:	3:01:09

29. Saving Private Ryan

Directed by Steven Spielberg
Universal City: DreamWorks Pictures, 1998

Complete			**Non-diegetic**			**Diegetic**		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:03:17	00:03:25	00:00:08
		00:00:00	00:04:32	00:27:07	00:22:35			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:28:25	00:28:37	00:00:12
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:35:40	00:35:53	00:00:13
		00:00:00	00:36:15	00:41:30	00:05:15			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:42:34	01:19:11	00:36:37			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:23:44	01:31:13	00:07:29			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:35:36	01:41:06	00:05:30			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:44:55	01:53:35	00:08:40			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:58:40	02:34:52	00:36:12			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:36:58	02:37:04	00:00:06
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:37:57	02:39:06	00:01:09
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:41:45	02:42:37	00:00:52
02:42:37	02:42:41	00:00:04			00:00:00			00:00:00
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:04	Runtime:	2:49:27
Non-diegetic silences:	2:02:18	Start of diegesis:	0:01:05
Diegetic silences:	0:02:40	End of diegesis:	2:42:44

30. *Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring*

Directed by Peter Jackson
Burbank: New Line Cinema, 2001

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:00:58	00:01:07	00:00:09
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:07:16	0:07:18	00:00:02
		00:00:00	0:07:48	0:08:26	00:00:38			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:10:40	0:10:42	00:00:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:10:52	0:10:54	00:00:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:11:34	0:11:50	00:00:16			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:13:21	0:13:23	00:00:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:13:32	0:14:14	00:00:42			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:15:52	0:17:24	00:01:32			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:18:10	0:19:30	00:01:20			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:20:34	0:21:15	00:00:41			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:22:35	0:22:37	00:00:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:23:05	0:23:18	00:00:13			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:23:47	0:23:54	00:00:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:24:31	0:24:50	00:00:19			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:26:04	0:26:10	00:00:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:29:26	0:29:35	00:00:09			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:30:30	0:30:52	00:00:22			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:31:26	0:31:38	00:00:12			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:32:08	0:32:14	00:00:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:35:55	0:36:30	00:00:35			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:38:59	0:39:41	00:00:42			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:43:10	0:43:43	00:00:33			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:44:33	0:44:44	00:00:11			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:44:57	0:45:02	00:00:05			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:45:14	0:46:14	00:01:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:49:23	0:50:14	00:00:51			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:50:46	0:51:25	00:00:39			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:51:52	0:52:12	00:00:20			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:53:36	0:54:21	00:00:45			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:57:44	0:57:56	00:00:12
		00:00:00	0:58:04	0:58:12	00:00:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:58:36	1:00:02	00:01:26			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:00:43	1:01:20	00:00:37			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:02:59	1:03:30	00:00:31			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:05:29	1:05:48	00:00:19
		00:00:00	1:08:12	1:08:19	00:00:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:08:19	1:08:42	00:00:23
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:10:06	1:10:14	00:00:08
		00:00:00	1:12:30	1:12:56	00:00:26			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:13:18	1:13:46	00:00:28
		00:00:00	1:13:54	1:14:41	00:00:47			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:15:44	1:15:52	00:00:08			00:00:00

		00:00:00	1:19:16	1:20:23	00:01:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:22:50	1:24:08	00:01:18			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:26:36	1:26:49	00:00:13			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:27:20	1:27:45	00:00:25			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:29:00	1:29:07	00:00:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:29:55	1:30:17	00:00:22			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:33:32	1:34:07	00:00:35			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:35:36	1:36:24	00:00:48
		00:00:00	1:36:38	1:37:12	00:00:34			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:38:24	1:38:33	00:00:09
		00:00:00	1:41:26	1:42:22	00:00:56			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:44:36	1:44:51	00:00:15			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:45:57	1:46:10	00:00:13			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:47:50	1:48:16	00:00:26			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:49:19	1:49:30	00:00:11			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:51:59	1:52:08	00:00:09
		00:00:00	1:54:40	1:55:54	00:01:14			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:57:00	1:58:30	00:01:30			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:01:51	2:01:59	00:00:08
		00:00:00	2:02:48	2:03:28	00:00:40			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:04:32	2:04:46	00:00:14
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:09:42	2:10:22	00:00:40
		00:00:00	2:11:24	2:11:36	00:00:12			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:13:21	2:14:23	00:01:02
		00:00:00	2:20:52	2:21:03	00:00:11			00:00:00
		00:00:00	2:23:26	2:24:05	00:00:39			00:00:00
		00:00:00	2:25:03	2:25:07	00:00:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:25:55	2:26:26	00:00:31
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:27:57	2:28:37	00:00:40
		00:00:00	2:29:03	2:29:51	00:00:48			00:00:00
		00:00:00	2:32:35	2:33:46	00:01:11			00:00:00
		00:00:00	2:34:45	2:35:02	00:00:17			00:00:00
		00:00:00	2:38:04	2:38:08	00:00:04			00:00:00
2:38:56	2:38:59	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	2:38:59	2:39:05	00:00:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	2:41:49	2:42:24	00:00:35			00:00:00
		00:00:00	2:44:46	2:45:17	00:00:31			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:45:30	2:45:48	00:00:18
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:46:36	2:46:58	00:00:22
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:47:52	2:48:01	00:00:09
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:49:42	2:49:48	00:00:06
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:50:29	2:50:42	00:00:13
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:03	Runtime:	2:58:25
Non-diegetic silences:	0:30:26	Start of diegesis:	0:00:32
Diegetic silences:	0:07:10	End of diegesis:	2:50:45

31. Road to Perdition

Directed by Sam Mendes
Universal City: DreamWorks Pictures, 2002

Complete			**Non-diegetic**			**Diegetic**		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00	0:01:01	0:01:24	00:00:23			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:02:23	0:02:40	00:00:17
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:02:47	0:02:59	00:00:12
		00:00:00	0:04:35	0:05:11	00:00:36			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:06:21	0:06:43	00:00:22			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:08:30	0:19:07	00:10:37			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:23:16	0:24:55	00:01:39			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:26:47	0:27:53	00:01:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:30:28	0:33:32	00:03:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:35:48	0:38:47	00:02:59			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:46:28	0:47:15	00:00:47			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:47:19	0:47:54	00:00:35
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:48:15	0:48:36	00:00:21
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:49:15	0:49:35	00:00:20
		00:00:00	0:50:05	0:50:14	00:00:09			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:51:20	0:52:38	00:01:18			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:55:06	0:55:56	00:00:50			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:57:23	0:58:52	00:01:29			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:01:33	1:01:45	00:00:12			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:02:45	1:03:30	00:00:45
		00:00:00	1:03:50	1:04:23	00:00:33			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:05:24	1:09:22	00:03:58			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:11:26	1:12:37	00:01:11			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:14:47	1:15:00	00:00:13
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:15:10	1:15:21	00:00:11
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:15:23	1:15:30	00:00:07
						1:15:32	1:15:51	00:00:19
		00:00:00	1:15:55	1:17:06	00:01:11			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:17:06	1:19:29	00:02:23			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:24:45	1:25:23	00:00:38			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:27:23	1:30:31	00:03:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:32:32	1:36:01	00:03:29			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:38:04	1:38:14	00:00:10			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:38:34	1:39:37	00:01:03
		00:00:00	1:40:34	1:40:44	00:00:10			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:43:33	1:43:55	00:00:22			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:44:21	1:44:38	00:00:17
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:46:35	1:47:00	00:00:25
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:51:03	1:51:13	00:00:10
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:51:49	1:51:49	00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:52:18	1:52:28	00:00:10
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:00	Runtime:	1:56:59
Non-diegetic silences:	0:42:44	Start of diegesis:	0:01:01
Diegetic silences:	0:05:25	End of diegesis:	1:52:28

32. *There Will Be Blood*

Directed by Paul Thomas Anderson
Los Angeles: Miramax, 2007

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:00:44	00:00:52	00:00:08
		00:00:00	00:01:02	00:04:26	00:03:24			00:00:00
00:04:49	00:04:53	00:00:04			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:04:53	00:05:41	00:00:48			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:06:21	00:06:28	00:00:07
		00:00:00	00:09:36	00:09:56	00:00:20			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:10:45	00:10:47	00:00:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:10:47	00:10:50	00:00:03
		00:00:00	00:12:45	00:22:59	00:10:14			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:24:54	00:25:01	00:00:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:26:37	00:29:25	00:02:48			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:30:42	00:36:21	00:05:39			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:37:21	00:37:29	00:00:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:38:22	00:38:24	00:00:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:38:51	00:38:57	00:00:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:39:21	00:39:23	00:00:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:40:26	00:42:32	00:02:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:40:54	00:41:11	00:00:17			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:41:17	00:41:19	00:00:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:41:25	00:41:29	00:00:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:46:41	00:49:38	00:02:57			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:51:02	00:52:24	00:01:22			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:53:19	00:53:26	00:00:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:54:42	00:58:48	00:04:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:59:49	01:01:41	00:01:52			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:01:41	01:01:45	00:00:04
		00:00:00	01:01:45	01:02:00	00:00:15			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:07:49	01:08:43	00:00:54			00:00:00
01:08:43	01:08:45	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:08:45	01:09:04	00:00:19			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:09:38	01:09:45	00:00:07
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:10:04	01:10:14	00:00:10
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:10:19	01:11:16	00:00:57
		00:00:00	01:11:16	01:12:13	00:00:57			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:14:31	01:17:03	00:02:32			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:18:15	01:21:03	00:02:48			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:25:10	01:34:21	00:09:11			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:37:15	01:37:27	00:00:12

		00:00:00	01:39:03	01:39:25	00:00:22			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:43:57	01:44:07	00:00:10			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:45:23	01:45:50	00:00:27			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:48:49	02:04:25	00:15:36			00:00:00
02:04:24	02:04:28	00:00:04			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:04:28	02:04:32	00:00:04
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:05:37	02:06:20	00:00:43
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:06:47	02:06:54	00:00:07
		00:00:00	02:07:20	02:07:24	00:00:04			00:00:00
02:07:24	02:07:30	00:00:06			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:07:30	02:07:40	00:00:10
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:07:55	02:07:59	00:00:04
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:08:16	02:08:22	00:00:06
		00:00:00	02:08:52	02:15:00	00:06:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:17:07	02:17:35	00:00:28			00:00:00
02:17:35	02:17:44	00:00:09			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:17:44	02:21:47	00:04:03			00:00:00
02:21:47	02:21:52	00:00:05			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:21:52	02:22:00	00:00:08			00:00:00
02:22:00	02:22:05	00:00:05			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:22:05	02:26:37	00:04:32			00:00:00
02:26:37	02:26:42	00:00:05			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:26:42	02:30:55	00:04:13			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:30:55	02:31:07	00:00:12
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:40	Runtime:	2:38:26
Non-diegetic silences:	1:29:40	Start of diegesis:	0:00:44
Diegetic silences:	0:03:14	End of diegesis:	2:31:07

33. Drag Me to Hell

Directed by Sam Raimi
Universal City: Universal Pictures, 2009

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00	00:02:07	00:02:54	00:00:47			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:03:10	00:03:22	00:00:12			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:03:22	00:05:31	00:02:09
		00:00:00	00:07:03	00:12:44	00:05:41			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:13:10	00:15:00	00:01:50			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:16:05	00:16:40	00:00:35			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:16:42	00:16:55	00:00:13			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:18:22	00:18:32	00:00:10			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:19:35	00:19:45	00:00:10			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:20:06	00:20:12	00:00:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:20:40	00:20:55	00:00:15			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:22:35	00:22:39	00:00:04
		00:00:00	00:22:41	00:23:18	00:00:37			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:23:46	00:27:08	00:03:22			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:27:18	00:27:29	00:00:11			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:27:41	00:27:44	00:00:03
		00:00:00	00:28:23	00:29:02	00:00:39			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:29:02	00:29:06	00:00:04
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:29:40	00:29:47	00:00:07
		00:00:00	00:30:36	00:31:27	00:00:51			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:32:18	00:32:25	00:00:07			00:00:00
00:32:25	00:32:26	00:00:01			00:00:00			00:00:00
00:32:28	00:32:30	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:32:30	00:33:01	00:00:31			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:33:13	00:33:28	00:00:15
		00:00:00	00:33:52	00:35:51	00:01:59			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:36:53	00:37:19	00:00:26			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:37:51	00:39:33	00:01:42			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:40:05	00:40:07	00:00:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:40:42	00:40:46	00:00:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:41:46	00:42:31	00:00:45			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:42:34	00:42:49	00:00:15			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:43:21	00:43:41	00:00:20			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:43:56	00:45:04	00:01:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:45:20	00:45:26	00:00:06
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:45:55	00:46:08	00:00:13
		00:00:00	00:46:16	00:46:19	00:00:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:46:23	00:46:29	00:00:06

		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:47:32	00:47:41	00:00:09
		00:00:00	00:49:33	00:49:43	00:00:10			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:50:24	00:51:13	00:00:49			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:53:53	00:56:23	00:02:30			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:56:37	00:56:54	00:00:17			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:57:14	00:57:32	00:00:18			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:57:44	01:01:22	00:03:38			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:02:18	01:02:56	00:00:38			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:04:58	01:05:14	00:00:16			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:06:54	01:07:02	00:00:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:09:23	01:09:26	00:00:03
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:09:28	01:09:36	00:00:08
01:10:45	01:10:47	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:10:47	01:10:55	00:00:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:11:01	01:11:36	00:00:35			00:00:00
01:12:10	01:12:12	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
01:12:14	01:12:16	00:00:02			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:12:12	01:12:14	00:00:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:12:16	01:12:19	00:00:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:13:03	01:13:07	00:00:04
		00:00:00	01:13:07	01:13:10	00:00:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:15:07	01:15:13	00:00:06			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:17:00	01:17:08	00:00:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:17:50	01:18:02	00:00:12
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:19:41	01:19:53	00:00:12
		00:00:00	01:21:35	01:24:57	00:03:22			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:29:08	01:29:24	00:00:16			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:30:59	01:31:14	00:00:15			00:00:00
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:09	Runtime:	1:38:52
Non-diegetic silences:	0:36:43	Start of diegesis:	0:00:33
Diegetic silences:	0:03:55	End of diegesis:	1:33:59

34. Skyfall

Directed by Sam Mendes
Beverly Hills: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 2012

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:00:28	00:00:56	00:00:28
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:00:57	00:01:03	00:00:06
		00:00:00	00:12:04	00:12:19	00:00:15			00:00:00
00:12:19	00:12:26	00:00:07			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:12:26	00:12:55	00:00:29			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:13:02	00:16:46	00:03:44
00:16:46	00:16:49	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:16:49	00:18:47	00:01:58			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:21:03	00:21:41	00:00:38			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:23:27	00:24:14	00:00:47			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:24:29	00:24:42	00:00:13
		00:00:00	00:25:34	00:27:42	00:02:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:30:10	00:32:12	00:02:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:32:11	00:32:17	00:00:06
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:32:18	00:32:21	00:00:03
		00:00:00	00:33:37	00:36:52	00:03:15			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:38:31	00:40:10	00:01:39			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:41:24	00:41:57	00:00:33
		00:00:00	00:42:19	00:42:34	00:00:15			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:44:06	00:44:19	00:00:13			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:46:26	00:46:33	00:00:07
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:46:34	00:46:49	00:00:15
		00:00:00	00:49:06	00:49:08	00:00:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:49:56	00:50:06	00:00:10			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:51:44	00:53:14	00:01:30			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:54:39	00:54:53	00:00:14			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:58:21	01:00:34	00:02:13			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:03:42	01:03:46	00:00:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:05:17	01:05:54	00:00:37			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:07:11	01:08:14	00:01:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:10:26	01:20:07	00:09:41			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:20:58	01:23:40	00:02:42			00:00:00
01:23:40	01:23:43	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:23:43	01:23:52	00:00:09			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:26:18	01:26:38	00:00:20			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:33:39	01:33:58	00:00:19			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:37:55	01:38:44	00:00:49			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:43:48	01:44:04	00:00:16			00:00:00

		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:44:31	01:44:35	00:00:04
		00:00:00	01:46:03	01:46:54	00:00:51			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:49:00	01:51:41	00:02:41			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:53:09	01:53:16	00:00:07
		00:00:00	01:53:54	01:54:39	00:00:45			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:55:02	01:55:06	00:00:04
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:55:09	01:55:12	00:00:03
		00:00:00	01:57:55	02:00:02	00:02:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:03:11	02:03:20	00:00:09			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:04:03	02:05:02	00:00:59			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:07:36	02:07:40	00:00:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	02:12:59	02:13:43	00:00:44			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:14:07	02:14:19	00:00:12
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:14:30	02:14:56	00:00:26
		00:00:00	02:15:07	02:16:47	00:01:40			00:00:00
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:13	Runtime:	2:23:10
Non-diegetic silences:	0:43:48	Start of diegesis:	0:00:28
Diegetic silences:	0:06:31	End of diegesis:	2:17:46

35. *Interstellar*

Directed by Christopher Nolan
Hollywood: Paramount Pictures, 2014

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00	0:01:28	0:01:48	00:00:20			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:03:34	0:05:48	00:02:14			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:07:47	0:08:06	00:00:19			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:09:40	0:13:40	00:04:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:15:27	0:18:20	00:02:53			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:20:19	0:20:26	00:00:07
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:21:14	0:21:26	00:00:12
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:22:56	0:23:01	00:00:05
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:23:09	0:23:16	00:00:07
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:25:01	0:25:04	00:00:03
		00:00:00	0:25:04	0:28:07	00:03:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:35:21	0:37:04	00:01:43			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:40:57	0:41:03	00:00:06
		00:00:00	0:42:20	0:43:39	00:01:19			00:00:00
0:43:39	0:43:44	00:00:05			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:43:44	0:43:47	00:00:03			00:00:00
0:43:47	0:43:51	00:00:04			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:43:51	0:44:00	00:00:09			00:00:00
0:44:00	0:44:06	00:00:06			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:44:06	0:44:48	00:00:42			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:45:16	0:45:24	00:00:08
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:45:32	0:45:42	00:00:10
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:45:44	0:45:48	00:00:04
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:45:51	0:45:56	00:00:05
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:46:01	0:46:06	00:00:05
		00:00:00	0:46:11	0:46:25	00:00:14			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:48:03	0:48:21	00:00:18
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:48:25	0:48:32	00:00:07
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:48:34	0:48:38	00:00:04
0:49:04	0:49:12	00:00:08			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:48:56	0:49:29	00:00:33			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:49:34	0:50:20	00:00:46
		00:00:00	0:50:24	0:53:15	00:02:51			00:00:00
		00:00:00	0:54:00	0:54:49	00:00:49			00:00:00
0:54:48	0:54:49	00:00:01			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:54:49	0:55:28	00:00:39
		00:00:00	0:56:16	0:58:58	00:02:42			00:00:00

		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:56:50	0:57:11	00:00:21
0:57:38	0:57:41	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
0:57:56	0:58:02	00:00:06			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:59:00	0:59:05	00:00:05
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:59:25	0:59:35	00:00:10
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:59:42	0:59:48	00:00:06
		00:00:00			00:00:00	0:59:51	0:59:55	00:00:04
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:00:05	1:00:10	00:00:05
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:00:12	1:00:16	00:00:04
		00:00:00	1:00:16	1:01:23	00:01:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:01:19	1:01:23	00:00:04
1:01:23	1:01:29	00:00:06			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:01:29	1:01:45	00:00:16			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:01:45	1:02:07	00:00:22
		00:00:00	1:02:24	01:05:22	00:02:58			00:00:00
01:05:22	01:05:25	00:00:03			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:05:25	1:05:34	00:00:09			00:00:00
1:05:34	1:05:41	00:00:07			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:05:41	1:06:14	00:00:33			00:00:00
1:06:14	1:06:15	00:00:01			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:06:19	1:06:24	00:00:05
		00:00:00	1:12:05	01:17:26	00:05:21			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:21:30	1:21:39	00:00:09			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:22:38	1:22:48	00:00:10			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:25:14	1:29:08	00:03:54			00:00:00
1:29:08	1:29:09	00:00:01			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:29:09	1:29:16	00:00:07
		00:00:00	1:30:44	1:31:26	00:00:42			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:40:44	1:41:04	00:00:20			00:00:00
		00:00:00	1:46:15	1:46:33	00:00:18			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	1:57:02	1:57:10	00:00:08
		00:00:00	2:00:25	2:00:38	00:00:13			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:02:52	2:02:56	00:00:04
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:03:17	02:03:30	00:00:13
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:03:35	02:03:42	00:00:07
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:04:18	02:04:28	00:00:10
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:04:31	02:04:41	00:00:10
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:04:46	02:04:54	00:00:08
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:04:57	02:05:05	00:00:08
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:05:18	02:05:22	00:00:04
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:06:25	02:06:30	00:00:05
02:07:24	02:07:29	00:00:05			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:07:31	02:07:39	00:00:08
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:08:02	02:08:07	00:00:05
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:08:11	02:08:14	00:00:03

		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:08:24	02:08:35	00:00:11
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:08:37	02:08:41	00:00:04
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:08:48	02:08:55	00:00:07
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:09:26	02:09:28	00:00:02
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:09:36	02:09:41	00:00:05
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:09:43	02:09:49	00:00:06
		00:00:00			00:00:00	02:09:58	02:10:01	00:00:03
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:10:09	2:10:17	00:00:08
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:10:18	2:10:29	00:00:11
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:10:32	2:10:40	00:00:08
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:10:44	2:10:48	00:00:04
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:10:51	2:10:59	00:00:08
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:11:09	2:11:15	00:00:06
		00:00:00	2:11:28	2:11:47	00:00:19			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:12:57	2:13:04	00:00:07
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:14:54	2:15:01	00:00:07
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:15:06	2:15:15	00:00:09
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:15:17	2:15:21	00:00:04
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:16:00	2:16:01	00:00:01
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:16:12	2:16:15	00:00:03
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:16:20	2:16:22	00:00:02
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:16:40	2:16:44	00:00:04
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:16:55	2:16:58	00:00:03
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:17:08	2:17:10	00:00:02
		00:00:00	2:18:18	2:18:21	00:00:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00	2:19:28	2:19:35	00:00:07			00:00:00
		00:00:00	2:20:05	2:20:24	00:00:19			00:00:00
		00:00:00	2:21:01	2:21:09	00:00:08			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:31:57	2:32:07	00:00:10
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:32:33	2:33:07	00:00:34
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:34:15	2:35:10	00:00:55
2:35:10	2:35:15	00:00:05			00:00:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00	2:35:15	2:36:37	00:01:22			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	2:42:04	2:44:00	00:01:56
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:01:01	Runtime:	2:49:03
Non-diegetic silences:	0:42:22	Start of diegesis:	0:01:00
Diegetic silences:	0:11:52	End of diegesis:	2:44:00

36. *Logan Lucky*

Directed by Steven Soderbergh
Beverly Hills: Fingerprint Releasing, 2017

Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		
Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length	Begin	End	Length
		00:00:00	00:00:55	00:02:58	00:02:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:03:58	00:16:27	00:12:29			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:16:46	00:16:53	00:00:07
		00:00:00	00:17:41	00:18:21	00:00:40			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:18:23	00:18:27	00:00:04
		00:00:00	00:18:55	00:27:57	00:09:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:28:46	00:31:44	00:02:58			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:31:44	00:31:48	00:00:04
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:32:21	00:32:25	00:00:04
		00:00:00	00:34:14	00:40:14	00:06:00			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:40:14	00:40:24	00:00:10
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:41:09	00:41:12	00:00:03
		00:00:00	00:41:14	00:44:17	00:03:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:45:44	00:46:02	00:00:18
		00:00:00	00:46:24	00:47:11	00:00:47			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:47:11	00:47:20	00:00:09
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:47:25	00:47:35	00:00:10
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:48:00	00:48:28	00:00:28
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:48:49	00:48:59	00:00:10
		00:00:00	00:49:03	00:52:57	00:03:54			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:53:44	00:53:50	00:00:06
		00:00:00			00:00:00	00:54:24	00:54:41	00:00:17
		00:00:00	00:55:01	00:55:04	00:00:03			00:00:00
		00:00:00	00:57:15	00:59:17	00:02:02			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:01:25	01:13:09	00:11:44			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:13:30	01:13:34	00:00:04
		00:00:00	01:14:17	01:24:04	00:09:47			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:24:20	01:24:29	00:00:09
		00:00:00	01:25:06	01:25:25	00:00:19			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:26:46	01:27:05	00:00:19
		00:00:00	01:27:20	01:31:21	00:04:01			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:32:01	01:32:17	00:00:16
		00:00:00	01:32:36	01:32:40	00:00:04			00:00:00
		00:00:00	01:34:52	01:36:47	00:01:55			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:37:45	01:37:51	00:00:06
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:37:54	01:38:08	00:00:14
		00:00:00	01:38:11	01:46:55	00:08:44			00:00:00
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:47:43	01:48:26	00:00:43
		00:00:00			00:00:00	01:50:04	01:50:14	00:00:10
		00:00:00	01:50:51	01:54:56	00:04:05			00:00:00
Complete			Non-diegetic			Diegetic		

Complete silences:	0:00:00	Runtime:	1:59:03
Non-diegetic silences:	1:23:40	Start of diegesis:	0:00:55
Diegetic silences:	0:04:11	End of diegesis:	1:55:13

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