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Abstract

This article analyses late 19th century French liberal socialist syntheses of liberty and equality, building on the existing body of literature on liberal socialism to illustrate the influence of the non-Marxist left on its development through a focus on the work of the Radical, Célestin Bouglé, and the Socialists, Benoît Malon and Charles Andler. The analysis of these thinkers demonstrates the ideological similarities of liberal socialisms of thinkers hailing from both the non-Marxist left and the new liberalism. A concluding section suggests that liberal socialism offers social democrats and progressive liberals an ideological heritage from which to pose a radical alternative to contemporary forms of neoliberalism.

Keywords: Liberal Socialism; Solidarism; Social Democracy; Liberty as non-domination.

Introduction

This paper analyses liberal socialist attempts to synthesise liberty and equality which developed in the latter half of 19th century France. These attempts were rooted in a conception of liberty as non-domination, a form of negative liberty developed ‘as a form of power capable of containing the forces of domination and of particular interest’.1 This differs from the modern liberal conception of liberty as non-interference, which ‘is the domain of action where individuals can do as they may want without interference on the part of others’, that can be traced back to the work of thinkers like Hobbes and Bentham, for whom individual freedom was the absence of obstacles,2 and was revived in the aftermath of WW2 by Berlin, in his, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’.3

In liberty as non-interference a failure to interfere by people with power over others is reduced to a choice, leaving those potentially interfered with at their whim because s/he ‘is permanently liable to interference of any kind’. From the perspective of liberty as non-domination, liberty as non-interference pays insufficient attention to situations in which the individual, without necessarily suffering attacks from others, finds him or herself obliged to live in a state of permanent and arbitrary threat.4 Liberty as non-domination thus grants importance to the idea that individual freedom involves ‘a kind of equality of opportunity and resources’, the ‘proper function of the State’ being ‘to promote this kind of equality’.5

Because liberty as non-domination is concerned with the arbitrariness of the potential interference of others it does not, as do approaches based in the idea of liberty as non-interference, see the interference of the law as reducing our freedom.6 It presents democracy and the general will as the
‘keys to liberty’, with freedom defined not as ‘freedom from public intervention but freedom by public intervention’,7 the main threat to liberty stemming ‘from aristocracy, privilege, a caste mentality, and the private bodies that interpose themselves between the state and the people’, rather than from the democratic state.8

In the period following the French Revolution for many thinkers political equality was vital to liberty as non-domination.9 Moreover, in relation to the struggle for national self-determination, ‘a branch of republican thought proposed much more explicit democratic and egalitarian solutions’, Mazzini and Blanc linking ‘republican freedom to universal suffrage and [sponsoring] a conception of liberty that extended non-domination claims outside the legal sphere to social and economic relations’.10 Liberal socialism represents an alternative attempt to extend such claims for non-domination.

A relatively broad literature on liberal socialism already exists, which this study builds on. Kloppenberg argues that between 1870 and 1920 a ‘transatlantic community of discourse in philosophy and political theory’ was created which discarded ‘accepted distinctions between idealism and empiricism in epistemology, between intuitionism and utilitarianism in ethics, and between revolutionary socialism and laissez faire liberalism in politics’ which ‘converged toward’ a ‘via media’ in philosophy and the political theories of social democracy and progressivism, articulated by such philosophers as Dilthey, T.H. Green, Henry Sidgwick, Alfred Fouillée, William James, and John Dewey.11

For Kloppenberg, social democrats sought ‘to extend the democratic principles of participation and equality from the civil and political spheres to the entire society and the economy, accomplishing without revolution the transformation from liberal democracy to social democracy’,12 bringing them ideologically close to the ‘new liberalism’ articulated by progressive liberals.13 That is, they were based on the principle of liberty as non-domination just outlined. The only French thinkers analysed by Kloppenberg, however, were Jaurès amongst the social democrats, and Bourgeois amongst the liberal progressives. Whilst this does offer some illuminating insights into the political culture of liberal socialism, the inclusion of Jaurès is open to some debate, and some of the characteristics both of social democracy and progressive liberalism, in the French context at least, are also questionable if one examines other thinkers.

Serge Audier’s work on liberal socialism analyses a much broader range of French, Italian and British liberal socialists in unpacking the hypothesis that liberal socialism offers ‘an original path’ beyond liberalism.14 His work offers a detailed analysis of a wide range of liberal socialist thinkers, but suffers to some extent from his denial that liberal socialism could be seen as developing out of historic socialism, and as such, that it can inform contemporary socialist practice.15 This leads him to pay less attention to a number of socialist thinkers who articulated forms of liberal socialism, arguing that if
liberal socialism were limited to this aspect of the trajectory of socialism its contribution to liberal socialism would be ‘thin’. From this perspective the 19th Century French socialisms of Pierre Leroux, Proudhon, and Fournière which Canto-Sperber and Peillon have claimed as liberal socialist, have little to contribute to the analysis of the historical emergence of liberal socialism as an ideology, and liberal socialism as an ideology does not encompass such forms of socialism.

This paper argues that amongst variety of responses within the left produced in the half century following the failure of the 1848 Revolution were found attempts ‘to reinvigorate the principles of democratic socialism’, associated with figures such as Jean Jaurès and Charles Andler, which did in fact contribute substantially to liberal socialist ideology. The failure to examine the role of these socialisms limits the analysis of the development of liberal socialism in the French Third Republic, and relatedly restricts any discussion of how socialists might respond to the challenges facing contemporary France through the rearticulation of republicanism based on liberty as non-domination. This is demonstrated by an analysis of the ideologies articulated by three figures, one clearly identified by Audier as liberal socialist, the other two completely absent from his analysis. The first figure is the Radical, Célestin Bouglé. The second two are the socialists Benoît Malon and Charles Andler.

The ‘maverick’ durkheimian sociologist, Célestin Bouglé, is clearly identified as a liberal socialist by Audier. A founding member of the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale and a regular contributor to the Année sociologique from its foundation in 1896, Bouglé was also a founding member of the Ligue des droits de l’homme, for which he was vice-president from 1911 to 1924, and stood, unsuccessfully, as a candidate for the Parti radical et radical-socialiste in 1901, 1906, 1914 and 1924. Bouglé’s numerous works on Marxism, Proudhon, Rousseau, solidarity, and democracy before the First World War developed a strand of liberalism he explicitly described as liberal socialist.

Andler was one of the driving forces in the development of German studies in French academia. Unmentioned by Audier, and largely omitted from English histories of French socialism, Andler was also a committed socialist. He was a member of Brousseau’s Fédération des travailleurs socialistes de France (FTSF) before joining, firstly, the Parti ouvrier socialiste révolutionnaire of former communard, Jean Allemane, then the unified French Socialist Party (the SFIO), which he left, ‘in a state of great dissidence’, after WWI. His fluency in German allied to his socialist activism made Andler familiar with Marx’s works—Andler had read the first two volumes of Das Kapital by 1899—as well as with the works associated with the ‘breakdown [décomposition] of Marxism’, such as those by Croce, Labriola and Sorel. This underpinned his intellectual critique of Marxism in France and his development of what he labelled a ‘liberal socialism’.
Malon was a leading socialist figure of the latter half of the nineteenth century, schooled in the tradition of federalist, Proudhonian socialism. A member of the First International from 1865 and of the Council of the Commune, upon his return to France following the general amnesty of those condemned for their activities in the Commune, he mobilised, firstly, in Guesde's Parti ouvrier Française (POF), then the FTSF, before becoming an Independent Socialist. His foundation of *La Revue Socialiste* in 1885, together with the publication of his two volume *Le Socialisme integral*, in 1890-91, formed part of ‘an enduring and powerful federalist, libertarian strand of French socialism.’ Unmentioned by Audier, and, again, largely omitted from English histories of French socialism, his theory of ‘integral socialism’ demonstrates clear affinities with liberal socialism.

**The emergence of Liberal Socialism**

The liberal socialisms analysed in this paper emerged at a time of crisis for both liberalism and socialism. After the French revolution, ‘radicals’ were typically bourgeois liberals seeking economic and political liberalisation. As the nineteenth century progressed, however, individual rights to use wealth became institutionalised, and individual ‘liberty’ gradually lost its subversive meaning and became part of the common sense of political discourse. It was substituted, however, by ideas about, and demands for, greater social equality, both in terms of formal freedoms to participate in democracy and for improved material conditions for working people and the poor. Thus, as liberals such as J.S. Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville were aware, social equality came to be articulated with democracy, modifying the latter’s meaning from narrow political democracy to a more expansive, socialised democracy.

Liberals sought to adapt to this changing social and political environment, exemplified by the English ‘New Liberalism’ and French ‘solidarism’ of the decades prior to the turn of the 20th century. New Liberals consciously synthesised liberal principles and socialist values in a revived version of liberalism that promoted elements of social reform and a common ethical framework. They rejected *laissez-faire* and the idea that liberalism justified self-interested individualism. In the view of thinkers such as Hobhouse, Hobson and Wallas, and following J.S. Mill, the liberal promotion of ‘individuality’ could not be realised without State action ‘to secure the conditions of self-maintenance for the normal healthy citizen’. New liberals aimed to diminish the threat of socialist demands for equality by appropriating its appeal to a common ethical framework in which the needs of the whole and not just the individual were attended to. This ethical stance enabled new liberals to defend holistic notions of ‘community’ and the ‘just society’ in which the State (as well as voluntary agencies) was charged with a ‘duty’ to enact measures of social reform to reduce the pernicious effects of poverty, inequality and ignorance.
In France, solidarism came to prominence during the Third Republic and was promoted by such figures as Léon Walras, Charles Gide, Léon Duguit and the Radical party under the leadership of Léon Bourgeois. It sought to reaffirm liberal values by stressing its ethical character and reaffirming the debt the individual owed society, harmonizing ‘individualism, corporatism and morality within an essentially liberal framework’. Rejecting both Marxism and laissez faire liberalism for their reliance on (individual or class) self-interest, solidarism promoted a moral code of solidarity in which individual and collective interests were to be harmoniously balanced. The Congrès International de l’Éducation Sociale, held in Paris in 1900 as part of the Exposition Universelle, bringing together the leading supporters of solidarism, concluded with a resolution defining solidarité as ‘the idea of justice as the idea of a “social debt” by the privileged to the underprivileged, assuming mutual interdependence and quasi-contractual obligations between all citizens and implying a programme of public education, social insurance, and labour and welfare legislation’. These ideas supported proposals to provide for ‘collective welfare’, social insurance, free State education, limited forms of wealth distribution and legislation against trusts and monopolies. The solidarists, however, preferred voluntary schemes, mutual societies and cooperatives, rather than the State as the agency of these proposals. Bouglé’s liberal socialism should be seen as a radical contribution to this new liberalism, proposing political as well as social reform.

Socialism developed early in France, Pierre Leroux claiming to be the first person to coin the term in 1834, following the emergence of what was labelled ‘the social question’ in the 1830s and 1840s; that is, the social impact of growing industrialisation and urbanisation. This socialism sought to ‘re-establish society’ on new bases of voluntary association as alternative matrices to individualism or medieval organicism. Socialist political parties did not develop until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, however, due to the republican fear of factional interests, a fear enhanced during the French Revolution ‘by the perceived association between corporatist and regionalist movements and counter-revolutionary forces’, the indivisibility of the ‘people’ and the nation meaning that identification was not possible with both the nation and sub-categories within it.

When socialist parties did emerge the combined effects of the repeated defeats of the 1830s and 1840s, notably that of 1848, of the political oppression of the Second Empire, of the failure of the 1871 Commune, and of the repression of the early years of the Third Republic, together with the relatively slow diffusion of Marxism in France, fragmented French socialism across a number of competing parties. The Parti Ouvrier, formed under Guesde and Lafargue in July 1880, split between the more intransigent Marxists around Guesde and Lafargue and a grouping known as the possibilists, led by Paul Brousse, which broke from Marxism at the Saint-Etienne Congress of 1882 and formed the FTSF. In turn the FTSF also fragmented, this process leading ultimately to the formation of a wide range of mutually hostile and contradictory French socialist movements.
Whilst a number of parties were extremely hostile to the French Republic, notably the Parti Ouvrier, others had a more accommodating relationship to it, seeing it as a possible vehicle for socialist transition. The strongest party in this regard was the FTSF, the first socialist party which Andler joined, which was one of Europe’s leading advocates of municipal socialism, advocating ‘the socialisation of the commune as the best road to the socialisation of the state’. In practice, however, French socialism struggled to come to terms with its relationship with Republican institutions, the clearest example of this being the furore caused by Millerrand’s decision to accept a post as Minister of Commerce in June 1899. This ultimately led to the passing of the Kautsky motion at the Socialist International Paris Congress of September 1900, which declared that: ‘The entrance of an isolated socialist into a bourgeois grouping cannot be considered to be the normal beginning of the political conquest, but only as a forced expedient, transitory and exceptional.’

Such tensions were exacerbated during the last decades of the nineteenth century by the emergence of the ‘revisionist debate’ in the late 1890s, reflecting a sense that the catastrophist vision of Marx was not on the cards. Instead, as Eduard Bernstein argued, capitalism was proving amenable to political agitation and gradual reform. In these circumstances, socialist thought witnessed a distinctive turn towards ‘ethical’ as opposed to ‘scientific’ approaches to socialism. These tended to reject class struggle in the narrow sense of defending class interests and looked to socialism as principle of a new moral order. The work of Malon and Andler can be seen as contributions to this ‘ethical’ turn. Such contributions were for a long time lost to history, however. The post-WWI hegemony of Marxism led to non-Marxist varieties of socialism being covered over by Marxist historiographers of socialism, this hegemony only being challenged in more recent decades.

### The Ideological Elements of Liberal Socialism

A close analysis of the political philosophy articulated by Bouglé, Malon and Andler reveals a shared ideological organisation around the following key features: voluntarism, socialism as the culmination of freedom, and the role of intermediary associations between the individual and the State.

**Voluntarism versus determinism**

Liberal socialists, the three thinkers analysed here included, emphasise the role of individual will, or choice, rejecting a materialist monism organised around economic or technical changes in favour of a voluntarism rooted in a broader synthesis uniting idealist and materialist elements. They unite idealist and materialist elements in a variety of different ways; there is no single metaphysic uniting them. All of them, however, result in some form of voluntarism, privileging the role of choice, and thus emphasizing the moral dimension of society.
Many liberal socialist syntheses originate in some form of neo-Kantianism. The works of Renouvier or of Henri Michel, presented by Audier as clear liberal socialists, are examples of this. Liberal socialists such as Andler sought to develop Marxism to remove the fatalist flaws inherent in the monist focus on the economy. Other liberal socialists, including supporters of solidarism, developed within the scientific framework of the sociological turn associated with Durkheim and durkheimians. There are overlaps between some of these approaches, notably in the work of Bouglé.

The early socialists ‘were moralists rather than politicians, seeking a new moral social framework at least as much as an economic or a political system’, so that from the start, French socialism contained a strong voluntarist component. This was continued amongst the non-Marxist French socialism of the late nineteenth century. Much of the work of French socialists at this time sought a ‘theoretical counterweight’ to Marx in previous, possibly more foundational, texts, to show that Marx hadn’t invented everything, and that the best of his work had precedents, the errors and authoritarianism stemming from Marx himself. This can be found in the work of Malon and Andler.

Malon broke with monist economism, critiquing Marxist determinism as read through the prism of the work of Lafargue. He agreed with Lafargue that economic relations were a ‘central component of any socialist critique of social relations’ and that ‘collective ownership would progressively replace private property’, but became ‘increasingly critical’ of the fatalism and collectivist vision of French Marxists. Criticising Marxist determinism for its failure ‘to appreciate the plurality of forces operating in history’, Malon presented socialism as an ‘idea-force’ found throughout human history, defined integral socialism as ‘socialism envisaged in all its aspects, in all its formative elements, with all its possible manifestations’, and argued that socialism was ‘the synthetic culmination of all of the progressive activities of humanity’. Surveying the historical development of morality ‘to show how, in each historical period reciprocity, altruism, and sociability progress’, Malon concluded that the end point of this development was a secular socialist morality wherein ‘the legitimate search for personal happiness or individual interest progressively’ involves ‘going beyond the limited horizon of each for himself in order to progressively merge with that of collective happiness or of the social interest’.

Malon claimed Marxism’s neglect of morality, the family and the State made it incomplete ‘because the roots of socialism plunge into all human sorrows, into all intellectual and moral progress, into all the maturations of history; the conflict is thus less determined and larger than is admitted by the exclusive partisans of class struggle’. Historical development was animated by the moral, affective or sentimental forces traversing it just as much as it was by productive forces. Thus, the advent of socialism could not be deduced mechanically from Marxist historical materialism, the task of socialism could not be reduced to making the proletariat conscious of their class interest, and it was wrong that collectivists of all types ‘limit themselves to economic demands, and [do not] attach
themselves to any new conception of duty, thus depriving themselves of a considerable moral and attractive force'.  

Likewise, Andler declared that ‘the mental and moral superstructure of societies is not only active, but decisive’, and that ‘the future emancipation is an affair of fraternal sentiment, of enlightened will, and of energy materially armed’. From the mid-1890s on he undertook a critical offensive against the theoretical bases of Marxism, drawing on the work of the ‘heterodox’ socialist, Otto Effertz, Effertz’s disciple, Adolphe Landry, and the law professor, Anton Menger. 

A fundamental aspect of this critique was his criticism of Marx’s understanding of economics, in particular of the Marxist theory of value. For Andler, drawing on Menger’s ideas, Marx failed to engage with the role of force in the generation of capitalism, and his refusal to envisage the juridical aspects of socialism blinded him to the idea that the distribution of surplus value stems above all from juridical conditions, which define both the structure of property and the status of individuals in society. The mode of production did not logically follow from technological developments, Andler argued, nor did the mode of distribution follow from any particular mode of production, Andler claiming it was often the mode of distribution which gave birth to the means of production.

Andler also radically contested the Marxist concept of surplus value. He argued that a portion of the value of a product was not produced by labour, but rather stemmed from the intrinsic value of raw materials, which Marx had been wrong to neglect. Moreover, surplus value was not realised solely through the production process, and production was not the main vehicle for its extraction. Rather, it was primarily realised through exchange, the ‘true exploitation’ occurring in the intermediation between producer and consumer.

From Andler’s critique of Marxist economic analysis, flowed his rejection of the economic determinism of Marx and Marxists, a conclusion he claimed was supported by Sorel’s and Labriola’s critiques of Marxism. He thus accepted Labriola’s rejection of Marx’s metaphysics, and Sorel’s remarks concerning the inadequate explanations Marx gives the base-superstructure relationship and his challenge to the idea that when ‘the infrastructure changes, the superstructure crumbles’. Marxism failed to materially explain the social regime, because it could not explain the genesis of sentimental and intellectual modes of human activity. He thus agreed with Sorel that ‘one cannot talk of determinism because there is nothing determinable’, seeing ‘contingency not only in the primitive origin of modes of production, but in all the mediations which exist between this proclaimed infrastructure and superior products’. 

Thus, in his Civilisation socialiste, Andler declared: ‘To be a socialist is to have undergone a complete internal regeneration, and a reconstruction of the whole spirit’. The new social structure would be born ‘of a new mentality of men, of a new creative faculty awoken amongst the multitude'. This
mentality would not grow automatically, but ‘must be produced through a conscious pedagogy’. Attacks on Kantianism as ‘excessively “metaphysical”’ at the beginning of the twentieth century saw some republicans replacing ‘the neo-Kantian strategy of appealing to the normative ideal of individual autonomy with an argument that this ideal was in conformity with the scientific laws of evolution’. This was the approach of Fouillé and Durkheim. Bouglé, however, made such a shift only partly. The maverick character of Bouglé’s sociology is shown by an eclecticism which prevented him from remaining within the Durkheimian sociological consensus without reservations, supplementing sociology ‘by doctrines which the majority of Durkheimians would consider—at best—as lacking in any sociological interest’, such as the work of Gabriel Tarde. Bouglé showed some degree of sympathy with the work of Marx, but the key difference from Durkheim lay in his neo-Kantianism, which led him to ascribe an original autonomy to the individual conscience.

Whilst Durkheim’s methodology eliminates individual motivation, Bouglé’s gives the major role to intentionality: ‘It is not necessary, as Durkheim believes, to explain the interior by the exterior, but the exterior by the interior. That is why I do not clearly distinguish sociology in the proper sense of the word from social psychology’. Like Mauss and Durkheim, Bouglé postulated that only the existence of certain innate mental capacities amongst primitive peoples could explain the transition from their magico-religious world to the rational and scientific modern one. However, whilst Mauss and Durkheim limited these innate capacities to such rudiments ‘as the capacity to distinguish between left and right and the past from the present’, Bouglé supposed in primitive man ‘a certain capacity to observe exactly and to reason from these observations’. Bouglé’s doctoral thesis, which drew on Durkheim’s work on the division of labour, ‘vigorously opposed’ the idea that the division of labour came about by itself, claiming that men must still consent to accept living according to this competitive mode of life. Durkheim suggested that men specialise in order to be able to live but, Bouglé argued, this is a choice, not something determined by social facts: ‘Unite and gather together as many men as you like; make their societies as dense and as voluminous as possible: if they do not want to live and live well, the division of labour will never be produced “by itself”’.

**Socialism as the culmination of liberty as non-domination**

All of the thinkers examined here presented history as involving a process of increasing freedom, and socialism as the culmination of this process on the basis of a definition of liberty as non-domination. For them true liberty depended on true solidarity, liberalism and socialism being in continuity, not conflict, because liberty and equality were mutually implicated. This is one of the key elements of liberal socialism marking its difference from Marxist variants of socialism, a synthesis of freedom and equality rooted in the conception of liberty as non-domination. For liberal socialists
this equation of liberty and equality was enabled through an emphasis on what was variously called solidarity or mutuality, though they differed to some extent in how they figured this solidarity. Many liberal socialists of the ‘sociological moment’, including Bouglé, were united around the idea of solidarism and the concept of the ‘quasi-contract’, this concept deriving in large part from the influence of Proudhon. For solidarists the social contract was the goal of society, not its origin. Such a contract was thus not real, but merely supposed, and retroactively consented to. Malon and Andler drew on the associationist tradition of French socialism noted earlier, although Andler wrote positively about the concept of the ‘quasi-contract’.

Bouglé suggested that ‘modern societies had reached an evolutionary stage in which the affirmation of the equal moral value of all of its members had become the privileged—indeed exclusive—form of social union’. For Bouglé as for Durkheim there were two types of solidarity—one, older form which represses the individual; another, contemporary one, rooted in larger, more differentiated societies, in which society had an interest in respecting difference, and the equality of value of the human person was a principle of union. Thus, whilst sociology explains that the individual is determined and is deprived of true creative power, it also explains how the equal development of the personality of all members of society is the only possible form enabling the reproduction of contemporary societies. On this basis Bouglé rejected what he called ‘disorganising individualism’, such as that of Spencer, in favour of an ‘organised individualism’ based on the equal value of all individuals, the moral affirmation that we should desire the liberty of all and only accept conduct which is compatible with this objective, and the intervention of the social power in order to guarantee to all equal access to the conditions enabling the expression of this. A republic based on equality of opportunity did not hinder individualism, he argued, but deepened it through counteracting the impact of the caste system produced by economic inequalities in contemporary societies, which allocated to individuals the presumed characteristics of the caste to which they belonged. This made Bouglé sympathetic to the aims of solidarism.

Andler’s socialism sought to reconcile collective solidarity with the rights of the individual in ways reminiscent of solidarism. He agreed with Bourgeois in rejecting concepts of the State which tended to personify it. Noting that the relation between individuals subject to a private quasi-contract is that of being obliged without knowing, and suggesting that the State was ‘but a quasi-contract between all individuals united in their juridical community’, Andler argued that the quasi-contract was ‘the very form of all the obligations of public law’. Quasi-contracts and social community share in common the fact that they both rest on an ‘unconsented solidarity’. The solidarity which connects us, says Andler, is found before our birth, and we cannot repudiate it unless all life ceases. ‘The isolated man’, he says, ‘does not exist’, and, as such, there can be no question of social life being created by a contract. We are born riddled with
debts which life increases, and provided with rights also which it is our responsibility to increase'. In
the modern division of social labour every man owes a debt to all other living men ‘due to, and to
the extent of, the services given to him by all’. This exchange of services ’is the subject of the quasi-
contract of association which connects all men’, and it is ‘the equitable distribution of services
exchanged, that is, of profits and charges, which is the legitimate object of the social law’.100 This
quasi-contract between individuals and those who govern ’forms precisely the material of affairs of
State’.101 Moreover, for there to be a heritage to manage a long period is necessary in which material
riches and treasures of knowledge are accumulated. Thus, the individual who is a debtor to all those
living is also indebted to the dead, and ‘the current State derives its strength from the wise
administration of its forefathers just as it owes its weakness to their faults’. Asking how a debt to
those no longer living can be paid off, Andler says that we do so by ensuring that the heritage is
safely transmitted on to our descendants: ‘By an act of good will let us accept that we are obligated
to the future generation by all that we owe to the past and the endurance of social life will be
ensured’.102

Andler explicitly termed ‘liberal socialist’ this reciprocity between the individual and society. The
juridical epoch to come, he argued, would ‘erase the distinction between public law and private law’
through ‘claiming the control of all over the benefits that each draws from the human association’.
This ‘is nothing other than what in vulgar language is designated by the term socialism’.103 Such a
regime ‘freely’ recognises the debt of each to all … which is in accord with the 1789 doctrine of
liberalism.104

In tying the development of socialism to the broader issues of human historical development by
emphasising the link between socialism and morality, Malon in turn linked morality to sociability,
freedom to association. Morality, he argued, was not innate, but derived from social interaction: ‘The
need for association is the mother, not only of morality, but also of the development of humanity’.105
Darwin’s theory ‘only applied to humanity’s presocial existence as an animal in competition with
other animals’, and with the birth of primitive associative social relations morality had emerged in
the form of altruism,106 which took the following form: ‘In social relations, justice and solidarity. In
human relations, sincerity and goodness. In relations with all other beings, moderation and pity.’107
Progress ‘could be measured by increases in human sociability and altruism’, each age providing
’some insight into sociability’.108 Human evolution should thus be seen as a ‘process of improvement
and broadening of the forms of human association, and, through these, of the feelings of sympathy
born by man for his fellows’.109

A number of issues flowed from the equation of liberty and equality enabled by what was variously
called solidarity, association, mutuality, or solidarism. Firstly, it supposed the mobilization of other
forces than those of interest or violence.110 This is clearly the case with the later Malon,111 and with
The emphasis on solidarity also broadened the focus of liberal socialism beyond satisfaction of the interests of one particular social group, such as the working class. For example, Malon’s socialism had a much more ambitious aim than representing the interests of a single class: ‘the civic and moral regeneration of a society which was corrupt and without ideals’. Such a focus thus opened up the possibility of collaboration across social and political groups.

If the fusion of liberty and equality made possible more pacific, more inclusive ways of figuring the political, it also opened up the possibility of resistance to the State. For social and political breakdown caused by this right to rebellion to be prevented from happening, all social groups needed to be incorporated into the decision-making process of society. Hence the focus by liberal socialists on the need to reform the political system to organise some form of intermediary associations between man and the State.

**Intermediary associations and the State**

Although opposed to collectivism, unlike many anarchists and the revolutionary syndicalists, who were completely opposed to any form of State, liberal socialists saw it as having some role to play in society. Liberal socialists rejected the authoritarian State, however, calling for the organization of some form of intermediary associationism working beneath, and with, the State.

Although critical of the excessive faith in associative action of Proudhonists, Malon’s emphasis on the ties between morality and sociability led him to call for a ‘solidaristic organization of labour’, organised via a defensive and an offensive programme, initially organised around the establishment of international labour legislation (around such issues as the 8 hour working day), to be followed by the establishment of a general system of social insurance through the creation of a Ministry of Social Security, which would provide insurance against various forms of disaster and against sickness, accident, old-age, and family deaths, and of a Ministry of Labour, responsible for the social organisation of labour. This programme involved the collectivisation of property and the instruments of labour, a form of collectivisation he distinguished from that of communism as under his proposals ‘the forces of production would be placed “under the protection” of the State, but direction would remain in the hands of producers and their associations, and distribution among the able-bodied would depend on work performed’. A further element of this programme was the elimination of financial speculation, which he believed could be achieved by ‘progressively eliminating the public debt and by nationalizing financial monopolies like banks and credit institutions’, and its replacement by industrial democracy, through ‘the creation of compagnies ouvrières to direct the day-to-day operation of the mines and industries, and, more generally, state and communal “administration” of the economy’.121
Malon’s reformist collectivism then was associative and federal, and gave an active role to both State and communes, the latter being presented as central to the achievement of socialism. Against the criticism that humans were only motivated by self-interest and that the collectivist society of socialism would thus not motivate them, Malon argued that ‘socialist society would leave sufficient room for individual initiative’, with individuals paid for actual work performed, the rates of pay reflecting difficulty, risk and unpleasantness, and those refusing to work being excluded from the free associations in which leisure-time social activity was carried out. Associationism would be enhanced by a second economic chamber ‘based on corporatively organised professional elections’, which would have sovereignty over the economic reforms noted earlier. A “political chamber”, elected by a truly universal suffrage, would have sovereignty over diplomacy, public order, education, justice, and other public services.

Andler’s support for the role of the cooperative movement in bringing about a peaceful transition to socialism suggests he favoured an associationist approach to power. This is reinforced by his critique of Menger’s State socialism, in which he argued that ‘freedom of contract appears as a right of man’, and ‘the power to contract must be left to individuals’. For Andler, ‘in the face of the almost certain impossibility of achieving the social republic throughout the national territory with a single blow, the safest method remained that of achieving it in small ways through consumer cooperatives provided with their own production workshops, progressively federated amongst themselves until they comprise, if possible, all the workers of the nation across the entire national territory’. He thus argued that the social republic was fed by freedom of contract, rather than being opposed to it. Criticising Menger’s form of decentralization for being accompanied by a ‘rigid discipline’, opposed both to individual autonomy and to freedom of association, Andler argued that envisaging it might form the basis for future conflicts ‘is not a reason for sacrificing a precious freedom like freedom of association [liberté syndical]’. What the future socialist State needed to ensure was the reattachment of the union movement to the cooperative movement, in such a way that union members are interested as consumers in not abusing the situation that syndicalism assures to them as producers.

Whilst for Bouglé there was a role for the State to play in diminishing the weight of privilege and inequality, he agreed with Durkheim in supporting a certain degree of decentralisation of public action. His argument that, after the Revolution, one could only find scattered individuals faced with a concentrated power, ‘an excessive “atomization” and an excessive centralisation’, from which stemmed the majority of the ailments we suffered from throughout the nineteenth century, together with his criticism of Rousseau’s war on ‘particular societies’, led Bouglé to argue the need ‘to reconstitute for ourselves organs which fulfil, without perpetuating their defaults, the space
of the corporations which is left empty’.131 ‘It is only through them’, said Bouglé, ‘that we can achieve an effective decentralization: professional decentralisation’.132 Increased social and material mobility was undermining the local solidarities underpinning regional identity, whilst professional solidarities were growing in vitality, ‘the profession acting as the “soil” in which the modern man is most easily “rooted”’,133 producing a scenario in which rather than the provinces, the professions constituted specialised organs which ‘facilitate … the irresistible movement of industrial civilization. If the division of territorial sovereignty remains a chimera, that of technical sovereignty remains achievable’.134 Only through the federalism of the professions, he argued, could the “administration of things” replace the “government of people”’.135

If Bouglé supported professional solidarities, however, he remained opposed to solid, closed associations from which could not freely leave. Opponents of administrative syndicalism, who had suggested that it would return France to the situation prior to the ‘unifying work of the Revolution’ of the state of division found in the Ancien Régime, were wrong, Bouglé argued, in their assimilation of the union with the corporation; ‘it is too obvious’, he said, ‘that in the new conditions of our industrial civilization, nothing resembling the closed, exclusive and oppressive corporation could be reconstructed’. The unions will ‘remain open’, the individual will remain free to enter or leave them, and they will work to restore equality between their members rather than maintain inequality between them.136

Bouglé, Malon, and Andler all argued for a State role in ensuring social solidarity, whilst arguing for it to be balanced against the individual through the re-development of intermediary associations between the individual and the State. There were differences between them, notably around the forms of association. Were professional associations the only form of association to be formed between man and state, or were others (organised around consumption, around regions) also to be encouraged? All of them saw some role for economic association, but Andler, like Durkheim’s son-in-law, the anthropologist, Marcel Mauss, and the cooperativist, Bernard Lavergne,137 focused on consumers and consumption, an aspect of association focused upon by the French cooperative movement. The similarity of approach between Malon, Bouglé, and Andler concerning the role of associationism clearly outweighs their differences.

**Conclusion**

Analysis of the French socialism which developed before Marxism demonstrates a high degree of ‘family resemblance’138 between the new liberalism as articulated by Bouglé, and non-Marxist socialism, as articulated by Malon and Andler, although the resemblance between Bouglé and Andler is perhaps greater, and one might see Malon as the link between earlier forms of associative socialism and that later developed by such figures as Andler, Fournière and Jaurès. This is not to
suggest that liberal socialists from a new liberal background and those who were non-Marxist socialists agreed on everything—we have already noted areas of difference between them—or necessarily thought that they shared ideas with each other, but that there is sufficient overlap between the ideas of these thinkers to suggest that non-Marxist socialism can be seen as contributing to the ideological development of liberal socialism.

This continuity across solidarism and non-Marxist socialism underscores the fact that liberal socialists were not merely evolutionary reformists, unconcerned with implementing dramatic shifts in social and political organisation, and suggests that Bellamy is wrong to state that solidarism and new liberalism both offered merely a moralisation of existing social relations under capitalism which promoted working class collaboration in the current economic system. Certainly as far as France is concerned, the Radical Party’s programme of government under Bourgeois excepted. All solidarists argued the need for the State to facilitate equality of opportunity and mitigate the oppressive effects of economic liberalism, but at the same time sought some form of political reform to enable secondary associations to counteract the power of the State, preventing the State from oppressing the individual in turn, and thus enhancing the freedom of the individual. They were joined in this, however, by socialists such as Malon and Andler, who denied that the violent break emphasised by Marxist theory and practice was the correct means to make the transition to a more democratic society. To be sure, they based such claims on different metaphysical grounds: in some a critique of the economic monism of French Marxism, in others, the newly developing sociology. All, however, were driven by these different approaches to argue that equality and liberty were mutually related. The individual liberty of laisser faire individualism was a false freedom, but State intervention in the name of equality risked crushing the individual. Only through a system based on reciprocity, in which each recognised the debt they owed to the collectivity for their own freedom, would the revolutionary triumvirate of liberty, equality and fraternity be united.

Accepting non-Marxist socialism’s contribution to liberal socialism concerns more than merely intellectual curiosity; it has implications for the way forward for the left in the current conjuncture. The triumph of Thatcherism and the subsequent emergence of Blairism in the UK, whatever the failings, in both theory and practice, of both of these, and the neo-liberalization of much of the European social democratic left from the 1980s on, have all called into question the social democratic model which developed following the Second World War. And yet, as inequality grows greater across the West, the need for a radical alternative to neo-liberalism, through the development of ‘new forms of socialisation and mutualisation’ has never been greater. A liberal socialist framework offers social democrats and progressive liberals precisely such an alternative through its basis in reciprocity, adapted to take account of the changed social, economic and political circumstances of the contemporary world.
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Endnotes

8 Spitz, ‘illliberalism’, op. cit., Ref.1, p.254
15 Audier denies attempts to designate the third way politics of some socialist governments at the turn of the 21st century as ‘liberal socialist’, and rejects any claim that the republican socialism articulated by leading figures in French socialist parties formed part of the liberal socialist pantheon (Audier, *ibid.*, pp. 6, 39).
16 Audier, *ibid.*, Ref. 14, p.25.
There is no biography of Andler in English, and more general texts largely ignore him. Jennings, Revolution, op. cit., Ref. 19 devotes just two paragraphs to Andler, for example.


34 Freed, ibid., pp. 52-75.


36 Bellamy, ibid., p.63


38 See Canto-Sperber, ‘Libéralisme’, op. cit., Ref. 17, p. 2. Peillon notes, however, the numerous objections to this claim. See Peillon, Leroux, op. cit., Ref. 18, p. 80.

39 See P. Chanial, ‘Le projet utopique des sciences sociales: le paradigme de l’association’, Quaderni, n°40 (1999-2000), pp. 79-95. Chanial argues that these socialisms contributed to the deployment of an associationist worker tradition—clearly seen in the writings of Louis Blanc on workers’ self-organisation, Fourier’s federal socialism, and the federalism of Proudhon—extended in Malon and Andler’s socialisms. Pilbeam points out that most early French socialists were ‘diametrically opposed to revolution as a philosophical system’, seeking instead ‘harmony, association and mutualism’ which were to be achieved through ‘cooperation’ (Pilbeam, French Socialists Before Marx (Teddington: Acumen Publishing, 2000), p. 27).


41 C. Laborde, Critical Republicanism (Oxford: OUP, 2008), pp.178-79. This was exemplified by the attack on intermediary bodies in the Le Chapelier law of 1791.

42 Caused partly by the infrequency of translations into French, texts appearing in waves from the 1872 La guerre civile en France on (a problem because so few French socialists read German), partly by suppression by the authorities, and partly by the paucity of networks for diffusing such texts. See Jousse, Réviser?, op. cit., Ref. 18, p. 80.


48 Its approach to the French Republic, like Marx’s prescription following the Paris Commune, was that the State must be smashed. Thus, the party promoted a line stating that the passage from the bourgeois to the
social republic must involve some form of radical rupture, a qualitative leap and wholesale destruction of
earlier republican forms. See J. Howorth, ‘From the bourgeois republic to the social republic’, in S. Williams

49 Adrian Veber, ‘Le socialisme communal’, Revue socialiste, 17 (June 1893), p. 664, cited in Rabinow, French
Modern, op. cit., Ref. 46, p.206. See also Louis, Histoire, op. cit., Ref. 47, p.231. Its programme was informed
by Brousse’s theory of ‘public service’, according to which all forms of production in a capitalist regime evolve
naturally into monopolies, these monopolies being slowly converted into public services.

50 On which see Louis, Histoire, op. cit., Ref. 47, pp. 239-240; Judt, Marxism, op. cit., Ref. 43, pp. 116-117.


52 See E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 1985), chapter 1; H. Stuart

53 For a detailed discussion of the debates sparked around Bernstein in France see Jousse, Réviser le marxisme?,
pp. 122-55. In France Bernstein’s revisionism was associated with Millerand’s reformism even though they
shared almost nothing in terms of ideological content, so that the former came to be associated with political
opportunism and the quarrel over ministerialism (Jousse, Réviser?, ibid., pp. 161-164).

54 Prochasson’s suggestion that a history of reformism and its networks during the periods of the 2nd and 3rd
Internationals ‘would demonstrate several characteristics of a movement which is much less wan, and at least
as well-armed intellectually, than the Marxist tradition suggested for a long time’ is very pertinent here.

55 See Peillon, Leroux, op. cit., Ref. 18, pp. 32-38; J. Wright, ‘Socialism and Political Identity: Eugène Fournière
and Intellectual Militancy in the Third Republic’, French Historical Studies, 36/3 (2013), pp. 449-478; Adler-


57 Hence Leroux’s rejection of the division between body and soul (Peillon, Leroux, op. cit., Ref. 18, pp. 111-
112).

Marxian tendency among the French socialists in the 1880s was motivated largely by the same mistrust against
the autocratic inclinations of Marx and his intimates which had cemented the anti-Marxian bloc in the
international’ (Landauer, ‘The origin’, op. cit., Ref. 45, p.84).

59 Vincent, Between Marxism, op.cit., Ref.31, pp. 86, 93.

60 Vincent, ibid., p.94.

61 A concept drawn from Fouillée, breaking with both Kant and neo-kantians (see Kloppenberg, Uncertain,
Ref.18, p.57), based on the claim that ‘the ideas we articulate shape the world we live in but they do not exist
externally—they reside only in the minds of interacting subjects and in their reflexive consciousness’ (L.
Dobuzinskis, ‘Non-Welfarism Avant la Lettre: Alfred Fouillée’s political economy of justice’, The European Journal
of the History of Economic Thought, 17/4 (2010), p.840), the ideas produced through reflexive consciousness
becoming self-realizing imagined representations, which ‘transcended the deterministic limitations of
experience’ (Hayward, ‘“Solidarity”’, op.cit., Ref. 35, p.213).

62 B. Malon, Le socialisme intégrale (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1890), p.6

63 P. Chaniol, ‘Le socialisme intégral de Benoît Malon comme morale et religion de la solidarité’, La Revue

64 Malon, Socialisme intégrale, op.cit., Ref. 62, p.28.

65 Malon argued that all contemporary socialist parties, whether reformist or revolutionary, were marked with
the stamp of collectivism (B. Malon, ‘Collectivism et Socialisme’, Revue socialiste, n°6, juillet-décembre 1887,
p.342).

66 Malon, ibid., p.343.

67 C. Andler, ‘Frédéric Engels: Fragment d’une étude sur la Décomposition du Marxisme (4)’, Revue socialiste,
1904), pp. iv-v, where he argues that the overthrow of a regime is the product of struggles between opposing
forces, not economic determinism.

68 The description comes from Prochasson, ‘Sur la reception’, op.cit., Ref. 27, p.93.

69 Whose L’Utilité sociale de la propriete individuelle was dedicated to Landry’s father and to Andler.

70 The brother of Carl Menger, who founded the marginalist school of economics. Jousse describes the work of
Menger as ‘key’ to Andler’s critique of Marxism.

Andler edited the preface to the French edition of Menger’s *Le droit au produit integral du travail* in 1900, as well as his L’*État socialiste*. The former argued that socialism seeks the ‘fundamental transformation of traditional legal inheritance’, and the latter that the capitalist regime was founded on the law of the strongest, and would end with the abolition of the distinction between private law (founded on domination) and public law (founded on the general interest). Jousse, *Réviser?*, op. cit., Ref. 26, pp. 195-196.

Andler argued that Marx’s claim in the first volume of *Capital*: ‘The historical conditions of capital are not given with the circulation of goods and money. It is only born where the owner of the means of production and subsistence finds the free worker in the marker in his capacity as a seller of his labour’ (emphasis Andler) suggested that the historic condition of the capitalist means of production was not provided by technology, but by the juridical situation of the person. C. Andler, ‘La conception matérialiste de l’histoire d’après M. Antonio Labriola’, *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 1893, p.653.


Andler, *ibid.*, pp. 125, 127. Hence Andler’s criticism of Marx for concentrating his efforts on production, to the detriment of consumption and exchange, argues that the production cooperative is ‘invariably a capitalist enterprise’, and so does not destroy the bosses ‘but multiplies them’, practices exploitation and provides no remedy for unemployment.

Andler, ‘La conception’, *ibid.*, Ref. 73, p.652.

See Prochasson, ‘Sur la réception’, *ibid.*, Ref. 27, p.94. Marxist economism was found in the very metaphor he used to describe the system, claiming that the ruling social class makes use of the oppressed class as it would a tool (Andler, ‘Préface’ to Menger, *L’État socialiste*, *ibid.*, Ref. 67, p.x, emphasis Andler).

Andler, ‘La conception’, *ibid.*, Ref. 73, p.656. Andler claims that Chinese and French protectionism give us examples every day of juridical institutions being strong enough to prohibit the introduction of new production methods (Andler, *ibid.*, pp. 655-656).


Though he criticised him for the distorting effects on the sociological analysis of institutions and ideology stemming from the concept of class, arguing ‘there is no true class except where a collective consciousness is formed’, the collective consciousness associated with a particular social class emerging via the intermediary of specific institutions, such as trade unions in the case of the working class. See Bouglé, *Chez les prophètes socialistes* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1918), pp. 211, 224). See also see Joshua M. Humphreys, ‘Durkheimian sociology and 20th-century politics: the case of Célestin Bouglé’, *History of the Human Sciences*, 12/3 (1999), p.123).


Davy, ‘Célestin Bouglé’, *ibid.*, Ref. 20, pp.11-12. See also Policar, ‘De la critique’, *ibid.*, Ref. 23, p.141. For an extensive summary of Bouglé’s criticisms of Durkheim in this text see Vogt, ‘Un durkheimien’, *ibid.*, Ref. 22, pp.125-126. However, one shouldn’t overestimate the extent of Bouglé’s divergence from Durkheim, as his stance did not prevent him from becoming one of the editors of the *Année sociologique*.


Policar, ‘De la critique’, *ibid.*, Ref. 23, p.159.

On which see in particular Policar, ‘Sociologie et morale’, *ibid.*, Ref. 87, pp. 96-97.

He argued that Durkheim himself supported the demands of modern individualism. His *Division du travail* ‘demonstrates the necessity of a solidarity of a new type which will enable individuals to differentiate themselves, to seek their own way, to run their own risks, to think for themselves’ (Bouglé, *Socialismes français*, 5th edition (Paris: Armand Colin, 1951(1932)), p.14).


‘… it seems that the only individualism justified sociologically today is precisely that which asks the community to know how to impose itself and to dominate men, an individualism which is at the same time
both democratic and rationalist—and this is why we can say that by allowing itself to be guided by sociology, solidarism rediscovered the meaning of, and continued the work of, classical individualism, in order to extend it’ (C. Bouglé, Le Solidarisme (Paris: V. Giard & Brière, 1907), p.133. See also Bouglé, Solidarisme et Liberalisme (Paris: Edouard Cornély et Cie., 1915), pp. 34-48.  
98 In this whole debate about the State, argued Andler, what is forgotten is that the State does not exist: ‘There is nothing outside of the human group and the sum of individuals’ (Andler, ‘Du quasi-contrat social’, op.cit., Ref. 28, p.521). Andler cited, positively, Bourgeois’ argument that if the State were not a true being, there would be no problem of rights and duties towards the State, but rights and duties between men.  
99 Andler, ibid., pp. 521, 524.  
100 Andler, ibid., p. 524.  
101 Andler, ibid., pp. 525-26. Andler argues that ‘men in society are like a group of shareholders choosing a Board of Directors’. Even if the government was not chosen directly by us, even if it took that role through force, ‘from the moment that we profit from its management, from the moment that it contributes towards guaranteeing for us the collective heritage of material goods, ideas and morals, we are connected to it by equity, responsible to it for debts, as it is held to us by obligations’.  
102 Andler, ibid., pp. 526-527.  
103 Andler, ibid., p.530, emphasis Andler.  
104 Andler, ibid., p.530. Andler concluded this argument with the statement: ‘We propose for the doctrine thus defined the name of liberal socialism’.  
107 Malon, ibid., pp. 373-4.  
108 Vincent, Between Marxism, op.cit., Ref. 31, p.129.  
110 As Spitz points out this recognition of equality demanded ‘a sort of prior agreement, a will to live in common which translates and materialises this equality, which affirms a resolution to turn to the paths of cooperation rather than those of violence, to mutualism rather than to predatoriness [prédation]’ (Spitz, Le Moment, op.cit., Ref. 92, p.386).  
111 See Vincent, Between Marxism, op.cit., Ref. 31, p.65.  
112 Andler denied that the transition to socialism could only be through the violent ‘expropriation’ of the ‘expropriators’. The fact surplus value was largely derived from exchange opened up the possibility of the peaceful transition to socialism via purchase cooperatives. These, unlike production co-ops, were not forced by competition to take on a capitalist form, but would replace such a form, attracting workers to them and away from bourgeois commercial outlets (Andler, ‘Le role social des coopératives’, op.cit., Ref. 92, p.386).  
114 For proponents of the idea of liberty as non-domination, ‘the construction of a free political order requires the intervention of a political authority strong enough to institute equality between citizens and prevent instances of private domination from occurring and multiplying in civil society’. It also suggests that the main threat to liberty stems ‘from aristocracy, privilege, a caste mentality, and the private bodies that interpose themselves between the state and the people’, rather than from the democratic state (Spitz, ‘Illiberalism’, op.cit., Ref.1, p.254).  
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120 Vincent, Between Marxism, op.cit., Ref. 31, p.120. See Malon, Socialisme intégrale, op.cit., Ref. 62, pp. 399-404.  
121 Vincent, ibid., p.121. See Malon, ibid., pp. 209-63.  
122 None of these institutions would be run by either State or by commune. Rather, they would rent the concessions for these industries and services to associations, thus ‘retaining some control over their operation, but leaving room for worker control and initiative’ (Vincent, ibid., p.97).  
123 Vincent, ibid., pp.132-133.  
124 Vincent, ibid., p.124.  
126 Andler, ibid., p.xxix.
Andler, ibid.


Which he suggested ‘misunderstood the worth of spontaneous formations, and the superior utility of sub-centres of coordination that history had slowly formed, obeying in this the preference shown by nature for differentiation’ (C. Bouglé, Syndicalisme et Démocratie: impressions et réflexions (Paris: Edouard Cornély et compagnie, 1908), p.16).

Bouglé, ibid.

Bouglé, ibid., p.17, emphasis Bouglé.

Bouglé, ibid., p.18. Bouglé cites Paul-Boncour’s 1900 Fédéralisme économique which proposed that large federations can themselves regulate the diverse branches of production in the same nation.

Bouglé, ibid., p.23.

Bouglé, ibid., pp. 42-43.

On Lavergne see Audier, Le socialisme libérale, op. cit., Ref. 14, pp. 48-49.


See Bellamy, Liberalism, op. cit., Ref. 32, p. 72.

A 2015 OECD report stated that the richest 10% of the population earned 9.6 times the income of the poorest 10% in the OECD member states, and that in 2012 the bottom 40% owned only 3% of total household wealth, whilst the top 10% controlled half of all total household wealth, and the top 1% owned 18%. See OECD, In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015).


For example, Just as liberal socialists of the nineteenth century argued that true republican freedom requires some form of equality of opportunity, so ‘critical Republicans’ like Laborde, argue that that the non-domination at the root of republicanism—understood in a more general sense than Pettit’s defence of non-domination as a theory of freedom involving the absence of mastery by others—is contradicted by the ways in which the current form of the Republic, in making invisible the ethnic and racial discriminatory practices of the French Republic and proscribing mobilization around ethnicity, serves to legitimise discrimination, have sought to reimagine republicanism in ways which make it more inclusive of otherness, making the French Republic adequate to the diverse identities of the 21st century. See Laborde, Critical Republicanism, Ref.41.