


**INTER-ORGANISATIONAL COOPERATION FOR PEACE:  
BURGEONING RELATIONSHIP OR OPPORTUNISTIC  
LIAISON?**

**A STUDY OF THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION  
AND UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS IN THE DEMOCRATIC  
REPUBLIC OF CONGO 2003–2008**

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Thesis submitted to Kingston University, in fulfilment for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy, June 2013.



### **Declaration**

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## **Abstract**

The study seeks to understand the nature and development of the relationship between the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) in peacekeeping using the case of the peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) between 2003 and 2008. The EU deployment in 2003 of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in DR Congo represented an important shift in the role of regional organisations, as it was deployed outside its geographical setting for peacekeeping reasons. Furthermore, the co-deployment of EU and UN forces highlighted the changing pattern in peacekeeping, as regional organisations were starting to play an important role in burden sharing with the UN, thereby enhancing the notion of effective multilateralism. However the seemingly positive rhetoric emanating from the EU and UN about the partnership did not necessarily reflect the reality of the relationship.

Fundamental to the study are issues concerning the involvement of regional actors outside their geographical spheres. Key questions are raised regarding the motives of regional organisations and the UN. Such questions concern, for instance, the motives behind the UN calling for EU involvement in DR Congo (at the expense of the African Union and nations) and factors that persuaded the EU to answer the call.

The dynamics of the EU-UN cooperation are analysed from a political and operational dimension. Key components of the operational cooperation are essentially command and control, logistics and communication. The political cooperation components include the course taken by actors while using the structures

set up to aid the partnership and the already existing departments within both organisations that facilitated the initial interaction.

Further questions arise concerning cooperation between the UN and EU from the political and operational level. These include questions concerning the informal and formal mechanisms put into place to resolve the divergences between the missions. In addition, perceptions of the recipient people and the neighbouring states are examined in order to assess if this partnership is working or not.

The results of the research which entailed a number of interviews and an analysis of primary and secondary data show that the motives of the EU and UN, plus the dynamics of their cooperation can be analysed in a multi-layered paradigm involving the following levels of interaction:

- i) Operational level — MONUC and EUFOR RD Congo, IEMF, EUPOL and EUSEC
- ii) Political level — local and national actors
- iii) Political level — regional and international actors.

For instance, from an operational perspective the UN considered EU deployment as suitable especially for the provision of resources. The EU on the other hand viewed the deployment in DR Congo as an opportunity to become a global actor especially in the aftermath of the fallout from the US and its allies' invasion of Iraq.

The local, national and regional viewed the motivation for the involvement of the EU alongside the UN with suspicion. This was mainly based on the fact that key players like Belgium and France had vested interests in the DR Congo. There was dissatisfaction regarding the marginal military role given to the regional and continental powers yet the conflict was in their backyard.

The nature of the path of the cooperation, especially from an operational perspective, was not smooth. This can be attributed to the different organisational cultures and motivations between the organisations. The internal dynamics of individual organisations played a role in determining the level of cooperation between the two organisations.



In light of the above, the research came to several conclusions which included the fact that, due to the complex motives and differing aims of the actors, cooperation at the political level does not necessarily dovetail with cooperation at the operational level. Although the organisations have set up a system of collaboration through the declarations of 2003 and 2007, it has not been fully utilized. National and organisational interests and organisational culture among others can hinder cooperation. Nevertheless, despite a divide between the political and operational aspects of the missions, actors in the field have found ways of addressing operational problems, though significant issues remain concerning the viability of the methods used to address them in the long run.

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I would like to dedicate this work to my son Malachai Ethan Sempijja, you have come into a world that is full of contradictions and is quite unpredictable. Yet it is enjoyable and full of opportunities. May this piece of work give you an insight into the world and issues involved and may it be a launch pad for you as you find your footing in this world.

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## **Abbreviations**

ABAKO	Alliance des Bakongo
ACTORD	Activation Order
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
ADP	Alliance Democratique des Peuples
AFDL	Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo
AMIS Darfur	African Union Mission in Darfur
APOD	Aerial Port of Debarkation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian States
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CFL	Compagnie des Chemins de Fer du Congo Superieur aux Grands Lacs Africains
CEHC	Comité d'Etude du Haut-Congo
CEREA	Centre de Regroupement Africain
CESDP	Common European Security and Defence Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIVPOL	(United Nations) Civilian Police

CNDP	The National Congress for the People's Defence
CNP	Congolese National Police
CONADER	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-assignment
CONAKAT	Confédération des associations tribales du Katanga
COPS	Comité politique et de sécurité (see PSC)
Coreper	Comité des Représentants Permanents
Coreu	Correspondance européenne
CPC	Close Protection Corps
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSRP	Police Reform Monitoring Committee
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation and Reintegration
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, Repatriation and Rehabilitation
DDR/SSR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration/Security Sector Reform
DGE IX	Directorate General for External Relations
DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DR Congo	Democratic Republic of Congo
EACC	European airlift coordination cell
ECOWAS	Economic community of West African States
EC	European Council
EDA	European Defence Agency
EEC	European Economic Community
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUFOR Chad/CAR	European Union Force Chad/Central African Republic
EUFOR RD CONGO	European Union Force in Democratic Republic of Congo
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff

EUPOL Kinshasa	European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa
EUPOL DRC	European Union Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
EUPM	European Union Police Mission in Bosnia
EUSEC RD Congo	EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
FAR	Forces Armées Rwandaise
FARDC	Forces Armées De la RDC
FDD	Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie
FDLR	Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda
FLC	Front de Libération du Congo
FNLA	Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola
FSIFM	Forminière Société Internationale Forestière et Minière
GAC	General Affairs Council
SRSRG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
IAA	International African Association
IAC	International Association of Congo
IEMF	Interim Emergency Multinational Force
IPTF	International Police Task force
IPU	Integrated Police Unit
JJCM	Joint Justice and Coordination Mechanism
JMC	Joint Military Commission
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MLC	Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo
MNC	Mouvement National Congolais
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Liberacao de Angola
MRLZ	Mouvement Révolutionnaire pour la Libération du Zaïre
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NF	Neutral Force

NRA	National Resistance Army
OAS	Organisation of American States
OAU	Organisation of African States
OPLAN	Operation Plan
ONUC	The United Nations Operation in the Congo (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo)
PIR	Rapid Intervention Force
PNC	National Congolese Police
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSR	Police Spécial Roulage
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie
RCD-Goma	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie–Goma
RCD-ML	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie–Mouvement
RCD-N	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie–National
Relex	European Commission External Relations
RPF	Rwandese Patriotic Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SG/HR	Secretary General of the European Council/High Representative
SHIRBRIG	Standby High Readiness Brigade
TAL	Tactical Air Lift
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations African Mission in Darfur
UNDPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UNEF 1	United Nations Emergency Force
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNMBIH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNPOL	United Nation Police

UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia
UNTAG	United Nations Assistance Group in Namibia
UNFICYP	United Nations Peace Force in Cyprus
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPC	Union of Congolese Patriots
UPDF	Uganda People Defence Forces
WEU	Western European Union

## **Chapter 1**

### **Introduction**

On 30 May 2003, United Nations (UN) Security Council passed resolution 1484 authorising the European Union (EU) to intervene in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo). This was after it became apparent that its own forces were unable to stop the fighting that had erupted between the Hema and Lendu militias following the departure of Ugandan troops, creating a humanitarian crisis (UN, 2003, S/RES/1484 pp.1-2). DR Congo had experienced two wars waged by its neighbours, mainly Uganda and Rwanda, in support of various rebel groups from 1996. This had culminated in the overthrow of Mobutu who had been at the helm for over 30 years. The second Congo war was a result of the fall out between Mobutu's successor Laurent Kabila and Uganda and Rwanda, his allies. However, they could not dislodge him as he had been able to enlist the help of countries like Angola and Zimbabwe. The ensuing stalemate culminated in the Lusaka peace accord of 1999. The accord called for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force.

Although the UN had deployed under the terms of chapter VII of its charter (UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1291 (2000, p.4) it had proved to be incapable of dealing with the conflict effectively. This can be attributed to the fact that the Uruguayan forces that were deployed in Ituri region after the withdraw of Uganda were neither trained nor equipped to handle (Koenig p.2 2012) the crisis that developed as Hema and Hendu militias attacked each other. The only alternative was to call in outside help. The UN made a decision to call on the European Union to

intervene outside its geographical location in 2003 and 2006. The EU was further involved in the security sector reform commencing in 2005 and was key in training the police. The involvement of the EU continued up to 2008 when it declined to get involved militarily in the fighting involving General Nkunda who was fighting the DR Congo army in eastern part of the country (Gowan 2011, p.593). However the EU continues to be engaged in civil military roles.

## **1. Aims of the study**

Although over the last few years there has been a lot of literature on EU-UN cooperation in DR Congo, most of it has focussed on the UN-centric and EU perspective. This has not presented a complete picture of the collaboration between the two organisations. For instance, there has not been an adequate examination of the perception of local actors, regional and sub-regional organisations. Therefore, one of the aims of the study is to examine EU and UN cooperation including the views and perception of local actors.

Furthermore, the study seeks to extensively analyse inter-organisational cooperation involving regional organisations operating outside their geographical setting. This is because although a lot of literature deals with the involvement of the EU and UN in DR Congo, there is not enough that specifically addresses out of area operations by regional organisations. Yet it seems like the UN has faced similar problems when operating with the EU and NATO in DR Congo and Former Yugoslavia respectively. NATO and UN found it hard to coordinate their command and control and these difficulties are examples of the desire by international organisations to 'jealously guard their operational independence, resist a functional division of labour and ...only assent to collaboration schemes on a more flexible and less formal basis' (Koops in Brockman 2008, p.24). Consequently, EU-UN cooperation in DR Congo faced similar challenges and it is the aim of the study to consider these challenges in a wider context.

The EU's involvement in DR Congo showed that collaboration between the UN and regional organisations has reached another level, to the extent that the EU was operating out of its geographical setting. Thus in situations where even the regional

actors are not able to intervene, another regional organization can help, especially by providing humanitarian assistance. Therefore, the study aims to contribute to the already growing academic literature on intervention in conflicts by looking at aspects of cooperation involving motives and causes, in addition to the dynamics of the collaboration when implemented.

Although getting involved in DR Congo was presented as a humanitarian operation, it can be emphasised that the key players in the EU had underlying motives. These states such as France had economic interests in DR Congo like the exploitation of rare minerals. France also wanted to protect countries in the Francophone group from influences perpetuated by their Anglophone neighbours (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004, p.120). The EU as a political institution was seen as trying to project itself in the international arena as both a civilian and military power (Martin 2008, p.97), while European states like Hungary saw their support for operations like Artemis as a rite of passage to joining the EU (Jahier, 2010, pp.89-90). It is in the interest of the study to examine such assertions and discover other interests or motives that may not have been articulated.

The study seeks to further understand why and how the UN came to the decision of asking the EU to intervene in the conflict in DR Congo. There is a general consensus that international organisations can only act as far as their member states are willing to let them. Nevertheless when it comes to the United Nations studies do not go deep enough to gain an understanding of the organisational motives. There is a considerable gap in the literature on specific reasons, for instance why the UN sought EU intervention at the expense of African regional and sub-regional organisations. Prior to the launch of operation Artemis the idea of sending an African force into Ituri had been raised, but the UN opted for the EU. Therefore, understanding the reasons behind the UN's decision will help to bring to the fore its interests and those of its member states. Furthermore, the study will seek to understand whether these interests affect the nature of EU-UN cooperation both at the political and operational levels.



Additionally, the study seeks to address the gap in the knowledge about the dynamic of the political and operational cooperation between the EU and UN. Although a lot has been written about the political cooperation, especially on the bureaucratic level, not much literature exists on the operational level or even the political cooperation in the field. Coupled with that is the notion that the rhetoric normally adopted by both the EU and UN is that their cooperation is efficient yet crucial differences exist in the way missions are commanded, information is shared and logistical support is given. These three aspects do have considerable impact on the cooperation between the two organisations. Thus the study will seek to understand whether they cooperated or if there were instances of competition and non-cooperation.

Further still, cooperation between the EU and UN normally draws on the numerous lessons learnt from both organisations. However the study seeks to go further by drawing lessons from the collaboration between the EU and UN in DR Congo and exploring other ways to improve cooperation for future missions, through a model of inter-organisational cooperation efficiency. The study therefore aims to bring to the fore new norms and paradigms of cooperation that have developed between the two organisations through this model with a view to setting a benchmark for similar collaboration in the future. This benchmark will also be used for future collaborations with other organisations like the African Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Inter-organisation cooperation has become a growing field in international relations. Most literature on inter-organisational cooperation can be found in sociology and business studies. This view is also held by Biermann (2008, pp. 152-152) who notes that it 'has to an astonishing degree remained unnoticed by theoretically informed IR scholars and although there is expanding literature especially after the rapprochement between NATO and the EU, the process is still piecemeal and with little theoretical guidance. Empirical data about the links between the organizations are either dispersed in a huge body of writings or non-existent.' So the study also aims to contribute to the overall literature on inter-organisation cooperation in international relations.

## 2. Research questions

The research questions revolve around the level of cooperation between the EU and UN peacekeeping missions in DR Congo. The key question the study seeks to answer is whether the collaboration between the EU and UN is a burgeoning relationship or an opportunistic liaison. This question is important because, as noted earlier, there is a need to understand whether out of area operations by regional powers will become more prevalent or if it was merely a one-off occurrence. If it was a one-off occurrence then it raises important questions about the EU decision-making process especially in the aftermath of its refusal to intervene further in Eastern DR Congo in 2008. The lessons learnt from this cooperation will therefore either point towards the unsustainability of such ventures or enhance them as the UN seeks partners in conflict resolution worldwide.

The key question can be divided into other questions which include: what are the motivating factors for both the UN and the EU? This will help the study understand the reasons behind the collaboration. It will also help explore in further detail why organisations cooperate in general. For instance, there are strong grounds to ascertain the reasons why the French, upon receiving a request to intervene in DR Congo, decided to involve the EU. In the same vein, it is important to grasp the rationale behind the EU's favourable response to the French in launching Operation Artemis.<sup>1</sup> Other motivations to be unravelled revolve around the UN's decision to involve the EU ahead of the African Union.

Apart from seeking to understand the motives of the EU and UN, there is reasonable justification to examine the nature of the collaboration. Is the collaboration made up of equal partners and, if not, who sets the agenda? Although the UN is tasked with maintaining international peace and security and is the authorising body of any intervention, especially for states and regional actors, this does not mean that it will set the agenda of the partnership with these organisations or states. For instance, member states have a key role to play in deciding where the UN can intervene. So in

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<sup>1</sup> Operation Artemis was the code name given by the EU to the mission that was to be carried out by the interim emergency military force that had been requested by the UN in Security Council resolution 1484 to end the fighting in the Ituri region of DR Congo in 2003 (Cullborg 2010 p.26).

the same vein regional organisations also have member states that have interests and may make demands before partnering with the UN.

Another issue is to determine whether the two organisations cooperate on the operational and political level and if not why? Furthermore, does the cooperation vary at different levels? For instance, is the collaboration between the EU and UN good on the political but not so impressive on the operational level, or vice versa? Why is this so? What does it illuminate in terms of the overall nature of this collaboration?

Finally, another sub-question involves understanding the perception of third parties regarding the EU-UN collaboration in DR Congo, for example the Congolese people, and regional and sub-regional actors involved in the conflict such as Uganda, Rwanda and SADC States. Therefore, although the perception of both the EU and UN is important to gain an understanding of the kind of relationship they have, it is also important to get the views of the third parties mentioned above on the partnership. These actors can shed more light on whether this is a burgeoning partnership or an opportunistic liaison.

### **3. Hypothesis**

The argument of the study is that although inter-organisational cooperation in crisis management is justified by the partnering organisations as motivated by efficient humanitarianism, this is not normally the only reason. Usually, the underlying aim is the pursuit of interests that are relevant to the organisations or their key members. The viability of the underlying motives normally affects both the political and operational cooperation negatively, usually resulting in a disconnection between the positive rhetoric on the political level and instances of non-cooperation on the operational level. It is important not to forget that lack of cooperation still occurs at the political level too. It is essential to note that the EU and UN are both run by member states and can only act as far as and in the way these states are willing to allow them. For instance, the refusal to reinforce the UN peacekeepers during the Rwandan genocide was spearheaded by the United States of America (a member of the UN Security Council) which did not believe it was in its interests to intervene

(Rory Carroll, *The Guardian* 31/3/2004), even though Rwanda was a member of the United Nations.

Likewise Key EU states like Germany, France and Britain are known to pursue their own interests. For instance, at the beginning of the Former Yugoslavia conflict, Germany pre-empted the recognition by the EU of Slovenia and Croatia due to domestic pressure (Postnikov and Boylan, 2011, p.4).

It can be deduced that, to a large extent intervention is normally driven by the interests of the intervening states or organisations. A case in point is that major EU military involvement in Africa has involved ex-colonial powers intervening in their backyard. For example, the EU intervened in the Central African Republic (Hari, J., *The Independent* 5<sup>th</sup> October 2007) and Chad (*BBC news*, 6<sup>th</sup> February 2008), both former French colonies, and France was heavily involved in each. Although the UN charter does not prevent regional organisations from intervening in areas outside their geographical setting, the decision by the EU to intervene appears to have more to do with its interests and those of its member states rather than being a largely humanitarian perspective.

The UN, for its part, appeared to go for the convenience of having France available and ready to deploy, yet ignored its chequered history in the Great Lakes region, especially its involvement in the genocide in Rwanda (Davies, L., *The Guardian* 25<sup>th</sup> February 2010). Although most African states that were able to deploy were not ready or had a stake in the DR Congo conflict, France fell into a similar category of having self-interest in DR Congo (Dahlburg, J., *Los Angeles Times* 9<sup>th</sup> May 1997). The only difference was that it had the capability to deploy quickly, knew the region and, above all, was a member of the UN Security Council. This could have made it easier for the UN to authorise its involvement and the addition of the EU into the equation gave the UN more flexibility as it could use chapter VIII of its Charter to authorise EU intervention.

As will be examined later, the lack of communication between the EU and UN during the reconnaissance mission by the French before the launch of Operation Artemis, and the refusal to “re-hat” the personnel, highlighted the view that there

may have been different motivations for EU involvement and that these may not have been only humanitarian. This may be further supplemented by the instances of non-cooperation in the field of operation and the fact that not much information was shared between the two organisations due to the EU's fear that information would be leaked out to the public by the UN. Coupled with this is the fact that the EU had a strong individual national presence in DR Congo, such as France and Belgium, which pursued their own interests bilaterally with the DR Congo government. This made it hard for the UN to find out the actual policy being pursued by the EU in DR Congo.

Therefore, to a large extent, the pursuit of interests by the EU and its member states combined with the UN seeking convenience (as examined above) portray the EU-UN partnership as more of an opportunistic liaison than a burgeoning relationship.

#### **4. Time frame**

Although the study delves into the background to the DR Congo conflict and EU-UN involvement, the time frame for the research is limited to the period going from 2003 and 2008. 2003 is the year when the European Union launched Operation Artemis, which marked the beginning of its military involvement as an entity. This does not mean that it was not involved initially, as the EU member states contribute to the UN peacekeeping forces. Nevertheless, although both organisations are still involved in DR Congo, the research time frame ends in 2008. This is because, in 2008, the security situation in DR Congo deteriorated again as dissident troops of General Nkunda attacked the government troops in the eastern part of the country and the UN asked the EU for a bridging mission that never materialised (Justaert and Keukeleire, 2009, p.14). Since that time there has not been any military deployment in DR Congo by the EU. Thus, it is fitting to end the research period in 2008.

When the EU-UN collaboration was initiated, different mechanisms and structures were put into place to aid it. However the interaction between the two organisations has not always been through the formal structures set out in the declarations of 2003 and 2007. For instance although the rhetoric called for 'pursuit of the establishment of specific coordination and cooperation mechanisms for crisis situations where the

UN and the EU are jointly engaged' (Council of the European Union 7, June 2007) In 2007 declaration, the EU did not positively respond to UN's call for intervention in 2008 as explained above. Therefore other methods of cooperation have been taking place and have helped in developing of the different features of the inter-organisational cooperation efficiency model.

## **5. Sources and methods**

### **5.1. Study design and sources**

Gathering information for the empirical work involved extensive field research based largely on in-depth interviews with the relevant EU policy makers in Brussels and field officers in DR Congo. Additional interviews were conducted with MONUC military officers, civilian police and representatives in the department of political affairs based in Kinshasa and New York. Diplomatic officials and civilians from DR Congo, Rwanda and Uganda were also interviewed. Between July 2007 and February 2013, 31 interviews were conducted in Kinshasa, Paris, Brussels and London, plus telephone interviews were held with participants based in New York, Brussels and Kampala.

The interviews were semi-structured, in that participants were presented with a set of questions, though the discussion followed a flexible approach which allowed the interviewees to give their observations, perceptions and experiences. Information collected from the interviews was substantiated with primary and secondary materials. EU and UN publications, reports, press releases and media coverage on EU-UN cooperation were methodically examined to corroborate assertions made in the interviews.

## 5.2. Interpretation of data

The research instruments involve an intertwining of primary and secondary materials which are analysed using conceptual tools to interpret the data gathered. These conceptual tools will also be useful in gaining an understanding of the ideological motivation of the actors and, at the same time, acting as interpretative tools.

There are some good grounds to the claim that one of the chief ideological and practical motivations of the actors in the study may be the pursuit of national interests (which are geared towards maximising their power in the international system) by key states (Lynn-Jones, 1998, pp.59-60) in the EU, which will be examined in relation to their actions and policies within the EU framework in dealing with the United Nations in DR Congo. In addition, the motives of the organisations themselves regarding why and when they deal with each other will be assessed. The pursuit of interests, both organisational and national, will provide the foundation for the conceptual framework.

Further, the pursuit of interests can fulfil a dual purpose as it can operate as an interpretative tool which will be used to examine the different actions (subtle or overt) of actors, both from a political and operational level.

At the same time the pursuit of liberal norms and values appears to be an important ideological motivation for the understanding of the very foundations on which international institutions like the UN and EU are based. Therefore although states pursue national interests even when they subscribe to organisations like the EU and UN, there are norms and values that have been for instance in the universal declaration of human rights that cannot be ignored. Furthermore values such as the respect for human life and therefore a need for humanitarianism are important parts of international policy. The pursuit of such values can lead to cooperation between international organisations.

In the same way that the pursuit of national and organisational interests can be used as an interpretative tool, the same applies to the pursuit of liberal norms and values.

For instance liberal norms are premised on the view that although human beings are selfish and competitive, this is only the case to a certain point as they share numerous aspirations and can get involved in combined and mutual social action both on the domestic and international front (Robert and Sorensen, 2007, p.98).

Therefore, the pursuit of common values and ideals such as democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights may be seen as the driving force of cooperation between states. This ideological motivation can be attributed to inter-organisational cooperation, especially between the EU and UN. Since both organisations subscribe to these values and ideals, the same can be used to examine their relationship.

The positive disposition of both organisations towards respect for human rights, rule of law and democracy can be used to verify whether or not they cooperate both on the political and operational level. For example, peace building processes are, in general, premised on these very norms. So is this sufficient to account for the cooperation between the two organisations? Since both pursue similar policies, is there a problem of duplication and competition, especially in the post-2006 election era for the case of DR Congo? Moreover, are all their decision-making processes purely based on these norms or are there other factors at play in the EU-UN collaboration?

Further interpretative tools used in the study revolve around socially constructed norms like identity and interests. They are based on the notion that the most essential facet of international relations is social, not material. So the social aspect is not something peripheral to the observer of international affairs. Jackson Robert and George Sorensen (2007, p.165) argue that the 'social and political world including the world of international relations is not a physical entity or material object that is outside human consciousness.'

As constructs, the two norms of interest and identity are inter-linked and one may determine the other. States pursue diverse interests with different states. For example, Uganda may pursue peaceful and trade fostering interests with Tanzania



because it is within the East African community<sup>2</sup> and poses less of a security threat. So, membership to the East African community is an identity which may dispel security fears because both states are on the same side due to the different treaties of integration that have been signed by the member states.

However, this may not be the case with DR Congo as it is not a member of the East African community is internally unstable and was identified at one time as a breeding ground for rebel groups which destabilised Uganda (Borzello, *The Guardian*, 5<sup>th</sup> May 1999). So immediately there is a difference in interests pursued by Uganda towards DR Congo. Uganda, therefore, identifies it as a security threat.

From the above it is evident that identities are intrinsically relational (Wendt 1992 p.397). So states can have a number of identities depending on the relationship with other states (ibid, p.398). These identities create a platform for the different interests pursued by the states. Wendt notes that state interests and identities are figured and modified within the international system (ibid p.393, p.410, p.423). This therefore can help to explain why states cooperate or join international organisations, a development which self-interest and liberal norms fail to adequately provide.

As a result, norms like identity and interest can go a long way towards explaining the cooperation and non-cooperation at both political and operational level between the EU and UN. Answering a question about why the UN asked France to intervene in DR Congo in 2003 may throw up a few reasons, depending on the view of the third parties. Some obvious reasons point to DR Congo's status as a francophone nation. Another reason is associated with French activity in the region and the UN's desire for a quickly formed stabilizing element in the Ituri region, which had been spiralling out of control. Other issues, especially why France asked the EU to join it, come into question. Had France identified a niche that would enhance the EU's reputation and reduce NATO's involvement with the EU?

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<sup>2</sup> 'The East African Community (EAC) is the regional intergovernmental organisation of the Republics of Kenya, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Republic of Rwanda and Republic of Burundi with its headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania.... The EAC aims at widening and deepening co-operation among the Partner States in, among others, political, economic and social fields for their mutual benefit.' The East African Community (accessed 7/6/12)

Other interpretative tools are derived from organisational analysis and organisational theory. This kind of approach mainly involves the dynamics between the organisations, the environment in which they operate, and the actors, including individuals and their role in either fostering cooperation or conflict between the organisations.

Lipson (2005, p.3) argues that operational cooperation or coordination is a prerequisite for operational success and failure can have dysfunctional effects on current and future peace operations. The resulting frustration with difficulties can lead powerful states to avoid multilateral engagement. For instance, the refusal of a UN role and the sharp severance between the military and civilian implementation effort in Afghanistan by the US-led NATO 'were to a significant extent driven by a misreading of the previous UN and NATO experiences in Bosnia, especially the infamous 'dual key' arrangements under which both UN and NATO officials had to approve the use of air power and the targets that could be attacked. Thus, coordination failures not only endanger the missions in which they occur, they tend to reverberate in later crises.'

Of particular relevance is the strategic framework approach, which will be used to examine the relationship between the UN as a lead coordinator in DR Congo before the 2006 elections. The resulting analysis of relationship between the EU and UN after the election of the DR Congo government can go some way to explaining the long-term motives and aspirations of the EU, and may help explain the change in dynamics of the relationship between the EU and UN with regard to providing a common front while dealing with the DR Congo government, especially on institutional development and the overall peace building process.

Other concepts used in inter-organisational analysis are known as formal and informal networking, and for the purpose of this study these will be compared and contrasted when examining the operational cooperation between the EU and the UN. Key questions that arise are attributed to whether there are informal EU and UN networks working along the formal structure in DR Congo. If so, why are they in existence? But also are they working and operating in their purest sense or are they just temporary and barely detectable by the political authorities? If they have been

detected by the political hierarchy, what has it done to address the needs that have led to the development of informal networks? Or is the political hierarchy supportive of them because they suit its interests?

The other key analytical components involve the role of individuals, which can also be linked to the development of informal networks, as it is individual relationships that culminate in informal cooperation. Koops (in: Brockmann, 2008, p.23) also highlights the 'alumni effect', which concerns the switching of personnel from one organisation to another. Also known as double-hatting, this is a key facet of inter-organisational cooperation and whether it is used or not will be vital when examining the conflict and cooperation between the EU and UN in DR Congo.

Overall, when analysing EU-UN cooperation, the identification of linkages between interests, ideals, identities and networks are particularly relevant. For instance the ideals that an organisation pursues can become a form of identity and can act as a basis by which interests are also formulated. Organisations with similar ideals can identify with each other and may pursue similar interest. For instance both the EU and UN are committed to multilateralism and as Koops noted European Security Strategy in December 2003 envisioned the 'EU's commitment to a rule-based international order with a capable and credible United Nations system at its core. This means upholding the UN Charter against breaches of its principles and norms, if necessary with military force. Consequently, strengthening the UN, particularly in the field of crisis management and conflict prevention has become a top priority in the EU's pursuit of effective multilateralism' (Koops, 2007, p.1).

Sometimes the divergence of these ideals leads to competition or non-contact between organisations. But the pursuit of these ideals may end up forcing some of the actors on ground to form informal networks to see to the fulfilment of goals. The formation of informal networks is usually through constructed norms such as identical culture, which eases the communication and builds trust. But this has a major flaw in that actors from a different culture may get sidelined, which limits cooperation between the organisations. Nevertheless, similar interests and ideals can also help in designing a cooperation framework that adequately meets the aspirations of all the actors.

## 6. Towards a model of inter-organisational cooperation efficiency

When examining UN and NATO collaboration, Kille and Hendrickson (2010, p.29) observed that most of the literature ‘focuses primarily on organizational coordination and conflict based out of shared engagement in operational missions. What is missing from this research is a close analysis of the growth in interaction across a number of other inter-institutional forums, which includes the intensified coordination between the Secretaries-General, the UN’s growing interest in building cooperation with regional organizations ... and the agreements and institutional offices created to foster cooperation and discourage rivalry.’

The above observation can be applied to EU-UN cooperation. As examined earlier, the different models examine the operational scenarios and it is very hard to delve into the interactions between the organisations on for instance the political level. Through this study a model was developed to help analyse the collaboration between the two organisations on the political and operational level and at the same time work as a guide for future cooperation. This model puts into practice what Kille and Hendrickson aspire for above.

Cropper et al. (2008, p.11) postulate that ‘inter-organisational relationships are described on the basis of dyadic or multilateral data. Typically researchers observe ‘values’ for the relationship(s) between two or more organisations (e.g. the extent of information exchange, the mechanisms governing the relationship, the power imbalance, or the degree to which the organisations in a relationship have particular attributes in common.’ Indeed the model at different stages examines the above-mentioned values, as will be shown in the analysis below.

When discussing the nature of relationships between organisations Cropper et al. (2008, p.11) further argue that ‘there are two (not mutually exclusive) dimensions across which organisations can be related. They can have: an interactive relationship, for instance in the exchange of information or resources or a non-interactive relationship when they share particular attributes – such as status, identity, cognitive

structures, strategic positioning, or core technology.’ The model focuses on the interactive relationship between the EU and UN.

The model is multi-dimensional and multi-layered with different frameworks and variables. The model uses the international system, nation state and individual levels of analysis. It has a four-dimensional set up which includes political cooperation, operational cooperation, hard cooperation and soft cooperation. These dimensions are made up of multiple layers whose characteristics and interactions with dimensions have the propensity to improve or derail inter-organisational cooperation.

### **6.1 Levels of analyses and components of the model**

EU-UN cooperation will be examined on four different levels of analysis. This is because a single level cannot fully help to analyse the cooperation between the two organisations. The first level of analysis is the international system and can be applied to the model’s institutional layer. This level of analysis is especially relevant to the institutional layer because both organisations have their unique identity in the international arena. Therefore it is important to examine their collaboration in the international environment. There is a need to ask: ‘to what extent do opportunities or developments at the level of the international environment constrain or enable actions for the EU’ (Koops 2011, p.34) and UN as global players?

Further still this level of analysis, according to Singer (1961, p.80):

‘is the most comprehensive of the levels available, encompassing the totality of interactions which take place within the system and its environment. By focusing on the system, we are enabled to study the patterns of interaction which the system reveals, and to generalize about such phenomena as the creation and dissolution of coalitions, the frequency and duration of specific power configurations, modifications in its stability, its responsiveness to changes in formal political institutions, and the norms and folklore which it manifests as a societal system. In other words, the systemic level of analysis, and only this level, permits us to examine international relations on the

whole, with a comprehensiveness that is... lost when our focus is shifted to a lower, and more partial, level.'

The problem with this level of analysis is that 'it tends to lead the observer into a position which exaggerates the impact of the system upon the national actors and, conversely, discounts the impact of the actors on the system... Secondly, this particular level of analysis almost inevitably requires that we postulate a high degree of uniformity in the foreign policy operational codes of our national actors' (Singer 1961, p.80).

Therefore, there is a need to also analyse the cooperation between the EU and UN at the nation state level. This level of analysis can be applied to the model's second layer made up of state actors and for the case of the DR Congo conflict this includes EU member states like France, Belgium and Germany to name but a few. Some of the other states include regional ones such as Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Burundi.

This layer and level of analysis gives a good foundation for the model in that 'it permits significant differentiation among our actors in the international system. Because it does not require the attribution of great similarity to the national actors, it encourages the observer to examine them in greater detail. The favourable results of such intensive analysis cannot be overlooked, as it is only when the actors are studied in some depth that we are able to make really valid generalizations of a comparative nature' Singer 1961 (pp.82-83).

It should be noted that the nation state level of analysis also has a few weaknesses like leading to distortions resulting from 'a marked exaggeration of the differences among our sub-systemic actors... in overemphasizing the differences among the many national states, the observer is prone to attribute many of what he conceives to be virtues to his own nation and the vices to others, especially the adversaries of the moment' (Singer, 1961, p.83).

Therefore, it is important to employ a third level of analysis which epitomises the role of the individual (Koops 2011, p.35) in the model. In international politics

individuals play a big role in decision-making. For instance, Koffi Annan was crucial in the decision to ask France to get involved in DR Congo. Likewise, the cooperation between the two organisations at the operational level, as will be examined, has been influenced greatly by individuals.

The inter-organisational level crowns the levels of analysis and it is mainly relevant because it is of crucial significance in gauging the integrative dynamics of multilateralism and focuses on how organisations like the EU and UN affect each other (Koops 2011, p.35).

The model is further comprised of the third layer of the model which consists of the local and regional actors. The local actors are mainly the DR Congo government, the opposition parties, militias and the local masses while the regional actors are the states that were involved in the conflict like Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Namibia and Chad. This layer epitomises two levels of analysis: the nation state and the individual level of analysis. Individuals like the Congolese nationals and government officials are important to understanding this layer.

The different layers of the model have a complex relationship. For instance, the different institutions have member states which are also found in the second layer. Moreover, the third layer has components of the second layer so the layers are permeable and interact quite often, as will be examined later.

The model is further made up of frameworks such as a legal framework that is essential to understanding the rationale for political cooperation as a dimension, for example. Organisations need legal apparatus in which to operate. For instance Koops, in Brockmann, et al. 2008, (p.22) identifies contractual formalisation of the collaboration which gives both parties a chance to help with giving clear demarcation on the division of labour and also to set up a hierarchy of leaders.

Furthermore, Kille and Henderson (2010, p.32) quoting from Smith (1995, p.68) note that it is 'widely accepted that only the global UN could confer the necessary degree of political legitimacy on a multilateral peacekeeping operation.' Therefore,

the legal framework is important to understanding the dynamics and motives of the cooperation between international organisations.

However, when this legal apparatus fails to foster cooperation or is bypassed for one reason or another during the interaction between organisations, other frameworks can be adopted. Such frameworks include informal processes and networks. These, as argued by Lipson (2005), will be examined later and may become an alternative if the course through the formal structure is sluggish, clogged, or even unsuitable for the assignment in place. Conversely, 'such arrangements may complement formal structures, compensating for their weaknesses' (ibid, p.24).

The model is further made up of variables which filter through dimensions, layers and permeate frameworks thereby creating dynamics during the cooperation. Such variables include; geographical space, time, the motives of the actors, identities and interests, alumni effect and the role of individuals, familiarity with theatre of operation and cultural similarity.

Missions are normally sent into a given geographical space and although the UN for the case of DR Congo has covered most of the country, the EU military operations concentrated on given areas like Kinshasa (EUFOR RD Congo) in 2006 and the Ituri region (Operation Artemis) in 2003. EUPOL was initially concentrated in Kinshasa but came to gradually cover the rest of the country. However, it only involves civil military officials who are mobile and are engaged in training. The same applies to EUSEC because it also has officials operating in a mobile capacity.

As will be discussed later, the limited nature of the geographical scope of operations like Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo gave them success in the short run but barely had any long-term benefits.

Time is another variable developed in the model that is important to gaining an understanding of inter-organisational cooperation and improving its efficiency. The time frame set for the launch and withdrawal of an operation affects how the collaborating organisation responds. If the response is not on time, for instance in the case of a bridging mission, once the initial mission has been withdrawn the



efficiency of the cooperation between the two organisations will be affected. This is because a power vacuum may be created and the successor mission may struggle to fill it quickly. Nevertheless there are factors that affect the time frame of an operation, some of which include logistics, the mandate and national/organisational interests/motives of the actors.

The motives of the actors involve the aspirations of the organisations as entities, the member states and the individuals. This linkage leads organisations, states and individuals to act in a particular way to achieve the desired interests. For instance the French interests in Africa had a bearing on President Chirac's decision to agree to intervene in 2003. The UN may have known about French interests but could have been driven by the desire to see the conflict ended quickly as the French were capable of accomplishing that. By drawing the EU into the intervention France was able to conceal its aspirations under the EU banner while at the same time achieving the desired motive of having the EU as a global actor Jahier (2010, p.85).

The aforementioned variable further displays a complex relationship within the variables as it has links with the role of the individual. Further still it links with variables like identity and familiarity with the theatre of operation. For example, France had been identified as the Gendarme of Africa and DR Congo was a Francophone country.

In the same vein the alumni effect, especially when the UN was taking over from the IEMF, could have helped the cooperation. However its refusal to re-hat its officials negatively affected the operation. Conversely, the IEMF was desirous to leave the Ituri region due to the fact that its mandate was coming to an end. However the Security Council would have provided a mandate if needed.

Thus from the above it is evident that the dynamics of the relationship between organisations that are based on different dimensions are affected by the diverse actors within the layers, operating within the aforementioned frameworks but acting under the influence of different variables.

## **7. Dimensions of inter-organisational cooperation efficiency**

### **7.1 Hard cooperation**

In order to define the term hard cooperation, there is a need to separate it into two words and then coalesce it into an operational definition. The term 'hard' stands for many things but in the case of the study it will be defined within the confines of being 'rigid' (Oxford dictionaries online accessed 1/6/2012).

Cooperation can be defined as 'the process of working together to the same end' (Oxford dictionaries online accessed 1/6/2012). From the above we can deduce that hard cooperation is the process of working together between two or more parties to achieve a common purpose but within rigid boundaries.

Lipson (2005) provides insights into hard cooperation when examining inter-organisational coordination. He uses terms like formal coordination which has the attributes of hard cooperation, as to him it 'involves redrawing organizational charts, the explicit assignment of authority and responsibility, and specification of procedures.'

Therefore, overall hard cooperation can be defined as a process of coordination between two or more parties to achieve a common purpose but within rigid boundaries where there is clear authority and duty allocation plus a lucid method of operation.

### **7.2 Soft cooperation**

Soft cooperation has mainly come to involve the flexibility of the actors, both on the political and operational level. This flexibility has bypassed the normally rigid set up of both organisations and has helped to overcome some of the obstacles to the cooperation. However this flexibility has been achieved mainly through the role of individuals working within frameworks like informal processes and networks. Although soft cooperation may be viewed as the opposite of hard cooperation it is not necessarily a replacement as certain aspects of hard cooperation are required, for instance to provide a legal structure within which the organisations can operate.

When examining informal coordination Lipson (2005, p.14) notes certain characteristics that are similar to soft cooperation. For instance, he notes that it 'develops spontaneously through social networks and ad hoc responses to interdependence' (Lipson 2005, p.14).

Therefore, soft cooperation can be defined as a process of coordination between two or more parties to achieve common purposes through the use of informal networks and processes which normally develop through social networks and improvised responses to interdependence.

### **7.3 Political cooperation**

Political cooperation involves the formation of dialogue structures to facilitate the cooperation. Furthermore, Abu-Alam, (2005, p.3) contends that 'political agreement... is needed to forge the necessary legal framework' to foster the cooperation. This may involve declarations of cooperation or memorandums of understanding. This sets into motion the channels and modes of communication between the organisations.

Political cooperation between international organisations is significant in many ways. A case in point is that smooth political cooperation helps the organisations to synchronise their activities in the field. For example, there is a need to understand the division of labour, especially once field operations start. Besides, it is important to set out the parameters of the roles to be played by each organisation.

### **7.4 Operational cooperation**

Operational cooperation, as will be examined in Chapter Six, involves a mechanism of interaction in the field of operation in spheres like the sharing of logistics, communication and coordinating command and control. For the case of the UN and EU in DR Congo it has been deduced that the EU has a separate command and control structure from the UN but every now and then the two organisations

cooperated with joint operations, as was the case in Kinshasa in 2006. They also shared information, though as examined earlier the EU had a strict policy on sharing sensitive information with the UN. According to sources H and U the two organisations sometimes shared logistics while in the field when it came to training the police force in Kinshasa. Source B also cited moments of sharing logistics when the EU supplied the UN with man power and equipment to monitor the media during the elections in 2006.

## **8. Layers and actors**

The model of inter-organisational cooperation efficiency, as discussed earlier, is imbued with four layers which help to gain a better understanding of the level at which the cooperation takes place, how to improve the non-cooperation and reduce the competition.

### **8.1 Institutional layer (The EU and the UN)**

In order to understand inter-organisational cooperation efficiency it is essential to examine the institutional layer which involves the EU and UN. From an institutional perspective, the two organisations are first and foremost engaged in a network as security actors. This network includes other organisations like NATO and the African Union to name but a few. According to Johnsen et al. (in Cropper et al., 2008, p.76) a network is 'a specific type of relation linking a defined set of persons, objects or events.' Since the UN is the international body tasked with the maintenance of international peace and security, the relationship with the EU and other regional organisations as mentioned above creates a specific network.

Johnsen et al. (in Cropper et al., 2008, p.77) go further to define networks as 'the total pattern of relationships within a group of organisations acting in order to achieve common goals.' These networks have core elements like 'actors, activities and resources... actors are defined by the activities they perform and the resources they control; they are connected to other actors via resources and activities' (Johnsen et al. in Cropper et al., 2008 p.77).

Therefore, both the EU and UN have a common goal of maintaining international peace and security and as actors they are connected to each other by the resources they control, for instance as will be examined below, the UN is the legitimising power in the international system. Therefore with an EU seeking to become a global actor working with a UN mandate gives it legitimacy. However it should be noted that it is not in every circumstance that the EU needs UN legitimisation. For instance the EU deployed EUSEC and EUPOL Kinshasa (later DR Congo) without UN authorisation.

Nevertheless this crucial position in the international system is what Kenis and Oerlemans (in Cropper 2008, p.296) refer to as position embeddedness. To them position embeddedness refers to:

‘the fact that the position of an organisation in a network influences its ability to access information about potential partners as well as its visibility and its attractiveness to other organisations... the more central an actor’s network position, the more likely it will have better information about a larger pool of potential partners... At the same time central actors are themselves more attractive to potential partners as their central position signals their willingness, experience and ability to enter into partnerships.’

Therefore since the UN is centrally located in the network of international security organisations, it can select potential partners from a large pool like it did in 2003 when it chose France and EU at the expense of a coalition of African forces. Conversely the centrality of the UN in the international system has made it more attractive for potential partners like the EU which were pursuing multilateralism, especially in the wake of the fall out of the 2003 Iraq invasion by the USA and Britain.

Regarding the network structure in which the EU and UN operate, it can be argued that:

‘is a repository of information and therefore is used in deciding with whom to build a new tie in that risk and uncertainty are fundamental to partner selection... organisations tend to select partners with whom they are familiar and on whom they are likely to have rich information. A useful source of such information seems to be the network in which organisations are mutually embedded. Consequently, organisations will choose relationships with partners within their own networks. Kenis and Oerlemans (in Cropper 2008, p.296).


This further explains why the UN decided to work with France and the EU in 2003 during the Ituri crisis and not a conglomeration of African states. This principle can be applied on both an institutional and individual level, as will be examined later.

It should be noted however that both organisations are multi-structured in that although they have organs that help them function like the Security Council for the UN and the Council for the EU; they do have member states which provide the man power to run these organs. This leads to a multiplicity of interests and agendas as each state has its own aspirations which will be pursued as long as that state belongs to that particular organisation.

Therefore since the two organisations are run by member states which decide what actions they will take in the international arena, this presents them as complex with internal dynamics which affects the way they interact with each other. For instance, a deadlock in the UN Security Council due to competing interests may prevent an intervention which may have been ruled as a threat to international peace and security. A case in point is the downgrading of the UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. So, the unpredictable nature of the UN can affect the efficiency of cooperation with other organisations.

Similarly, the EU member states decides on the actions it can take on an international scale. For instance, although the EU helped the UN out in 2003 and 2006 it was not willing to do so in 2008 when MONUC became overwhelmed by General Nkunda's forces in Eastern DR Congo.

Fig. 1. Illustration of the different inter-links between the EU and UN plus member states



From the illustration above the complexity of the cooperation between organisations can be examined. Furthermore, the extra dimension of the member states cannot be underestimated as international organisations can only do as much as their member states are willing to allow them. As a consequence of this complexity the member states have developed a range of groups and subgroups plus frameworks. For instance, during the conflict in former Yugoslavia the UN, EU and NATO were the leading actors in trying to resolve the conflict. However, other groups like the contact group emerged as key players especially in reaching diplomatic solutions (NATO, accessed 1/5/2010). Yet, the member states of the contact group also included members of the EU like the United Kingdom and France which at the same time were members of the UN Security Council. Others, like the United States, were part of NATO and the UN Security Council. Other member states like Germany and Italy, although not members of the UN Security Council were members of the EU. Russia on the other hand was a member of the Security Council (United States Information Agency, accessed 3/1/2009).

Therefore, as the need to cooperate between international organisations has developed, it has become imperative to develop a functioning framework to facilitate the cooperation. This is also noted by Cropper et al. (2008, pp.11-12) who state that one of the main dimensions of an interactive relationship among organisations is the governance mechanism. Yet even with the framework or governance mechanism, cooperation efficiency is not guaranteed, especially due to varying strategies, interests and goals set by different organisations. Also, the organisations have different operational frameworks that are sometimes in direct conflict with the organisations they are working with. For instance, although the EU and UN signed joint declarations in 2003 and 2007 cooperation between them was not as smooth as it could have been. As will be examined in the subsequent chapters there was mutual suspicion between the two organisations, especially regarding the sharing of information (Source H, interviewed 5<sup>th</sup> July 2007).

## 8.2. State actors

As examined under the layer involving the EU and UN, states play a major role in the running of international organisations. These state actors are also vital when it comes to inter-organisational efficiency. Although inter-organisational cooperation efficiency applies to an array of states in the international system, for the purpose of this study it is important to examine the role and aims of states like Belgium and France which are members of both the EU and UN. This is not to discount the role of other states like Germany in the EUFOR RD Congo mission and its desire to forge closer relations with its former foes within the EU structures (Jahier, 2010, p.86) or other states like Hungary which contributed to the IEMF in order to gain ascension to the EU (ibid, pp.89–90). However Belgium has been chosen for illustration purposes because, as examined earlier, it was the former colonial master of DR Congo and played a key role alongside France in getting the EU to launch military operations in DR Congo.

France on the other hand sees DR Congo as its domain of influence and has been active in the Great Lakes region, as exemplified in the controversial operation *Turquoise*. France was contacted by the Secretary General about launching an operation in DR Congo and acted as the framework nation during Operation *Artemis*. France has maintained a presence in the region and influences EU and UN policies concerning DR Congo.

Other state actors include regional powers like Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Burundi and Zimbabwe in addition to South Africa. Their actions in DR Congo, for instance the invasions and the impasse that led to the Lusaka Peace accord in 1999, prompted the cooperation between the EU and UN. Furthermore, their perception of the cooperation is important to understand, regarding whether it was efficient or not and helps with planning a way to make it more efficient.



### 8.3 Local and regional actors

When analysing inter-organisational cooperation efficiency, local and regional actors in the area where the organisations are collaborating serve as good pointers as to whether the collaboration is efficient or not. For the case of the EU and UN cooperation in DR Congo, the local actors include the DR Congo government, different contending forces including militias and parties and the population at large. The regional actors include states with security, economic and social interests in DR Congo. For instance Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Namibia, South Africa and Congo-Brazzaville to mention but a few.

It should be noted that this layer is linked with the state actors to some extent and provides a complex relationship between the layers. For instance the regional actors are also members of the UN and therefore have an interest in debates relating to the conflict resolution process in DR Congo. These interactions can affect the cooperation between the organisations either positively or negatively. A case in point is that if France had failed to secure the cooperation of Rwanda and Uganda before the launch of operation Artemis, this would have jeopardised the cooperation as both countries, apart from having participated in the conflict, had militias that were bankrolling in the conflict. This is given credence by Fruchart's (2007) assertion that even after withdrawing from DR Congo 'Rwanda continued supplying RCD-Goma with arms from December 2002 until at least August 2003' (Fruchart 2007, p.8). It should also be noted that the different layers have been permeated by different frameworks which have had an impact on the cooperation efficiency.

## 9. Frameworks

The study has come up with a number of concepts to help understand the operation and development of inter-organisational efficiency. These concepts help explain why inter-organisational cooperation is the way it is and what has helped to make it efficient within the different dimensions and layers.

## 9.1 Legal framework

The legal framework involves the decision-making process of both the EU and UN. It also falls into what is called the governance mechanism of inter-organisational cooperation. Cropper et al. (2008, p.12) postulate that 'governance mechanisms are the means through which actors manage the content flows and co-ordinate their relationship... The mechanisms enable and constrain actors' behaviour: different governance mechanisms regulate in different ways, for example by providing (dis) incentives for action or by directly regulating behaviour through fiat.' Cropper et al. (2008, p.12) identified comprise incentive structures and administrative control plus various forms of contracts as some of the various attributes of governance mechanisms.

Therefore in order to address situations that threaten international peace and security, the UN relies on the Security Council to pass resolutions on the kind of action to be taken. The Secretary General keeps the UN Security Council abreast of potential threats to international peace. The Secretary General further ensures the Security Council is aware of the progress made regarding any action that had been authorised. The EU Council decides on action to be taken, especially if there is a need to get involved in the affairs of another country.

The EU and UN have set rules and guidelines on launching, maintaining and terminating missions. There are also guidelines about how to cooperate. There are two sets of guidelines for each organisation. For instance, there are internal guidelines that each organisation sets out to adhere to when dealing with the other. A case in point is the EU ESDP report in 2000 to the Nice European Council in which according to Tardy (2005, p.54) brought to the fore the importance of cooperation between the EU and UN at the moment when the EU crisis management and conflict prevention capabilities were in an embryonic stage.

After dialogue with the UN and the subsequent visit of the UN Secretary General to different EU institutions, the EU drew up concrete plans for cooperation by the EU General Affairs Council in June 2001. The draft conclusions affirmed the need for cooperation in conflict resolution in areas like Bosnia and Africa. This document

also emphasised the need for the UN to benefit from the ever-improving EU military capability to enhance its training capabilities, information exchange and coordination in the field (Wouters et al., 2006, p.243).

On the side of the UN, chapter VIII of its charter has always been used to define its relationship with regional organisations. For instance, Article 53 states that ‘The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state’ (UN Charter, chapter VIII).

The other group of guidelines are set out between the two organisations. A case in point is that after being in a state of constant dialogue since the ESDP report to the Nice European Council and after subsequent draft conclusions of 2001, the request to intervene in DR Congo in 2003 led the EU and UN to draw up a joint declaration in 2003 to define the confines of their collaboration. This was followed by the joint declaration of 2007 (in the aftermath of EUFOR RD Congo) which strengthened the EU-UN collaboration.

Nonetheless, under hard cooperation it is not unusual to have a disconnection between the internal guidelines and official ones between organisations. The former for the case of the EU-UN cooperation have taken precedence over the latter. For instance, as examined in Chapter 5 the EU Council passed Declaration 2006/319/CFSP which asked EU officials to give the UN access to classified and unclassified data in relation to the operation. However, during the planning for the EUFOR RD Congo operation, ‘there was frequent frustration over the lack of formal coordination structures. Irritations arose over issues such as sharing documents’ (Security and Defence Agenda, 2007, p.30). Furthermore, according to Source B, when the EU officials helped out the MONUC forces during the elections by monitoring the media, it was feared that they had contravened the strict EU rules on sharing information with other organisations.

Sources U a senior ranking EU official in DGE VIII and H an official in the Council of the European Union General Secretariat had postulated that the UN could not be trusted when it came to sharing information, as there was a possibility of it being leaked to the media. So, the internal rules, especially for organisations like the EU in relation to the UN, are borne out of experience. Source U went further by asserting that the EU could not put its troops under UN command and control because of the bad experience during the Former Yugoslav conflict where the EU felt the UN was inadequate and bureaucratic.

This perception was further exposed by the refusal of the French assessment team sent into Bunia before the launch of Operation Artemis to liaise with the MONUC forces. Although initial contact was made, it was not sustained and the French assessment team went about its duties without much interaction with the MONUC forces. There was concern on the French side that sharing the information and intelligence with the UN would endanger the mission (UNDPKO Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, 2004, p.11).

From the above it is clear that the legal framework under hard cooperation makes the cooperation rather inflexible and if it were to be adhered to completely then the cooperation would not be so efficient.

Nevertheless it is relevant, especially as it is seen as the vital component of inter-organisational cooperation. Cropper et al. (2008 p.12) view context as comprising 'conditions that facilitate and constrain the emergence, functioning, evolution and dissolution of' inter-organisational relations. To them the legal environment is part of the macro-context which is at a higher level of institutional environment in which inter-organisational relations are located (Cropper et al., 2008, p.12).

## **9.2 Informal process**

As a framework, the informal process has been prevalent under soft cooperation during the launching and sustaining of peacekeeping missions and has featured both during political and operational cooperation. For instance, before the launch of Operation Artemis, the UK *Telegraph* noted that 'Canada, Pakistan, Nigeria and

South Africa all signalled that they, too, might send in forces following the appeal by the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, for a "coalition of the willing" to create a rapid reaction force for the Congo' (*Daily Telegraph*, May 25, 2003 p.1). However with such an offer before him the UN Secretary General contacted the French President about the possibility of intervening in DR Congo. The French later drafted in the EU, as examined earlier.

This was an informal process mainly because the UN does not have a standing army it can call on to maintain international peace and security. Although the Security Council has the power to identify and deal with threats to international peace, it sometimes does not act swiftly or adequately due to member states exercising vetoes or authorising limited intervention yet a more robust one would have been needed. This is mainly due to the presence or absence of interests in a given area of conflict. A case in point is the rapid reaction to the invasion of Kuwait by the UN Security Council which was spurred on by the United States of America in 1991.<sup>3</sup> Yet in 1994 this urgency was not evident when the Rwanda genocide was taking place. Even when the UN allowed a French mission into Rwanda it merely provided a safe passage for the perpetrators of the genocide (Destexhe, 1995, pp.51–55).

Therefore, a pattern of slow reaction or inaction emerges when it comes to conflicts in areas that are not of much interest to the members of the Security Council. This leaves the Secretary General with the task of approaching the countries he thinks are able to intervene when the Security Council is less willing to take a leading role.

Consequently, when it came to the DR Congo the Secretary General ignored the calls for an African force and the nations that had expressed a willingness to intervene and requested the French instead. In this way he used an informal process and having drafted in the EU and got a favourable response, the Security Council legalised the collaboration with a declaration.

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<sup>3</sup> The UN website on the UN Iraqi-Kuwait Observer mission states that: 'On 2nd August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. On the same day, the Security Council adopted its resolution 660 (1990), condemning the invasion and demanding Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal of its forces to the positions they had occupied the previous day. A few days later, the Council instituted mandatory arms and economic sanctions against Iraq. All in all, over the period between 2nd August and 29th November 1990, the Council adopted 12 resolutions on various aspects of the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, culminating in resolution 678 (1990).' (United Nations UNIKOM accessed 25/3/12).

The informal process comes under the second dimension of an interactive relationship between organisations known as the structure of collectivity, as described by Cropper et al. 2008, pp.11-12. Cropper et al. (2008, p.11-12) contend that 'the Structure of the collectivity of all relationships... provides associated actors with opportunities and constraints for action... Structural attributes of relations in an IOE refer for instance to: the diversity of types of relations that exist among the organisations...the overall intensity and restrictedness of the relations.'

Therefore the flexibility of the relationship between the EU and the UN in the international system was seized on by France in 2003 when the UN requested the latter to help in the Ituri region. Similarly when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991 the United States championed the cause of the Kuwaitis in the UN Security Council and put together a coalition of the willing that was able to protect the sovereignty of Kuwait.

This structure of collectivity can sometimes lead to inaction, as examined earlier, in that the United States played a critical role in blocking robust UN action in Rwanda in 1994, which culminated in the loss of a million lives. Nevertheless with the UN now having the flexibility to intervene under the responsibility of protecting civilians, the structure of collectivity can play a major role in fostering informal processes if there is a gridlock in the UN Security Council.

It should be noted however that the relationship between the EU and the UN is constantly evolving, especially with the ever present need to handle threats to international peace and security. However, throughout UN and EU cooperation, there has been mutual suspicion and inflexible stances taken by one of the parties at a given point in the collaboration. For example, as examined earlier, the EU declined to share a command and control structure and was uneasy about exchanging sensitive data with the UN for fear that it would be leaked to the world media.

Hence, regardless of the diplomatic efforts and joint declarations, plus the positive rhetoric championed by the EU and UN hierarchy that the cooperation is in earnest, there have been instances of differences between the organisations. However, in a

bid for missions to be accomplished, a mechanism has come into force to facilitate their execution. This mechanism has involved informal networks whose basis has been derived from the identity and interests of the actors within the organisations, and has helped shed more light on the nature of EU-UN cooperation.

### **9.3 Informal networks**

Although during operations organisations use structures to help with smooth cooperation, a deadlock normally arises. One of the ways to resolve it is through the use of informal structures between the two organisations. Conversely, this deadlock can also work the opposite way, in that if the two organisations are working together in an informal network, a deadlock or a situation demanding more commitment from either organisation can lead to the abandonment of an informal structure to pursue action through formal structures.

Although networks have been discussed from a general perspective, it is crucial to also examine what other authors cite as reasons for their formation. Kenis and Oerlemans in Cropper et al. (2008, p.294) argue that 'network formation is a result of two opposite forces: the reproduction of the network structure as a general social capital source for members of the network and the alteration of the network structure by entrepreneurs for their own benefit.' However their analysis is on a general level and they also do not deal with informal networks.

Therefore for the case of the EU and UN in DR Congo it is evident that informal networks are a response by the officials in the field of operation to meet a need or to deal with their reality. The inability of the formal structures to facilitate the smooth execution of the missions leaves the different officials in the field of operation with no alternative but to form informal networks to fulfil their mission. The officials are interested in executing their duties; some may be spurred on by a humanitarian aspect of the mission, and others may just want to get on with their job. Yet, whatever their interests the informal networks have ended up as a means to meet these interests.

Informal networks can be further explained in the context of the social networking perspective. According to Kenis and Oerlemans (in Cropper 2008, pp.289-290), ‘the social network perspective... focuses on the joint activities of and continual exchange between, participants in a social system. This perspective is characterised by an interest in recurrent relationship patterns that connect the actors that make up a systems’ social structure... the focus is on the interaction between actors.’

Kenis and Oerlemans (in Cropper, 2008, p.291) further state that the relations between the actors connect and define the substantive relationship and ‘can range from friendships and social contacts to formal contracts, working relationships, giving and/or receiving advice, interlocking directories etc.’ Further still they state that these relationships are more stable and less hierarchical (Kenis and Oerlemans in Cropper 2008, p.291).

During the DR Congo elections, MONUC officials could rely on the EUFOR RD Congo to intervene in a situation without consulting the commanding EU hierarchy in Potsdam. On the other hand, if there was a possibility that casualties could be sustained, then the EU officials would have to get in touch with the higher authorities to give clearance for the operation.

Even so, formal structures were not necessarily weak, especially during the transition period, as the UN was in a more prominent position. It could therefore take the lead on key issues and could get a favourable response from organisations like the EU. For instance, the formal structures, especially at the decision-making level, were favourable channels to get the EU on board during 2003 and 2006 when the UN desperately needed help.

With the end of the transition period, the development of informal structures was enhanced as the new government in DR Congo exercised its sovereignty and took a stronger hold on domestic politics and the overall governance of the country. So the EU was no longer obliged to go through the UN to initiate certain projects.

Subsequently, the EU-UN relationship has experienced limitations and, as the EU officials (for example Source P) illustrated in DR Congo, the UN is not the only



organisation they can go through. The presence of the DR Congo government has provided an alternative and with that there has been the expansion of EUPOL Kinshasa to the whole of the country without UN approval.

As a result, the informal structures have become a vehicle through which humanitarian assistance has been adequately provided. This does not downplay the role of formal structures. However, the informal structures give a new dimension to the cooperation between the EU and UN in that so much gets done which would otherwise have been bogged down in the bureaucratic negotiations.

Furthermore, informal networks have proved useful with regards to the communication between the EU and UN. The EU follows a strict code on sharing information and the informal network has helped to bridge the gap as the EU and UN have worked together to solve issues, particularly during the elections and in the work carried out during the disarmament and rehabilitation process.

As a consequence, the use of informal networks has been a response by the officials to the self-interest aspect of the political cooperation. They have helped to foster humanitarianism as the officials set about their mission of bringing peace and hope to a suffering people. In addition, informal networks highlight the commitment to multilateralism by the different officials, even in an environment of restrictive organisational practice.

The rationale for the formation of the networks plus their depth can be explained using the theory of embeddedness. As will be examined later under the variables, the formation of the informal networks is based on a number of aspects like cultural similarity, identity and interests. These aspects fall within the theory of embeddedness.

Kenis and Oerlemans (in Cropper 2008, p.293) argue that 'embeddedness refers to the desire by actors in a social network to '(1)...interact with family members, friends and acquaintances rather than with persons they do not know; (2) that social ties are nested in other ties; and (3) that previous ties influence the development of future ones.'

Kenis and Oerlemans (in Cropper 2008, p.293) further argue that relational embeddedness is important to the building of trust thereby decreasing uncertainty levels. This is because 'actors that share direct connections are likely to possess comparable knowledge and information, leading to shared understandings which influence behaviours, imitation for example' (Kenis and Oerlemans in Cropper, et al., 2008, p.293).

Therefore the informal cooperation between the EU and UN officials can be examined in the context of relation embeddedness because the two organisations possess a lot of information about each other and can actually re-hat their officials as the case was in Bosnia when the UN handed over the EU police force in 2003. Further still, most officials, as will be examined, are from the same cultural background and therefore can share information easily.

Another aspect of embeddedness is known as structural embeddedness. According to Kenis and Oerlemans (in Cropper, et al., 2008, p.293) this

'refers to the fact that organisations do not just have relationships with each other but also with the same third parties. As a consequence of which is that actors are linked indirectly by third parties. The more structural embeddedness there is in a network, the more information about each actor is known to all other actors. Moreover, actors situated between distinct groupings can derive advantages from their positions for themselves and can broker relationship among other players.

An example of structural embeddedness can be seen in the way France brought the EU on board to lead operation Artemis. Both the EU and UN were linked by France which acted as the third party because it belonged to both organisations. At the same time France was able to derive much advantage from the position, as will be examined later. It was able to deflect attention from its interests in DR Congo and although it was acting as the framework nation, operation Artemis was viewed as an EU operation.

## **10. Variables**

As discussed earlier, the study came up with a number of variables which are crucial to understanding inter-organisational efficiency. These variables filter through the different dimensions, layers and frameworks of inter-organisational cooperation, thereby helping to draw conclusions on how to make inter-organisational cooperation more efficient.

### **10.1 Motives and interests of organisations and member states**

The aspirations of organisations and the members within the organisations are important variables to the model. The convergence or divergence of organisational interests can play a big role in determining the direction an interaction between organisations will take. Further still both the UN and EU are run by member states with certain interests in given conflicts or regions. Therefore this limits organisations in as far as they can cooperate. Therefore as stated earlier it is clear that international organisations like the UN and EU can only act as far as their member states are willing them to. So this aspect therefore can affect the dynamics between hard and soft cooperation on both the political and operational level of cooperation. For instance as will be examined later, the EU's desire to be portrayed as a global actor enhanced cooperation with the UN on both the political and operational level. However the strict adherence to its rules like not sharing information as examined earlier hindered cooperation on the operational level and the individuals on ground had to devise informal ways of cooperating as will be examined in the thesis.

Therefore the model presents interplay between the different variables and the way they permeate the layers and frameworks consequently shedding a new light on the effectiveness and efficiency of different inter-organisational cooperation frameworks in place. For instance although the UN would like to utilise regional organisations under chapter VIII of the UN charter, it is not guaranteed that they will respond favourably due to their interests both from an organisational and member state perspective. Even when they respond favourably, it is what the organisations are willing to give other than what the UN wants.

Therefore, an examination of EU and UN interests in the case of the DR Congo is important in putting the above analysis into perspective.

### 10.1a EU motives

The EU's pursuit of interests, such as the desire to become a global actor, has been influential in its work with the UN (Macaj, 2008 p.2). This view is supported by Gorm (2009, p.246), who argues that, in the case of DR Congo, this pursuit of interests took precedence over any concerns for Africa. Further still, according to Olsen (2009, p.246), the EU's motivation, fuelled by self-interest, ran parallel to other French national interests. Olsen, (ibid, p.246) goes on to postulate that EU interests are supposed to be related to the EU's identity of inter-governmentalism. However, these are hamstrung by the interests of the former colonial masters of African states like France and Britain who end up influencing the common European policies towards Africa.

Charbonneau (2009) is in agreement with Olsen as he posits that the EU is committed to multilateralism, especially to the multilateral structures of the UN, although not exclusively. Though Charbonneau (2009, pp.548-549) contends that within the UN, as argued by Jean-Marie Guéhenno the UN Under-Secretary for peace operations, 'the EU is to present a compelling argument for international order based on effective multilateralism... it is not a question of either UN or regional peacekeeping; the issue is how we can best work together in effective multilateralism to advance the cause of peace and global security.'

However, as will be examined in Chapter 3, the EU also had its own interests in addition to the ones mentioned above. Its desire to portray itself as a global actor and present an alternative to NATO would be central to its development, with key EU generals talking about building an EU army free from NATO influence.

Although the EU acknowledges that the UN plays a primary role in the safeguarding of international peace and security and needs it as a mandating body when participating in peace operations, the UN does not necessarily set the agenda of the cooperation. Tardy (2005 pp.67-68) argues that while the UN favours a larger role

for the EU in peacekeeping, the EU 'favours a more flexible and case-by-case approach, where EU autonomy of decision and action would prevail and with no guarantee that the UN's needs will ever be met'.

Furthermore, the influence of individual states within the EU is very telling in relation to the amount of control the EU has on setting the agenda regarding where and when to intervene. Drawing from other examples of EU cooperation with the UN, Charbonneau (2009, p.550) notes that it is no coincidence that most of the partnerships in Africa have happened in Francophone countries. Although the EU has worked with the UN in Bosnia, cooperation in Africa has either been in former French colonies like Chad or countries that joined the Francophone fraternity, like DR Congo.

However, it needs to be argued that other European countries were also involved and pursued their own interests. According to Onana and Taylor (2008), coordination was disrupted in 2005 during the security sector reform process due to the actions of individual EU states. Countries like the Netherlands and Belgium signed bilateral funding treaties with the DR Congo government to provide funds for the demobilisation and reintegration of soldiers. This complicated the attempts to coordinate the whole process. Such acts gave the officials within the DR Congo transitional government the opportunity to exploit the divisions and lose interest in the technical support structures that had less financial support (Onana, and Taylor, 2008, p.509).

Coupled with the above is the fact that some states participated in operations like Artemis in a bid to enhance their chances of joining the EU. As examined earlier in Chapter Three, this was viewed as a rite of passage for them. Countries like Hungary supplied staff, thereby enhancing their chances of joining the EU later (Jahier, 2010, pp.89-90).

Coupled with the initial analysis on motives of organisations, aforementioned scenarios also set a strong case for hard cooperation where the legal framework comes into play on more than one front. For instance, the UN is needed as the legitimising body for the EU. Coupled with this are a number of EU organisational

and individual states' interests. A case in point is the EU's desire to portray itself as a global actor, yet also setting the tone for collaboration with the UN, like favouring a more supple and case-by-case approach (Tardy 2005 pp.67-68) to UN requests. On top of this the EU prefers short-term intervention, as explained by Source H earlier.

### 10.1b UN motives

When deciding which country or organisation to partner with when dealing with the crisis in DR Congo, the UN refused the calls for an African intervening force. This was in spite of the fact that the African states had actually been party to the diplomatic negotiations like the Lusaka peace accord and the Sun City talks. Yet more than half a dozen of these states had been involved in the conflict and some like Rwanda had been accused of exploiting DR Congo mineral resources (Security Council Deliberations 4273rd, 4323rd, 4532nd, meetings).

Other states like Nigeria and Ghana had retained credibility and could have played a key role but there were some issues concerned with their ability to raise the required forces in time. Although South Africa did not participate in the conflict in DR Congo, President Mandela did come out in support of the SADC member states that had intervened on the side of Kabila (*BBC* 3/9/1998). In a way, the neutrality of South Africa was compromised and the UN could not count on it as an arbiter in the form of an intervening force.

However, on closer analysis the decision the UN made was also not without fault. The French, as seen earlier, were party to the Rwandese conflict, as according to the Peace Pledge Union (accessed on 30/5/2012), they supported the Hutu government and their military personnel had advised the Hutus to present an improved image to the world by hiding the dead bodies of killed Tutsis from the media. France further launched the controversial Operation Turquoise which according to McGreal (*The Guardian* 11/1/2007) provided safe passage for the perpetrators of the genocide into DR Congo (formerly known as Zaire). Consequently, in as far as responsibility for some of the conflicts in the Great Lakes region was concerned; the French and African states were in a similar league.

So it is clear the UN may not have considered these transgressions, but went for France's ability to deliver an end to the fighting, and since the latter was a member of the Security Council this helped with overcoming the bureaucratic process quite easily. Nevertheless, by drafting in the EU the French were able to deflect attention away from their misdemeanours in Africa, as the operation was heralded as an EU one and not a French one.

Therefore the UN saw an opportunity to benefit from the French resources. These came in the form of military expertise and machinery and geographical awareness, especially as France was conversant with the region. The fact that the EU was drafted in gave the UN access to greater resources which would not have been available had the African states been allowed to set up an intervention force.

This perception is reinforced by Dacin et al. (in Cropper 2008, p.104) who when discussing partnership contend that 'partner selection is a matter of context, requirement and purpose of an alliance....firms discriminate among their past allies by selecting partners with whom they have formed reciprocal relationships or shared favourable partnership outcomes and who possess experience relevant to the specific context of the new partnership.' Therefore from that perspective the French and EU fulfilled UN requirements.

Conversely, the peripheral role given to African actors was not missed by Charbonneau 2009, who notes that the EU-UN partnership in Africa lacks the input of Africans. To him, African engendered knowledge is hardly ever considered. Charbonneau (2009, pp.548, 551) further postulates that while Africa is deemed a place of conflict, anarchy and disorder in need of internal intervention, Europe is viewed on a higher plane with a better level of authority, therefore promising superior cosmopolitanism, competence and legitimacy. This distinction 'works politically to de-historicise the overlapping geographies and intertwined histories of the two continents' (Charbonneau 2009, pp.548, 551).

Consequently, by mandating French-led EU forces, for instance, in Ituri without considering the historical legacy like colonialism and post-colonial interference, the

UN ran the risk of antagonising the region. Although Operation Artemis was judged to have been a success to some extent, countries like Rwanda were suspicious of French motives. Furthermore, the bulk of UN-mandated intervention by the EU in Africa, as noted by Charbonneau Bruno, (2009, p.550), has been in Francophone countries like DR Congo and Chad. The prominence of France in the intervention in Africa paints a less glamorous image of the motives of EU intervention.

The African actors have continued to be ignored even in the security sector reforms. According to Renner and Hannah (2008, p.506), during the final planning stages of the security sector reforms, the process began to stall and they argue that it was because African partners like Angola and South Africa were not informed.<sup>4</sup>

However, even with the open nature of the relationship and the pursuit of effective multilateralism, the UN needs the EU more. An overburdened UN needs other actors to relieve it. Although the pull factor is the mandating power of the Security Council, self-sufficient organisations like the EU normally choose where to get involved. They can choose the mode of operation in the field and, as seen in Chapter Six, the lack of coherent coordination in the field has led to officials on both sides using the soft cooperation dimension of inter-organisational efficiency to accomplish the missions.

## **10.2 The alumni effect and the role of the individual**

It is a common practice in co-deployment for forces or officials of the departing organisation to be redeployed by the one taking over. This is normally referred to as re-hatting or double hatting. Under hard cooperation this is barely possible. As was the case when MONUC was taking over from IEMF, the forces were not re-hatted (Kess (2007, p.154). This could be attributed to a number of reasons.

For instance, as examined above, the fear of sharing information with the UN felt by the re-hatting officials could have been a driving factor, as the EU has a strict policy

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<sup>4</sup> As will be examined in Chapter 6, Source L confirmed that MONUC officials of African origin were not benefiting from the informal network set up and had not even been kept abreast of developments in the security sector reform by their EU counterparts.



on sharing sensitive information. The other reason was the lack of a legal framework to re-hat as the IEMF mandate was running out.

As a variable under soft cooperation the alumni effect and the role of the individual are crucial. Koops (2008, pp.19-27, 22) highlights the role of individuals in these organisations as vital because they tend to act as boundary-role occupants. These individuals ‘form the interface between their own organization and other organizations in the external environment.’ For instance, as examined under hard cooperation Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General at the time Operation Artemis was authorised, was crucial in opening up the way for French and later EU involvement in DR Congo. The officials in the field of operation, for instance source G, highlighted the need for individual collaboration in the field of operation in enhancing the soft cooperation. Individuals on both sides would unofficially cooperate as long as there was no danger to their personnel and if not much commitment was expected.

In addition, the so-called “alumni effect”, ‘the switching of key personnel from one organization to the other and thus the facilitation of inter-organizational understandings through personal links—increased the diffusion of knowledge about the former employer’s organizational culture and the creation of epistemic inter-organizational communities, is also identified as an important factor for reinforcing inter-organizational links and cooperation’ (ibid, p.22). As examined earlier, it is a crucial part of relational embeddedness and can enhance cooperation between organisations on a wider scale.

As will be examined, the failure of the IEMF to fully re-hat its personnel robbed the MONUC forces of key intelligence that had been generated. So MONUC would have been given a head start had it had a number of officials re-hatted. This would have eased the transition period from IEMF to MONUC.

### 10.3 Identity

As a social construct, identity is a major variable of inter-organisational cooperation efficiency. It not only sheds more light on the advent of informal networks, but it is also crucial to understanding the nature of the EU-UN cooperation. Identity was a key driving force in the UN's decision to initially draft in France, which can be viewed from two angles. The first is drawn from the fact that the UN saw France as the gendarme of Africa — DR Congo was in its sphere of influence as a Francophone country. Coupled with this was the knowledge that having initiated Operation Turquoise after the Rwanda genocide, France could deploy another mission in the Ituri region. So its extensive knowledge of the region made it a likely candidate to carry out an intervention.

The other angle is mainly to do with availability and the readiness to carry out the operation needed by the UN. Other members of the Security Council were either committed elsewhere or unwilling to commit troops at short notice. The UN was not ready to delay this operation and although the African nations were willing to commit troops, the question that remained unanswered was to do with how quickly they would be deployed. France, on the other hand, had proved during Operation Turquoise that it could deploy at short notice.

By choosing to draft in the EU, France<sup>5</sup> brought together two organisations that had similar interests in as far as humanitarianism was concerned. The EU viewed the UN as the leader when it came to maintaining international peace and security and has always pledged to work under the UN to promote peace and security. Consequently, when the two organisations realised they were in pursuit of similar ideals they cemented their relationship with two declarations in 2003 and 2007, which set in motion the wheels of cooperation.

As examined under informal networks, identity played a crucial role. For instance, some officials formed the networks out of the desire to attain the humanitarian goals

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<sup>5</sup> As was the case during the build up to the war in Iraq, France, according to Frost's interview with French Foreign Secretary Dominique de Villepin (BBC, 2<sup>nd</sup> March 2003), constructed its foreign policy on the belief that it spoke for the international community and individuals the world over.

they had set out to accomplish. Therefore, the pursuit of the humanitarian goals became an identity which facilitated the cooperation. So officials would go out of their way for the sake of humanity and, in essence, identify with their fellow humans (Congolese in distress).

Furthermore, the informal networks were mainly formed from cultural norms on the political and operational levels. Officials from similar states such as the Nordic ones in both organisations would work well together because language and communication barriers would be removed.

#### **10.4 Interest**

The shared interest of bringing peace to DR Congo was a fundamental variable in igniting the cooperation between the EU and the UN. This is the case if interest is taken as a social construct. The common value of humanitarianism was vital in convincing the EU member states to join the UN in bringing stability to DR Congo. Although France, as seen earlier, was also interested in maintaining its grip on the Francophone sphere of influence, getting the EU on board would take more than that. France had to bury its own interests in the meantime and concentrate on the bigger picture of appealing to the EU's values and interests.

Therefore, although the bulk of the troops and equipment were supplied by France during Operation Artemis, the identity and the interests being pursued were primarily European in nature.

Furthermore, the UN did not oppose the EU identity of the mission because it was interested in having regional organisations take some of the peacekeeping burdens. As noted in the UN charter, regional arrangements were to play their role in maintaining international peace and security. This call was reiterated in the Brahimi report of 2000 and the UN was very relieved when the EU stepped up to the table and got involved in a mission outside its geographical confines.

## **10.5 Cultural similarity**

A similarity in culture is fundamental variable when examining inter-organisational cooperation efficiency. From an operational cooperation dimension, opposing members of two given organisations working together in the field can rely on familiarity with each other to solve tricky situations in case of a deadlock. For instance, both the EU and UN have officials from European countries. So this knowledge about each other and cultural familiarity strengthens the need for soft cooperation. As an aspect of social networking and also relational embeddedness this variable is important to enhance cooperation between organisations.

For instance, as will be examined in chapter 5, according to source B, EU officials agreed to monitor the DR Congo media during the elections without official authorisation from the EU. In the end it was feared that they could have breached the strict EU code of not sharing sensitive information with third parties.

Cultural similarity further facilitates the dialogue on the political level and can counter an impasse when hard cooperation is active. For instance, as discussed in Chapter 5, the process of security sector reforms being carried out by the EU and UN is being facilitated by cultural similarity. Therefore, cultural similarity can permeate the different named dimensions and layers because it is effective on almost all layers and frameworks.

The downside to this was that UN officials from other cultural backgrounds found it very hard to deal with their counterparts in the EU. This was succinctly put by Source L who argued that the security sector reform faced difficulties because of a lack of communication with the EU officials and a fear of duplicating roles due to this lack of knowledge about what they were doing.

## **10.6 Familiarity with the field of operation**

Prior knowledge of the theatre of operation is another important variable when analysing inter-organisational cooperation efficiency. If organisations are conversant with the territory they are working in then there will be flexibility when facilitating

the cooperation. For instance, Belgium on the side of the EU was the former colonial master of DR Congo. France took DR Congo under its wing in the post-colonial era and worked closely with the Mobutu regime. Coupled with this was the influence France had in the region due to its colonial legacy in Africa. This knowledge was important in facilitating the approach from the Secretary General of the UN to French president Chirac. France obliged and in the end managed to convince the EU to take over the mission, with France acting as the framework nation.

Furthermore, this knowledge of the theatre of operation can also be attributed to facilitating cooperation between the EU and UN during the elections. This was possible due to the colonial legacy which meant that French was a widely used language in DR Congo. Also, the French and Belgians were familiar with the territory. For instance, France was able to spearhead the IEMF and bring the Ituri region under control, which was partly because it knew the Ituri region.

Coupled with this is the perception that operations like Artemis in 2003 brought cooperation between the EU and UN to a greater level, which culminated in the 2003 and 2007 declarations of cooperation between the EU and UN. Therefore, as examined earlier, such a variable enhanced the four dimensions of inter-organisational cooperation efficiency and its effects permeated the different layers of the collaboration. For instance EU-UN cooperation was enhanced. The member states, both in the EU and UN, allowed greater cooperation between the two organisations, especially as this gave rise to the two declarations of 2003 and 2007.

Greater relations with the regional powers were enhanced, as France had to secure their agreement before launching Operation Artemis. The EU further used these regional powers as logistic bases and holding areas for its over the horizon forces in 2003 (Uganda) and 2007 (Gabon) respectively. On the local level it has to be argued that although Operation Artemis did not make Bunia a weapons-free area, it ended the massacres and paved the way for MONUC deployment. The EUFOR RD Congo mission ensured stability during the elections.

However the familiarity with the field of operation can be seen in a neo-colonial context especially if it involves a North-South intervention. French influence in DR

Congo was seen as a desire to keep hold of a Francophone domain as discussed earlier. Although the UN was benefiting from the resources from France and the EU, the Congolese and the regional actors saw the driving influence of France in a neo-colonial context. Plus as a member of the Security Council France held a formidable bargaining position in as far as its interests were concerned. The meeting of French and EU interests therefore present a hindrance to cooperation efficiency in those regions which fall out of their domain of influence or interests.

### **10.7 Mission time frame**

The role of time as a variable in inter-organisational cooperation efficiency has been crucial to the success or failure of EU and UN collaboration. The strict adherence to time has been a major facet of hard cooperation, as exemplified during Operation Artemis which was launched on 12<sup>th</sup> June 2003 and ended on 1<sup>st</sup> September 2003 (EU Consilium press briefing 2003, p.1). The EU officials were not willing to go beyond the mandated time which affected the effectiveness of the mission. For instance Morsut (2007, p.4) contends that the time limitation on Operation Artemis 'left Bunia a 'weapons-invisible' zone, rather than a 'weapons-free' zone. This led MONUC to hastily assemble a force. The rebels who had been fighting in Ituri also realised the time barred nature of the mission and merely withdrew to other territories and waited.

When it came to the EUFOR RD Congo mission Germany opposed plans by France and Belgium to extend the operation by several weeks in order to address the danger of new disturbances breaking out during or shortly after the delayed second round of elections, the results of which were not announced until 29<sup>th</sup> October, only a week before EUFOR RD Congo was scheduled to withdraw (Ehrhart, H. G. (2007, p.2).

A few months after he was elected President Kabila attacked his main rival who fled into exile (UNHCR Refugee development Centre Ireland, 2012, p.1). This had been bound to happen as both groups were in command of armed troops. It would have been unlikely for President Kabila to accomplish such a feat with EUFOR RD Congo forces being kept in there longer during the post-election period.

However, it should also be noted that budget allocations in international organisations might affect the length of a mission. Since the EU and UN in DR Congo were not under the same command and control, the EU relied on its budget to fund the missions and therefore the member states had a free hand in deciding whether to seek an extension from the UN Security Council or not.

Therefore, operations limited in time may have short-term gains and may be in the interests of organisations like the EU, but in the long run they may not be effective. For instance, as illustrated by sources H and U, the EU political hierarchy preferred short-term operations and was not interested in getting bogged down in long-term missions.

This nevertheless enhances inter-organisational cooperation efficiency from both the political and operational aspects; as such missions bridge the gap needed for the organisation to be helped with pulling together and reinforcing its mission, as was the case in Ituri. However if the organisation being helped to re-enforce experiences delays this may lead to the other organisation hastily pulling out and therefore not safeguarding the gains in the long run. The pull out could be the result of a tight deadline set in the mandate by the legalising body and the lack of logistics to stay longer in the field of operation.

Hence, the strict adherence to the time scale of the operation may not be favourable to the development of soft cooperation, however as examined earlier, informal processes and networks were forged between EUFOR RD Congo mission and MONUC. This may have been enhanced by the fact that both forces were co-located in Kinshasa (although MONUC forces were spread all over DR Congo). Plus MONUC had control of the capital before EUFOR RD forces were deployed. So the proximity may have helped with forging these ties, unlike during Operation Artemis where the MONUC forces were not in charge of the area and reinforcements came in after the place had been pacified.

## 10.8 Geographical space

The limited or less limited nature of the geographical space of operation is of significant importance to the inter-organisational cooperation efficiency. Limiting the geographical space of an operation is crucial to hard cooperation. This is because it restricts missions creeping into other territories and keeps responsibility to a minimum. The resources are further put to greater use, especially as that is what may have been budgeted for. For instance, EUFOR RD Congo and Operation Artemis were limited in geographical scope. That is to say Operation Artemis was only operational in the Ituri region (Peacekeeping best practices 2004, p.3) and to be specific in Bunia (Morsut 2007, p.4), while the EUFOR RD Congo was deployed in Kinshasa (Hoebeke, et al., 2007, pp.11-12). The results were that the 2006 elections were to a large extent peaceful under the watchful eyes of EUFOR RD Congo forces (Rodt, 2010, p.30). The fighting in the Ituri region was brought under control by the IEMF (Morsut, 2007, p.3).

One of the major factors that enhance inter-organisational cooperation efficiency is the ease with which each organisation plays its role in the collaboration. Therefore, from a political perspective the EU which favoured short robust missions, as examined earlier, was at ease in the limited geographical scope during both missions. This enhanced the relationship between the EU and UN, as exemplified by the declarations of cooperation in 2003 and 2007.

However, the limited nature of the geographical scope in DR Congo for Operation Artemis was detrimental to the overall resolving of the conflict. This is because the defeated forces from Bunia filtered away to other areas with their arms. So the problems from one area were merely transferred to another. Plus, as examined earlier, Bunia became a weapons invisible area but was not a weapons-free one (Morsut 2007, p.4).

With EUFOR RD Congo merely confined to Kinshasa MONUC was literally on its own when dealing with conflicts outside of Kinshasa. This cause was not helped by the sheer size of DR Congo. It is almost the size of Western Europe and more forces would need to be deployed. Though it has to be argued that the over the horizon



forces (Hoebeker et al., 2007, pp.11-12) set up by the EU served as a deterrent to most election violence.

## **11. Conceptualising inter-organisation cooperation efficiency: the dynamics and interactions of hard and soft cooperation**

As will be examined in Chapter 3, there are many reasons that have led organisations to cooperate, some of which according to Biermann include (2009, p.7), ‘ambivalent consequences of globalization and interdependence. Transnational challenges ranging from humanitarian disasters, pandemics and global warming to nuclear proliferation and Jihadist terrorism pose problems that transcend national capacity.’

To him ‘cooperation incentives arise all the more when organizations are confronted with transnational problems even they cannot solve alone...Often, this inter-organizational cooperation is embedded in complex, multi-actor governance systems in which organizations contribute to problem solving among others’ (ibid, p.7).

As examined earlier Lipson (2005) provides insights into soft and hard cooperation when examining inter-organisational coordination. He uses terms like formal coordination which has attributes of hard cooperation, as to him it ‘involves redrawing organizational charts, the explicit assignment of authority and responsibility, and specification of procedures’ (Lipson 2005, p.14). He further mentions informal coordination which also has attributes of soft cooperation, as he states that it ‘develops spontaneously through social networks and ad hoc responses to interdependence’ (ibid. p.14).

In order for international organisations to cooperate efficiently, it is essential to mix attributes of both soft and hard cooperation on the political and operational level. This is because there are situations where the bureaucratic nature of hard cooperation will hinder or stall this collaboration and the need for flexibility will therefore be vital. On the one hand, soft cooperation alone in the field may lead to unplanned consequences like casualties if forces are unwittingly thrown into a warzone without consulting the decision makers at the top.

Lipson (2005) is in agreement with this as he also argues that formal and informal coordination (hard and soft cooperation respectively) 'are to some extent complementary and each depends on the other to function effectively. Yet informal coordinating activities can defeat the intended purposes of formal measures, and dysfunctional formal arrangements can inhibit potential salutary informal responses in addition to failing to achieve their own goals' (ibid, p.14).

Furthermore, Lipson 2005 highlights Powell's argument (Powell 1990 in Lipson 2005) that 'informal networks are lighter on their feet than hierarchies (ibid, p.18). To him the 'network modes of resource allocation and transactions occur neither through discrete exchanges nor by administrative fiat, but through networks of individuals engaged in reciprocal, preferential, mutually supportive actions. Networks can be complex: they involve neither the explicit criteria of the market, nor the familiar paternalism of the hierarchy. Basic... assumption of network relationships is that one party is dependent on resources controlled by another, and that there are gains to be had by the pooling of resources' (ibid, p.18).

Coupled with this is the fact that the informal networks often run around formal structures that are overly challenging (ibid, p.18). Besides, informal networks may become an alternative if the course through the formal structure is sluggish, clogged, or even unsuitable for the assignment in place. Conversely, 'such arrangements may complement formal structures, compensating for their weaknesses' ibid, p.24)

Lipson goes further to postulate that that organizational and inter-organizational 'activity may come to be conducted primarily through informal methods, bypassing formal structures and rendering them largely ceremonial' (ibid, p.24). However this is not necessarily true, since although the informality may be one of the vital ingredients for efficiency, the formal dimension is absolutely necessary for legitimising the collaboration. Thus, formal structures are necessary in the embryonic state of the collaboration, especially when constructing a basis for the two organisations to collaborate. This construction is given a legal framework in which to operate. For instance as examined earlier, Source M asserted that both the EU and UN officials were willing to cooperate informally (using soft cooperation) but if there was a need for greater commitment and there was a possibility of casualties

then the different headquarters were consulted. In essence they had to revert to the formal structures in order to cover themselves.

Therefore, such attributes portray soft cooperation as a form of hidden collaboration whereby officials in the field of operation take it upon themselves to act, but within a reasonable means, without endangering the forces or the mandate. So, the officials in the field of operation take risks with the possibility of fatal mistakes that may have grave repercussions. Yet, if they are successful then all parties will be happy about how successful the mission was and the flexibility will not be officially recognised.

The actual operations may be noted but they are not described as being taken by officials in the field of operation on their own initiative in the Security Council reports or EU Council reports. Instead they are attributed to hard cooperation. However, it is understandable why this is the case. Both organisations are run by member States that commit a number of troops on ground and in different capacities. So they are very protective of their service men and women. On the other hand, organisations like the UN have been affected by dwindling troop contributions, especially from first world countries. So there is a desire to keep the other countries that are still sending troops content. The EU, on the other hand, is a growing power and would like to keep the momentum going. In addition, it wants to maintain a strict adherence to its rules.

Nevertheless, there is a need to officially recognise the contributions of soft cooperation and give allowances for it. For instance, there is a need to maintain a line of communication in the field to allow officials mandates to use their judgement without facing grave consequences in case of the failure of a given operation.

The reason for this is that both the EU and UN at the political level have often relied on soft cooperation to launch missions or to get other states to intervene in areas of conflict. For instance, when discussing inter-organisational cooperation Wendling (2010, p.3) highlights the role of individuals as entrepreneurs and, as examined earlier, the individuals at the political level have used frameworks that are synonymous with soft cooperation to foster inter-organisational collaboration.

By approaching France (in spite of its controversial role in the region) to intervene in DR Congo, the UN Secretary General epitomised Wendling's (2010) assertion concerning the important role played by the individuals. Further still, President Chirac (Kees, 2007, pp.2, 156) decided to involve the EU after the UN Secretary General received confirmation from him that France would be willing to intervene in DR Congo. These two actions changed the nature of the EU and UN relationship and fostered cooperation.

The use of soft cooperation alongside hard cooperation can reduce the propensity of organisations to conflict or compete with each other. Conflict between intergovernmental organisations can be broken down into two aspects which include non-interaction and competition.

Schroeder (2007, p.199) defines non-interaction as referring 'to cases where several actors pursue similar security assistance policies in a region or state in parallel without institutionalising information exchange or cooperation with each other.' While competition is 'often driven by unclear divisions of competence between agencies or, alternatively, of the intrusion by one agency into another's domain. Such occupational overlaps between different agencies, and accompanying conflicts over resources and competences, can lead to competitive and antagonistic behaviour among the organisations involved' (ibid, p.199).

Koops holds similar views with Schroeder, as he asserts that 'the central problem with inter-organisation coordination involves the practical constraints on assenting to an obvious and inflexible hierarchy between formally autonomous organizations. Although the UN is often recommended as the key authoritative and lawful organization to execute such a role, in practice this however seems impossible, as other organisations are suspicious of the UN's dominance. Coupled with this is the difficulty to achieve the pre-defined legal and contractual formalization cooperation between organisations. This is attributed to the fear that such an arrangement will reduce flexibility and innovation and grossly curtails organisations' independence (Koops, 2008, p.23).

Koops argues further that the ‘problems encountered between NATO and the UN during their cooperation efforts in Bosnia during the early 1990s are an important reminder that international organizations will jealously guard their operational independence, resist a functional division of labour and may only assent to collaboration schemes on a more flexible and less formal basis’ (ibid, p.23).

Overall, Schroeder (2007, pp.197-198) argues that the presence of many actors (states and non-state actors) in the international system ‘with sometimes rather similar mandates, operating in close proximity, coordination is essential if assistance efforts are not to be duplicated...the need to coordinate activities across departmental and organisational divides is a matter of urgency. Failure to do so will have an adverse effect on the prospects for creating stable, democratic and sustainable security institutions’ in the intended country.

Therefore, hard cooperation provides the legal framework within which organisations cooperate but its inflexible nature in relation to geographical location, time frame, failure to encourage re-hatting, officials and motivations of the actors has created the need for soft cooperation. Its different frameworks like informal networks, as stated by Michael Lipson 2005, p.18), come into action when the formal structures become sluggish, clogged, or even unsuitable for the assignment in place, thereby complementing and compensating for their weakness.

On larger scale, aspects of inter-organisational cooperation efficiency have been applied in conflict resolution processes in Darfur and Chad. In Chad the unstable regime of President Deby from 2005 was heavily tested by rebels some of whom were supported by Sudan. Deby was able to stay in power due to French help and reached an agreement with the rebels in 2007 (Safer Access, March 2008, pp.2-3). There after Arteaga (2008) contends that:

‘the UN Security Council began designing an international mission supported by three components: humanitarian, police and military. The United Nations would handle the first and Chad the second, with UN backing. The mission would be rolled out in the areas where refugees and displaced persons from eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic are located, but

there would be no military presence on the border. In parallel, the EU began to prepare to take charge of the military component of the mission and its Council meeting of 23-24 July approved its involvement in the UN mission. The 12 September meeting approved the concept of crisis and the Secretary General and High Representative of CFSP reported five days later to the Secretary General of the United Nations that the EU was willing to take charge of the operation's military component during the first 12 months' (Arteaga, 2008, p.4)

The above shows an extension of cooperation between the EU and UN into Chad. The two organisations use their legal framework to put into place a mission to deal with humanitarian, security and law and order problems in Chad. Arteaga (ibid, p.4) notes that the UN Security Council passed resolution 1778/2007 on 25<sup>th</sup>/09/2007 launching a multidimensional mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)' this was to operate under chapter 7 of the UN Charter (Ibid, p.4)

Arteaga (2008) notes that 'EU began planning the operation in July 2007 to take charge of security in the refugee camps, a similar mission to that carried out in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Operation Artemis in 2003. Backed by UN Security Council Resolution 1787, approval of which would not have been possible without the backing of Europe and, in particular, France, the EU approved the subsequent joint action in EU 2007/677/PESC, dated 15 October, to launch the operation' (ibid., p.5)

From the above the role of the state actors like France is evident and the use of the UN as the legalising power is also highlighted. Further still although Arteaga (2008) seems to suggest that the EU was using the Operation Artemis template, it can be argued that MINURCAT was an improvement on the IEMF and EUFOR RD Congo. This is because Arteaga (2008) notes that the EU was indeed a component of MINURCAT. He states that 'The European component of MINURCAT, operation EUFOR Chad/CAR, comprises 14 nations and 3,700 troops (of whom 2,100 are French)' (ibid, p.5). However it should be noted that it had its own chain of command reporting to the French headquarters of Mont Valérien. It also had a ground force commander who was French (ibid, p.5).

## **Darfur Conflict**

The conflict in Darfur that commenced in February 2003 (Tar, 2006, p.1) presented one of the greatest challenges to the African Union as it was an internal matter in the Sudan yet had spilled over into Chad (Safer access, March 2008, p.4). However according to Mansaray (2009, p.37) the African Union had launched AMIS (African Union Mission in Darfur) in 2004 to monitor the ceasefire between the Sudanese government and the rebels. This was later turned into a hybrid mission with the UN in 2007 after the Security Council passed resolution 1769. The AMIS peacekeepers were to be re-hatted (UN Security Council/RES/1769, 2007, p.3) into the new mission known as UNAMID (United Nations African Mission in Darfur).

UNAMID was a further improvement on MINURCAT in that although it was a hybrid mission, the Security Council resolution called for a single command and control structure (ibid. p.4)

Therefore inter-organisation cooperation efficiency is constantly evolving. International organisations like the UN can choose to apply different aspects as examined above. The formation of the hybrid mission was a major step in peacekeeping and inter-organisational cooperation. The UN has shown a willingness to embrace change in the ever changing international system. As reiterated by Biermann (2009, p.7), earlier the different issues the UN has to deal with have to be addressed with a flexible attitude. The UN and other organisations in the international system have to adapt to new ways of peacekeeping and conflict resolution and from the above analysis it is evident that the UN has indeed embraced change as it grapples with international conflicts.

## **12. Structure of the thesis**

The thesis is divided into seven chapters, covering a wide range of inter-linked topics. Each chapter leads on to the following one and culminates with the final chapter which joins together the different topics of discussion in the thesis.

Chapter one elaborates on the rationale for the research. The aim of the study is mainly to assess EU-UN cooperation in DR Congo, purposely gauging the reasons behind the collaboration. This is followed by a comprehensive examination of the research questions and an explanation of their relevance, and a discussion of the hypothesis of the research.

The chapter then specifies and justifies the chosen periodisation of the study (from 2003 to 2008). Although actual military collaboration in DR Congo started in 2003, it could not go beyond 2008 when the EU refused to honour a request by the UN to enter eastern DR Congo when a conflict had broken out. This marked the end of EU military engagement in DR Congo and no mission has been launched since. The chapter goes on to discuss the sources and methods of the study. The rationale for DR Congo as a case study is put forward. Among the reasons is the fact that it was a location for two EU military operations in collaboration with one of the largest UN missions. The chapter then succinctly anticipates the conceptual framework that will be relied on when examining the research questions. In this chapter a multi-layered, multi-dimensional approach to inter-organisational cooperation is developed. The different dimensions, layers, frameworks and variables of the model are introduced and examined. The linkages between the aforementioned are also assessed. The model is tested against other interventions like in Darfur and the Central African Republic and Chad.

Chapter two provides the context on how and why the UN has increased regional cooperation over the last two decades and the context against which UN-EU cooperation has developed. It starts with a discussion of the changes undergone by the peacekeeping process in the post Cold War period which saw the international system change from bi- to multi-polarity. With it came a number of challenges such as ‘new wars,’ which were mainly intra-state ones. These brought the UN to reform its approach, especially adopting the ‘responsibility to protect’ principle alongside fostering sovereignty of the state — a lynchpin of international politics. In this transition period, the UN had to increasingly rely on regional bodies, especially as its reforms were not happening instantly. For instance, although it was operating under what came to be known as Chapter VI and a half of the UN Charter in DR Congo



prior to Operation Artemis, the French-led EU forces were operating under Chapter VII.

The chapter then examines the issue of regional cooperation and a survey of regional organisations and examples of cooperation. The study acknowledges that since the end of the Cold War the EU has been willing to work under the leadership of the UN in crisis management with the view of upholding the UN Charter, and fostering effective multilateralism. The chapter then examines changes undergone by the EU since the early 1990s, charting the development of the common foreign and security policy (among other pillars of the EU), which enabled the EU to become a more viable interlocutor to the UN. The chapter also discusses the concept of effective multilateralism first by tracing the origin and different definitions of the concept of multilateralism to the current era as examined by different academics.

Chapter three reviews the scholarship on both the UN and EU peacekeeping, whether authors have addressed the key issues of EU-UN cooperation and whether this is done convincingly. It evaluates the success or failure of the EU-UN cooperation through the eyes of key authors in the field of international organizations and peacekeeping. The key operations discussed include operation Artemis, EUFOR RD Congo, European Union Police Mission Kinshasa/DR Congo (EUPOL) and the EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC). As a result this chapter develops a conceptual framework to examine EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping, using a multi-layered approach to understanding EU-UN cooperation is used.

Chapter four starts by mapping the historical background to the conflict in DR Congo. The discussion on the country's history starts from the pre-colonial through to the colonial era, independence and up to Mobutu's regime and the events leading up to the first outbreak of the conflict in 1996. This leads to a discussion of the interplay between domestic, regional and international factors that have been at the heart of DR Congo politics from independence to the present day.

The involvement of more than half a dozen countries in the second war in DR Congo eliminated most of the neighbouring states from being part of the solution, as they

were part of the problem. Therefore, the ensuing stalemate only led to the further internationalisation of the conflict thereby bringing about the deployment of the UN after the 1999 Lusaka peace accord.

The deployment of the UN forces and the chaos that erupted in the Ituri region in 2003, which led the UN to ask the EU to intervene in the conflict, is analysed. The decision-making process of the EU is discussed, in addition to the events leading up to the launch of Operation Artemis by the EU.

Chapter five examines the cooperation and lack of cooperation between the EU and UN on the political level, using a combination of secondary and primary research findings concerning the different missions that have been set up in DR Congo. These include the United Nations Organisation Mission in The Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC/MONUSCO) for the United Nations and Operation Artemis, the European Force in The Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR RD), EUSEC (tasked with Security Sector reforms) and European Union Police in Kinshasa and DR Congo for the European Union.

The chapter discusses background to the political cooperation and examines the interactions between the EU and the UN at their headquarters in Brussels and New York respectively.

The Joint declarations between the EU and UN in 2003 and 2007 which dealt with the partnership and the development of a feasible working framework between the two organizations are examined. Also, an evaluation of the levels of cooperation between the EU and UN at different levels is done.

Although the cooperation and the failure to cooperate between the EU and the UN is explored at both the political and operational level, it is important to assess the views held by other parties involved in the conflict on whether the two organizations cooperated or conflicted. Therefore the opinions of the parties to the conflict like the Congolese politicians, civilians, Rwandan government, Ugandan government and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)<sup>6</sup> are discussed.

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<sup>6</sup> The SADC states among others includes Angola, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia which played a crucial role on the battle field and in the diplomatic effort to end the conflict.

Taken as a whole this section seeks to clarify the positions by different parties of the conflict and the perception of Africans to inter-institutional collaboration into a different light

Chapter six analyses the interaction between the two organizations at operational level focussing on components such as command and control, communication and logistics. The EU operations like Artemis, EUFOR RD, EUSEC, EUPOL Kinshasa and DR Congo are evaluated. The thesis especially delves into the informal networks that are developed by the operatives both within the EU and UN in order to achieve the desired goal of carrying out their duties and pacifying the DR Congo.

The study then examines the conflict and cooperation between the EU and UN within specific operations. For instance did the UN Police (CIVPOL) cooperate or conflict with its opposite number EUPOL DR Congo? Or how well did MONUC cooperate with the French led EU Force codenamed Operation Artemis and the subsequent mission EUFOR RD Congo? Or how well did MONUC cooperate with EUSEC.

Chapter Seven brings together all the findings giving a clear understanding on the dynamics of EU-UN cooperation. The impact of inter-organisational cooperation efficiency on the theory and practice of peacekeeping is also analysed. The chapter also examines the areas for further research in EU-UN cooperation and discusses a new approach to peacekeeping in Africa.

The next chapter will start by examining the ways such peacekeeping evolved since the Cold War, responding to the changing nature of conflicts (the 'new wars') and the evolving environment of international cooperation.

## **Chapter 2:**

### **The changing structures of peacekeeping and the emergence of inter-organisational cooperation**

#### **1. The changing nature of peacekeeping**

From the time of its commencement to the current era, peacekeeping has been going through a series of changes. For instance, Hammarskjöld's vision of peacekeeping, whereby peacekeepers were called in by parties to a conflict and could only use force in self-defence, has mostly disappeared (May, 2004, p.xxxviii). Unlike previously, peacekeepers can now be used in the internal affairs of a country and can be deployed without the consent of all the parties, especially where there is an incidence of gross human rights abuse (Osmançavuşoğlu, 1999–2000, p.3).

The changes to the way peacekeeping is carried out can be attributed to the changing nature of the international system. Although peacekeeping was adopted by the United Nations in an attempt to fulfil the primary objective of maintaining international peace and security, it was also used as a means to stop Cold War

superpowers from getting entangled in localised conflicts, as it was not about authoritative or forceful maintenance of peace (Melander and Pigache, 2007, p.10). Therefore, peacekeepers could be deployed, for example, in Cyprus in 1964 to separate the Greek and Turkish Cypriots who were supported by Greece and Turkey respectively.

The deployment of the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus had a dual purpose. Firstly, it was intended to prevent or reduce the likelihood of superpower rivalry from fanning the conflict. Secondly, it was anticipated that the peacekeeping force would facilitate the peaceful resolution of the conflict (UN Peacekeeping UNFICYP Mission).

Peacekeeping missions in the Cold War era were, according to Osmancavusoglu (1999–2000, p.2), characteristically long and ‘their presence in relatively populated areas for more than a decade made peacekeeping forces a local party directly involved in politics on the ground...these forces became a long-term contributor to the civilian economy and provider of such services as medical treatment, housing, distribution of food and services, and family contacts.’

It has also been argued that, although inter-state war was prevalent during the Cold War, there were not so many intra-state conflicts, especially in Europe, as most were either under the strong hand of the Soviet Union or subscribed to the liberal views of the United States and its allies. Some long-running conflicts in the Third World were resolved after the collapse of the Soviet Union and some academics even began theorising about the end of the use of force (Yilmaz, 2008, p.44).

However, the post-Cold War era has witnessed a fresh wave of conflicts termed ‘new wars’ (Kaldor 2006, p.5) which have changed the role of peacekeeping. These wars, according to Melander, Öberg and Hall (2009, p.7), are characterised by a blur in the ‘distinction between internal and external, public and private, political and economic, civilian and military and even war and peace itself.... occurring in failing or failed states, these are understood to be essentially non political, identity-based, organizationally deconstructed wars of aggrandizement waged among a myriad of actors unified only in their disregard for legitimacy, ideological goals and military

restraint.' These are quite different from the old state-based wars where leaders organised states, economies and armies with the aim of fighting similarly organised foes.

Melander, Öberg and Hall (ibid, p.7) argue that, during the Cold War, the international system was exceedingly ordered and highly predictable because the ensuing superpower competition between the Soviet Union and the United States of America created bi-polarity which the Third World states made use of and were also regulated by. For instance, they could play one super power against another, as most claimed to be non-aligned. However the end of the Cold War led to the erosion of state sovereignty of the Third World states through the expansion of globalisation.

Coupled with this is 'an apparently reduced willingness and ability to control internal violence...Governments and potential insurgents no longer have ideological patrons who provide them with the wherewithal to commit violence and then expect some influence over how that violence is carried out...the Cold War provided regimes with higher ideological goals and roles within the global struggle that provided a source of legitimacy. With the collapse of the Cold War, greater instability was introduced into the global system, increasing the likelihood of the outbreak of violent conflict and opening the doors to atrocities' (ibid, p.10).

Another school of thought, spearheaded by former US presidents George W. Bush Senior and Bill Clinton, views the causes of the new wars through the lenses of the end of the Cold War. Proponents of this school of thought go further to postulate that the end of the Cold War lifted the lid on the ancient hatred and simmering rivalries harboured by different ethnic groups in many states. This led to dormant grievances resurfacing and spiralling into conflict (Brown, 1996, p.13).

However, Brown (1996, p.13) also states that these mainly internal new wars are a result of weak state structures as most of these states, like DR Congo, were artificially created during the scramble for and partition of Africa in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Stedman (1996) in Brown (pp.238, 240, 245) concurs with Brown by arguing that colonial powers had consumed territories that formed borders that barely responded to African political, cultural and economic life. The new borders split tribes asunder, with some tribes breaking up and finding themselves on

different sides of the border of different colonies and, later, states. This has led to porous borders in Africa and, indeed, the borders have looked artificial, especially in DR Congo which shares a border with over half a dozen nations.

The artificiality of the borders has resulted in conflict spill-over, as a persecuted tribe has always sought help from cousins across the border. This has led to sometimes clandestine or open support for these tribes by neighbours and, in some instances, has resulted in conflict between the nations (ibid, pp.245–246). The porous nature of the borders and the inability of some states to man their borders has led rebels in some states to use neighbouring territories as a spring board to attack their homeland. Sometimes they have launched these attacks with the help of the host government but they have also proved to be uncontrollable, especially when they are no longer of strategic importance to the host nations. It should be noted that the harassed states have often used tit-for-tat tactics to fend off rebels by using proxies in the offending state to fight their enemies (ibid, pp.245-246).

The phenomenon of new wars has been intensified by the proliferation of small arms made available in the aftermath of the Cold War. Kaldor (2006, p.4) notes that these arms were originating from the successor states to the collapsed Soviet Union. Most of these arms found their way into the hands of both national armies and rebel factions in Third World countries. This development fanned conflict, as opposing sides were confident of victory and saw less need to reach diplomatic solutions.

Kaldor (ibid, p.5) argues further that the new wars are exacerbated by globalisation. She contends that the global interconnectedness threatened the future of territory-based sovereignty, which is one of the major foundations of the modern state. The erosion of this sovereignty has undermined the autonomy of the state and in extreme circumstances has led to the disintegration of states. This has arisen as a result of the erosion of states' monopoly over legitimate organised violence, primarily caused by the trans-nationalisation of military force. This practice began in World War II, was institutionalised by the bloc system in the Cold War and has transitioned into the post-Cold war period. Consequently, with increasing globalisation, weak states have struggled to keep internal dissension under their control.

Therefore, due to the aforementioned factors, peacekeeping has had to go through some drastic changes, especially as far as the roles of peacekeepers are concerned.

Where peacekeeping had become a viable tool during the Cold War when collective enforcement was impossible, the UN found that its methods could not combat the new developments in the international system. These methods included observation missions (UNDPKO, May 2008, p.1) and peacekeeping missions which came to be defined under Chapter six and a half of the UN Charter as they fell 'somewhere between the traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully (outlined in Chapter VI) on the one hand, and more forceful, less "consent-based" action (Chapter VII), on the other' (ibid, p.1).

With the demise of the Soviet Union leading to the end of the Cold War, the Security Council got some more leeway in the continual use of peacekeeping as a tool of conflict resolution in the international arena. But peacekeeping had to be refined in order to address the problems of the day because as Sapiro (2004, pp.348–349) notes, the 'end of the Cold War shifted the focus from strategic thinking from inter-state ideologically fuelled conflicts to predominantly intrastate multifaceted crises.'

Sapiro (ibid, p.349) postulates further that this lifting of the ideological veil shed a glaring light over the root causes of internal conflicts which involved a combination of degraded economic circumstances, social and political instability and weak states among other factors. This therefore led to the development of a new conception (away from the Charter) on the meaning of security, from collective defence or territorial threat to human security based on the link between human rights, democracy, peace and development.

The above development consequently led to the revamp in the peacekeeping process as a whole, in that it became multi-faceted. Apart from peacekeeping duties, a mission often incorporates peace-building in its agenda. For instance, peacekeeping missions are involved in overseeing the security sector reforms of the recipient nation, carrying out elections, restructuring the judiciary and working with other humanitarian organisations to improve the economic, health and social situation of the recipient state. These developments created the need for the UN and its agencies



to partner with regional organisations in peacekeeping. On its own the UN could not provide or sustain such a complex endeavour involving economic, political, military and social economic apparatus.

As examined earlier, the internal nature of the post-Cold War conflicts stretched the UN's peacekeeping capabilities, as intervention was required at all levels. In addition to overstretching the UN, there was a disturbing aspect about these conflicts that complicated matters. The internal nature of the conflict created legal problems with respect to the sovereignty of states. Yet the UN is tasked with the maintenance of international peace and security. In the midst of the chaos, the UN realised it needed to encourage regional organisations to step up to the mark and partner with it to resolve conflicts.

This was epitomised by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali who postulated that, at times:

‘Regional arrangements or agencies in many cases possess a potential that should be utilized in serving the functions...preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building...regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations’ efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratisation in international affairs...Consultations between the United Nations and regional arrangements or agencies could do much to build international consensus on the nature of a problem and the measures required to address it. Regional organizations participating in complementary efforts with the United Nations in joint undertakings would encourage States outside the region to act supportively’ (Report of the Secretary General, A/47/277 - S/24111, 1992, p.1).

The Brahimi report, which was produced in 2000, made a reference to a partnership between the UN and regional organisations in resolving conflicts. The primary objective of the panel that wrote the report was to ‘undertake a thorough review of the peace and security activities, and to present a clear set of specific, concrete and

practical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future' (Tardy, 2004, p.5). This was in response to military, organisational and political problems which the UN was facing while carrying out peacekeeping operations in the 1990s (Ibid, p.5). The key areas identified were 'Doctrine, strategy and decision-making for peace operations; UN capacities to deploy operations rapidly and effectively; Headquarters resources and structure for planning and supporting peacekeeping operations; and Peace operations and the information age' (ibid, p.5).

The need for cooperation between the UN and regional organisations has further been enhanced by the lack of political will within the Security Council to intervene in conflicts or even give missions strong mandates to carry out their duties. This has given credence to the view that international organisations like the UN are member driven and can only be as effective as members are willing to allow them to be (Sapiro, 2004, p.356). States have specific interests as to why they support certain interventions and oppose others.

For instance, during the genocide in Rwanda the Security Council, led by the United States, refused to send more troops to back up the stretched mission and even downgraded its mandate. The result was that they watched on as hundreds of thousands of people were massacred and they could do nothing. Other UN members, according to Sapiro (Ibid, p.356), have different views when it comes to the use of force in the international arena. Herrberg (2008, pp.209–211) contends that the EU would favour a soft power approach to conflict resolution as it was founded on principles of non-coerciveness.

Over the years, the UN and regional organisations have held biennial meetings (Wouters et al. 2006, p.232). The first one was in 1994 and the list of participating organisations has increased from 10 in 1994 to 20 in 2005. The meeting held under the guidance of Kofi Annan on 18<sup>th</sup> July 1998 called for the establishment of a framework of cooperation (Kronenberger and Wouters, 2004, pp.382–383). Other meetings that have been held throughout the years have involved discussions on potential violence in respective regions of participating organisations, likely preventive measures and guidelines for coordinated regional effort, e.g. setting up

joint peacekeeping and peace-building units, and assessing missions in the field (ibid, p.363).

These talks have resulted in the formation of an understanding between the UN and regional organisations. On a case-by-case basis, the UN has associated itself with different organisations in their respective areas. During the conflict in Sierra Leone, the UN supported the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervention in 1998 without authorisation from the Security Council<sup>7</sup> (Sarkin, 2009, p.7).

Indeed the UN has collaborated with a number of regional bodies in peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War. For instance, 'United Nations' field missions have been deployed in conjunction with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and with CIS in Georgia. ...joint operations, such as the current human rights mission of the United Nations and the OAS in Haiti' (UN Secretary-General report on cooperation with regional organisations, 1995). Also, the UN has worked with the African Union in the Darfur region of Sudan (UN Department of Political Affairs).

Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has shown a willingness to cooperate with the UN. The main reason for this stems from the inherent favourable predisposition of the EU towards multilateralism and the recognition that the UN is the main actor as far as maintenance of international peace and security is concerned. Throughout its formation and metamorphosing, as witnessed in the various treaties, the EU has maintained adherence to multilateralism and recognised the leadership of the UN in the maintenance of peace and security in the international system. Wouters and Frederik Naert (2005, p.3) state that, in 1995, when the UN was celebrating its 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary, 'the EU strongly reaffirmed its attachment to the Charter and pledged to support the UN in a Declaration adopted at the Cannes European Council in June 1995'.

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<sup>7</sup> 'It would appear that the UN Security Council has never complained about its powers being usurped because the interventions were in support of popular causes and were carried out partly because the UN Security Council had not taken action or was unlikely to do so at the time.' Sarkin, 2009, p.7)

In Helsinki (Dec. 1999), the European Council unequivocally declared: 'The Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security' (Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10–11 December 1999).

Furthermore, in the latter part of 2000, according to Tardy (2005, p.54), the European Security and Defence Council (ESDP) report to the Nice European Council was released, highlighting the value of cooperation between the EU and UN during a time when the EU was developing its crisis management and conflict prevention capabilities. The report acknowledged that the efforts to foster the cooperation would help the EU to respond more efficiently to requests from organisations like the UN.

The willingness of the EU to cooperate with the UN took a new turn in 2003 in Bosnia, where the UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF) mission was replaced by the EU Police Mission (EUPM) and Operation Artemis in DR Congo. The success of these missions showed the desire for the EU to partner with the UN in peacekeeping and therefore presented itself as a viable option among regional organisations.

The other reason why the EU has been disposed to collaborate with the UN in peacekeeping is largely because of its member states' capabilities to rapidly deploy in a conflict area because it has the forces and military hardware to do so. For example, British troops were able to deploy in Sierra Leone in 2000 to end the fighting. Roberson (2007) contends that 'the British intervention provided legitimacy to the UN mission, and time for the UN peacekeeping mission to build up forces' Roberson (2007, p.7).

Another factor in the willingness of the EU to work with the UN is attributed to the interest of its member states in key regions of conflict. It has played a key role in rebuilding successor states in the former Yugoslavia because the region is in its own backyard. This could explain why the EU played a crucial role in the diplomatic manoeuvres as the conflict raged on in the 1990s. Further still, the EU was deployed

in states like Bosnia to take over from the UN as it launched the EU Police Mission in Bosnia. Other operations included Althea in 2004 as a successor to the NATO-led stabilisation force (SFOR). However, operation Althea was authorised by the Security Council (EUFOR BIH factsheet, p.1, 2004).

Apart from intervening in its backyard, the EU has further intervened in areas outside its geographical setting, as seen in DR Congo with the launch of Operation Artemis. States like France and Belgium had key national interests and subsequently had the EU on board when launching Artemis in 2003. Bushoki (2006) asserts that the EU's involvement in DR Congo can also be attributed to the interests of states like Belgium and France in relation to DR Congo. As a former colonial master, Belgium has expressed specific and even more emotional reactions vis-à-vis DR Congo. France's connection with DR Congo during the Cold War, and its cultural connection due to the fact that French is the spoken language there, spurred on joint action by the EU, though it was a recipe to block the common EU agenda.

## **2. Changes undergone by the EU since the early 1990s**

In examining the EU-UN cooperation, there is a need to understand the changes the EU has gone through since the 1990s. The EU has gravitated towards a more robust involvement in the maintenance of international peace and security through multilateralism. This has been carried out through a process of treaty signing and from the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 onwards. These treaties have set up institutions, revamped them or totally changed their role in line with the changing role of the EU in the international system.

For instance, from the Treaty of Maastricht signed in 1992, article B states that the European Union was to 'assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through implementation of a common policy and security policy which included the eventual framing of the common defence policy' (Treaty of European Union, Title V, 1992, article B(2)). This led to the creation of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) pillar. According to article J.1, the objective of the common foreign policy was, 'to strengthen the security of the Union and its member states... preserve

peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter... to promote international co-operation...to develop and consolidate...respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms' (Treaty of European Union, Title V, 1992, article J.1 2).

Having been viewed as more of an economic power than a military one, the EU positioned itself for a more hands-on role in international politics (Demirtaş-Coşkun, 2006, p.57). This was particularly triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which left the United States and its allies as the key powers in the international system. Although the Soviet nuclear threat was no longer possible in Europe and America, insecurity was still rampant in other areas of the world like Africa and Asia. Furthermore, in the EU's backyard the former Yugoslavia was at civil war; territories like Slovenia and Croatia were seceding and fighting had broken out in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina (ibid, p.49)

The insecurity in countries like Somalia, which collapsed, was a key concern for the UN and European powers. The collapse of the Soviet Union was a triumph for values of democracy, respect for human rights (West J. East Asia Forum, 11<sup>th</sup> January 2012, p.1) and fundamental freedom. Therefore, in Maastricht the EU was aligning itself to such roles as spreading the core values of the Western world, a vision that is still pursued by states in the West.

By setting up the CFSP pillar, the EU was trying to find a unified voice in the international arena. By aligning foreign policies, it would get a strong say in key international matters, especially at the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The above aims were accentuated by the Amsterdam Treaty, which was signed in 1997, where CFSP was given five primary objectives. These included safeguarding 'the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter' (Amsterdam treaty, 1997 article J.1 clause 1). It was also tasked with strengthening the security of the EU and given the duty of preserving 'peace and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principle of the

Helsinki Act and the objectives of Charter of Paris, including those on external borders to promote international co-operation' (Ibid, clause1).

By 1997, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia had waned but the devastation left had traumatised the region. Furthermore, there was fighting in Kosovo and the EU had quite often been left helpless, especially as NATO had taken over most of the military operations (Yesson, E., 2003, p.3). NATO member states were also involved in the diplomatic negotiations (Ibid, p.3) which had left the EU playing second fiddle to proceedings. So, by improving the role and objectives of CFSP in the treaty of Amsterdam, the EU was trying to consolidate its role in the international arena but also work with NATO because some of the key EU states belonged to NATO.

Conflict had also been rife in the Third World — Somalia was in total anarchy after its state collapsed, there was genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and DR Congo was invaded by its neighbours Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Angola in 1997. So there was a role for the EU to play, especially as NATO was preoccupied in the Balkans. In addition, the United States did not want to get involved in Africa after the case of Rwanda when the US blocked a robust UN mission from being deployed, leading to the deaths of up to a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus in the 1994 genocide.

However, there was growing unrest, especially from states like France which did not belong to NATO and were desirous to enhance EU capabilities. The continued aspiration to reduce NATO's involvement in the EU by states like France alarmed pro-NATO states like Britain (Ozen, 2002, pp.233-245) which organised the St. Malo meeting to reach a compromise. The St. Malo declaration of 1998 called for both use of EU and NATO capabilities. For instance, it was declared that, in order to achieve what was set out in the treaty of the European Union 1992 title V, 'the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises' Franco-British Summit Joint declaration on European Defence (1998, p.1). But the declaration went further to state that:

'In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be given

appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework)' (ibid, p.1).

The EU realised a need to come together in St. Malo in a bid to strengthen the commonality between the EU member states, giving it one voice in the international arena while at the same time keeping up with its commitment to NATO (ibid, p.1). The St. Malo declaration was quickly Europeanised under the Germany Presidency of the European Union. The German Presidency transformed the British and French initiative into a European certainty by changing the European Security Defence identity into a European Security and Defence Policy (Haine, 2004, p.3). This was achieved in June 1999 in Cologne where the EU member states declared that:

'The EU shall play its full role on the international stage. To this end, we intend to give the EU the necessary means and capabilities to assume responsibilities regarding a common European policy on Security and defence...the union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO (Cologne European Council Conclusions of the Presidency, Annex III-1999, p.24).

On the issue of EU decision-making, the EU reiterated its desire to retain political control and strategic direction of the operations (modelled on the WEU Petersberg declaration) with the aim of deciding and conducting the operations successfully. To carry this out, the EU noted a need for the capacity to analyse situations, gain sources of intelligence and the means to execute strategic planning. However, the EU needed to develop the decision-making structure of the ESDP. So it proposed that:

'regular (or ad hoc) meetings of the General Affairs Council, as appropriate including Defence Ministers; a permanent body in Brussels (Political and



Security Committee) consisting of representatives with pol/mil expertise; an EU Military Committee consisting of Military Representatives making recommendations to the Political and Security Committee; a EU Military Staff including a Situation Centre; other resources such as a Satellite Centre, Institute for Security Studies. Decisions relating to crisis management tasks, in particular decisions that have military or defence implications will be taken in accordance with Article 23 of the Treaty on the European Union. Member States will retain in all circumstances the right to decide if and when their national forces are deployed' (Cologne European Council Conclusions of the Presidency, Annex III-1999, p.24).

Haine (2004, p.5) argues that these institutions were further elaborated in Helsinki, through what came to be known as the Helsinki goals that were declared by the EU in December 1999. These included: voluntary cooperation in EU-led operations, where member States were to be able 'by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks' (Helsinki European Council Conclusions of the Presidency, 1999, p.5).

According to Umbach (2003, p.6), these forces were to be 'militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements.'

Another goal included the establishment of the new political and military bodies and arrangements inside the Council, which had been explored during the Cologne European Council and summarised into its conclusions. These structures were 'to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework' (Helsinki European Council Conclusions of the Presidency, 1999, p.5).

Besides, a non-military crisis management mechanism was set up 'to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States' (ibid, p.5).

The Council went further by proposing conditions for broader discussions and collaboration with NATO<sup>8</sup>, without undermining the wishes of the EU Member States. It went further by defining 'appropriate arrangements that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management' (ibid, p.5).

The Helsinki goals were finalised in the Santa Maria de Feira European Council meeting between 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> June 2000. The Council welcomed:

'The setting-up and first meeting of the committee for civilian aspects of crisis management...the identification of priority areas for targets in civilian aspects of crisis management and of specific targets for civilian police capabilities...Member States, cooperating voluntarily...to provide up to 5,000 police officers for international missions across the range of conflict prevention and crisis management operations...to identify and deploy up to 1,000 police officers within 30 days' (Santa Maria Da Feira, 2000, p.2).

This development set the stage for the ESDP and its institutions to be incorporated in the Treaty of Nice in December 2000. According to the summary of the treaty, the European Council 'adopted the Presidency's report on the European security and defence policy which *inter alia* provides for the development of the Union's military capacity, the creation of permanent political and military structures and the incorporation into the Union of the crisis management functions of the WEU.' (Memorandum to the members of the Commission, Summary of the Treaty of Nice, 2001, p.12.)

Haine (2004, p.4) adds that 'also agreed in Nice was the creation of autonomous agencies that would incorporate within the EU the WEU structures dealing with ESDP, for example the Satellite Centre and Institution for Security Studies. These two agencies were officially created by European Council Joint action in July 2001.'

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<sup>8</sup> As far as collaboration with NATO was concerned, the EU signed the Berlin Plus agreement in December 2002 with the EU, which called for both organisations to work together in crisis management both in Europe and the world over. The EU was to benefit from using NATO and assets planning capabilities in its crisis management operations. The two organisations were to work in close consultation during EU-led crisis management operations and were to reinforce each other's capability requirements (Waugh, 2004, p.2).

With the subsequent development of EU structures over time, cooperation with the UN in the field of operation involving peacekeeping forces has become feasible. However, since the UN is internationally recognised as a key, but not the only player in the maintenance of international peace and security, models of cooperation have been developed to facilitate the EU-UN partnership.

### **3. Models of UN/EU cooperation**

Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has been working in conjunction with other organisations like NATO, the EU and African Union. Different models of cooperation have been developed to try to find a working framework of cooperation. During the study a new model of cooperation between the EU and UN was developed. However it is vital that the different models of cooperation previously explored in the academic literature on inter-organisational cooperation be examined.

The Joint Declaration between the EU and UN, passed in September 2003 was followed on by the European Council Elements of implementation of EU-UN joint declaration document in June 2004. The Elements of implementation document identifies six models of EU-UN cooperation. These include the clearing house process, the Bridging model, the stand-by model, EU operation taking over from the UN, the stand-alone model and the modular approach. (EU Council 2004, pp.1–4).

According to the Joint Declaration, these models were designed to incorporate two options, which were the ‘provision of national military capabilities in the framework of a UN operation, or, an EU operation in answer to a request from the UN’ (EU Council 2004, p.2). These have been further analysed and explained by Tardy (2005 pp.60-66) who elaborates on how each model operates in practice.

In reference to the clearing house process model, EU member states are given leeway to contribute voluntarily to the UN peace missions. For instance, they can ‘exchange information on their contributions to a given UN operation and if they so decide, coordinate these national contributions’ (EU Council 2004, p.1).

It is argued that this model came about as the result of the UN appealing for the strengthening of MONUC, which prompted the EU to avail its Satellite Centre to the UN (Tardy, 2005, p.61).

The Bridging model entails a regional organisation (the EU for the purposes of this study) to carry out an operation to keep or restore order in a conflict zone as a UN mission is being prepared or strengthened to take over. For example, the failure of the UN to maintain peace in Ituri (DR Congo) after the departure of Ugandan forces led to the commissioning of Operation Artemis with the express aim of restoring order and giving the UN time to reorganise itself and strengthen the MONUC mission (Novosseloff, 2004, p.9).

According to the EU Council elements of Implementation document (2004, p.1), the stand-by model was envisaged by the UN Secretariat as being composed 'of an over the horizon reserve or an extraction force provided by the EU in support of a UN operation...It involves complicated coordination between the EU and the UN and is limited in its usability.' An example of such a force is the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), a 16-nation strong force of which 13 are EU states that have been deployed in the horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan) and the West African state of Liberia (Gowan, 2007, p.29).

It should be noted that the 'deployment of SHIRBRIG must be mandated by the Security Council. Although originally established for UN missions under Chapter VI of the Charter, more robust missions are considered on a case-by-case basis. SHIRBRIG will deploy for a maximum of six months, following which the mission is either terminated or replaced by a non-SHIRBRIG contribution' (UN publications SHIRBRIG, 2006, p.1). It should be noted that SHIRBRIG was disbanded in June 2009 (Global Governance Institute accessed 20/3/2013).

The other model involves an EU operation taking over from the UN, usually arising in circumstances where the UN needs to pull out of an area for a number of reasons. So the EU takes over the full responsibility of the mission. A case in point is the European Police Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which took over from the

UN's international police task force (IPTF) with a view to adding to the achievements of the UN (Tardy, 2005, p.64).

The stand-alone model was designed to allow the EU to conduct operations either 'under a UN mandate, at the request of the UN or as an EU initiative, which, once created, would have no link with the UN structure. Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina provides an example. In this case, the EU may report regularly to the UN Security Council (via the UN Secretary-General), but no other form of communication would be envisaged. The EU would act as a sub contractor of the UN or, put differently, the UN would act (only) as the mandating body of the EU' (Tardy, 2005, p.61).

The modular approach involves the EU taking over 'responsibility for a specific component within the structure of a UN mission... in this case an EU component would operate under the political control and strategic direction of the EU' (EU Council 2004, p.3).

Although the European Union gets some form of recognition, according to Thierry Tardy this type of arrangement is more favourable to the UN as it gets the EU involved in its operations with the likelihood of submitting to UN leadership. Nevertheless, Tardy (2005, pp.64–66) asserts that this model is more acceptable to the EU in the civilian aspect of the operation with an independent EU civilian chain of command.

#### **4. Effective multilateralism**

The term effective multilateralism was used by the EU in the European Security strategy document that was produced in 2003 in the aftermath of the fallout from the invasion of Iraq. The EU was deeply divided about whether Iraq was to be invaded without a second UN resolution. Major nations like France and Germany did not favour an invasion while Britain and a few other nations sided with the United States, leading Donald Rumsfeld to coin the term old and new Europe. The EU at the

instigation of its members on both sides of the debate asked Solana to design a new strategy that was reiterated in the European Security Strategy.

However before delving into the document and the concept of effective multilateralism it is important to define the term multilateralism. Koops (2011, p.66), notes that ‘despite its long established salience in political rhetoric and practice, the general academic discourse on multilateralism itself seems rather fragmented, unsystemic and largely under-theorised.’ However there have been attempts at defining the concept and one of the re-known early experts on the concept is Robert Keohane who defines multilateralism as ‘institutionalized collective action by an inclusively determined set of independent states’ (Keohane, 2006, p.1). This definition is different from the original one which is ‘practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states (Koops 2011, p.68 from Keohane 1990, p. 731).

The original definition by Keohane is critiqued by Ruggie 1992, (pp.565-566) who argues that it ‘poses the problem of subsuming institutional forms that traditionally have been viewed as being expressions of bilateralism, not multilateralism—instances of the Bismarckian alliance system, for example, such as the League of the *Three* Emperors. In short, the nominal definition of multilateralism misses the *qualitative* dimension of the phenomenon that makes it distinct... what is distinctive about multilateralism is not merely that it coordinates national policies in groups of three or more states, which is something that other organizational forms also do, but that it does so on the basis of certain principles of ordering relations among those states.’

Therefore Ruggie (1992, p.568) argues that multilateralism ‘refers to coordinating relations among three or more states in accordance with certain principles.’ He expounds this by arguing that NATO’s collective security clause can be seen as an example of a principle premised on the indivisibility of security in that it does not matter who is attacked. But an attack on any of the NATO members is an attack on all. Secondly, it is also premised on unconditional collective response (Ruggie 1992, pp.569-570.).

According to Ruggie (1992, pp.570-571), multilateralism portrays a generic institutional form in international relations and he goes on to further define multilateralism as an 'institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of "generalized" principles of conduct—that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without any regard for the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence.

Koops (2011, p.69) argues that Keohane and Ruggie's definition can be seen in the context of traditional multilateralism which is based on 'and guided by more long-term generalised principles of conduct and diffuse reciprocity.'

With diffuse reciprocity the gains do not materialise immediately but over a period of time. Therefore it rests on the notion that current sacrifices will yield long-term returns. For instance Koops, (2011, p.69) points out that the EU is premised on this very notion as EU member states have pooled their sovereignty together and hope to gain in the long-term at the expense of a loss of short-term autonomy. Therefore the fallout during the lead up to the Iraq war was an exercise of reverse diffuse reciprocity where nations decided to sacrifice long-term returns for short-term ones of autonomy and control over foreign policy (Koops 2011, p.69).

Koops, (2011, p.71) goes further by stating that 'Caporaso synthesises Keohane and Ruggie's approach by arguing that: as an organising principle, the institution of multilateralism is distinguished by indivisibility generalised principles of conduct and diffuse reciprocity.'

Caporaso according to Koops (2011) views multilateralism as a belief or ideology by noting that it; 'may be a belief of both in the existential sense of a claim about how the world works and in the normative sense that things should be done in a particular way. As such multilateralism is an ideology designed to promote multilateral activity. It combines normative principles with the advocacy of existential beliefs (Koops 2011, p.71 quoting from Caporaso, 1992, p.603).

Koops (2011, p. 71) argues that the perception multilateralism as an ideology is rather enlightening, especially when viewed in the context that effective

multilateralism is the 'EU's foreign policy philosophy which in a sense could be seen as nothing less than an integrative ideology used for promoting internal member state cohesion.

Other definitions of multilateralism which Koops (2011) puts in the traditional group include Hemmer and Karzenstein (2002, pp.575-576) who define multilateralism 'as a particularly demanding form of international cooperation which requires a strong sense of collective identity in addition to shared interests.'

This definition according to Koops (2011, p.72) displays strong constructivist assumptions 'as it underlines the importance of norms, ideas, principles and even the existence and forging of collective identities'. He further notes that 'this view of traditional multilateralism seems to be reflected, at least partially in the ideological and normative angle of the EU concept of effective multilateralism, which lays emphasis on the principle of UN security Council authority and the need to promote multilateralism as a means of strengthening a rule-based order itself.' Further still, the aspect of seeking to promote collective identities at the EU-organisational and ERU-member state level also seems to be an important feature of the EU's effective multilateralism strategy.

Koops (2011, p.72) notes that traditional multilateralism lasted from the end of the Second World War to the late 1980s. This period was exemplified by 'a clear emphasis on cooperation through international organisations and on multilateralism as a long-term organising principle for international order.' The post-Cold War period has witnessed a shift in theory and practice, especially after the failure of the UN to live up to the collective security and humanitarian intervention during the first decade of the post-Cold War and has been amplified since 9/11 by the US-led war on terror (Koops, 2011, p.72).

The post-Cold War period has seen what is known as new multilateralism. Koops (2011, p.73) notes the argument by Boyka Stefanova which states that the difference between classical/traditional and new multilateralism is that classical multilateralism practised under US hegemony 'was an element of order. New multilateralism is a threat response.'



Thus Koops (2011, p.73) postulates that ‘due to the increase in unpredictable threats since the end of the Cold War, particularly those posed by international terrorism and rogue states, coupled with the alleged ineffectiveness of the UN systems, the tardiness of international institutions and the resurgence of the salience of military power in international relations, ‘classical multilateralism seems to have been refashioned into new multilateralism which is a form of cooperation that displays a much more ends-means rationality rather than a structurally determined normative character.’

Indeed this is far removed from traditional multilateralism which championed long-term diffuse reciprocity and normative principles (Koops 2011, p.73).

Other forms of multilateralism under the new multilateralism noted by Koops include genuine multilateralism and minilateralism advanced by Kahler. Genuine multilateralism is ‘defined as incorporating a very large number of players’ (Koops 2011, p.74), while Minilateralism ‘is limited great power collaboration within multilateral structures’ (Koops 2011 p.74). The former was pursued in order to deal with impasses often encountered in large number multilateralism.

Koops also examines Dysfunctional multilateralism introduced by John Van Oudenaren. Dysfunctional multilateralism is seen in the context of states or groups of states systemically abusing the available escape clauses or opt-out clauses of Post-World War II treaties. Multilateralism also becomes dysfunctional because ‘states lack the ability to comply with their international obligations’ (Koops, 2011, p.74). The best examples can be seen in the UN Security Council’s failure to stop the genocide in Rwanda (Koops, 2011, p.74).

### **Defining Effective multilateralism**

Effective multilateralism was first used by the European Union in the European Security Strategy document produced in 2003. This document was produced after the fallout between the EU countries over the invasion of Iraq. Countries like Britain and Spain supported the American plan to invade Iraq without a second UN resolution

while France and Germany opposed it (Biscope and Drieskens in Wouters et al., 2007, pp.267-268).

In the midst of this disagreement Biscope and Drieskens (in Wouters et al., 2006, p.269) note that there was the realisation of a need for a strategic vision and a security strategy, and more specifically, of a definition of the overall policy objectives that could serve as a reference framework for everyday decision-making.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) document which was designed by a team headed by Javier Solana (Biscope and Drieskens (in Wouters et al., 2006, p.269) coined the term effective multilateralism and argued that ‘in a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective’ (A Secure Europe in a better World, 2003, p.9).

In light of the above it is very tempting to see effective multilateralism in the context of the EU. Indeed Koops (2011, p.79) notes that ‘Sven Biscop argues the best way of summarizing European Security Strategy is by effective multilateralism (Biscop, 2004b:27).’ Koops goes further to argue the

‘overall consensus is that effective multilateralism represents the EU’s own distinctive approach to international affairs, which seeks to integrate the norms and rules and institutions of traditional multilateralism...with a more pragmatic, actively interventionist and even more military-gearred culture akin to some form of output oriented new multilateralism (Koops, 2011, p.80)

This conclusion is drawn from the perception that the European Security strategy brings about an interpretation of effective multilateralism that aspires to combine military intervention in the form of early response with the development of international law and support for the UN (Koops, 2011, p.80).

Furthermore, effective multilateralism can be viewed in the context of strengthening the EU’s role in international politics. For instance the ESS document states that ‘the increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual

solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world' (A Secure Europe in a Better World, 2003, p.9). The EU views multilateralism as a vehicle to making it a credible and more integrated actor in the international arena.

The ESS emphasises cooperation between the EU and UN, thereby integrating international institutions into the definition and attributes of multilateralism. Most authors who have attempted to define it, as examined above, have mainly viewed multilateralism as involving states. With the ESS there is emphasis on institutions. Indeed Koops argues that the ESS, which he views as the EU's foreign policy philosophy, 'represents a rather novel development, as it seems to promote multilateralism between international organisations instead of a multilateralism hitherto centred on states' (Koops 2011, p.78).

Although effective multilateralism has mainly been used in the context of the EU, it can be applied on a wider scale for other organisations like the African Union and NATO, to name but a few. The UN stays at the centre as the legitimising power, leaving other organisations to coordinate with it in creating a secure world. Further still, the definition of multilateralism has been enlarged to incorporate international organisations. Coupled with this is the fact that when examined from the background of traditional and new multilateralism, effective multilateralism has shown an ability to combine aspects of the two types to suit the needs of the contemporary world, as examined above.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Approaches of inter-organisational cooperation in peacekeeping**

When dealing with the questions pertaining to the thesis, as examined in the introduction, there are strong grounds to examine the existing literature on the topic. EU-UN cooperation has been a growing area of study since the EU affirmed its commitment to partner with the UN in the maintenance of international peace and security. The cooperation has become more frequent and robust since the turn of the century. The main reasons for this, as examined in the previous chapter, can be attributed to the fact that the UN has been grappling with the changing nature of conflicts ('new wars') in the post-Cold War era, which it has not been equipped to deal with, both on a mandate and manpower level. This has led to the need to involve regional powers like the EU to assist when the UN cannot adequately meet its duty to maintain international peace and security. Apart from the EU, the UN has also partnered with other organisations like NATO and the African Union.

Therefore, to fully answer the question as to whether EU-UN partnership is a burgeoning partnership or an opportunistic liaison, it would be a good starting point to understand on a general basis why organisations cooperate with each other. After this, the study will delve into the motives of EU-UN cooperation as viewed by other authors and whether their assessment is in line with the hypothesis of the study. The thesis will then examine the assessment of other authors on EU-UN cooperation in DR Congo.

### **1. Rationale for inter-organisational cooperation**

Biermann (2009, p.7) contends that inter-organizationalism has largely been stimulated by the ‘ambivalent consequences of globalization and interdependence. Transnational challenges ranging from humanitarian disasters, pandemics and global warming to nuclear proliferation and Jihadist terrorism pose problems that transcend national capacity.’ To him, these institutions are set up to solve such problems. First, new problems kindle the formation of new organizations and regimes, e.g. inter-governmental organisations have grown four times since the end of World War II, while international non-governmental organisations have been decreasing (ibid, p.7).

Furthermore, Biermann (2009) postulates that the aforementioned escalating troubles elicit institutional alteration in order to adjust organizations to changing use. ‘Many organizations, such as the Euro-Atlantic security institutions after 1989/90, expand their institutional scope and membership. Consequently, institutional density is growing worldwide, particularly in Europe’ (ibid, p.7). These crowded institutional spaces stimulate inter-organizational networking.

The stimulation of cooperation between international organisations due to the mounting nature of the problems and the inability to solve them has led to two painful lessons.

‘First, that only a concerted approach could put an end to war-fighting. No organization was capable and none was willing to solve this conflict on its own. The second lesson was that the balance between autonomy and

cooperation, hitherto heavily tipped in favor of autonomy, had to be adjusted' (Biermann, 2008, p.159).

Biermann, (2008) argues that cooperation between the EU and UN began in earnest as shown by the interaction of the two organisations during the conflict in Former Yugoslavia. For instance 'The EC first called the UN to step up its involvement. UN Special Envoy Cyrus Vance managed in January 1992 to end the war-fighting in Croatia.... Then UNPROFOR was deployed to Croatia, later Bosnia. In mid-1992, EU and UN jointly organized the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia. For 3 years, co-chairmen from both organizations tried to mediate a diplomatic solution for the multiple conflicts' (Biermann, 2008, p.159).

Therefore Biermann (2009, p.7) goes on to add that as organizations come together, 'in their mandates, tasks, resources and membership, they increasingly overlap in their geographic and functional competences. Overlap is a *sine qua non* for meaningful cooperation, offering opportunities to forum shop among organizations, to share and shift burdens and, overall, to solve problems more effectively. Cooperation incentives arise all the more when organizations are confronted with transnational problems even they cannot solve alone...Often, this inter-organizational cooperation is embedded in complex, multi-actor governance systems in which organizations contribute to problem solving among others.'

Biermann is indeed justified in his assertion, especially regarding the new issues facing international organisations, hence leading to cooperation. Global issues like climate change, terrorism and international conflict bring organisations together to try to find a solution. Since the EU and UN are run by member states, the transnational issues Biermann raises affect the member states and thus their need to cooperate with each other.

Although he adequately delves into the dynamics of the cooperation and moves to find solutions, Biermann does not mention the issues like organisational interests and the interests of member states in fostering inter-organisational cooperation. Moreover, even though he is aware that globalisation and interdependence have

created opportunities for inter-organisational cooperation, he does not go into the causes of the globalisation and interdependence. Hence he does not mention the impact of the end of the Cold War on creating a favourable atmosphere for cooperation.

Other reasons why organisations cooperate are brought into focus by Wendling (2010). She lists them as 'the embedding of the organizations in a common network, the role played by the member states of the international organizations and the role played by the officials of the organizations as entrepreneurs, the convergence-divergence of the interest of the organizations (material interest link to resources for instance) and the convergence-divergence of the values of the organization (shared norms, for instance). These driving forces are often combined' (Wendling, 2010, p.3).

From the above explanation Wendling to a large extent fills the gap left by Biermann by stressing the role of member states. Organisations like the UN and EU can only act as far as their member states are willing to allow them. Therefore, the EU was able to launch Operation Artemis, EUFOR RD Congo, EUPOL and EUSEC because its member states were in agreement. However, when the UN needed help in 2008 to quell fighting in Eastern DR Congo, the EU did not favourably respond to that request because member states disagreed on the viability of such an operation. In the same vein, the UN was prevented from strengthening its mission to Rwanda during the genocide in 1994 at the behest of the United States (Houston chronicles 17 May 1994 section A, p.10). Yet the United States spearheaded NATO's activities to stop the annihilation of Bosnian Muslims in the former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s.

Wendling goes on to justifiably highlight the role of individuals as entrepreneurs. For example, the UN Secretary General fostered the cooperation of the EU and is in constant liaison with the EU officials. Similarly, Solana, the EU High Representative at the time of the intervention in DR Congo, played a key role in liaising with the UN and his support for the missions helped to present the role which the EU played in a favourable light. Coupled with that, it is also evident that the decision by Chirac (Homan, 2007, p.2, 156) to involve the EU after the UN Secretary General had received confirmation from him that France would be willing to intervene in DR

Congo played a key role in portraying the EU as a security actor, a role it was desirous to achieve.

The convergence-divergence of interests is indeed vital for fostering cooperation or non-cooperation between international organisations. The national interests of member states can encourage cooperation because they get to view the partnership with that particular organisation as a way for them to realise their interests. Furthermore, shared values such as adherence to the protection of human rights and other liberal policies like good governance can lead to cooperation between organisations because they presume that the shared values make cooperation smoother. The divergence of interests does not necessarily lead to non-cooperation. For instance, although the EU and UN disagreed on the deployment of an EU force in the Eastern DR Congo region in 2008, this did not mean that cooperation between the two organisations was over. Nevertheless, other authors build on Wendling's assessment by bringing in new motives for inter-organisational cooperation.

Other scholars such as Haugevik (2007, p.1), when examining why organisations cooperate, highlights similar motives; she lists six and divides them into materialist and ideational aims. To Haugevik (*ibid*, pp.1, 8), materialist aims include organisational survival, resource dependence and neutralising rivals. From these aims organisations are in pursuit of their interests or what they can get from the collaboration. However, the ideational aims are mainly geared towards legitimization, shared values and organisational learning. Therefore, organisations may not only cooperate due to the sheer pursuit of material gains but also 'because they consider it right, good or enlightening to do in a given context' (*ibid*, p.8).

When assessing the materialist motives, Haugevik (2007, p.9) points out that survival or a desire to maintain relevance in the international system may drive one organisation to cooperate with another. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003, pp.1-2) expound on this further by arguing that 'to understand the behaviour of an organisation you must understand the context of that behaviour- that is the ecology of the organisation... organisations are inescapably bound up with conditions in their environment...their existence is constantly in question and their survival viewed as problematic.' Therefore when it comes to international security organisations it is



clear that it is 'structured as a self-help system where all actors ensure their own survival and to that end will sometimes decide to enter into a marriage of convenience' (Haugevik, 2007, p.9).

Consequently, Pfeffer and Salancik (2003, p.3) point out that organisations face survival issues not 'merely because they are dependent on their environment but because this environment is not dependable. Environments can change, new organisations enter and exit and the supply of resources becomes more or less scarce. When environments change, organisations face the prospect either of not surviving or of changing their activities in response to these environmental factors.'

Haugevik, (2007, p.9) illustrates this further by arguing that NATO faced extinction after the end of the Cold War as its existence had been founded on the Cold War order. So it either had to disappear or reshape its policy on the basis of the new power distribution in Europe. So in the end NATO has become a forum at which member states consult each other on security issues and then take joint action (Haugevik, 2007 p.10). NATO went further by cooperating with the UN in the Balkans in the 1990s (Boutros Boutros Ghali, 1999, p.84).

Similarly, having been portrayed as mainly an economic power, over the years the EU has sought a role as a major global actor. Falletti (2009, p.1) contends that although the EU is an economic giant, it is a political dwarf mainly because it cannot turn economic leverage into political clout. The EU has wrestled with such a tag and has been attempting to find a role in the international system to present itself in a different light. For instance, according to Silber and Little (1996, p.159), in 1991 it was claimed, at the outbreak of the Yugoslav conflict, that the hour of Europe had dawned by Jacques Poos, Luxembourg's Foreign Minister.

Although the perception of the EU has changed over time, this has only been achieved by working closely both with NATO and the UN. With NATO, the EU developed the Berlin Plus concept, whereby it would rely on NATO facilities in a military intervention. Furthermore, the EU has worked closely with the UN in the Balkans and DR Congo (Bianca et al., 2010, p.2).

Górka (2007, p.4) agrees by stressing that the EU's involvement in DR Congo was meant to prove 'that it possesses the necessary capabilities to behave as a global actor, and, which is even more important, that the European Union as an institution is an acceptable or even desirable partner for different political forces in war-torn countries like the DRC. Moreover, the Congolese mission also contributed to the creation of the positive image of the EU in the United Nations. The former is no longer perceived as another rival for limited resources (financial, material, etc.), but instead as a credible partner.'

Wendling (2010, p.4) further emphasises the motivation of the EU to enhance its image internationally by arguing that the intervention in DR Congo 'was made possible because the EU wanted to be more respected in international arenas as a crisis manager and because the UN found a reliable partner with the means to offer a multidimensional response to a crisis'.

Therefore, it is clear that cooperation was to some extent aimed at finding new relevance for the EU. By proving to be a viable partner for the UN, the EU was thrust on to the world stage as a new military power. This helped the process of centralisation of the foreign policy within the EU, as witnessed with the Lisbon treaty, which came into force in 2009 and created a ministry for foreign affairs. Hageman (2010, pp.5–6) goes further to affirm that 'the European Union has successfully transformed its role from that of a pure civil power to a considerable military security actor in the world.'

Organisations further cooperate to neutralise competition in cases where they have overlapping and likely contending roles and capabilities. For example, Haugevik (2007, pp.10–11) postulates that when the EU began positioning itself as an international security actor, this caused alarm in the NATO hierarchy due to fear of the duplication of roles and competition between the two organisations. When it comes to the war on terror, Jenkins (2002, p.2) states that 'European political developments threatening the Atlantic partnership are already dividing the coalition against terrorism and could ultimately undermine the security of Europe and the United States itself'.

Such developments have led NATO to sign the Berlin Plus agreement, giving the EU access to its assets and capabilities. However, this was also a mechanism by which states like the United States of America would use NATO to maintain control over EU operations (Biscop 2006, p.6).

Similarly, although the United Nations is acknowledged as the body tasked with the maintenance of international peace and security, over the years this has not stopped other states and organisations acting independently of it. For instance, the invasion of Iraq was carried out by a US-coalition without a second UN resolution (Koffi Annan, BBC interview 2004). Therefore, by cooperating with these organisations there is less room for them to act independently of the UN. The UN has signed joint declarations with the EU, both in 2003 (Council of the European Union September 2003) and 2007 (*ibid*, 2007) and communication has been established between the Secretary General and most of the ranks below (Tardy, 2010, p.10). So it becomes increasingly difficult for the EU to undermine the UN and even if it acts alone in a security role it will come back to retrospectively seek UN approval, as was the case with ECOWAS in 1992 when the UN approved the ECOWAS mission to Liberia retrospectively (Agyapong, 2005, p.3).

Haugevik (2007, p.11) notes further that resource dependence is another motive of cooperation between organisations. This was originally noted by Pfeffer and Salancik (2003, p.45)<sup>9</sup> in 1978. They argue that one of the factors that is 'vital to determining the reliance of one organisation on another is the importance of the resources, the extent to which the organisations requires it for their continued operation and survival.' Haugevik (2007) contends that cooperation between security organisations for example occurs 'because a security organisation is not capable of meeting demands and needs on its own, or because two organisations have complementary competences and realise they can benefit from gaining access to each other's capacities and resources' (Haugevik, 2007, p.11, quoted from Stokke, 2001, p.29). This is indeed applicable to UN cooperation with the AU, EU and NATO.

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<sup>9</sup> The book was originally published in 1978.

As examined earlier, the UN has been stretched due to the number of conflicts that erupted after the collapse of the Soviet Union; therefore it needed a helping hand. Furthermore, it has faced mandate limitations and has had to rely on organisations like NATO in the Balkans to bring the protagonists to the negotiating table after bombing them, as was the case with Serbia (Bourantonis and Evriviades, 1996, p.2). In the Ituri region when inter-tribal war broke out in 2003, the UN had to rely on the EU operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UN Security Council Resolution 1484, 2003, p.2) to end the slaughter of people. The UN was limited by resources and mandates and could not decisively end the conflict.

Pfeffer and Salancik (2003, p.46) further note that an organisation's vulnerability to the influences of other organisations has 'determined the extent to which an organisation has come to depend on the types of exchanges for its operation.' The importance of resource exchange is divided into two dimensions. These include the relative magnitude of the exchange and the critical nature of the resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003, p.46).

As a determinant of the importance of resources, the relative magnitude 'is measured by assessing the proportion of total inputs or the proportion of total output accounted for by the exchange' (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003, p.46). When put in the context of EU-UN cooperation the intervention in Ituri required a large EU input to stabilize the region as the UN could not deal with the situation. However the second dimension is of more importance to the study, as it is stressed by Pfeffer and Salancik that 'criticality measures the ability of an organisation to continue functioning in the absence of resources' (2003, p.46).

Although the UN has faced isolated cases where it has been unable to deal with conflicts effectively like Rwanda in 1994 and Somalia since 1991, the accumulation of such cases, especially in Africa would have led to a questioning of the relevance of the UN in the international system. Therefore the dependence on resources from the EU in 2003 and 2006 was critical to the long-term future of the UN because if it had failed to protect the people its survival in the international system would have come under question.

Pfeffer and Salancik (2003, p.47) further argue that 'discretion over the allocation and use of a resource' owned by another organisation is a major determinant of dependence. The ability to determine how a resource is allocated or used gives an organisation the chance to exercise such power over the recipient organisation. This becomes more apparent especially if the resource is scarce. Therefore one basis of control of resources is possession (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003, p.48). The level of possession determines the level of discretion on how the resource is distributed.

The other basis concerns access to the resource. Pfeffer and Salancik (2003, p.48) argue that it is possible to regulate access to a resource without owning it. In addition, the agents of organisations who influence the allocation of the organisation's contract develop personal power from their positions. When put in the context of EU-UN cooperation, French president Chirac was able to act as an agent to persuade the EU to get involved in DR Congo in 2003. In the same vein Kofi Annan the former UN Secretary General, while acting as an agent for the UN, was able to ignore the calls from the African nations who wanted to raise a force to go into DR Congo. He was able to use the power of his position to influence the resource allocation which in this case was the UN mandate or legitimacy for the EU to deploy a multinational force outside its geographical setting.

According to Pfeffer and Salancik (2003, p.49) the other basis for control resource allocation is 'the use of the resource and who controls its use. It is possible for a resource to be used by people other than the owners, in which case the users have some measure of control over the resource.' For instance, although the EU had control over the resources (deployment of forces in Ituri and Kinshasa) the UN had control over where they were deployed and for how long because it was the legitimising power. Nevertheless the EU had ultimate control over how many of its troops it deployed and could choose to respond to future UN requests. Also, as has been noted earlier, the EU did not positively respond to the UN request for help in 2008 when General Nkunda attacked the eastern part of DR Congo.

However Biermann (2008, p.160) contends that;

Cooperation is not purely motivated by rational cost-benefit considerations. Resource dependence theory tends to neglect intangible resources...Three are

relevant here. First, an organization may align with another organization, which is perceived to have a stronger reputation to improve its own image.... Second, relative positions in an institutional network affect the visibility and reputation and thus the attractiveness of an organization. Third, organizational cultures shape the partner selection process. A mutual perception of affinity stimulates cooperation. The UN was also in this respect a partner of first choice for the EC. Cooperation with the world organization helped to regain legitimacy after the recognition fiasco. The central position of the UN in the international institutional architecture made the UN highly attractive as a partner. And the similar soft power approaches of EC and UN drew both together.'

Haugevik (2007, pp.12–13) further argues that ideational motives for cooperation 'can emerge when norms held or promoted by one security organisation have a legitimising effect on the actions of another security organisation, thus making the former an appropriate and attractive partner.' In this case the UN has been viewed as the legitimizing power in international politics (Oertel, 2008, p.2).

According to the UN Charter, the UN is to 'determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression and to make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace and security' (Haugevik, 2007, p.13, from UN 1945). As examined earlier, even in situations where an organisation has been involved in an intervention like ECOWAS in Liberia in 1992, a retrospective UN Security Council resolution authorising the mission had to be sought (Agyapong, 2005, p.3).

Both NATO and the EU recognise the UN as the legitimising body in the international system. Haugevik (2007) argues that the first sentences of the NATO treaty acknowledge the UN as the one responsible for upholding international peace and security. The treaty goes on to caution NATO to desist from 'the threat or use of force in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN', and reaffirms the NATO members' trust in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter (Haugevik, 2007, p.13, in NATO 1949). The EU, in a similar vein, acknowledges the UN's

leading role in the maintenance of international peace and security in its treaties, e.g. in Nice and Amsterdam.

Tardy (2009, 45) takes the argument further by stating that the EU is keen on the legitimacy that accrues due to association with the UN. He notes that 'in places where the EU might be seen as politically biased or simply where the local context is difficult, acting at the request of the UN or on its behalf is of key importance' (ibid, p.45). For instance, although the French-led Operation Artemis was viewed as serving French interests, countries like Rwanda, which were opposed to the French presence in the area, had to agree to their presence. Grignon (2003, p.2) notes that Rwanda as well as Uganda had to be consulted and it was after they agreed to the French involvement that the UN passed resolution 1484.

The pursuit of shared values is another ideational motive for cooperation between security organisations according to Haugevik. She argues that security organisations espouse norms or ideas as they accept as true the ideals and values embodied in the norms (ibid, p.14). The major threats to international peace and security in the current era have come to include terrorism, which has proved to cut across borders. Burgess and Mouhleb (2008 p.1) assert that, according to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, there is no demarcation between internal and security threats. There has been 'a globalisation of threats and subsequent demands from international organisations to standardise responses and preparedness'.

Haugevik (2007, p.14) adds that an organisation's self-interests can be disguised as values, the latter term representing a more marketable motivation. For example, the fight against terror was turned into a global security problem to which organisations like the UN had to find a solution. A case in point is that after the attacks of September 11 2001, the US president argued that there was no neutrality in the fight against terror and coined the famous phrase 'you are either for us or against us' (CNN, 6 November, 2001). By calling for collective responsibility he internationalised the war and it became a threat to international peace and security within the UN framework.

Nonetheless, according to the 2006 report on EU-UN cooperation, it was stressed that the two organisations were ‘united by the core values enumerated in the UN charter and human rights declaration’ (ibid, p.14 quoted from UN, 2006). Tardy (2010 p.1) concurs with the above statement and adds that the EU and UN have been viewed to share values such as belief in the merits of international law and multilateralism, a penchant for the non-violent resolution of dispute, and a keen discomfort with the use of force.

Organisational learning is the final ideational motive highlighted by Haugevik (2007), whereby one security organisation functions as a role model for another, thus providing it with prospects for improvement and growth. In such an environment knowledge is exchange and emulated (Haugevik, 2007, p.15). Haugevik draws from the modelling theory to illustrate organisational learning further. She postulates that ‘social learning, or imitation and modelling, in the emergence of cooperation...this means that one organisation observes another, and chooses to imitate or model that organisation’s structures, procedures and values (ibid, p.15 quoted from Smith, 1995, p.18).

Organisation learning has indeed been very prominent in inter-organisational cooperation. The African Union was modelled on the EU template and the EU itself has been utilising the Berlin Plus initiative to learn and model itself on NATO. However, NATO, the EU and the African Union (AU) have modelled themselves on aspects of the UN, as they make references to ‘the international values established by the UN (ibid, p.15 quoted from AU (2000); European council (2003); NATO (1999).

Biermann (2008, p.160) states that cooperation between organisations can be fostered in environments of high issue density and issue durability. ‘Issue density refers to the number and importance of issues arising within a given policy space; issue duration refers to the length of time an issue remains unresolved. To expound on it further Biermann (2008, p.160) explains that first and foremost ‘the unfolding Balkan wars ushered in a period of turbulent change and unprecedented ethnic warfare in the center of Europe. Second, the violence could only be locally contained, but not terminated. Taken together, initiating cooperation among the



relevant security institutions helped both to reduce uncertainty and to institutionalize long-term cooperation to solve long-term problems'

The above development does not rule out the desire by organisations to retain their autonomy. However cooperation is made possible by endogenous and exogenous triggers which foster an acceptance that only honest cooperation can help to solve the rising problems. These triggers can be in the form of new organisational leadership or external shock that alters the expectations, processes and relations driving inter organisational cooperation (Biermann, 2008, p.161).

## **2. Causes of disparity in inter-organisational collaboration**

Having examined why organisations cooperate, the study now seeks to get an understanding of why non-cooperation occurs between them. Tardy (2009, p.47) hypothesises that the relationship between the EU and UN 'faces limitations of a political nature that may impede inter-institutional cooperation at a strategic/systemic level or in a particular case.' This is attributed to the fact that competition occurs when organisations develop similar capacities in a bid to work together. Koops (2009, p.3) adds weight to the argument by stating that although each international organisation 'contributes valuable resources, expertise and its own distinctive approach to military crisis management, it has also become clear that the risk of duplication of efforts and even outright competition between these actors is high and, indeed, a serious impediment to a coherent response to complex crises.'

Biermann (2009, p.8) concurs with Tardy and Koops and goes even further by arguing that the 'overlap...instigates rivalry for mandates, tasks and resources among organizations competing for relative relevance'. This is especially true, as seen in DR Congo, when the interim government requested the EU to authorise EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC, yet the UN was training the police, integrating former combatants in the army and disarming the rest. This created a duplication of roles and was a likely catalyst for schism between the EU and UN.

In addition, the overlap in membership puts states that hold dual membership in the difficult position of choosing which organisation to favour in case of a deadlock. Tardy states that this deadlock is normally overcome by the kind of agendas developed by different members for each of the organisations. So, in the end, one organisation is preferred to another and members avail resources and develop capacities for one organisation at the expense of the other. EU member states prefer the EU to the UN as a forerunner in crisis management (Tardy, 2009, p.48).

Political factors in the decision-making process affect cooperation and can lead to non-collaboration. A case in point is that of the German-led EUFOR RD Congo mission, which faced a lot of internal scrutiny at EU level, as demands were made by the framework nation, especially in relation to the way the troops were to be raised, leading to tension. This, according to Tull (2009, p.49), affected EU-UN cooperation to an extent. On the other hand, diverging political agendas hindered the Security Council's decision on Georgia and Kosovo. Concerning Kosovo, 'divergences delayed the Security Council's endorsement of the EU-led civilian mission and complicated UN-EU cooperation on the ground as well as the UN handover to the EU. For Georgia, endorsement by a Security Council resolution of the EU Monitoring Mission was never envisaged, given the civilian nature of the mission and also because of the Russian opposition at the Security Council' (Tardy, 2009 p.48).

The other cause of difference is related to inequality in the relationship between the organisations. For example, Tardy contends that 'the EU tends to dominate and define the agenda while the UN is often on the receiving end, getting what the EU is willing to give. In most scenarios of UN-EU cooperation, it is the EU that supports the UN so as to palliate an alleged or real weakness of the UN (lack of rapid reaction force, difficulty to conduct robust peacekeeping, lack of tactical air support, finance, etc). In this 'demand *versus* supply' relationship, what the EU is ready to bring is the result of an internal EU decision-making process and does not necessarily match what the UN would like to get' (Tardy, 2009, p.49).

This can be illustrated by the issue relating to the refusal by the EU in 2008 to help MONUC in DR Congo. Gowan (2009, p.54) viewed it as a downward trajectory in

the relationship between the EU and UN. However, this has always been the case in that the EU has picked areas of engagement and has not always responded favourably to the UN's requests.

Koops (2010, p.2) argues that matters of delineation and independence are strongly associated to the quandary of the organisational politics of image and visibility promotion. With regards to inter-organisational interactions, Koops (ibid, p.2) is of the view that participating organisations frequently attempt to promote their own visibility, which could produce negative results for the inter-organisational operation overall.

Furthermore, Koops (ibid p.2) states that conditions of power and resource parity, as opposed to asymmetry, negatively affect cooperation between organisations. This is because when it comes to resource dependence, the stronger organisation can avail its resources and expertise and can also serve as a model to the weaker organisation to aid its development. In these situations the roles and capabilities are plain and explicitly allocated, aiding smooth cooperation. A case in point is the relationship of the EU and AU. The AU was modelled on the EU and benefits a lot from all forms of support from the latter.

Therefore, conditions of parity do not necessarily facilitate this cooperation, as there is no mentor-mentee relationship. The EU and UN in DR Congo did not cooperate fully because the EU was self-sufficient and mainly required the UN as a legitimising body. Operation Artemis was, for instance, conducted independently of the UN to the point that the pre-mission plans were kept away from the UN.

Tardy (2010, p.47) theorises that some of the constraints to cooperation 'have to do with the two institutions' respective structures, crisis management cultures and procedures'. On these issues Koops (2010, p.3) argues that one of the main hindrances to cooperation between international organisations is the clash of organisational cultures. Normally cooperation in the field requires personnel to be double hatted and to aid transition, for instance if one organisation is taking over from another. Cooperation in the field may also require the formation of joint liaison

mechanisms and joint teams. Therefore, if any or both of the organisations are oblivious to these steps cooperation becomes cumbersome.

However, Koops (*ibid*, p.3) contends that ‘no degree of ‘inter-cultural awareness’ will help to overcome deep rooted conflicts between organizations’ staff if there is an unwillingness on both sides to depart from insisting on the superiority of their own organisation’s model, approach and procedures.’

Biermann (2008, pp.154, 158) further argues that the reluctance of organisations to give up their autonomy is a major hindrance to inter organisational cooperation. This is brought about because he believes cooperation entails compromising autonomy like altering policies to accommodate the preferences of the partner. Biermann (2008, p.158) notes that ‘fears of encroachment run counter to organizations striving for autonomy. Cooperation increases the complexity of and thus slows down decision-making. This might lead to paralysis or lowest common denominator policies. Scarce resources have to be invested when the returns of investment are often uncertain and intangible... Thus, guarding institutional autonomy and trying to “go it alone” has an almost intuitive appeal for international organizations, especially before some experience with the added value of interorganizational cooperation has been made.’

Biermann (2008, p.158) further argues that cooperation can be hindered by a lack of corresponding goals and role expectations mainly because cooperation normally involves a task-related division of labour. The aforementioned obstacle ‘enhances inter-organizational rivalry and undermines cooperation from the beginning. Especially weaker organizations fear a loss of identity and visibility when cooperating with stronger partners.’ For instance Biermann argues the OSCE in the post-Cold War era insisted on its autonomy in regards to NATO mainly because during this period each organization was ‘first of all interested in establishing its own relevance, not restricting its authority by working together with others. Strong rivalry for relative positions seriously hampers cooperation’ (Biermann 2008, p.158).

Biermann (2008, p.167) further argues that when it comes to resource dependence, cooperation can be hindered by a desire of the organisation receiving resources to

minimise the dependence. This therefore dampens the willingness to cooperate. In a move to reduce the dependence on a resource a recipient organisation may opt for an alternative. Indeed Biermann notes three ways of reducing resource dependence. These include substitution, duplication and diversification. 'Substitution refers to intra-organizational adaptation in order to replace scarce resources, which are otherwise only available through external provision, with self-generated resources...this might imply the duplication of resources the other organization can provide simply to avoid dependence. Diversification is the attempt to multiply the resource providers by relying on several organizations instead of on one' (Biermann, 2008, p.168). For instance as will be examined, the EU missions EUPOL and EUSEC did not get UN mandates as they were organised in conjunction with the DR Congo government. So the provision of legitimacy which had been the domain of the UN was side-tracked and sought from the state itself.

Situational obstacles can also lead to non-cooperation between international organisations according to Biermann (2008). For instance the transatlantic disagreement over the invasion Iraq soured relations between NATO and the European Union (Biermann, 2008, p.167).

### **3. EU and UN in DR Congo: motives and aspirations**

Having assessed the overall motivations for cooperation between international security organisations, the study will analyse the motivations and aspirations for the EU and UN partnership in DR Congo. This is because although the general motivations give a great picture of the reasons why organisations cooperate, there are specific reasons why the EU and UN partnered in DR Congo on top of or in elaboration of the ones already mentioned.

There are a range of motives and aspirations on the side of both the EU and the UN when it comes to partnering in peacekeeping missions. Some of the motives fall under the pursuit of national and organisational interests. Concerning DR Congo, Justaert and Keukeleire (2009, p.2) observe that when the EU security and defence policy is considered, differences exist between the motivations of different EU

institutional actors and the ‘different policy-making regimes (procedures and initiatives in the EU’s 1st pillar vs. those in the 2nd pillar; Commission approach vs. Council approach).’

Justaert and Keukeleire (2009, p.2) further state that differences are prevalent between the EU and its member states, and among the member states involved in the DR Congo transition process through numerous schemes, both within the framework of the EU, other international organisations and jointly with DR Congo. Coupled with that is the notion that ‘European foreign, security and defence policies, and other international actors pursue their policies towards the DRC (such as the UN and third countries), which have an impact on the security and defence policies of the EU and its member states (e.g. the fact that France and the United Kingdom are both permanent members of the UNSC)’ (Justaert and Keukeleire, 2009, p.2).

One of the key players during operations Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo was France which, according to Jahier (2010, p.85), has a tendency to pursue a two-track foreign policy. While track one is geared towards making the EU stronger as a supranational organisation, track two involves the pursuit of national interests to augment its position as a great power in the international arena.

This view is supported by Soder (2010, p.9), who contends that France is the driving force behind Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and a major contributor financially and logistically. Therefore ‘CSDP can be a vital instrument and it can support France’s interest in expressing its leadership role. In the eyes of France European ambition stands as a priority. Making the European Union a major player in crisis management and international security is one of the central tenets of our [French] security policy. A stronger CSDP means more autonomy from NATO and consequently for the US.’

The argument is taken further by Major and Mölling (2007, p.3) who state that ‘France considered European cooperation as an appropriate framework for defending an independent role in world politics’. This, according to Major and Mölling, was because the aftermath of World War II left two superpowers on the international stage, namely the Soviet Union and the US. France lost its role as a key power in the

international arena, a fate that was compounded by the end of its colonial empire and the international loss of importance of the French language and culture.

Major and Mölling (*ibid*, p.3) further contend that ‘the French commitment for a strong and active Europe resulted also from the awareness that the national state alone has only a limited capacity to act on the world scene. It is only in cooperation, strictly limited to intergovernmental forms though, that France can play the role in international politics it considers due to her. French sovereignty was thus to be reinforced and strengthened through its anchoring in Europe.’ Pachta (2003, p.3) weighs in by stating that ‘France represents an obviously significant case of a country, which links its foreign policy with European integration while preserving its national exclusivity and large foreign policy engagement.’

Additionally, France had damaged its reputation in Africa after the controversial Operation Turquoise towards the end of the Rwandese genocide, an operation which aided the run to safety some of the perpetrators of the genocide. As a result, French policy makers believed that by playing a pivotal role in the EU operations Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo, its battered reputation would be on the mend (Jahier, 2010, p.85).

It is further noted by Jahier (2010, p.86) that other EU states like Germany also had interests to pursue in EU structures. For instance, Germany was more interested in building closer relations with former enemies through a common European defence policy that got rid of any independent utilisation of military force. Therefore, Germany’s aspiration was to go through a normalisation process on the international stage and utilise its own interests through EU set-up and security-related programmes. Opposing the US-led war in Iraq alongside France gave Germany self-belief that it could take on its strong ally and thus gave it clout in the international arena, strengthening its position as an alternative to US leadership.

Other states like Hungary saw supporting Operation Artemis as an opportunity to strengthen their position to join the EU. So it was viewed as a rite of passage, according to Jahier (*ibid*, pp.89–90). States like Turkey, meanwhile, which are a few

years away from joining the EU, did not harm their position when they participated in EUFOR RD Congo (ibid, pp.89-90).

Further still, another motivating factor for the collaboration between the EU and UN during operations Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo (ibid, p.87) is that the chances of success for the missions were high. This can be attributed to the strong mandate giving the EU powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. With such a mandate and the short-term nature of the missions, EU member states were convinced there was a strong chance for few casualties (ibid, p.85). Coupled with this is the fact that the short length of the missions favoured the strategic and economic interests of bigger EU member states (ibid, p.84).

As it was still developing its military capabilities, the EU saw Operation Artemis as an opportunity to prove the value of its military capability for peacekeeping. By 2003, the EU did not have the capacity to answer a call from the UN Secretary General. The timescale afforded for operational planning and mobilisation of troops to deploy in Bunia was so short that the EU had to rely on the national capacities of France.

It is further asserted by Grignon (2003, p.4) that Operation Artemis was viewed by many as the start of an EU military coalition destined to contend with, if not replace, NATO, which was wholly preoccupied with the future of transatlantic relations and the war on terror. This was an opportune time for the EU to become a leader and at the same time build its military capability for peacekeeping missions in Africa, a region of foreign policy with which the US-dominated NATO was unlikely to be concerned. Grignon further contends that French Major General Bruno Neveu pointed out, by mid-September 2003, that the utilisation of NATO assets for EU operations could in the future become the exception rather than the rule. Therefore, the framework nation model was likely to become a blueprint for future EU operations and a substitute to the Berlin Plus arrangement which availed access to NATO's assets and capabilities.

Kees (2007, p.2) concurs with Grignon about the desire by the EU not to rely on NATO, as he asserts that although the UN Secretary had reached an agreement with



the French President Jacques Chirac to organise a multinational force, Chirac realised that the 'intervention would be the ideal case to prove the capacity of the EU to act autonomously from NATO. The operation was....Europeanised in the context to ESDP. The decision by the Elysée was strategic.'

It is also pointed out by Major and Christian (2007, pp.4–5) that fears of US domination were the motivating factors, especially for France's moves to incorporate the EU in what was essentially a French operation. They postulate that the Gulf war of 1991 had shown the French how much the EU depended on the US, as the EU was not in a position to carry out independent missions. The situation was compounded by the Balkan crisis where NATO played a key role.

To reiterate the mood within the EU hierarchy during EUFOR RD Congo, 'General Christian Damay mentioned that mission was a contribution to the concept of European army...I am very satisfied because I believe that we have a very well-functioning unit...Now we really have the beginning of a European army' (Jahier, 2010, p.85). Additionally, in article 42 (p.26) of the Lisbon Treaty the EU called for implementation of a common foreign and security policy. This comprised the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which was geared towards common defence and fostering European identity and its autonomy with the aim of promoting peace, security and progress in Europe and also the world.

Nevertheless, the desire to reduce dependence on NATO was further shown by the willingness of the EU to send the EUFOR RD Congo force into DR Congo to beef up UN forces during the elections of 2006. However, during the mission it was to keep NATO informed of the events in accordance with its consultation agreements with the EU (EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, 2006, p.1). It seemed like NATO had come to terms with the development of EU military capabilities.

As examined earlier, the EU was keen to position itself in the international arena, but with the development of the ESDP there was a desire for the EU to portray itself as a global actor in comparison with the United States. The development of the ESDP has had, and will continue to have, an impact on the relationship between the EU and the US. The launch of Operation Artemis, which was independent of the Berlin Plus

arrangement, was not welcomed by the US. For instance, when France tried to acquire planes for the transportation of logistics, the US refused, arguing that this was not part of the Berlin Plus arrangement. In the end, the EU resorted to using Ukrainian planes for logistics (Homan, 2007, pp.2–3).

Further still, when commenting on Operation Artemis, Dobbins (2008, p.119 (163)) notes that French Defence Minister Michele-Alliot Marie and her Belgian counterpart, Andre Flahaut, hailed the operation as a major success during a joint visit to Bunia. Notably, in their remarks, the ministers emphasised ‘the success that the operation represented for the ESDP rather than its importance for state-building in the DRC.’ The impression given is that operation Artemis had more to do with the projection of the EU as a global actor than improving the security of the inhabitants of Bunia or DR Congo at large.

Morsut (2007, p.8) argues that the EU operations in support of the UN have shown that it can act as a reliable partner for the UN in maintaining international peace and security. She is of the view that although both organisations have different structures, agendas, goals and means, a similar devotion they have is the allocation of a lot of time and effort towards improving peace and security. She suggests that the EU and UN can be involved in a symbiotic relationship, in that for the EU to grow stronger and gain more respect internationally it has to participate in efforts to make the UN stronger, especially in terms of peacekeeping. Likewise, the UN can partner with the EU in effective multilateralism, as this is one of the aims of its Charter and the European Security Strategy.

Morsut’s assertion is given credence by the report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Aasted-Madsen and Rouquet (2009, p.8), who argue that ‘the fact that there is a growing demand from the UN for EU contributions and that the EU is in a position to supply that demand, driven by the wish for a legitimising base for ESDP missions, makes the UN and the EU valuable partners in military cooperation.’

According to Wouters and Ruys (2005, pp.21–22), the EU is continuously committed to helping the UN fulfil its primary role of maintaining international

peace and security. They argue that article 11 of the EU Treaty postulates that the CFSP aspires to safeguard the common values and the uprightness of the Union while conforming to the principles of the UN Charter. They further argue that The European Security Strategy asserts that: ‘Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.’ Thus Wouters and Tom (ibid, pp.21-22) are in agreement that ‘Effective multilateralism is indeed considered one of the strategic objectives of the European Security Strategy’.

However, even with the desire to help foster effective multilateralism, it is evident that the pursuit of interests relevant to the EU, its member states and those aspiring to join the EU seem to be the driving force for EU cooperation with the UN. Effective multilateralism is more of a construct with self-serving interests at the centre of the collaboration.

#### **4. Different perspectives of the actors in the EU-UN cooperation**

From the above analysis it is evident that the pursuit of self-serving interests is important when examining reasons why organisations choose to cooperate and when dealing with the internal dynamics of organisations like the EU and the interests of states, for instance France and Belgium in DR Congo. For example, as the former colonial master, Belgium had to play a key role in getting the EU involved in DR Congo in order to safeguard its national interests (Bagoyoko and Gibert, 2007, pp.24-25). France on the other hand had taken on DR Congo as a Francophone country and was desirous to continue its fight against the Anglo-Saxon influence creeping into its backyard (King 1999, p.330).

Although the pursuit of national and organisational interests has been crucial to explaining the motivations for inter-organisation cooperation, it is limited, especially for the purpose of this study. This is mainly because it does not provide a sufficient explanation of the actual dynamics of inter-institutional cooperation and non-cooperation. Although the EU and UN are run by states, their cooperation cannot solely and adequately be explained through the perspective of the state-centric pursuit of national interest. If indeed it were to be viewed from a state-centric

perspective it would be insufficient, as realists are less inclined to encourage states to join international organisations. This falls into Archer's (2001, p.125) assessment that the pursuit of self-serving interests is insufficient when explaining why states join international institutions.

By assuming that state policies are merely driven by the desire to achieve more power in the international system, realists do not satisfactorily explore other motives like humanitarian intervention. For instance, it can be argued that not all states that participated in Operation Artemis had interests in DR Congo. Among them were Nordic states like Sweden (Defence News, 2008) with a long tradition in peacekeeping. Coupled with this is the fact that most of the peacekeeping forces supplied within the UN framework are from states with no direct links to DR Congo. Most of the states avail their troops to the UN in respect of the Charter and commitment to retain international peace and security.

Nonetheless, in relation to interests, it can be argued, as discussed earlier, that although not all states had interests in DR Congo, some may have been using DR Congo as a launch pad for their aspirations within the respective international organisations. For instance, as noted earlier, Hungary was believed to have supported Operation Artemis with a view to joining the EU. Selbervik and Nygaard (2006, p.14) note that the realist perspective of Nordic countries' pursuit of humanitarian assistance would be that 'from a "small state" perspective it seems rational for small and vulnerable states with open economies to opt for strong multilateral organisations ... as part of their extended security considerations'

Nevertheless, Realists provide a narrow view of international relations by limiting major international actors to only states. Institutions like the European Union and United Nations are given a secondary role yet they are now major actors. Although they are made up of states and indeed their policies are designed by states, they have acquired an international identity by acting for the states they represent. In a way, the UN is limited in that it can only act as far as states are willing to allow it.

In the case of the EU, states have given up part of their sovereignty and apply all the laws that have been agreed to in the EU. Although it should be noted that not all

countries, for instance, use the Euro, the general idea is that in the long run states will apply all the laws domestically passed in the EU parliament. Realists are not familiar with such developments and therefore this limitation necessitates the use of other research tools to assess the development of EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping.

It should be noted that although some EU states by cooperating with the UN were pursuing their own interests, they could not rely on their aspirations to convince other member states to join in their endeavour. They had to construct reasons to appeal to the ideals of humanitarianism to capture the imagination of these states to join the mission to intervene in DR Congo. For instance, the arguments presented by France to the EU could not reflect national interests; rather they had to reflect broader themes like humanitarianism and the wider security of EU member states. However, this did not remove France's interests, as they would still need to be met once the EU intervened, especially because the French were the framework nation, as witnessed in Operation Artemis. Although France was not at the helm of EUFOR RD Congo, the fact that the EU was involved gave it a voice to speak out about the way policies were carried out.

The quest for idealist norms is crucial to understanding the very foundations on which international institutions like the UN and EU are based. Furthermore, through idealist views an assessment of the decision-making process within these organisations can be analysed. Both organisations are run by states and have decision-making structures based on agreements by the parties involved. So this can explain the decision by the EU and UN to cooperate.

The above-mentioned idealist aspirations cannot fully explain the motives of the actors in EU-UN cooperation. For example, they do not necessarily explain why Kofi Annan, the then Secretary General of the UN, decided to contact France about helping it out in Ituri in 2003. By choosing to ignore the African states that were offering their help, Kofi Annan had already constructed reasons that suited his decision. For instance, as more than half a dozen regional powers had been involved in the conflict, it was feared that choosing them to intervene would escalate the conflict. Plus, the UN could depend on the military resources of France, as the

African nations would need funding and an operation like Artemis needed quick deployment to alleviate human suffering. Further still, France had intervened in Rwanda under Operation Turquoise which made it knowledgeable about the regional politics and geography (McGreal, the *Guardian* 11/1/2007).

Such a construct made France a viable partner and by bringing in the EU the French covered their national interests concerning the region. At the same time, France provided the UN with a partner in the form of a regional organisation (the EU) with which the UN could build a relation in line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This benefited France because it could still pursue its interests in DR Congo under the auspices of the EU, as the relationship between the EU and UN was strengthened.

The idealistic perspective does not fully explain the lack of cooperation between the EU and the UN. The view that both institutions are founded on liberal principles merely sets the stage for cooperation. Although conflicts arise and can be solved through diplomacy, there are issues that are a constant cause for conflict between these two organisations — especially in the field — that can only be explained through using other research tools.

What's more is that the insistence of the EU to use its own chain of command throughout its operations has been traced back to earlier failures of the UN, especially in Bosnia Herzegovina. Although the UN has moved on since, especially as mandate issues were handicapping it, the EU still prefers to use autonomous missions. Therefore, over time, the EU has constructed a view about the UN in the field as being ineffective, as seen in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. This construct has led it to act the way it did to protect its interests but also to be able to function efficiently as an organisation. It should however be noted that the decision by the EU to use its own command and control structures can be attributed to a desire to maintain its autonomy (Biermann, 2008, p.158).

Nevertheless, as seen earlier, getting states to intervene in DR Congo, for example, required the organisations involved to draw from the ideals and norms of their very foundations. The EU and UN are influenced by the ideals of human rights and

equality than by the law and justifiable economic dealings. This has ended up creating an identity and a form of social construct. Identity as a social construct illuminates the notion that the EU and UN have similar ideals and can work together in the field to the extent that their officials can be swapped, a development that has come to be known as 'double hatting'. This was the case in Bosnia Herzegovina when the EU took over from the UN. Danish Commissioner Sven Frederiksen, who was also the head of the UN's International Police Task Force, was appointed head of the EU planning team and finally the head of the incoming EU police mission (Novosseloff, 2004, p.11). This helped the transition process, as Frederiksen was acquainted with the structures of the outgoing and incoming missions. This also helped with completing the transition on time because Frederiksen did not need much briefing, as he had been part of the outgoing mission.

However, this has not been a consistent policy between the EU and UN in the field; the EU did not double-hat its officials after Operation Artemis when the MONUC finally took over (Major, 2008, p.13).

The handover from the EU to the UN was successful, as it involved common patrols, field briefing of MONUC liaison officers, logistical support to MONUC, proper planning, a planning programme for different stages of the handover and co-location of both military staff in Bunia plus the appointment of a French officer as a MONUC representative in Ituri (Novosseloff, 2004 p.15). Nevertheless, it can still be argued that the concept of identity under social constructivism is a viable tool for examining the EU and UN cooperation in peacekeeping.

Dunne et al. (2007 p.182) argue that although constructivists do not 'deny the importance of interests; they would tie them more directly to the identity of the subject'. For instance, although the US stockpiled nuclear weapons in the interests of containing the Soviet Union, this was after the latter had been identified as an enemy once a distinction between capitalism and communism was made, among other things.

The cooperation between the EU and the UN in Bosnia Herzegovina was at some point also attributed to the fact that the EU viewed it to be in its own interests to

stabilise the region — this would safeguard other European countries. Furthermore, the EUPM was closely tied to the prospects for, and debate on, accession within the stabilisation and association process (Hansen, 2006, p.11).

In addition, the interests of countries like France and its identity as the Gendarme of Africa (*Mail* and *Guardian* online 25/102007, p.1) can be used to explain its major role within the EU and the moves to launch Operation Artemis. Coupled with this is the possibility of using interest as a tool to examine the motives of the EU as a whole in cooperating with the UN in peacekeeping. This can also be used in tandem with the realist theory to fully assess the reasons for EU involvement in DR Congo and why this resulted in cooperation or conflict.

The EU-UN relationship is a developing one and since both organisations are key players in the field of humanitarian assistance, they have been viewed as symbiotic partners. The EU has made provisions for cooperation with the UN in its 2003 security strategy<sup>10</sup> (Wouters and Ruys, 2005 pp.21–22) and the two organisations signed declarations, both in 2003 and 2007. However, social constructivism alone cannot explain EU-UN cooperation, as some states' actions can be interpreted from a realist perspective rather than merely a social constructive one. Nevertheless, social constructivism acts as a link between the theories and is fundamental in showing why states and organisations act the way they do.

It can be argued that notions of identity are important in inter-organisational cooperation too, as they may either work under the formal or informal sectors of cooperation. Organisations like the UN and EU can be drawn together because of similar ideals and interests, which can facilitate their cooperation at the decision-making level and in the field. However, the breakdown of cooperation may lead to the formation of informal networks, as seen under inter-organisational cooperation. Yet, these informal networks are normally formed along the lines of identity and common interests, thereby creating a link between social constructivism and inter-organisational theory.

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<sup>10</sup> 'Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority' (European Union Security Strategy 2003, p.10).



As noted earlier, Biermann (2008, p.154) argues that with organisations that are extremely reluctant to give up their autonomy through cooperation, strong forces like resource dependence, issue density and learning through failure are needed to foster cooperation. However sometimes these factors may not be enough to lead to cooperation and networks may still arise. For instance, Biermann (2008, pp.154-155) notes that during the Yugoslav conflict 'the emergence of the network occurred around the mid-1990s, with the action-set formed in the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995 marking the transition from informal, ad hoc cooperation to institutionalized, longer-term cooperation. The constituting feature of a network proved to be the rise of dense cross-links among the organizations.'

Biermann (2008, p.155) further argues that 'networks arise to achieve better policy output through synergy. This depends inter alia on the quantity and even more on the quality of ties among the network partners. Concerning the Euro-Atlantic security institutions today, the cooperation has so far remained mainly on the information sharing level, due to the structural impediment of asymmetric dependence, which inhibits more far-reaching cooperation. The ensuing deadlock has caused disillusionment and slowed down the maturation process of the network.'

The formation of networks (both formal and informal) can also be explained from the social capital perspective which can be defined as 'the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available through and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit. Social capital thus comprises both network and the assets that may be mobilized through the network' (Nahapiet in Cropper et al., 2008, p.582).

Social capital works on two features of exchange, namely appropriability and reciprocity. Appropriability 'is the idea that social connections of one type often can be used for different purposes. For example a friend of a friend may provide timely information about a job opportunity' (Nahapiet in Cropper et al., 2008, p.584). While reciprocity on the other hand is 'the expectation that exchange will be mutual' (Nahapiet in Cropper et al., 2008, p.584). These two features are very prevalent in both the formal and informal networks.

The problem however with formal networks is that they produce ‘causal effects, generated both by positioning and emulation. The ubiquitous quest for centrality in the network causes permanent friction among the organizations; social learning and emulation motivate convergence of the profiles of the network partners’ (Biermann, 2008, p.155). Therefore deadlock within formal networks can lead to informal networks.

Informal networks chart their course around formal structures that are excessively problematic and may sometimes be sluggish, clogged up or unsuitable for the role in hand. Lipson argues that ‘the formal Integrated Military Task Force set up for the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was excessively big and ungainly, which led DPKO to instead preside over a Liberia working group that shared a lot of the participants and characteristics of an IMTF, though it did not share the label’ (Lipson, 2005 p.24).

Although EU decision-making in the area of foreign policy has been highlighted by states pursuing their own interests, as was the case in DR Congo, Justaert and Keukeleire (2009, p.16) argue that:

‘the length and complexity of the ESDP procedures, the number of actors involved and their different interests and priorities do enforce the importance of more informal bilateral contacts and networks or coalitions among member states. This is especially the case when particular member states really want action vis-à-vis a specific country or crisis. Rather than operating in the formal – and often rigid – ESDP architecture, these flexible and less hierarchical networks are nodal points of coordination among variable interested and relevant actors and components. Moreover, depending on the issue at stake, we indeed observe that particular member states engage as policy entrepreneurs and activate and network with like-minded, interested or capable actors to push a certain policy solution or initiative. Furthermore, the key states pursue both EU oriented and national interest.’

To illustrate this further, Justaert and Keukeleire (ibid p.16) postulate that although France was willing to intervene in DR Congo in 2003, it ‘convinced its colleagues in the PSC, of which the most important were in the UK and Germany, and in less than a

month after the formal request of the UNSG, Operation Artemis was launched.’ A similar situation presented itself during 2006 when the UN requested the EU as a force to support MONUC during the election. Justaert and Keukeleire (*ibid*, p.16) state that ‘France, strongly supported by Belgium, took the lead in the policy process after the UN request for an intervention force to provide security during the Congolese election process.’

Likewise, concerning the failed request by the UN for a bridging force in DR Congo in 2008, informal networks were at play within the EU, both for and against the mission. Belgium, the major proponent for the mission, was supported by Spain, Ireland, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. However, the major military actors like France, Germany and the UK were in the opposing camp and, in the end, the mission was never carried out, especially as France was holding the presidency of the EU (Justaert and Keukelaire, *ibid*, p.17).

Although Lipson (2005, p.24) argues that the informal networks may complement formal structures, making up for their weaknesses, the conduct of the EU-UN relationship does not necessarily conform to his latter assertion that, ‘organizational and inter-organizational activity may come to be conducted primarily through informal methods, bypassing formal structures and rendering them largely ceremonial’.

The inter-organisational perspective, to some extent, moves the focus from the politics of member states and delves into the organisations themselves, unravelling the core issues at the heart of the conflict or cooperation between the organisations. This will definitely give the study a balanced analysis on cooperation between the EU and the UN.

For instance, the lack of cooperation between the EU and UN, especially on issues like sharing information, can be attributed to lack of trust which, according to Koops (in: Brockmann, 2008, p.23), is a major facet of cooperation between organisations. In addition, conflict between organisations can be attributed to shared culture and code of practice. However, this culture is usually born out of mistrust, which may have developed out of interaction.

The above concepts of trust, shared culture and code of practice are crucial aspects that Janine Nahapiet (in Cropper et al., 2008, p.586) refers to as the relational dimension of social capital that 'captures those dimensions which describe particular aspects of the relationships between actors, such as trust and friendship, shared norms, mutual obligations, identification, that influence behaviour.'

The lack of good relational social capital can be explained by the EU's continuous refusal to put its troops under the leadership of the UN because, according to Source U a senior EU official in DGE VIII, they had a torrid experience during the conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina and preferred to have a different chain of command from the UN. EU officials do not trust the UN's ability to protect their troops. Therefore, this mistrust erodes the UN's authority to act as the legitimising organisation. This normally results in a lack of leadership which is a prerequisite for cooperation between organisations.

The inter-organisational perspective cannot provide all the answers to EU-UN cooperation on its own. The use of other research tools, in addition to the aforementioned one, helps present a wholesome picture of the EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping. Since the relationship between the EU and UN is a developing one, it is clear that a single research tool cannot adequately explain the cooperation, hence the use of other research tools. The use of these research tools in the study of EU-UN partnership in DR Congo will add to the already existing literature and also acts as a springboard for further research into conflict and cooperation between the UN and other regional organisations.

## **5. Nature of EU-UN collaboration**

Having examined the reasons why security organisations cooperate and the actual motivations for EU-UN partnership in DR Congo, it is vital to further assess the nature of the overall UN-EU relationship. Therefore, when examining the nature of the EU-UN partnership, Tardy (2005) does not paint a glamorous picture. Tardy (2005, p.51) first of all views EU member states' policies towards the UN as

ambivalent. He argues that 'on the one hand, the EU and EU member states are strong supporters of the UN, in accordance with the European Security Strategy and the concept of effective multilateralism.' This is because they are connected to the centrality and legitimising power of the UN Security Council, have achieved political influence within UN bodies beyond the responsibility held by the Commission in economic and development affairs, and have supported the UN by making large contributions to the regular and peacekeeping budgets to the tune of 37.75% and 39% respectively (Tardy, 2005, p.51).

Tardy (2005, p.51) stresses that 'on the other hand, the strong emphasis that the EU places on its political autonomy leads it to somehow distance itself from the UN. For example, obtaining UN mandates for ESDP operations does not appear to be a requirement as long as these operations are deployed in Europe, with the consent of the host state, and are of a non-coercive or civilian nature.'

Tardy (2005, p.52) postulates further that, although the EU member states make big contributions troops to UN mandated peace operations, they are anonymous when it comes to contributing to UN-led operations. By early spring 2005 the EU accounted for only 6.25% of UN troops. When it came to Africa the EU only contributed a mere 2.24% of the whole UN troops contingents to Africa.

The likelihood of using EU military capabilities in UN-led operations is very low and comes with very specific conditions. To Tardy 'the general reticence of the European states to place troops under UN command, in addition to their scepticism about the reliability of the UN structure in general, are concerns that are echoed within the EU itself and its politico-military structure, and that both negatively impact on the EU-UN relationship' (Tardy 2005, p.52).

Tardy (2005, p.52) also states that the specificity of ESDP operations adds weight to EU rigidity, as it pursues autonomy in its decision-making process. By cultivating a culture of placing ESDP operations under 'the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee (PSC)' (Council of the European Union 11277/07, 2007 p.5) putting EU operations under UN command conflicts with ESDP's philosophy.

Furthermore, Novosseloff, (2004, p.11) argues that the use of elaborated principles and prerequisites has been in response to UN expectations and demands. Apart from the PSC retaining the political control and strategic direction of any of its operations, the EU further follows the principle of cooperation with the UN on a case-by-case basis. 'There would be no automatic involvement; the EU does not constitute a pool of forces but can only intervene by conducting specific missions or operations, and there would be no earmarked forces to any stand-by arrangements' (ibid, p.11).

Major (2006 p.13) wades in by hypothesising that the EU-UN relationship is influenced by the pursuit of EU interests, as opposed to what the UN may require. This is mainly because the EU has pursued an autonomous policy in that it determines where and how to intervene by considering a multitude of external and internal factors. The overlap between what the UN desires and what the EU is willing to provide has come to define the limits of the cooperation between the EU and UN. The situation is complicated further by the fact that the EU is an intergovernmental organisation and not a unitary actor and therefore much depends on the member states' political will. For instance, factors like foreign policy goals, economic situation and unanimous decision-making has to be taken into consideration.

Wouters and Ruys (2005, p.34) are in agreement with Major and note the wide variety of actors in the European Union. They add that 'despite the emergence of EU-UN meetings on different levels, the same question now puzzles UN officials. In principle, the Presidency of the Council is charged with representing the Union in all CFSP matters. But several other actors play an important role; the European Commission (which performs the role of the EC as an observer at the UN), the Member States and the CFSP High Representative' (ibid, p.34).

The ambivalence of the EU towards the UN can also be highlighted in the refusal by the EU to re-hat its assets and to make them available to the UN after Operation Artemis, which endangered the integrity of MONUC. 'In the context of EU-UN relations, the European stance revealed the limits of cooperation; it showed what the EU and its member states were ready to do (offer support through a separate

operation), but also what they would not do (offer support within the UN operation)’<sup>11</sup> (Tardy, 2005, pp.55–57).

The 2007 EU-UN declaration, according to Major (2006), was more of a reiteration of the 2003 declaration, yet in essence it was designed to restate the issues that had not been addressed since 2003. This involved sharing confidential information (Major, 2006, p.13). The UN does not have a procedure to handle sensitive information, which is a major hindrance to operational cooperation.

According to the report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Ine Aasted-Madsen and Mr René Rouquet (2009, pp.9–10), it is argued that concerning information sharing on the operational level, it is still a contentious issue that has proved to be politically and technically hard to solve as there is no agreed framework and it continues to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. On institutionalising the EU-UN relations, significant advances have been made in communication and liaison though, ‘a notable lack of guidelines and common definitions continues to inhibit the relationship in the field and prevent efficient cooperation’ (Aasted-Madsen and Mr René Rouquet, 2009, pp.9-10).

Koops (2011, p.78) notes that some of the statements made by the EU in European Security Strategy were opportunistic in nature. For instance EU insistence on strengthening the UN was interpreted as an opportunistic approach to multilateralism in that ‘the EU was portrayed as the rescuer of the United Nations Systems, and thus with a distinct principle for enhancing the EU’s own international actorness and profile.’

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<sup>11</sup>‘The re-hatting of forces was implemented in East Timor in 1999, where Australia, which acted as the lead nation in the UN mandated operation INTERFET, agreed to keep some of its troops in the UN-led operation (UNTAET), thus guaranteeing its credibility. The ‘East Timor model’ has often been praised by UN representatives, who see in it the opportunity for the UN to benefit from Western states’ key military assets, but who are also anxious to ‘narrow the commitment gap’ between the developing and the developed world’ Tardy (ibid, pp.56-57).

## 6. Assessing EU-UN cooperation in DR Congo: a critical analysis

When discussing EU-UN collaboration in DR Congo during a presentation to the Royal United Service Institute on 20th May 2010, Alan Doss<sup>12</sup> described it as a success over the period 2003 to 2008. Although he noted a few challenges, he was satisfied with the whole collaboration. The EU High Representative Solana has always championed EU-UN cooperation in speeches as a way of fostering multilateralism in the international system (Solana, 2005). However, not all experts on the collaboration hold the same views and a number disagree with Doss and Solana.

Since different operations have been carried out at different times and under different circumstances, it can be presumed that the results were not entirely uniform across the board for all operations. Therefore, whatever the justification, the practice of cooperation can be seen in different ways by numerous analysts. In this section the different episodes of cooperation since 2003 involving operations Artemis, EUFOR RD Congo, EUPOL Kinshasa/DR Congo and EUSEC shall be examined.

### 6.1 Operation Artemis

Wouters and Ruys (2005, p.27) argue that Operation Artemis was a success due to the fact that there was a remarkable swiftness with which France and the EU responded to the appeal by the Secretary General for help with the conflict in Ituri. The UN admitted that it neither had the mandate nor the resources to provide security in the Ituri region once the Ugandan forces departed (UNDPKO, Peacekeeping best practices 2004, p.3). Therefore, it was a race against time to have a force in place with the correct mandate and enough resources to deal with the fighting, as many people were dying on a daily basis.

The UN Secretary General had called for a 'rapid deployment to Bunia of a highly trained and well-equipped multinational force under the lead of one member state to

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<sup>12</sup> Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) of the United Nations in DR Congo and Head of the MONUC from 2007-2010.



provide security at the airport as well as to other vital installations in the town and to protect the civilian population' (ibid, p.3). The French responded favourably to the call, though from the request set out by the UN it could not do it alone.

Furthermore, a French-led multinational force, without the backing of a key regional organisation, would look like it was designed to meet French national interests. This is because French forages into, for example, Rwanda after the genocide under Operation Turquoise were still fresh. Its presumed complicity in the Rwandese genocide would work against it since Rwanda was a major player in the DR Congo conflict. Coupled with this was the likelihood of not attracting many nations to form the multi-national force envisaged by the Secretary General. Therefore, there was a need to get an overall body to operate under and the EU came in handy.

According to Arnould (2009, pp.9-10), 'between Javier Solana and the French government and Kofi Annan, there was a clear understanding that transforming a French operation into an EU operation did not cost one day, which is positive because one day could mean a massacre, and it did not cost anything in terms of military efficiency').

Therefore, it can be argued that indeed cooperation between the two organisations had a successful start in that they managed to launch Operation Artemis in such a short time. However, questions linger regarding whether the UN would have allowed the French to go back into the region, especially after the debacle in Rwanda. By agreeing to the EU coming on board, the UN seems to disregard the historical context of the French role in getting the mission launched. The UN was putting the saving of lives in Ituri at the forefront, as the French and the EU provided a viable option. Thus, past misdemeanours or running national interests had to be put aside. The involvement of the EU also provided the cover needed to overlook the interests of key states like France and Belgium.

Wouters and Ruys (2005, p.27) further argue that cooperation between the EU and the UN during Operation Artemis was efficient, with Javier Solana — the EU High Representative — reporting directly to the UN Security Council in Ituri. Wouters and Ruys (2005) further state that in order to coordinate the EU and DPKO had to

carry out some improvisation, for instance, 'the transition was facilitated through common patrols, attendance of briefings by MONUC liaison officers, progressive hand-over of points of control, etc. Analogous to the case of EUPM, the MONUC representative in the Ituri sector (where Operation Artemis took place) was also a French officer. In sum, both Artemis and EUPM demonstrated that EU-UN cooperation on crisis management had successfully become operational, through simple and transparent procedures' (Wouters and Ruys 2005, p.27).

Tardy (2005, pp.56–57) adds his voice to the analysis by stating that Operation Artemis was a good example of EU-UN cooperation, as the communication between the two organisations was good. Coupled with this is the fact that the political cooperation between Brussels and New York was believed to have been satisfactory.

Tardy (2005) argues that 'the deployment of the first elements of the Ituri Task Force in mid-August 2003 also led to valuable cooperation between the two forces. Most importantly, EU cooperation with the UN Secretariat (and with Bangladesh as the main contributor to the Ituri Task Force) to make sure that MONUC could take over in September 2003 as agreed, proved to be successful. This point was of crucial importance, since the UN's ability to take over Artemis constituted the exit strategy for the EU' (ibid, p.56).

However, Koops (2011, p.315) argues that as the mission was only carried out in 3 months and was largely confined to Bunia it only served to show that the underlying aim of Operation Artemis 'was to conduct manageable, but highly symbolic, cooperation in order to avoid the risk of failure from the outset as it would have killed off the embryonic ESDP military dimension in its infancy.'

The handover between the EU and the UN in Ituri was not carried out as smoothly as it was in the case of a similar situation between the two organisations in Bosnia. The handover by the UN to the EU in Bosnia was viewed as smooth due to the fact that the UN re-hatted its officers and a 'small UN liaison office (11 staff members) remained from January to June 30, 2003 in the EUPM headquarters in order to provide assistance to EUPM, to complete the transfer of the database, and to liaise with the locals' (Novosseloff, 2004, p.11). Lessons learnt from the transition mainly

focused on the significance of the need to co-localise the missions, the smooth reassigning of logistics, and the double-hatting of mission heads and personnel (Novosseloff, 2004, p.13).

The handover to the MONUC forces in Ituri was not this far reaching, as officers were not re-hatted (Kees, 2007, p.4 (154)). However, Kees (2007, p.3 (153)) contends that during the transition to MONUC the Ituri Brigade led by Bangladesh troops and the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) continued to participate 'in common patrols, provide logistical support and participate in MONUC planning programmes'.

Novosseloff (2004, p.15) also contends that the lessons learnt during the transition from IPTF to EUPM were adhered to throughout Operation Artemis; the EU and UN had continuous relations at all levels both formally and informally. Both organised the handover from the IEMF to MONUC (Ituri task force) between 15<sup>th</sup> August and 1<sup>st</sup> September 2003. The EU operations headquarters in coordination with the United Nations Department of peacekeeping, MONUC and the Bangladeshi Authorities organised the transition, which included 'common patrols, liaison officers of MONUC attending field headquarters briefings, the Operation Commander's visit to New York, a mission of the operational headquarters sent to Bangladesh, logistics support given by Artemis to MONUC, a planning program established for the different stages of the hand-over, both military staff co-located in Bunia, and the progressive hand-over of points of control. This transition was facilitated by the fact that a French officer was the MONUC representative in the Ituri sector' (Ibid, p.15).

Tardy (2005, p.58) postulates that on a conceptual level it culminated in the elaboration of the EU battle group concept, hastened the institutionalisation of the EU-UN cooperation through the joint declaration of September 2003 and the formation of the steering committee. The EU-UN relationship has blossomed, as they have carried out joint training exercises and the UN has not been deterred by the EU's quite so self-interested peacekeeping policy. Besides, 'the EU-UN relationship has developed further and faster than the relationship between the UN and any other regional organisation. Moreover, this relationship may be seen as a model to be replicated, between the UN and African organisations for example' (ibid, p.58)

It is the assertion of Novosseloff (2004, p.5) that the EU has gained importance as a contributor to international security due to its ability 'to combine civilian and military resources to manage violent conflicts. The EU presents itself as able to combine traditional 'hard' military power with non-traditional 'soft' power.' Novosseloff further argues that although there were instances of lack of cooperation at the political level, especially between the Special Representative of the EU and his UN counterpart, plus the field headquarters, Operation Artemis eased the fears of the UN concerning the willingness of the EU by partnering with the UN in peacekeeping (Novosseloff, 2004, p.16).

Koops (2011, p.315) notes that concerning effective multilateralism; in the words of Marta Martinelli (2008, p.118), Operation Artemis 'was a case of successful UN-EU co-operation, representing in concrete terms what the European Security Strategy would later term 'effective multilateralism.' Though it should be noted that the Germans had surprisingly preferred a coalition of the willing, a term that had been used for the build up to the war in Iraq and therefore linked to 'non-legitimate unilateralism and the opposite of principled multilateralism' Koops (2011, p.323).

When the German foreign minister Joschka Fischer was talking about Operation Artemis to the Germany parliament Koops (2011, p.315) notes that 'not once in his speech did Fischer refer to the United Nations, let alone to strengthening MONUC as a key objective of the mission. Instead, he concluded his appeal to the Parliament by noting that "Operation *Artemis* highlights that the European Union is capable of acting swiftly and effectively in case of an emergency. Therefore, the European Union proves its ability to act, if the big member-states decide to cooperate.'

It should be noted that, according to Rodt (2010, pp.16, 20–22), the EU's success during Artemis was tainted by the misconduct of individual EU soldiers who tortured Congolese civilians. French soldiers were reported by their Swedish counterparts for torturing a Congolese civilian in July 2003. However, after an internal investigation the French denied such torture took place. Lack of transparency within the EU undermined cooperation between it and the UN, as the UN received contradictory information on situations like the one involving torture.

The torture situation reflected badly on MONUC forces as they were also viewed in the same light. Furthermore, torture was a contradiction of the mandate given by the UN which called for the protection of citizens, among other things.

## 6.2 EUFOR RD Congo

EUFOR RD Congo was set up in 2006 in response to a UN request for support during the DR Congo elections of 2006 due to concerns that violence would flare up during or after the elections. The request was made by the UN undersecretary for peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, on 27<sup>th</sup> December 2005 to the EU Presidency (Koops 2011, p.361).

France supported the sending of a mission to DR Congo but was unwilling to lead it due to a fear that ESDP missions would be seen as a French run show as it had led quite a few. Germany reluctantly agreed to lead the mission after the British also refused due to their commitments in Afghanistan (Koops, 2011, p.362). The Secretary General of the UN received a response from Ursula Plassnik, the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Austria, on behalf of the Council of the European Union, who conveyed 'the willingness of the European Union to provide support to MONUC during the electoral period, subject to the authorization of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations' (S/2006/219, p.2).

The UN Security Council passed resolution 1671 authorizing the deployment of EUFOR RD Congo

'(a) to support MONUC to stabilize a situation, in case MONUC faces serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate within its existing capabilities, (b) to contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of its deployment, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (c) to contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa, (d) to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel as well as the protection of the installations of EUFOR R.D.Congo, (e) to execute operations of

limited character in order to extract individuals in danger' (S/RES/1671 (2006)).

The EU through Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP (p.1) gave authorization for the political and security committee to take political control of the mission, provide it with strategic direction and make appropriate decisions. Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck was appointed as the operations commander with the operations headquarters in Potsdam Germany. Major General Christian Damay was appointed force commander (Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP, p.3). His headquarters were in Kinshasa DR Congo (Koops, 2011, p.363). EUMC was responsible for monitoring the execution of the mission and was to receive updates from the operations commander. The EU was to work closely with the UN, both in the field and at the headquarters (DPKO) (Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP, pp.3-4).

The troop contributing countries included 'France (1,090) and Germany (780), Spain (130), Poland (130), Belgium (60), Sweden (55), Netherlands (in addition: Britain, Austria, Cyprus, Czech, Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia)' and at its peak the mission had 2,466 troops at its disposal (Koops 2011, p.364). Part of these troops were stationed in Libreville as over the horizon troops (totalling 1,200) which were made up of German and French infantry plus a Dutch platoon, not forgetting 400 troops stationed in Europe as a strategic reserve (Koops 2011, p.363).

The mission was launched on 12<sup>th</sup> June 2006 (Council Decision 2006/412/CFSP, p.1) and terminated on 30<sup>th</sup> November 2006 (Council joint action 2007/147/CFSP p.1). It is noted by Koops (2011, p.364) that 'during the actual course of the operation, *EUFOR RD Congo* did not have to deal with any *major* security challenges (unlike the demands on *Artemis*). Merely three minor violent incidents took place in August, September and November.'

Cooperation between the EU and UN from the decision-making level, according to Major (2008, p.23), was highlighted by slow intergovernmental procedures on the side of the EU and a shock UN decision to bypass the consultation mechanism (set

up in 2001 between the two bodies) when the EU was asked to commission a force in DR Congo for the election.

The overall planning process for the EUFOR and MONUC cooperation was limited due to the lack of formal coordination structures, which always resulted in frustration. 'The UN did not have or did not use the opportunity to influence the EU planning process' (Major, 2008, p.27).

Tull (2009, p.48) further contends that, although the decision to create EUFOR RD Congo was arrived at rather smoothly, the opposite happened when it came to advanced decision-making and planning. There was considerable tension between EU member states when it came to deciding which country would lead the mission and how it would be led. The tension and irritation went as far as affecting the EU and UN relationship, to some extent.

The tensions and irritations were precipitated by the suspicious atmosphere within the EU when Franco-German relations came under strain after Germany agreed to act as the framework nation for the mission. According to Ehrhart (2007, p.10), the Germans felt like there were behind-the-scenes dealings between Paris and New York to place 'Germany in a position in which it could not refuse to take on the leadership role' of the EUFOR RD Congo mission. Coupled with this was the torturous nature of the force generation which was not a testament to the rapid reaction by the EU.

For instance, the German parliament gave the EU *fait accompli*, according to Tull (2009 p.49), that the force generation had to be completed before preparing the concept of the operation. This turned the planning process on its head, as neither the operation head quarters nor the operation commander had been named. 'This led to tensions between Solana and defence minister Jung who criticised both the preparations of the organisation by the EU and the prevarication of other EU member states in giving firm promises of troops' (ibid, p.49). Therefore, with the lack of a united front the EU could not effectively pursue its goals and coordinate with the UN unit.

Cracks began to show in the EU when Germany opposed plans by France and Belgium to 'extend the operation by several weeks in order to address the danger of new disturbances breaking out during or shortly after the delayed second round of elections, the results of which were not announced until 29 October, only a week before EUFOR was scheduled to withdraw (Ehrhart, H. 2007, p.10).

Major (2008, p.27) argues that cooperation in the field was hindered by the practical repercussions of EUFOR's setting, in that it insisted on autonomy and risked putting the elections in jeopardy. 'EUFOR was supposed to intervene at the request of MONUC in an emergency situation, but retained autonomous decision-making for its troops' (Ibid, p.29).

The situation was not helped by the different chains of command in the EU which seemed to be too long-winded for the UN. For instance, the EU had three chains of command based in Kinshasa, Brussels and Potsdam, while the UN had an integrated one with a base in Kinshasa. So it turned out that although the lead chain of command of the EU was in Potsdam, there was less interaction with that of MONUC as it was in Kinshasa. This delayed responses to requests by the UN — usually to the tune of 24 hours — as the chain of command in Kinshasa always had to get clearance from Potsdam, thereby putting the lives of civilians and MONUC troops at risk (Ibid, pp.28–29).

The EU and UN also had coordination issues concerning the sharing of logistics. MONUC was tasked with providing logistics to the EU but the latter felt the former was not up to the task. Major (2008, Ibid, pp.31–32) argues that had the EU been requested to deploy the 'over-the-horizon force', it would have found it difficult due to the problems in logistical support.

Rodt (2010, p.30) argues that EUFOR cooperation with MONUC was a success as EUFOR maintained security in Kinshasa by protecting the civilians, key installations like the airport and carried out limited military operations like rescuing individuals from danger. Rodt postulates that 'when fighting broke out between supporters of the two presidential candidates in Kinshasa in August 2006, EUFOR supported MONUC, helped separate the fighting factions and re-established order. It assisted in



the recovery of diplomats trapped by the violence and mediated between belligerent parties. EUFOR also airlifted weapons out of areas occupied by groups of demobilised soldiers and participated in humanitarian initiatives.'

Overall, Tull (2009, pp.50–51) asserts that EUFOR RD Congo accomplished its mission, as it was sent in to back up MONUC and to deter possible disruptions to the elections in DR Congo. This view is supported in the Ehrhart (2007, p.10), which stated that EUFOR and MONUC worked well jointly and the EUFOR mission conformed to the EU's dedication to 'effective multilateralism' by backing up MONUC. Moreover, 'EUFOR was also the first successful practical application of the standby model, previously discussed by the EU and the UN, whereby the EU held a rapid reaction force 'over the horizon' for contingencies to support UN forces or help them to disengage from difficult situations' (ibid, p.10).

Furthermore, it is contended by Ehrhart (2007, p.10) that EUFOR RD Congo has to be taken in the context of overall EU engagement in DR Congo on the political and economic level. EUFOR RD Congo was a successful collaboration because it highlighted the ongoing support the EU has for DR Congo and the UN. The EU has worked alongside the UN to build a police force and an army for DR Congo through the security sector reform. Coupled with this is the continued support through aid and infrastructure projects. However, Tull (2009, p.54) does not agree with this assessment, as he asserts that the EU does not have a coherent political strategy towards DR Congo. Therefore, with no implicit or explicit strategy towards this state, it would be going too far to interpret the intervention by EUFOR RD Congo as an implementation of EU African strategy. To Tull (2009, pp.54–55) the EU Congo policy is 'the sum of incremental and ad hoc decisions and measures that reveal no clear line. It is the result of the interests of individual countries (France and Belgium).'

Ehrhart (2007, p.11) goes on to state that 'EUFOR pursued a successful 'hearts and minds' strategy. It managed to convince the Congolese public that its presence was purely to support the UN; that it was strictly impartial; and it behaved with great professionalism.'

However Koops (2011, p.360) notes that EUFOR RD Congo ‘was most strongly criticized by commentators as being a mere act of ‘tokenism’ and ‘ESDP show-piece.’ Furthermore the EU failed to validate the battlegroup concept due to Germany opposition (Koops, 2011, p.369). Nevertheless, EUFOR RD Congo helped advance ‘the EU’s independent *identity* and *role* as a continuing supporter of the EU-UN side of effective multilateralism.

### 6.3 EUPOL

The law enforcement apparatus in DR Congo needed a complete overhaul after the corrupt regime of Mobutu. After overthrowing Lumumba in the 1960s, Mobutu went about stamping his authority on the state institutions and oversaw a corruption and erosion of the army, police, judiciary and legislature. He had come up with ideas like Mobutism which ran contrary to the free and fair running of the state as he became more benevolent (Fowale 2010, African History @ suite 101, p.1). At the time of his overthrow he was relying on mercenaries to defend his country and his army was notorious for raping women and destroying property during war situations (Khalid S M the Baltimore sun, 23<sup>rd</sup> September 1991, p.2).

Therefore, after 2002 when a ceasefire was signed between the warring parties, it was realised that institutions had to be rebuilt and among these was the police. According to Dobbins et al. (2008, p.105) ‘Under Mobutu, the police forces had been frequently reorganized and lacked a coherent structure. During the civil war, they were largely overtaken and replaced by the militias, who took justice into their own hands.’

In the post-Mobutu era, the EU worked alongside the UN to train the police. Dobbins et al. (ibid, p.117) argue that ‘The EU contributed to security-sector and police reforms with two separate advisory missions.’

As the UN was reforming and retraining the police force, Dobbins et al. (ibid, p.123) note that the EU played an active role in the endeavour by availing funds and setting up EUPOL Kinshasa (which will be discussed in depth in chapter VI) in early 2005,

which had trained close to 1,000 police forces for the integrated unit by May 2005. 'In addition, the European Commission showed growing interest in contributing to the police reform. France also made bilateral arrangements in 2004 to train and equip a rapid-reaction police force for riot control and, by mid-2005, had trained 1,500 police officers. South Africa, the Netherlands, and other countries also began to contribute on a bilateral basis. To avoid duplication of effort, they formed a working group for police reform in 2005' (ibid, p.123).

#### 6.4 EUSEC

As examined above, the erosion of the DR Congo state during Mobutu's era further necessitated the restructuring of the army and led to what came to be known as 'security sector reforms' championed by both the EU and UN. The EU launched an operation known as EUSEC in May 2005, at the request of the Democratic Republic of Congo's interim government (Council of the European Union Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP, p.1) to 'provide advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in integrating, restructuring and rebuilding the Congolese army' Davis 2009, p.27).

The request from the DR Congo government came after successful negotiations held in Sun City and Pretoria in 2002 and 2003. The talks had set in motion the transitional process which among other things involved the restructuring and integrating of the national army (Rogier, 2004 pp.30-31). EUSEC tasked with the role of assisting and advising the Congolese authorities in charge of security at the same time, ensuring the promotion of 'policies compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public rights, transparency and observance of rules of law' (Council Joint Action 2005/355/, Article 1, p.3).

Other objectives of the mission included working in 'close cooperation and coordination with the other actors in the international community to provide practical support for the integration of the Congolese army and good governance in the field of security, as set out in the General Concept, including identifying and contributing

to the development of various projects and options that the European Union and/or its Member States may decide to support in this area.’ (ibid, Article 2, p.3).

Melmot (2009, p.8) theorises that once the idea of security sector reform was mooted, there was immediate intellectual consensus between the EU and UN that it was the right programme to carry out. EU-UN cooperation continued in 2003 when, at the behest of the French, a project to re-establish the penal system in Ituri was launched. The implications were that the court, the prison of Bunia and the police station had to be reconstructed. The magistrates had to be trained and the same applied to policemen and women, plus prison staff. This project was pioneered in a border location that had witnessed a breakdown of law and order. The militias had taken over the role of providing justice to the extent that interference from the interim government in Kinshasa was successfully resisted in 2002. ‘Ituri symbolized the breakdown of the rule of law and became an experimental zone for urgent intervention by the EU in the field of security’ (ibid, p.9).

Melmot (2009, p.16) notes that competition is rife between the EU and UN mainly because both emulate each other to take the lead in security sector reforms (SSR). He contends that the European Council gave an explicit mandate to EUSEC to coordinate with EUPOL and allow for intervention from MONUC. He states that:

‘this recommendation follows on from the fact that international leadership for supporting SSR has never been clearly established between the UN and the EU, whose institutional interests in this new public policy are very strong. For the UN, SSR partly justifies its mandate for keeping the peace. In contrast, for the EU it relates to the assertion and consolidation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Yet, it should also be pointed out that several EU member states believe they have a role to play in Africa, including in terms of security, independently to the ESDP’ (ibid, p.16).

This competitive nature of the relationship has let through the (state) actors whom Melmot refers to as “lone riders” like China and the United States seeking influence in Kinshasa to carry out military collaboration remotely from the reference structure and in an obscure manner (ibid, p.16). This, to Melmot, suits the DR Congo

government, as it favours bilateral as opposed to multilateral cooperation (ibid, p.17). With a lot of actors it has choice about what it implements. Since some are pursuing their own interests they may not necessarily comply with standard procedures like teaching soldiers to respect human rights. So their involvement is interest driven. This form of *à la carte* puts the cooperation between the EU and UN in jeopardy in a number of ways.

Since the EU and UN are run by member states, the same states may pursue individual deals with the DR Congo government and this may affect the length and impact of both the EU and UN. For instance, if France got an agreement to deal with SSR on its own, it would not need the EU or UN to help it if it was felt that France had the expertise. Alternatively, as examined earlier, it may favour one organisation at the expense of the other, depending on its interests.

When assessing the impact of EUSEC, Tull (2009, p.55) postulates that DR Congo has no special importance to the EU and this is shown in the fact that for years EUSEC was operating at 30% below its mandated staffing level. So with personnel of less than 100 people for a country almost the size of Western Europe, this is a clear indication of DR Congo's low priority in the eyes of the EU.

Furthermore, coordination has proved cumbersome, as individual countries like France and Belgium are pursuing bilateral relations with DR Congo. So the pursuit of national interests by some actors within the EU is hindering intra-EU coordination, which, in the end, affects cooperation between the EU and UN, as the UN may be left in limbo by the stand taken by the EU on certain issues. For example, France's view on certain policies pursued by the DR Congo government may diverge from that of the EU. But with a lack of internal cohesion, the UN may be left in the middle trying to figure out how it will design a policy to reflect a unified stand with the EU.

Tull (ibid, p.55) further notes that after the 2006 elections, the EU involvement in DR Congo waned considerably. On top of that the political attention and diplomatic activism of 2005 and 2006 also evaporated in the post-election period, although the peace process was still fragile. This was given credence when the EU refused to

respond to the UN request for an emergency force in 2008 when fighting broke out in the eastern part of the country. Overall, Tull cannot see the evidence of a lucid policy with staying power (*ibid*, p.55).

Overall, the literature dealing with motives for EU-UN cooperation is paramount, with different authors tackling the collaboration from different perspectives. However, most literature deals with the realist perspective of the cooperation and not so many linkages are made in the theories, as the thesis will show. Furthermore, the inter-organisational cooperation perspective is not fully examined and this can be attributed to the fact that the EU-UN relationship is a growing one. But it could also be that the euphoria that had come with the intervention in 2003 and 2006 was dampened by the EU's refusal to help the UN out in 2008.

Research using the social constructivist point of view is employed sparingly, as authors concentrate on the realist perspective. However, as will be shown in the thesis, it plays a key role, especially in the field, as it is crucial to forming the linkage with the inter-organisational cooperation perspective.


In light of the aforementioned development, it is quite evident from the literature that the EU-UN cooperation in the field has not been fully examined. The interaction between the two organisations in the field is vital to understanding the motivations for continued partnership, particularly in the SSR and the discontinued collaboration militarily since 2006 in DR Congo. However, the two organisations have been working together in Darfur and Chad. But the collaboration in DR Congo has had an impact on future liaisons in peacekeeping, especially outside the geographical context of the EU. In light of the findings in the literature review, the study will delve into the findings on the EU-UN cooperation in DR Congo.

All factors examined until this point provide useful tools to assess other analysts' views on the EU-UN cooperation. Yet, there is a need to examine the field in which the cooperation took place, which of course is DR Congo. This will be the subject of the next chapter.

## **Chapter 4:**

**EU–UN involvement in the conflict in DR Congo: Political and Historical background**

Fig 2. Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo<sup>13</sup>



<sup>13</sup> Map accessed from international opportunities organisation, Austin Texas 2001



## 1. Introduction

In order to fully understand cooperation between the EU and UN, an examination of the political and historical background of the DR Congo has to be carried out. The country covers an area of 2,345,410 sq km with a population estimated to be around 62,660,551 (UN 2012) includes diverse tribes such as Bantu nilotics and pygmies and has been a major arena for international players since the 15<sup>th</sup> century. These players both regional and international and have been influential in shaping its geography, politics, economic and social set-up. Encounters with international players have also planted the seeds for future conflicts.

Outside influence began in 1482, when Diogo Cao, a Portuguese navigator visited the Congo after reaching the mouth of the Congo River (Britannica encyclopaedia p.3). Soon the Portuguese established ties with the Kongo Empire (*BBC World Service*, the story of Africa). Cao was later followed by Arab slave trader Muhammad bin Hamad, also nicknamed Tipp Tip, who invaded the Eastern part of Congo and even established kingdoms (Angela Downing, 1989 p.65). Others like Msiri of the Nyamwezi (Reef, 1981, p.173) established the Garenganze Kingdom in 1856 near Mwata Kazembe.

However, it was Henry Morton Stanley, a British-born American journalist writing for a New York tabloid, who opened the Congo to the outside world as he crossed through it on his return from Africa during his search for Dr. Livingstone. King Leopold of Belgium hired him to help him establish and subjugate the area which came to be known as the Congo Free State (Dunn, 2003, p.23). Stanley returned to Africa between 1874 and 1884 and established the Congo by signing a number of treaties with the natives (Federation of Free states of Africa).

### The Congo Free State

During the Berlin conference of 1884, King Leopold got the support he needed to take over the Congo. He then set about bringing territories marked out on the map as

agreed in Berlin under his control. Human rights abuses were rampant in King Leopold's bid to maximise profit through a collection of rubber and other resources from the colony<sup>14</sup> (Gann and Duignan, 1969, p.268).

Such abuses included flogging, hostage taking and punitive expeditions for rebellious villages. Soldiers and agents mutilated bodies of natives they had killed and reported back to their posts with ears and right hands as evidence of how the cartridges had been used while gun butts were used to kill children (Anstey, 1966, p.7). This ultimately led to depopulation.

The gross human rights abuse would eventually be revealed to the world, especially through a former ship agent, E.D. Morel, who was stationed at Antwerp (Hochschild, 2006, pp.178–179). Morel's Congo Reform Association, formed in 1904, would campaign against the dehumanising nature through which the rubber and ivory was collected (Hochschild, 2006, pp.178-179).

The British-funded Casement Report of 1903 confirmed Morel's views and Britain began calling for Belgian government to take over the colony and was joined by France and the USA in 1906 (Dunn, 2003, p.14). Although King Leopold's commission of inquiry acknowledged the abuses, it was too little, too late to stave off a takeover by the Belgian government in March 1908. King Leopold was paid off handsomely (Dunn, 2003, p.14).

### **The Belgian Congo**

On taking over the Congo, the Belgian government designed a document called *charte coloniale*, to act as a political, social and economic guide to governing the colony (Hochschild, 2006, p.38). The Belgian government oversaw a reduction in human rights abuse by its officials from 1908 onwards. However the system of forced labour was retained as young men were required to labour for the colonial

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<sup>14</sup> 'The instructions sent to officials were simple and were incessantly repeated and emphasised: production must be pushed to the maximum. Officials were aware that they were dealing with a matter of state concern, and that it was essential in terms of the production level attained that their work would be judged. Judged and even paid... On the other hand the labour services exacted on the Africans were for a long time left to the official's discretion; they were not defined by law... until 1903 that the duration of the forced labour rendered by workers was gradually subjected to regulation.' (Gann and Duignan, 1969, p.268).

regime for a period of up to 2 months which was doubled during World War II (ibid, pp.28-29).

### **Road to independence**

After World War II, the decolonisation storm began to gather within the Belgian Congo as political parties like Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO), were formed in 1952 led by Joseph Kasavubu (Hochschild, 2006, p.43). Other parties emerged in 1957, like 'the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC), led by Patrice Lumumba; Balubakat, the political association of the Luba Katanga under Jason Sendwe; the Centre de regroupement Africain (cerea) of Anicet Kashamura, which was based in Kivu and the Confédération des associations tribales du Katanga (Conakat) of Moïse Tshombe' (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p.82). Congo nationalism took a somewhat unusual road as it 'burst in suddenly and won over the people in two or three years' (Hochschild, 2006, p.42). This was in contrast to the route taken by some of the other colonies under the British and French, where intellectuals were leading the independence struggle (ibid, p.42).

Belgium awarded independence to Congo after the Leopoldville protests when the ABAKO leaders were arrested in 1959. Similar protests were carried out in October 1959 in Kisangani leading to the arrest of MNC leader Lumumba in October 1959 (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p.87). Talks were held in Brussels in early 1960 attended by Lumumba and it was agreed that independence would be awarded on 30<sup>th</sup> June 1960 (Hochschild, 2006, p.42). Lumumba's party won the majority of parliamentary seats the first parliamentary elections in May 1960 which led him to becoming Prime Minister and Kasavubu installed as the president.

Less than a week after independence, the country was plunged into chaos when the Congolese soldiers mutinied after they were informed that regardless of having attained independence, their service circumstances had not changed (Nwaubani, 2001, p.607). The mutiny spread into the 'civilian population and escalated into a large-scale anti-European unrest' (Nwaubani, 2001 p.607). Katanga soon seceded on 11 July 1960. This availed the Belgians the opportunity to send in troops in Katanga without consulting the Lumumba government (Bilsen, 1962, p.48). It soon became

apparent that the Belgians were attempting to re-colonise Congo (Nwaubani, 2001 p.607).

The Belgian support for Katanga secession was the start of a policy by they supported 'the parts of the Congo which desired to escape the grip of Lumumba movement...Her line of thought was...to recreate a confederate whole of those parts of the Congo, such as South Kasai, the Bakongo country, Equateur and Kivu, which wished to break away from Lumumba and join the occidental or Belgo-occidental, camp' (Bilsen, 1962, p.48).

The Katanga secession led Kasavubu and Lumumba to seek assistance from the United Nations as they tried 'to protect the national territory against the present external (Belgian) aggression which is a threat to international peace' (Rajeshwar, 1976, pp.6–7). The UN responded by passing Security Council resolution 143 which however only called for withdrawal of Belgian forces but made no mention of the Katanga secession. Nwaubani (2001, p.608) argues that, having failed to make the UN and US realise the gravity of the situation, Lumumba appealed to the Soviet Union which quickly replied and sent in '10 Soviet planes, 60 trucks, weapons and military advisors to help Lumumba' (ibid, p.608).

This did not stop the secession of the Kasai province which was led by Albert Kalonji (Bilsen, 1962, p.50) and by 9 August 1960, after the Security Council had passed a resolution on 6 August 1960 specifically referring to Katanga and calling on the Belgians to withdraw, Congo was already in danger of being torn apart (Nwaubani, 2001 p.608).

Kasavubu and Lumumba soon fell out with each other as the Cold War politics kicked in with Lumumba being accused of pursuing the communist cause. Mobutu Sese seko a journalist by training but had joined the army and been promoted to army chief of staff and later commander-in-chief (CNN, 1997, p.1) carried out a coup against Lumumba and Kasavubu. The coup fragmented the country into four governments with 'one in the eastern city of Stanleyville, loyal to the ousted Lumumba; one in Katanga under Moise Tshombe, supported by Belgians; one in Kasai under Albert Kalonji; and one in Leopoldville under Kasavubu' (Wrong, 2000, pp.67, 76, 77).

Moise Tshombe was a good ally of the Belgium and he is believed to have been present at the execution of Lumumba in Katanga region (Linda Slattery, world socialist web, 2001, p.1)

The UN managed to stop the secession of Kasai and Katanga (ibid, p.80) but Lumumba supporters like Laurent Kabila (who was to play a role in Zaire in the post Cold War) and Mulele moved east opening up a new rebel frontier. Mobutu finalised his coup in November 1965 after Tshombe had been sacked as Prime Minister by Kasavubu (ibid, pp.80-81).

## **2. The rise and fall of Mobutu (1965-1997)**

On taking power Mobutu got the Members of Parliament to rubber stamp the coupe on the promise that they would continue to receive their remunerations (Young, in Birmingham and Phyllis, 1998, p.110). Soon afterwards, Mobutu 'claimed extra-constitutional legislative powers for a five year period, and appropriated full legislative authority. Political parties were swept away. He abolished elected provincial institutions... and in a major recentralisation of power, reduced the number of provinces from twenty one to eight, plus the capital district' (ibid, 1998, p.110).

In a bid to gain national cohesion after what he believed was a shambolic colonial legacy, Mobutu sought 'to move away from borrowed or imposed ideas towards an increased awareness and privileging of indigenous cultural beliefs and values...this was seen as a pivotal act of decolonisation because it restored the dignity of local cultures that were denigrated under Belgian colonial rule' (ibid, 1998, p.111). The country was renamed Zaire (Dunn, 2003. p.110) and the Congo River was too renamed River Zaire. Mobutu further got rid of Western-style dress style (McNulty, 1999, p.59).

He then passed a localisation decree on 30 November 1973, which was termed as Zairianisation and radicalisation (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002 p.149). This was the 'confiscation of small and medium enterprises owned by foreign nationals, including

Belgians, Greeks, Portuguese, Italians, Pakistanis and West Africans for the benefit of Congolese politicians, senior civil servants and merchants' (ibid, p.149).

However by December 1974, this policy was leading to economic disaster. Mobutu then 'declared war on the bourgeoisie and proclaimed state takeover of private ventures along with what remained of the colonial business sector' (Young in Birmingham and Martin, 1998, p.115). In the mid 70's Mobutu adopted Mobutisme which was defined as the 'sayings, thoughts and actions of the president founder' (ibid, p.129).

The security situation deteriorated in 1977 when Katanga soldiers attacked Shaba province using Angola as a spring board. However, 'the Zairian army offered almost no resistance and the invaders were only stopped by the engagement with the Moroccan forces' (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p.121). The second attack in 1978 was put down by the French and Belgian troops with the Americans providing logistical support (ibid, p.121). It became apparent from then on that Mobutu's survival was only guaranteed if the Western powers were willing to prop up his regime. Therefore he began his long terms strategy of ensuring that in the eyes of the Western powers he was the only one who could keep the country intact (Young in Birmingham and Martin, 1998, p.131).

Soon after the end of the Cold War Mobutu came under pressure from Western governments to open up political space, which he did on 24 April 1990 by abandoning the single party rule (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p.186). Political parties mushroomed almost immediately and the sovereign national conference was set up in August 1991. This led to the appointment and sacking of Prime Ministers like Tshisekedi and Mungul-Diaka. Diaka lasted only a month and was replaced by Nguzi, who subsequently ended the Sovereign National Conference on 19 January 1992 (ibid, pp.189-190). Nguzi restarted the Sovereign National Conference which re-elected Tshisekedi as prime minister on 30<sup>th</sup> August 1992. Mobutu intervened in the conference and got Kengo his trusted aide to be elected Prime Minister from 1994 to 1997 (ibid, pp.201-204).

### **The fall of Mobutu**

The fall of Mobutu was precipitated by a combination of factors from within and outside Zaire. Events that occurred within Zaire provided a conducive atmosphere for the anti-Mobutu forces to get rid of him with ease. Mobutu's corrupt leadership had led to the total breakdown of the state, which left a power vacuum. However, even with the power vacuum, Mobutu remained as president, partly because of the tacit support he received from France, the US and Belgium. These countries kept supporting him for a number of reasons, but mainly because they feared Zaire would implode if he was ousted from power (McNulty, 1999, p.67).

The French mainly saw Mobutu as a lynchpin for the continued influence and expansion of Francophone ideas. The growing British and American influence, especially in East African states like Uganda, created unease in Paris. The French therefore needed Mobutu to act as a bulwark against them (Prunier, 1995, pp.104–107). As well as the domestic and international dimension, there was also the regional dimension. The relationship between Zaire and neighbouring states like Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Angola, coupled with Zaire's intervention in their internal politics, was to play a major role in defining Mobutu's future at the helm of Zaire.

### **Regional factors for the fall of Mobutu: the Rwandese Genocide spill over**

In 1994, Rwanda went through genocide of immense proportions that sent shockwaves through the Great Lakes region of Africa. Prior to that, on 1 October 1990, an armed group of Tutsi refugees from Uganda, who came to be known as the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) and had participated in the 1986 liberation war in Uganda, decided to cross back into Rwanda with tactical help from the Ugandan government (Mamdani, 2001 p.184).

The RPF was made up of second generation Tutsis who had been forced to leave Rwanda in 1959 when the Hutus (with tacit help from the Belgian colonisers) took over positions of leadership and excommunicated or killed most of the Tutsis (Scherrer, 2002, pp.28–30). Their destinations were refugee camps in Tanzania and

Uganda, while some fled to Europe, Kenya and Zaire. However, the 1990 RPF invasion did not go according to plan — a day into the invasion, infighting broke out and the leader Fred Rwigyema was killed (Prunier, 1995, pp.94–96).

This led to Paul Kagame cutting short his studies in the US and coming home to lead the rebellion. Matters on the battleground were worsening following crushing defeats by the Rwandan army assisted by French, Belgian and Zairian troops (Mamdani, 2001 p.186).

Regional and international pressure to negotiate with the rebels grew and Habyalimana, the president of Rwanda, had to meet the rebels in Arusha Tanzania (Destexhe, 1995, p.46). However, Habyalimana faced growing opposition from extremists who felt he had betrayed Rwanda by talking to the Tutsis. Political parties and political elites like *Akazu* (made up of members of Habyalimana's wife's family) then began bankrolling the training of private armies like the *Inkuba*, *Impuza Mugamba*, *Abakombosi* and the *interahamwe*. '*Interahamwe*' means those who kill/strike together and was made up of youths from Habyalimana's tribe and were trained by French special military personnel (Scherrer, 2002, p.69).

There was a growing desire to use genocide as a weapon against the advancing RPA soldiers, with a view to killing as many Tutsis as possible, so that when the RPA got to Kigali they would find few or none alive. In order to exterminate the Tutsis a spark was needed to get all the Hutus to rally around the same cause. This cause emerged on 6 April 1994, when Habyalimana and Cyprian Ntaryamira were killed after missiles were fired at their plane as it touched down at Kigali International Airport (Prunier, 1995, pp.211-212). Although the culprits were never caught, it is widely believed that members of the *Akazu* ordered the killing as they saw Habyalimana as a threat to continued Hutu supremacy. This idea is supported by the fact that, immediately after his killing, moderate Hutus, especially those in the government, were killed (ibid, pp.229-230).

Very quickly these attacks spread to Tutsis and within 100 days, close to one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus had been killed. The massacre was only stopped by the capture of power of the Rwandese Patriotic Front in June 1994 (Nzongola-Ntalaja,



2002, p.224). The defeat of the militias and the Rwandan army restored calm in Rwanda but precipitated new problems for the region and Zaire in particular.

In the aftermath of the RPF victory in Rwanda, the French requested the UN to intervene in the conflict. The UN allowed the French to intervene militarily on humanitarian grounds. The French called the intervention Operation Turquoise. This was designed to provide safe passage to the perpetrators of the genocide and had little to do with providing humanitarian help or stopping the massacre (Destexhe, 1995, pp.51–55). The perpetrators of the genocide fled with a lot of people, mainly to Zaire and Tanzania, and were put in refugee camps set up by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees.

### **Citizenship question of the Tutsis and Hutus in Kivu (Zaire)**

The exodus into Zaire by the Rwandese National Army, or *Forces Armees Rwandaise* (FAR), the *Interahamwe* and other militias, as well as citizens who had merely fled Rwanda out of fear of repression, posed a major threat to the stability of Eastern Zaire in the province of Kivu. This was because Kivu was inhabited by a diversity of people. Among these were people of Tutsi and Hutu origin located in the North and South of Kivu. Before the onset of the genocide in Rwanda, Northern Kivu had a Rwandese population called the Banyamasisi (Mamdani, 2001 p.239). These people had been brought in by the Belgian colonialists from Rwanda to provide labour (Adelman and Suhrke 2000, pp.324–325).

Following the mass murder of about 200,000 Hutus in Burundi in 1972, there was an influx of refugees into Zaire. Mobutu, who was heavily influenced by *chef de cabinet* Mr Bisengimana, extended citizenship to all refugees from Rwanda who had settled in Zaire between 1959 and 1963 (Mamdani, 2001 p.243). However, under pressure from the Nande and Hunde politicians, parliament passed a law in 1981 which 'stipulated that only those persons who could demonstrate ancestral connection to the population residing in 1885 in the territory demarcated as Congo would qualify to be citizens of Congo' (ibid, p.244). The Sovereign National Congress (Conference Nationale Souveraine (CNS)) of 1991 questioned the citizenship of the Rwandese-speaking people in Zaire. Matters were not helped when, in the same year, Mobutu, in a bid to retain power, authorised 'the Mission

d'Identification de Zairois au Kivu ...to carry out on the ground verification of who among the Kinyarwanda speakers was Zairean and who was not — because their families came after the Berlin conference' (ibid, p.245). By 1994, the Banyamasisi of Zaire were split asunder and the Hutus began to identify themselves as the indigenous people and the Tutsis as non-indigenous.

Southern Kivu came to be inhabited mainly by Tutsis from Burundi and their presence dates back to the 1880s. They moved as a result of the power struggle that arose after the death of King Rwabugiri, who ruled over the kingdom of central Rwanda. A power struggle started and the defeated people had to flee into Zaire (ibid, p.245). However, it cannot be ruled out that the arbitrary nature with which the colonial boundaries were drawn up resulted in many tribes being split between states (Adelman and Suhrke, 2000, p.325). Different tribes have kinsmen in neighbouring states. These Tutsis came to inhabit the hills of Mulenge and thus were referred to as Banyamulenge. Their numbers were increased by the migration of Tutsis from Rwanda between 1959 and 1960.

With the passing of the 1981 citizenship decree, many Banyamulenge felt victimised and when the Rwandese Patriotic Front invaded Rwanda from Uganda in 1990, many young men joined their ranks. In Kivu, the Tutsi and Hutu divide began to crystallise. The Banyamulenge formed close links with the Tutsis in Masisi and the few Hutus in South Kivu joined hands with fellow Hutus in Masisi (Mamdani, 2001 pp.251–252).

### **Post-Rwandese genocide; Hutu refugees in Zaire**

The refugees who poured into Zaire from Rwanda settled in Goma and Bukavu. They totalled between 1.1 and 1.25 million men, women and children (Kisangani, 2000, p.165). However, their camps were controlled by *interahamwe*, ex-FAR and other militias. These groups continued to enjoyed massive support from France and its protégé Mobutu, who armed and sustained them. They set up mini republics with complete knowledge of the Zairian authorities. However, by sustaining these groups Mobutu was alienating most of the international powers that had sustained his rule.

The spark for the war against Mobutu was provided by the forced repatriation of Banyamulenge to Rwanda by Zairian authorities. This was a culmination of events set in motion in 1994, when the 'High Command of the Republic (HCR) — the Parliament of Transition — sent a member of Parliament, Mambweni Vangu to review the situation in Kivu following the genocide of 1994. All Kinyarwanda-speaking people, Hutu or Tutsi, are refugees and must return home — such was the verdict of the commission' (Mamdani, 2001, p.255).

Key politicians like Anzuluni Mbembe, the co-speaker of Parliament, joined the call for the expulsion of Banyamulenge. In March and April 1996, Tutsis from Masisi and Rutshuru were rounded up and sent to the Rwandese border. Ironically, it was the Hutus that were tasked with the duty of rounding up the Tutsis. The Hutus decided to round up some of the Bahunde and Banyanga (ibid, p.255). This turned these two tribes against Mobutu and in any conflict they were likely to be on the opposing side.

Already feeling physically endangered by the presence of armed Hutus, the Banyamulenge began to arm and seek training from the Rwandese government in Kigali. Ordinary life in Kivu got militarised and as the *interahamwe* and the ex-FAR began to roam the countryside in collaboration with the Zairian army, locals began to arm and form militias (ibid, pp.256–257). In June 1996, the Banyamulenge rebelled against the Mobutu state. Although this was a local resistance against their *interahamwe*, ex-FAR and Zairian army tormentors, it provided the spark for the war, which marked the end of Mobutu's rule.

### **Role of regional powers (Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Angola) in ousting Mobutu**

What had begun as a rebellion by the Banyamulenge fighting for their freedom turned into a civil war against Mobutu and later took on a regional dimension. Rwanda, in defence of the Banyamulenge and also in a bid to get rid of the threat from the *interahamwe* and ex-FAR soldiers, attacked the refugee camps in Kivu. Although the Rwandese army met some resistance from Zairian troops, all camps had been cleared of refugees by November 1996. The refugees fled in all directions

and around 700,000 returned to Rwanda (Kisangani, 2000, p.168). The remaining 500,000 fled deeper into Zaire, died or joined the Zairian troops in fighting the Rwandese government and the Banyamulenge.

The rebellion against Mobutu gained momentum. The Banyamulenge merged with the dormant Katanga rebels to form a rebel movement which was led by Laurent Kabila, a man who had fought against Mobutu during the Mulele uprising in the 1960s. His new rebel movement came to be known as the Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) which was formed on 18 October 1996 in Lemera, South Kivu (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p.225). It was a conglomeration of his own rebel group, which had been reduced to a few exiles in Europe, and a Lumumbist group previously based in Eastern Zaire and led by Andre Kisase Ngandu. There were also other groups like the Alliance Democratique des Peuples (ADP), comprising Congolese Tutsis led by Deogratias Bugera, and the Mouvement Révolutionnaire pour la Libération du Zaire (MRLZ) led by Anselm Masasu Nindaga (ibid, p.225).

As the rebellion progressed, towns like Kisangani and Lumumbashi fell one after the other. International help, which had always been provided by France, Belgium and the United States, never materialised. Neighbouring nations like Uganda, Burundi and Angola joined the rebellion on the side of the anti-Mobutu forces. Angola supplied tanks and heavy artillery in the battle for Kinshasa, which pushed the Mobutu forces, ex-FAR, *interahamwe* and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) that was led by Savimbi into Congo Brazzaville (McNulty, 1999, p.77).

The countries opposed to Mobutu had different interests and concerns. For instance, although Rwanda was supporting the cause of the Banyamulenge, it was primarily concerned with the refugee camps in Zaire. These were made up of armed *interahamwe* forces and other perpetrators of the genocide and were holding the population hostage as they planned and carried out attacks against the Kigali regime (Rwanda Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 2010 p.6).

Angola's decision to join the war against Mobutu was based on security concerns (Nzongola Ntalaja, 2004, p.22). Mobutu had supported and sheltered UNITA rebels opposed to the regime in Luanda. Uganda wanted to secure its borders against the Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF), which was using Zaire as a launch pad for its insurgency in Uganda. Also, many rebel groups fighting in Northern Uganda were hiding in Zaire and being supported by Sudan. Burundi, under Pierre Buyoya, joined the war to consolidate the Tutsi hold on power by getting rid of threats in neighbouring Congo. Rebel groups were operating from Zaire with the complicity of Zairian authorities (Reyntjend, 1999, p.242). Mobutu also wanted to gain political capital with his neighbours, as his coup had not been a popular one with the neighbouring states, which had imposed sanctions on his country (Haq, 1997, p.1).

### **Mobutu deserted by international powers**

Mobutu's support for the Habyalimana and his refusal to condemn those who carried out the genocide worked against him when it came to soliciting international support against the rebellion backed by his neighbours. By this stage he was also suffering from prostate cancer, which made him a liability to potential supporters. For the United States, the inglorious outcome of the Operation Restore Hope in Somalia made it wary of intervening in Africa. Coupled with this was the fact that Ugandan and Rwandan leaders were seen in Washington as the new breed of African leaders (McNulty, 1999, p.72). The US did not question Rwandese actions, especially concerning the massacre of refugees in Kivu, mainly out of guilt for its inaction during the genocide.

France was forced into voluntary inaction largely because the US had pulled the rug from under Mobutu's feet, but also because it failed to garner support for a military intervention from the UN. France was criticised by the Dutch government for its hypocrisy and the US reminded France of how it could no longer support dictators even if they (dictators) were pro-Western (McNulty, 1999, p.73).

On 17 May 1997, the US negotiated Mobutu's departure as it favoured a soft landing in Kinshasa for the AFDL, which formed a government and named the country The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) under the leadership of Laurent Kabila.

### 3. The second Congo war and the deployment of MONUC

Less than two years into his presidency, Kabila was confronted with a rebellion in Northern Kivu on 2 August 1998 (International Crisis Group, Report No. 1 August 1998, p.i). The Banyamulenge were again at the centre of this rebellion fighting for the right to stay in DR Congo. However, they seemed to be pawns in a game between Kabila and his former allies. During the 14 months Kabila was in power, he suffered from declining popularity with claims that he was a protégé of Rwanda and Uganda. In a bid to show the contrary, Kabila backtracked on the promises he had made to Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda of securing the borders so that rebel groups would not use DR Congo as a launch pad in carrying out their rebellion (Reyntjend, 1999, p.243).

Although he had entered into private agreements with these three states, local militias were giving help to insurgents and Kabila was doing little to stop them (Reyntjend, 1999, p.243). The ADF had stepped up its attacks in Uganda as of November 1997 (International Crisis Group, Report No. 1 August 1998, p.3). Rwanda felt ill at ease as an estimated 15,000 *interahamwe* and ex-FAR soldiers were reported to be training in the Masisi area of North Kivu and their camps were believed to be attracting recruits from Rwanda, DR Congo, Burundi and Uganda (International Crisis Group, Report No. 1 August 1998, pp.6–7). The Tutsi regime in Burundi also felt threatened by the Hutu re-arming in Congo. Buyoya was determined to be in the good books of his neighbours, so he could not look on as Kabila destabilised the region.

Kabila decided to expel all Kinyarwanda/Kirundi-speaking people from the army, therefore severing his ties with Rwanda, which had supplied the personnel to train his new army. By expelling the Kinyarwanda/Kirundi-speaking people he was also getting rid of the Banyamulenge, who had provided the rank and file of his troops when he toppled Mobutu. By re-igniting the citizenship question that had been the trump card of the Bahunde and other tribes in Congo, Kabila raised alarm among the

Tutsis of Kivu leaving them no option but to rebel against him (Scherrer, 2002, p.252).

This provocation ultimately led to war and a new coalition to oust Kabila from power emerged. It was made up of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Banyamulenge soldiers, former Mobutu soldiers, civilian groups like the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD), and politicians from Mobutu's regime (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, pp.227-229). The coalition made rapid progress throughout the country and within a few months was holding large territories.

However, Kabila forged crucial links internally and externally which were able to sustain his regime. Internally, he allied with the Mai Mai, a militia which resented the Tutsis, the *interahamwe*, ex-FAR, ADF and anti-Burundi rebels FDD (Forces pour la Defense et de la Démocratie) (International Crisis Group, Report No. 2 17 November 1998, p.1). Internationally, Kabila got military support from Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad and Sudan, while Libya sent financial help (International Crisis Group, Report No. 2 17 November 1998, p.1). South African Development Community (SADC) members such as Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia intervened mainly due to the defence agreement between SADC members, though some like South Africa took a neutral stand (International Crisis Group, Report No. 2 17 November 1998, pp.20–24). The injection of Zimbabwean, Angolan, Namibian and Chadian troops halted the advance of the anti-Kabila forces leading to a stalemate, which resulted in negotiations in Lusaka, Zambia. These negotiations resulted into the signing of the Lusaka Peace Accord on 10 July 1999 (Scherrer, 2002, p.253).

### **The Lusaka peace agreement**

Moves to end the conflict were numerous but mostly unsuccessful. This was mainly due to Kabila's reticence to consider numerous suggestions both by regional and international leaders. Coupled with that was the fact that most of the peace negotiations excluded certain parties and therefore were not universally accepted by all the parties in the conflict. The Paris accord, signed under the auspices of France and the UN in November 1998, was belittled and denied by Kabila and other states that had been involved in the conflict.

The peace conference, which was called by Kofi Annan and French President Jacques Chirac, was seen as a states-only affair. The exclusion of rebel groups affected its credibility and it was not implemented. The Organisation of the African Unity conference in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, held under the chairmanship of President Blaise Compaore in December 1998, never made progress as far as the DR Congo conflict was concerned. Talks hit a snag when Uganda and Zimbabwe could not agree to a mechanism that would enable the signing of a truce (Scherrer, 2002, pp.275-276).

Libyan leader Colonel Gaddafi successfully hammered out a peace deal, which came to be known as the Syrte Peace agreement on 18 April 1999. However, it did not have legitimacy, as Rwanda and the RCD rebels were excluded. Also, Gaddafi's role as an honest peace broker was in question, as he was known to have bankrolled the Chadian forces that had been defeated earlier on in the conflict.

The Lusaka Peace Accord of July 1999, borne from SADC negotiations, called for:

‘Immediate cessation of hostilities; establishment of a joint military commission composed of the belligerent parties to investigate ceasefire violation, to work out mechanisms to disarm the identified militias, and monitor the withdrawal of foreign troops according to an established calendar; the deployment of a UN chapter 7 force tasked with disarming the armed groups, collecting weapons from civilians and providing humanitarian assistance and protection to the displaced persons and refugees; and the initiating of a Congolese National Dialogue intended to lead to a new political dispensation in DRC’ (International Crisis Group, Report No. 5 20 August 1999, p.i).

The leaders of DR Congo, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda and Uganda signed the peace accord on 11 July 1999. Burundi was not party to the agreement, though it did not deny having troops in DR Congo, but had its own view on the nature of their involvement. Sudan, too, did not sign it as it denied its troops were involved in the conflict. Uganda and Rwanda were instructed to get the rebel groups to sign the treaty and this did not happen until 1 August 1999 when Mouvement de Libération



Congolese (MLC) signed the treaty under pressure from Uganda. The RCD factions signed on 31 August 1999.

However, this was only possible after fighting between Uganda and Rwanda. The two allies turned on each other from 14 to 17 August after relations between them became strained. The RCD rebel factions had been split by infighting — rebel leader Wamba dia wamba was ousted but refused to step down and relocated to Kisangani and formed RCD-Kisangani under the backing of Uganda. The other RCD faction remained in Goma, hence the name RCD-Goma. Both factions demanded exclusive rights to sign the peace accord and having not got their way engaged in strategies to buy time (International Crisis Group, Report No. 5 20 August 1999, p.i).

The former president of Botswana Ketumire Masire was named as the facilitator for the Inter-Congolese dialogue, but he could not start his work, as the office was not set up. So he missed the deadline of October 1999. He arrived in Kinshasa in February 2000 and the first meeting did not take place until June 2000 in Cotonou, Benin. It was boycotted by Kabila who was very hostile to Masire and hamstrung all moves to have the dialogue started (Scherrer, 2002, p.282).

As the Inter-Congolese dialogue came to a halt, fighting also went on unabated. Towns were won and lost by both the government and its allies and the rebels and their allies. So the Lusaka peace accord looked hollow (International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 26, 20 December 2000, pp.3–8). Uganda and Rwanda's alliance crumbled in 2000 as they fought for the control of diamond-rich Kisangani. This was at the cost of hundreds of lives, destruction of infrastructure and the loss of international credibility by both countries (International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 26, 20 December 2000, pp.9–10).

As the war entered a stalemate, the Ugandan and Rwandese army and politicians became involved in business and exploited the mineral resources of the country. There was a reported increase in gold exports by Uganda despite the lack of increased domestic production (International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 26, 20 December 2000, pp.31–32). Meanwhile, Ugandan troops were also accused of fuelling ethnic conflict between the Hema and Lendu in Ituri. The Hema was a

pastoral group who had cultural links to the Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi, as well as the Hima and the Banyoro of Western Uganda (International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 26, 20 December 2000, pp.32–33). The Lendu were related to the Kakwa, Lugbara and Alur in the West Nile region of Uganda.

Having been favoured by the Belgians, the Hema had amassed large pieces of land, leaving the Lendu on the fringes. However, the two tribes co-existed peacefully until the rich Hema tried to grab the remaining land from the Lendu in the ensuing chaos of Mobutu's crumbling regime. Fighting broke out and thousands perished. The Ugandan forces sided with the Hema and armed them further, making themselves targets of the Lendu (International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 26, 20 December 2000, pp.32–33).

The peace process was given a fresh lease of life when Kabila was assassinated on 16 January 2001 (International Crisis Group, Report No. 27, 16 March 2001, p.1). He was replaced by his 29-year-old son Joseph Kabila, who moved quickly to assure the international community and the regional states that he was committed to the Lusaka Peace Accord and was willing to pursue the peace process. As noted by the International Crisis Group:

‘Leaders in the U.S., Europe and the United Nations immediately recognised the new president in order to give him the confidence to break from the policies of his father and implement the terms of the Lusaka ceasefire. In turn, Joseph Kabila ... welcomed a quick deployment of MONUC, the UN military observer mission for the Congo’ (International Crisis Group, Report No. 27, 16 March 2001, p.1).

### **The UN Military Observer Mission for the Congo (MONUC)**

Although the Lusaka Peace Accord called for the UN to deploy a peacekeeping mission, it took a while before any troops were on the ground. The reasons were highlighted in the Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council on 15 July 1999 which hailed the Lusaka Peace Accord and called for the formation of a peacekeeping mission to DR Congo. However, he warned that it was going to be large, expensive and the deployment process was going to be slow (Report of the UN Secretary-General S/1999/790, 15 July 1999, pp.1–4). He attributed this to a number

of factors — the country was big, the infrastructure had been degraded, some aspects of the conflict had been intractable, there was a high level of mutual suspicion, internally displaced people, militias and the intensity of the conflict (Report of the UN Secretary-General S/1999/790, 15 July 1999, p.4).

Even though the Secretary-General noted the fact that DR Congo was in a precarious situation, he still called for a piecemeal deployment of observers and military advisors in small numbers despite the country being so large (Report of the UN Secretary-General S/1999/790, 15 July 1999, pp.4-6). The Security Council agreed to the recommendations and authorised the deployment of 90 UN military liaison personnel together with civilian, political, humanitarian and administrative staff to the capitals of the states' signatories to the ceasefire agreement and headquarters of the Joint Military Commission for a period of three months (Security Council Resolution 1258, 1999, p.1). However according to the Secretary General's report S/1999/1116 (pp.3-4) issued in November 1999, protagonists in the conflict both had been slow in issuing security guarantees for the UN personnel. Where they had been issued they came with restrictions. Furthermore the technical survey team was unable to view the proposed deployment locations thereby leading to a delay in stationing of liaison officers on standby.

The Security Council also passed resolution 1279 (30 November p.2) stressing that in order to fully deploy the technical assessment team had to be allowed to complete its mission and also reiterated the need for 'firm guarantee,es from the parties to the conflict over the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel.' The Security Council further stipulated composition of MONUC would include 'a multidisciplinary staff of personnel in the fields of human rights, humanitarian affairs, public information, medical support, child protection, political affairs and administrative support, which will assist the Special Representative' (Security Council resolution 1279, 30 November p.2)

On 11 December 1999, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Kamel Morjan, from Tunisia took office in Kinshasa, which was five months after the Lusaka Peace Accord. The Security Council (resolution 1279, p.3) had decided that

the Special Representative along with the MONUC officials were to carry out certain roles which included:

- ‘(a) To establish contacts with the signatories to the Ceasefire Agreement at their headquarters levels, as well as in the capitals of the States signatories;
- (b) To liaise with the JMC and provide technical assistance in the implementation of its functions under the Ceasefire Agreement, including in the investigation of ceasefire violations;
- (c) To provide information on security conditions in all areas of its operation, with emphasis on local conditions affecting future decisions on the introduction of United Nations personnel;
- (d) To plan for the observation of the ceasefire and disengagement of forces;
- (e) To maintain liaison with all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to displaced persons, refugees, children, and other affected persons, and assist in the protection of human rights including the rights of children.’

Although the UN was slow in setting up a peacekeeping mission, the lack of cooperation from Laurent Kabila further slowed the process down. For instance, the UN personnel sanctioned by the Security Council were denied freedom of movement until the intervention of the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the peace process in DR Congo, Moustapha Niasse, between 3 and 10 November 1999 (Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2000/30, 17 January 2000, p.4).

The Secretary-General deployed two military liaison officers at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to improve relations with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), later the African Union (Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2000/30, 17 January 2000, pp.4–5). But the deployment of peacekeepers still seemed to be a thorny issue as the UN was concerned about their safety. In his report of January 2000, the Secretary-General sounded afraid of the precarious situation DR Congo was in. He gave conditions; such as the UN could only escort humanitarian assistance convoys within its means and if favourable security conditions were met (Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2000/30, 17 January 2000, pp.13–15). To make matters worse,

fighting continued even after the Lusaka Peace Accord was signed, and the UN was uneasy about a quick deployment of forces without a peace to keep.

However the Security Council (S/RES/1291, 2000, p.3) determined that the situation in DR Congo was a threat to both regional and international peace. The Security Council went further to increase MONUC military personnel to 5,537 including 500 observers and reiterated that:

‘acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located JMC personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’ (S/RES/1291, 2000, p.5).

MONUC developed a good working relationship with the Joint Military Commission (JMC) but found it hard to deal with Kabila. The Secretary-General had to send in his Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping to negotiate access to key towns like Mbandaka, Matadi, Mbuji Mayi and Kananga. Although Kabila agreed, he later went back on his word as soon as the Under-Secretary had left. He later grudgingly granted MONUC access (Second Report of the Secretary-General S/2000/330, 18 April 2000, pp.1–3).

With this lack of co-operation and the continued fighting, the projected force of 5,537 could not be deployed early enough. Instead, however, a total of 111 military officers were deployed within DR Congo and the capitals of the belligerent states (Second Report of the Secretary-General S/2000/330, 18 April 2000, pp.2–3).

By mid-June 2000, only 228 MONUC peacekeepers had been deployed in DR Congo. The reason can be attributed to the fighting between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani. MONUC had wanted to deploy in Kisangani because it was relatively secure. However, the alliance dissolved when they began fighting and the UN’s plans went up in smoke (Third Report of the Secretary-General S/2000/566, 12 June 2000, pp.2–3). Agreements signed between MONUC and the belligerent states and

rebels did not seem to hold. MONUC also still faced limited freedom of movement from both the rebels and Kabila's side (Third Report of the Secretary-General S/2000/566, 12 June 2000, pp.1–5).


The visit of the Security Council Mission between 4 and 8 May 2000 never achieved much as Kabila continued to frustrate MONUC activities. The Security Council called for a phased withdrawal of Uganda and Rwanda and noted with concern the illegal exploitation of Congo's assets (Security Council Resolution 1304 (2000), pp.1–3). The Security Council extended the mandate of MONUC to 15 October 2000, but was increasingly worried about the continued obstacles to full MONUC deployment by the DR Congo government and rebel forces (Security Council Resolution 1316 (2000), pp.1–2). Kabila's view was that MONUC should deploy in rebel areas to escort the foreign armies out of DR Congo.

When informed of the impending deployment of armed MONUC units, Kabila said that he could not entertain another army in the country. At the same time he was blaming the UN for not protecting the citizens. MONUC succeeded in monitoring Uganda's withdrawal of five battalions of its army on 22 June 2000 and Rwanda withdrew 1,000 troops on 8 August 2000 (Fourth Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2000/888, 21 September 2000, p.5).

Fig. 3

**Approximate Deployment of Armed Groups in DRC**

Source: IRIN-CEA, 28 March 2000



The peace process was given a new lease of life when the Security Council extended the MONUC mandate to 15 December 2000 (Security Council Resolution 1323 (2000), p.1). But the lives of the unarmed MONUC observers were in danger with the continued fighting, especially in Kisangani where they were caught in the middle of a gun battle between Uganda and Rwanda. Also, rebels from MLC headed by Bemba shot at a MONUC plane, injuring personnel and damaging the plane (Fifth Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2000/1156, 6 December 2000, p.8).

By the end of the year, MONUC had the following personnel deployed: '224 liaison officers and military observers...In Democratic Republic of Congo, in addition to Kinshasa, teams of military liaison officers ...deployed to the headquarters of rebel movements (at Bunia, Gbadolite and Goma) and the four regional joint military commissions (at Boende, Kabalo, Kabinda, Kindu, Kisangani and Mbandaka).

Twenty-three liaison officers...stationed in the capitals of surrounding countries' (Fifth Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2000/1156, 6 December 2000, p.7).

The Security Council extended the MONUC mandate to 15 June 2000, and gave full backing to the Secretary-General for the intended desire to deploy MONUC units (Security Council Resolution 1332 (2000), pp.1–3). The assassination of Laurent Kabila on 16 January 2001 proved to be a turning point as far as the deployment of MONUC peacekeepers was concerned. Kabila's son, Joseph, distanced himself from his father's negative policy against the UN and the Lusaka Peace Accord. Joseph Kabila gave reassurance to the Special Representative of the Secretary General Kamel Morjan that he was eager to have the UN quickly deployed to carry out its roles. He visited the Secretary-General in New York on 1 February 2001 and gave his support to MONUC's deployment in government territory (Sixth Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2001/128, 12 February 2001, p.2).

Even with the optimism that followed the death of Laurent Kabila, the war continued on both an inter-state and inter-tribal basis. Three rebel groups merged to form the Front de libération du Congo (FLC) on 17 January 2001. These were the Mouvement pour la libération du Congo (MLC), the Rassemblement Congolais pour la démocratie-Mouvement (RCD-ML) and RCD-National (RCD-N) (Sixth Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2001/128, 12 February 2001, pp.2–3).

As territories changed hands between rebels and government troops, MONUC continued to be hamstrung by conflicting demands. For instance, Rwanda had negotiated with the MONUC force commander General Mountaga Diallo about deploying an observer force in Pweto, a town that had just been captured from the Zimbabwean forces only for the RCD to refuse, citing the fact that Rwandan issues or statements were separate from theirs (Sixth Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2001/128, 12 February 2001, p.4).

By February 2001, MONUC personnel had been reduced to 200, but it still had managed to open up logistic bases to help with the deploying of observers and troops in Kinshasa, Goma and Bangui in the Central African Republic (Sixth Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2001/128, 12 February 2001, p.6). MONUC had also



signed agreements (Status of the Force) with all the belligerents in the conflict, but the DR Congo government had not lifted the flight notification by MONUC on a case-by-case basis and MONUC was preparing for the deployment of armed units (Sixth Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2001/128, 12 February 2001, p.6). The Security Council welcomed Joseph Kabila with open arms and even set 15 May 2001 as the day 'for the immediate implementation of prioritized plans for disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation or resettlement of all armed groups.' (Security Council Resolution 1341, 2001, p.3).

The Ugandan and Rwandese forces began withdrawing from DR Congo in sizeable numbers under the watchful eye of MONUC (Seventh Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2001/373, 17 April 2001, p.4). The Zimbabweans gave notice of their willingness to reduce the size of their troops by 5,000.

By mid-April 2001, MONUC had a total of 288 liaison officers deployed in the initially mentioned towns. However, Lisala was also added. Some military observers were stationed in Dubie, Gemene, Ikela, Isiro, Kalemie, Kananga, Kindu, Kisangani, Mbandaka, Pepa and Pweto and at Nchelenge in Northern Zambia. MONUC also formed 29 military observers to verify the disengagement of forces. Guard units from Uruguay arrived on 29 March 2001 and were stationed at Kalemie. Another unit of Senegalese was stationed at Kananga on 4 April 2001.

More Senegalese and Moroccan units were expected and were to be deployed at Mbandaka, Kisangani and Goma (Seventh Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2001/373, 17 April 2001, p.7). The success of this deployment, which came to be known as phase II, opened the way for phase III, which called for larger forces and a different mandate. In the meantime, MONUC did not have the means to protect the civilians (Seventh Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2001/373, 17 April 2001, p.14). Therefore, as the foreign troops left there was a need to fill the vacuum and the UN needed to act quickly.

On 8 June 2001, MONUC increased its presence to 2,366 military personnel, plus 497 liaison officers and military observers in DR Congo. MONUC deployed observers at the headquarters of rebel movements in Goma, Gbadolite and Bunia,

plus 24 liaison officers placed in the capitals of neighbouring states. Seventeen officers were appointed as planning support to the Joint Military Commission and military observers were placed in locations (as previously noted), but increased to 22. The new locations were Basankusa, Befale, Boende, Bolomba, Kabalo, Kabinda, Kananga, Lisala, Makanza and Manano (Eighth Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2001/572, 8 June 2001, pp.3–4). MONUC was experiencing few hardships from the government now that Laurent Kabila was no longer alive. However, opposition came from rebel-controlled territory, whereby the RCD and FLC rebel groups were testing the patience of the UN with blockages and delays (Eighth Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2001/572, 8 June 2001, p.5).

MONUC was making progress with the verification process and disengagement of forces launched on 17 April 2001. From 23 May to 1 June, MONUC observers were on the ground to witness Uganda's withdrawal of soldiers from Isiro and Gemena (Eighth Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2001/572, 8 June 2001, pp.5–6). In the process, Zimbabwe withdrew two units and sent them back home. As foreign forces rapidly withdrew, MONUC faced the possibility of having a power vacuum; moreover, the UN was in a hurry to launch the disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, repatriation or resettlement of armed groups, as stipulated in the Lusaka Peace Accord.

The withdrawal of foreign forces led to an influx of 'negative forces'; these were the groups named in the Lusaka peace agreement that were to be disarmed. They included the *interahamwe*, ex-FAR and Burundian rebel groups. They came back to Eastern Congo well armed, having been used as part of Laurent Kabila's army. These forces began destabilising Burundi and many people left Burundi to join them (Scherrer, 2002, pp.312–313).

The Political Committee of the Joint Military Commission made plans for disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, repatriation and rehabilitation (DDRRR) and called for the UN to provide a force under chapter VII of the charter to carry out this process. The Security Council responded by passing Resolution 1355 which stated that it took note of the:

‘plans drafted by the Political Committee (S/2001/521/Add.1) for the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and for the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration (DDRR) of all armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and *calls on* the parties to finalize these plans and to implement them as a matter of urgency’ (Security Council Resolution 1355 (2001), p.1).

The fear was that without MONUC having the capacity to operate under chapter VII of the UN charter DDRRR would be catastrophic, as Joseph Kabila had a weak army and, as mentioned above, was assisted by negative forces. Therefore, the country would just implode and fighting would resume (International Crisis Group; Africa Briefing: 12 June 2001, p.4).

MONUC completed the verification and disengagement process by October 2001. Uganda had all but withdrawn its forces, with just a battalion in Bunia and a few units in Gbadolite. The Zimbabweans had withdrawn three battalions and the Namibians kept a small presence in DR Congo. Angola declared it was prepared to leave and Rwanda was withdrawing slowly but surely (Ninth Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2001/970, 16 October 2001, pp.4–5). By October, MONUC neither had the mandate nor the means to initiate DDRRR, so it had to rely on UN aid agencies and non-government organisations for support (Ninth Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2001/970, 16 October 2001, p.10).

Nevertheless, the Security Council supported the Secretary General’s call for initiation of phase III for MONUC, especially in Kindu and Kisangani (Security Council Resolution 1376 S/RES/1376 (2001), 9 November 2001, p.2).

By February 2002, the small MONUC contingent was still unable to stop any ceasefire violations, especially in the North-east of DR Congo. Yet the Secretary-General was sure that the administrative and logistical structures were in place for phase III to start. The demobilisation of 3,000 ‘Rwandese soldiers’ by the government in September 2001 heralded the start of DDRRR. This, however, presented its own problems for MONUC, as the arms the combatants were supposed to have been using were not in sight and they could not be properly screened as all of

them refused to pass on information about themselves (Tenth Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2002/169, 15 February 2002, pp.10–11).

MONUC further received 1,000 weapons, mainly light arms, from Kamina but was unsuccessful in getting access to the combatants. Therefore, soldiers could still be armed again (Eleventh Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2002/621, 5 June 2002, p.5).

The failures highlighted a lack of will from the UN to give MONUC the peacekeepers to enforce the DDRRR process. Although teams were dispatched to set up DDRRR centres in Masisi, Walikale, Shabunda, Goma and Bukavu, the lack of security guarantee meant that the teams only visited Goma and Bukavu. MONUC also failed to effectively sensitise the targeted soldiers with the confidence-building measures it had in place.

MONUC began training civilian police in Kisangani as a means of building institutions to cater for the security of the population (Eleventh Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2002/621, 5 June 2002, p.6). With the DDRRR process stalling, the Security Council called on member states to support the increment of troops to 5,537 and gave MONUC a slightly stronger mandate, which called for the protection of civilians facing imminent danger (Security Council Resolution 1417 (2002), pp.3–4).

The peace process further progressed through inter-Congolese dialogue, which was held in Sun City, South Africa, when Kabila signed a pact with Bemba of MLC in summer 2002. The two announced the formation of a government. This further isolated the RCD-Goma rebel groups supported by Rwanda. This helped ease the conflict, as Bemba had a large piece of territory. So the agreement unified a large section of the country and that left the East of the country still in turmoil (International Crisis Group; Africa Report No. 44, 14 May 2002, p.6). Nevertheless, fighting continued and opposition to MONUC by RCD rebels led to soldiers being attacked and their vehicles burnt (Twelfth Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2002/1180, 18 October 2002, p.6).

The continued withdrawal of foreign troops reached a climax in September 2002 when Uganda signed a bilateral treaty with DR Congo for the withdrawal of troops and normalisation of relations between the two states. The treaty was signed under the auspices of the Angolan head of state, who signed the treaty as a witness (Special Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2002/1005, 10 September 2002, p.3). Uganda was to withdraw its troops from Gbadolite, Beni and Bunia. However, there was a need for the establishment of a stabilisation force in Bunia, especially due to the fact that the Hema and Lendu were fighting each other. In face of the impending withdrawal of foreign troops, the Secretary-General asked for an increase of troops to 8,700 in order to increase the capacity for MONUC to fill the void (Special Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2002/1005, 10 September 2002, p.6).

The inter-Congolese dialogue gave birth to the formation of a government of national unity that was to last 24 months. Kabila was to remain the Head of State and supreme commander of the armed forces. He was to be deputised by four vice-presidents. The vice-presidents would be in charge of government commissions each made up of ministers and deputy ministers. Political and financial commissions were to be headed by RCD-Goma and MLC respectively, while the reconstruction and development commission was to be headed by the government. The political opposition was assigned to head the social and cultural commission (Thirteenth Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2003/211, 21 February 2003, p.1).

However, events were about to take a bad turn for MONUC, especially as the pace at which foreign armies were being withdrawn quickened. The security void left in regions like Ituri by the Ugandans was not adequately filled, leaving the UN with a need to get quick assistance from the European Union.

#### **4. The European Union led Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in Bunia**

The fact that MONUC was underfunded and also had few people on the ground slowed down the DDRRR process and its deployment in volatile places. It also could not train the civilian police in all major towns early enough to take over

responsibilities for safeguarding the community. By January 2003, MONUC had only trained 161 civilian police officers in Kisangani alone (Thirteenth Report of the UN Secretary-General S/2003/211, 21 February 2003, p.8). So other cities and towns like Kinshasa, Beni and Mbandaka had to rely on the occupying army.

On 6 March 2003, Ugandan troops began the last phase of withdrawing from Bunia as per the Luanda agreement. They were to be replaced by 840 Uruguayan peacekeepers that were only accustomed to the slow life of guard duty and were not psychologically prepared for the mayhem they were thrust into as the Hema and Lendu killed each other with impunity. The first contingent of 101 Uruguayans arrived on 23 April 2003, and Colonel Fonts assured Brigadier Kale Kayihura, who was leading the Ugandan troops, that it would take a month for all the 840 peacekeepers and 32 armoured personnel carriers to arrive (Block and Freeman, 1 Oct 2003, p.2).

The slow deployment did not afford MONUC troops enough time to prepare adequately, which made the situation worse. The peacekeepers were therefore totally helpless when the fighting started after the departure of the last Ugandan soldier. The Lendus took the town of Bunia; killing all Hemas they could find and putting to flight 250,000 people (Astill, *The Guardian*, 23 May 2003, p.1). The situation arose mainly because no country wanted to contribute troops for this mission, which meant relying on the Uruguayan troops who were traumatised by the whole experience. They were unable to stop the carnage as they were unauthorised to intervene (Astill, *The Guardian*, 23 May 2003, p.1). They ended up hiding in their well-protected bases as hundreds were slaughtered.

As the town changed hands now and again, with the massacres at an unprecedented level, the Secretary general of the UN called on the Security Council to put into place measures to stop the situation from deteriorating as it had harrowing similarities to the failures of the UN in Rwanda in 1994 (Koops, 2011, p.318). Between 28<sup>th</sup> April and 8<sup>th</sup> May 2011 the EU Council Secretariat circulated and accepted a draft resolution common position respectively calling on the combatants to surrender and reiterated the EU's support for the UN (Koops 2011, p.319). The UN first requested the US to intervene but this was unsuccessful and turned to France between 11<sup>th</sup> and

12<sup>th</sup> May 2003. French president Chirac agreed to the request. As the French were planning for the mission that had been code named operation Mamba, 'Annan contacted Solana for a possible EU-wide mission... Chirac also pushed for a multilateralization, and indeed Europeanization of the mission' (Koops 2011, p.319).

On Mr. Javier Solana's<sup>15</sup> recommendation team was sent into Bunia on 20<sup>th</sup> May 2003 to assess the feasibility of the mission this led to endorsement by the British which was followed by a hesitant Germany later in May 2003 (Koops 2011, p.320). 'Hence, at the EU-internal *national level*, the foundations were laid for *Europeanizing* mission 'Mamba' into the EU Mission *Artemis*' (Koops 2011, p.320) This was legalised by the UN Security Council through resolution 1484 calling for:


'The deployment until 1 September 2003 of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia in close coordination with MONUC, ... to contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, ... the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and... to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town' (Security Council Resolution 1484 (2003) p.1).

The deployment of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force was on an impermanent basis with the aim of allowing the Secretary-General to strengthen MONUC's presence in Bunia. The Secretary-General was permitted to deploy, within the generally approved MONUC ceiling. A reinforced UN presence to Bunia was to be in place by mid-August 2003 (Security Council Resolution 1484 (2003) p.2).

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<sup>15</sup> He was the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

**Figure 3: MONUC deployment by June 2003 (UN Department of Public Information)**



Mr. Javier Solana met the ambassadors of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) with whom he agreed a joint action plan that established the principles of launching the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (S0123/03 'Remarks by Solana Javier' EU, 4 June 2003, p.1). On Solana's recommendation an assessment team was sent into Bunia

The joint action plan was submitted for approval to the European Council (ibid, p.1). The key objectives of the proposed EU-led force were to improve the humanitarian situation and stabilisation of the security condition in Bunia. The force was also to ensure protection for the displaced people in camps in Bunia and, if the



circumstances necessitated, to help with to the safety of the local population, MONUC personnel and humanitarian agencies in Bunia (ibid, p.2).

On 5 June 2003, the European Council adopted the joint action plan and authorised the launching of the International Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF). The IEMF was to stabilise the region as MONUC reinforcements were being put in place. It was also to give momentum to progressing EU and UN endeavours to shore up the DR Congo peace process (ibid, p.2). The EU Special Envoy to the Great Lakes, Aldo Ajello, was sent to meet leaders of the states in the Great Lakes region on behalf of Solana (ibid, p.3).

The IEMF operation was to be carried out in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1484 and France was to act as the Framework Nation for the operation<sup>16</sup> (Bono, 2005 p.21). Major General Neveux was appointed the EU operations commander (9957/03 (Presse156), 5 June 2003, p.1). The operational headquarters were to be located in Paris and were to include members from the General Secretariat of the EU Council and officers from several participating states (ibid, p.1).

The EU Council set about adopting the operation plan and tasked the Political and Security Committee (PSC) with the duty of exercising, under the responsibility of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the operation ((ibid, p.1). On 12 June 2003, the EU Council adopted a decision to launch Operation Artemis. By its decision the EU Council approved the Operation Plan and authorised Major General Neveux to release the activation order (ACTORD) in order to carry out the deployment of forces and begin implementing the mission (S0131/03, 12 June 2003, p.1).

Other stipulations were that the European Union Military Committee was tasked with ensuring the appropriate implementation 'of the military operation conducted under the responsibility of the Operation Commander' (Koops 2011, p.325) who

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<sup>16</sup> The Framework Nation concept was agreed by the EU on 24 July 2002. It allows a member state to put at the disposal of the EU Council its command and control facilities necessary for the planning launch and conduct of a military operation (Bono, 2005 p.21)

reported 'directly to the Chairman of the EUMC, who in turn reported to the PSC. This ensured an integrated chain of command with the PSC in charge at the political and strategic level, contributing to further 'joint experiences' and integrative lessons learned at the ESDP organisational level' Koops, 2011, p.325).

Troop contributing countries included: 'France (1679), United Kingdom (115), Sweden (75), Belgium (60), Canada (52), Brazil (41), South Africa (22), Germany (05), Greece (05) Austria (02), Ireland (02), Portugal (02)' (Koops 2011, p.320). The first contingent of 100 French troops landed in Bunia on 6 June 2003 (Astill, *The Guardian*, Manchester, June 7, 2003, p.18).

Engineers to carry out maintenance of the airfield for the movement of personnel and equipment followed these shortly (UNDPKO peacekeeping, Best Practices October 2004, p.12). Apart from Bunia, IEMF set up headquarters in Entebbe, Uganda, which hosted less than half the troops. The IEMF also had headquarters in N'djamena; the Central African Republic was the base for French air assets like Mirage fighters (although some were also located at Entebbe) used for close air support, reconnaissance and surveillance (UNDPKO peacekeeping Best Practices, *ibid*, p.12). The whole IEMF was in place almost a fortnight later.

## **5. Early signs of conflict and cooperation between the EU and UN**

The French assessment team that was sent to DR Congo on 20 May 2003 prior to the launch of the IEMF mission managed to establish contact with MONUC in Kinshasa but did not sustain it when the team went to Bunia. So the team departed from DR Congo without back-briefing MONUC in Kinshasa (UNDPKO peacekeeping Best Practices, *ibid*, p.11). Following the initial contact between MONUC and the French assessment team, 'there was no further direct communication between what would become the operational headquarters of the IEMF and MONUC during the pre-deployment period...there was no direct MONUC or other UN involvement in the planning of IEMF operations' (UNDPKO peacekeeping Best Practices, *ibid*, p.11).

The IEMF kept its pre-landing plans from MONUC, which created the potential risk for incidents, as there was not much information pertaining to the movement of MONUC and IEMF troops in Bunia (ibid, p.11).

Even with the IEMF refusing to fully cooperate with MONUC, there were signs of cooperation from the side of MONUC. MONUC facilitated the deployment of the IEMF from the time the first contingent of IEMF troops arrived. Although it was overstretched in Bunia, MONUC provided security on the ground, predominantly at the airport and along the major roads. MONUC also ensured that the notoriously difficult runway was functioning (ibid, p.12).

## **Conclusion**

The outbreak of the second war less than 18 months after the first one was mainly due to the fact that the underlying causes of the first conflict had not been dealt with. Rebels were using DR Congo to destabilise Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. The quick victory that was hoped for did not materialise as the Zimbabweans, Angolan and Namibians intervened on Kabila's side. However, the subsequent treaties and diplomatic intervention by both regional and international powers assured Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi of their security. With the UN dragging its feet as the invading countries fulfilled their commitment to withdraw, DR Congo began falling into inter-tribal war, as the power vacuum left by the withdrawing nations was not adequately fulfilled by the UN. The conscription of the EU in Bunia marked a turning point in stemming the inter-tribal wars, especially Bunia, but the question was what would happen if they left? Or if they remained or came back at some point, would they work well with MONUC?

## **Chapter 5:**

### **Political cooperation between the EU and UN**

For the EU and UN cooperation to be conclusively examined, the political dimension of the relationship cannot be ignored. In order for the operational cooperation to be effective or to even commence, a political cooperation mechanism has to be in place to give guidance to the operations. Political cooperation involves the formation of dialogue structures to facilitate the cooperation. Furthermore, Abu-Alam (2005 p.3) contends that 'political agreement... is needed to forge the necessary legal framework' to foster the cooperation. This may involve declarations of cooperation or memorandums of understanding. This sets in motion the channels and modes of communication between the organisations.

Political cooperation between international organisations is significant in many ways. Smooth political cooperation helps the organisations to synchronise their activities in the field, for example there is a need to understand the division of labour, especially once field operations start. Besides which, it is important to set out the parameters of the roles to be played by each organisation.

Political cooperation will be discussed in four categories.

1. Political cooperation at the decision-making level.
2. Institutions and practice of political cooperation at the highest level.
3. Organisation of political cooperation in DR Congo.
4. The institutions and practice of political cooperation in DR Congo.

### **1. Political cooperation at the decision-making level**

Tardy (2005, p.54) argues that the EU-UN collaboration was enhanced in 2000 when the ESDP report to the Nice European Council was released. The report brought to the fore the importance of cooperation between the EU and UN at a moment when the EU crisis management and conflict prevention capabilities were in an embryonic stage. The report recognised that the efforts to cultivate the collaboration will help the EU respond more ably to requests from organisations like the UN.

Since then, the EU and UN have been in constant dialogue over cooperation in peacekeeping and the desire to work closely together was engineered by the French presidency of the General Assembly in 2000. The Secretary-General (Kofi Annan) was invited to meet EU institutions, an action he accomplished immediately. The EU then called on member states to explore cooperation with the UN in crisis management in December 2000 at the Nice European Council (Kronenberger and Wouters, 2004, p.387).

This was followed by the drawing of concrete plans for cooperation by the EU General Affairs Council in June 2001. The draft conclusions affirmed the need for cooperation in conflict resolutions in areas like Bosnia and Africa. This document also emphasised the need for the UN to benefit from the ever-improving EU military capability to enhance its training capabilities, information exchange and coordination in the field (Wouters et al., 2006, p.243).

Wouters et al. (ibid, p.243) contend that the need for enhancement in the communication from biennial high-level meetings between the Secretary-General

and representatives of EU and other regional organisations was highlighted. By October 2001, the Secretary-General was having informal meetings with the European Union High Representative.<sup>17</sup> The UN Deputy Secretary-General and the Under-Secretary-General were to have meetings with the EU Commissioners for External Relations and Political and Security Committee. These meetings would also continue at other levels, such as the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO). Contact was also to be established between the EU Council Secretariat and Commission Services on the one hand and the UN Secretariat on the other (Kronenberger and Wouters, 2004 p.388). The two organisations intensified the information exchange, particularly the desk-to-desk dialogue (Wouters et al, 2006, p.243).

The Greek Presidency report of 18 June 2003 on conflict prevention highlighted the fact that contact had been established at working level between the UN and EU framework teams based both on the UN Department for Political Affairs and the EU Commission coordinating 'early warning and preventive action, a structure associating all relevant UN agencies and departments and dealing with situation analysis in a conflict prevention perspective' (Kronenberger and Wouters, 2004, p.362).

Thereafter, the EU and the UN issued a joint declaration to cement the relationship. This had developed after the successful handover of the UN to the EU police force on 1 January 2003 in Bosnia and the completion of Operation Artemis. This declaration recognised the leadership of the UN in matters pertaining to maintenance of international peace, but at the same time reiterated the EU's support for the UN in the maintenance of international peace.

The EU and UN established 'a joint consultative mechanism at the working level. This was to examine ways and means to enhance mutual co-ordination and compatibility.' (EU-UN joint declaration, 2003, p.2) The areas to be covered by mutual co-ordination and compatibility included planning, training, communication and best practices (EU-UN joint declaration, 2003, p.2).

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<sup>17</sup> (Yet according to Wouters et al 2006 (p.243) this cooperation remained symbolic at the start of 2003).

Planning was to involve mutual assistance in assessing missions ‘and greater contact and co-operation between mission planning units, specifically with regard to logistical resource allocation and inventory as well as interoperability of equipment’ (EU-UN joint declaration, 2003, p.2 ).

The training was to involve ‘the establishment of joint training standards, procedures and planning for military and civilian personnel; the synchronisation of pre-deployment training for civilian police, military liaison officers and military observers; and the institutionalisation of training seminars, conferences and exercises’ (EU-UN joint declaration, 2003, p.2).

To enhance communication the EU and UN were to ensure ‘greater co-operation between situation centers; exchange of liaison officers whenever required (military, civilian police, situation center, political/headquarters officials); establishment of desk-to-desk dialogue through the respective liaison offices in New York and Brussels’ (EU-UN joint declaration, 2003, p.2)

Furthermore, best practices were to involve ‘the regularised and systematic exchange of lessons learned and best practices information, including sharing of information on mission hand-over and procurement’ (EU-UN joint declaration, 2003, p.2). The political cooperation at the decision-making level ultimately led to the practice of what had been put in place.

## **2. Institutions and practice of political cooperation at the highest level**

According to Source C, an EU official at the EU Council secretariat’s office to the UN (interviewed on 24/October/2008) who also deals directly with the UN-EU Steering Committee, the interaction between the EU and UN is done through member states and the president of the Commission. This is given credence by Biscop and Missiroli (2008, p.9), who contend that in the current era, ‘the EU as such does not have a formal status at the United Nations: only the European Community (EC) has one but as a simple observer. As a result, the Union does not have the legal competence or authority to act on behalf of its Member States — either in the General Assembly or, even more so, in the UNSC’.

Nevertheless, the EU and UN have a framework process, part of which is the strategic partnership according to Source C. This partnership involves organisations such as the United Nations Development Program cooperating with EU bodies.

Yet Biscop and Missiroli (2008, p.10) highlight the inability of the EU to get involved or influence proceedings in the UN Security Council (UNSC) discussion by noting that:

‘the majority of the negotiations on draft resolutions are conducted by the UNSC members in the caucusing sessions or in informal meetings outside of formal instances. As a result, although the Union has been increasingly visible in the formal UNSC meetings, the degree to which the EU is present and ‘tangible’ in actual proceedings depends on the extent to which the Member States sitting on the UNSC allow for this. When for instance Germany and Spain announced their intention to offer a seat to the EU Presidency within their delegation during their two-year stint on the UNSC (2003–04), they were blocked by France and the UK. Belgium and Italy, elected for the period 2007–08, have therefore adopted a much more pragmatic approach, aiming for incremental improvement in the EU presence.’

This ambivalence to EU presence in the UN Security Council by its own member states is borne out of the rigidity and detailed nature of EU participation in UN conferences, which has ended up leaving little room for negotiations by other players. This development, according to Biscop and Missiroli (*ibid*, p.12), ‘is very unpractical and also unacceptable for the EU Member States on the UNSC — and especially for Britain and France, who greatly value their position as permanent members (although France sometimes tries to obtain a fixed position from the PSC, notably in cases when the view of Paris may be different from London’s).’

Nevertheless, a conflict prevention dialogue was launched in 2003 between the EU and UN. It was tasked with putting together a committee at the regional level. It deals with exchange analysis, plans, situation, the same understanding of the situation and ways of cooperating. The EU invites colleagues to discuss the issues arising though it is for a limited number of countries and meets twice a year.



However, it can also meet any time from a pragmatic perspective. This dialogue has an average of one session a year and covers six countries.

## **2.1 Secretary-General level**

The Secretary-General and the General Assembly President meet with the EU officials at least four to five times a year. Apart from cooperation on peace and security, other issues like development are discussed. The EU commissioner meets with the Secretary-General and head of peacekeeping on a regular basis throughout the year. According to Source C, the EU and UN do not have a bureaucratic set-up in their communication. For instance, the Secretary-General of the UN's contact with the EU is not only limited to the heads like Barroso or Solana; he can also communicate with ambassadors, as was the case on 17 October 2008 when he addressed 27 EU ambassadors (Source E an EU official at the EU Council secretariat's office to the UN interviewed on 24<sup>th</sup> October 2008).

## **2.2 Steering Committee**

The Steering Committee is a joint consultative mechanism which was set up in 2003 after the conclusion of Operation Artemis in DR Congo. It was established at working level and at regular meetings between the EU and UN staff (Joint EU-UN Declaration in Crisis Management, 2004, p.4). Steering Committee meetings are held twice a year at both senior and official level. They comprise a conglomeration of officials from the EU Council and UN Secretariat and involve the UN Department of Peacekeeping and the Department of Political Affairs (Wouters et al., 2006, p.247). Subsequent meetings are usually chaired by the host. For example, if the meetings are held in New York they are chaired by the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping. The EU chairs the meetings held in Brussels (Source E)

Source E further states that the Steering Committee helps create a climate of confidence and understanding of the structures of cooperation set up between the EU and UN. The meetings remain at the strategic level and try to discuss ways to

improve the structures and cooperation in the long term. Nevertheless, exchange of information is not limited to the Steering Committee. The German EU Presidency of 2007 sought to bring cooperation closer and formalise the relationship. According to Source E, EU officials in Brussels and UN officials in New York are in dialogue on a daily basis.

Steering Committee meetings have resulted in the identification of a joint initiative in areas like disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (Wouters et al., 2006, pp.246–247). For instance, MONUC worked well with EU officials in DR Congo to see through the process of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants. The EU and UN are currently working together to restructure the way the army is run by separating the chain of payment from the chain of command. They are also working together to ensure the army, currently made up of government troops and ex-combatants, works as a unit and is disciplined (Source F, UN official in Rule of Law Unit MONUC interviewed on 7 March 2008).

In addition, it should be noted that the EU delegation at the UN in New York keeps the EU leadership in Brussels aware of UN proceedings. If the Secretary-General has trouble contacting Brussels, the EU delegation will be duly contacted. Likewise, if the EU wants to pass on information to the UN it can rely on its delegation in New York.

With the promulgation of the Lisbon Treaty, Council representation and liaison offices were set up in the Commission premises at the UN. These details came to fruition under the guidance of the German EU Presidency in early 2007. The aim was to sustain the rotational Presidency in managing EU policy in the UN at large. This, it was felt, was most likely to take up a growing importance as it was under the High Representative and would ensure a permanent link with the PSC chair in Brussels. In the end it would lead to the easing of and even reinforcing the ‘exchange of information and, arguably, the coordination between the two cities’ (Biscop and Missiroli, 2008 p.15).

### **2.3 Type of communication**

The communication between the EU and UN is not so formal, even though there are set meetings between the two organisations. Officials from both organisations utilise the opportunities that arise to discuss pressing matters.

### **2.4 Joint exercises between the EU and UN**

The EU and the Department of Peacekeeping, during operations like Artemis and EUFOR RD, cooperated with each other through common patrols, attendance at EU briefings by MONUC liaisons officers and the handover of points of control (Spokesperson for French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003).

It should be noted that the EU, in April 2005, organised a crisis management exercise (EST) focusing on EU-UN cooperation modalities. According to the EU, during an EU-UN operation on the ground, three scenarios were possible: a UN military operation taking over a UN one; an EU police operation replacing a UN one; and health and medical support for a UN operation (Wouters et al., 2006, p.247).

Other types of communication involve the exchange/education on how to plan a crisis management discussion between the EU and UN on upcoming missions. In addition, the EU has stationed a military liaison officer at DPKO at UN Headquarters in New York since November 2005 in order to enhance operational co-ordination and co-operation between the two organisations (EU Presidency Report 16/12/2005).

It should be noted that the Civilian Police Division of DPKO 'provides advisory and operational support to peacekeeping operations from Headquarters in New York by advising, providing technical guidance and supporting the police commissioners and SRSGs' (UNDPKO, Peacekeeping best practices unit, 2003 p.84). With the political cooperation mechanism set up at the decision-making level, it is vital to analyse if this translated into proper organisation of the political cooperation in the field. For this study, the organisation of political cooperation in DR Congo is examined.

### 3. Organisation of political cooperation in DR Congo

According to Source A, a UN official in the political affairs department (interviewed on 13<sup>th</sup> March 2008), MONUC organises meetings on a political level once a week for all embassies, including EU ones in DR Congo. This is mainly to deal with matters arising and to brief the aforementioned parties on UN activities. Coupled with that, the UN often meets with an EU informal contact group made up of France, the UK, Belgium and the EU Council's Secretariat General (Keukeleire, 2006, p.5).

This leads to an interpretation that cooperation in the field, even on a political level, is cumbersome, as there does not seem to be a special relationship between the UN and EU. However, this does not take anything away from the cooperation at the decision-making level at UN and EU headquarters.

Furthermore, the EU seems to be missing at the forefront of decision-making in the field due to the resolution to pursue its interests within the setting of the Security Council and not separately. This is attributed to the fact that the EU has strong representation in France and the UK. But even with this representation, France and the UK cannot be left to their own devices as they have competing interests that may hinder the expression of EU policy.

Hence this has led to the organisation of meetings between the three permanent members of the UN Security Council (France, the UK and the US) plus two others (Belgium and South Africa). The inclusion of Belgium is to ensure that the broader EU policy is articulated. However, Belgium also has a special attachment to DR Congo, as it was a former colonial master. South Africa is included as a major contributor of troops and equipment to the UN and as a key member of SADC (South Africa Development Community), to which DR Congo belongs.

The different EU states working in DR Congo pursue different interests, according to Source B, a UN official-based at Radio Okapi (interviewed on 6<sup>th</sup> March 2008). The different EU embassies are always in pursuit of different policies and this sometimes confuses MONUC officials. Furthermore, there is no proper chain of command and the embassies tend to be more vocal than the EU Commission in DR Congo. Britain has been accused of pursuing Commonwealth interests in the region other than addressing the actual humanitarian issues facing DR Congo. For instance, as the

French and Belgians were calling for military intervention during the outbreak of conflict in 2008 in Eastern Congo, Britain remained sceptical and was widely believed to have been so out of the need to reassure Rwanda, which was about to join the Commonwealth State (Campbell, *Reuters*, 17<sup>th</sup> November 2008).

EU states tend to be more vocal, especially in pursuit of their national interests. Even as the French and Belgians were calling for military intervention in Eastern DR Congo, when Nkunda led rebels against the government and the UN in 2008, Javier Solana, the chief EU High Representative, completely rejected it (*ibid*). In the end, diplomacy prevailed as the regional powers were drafted in and Nkunda was arrested by the Rwandan government (*BBC news*, 23 January 2009).

One of the consequences of such conflicting intentions by the key EU states is confusion; first within the EU itself, as the other states are caught between three parties pursuing different policies. This can cause a delay in the implementation of humanitarian initiatives, whether through diplomacy or military intervention. However, it should not be forgotten that there is a need for internal democracy to take root. Key institutions like the Council of the European Union are used to examine the viability of certain requests from organisations like the UN. Plus, the EU cannot favourably respond to all UN requests due to budget, political and logistical issues.

The lack of clear strategy and confused responses leave EU partners like the UN in limbo concerning the actual intentions of the EU. For instance, as France and Belgium were initially positively predisposed towards the mission, it had the effect of giving the UN false hope because the two have been prime movers in the EU's involvement in DR Congo. This also creates confusion about whether to listen to the EU High Representative, as he is supposed to speak for the EU or the individual EU nations. This inevitably leads to delays on the UN side as far as drafting contingency plans to deal with the conflict in whichever way the EU may decide to act.

Consequently, the mixed messages coming from the EU also confuse the different regional organisations like the African Union. Conflict normally leads to an influx of refugees into neighbouring states, causing security concerns. So in a situation like the one in 2008, regional powers like Rwanda and Uganda were worried as the

conflict was on their doorsteps. With MONUC unable to bring it under control and with the DR Congo army in disarray, these states faced a stark choice of whether to engage militarily, especially as the EU was dragging its feet, or wait and see if the EU would send forces.

It should be noted that the conflict of 2008 was different. This was not a disorganised militia wantonly killing but a highly organised unit believed to have backing from Rwanda. So the possibility of EU casualties was high in case a military force was deployed. Diplomacy was the only solution, as the Rwanda army was allowed into DR Congo to bring Nkunda into line. In the end, he was put under house arrest in Rwanda and his forces disbanded (*BBC news*, 23 January 2009).

Concerning the EU-UN cooperation, Source A further argues that, after the election of the DR Congo government, the EU member states do not see the need for closer cooperation with the UN as it is no longer in charge of the country. This is again attributed to the different states pursuing their national policies as they are given freedom by the EU. For example, the UN was opposed to the sacking of members of the judiciary by President Kabila in 2007 but it could not get a common position on the matter with the EU because member states seemed to be eager to please him.

This argument may not be entirely justified. This is because in 2007, the EU and UN signed a joint declaration highlighting further cooperation in crisis management. However, just like all organisations working together they are bound to disagree on certain policies.

Nevertheless, the EU and UN seem to be more in disagreement than in cooperation at the political level in the field. This does not seem to be the case at their different headquarters in Brussels and New York. Furthermore, the practice of political cooperation during the different EU missions will have to be discussed to get a broader picture on the EU-UN cooperation on the political level.

## **4. The institutions and practice of political cooperation in DR Congo**

### **4.1 Political cooperation during Operation Artemis**

During Operation Artemis the EU High Representative reported directly to the UN Security Council on the progress of the operation in the field (Spokesperson from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 16/9/2003). There was also a clear understanding between Javier Solana, the French government and Kofi Annan, 'that transforming a French operation into an EU operation did not cost one day, which is positive because one day could mean a massacre and it did not cost anything in terms of military efficiency' (Wouters et al., 2006, p.247).

Before the launch of Operation Artemis, a French assessment team was sent to Bunia on 20 May 2003. Although early contact was made with MONUC, this was not sustained as 'the French team returned home without back briefing MONUC in Kinshasa' (UNDPKO, Best Practices unit, 2004, p.11). This was attributed to the mistrust of the planners of Operation Artemis at the political level of UN ability to keep information. There was a fear that sharing the information and intelligence with the UN would jeopardise the mission (UNDPKO, Best Practices unit, *ibid*, p.11).

In addition, 'following that initial contact, there was no further direct communication between what would become the operational headquarters of the IMEF and MONUC during the pre-deployment period. In fact, there was no direct MONUC or other UN involvement in the planning of IMEF operation' (UNDPKO, Best Practices unit, *ibid*, p.11).

### **4.2 Political Cooperation during EUFOR RD Congo**

During the planning for the EUFOR RD Congo operation, 'there was frequent frustration over lack of formal coordination structures. Irritations arose over issues such as sharing documents' (Security and Defence Agenda, 2007, p.30). Yet the EU Council passed Declaration 2006/319/CFSP asking EU officials to give the UN access to classified and unclassified data in relation to the operation. The key obstacle was the stipulation that this information would be shared within the EU

guidelines. This emphasis was a contradiction that portrayed the Council directive as mere rhetoric because the EU does not like sharing information with the UN, as examined earlier.

Nevertheless, EUFOR RD Congo was launched with the sole purpose of backing the MONUC peacekeeping force in order to have a peaceful election. It should be noted that it was launched under a UN mandate adopted by the Security Council under resolution 1671 on 25 April 2006. The mandate authorised 'the temporary deployment of an EU force to support MONUC during the period encompassing the elections in the DR Congo. The military operation was conducted in ... in close coordination with ... MONUC' (EU external action consilium, 2006 accessed 6/7/11).

#### **4.3 Political cooperation during EUPOL Kinshasa**

During the transition period, all civilian policing activities in DR Congo fell under the jurisdiction of the CIVPOL section of the UN. According to the EU, both organisations were cooperating in a couple of ways — France, Sweden and Portugal contributed around 22 of the 175 police officers in CIVPOL. Moreover, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK and the European Commission were members of the Joint Security Sector Reform's sub-committee on policing set up by MONUC (Pauwels, N, 2005, p.1).

These Committee members were to offer technical assistance and knowledge to the Transition Government. Besides, France had its own police training programme and at one point had trained 1,000 officers for the Rapid Intervention Force (PIR) specialised in riot control which was based in Kinshasa. In addition to that, while working with Belgium, France trained an integrated police brigade in Kisangani (Pauwels, N, *ibid.* p.1).

With states like France and Belgium operating outside the EU framework there was a likelihood of the EU-UN cooperation being undermined. For instance, as the Integrated Police Unit was being trained by MONUC in cooperation with EUPOL Kinshasa, there was a risk of running parallel training by France and Belgium that



would cause problems of integration. Furthermore, by operating outside the EU framework the French and Belgians portrayed a lack of coherence and reinforced the view that they were pursuing interests that were more relevant to their subsequent nations than the EU. This, in the end, undermined the EU and reinforced Source B's view that the individual EU nations like France and Belgium were more vocal and had stronger influence than the EU. This created a dilemma for MONUC in terms of cooperation, as there was uncertainty about whether to engage the EU or individual nations in the field.

Nevertheless, during the inauguration of EUPOL Kinshasa, Mr Solana argued that the support provided by the EU to the Integrated Police Unit would fall within the agenda of close co-operation with MONUC. He reiterated the fact that the EU was committed to aiding the UN and he was satisfied with the possibility of close cooperation between the two organisations (Solana, 30/4/2005, p.1).

Cooperation with the UN was enhanced when the EU Council approved 'Joint Action 2006/300/CFSP on 21 April 2006, establishing the temporary reinforcement of EUPOL in support of Congolese crowd control units in the capital city during the transition process in the DRC, for a period of up to five months. The temporary reinforcement of the mission by 28 police officers has been extended until 31 March 2007' (Morsut, 2007, p.4).

It should be noted that the operation was requested for by the DR Congo interim government and therefore the UN did not have much influence, especially with the mandate of EUPOL Kinshasa. Even though it was an independent mission, political cooperation was assured, as the UN was in charge of the policing operations in the DR Congo, which was still in transition. Therefore, the mere fact that the EU accepted the hierarchy (as seen earlier) worked in the favour of cooperation between the two organisations.

#### **4.4 Political cooperation during EUPOL DR Congo**

According to the UK House of Commons, 'the EU indicated in September 2006 that it was prepared to undertake, in close co-operation with the UN, the coordination of international efforts in security sector reform in order to support the Congolese

authorities in this area. Following two fact-finding missions in October 2006 and March 2007, two Joint Actions were agreed by the Council on 12 June 2007, which aimed...to establish a police mission leading on security sector reform and its justice interface in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL DRC)' (House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, 21/10/09).

Therefore, the decision to launch EUPOL RD Congo was taken with the prior knowledge and approval of the UN. This was geared towards improving coordination of the international effort in bringing peace to the DR Congo. However, it should be noted that the mission was autonomous from the UN. The desire to work closely with the UN, even though the mission was not UN mandated, was a positive sign that cooperating was possible on the political level. But this development could not override the overall lack of cooperation mainly driven by particular state interests in the form of France and Belgium, plus EU interests and its mistrust for the UN, as explained earlier.

#### **4.5 EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC)**

EUSEC, under the operational perspective, was launched on 8 June 2005 at the request of the DR Congo interim government in a bid to procure 'assistance from the European Union through the establishment of a team to provide the Congolese authorities with advice and assistance for security sector reform' (Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP 2005, p.3). The EU made its decision in support of, first and foremost, the inter-Congolese dialogue Sun City talks on 17<sup>th</sup> December 2002, which had called for a transition government to restructure and reintegrate the army.

Furthermore, the EU wanted to support the UN effort passed in the UN Security Council Resolution 1592 on 30 March 2005, which reiterated 'its support for the transition processing the Democratic Republic of the Congo, urged the Government of National Unity and Transition to carry out a reform of the security sector' (ibid, p.2).

The EU was careful to ensure that the operation was in line with the aspiration of the UN despite not being given a UN mandate. It was therefore in support of the UN effort. EUSEC has been run in close cooperation with the UN security sector reform initiative. However, as far as its set up and the way it is run are concerned, these were carried out independently of the UN, as the mission was requested by the DR Congo interim government.

On the other hand, there is little evidence to suggest that consultations were made with the UN about the viability of an EU mission running alongside MONUC set up in the security sector reforms. The EU seemed happy to state that it was supporting the UN efforts but there is little to suggest the UN actually wanted help in that area. As the case was with EUPOL and different EU states running parallel missions to MONUC, there seemed to be a scramble to gain influence in DR Congo. With an à la carte menu of sectors to reform, organisations like the EU saw it in their interests to get in on the act without due consultation with the UN on where they could actually throw their efforts. The interim government in DR Congo was not in the mood to resist such offers of help and with elections looming, EU support would be crucial to some of the key actors in the DR Congo government.

## **5. African states, organisations' reaction to EU-UN cooperation in DR Congo**

### **5.1 The Democratic Republic of Congo**

The EU-UN cooperation in DR Congo has been viewed differently by all parties in the conflict that has been ravaging the country since 1996.

The Congolese government welcomed the cooperation between the EU and UN, especially in alleviating the conflict in Ituri. The inter-institutional cooperation has brought stability which has seen the election of a government into power. The DR Congo ambassador to the EU saw the missions by the EU working in partnership with the UN as a success. To him, the missions in DR Congo were viewed as 'part of a collaborative political action and not as an occupying force' (Security and Defence Agenda 2007 p.10). He argued that the results of the partnership, which included the successful election of a president, the formation of a government and the

inauguration of a parliament, were further testament to the success of the collaboration between the organisations.

However, during the outbreak of the conflict between the Hema and Lendu, the French were suspected of ulterior motives by both the Hema and Lendu. They were seen as allies of Belgium, the former colonial master which the Lendu accused of favouring the Hema. Also, the French intervention was rejected by Lubanga, the leader of the Hema Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC). He also argued that they were supporting Kabila, who was leaning towards the Lendu (*BBC, DR Congo's ethnic flashpoint*, 13/5/2005).

The Congolese were further wary of the EU-UN partnership as both organisations had been involved in abuse of the Congolese and were therefore mistrusted. During Operation Artemis, two Swedish officials were accused of being witness to the torture of a Congolese prisoner (High Beam research, 22/4/2008). The Swedish soldiers had filed a complaint which, according to Rodt, (2011, pp.20-21) stated that:

‘In July 2003 French soldiers captured a young man in his twenties, and took him to the Swedish-French base [...] The man was paraded around the base with a snare around his neck by a French Colonel's aide. During the interrogation, which continued for several hours in the French section, the prisoner was subjected to mock drowning. The prisoner's screams were heard over the entire base [...] The prisoner was bent down against the ground and an officer performed a mock execution by shooting his gun at the prisoner's head without a shot going off [...] The torture continued all evening until midnight when the prisoner with a hood over his head was loaded onto a French jeep and driven out of the camp. His destiny is unknown.’

However, Rodt (ibid, p.21) argues that the French carried out an investigation and ruled that no crime had been committed. This whitewash highlighted a deliberate bid to cover up and showed a lack of respect for the human rights of the Congolese by the French, even though they had been sent in a mission to end the fighting.

According to the Human Rights Watch report, the MONUC forces (2009, p.39) ‘have...been involved in sexual abuse in Congo, including notably sexual

exploitation of minors'. This has not endeared them to the people of DR Congo. Furthermore, the same report (ibid, pp.37-38) accuses MONUC of not doing enough to combat the sexual violence committed by DR Congo troops against the civilians. These violations of both the EU and UN have placed the partnership in a bad light in the eyes of the very people they are supposed to protect.

Furthermore, the hope the people carried that MONUC was there to protect them has given way to despair and, later still, to actual cynicism. According to the *Virunga news* (2007, pp. 1-3), the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) alleged MONUC had sided with the DR Congo army which had elements of the FDLR rebel group which had committed genocide. This feeling of betrayal sowed the seeds of the conflict in 2008, spearheaded by General Nkunda, which almost pushed DR Congo into all out war.

Nzongla-Ntalaja, a Congolese academic, saw the collaboration between the EU and UN as disjointed due to the poor policies of the UN and the limited nature of the EU operations Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo. He argues that the reluctance of the UN to head the Lusaka Peace Accord calls to deploy a force under Chapter VII led to the need to have Operation Artemis extricate it from a precarious situation of its own making. Therefore, the failure of the Security Council to be more proactive in its policies led to unnecessary missions like Artemis (Security and Defence Agenda, 2007, p.32).

He further argues that a failure to understand the conflict dynamics in the region led to the unravelling of the gains from Operation Artemis. Although Operation Artemis had left in place a security infrastructure in the form of the police and judiciary that were capable of providing intelligence on militias to the MONUC forces, 'it did not reinforce MONUC's capability to deal with activities of armed factions and bands in the whole area of Eastern Congo. Less than a year after Artemis MONUC seemed powerless when dissident Congolese army officers, General Nkunda and Colonel Jules Mutebusi attacked the city of Bukavu in June 2004' (Security and Defence Agenda, 2007, p.32).

Nzongla-Ntalaja argues that during the Congolese election in 2006, there was no clear strategy to end militia activities both politically and militarily. EUFOR RD

Congo did not have a police mandate (ibid, p.33) and was therefore limited in the cooperation with MONUC. He also contends that the general sentiment among the Congolese was that 'EUFOR was sent to ensure Kabila remained in power, the operation has unnecessarily contributed to nurturing strong xenophobic and anti-European feeling in DRC' (Security and Defence Agenda, 2007, p.33).

Nzongla-Ntalaja further postulates that it is dangerous to promote operations like EUFOR RD Congo as part of the EU's African strategy, as almost all the assumptions on which it was based were either wrong or badly formulated (ibid, p.33). He asserts that EUFOR RD Congo was sent to keep Kabila in power and this created an anti-European sentiment in Kinshasa and also led to nurturing anti-European sentiment (Security and Defence Agenda, 2007, p.33). This view is supported by Source X a DR Congo national working as an IT technician in France. He contends that 'the collaboration between the EU and the UN in DR Congo during the elections worked well as they both managed once again to prevent the Congolese population from expressing their voice and rights the way they wanted.'

When discussing the perception of local people about the collaboration between MONUC and EUFOR RD Congo Source X argues that he did not think the local population bothered about the collaboration the EU –UN as they had been experiencing what he termed as the worthless presence of the UN (via MONUC) in DR Congo for years. He wondered that if 17,000 of them could not manage to secure the country and its people as they claimed they were supposed to do, how then could they secure the electoral process throughout the country with a mere addition of less than 2,000 EU troops on ground?

Furthermore the Congolese people viewed the UN as weak and held hostage by bigger powers in the Security Council, which were pursuing their own interests. Nzongla-Ntalaja backs up his argument by stating that the UN could have avoided operations like EUFOR RD Congo or even Artemis had the Security Council been more proactive. In essence, if the Security Council had deployed MONUC under chapter VII with the required manpower and equipment, MONUC would not have relied on the EU to quell the fighting in Ituri (Security and Defence Agenda, 2007, p.32). Source X also wades in by stating that whenever he thinks of the UN he only perceives the USA and the UK. To him these yield more power and can decide on

whether a mission should take place or not. For instance the USA blocked the intervention in Rwanda during the genocide of 1994.

In addition, the cooperation between the UN and EU was not fruitful. As examined earlier the French-led IMEF only made the capital a weapons-free zone and the soldiers were always lingering on the periphery of Bukavu. The force, therefore, did not set up a capable security structure deal with threats. Thus the UN could still not prevent fighting in Bukavu in 2004.

A cross-section of the Congolese, as explained by Nzongla-Ntalaja, was suspicious of the EU, especially France and Belgium. As evidence had begun to surface on the French role in the Rwandan genocide, coupled with the mineral wealth of the Congo, the Congolese felt they were going to be exploited by the EU, so they saw the collaboration in terms of countries pursuing their own interests.

## 5.2 Uganda

According to Source Y (a Ugandan diplomat with the African Union commission interviewed on 9<sup>th</sup> November 2009) the Ugandans responded to the EU-UN collaboration with mixed feelings. This is mainly because they felt the Security Council favoured the EU intervention for political reasons and as Uganda's request for an African force were rejected (*BBC news*, 13/5/2003). To further prove that the Security Council had ulterior motives, it was France that was requested to intervene at first and not the EU. The EU was merely brought in by the French to cover them and also to give the operation more legitimacy.

The assertion is given credence due to the fact that, 'on 15 May 2003... the Secretary-General called for the rapid deployment to Bunia of a highly trained and well-equipped multinational force, under the lead of a Member State,...Following a call to President Jacques Chirac by the Secretary-General, France indicated its readiness to deploy a force to Bunia. On 30 May 2003, the Security Council authorized the deployment, until 1 September 2003, of an IEMF in Bunia' (UNPKO Best Practices Unit Military Division, 2004, p.3). Source Y also argues that the belief in merely organising elections as a sign of progress is flawed (Security and

Defence Agenda, 2007, p.33). Indeed, after the elections of 2006, DR Congo remains deeply divided, especially on tribal grounds.

However, Source Y acknowledges that the French-led operation had a base in Uganda and the Ugandan government was consulted before the operation was launched. In that way, the French were making an effort not to be misunderstood. The two countries signed a treaty on 18 June which paved the way for cooperation between them<sup>18</sup> (*Asia Africa Intelligence Wire* 20<sup>th</sup> June, 2003).

Source Y argues that although Operation Artemis brought calm to the region, it did not dismantle the network of illegal arms groups and left the UN with an uphill task to restore order. To him, the cooperation between the EU and UN was more of a show of force<sup>19</sup> (Dougherty, July 13 2003, p.1).

This assertion is also supported by Alan Doss, the Secretary General Representative in charge of MONUC who asserts, when talking about EUFOR RD Congo, that it was also more of a show of force during the DR Congo elections.<sup>20</sup>

In all his arguments, Source Y ignores Uganda's role in escalating the tensions in the Ituri region. According to Human Rights Watch 2001, although the Ugandan authorities trained both the Hema and Lendu when they were in charge of the region, they favoured the Hema. As the two had been embroiled in land conflict over the years, this favouritism drove a wedge between the two communities on the lines of Tutsi-Hutu divisions. The Hema saw themselves as Tutsis and the Lendu saw themselves as Hutus. When fighting broke out after the Ugandan army left, it was bordering on genocide.

Source Y also argues that EUPOL Civpol delayed going to Eastern DR Congo because they thought Uganda supported Bemba, yet the EU and UN were focused on

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<sup>18</sup>Uganda and France have signed a pact legalising the French-led multinational force's use of Entebbe Airbase as the launching pad for troop deployment to curb the bloody inter-ethnic violence that has gripped Bunia.' *Asia Africa Intelligence Wire*, 20<sup>th</sup> June, 2003)

<sup>19</sup> For instance, during the operation it was reported that: 'in Bunia, night time "disappearances" of civilians following visits by armed militiamen are still a regular occurrence, though the number has tapered off from a rate of about four per night a few weeks ago. "The French control Bunia," said Amagi Uringi, but the night belongs to the militia" (Dougherty, July 13 2003, p.1).

<sup>20</sup>Alan Doss, Head of the MONUC peacekeeping forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.



Kabila. Therefore, the EU-UN collaboration is intended to survey the political interests of the member states and does not have the spirit of the UN charter.

Source W (a desk officer in the ministry of foreign affairs in Uganda interviewed on 5<sup>th</sup> November 2009) held similar views to Source Y, but she saw EU-UN cooperation as a form of power sharing by two dominant players in the international system. The UN could not let Uganda raise a force to end fighting in Ituri in 2003 because it felt Uganda had been compromised due to its earlier involvement in the conflict. Nonetheless, Source W believes the EU and UN had their own interests in the region taken from the angle of being hegemonies themselves. The EU and UN felt Uganda's role would reduce their influence.

Source W appreciates the pursuit of liberal norms in the EU involvement but lends credence to the argument that member states like France had ulterior interests. But it cannot be discounted that the UN was using the EU to back it up militarily, given its weaknesses, as seen in prior missions such as in the former Yugoslavia.

The Ugandan perspective leans more to interest-driven motives mainly because of the belief that the UN collaborated with the EU to fulfil certain interests. The EU was also largely seen as pursuing its own interests, especially in the way it quickly agreed to Operation Artemis even though it was originally a French operation. The pursuit of humanitarian principles cannot be discounted, as the EU and UN subscribe to the spread of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights.

It should be noted that when the fighting between the Hema and Lendu got worse in 2003, the Monitor newspaper of Uganda on 23<sup>rd</sup> May 2003 in an editorial argued that 'France cannot dilly dally anymore about providing those troops UN Secretary General Kofi Annan requested for to be deployed in eastern DR Congo Ituri Province.... The international community should ignore the feverish protests from Rwanda and some factions of the fighting groups in Ituri that an intervention force from France would come with an ulterior motive. The Rwandese allege that France intends to use this opportunity to reassert its influence in the Great Lakes region. It is plausible that France might want to regain the position it held here before the governments of Juvenal Habyarimana and Mobutu Sese Seko (RIP) were toppled in Kigali and Kinshasa, respectively. But this possibility is not

enough to frighten the world from intervening in a conflict that is costing thousands of lives and has fractured an entire society. We have seen interventions for lesser causes, which makes it absolutely important that the French come in now' (Monitor newspaper 23/5/2003)

The Ugandan media was more interested in seeing an end to the bloodshed than getting involved in a debate about French interests. To the media house saving lives was more important than dwelling on suspicions of perceived interests of major actors.

### **5.3 Rwanda**

As major party to the conflict in DR Congo, Rwanda viewed the EU-UN cooperation with suspicion. The new regime headed by President Kagame in Kigali did not take to the French-led Operation Artemis. According to Source Z (a diplomat at the Rwandan Embassy in London interviewed 5<sup>th</sup> November 2009), the experience with the French has been a painful one. He argues that France has seen Africa as its backyard and would be lost without the influence over its former colonies in particular. National interests other than humanitarian reasons have motivated French involvement in Africa.

He contends that the French-led intervention under Operation Artemis was reminiscent of Operation Turquoise, when the French intervened to provide a corridor for fleeing Rwandese refugees among whom were criminals who had committed the 1994 genocide. Although France had its own interests during Artemis, it is quite an exaggeration by Source Z to put it on a par with Turquoise. Artemis was not designed to help any criminals escape but to restore law and order and give the UN a much required stopgap to reinforce its troops and get an appropriate mandate to fulfil its peacekeeping duties.

Nevertheless, his assertion serves to highlight the fall out between the post-genocide regime in Rwanda and the French. French involvement in the same region was to bring apprehension on the Rwandan government which bore the brunt of French intransigencies during and after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. It should be noted that France got consent from the main regional powers before launching Operation

Artemis in 2003. But from the views of Source Z it is evident the consent was not given wholeheartedly. This view is supported by the earlier analysis concerning the Monitor newspaper editorial which disregarded the fears of Rwanda.

Source Z further separated the EU from France by arguing that France uses the EU for funding and legitimacy. To him, the EU unwittingly supported French interests by funding Operation Artemis. Therefore, the EU-UN cooperation favoured the interests of states like France and was not very beneficial to the fostering of EU-UN interaction in the long run. The EU did not necessarily unwittingly support French interests. As examined in the literature review, the EU was also looking to portray itself as a global actor. So, in essence, it had its own interests which it achieved through the help of the French who offered to be the framework nation. Source Z's argument has an element of truth, in that the interaction between the EU and UN helped foster French interests. But the EU, UN, Belgium and aspiring EU member states had all their interests met by the collaboration between the two organisations.

In reiterating the comments made by Source B, Source Z argues that with no central authority in the EU, cooperation between the EU and UN was rather awkward. He therefore views the cooperation more from an interest-driven perspective because states within the EU have ended up playing leading roles in its intervention in DR Congo. This supports the view held by Source B that the different EU embassies are far more vocal than the EU Commission in DR Congo.

Owing to the painful memories of French attempts to scupper the current government in Rwanda's effort to stabilise the country after the 1994 genocide and the provision of protection and asylum to people who committed the genocide <sup>21</sup> (Waugh, 2004, p.86), the Rwandan perception of the EU-UN cooperation has therefore been seen from an interest-driven perspective.

To the Rwandan post-genocide regime, the international community does not care for obscure nations, especially if they do not have mineral resources. This indeed is at the centre of international intervention in crises the world over in the post-Cold

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<sup>21</sup> According to Waugh, 2004, (p.86) France through Operation Turquoise after the genocide provided safe passage to the *interahamwe* and leaders of the genocide to France and other French allies. France also blocked the transfer of international aid and funds from the EU and World Bank to the new post-genocide regime. France argued that it should be transferred instead to the refugees camped in Zaire (now DR Congo).

War era. For instance, the United States pulled out of Somalia after suffering 17 casualties in 1993, while 10 years later thousands of lives were sacrificed in Iraq on the pretext that it had weapons of mass destruction, yet the evidence was not there. Although the Somali scenario was prior to the war on terror after 9/11, interest driven intervention can still be highlighted by the recent intervention of Western powers to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi in oil rich Libya, yet paying little attention to the struggles of Syrians in the same predicament as the Libyans.<sup>22</sup> Stephen Twigg, a Labour MP, views the situation in Syria and Libya as having undergone a similar diagnosis but having been given different prescriptions (progressonline, 2011, p.1).

So the EU-UN cooperation was based on two organisations with vested interests in the region. The EU-leading states (primarily France and Belgium) were looking to secure their national interests and stop the surge of Anglo-Saxon hegemony spreading through the Great Lakes region, while it can be argued that the UN was in DR Congo because its hand had been forced due to the Lusaka Peace Accord calling for its deployment.

However, the abandonment felt by the Rwandan current government in the aftermath of the genocide was enough to shape its perception of the international organisations. In essence, international organisations like the UN cannot do much more than the member countries are willing to allow it. Although they could not allow it to act in the Rwandan genocide due to the vested interests of states like the US (which did not want to commit its forces), the fear of a repeat in DR Congo and the fear of being accused of indifference forced the UN to act.

Source Z's assessment is critical of the implementation of reforms from a liberal perspective. He was less than enthusiastic about the Security Sector reforms in DR Congo. To him, to reform also means to bring back to a former state. The Congolese army did not have a proud history, especially as it was known to be ill-disciplined

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<sup>22</sup> According to Robert E. Kelly on 29 April 2011, who was quoted in an Asian security blog: The most obvious answers as to why Western powers have intervened in Libya and not Syria contradict the responsibility to protect a framework as they are coarse and strategic. For instance: 'Libya is close (Rwanda was far from NATO); Gaddafi is a Western enemy already (so getting rid of him is a 'twofer' – saving lives and eliminating a nuisance); Libya has oil... But the whole point of R2P is to get beyond that sort of crass maneuvering and suggest there is a *minimum* moral benchmark of global treatment of civilians. If we accept the R2P logic, then some kind of moral distinctions should be made beyond the 'extras' that we don't like Gaddafi already or that his oil supplies the huge EU market.'

under Mobutu. To Source Z the security sector reform agenda was more garnered towards what the developed world perceived the army should be like, instead of designing the policies according to the needs and perceptions in Africa.

Source Z's assessment is supported by the fact that the Congolese army remains rather ill-disciplined and is known to have committed atrocities against civilians, especially in the East of DR Congo and with the knowledge of the UN. His assessment is further backed up by the Human Rights Watch report of July 2009. This implicates the DR Congo army in rapes committed against civilians and highlights a conspiracy by the armed forces hierarchy to turn a blind eye to these atrocities. A 15-year-old girl, known as Minova, from South Kivu in March 2009 testified that:

'I was just coming back from the river to fetch water.... Two soldiers came up to me and told me that if I refused to sleep with them, they would kill me. They beat me and ripped my clothes. One of the soldiers raped me... My parents spoke to a commander and he said that his soldiers do not rape, and that I am lying. I recognized the two soldiers, and I know that one of them is called Edouard' (Human Rights Watch report, July 2009, p.4).

The report (Human Rights Watch report, *ibid* p.5) further adds that, in spite of the 'protests by victims, residents, NGOs, and even politicians, Congolese military courts have done little to bring to justice those responsible. Commanders have protected their soldiers.' It therefore looks like the security sector reform policies have not been very effectively, as the Congolese army is not much different from the one before it. Important issues to do with respect for human rights, property and lives of civilians which are major components of the security sector reforms have not yet been appreciated by the army and the hierarchy. Therefore there is a need to impress it on the DR Congo government that it is important to inculcate the values internationally accepted into the army.

However, Source Z admits that the presence of the UN reduced the burden on Rwanda, especially in securing its borders. The EU-UN collaboration in Ituri (2003) and Kinshasa during the elections helped ease the tension and stabilise the country.

This left the Rwandan forces with little to do in so far as defending the border was concerned.

#### **5.4 SADC (Zimbabwe, Angola, South Africa, Namibia)**

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was an organisation Laurent Kabila joined as soon as he became the president of DR Congo in 1997. It was composed mainly of members in the Southern region of Africa like South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Some of these states — Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola — came to Kabila's rescue when he was faced with an onslaught from Uganda and Rwanda during the second invasion of DR Congo in 1998. They had managed to cause a stalemate and therefore prop up the regime in Kinshasa.

However, after the Lusaka Peace Accord many of them began withdrawing their forces as the UN began to deploy. Conversely, apart from Angola, which had been perceived to have a security interest in sustainable peace in DR Congo, it is argued by Waugh (2004 p.131) that the rest were mainly pursuing economic gains. By going to help Kabila, the SADC states were fulfilling a requirement in the SADC mutual defence pact (Article 6, p.3) that an attack on one of them shall be considered a threat to the regional security and shall be met with united action immediately.

During the outbreak of fighting in Ituri, SADC member states were considering sending troops there because they felt the UN was not willing to do so (Tromp, IOL news, 21 May 2003). The SADC had felt frustrated by the UN's refusal to upgrade its mandate to Chapter VII and was calling on states to volunteer their own troops to do the work. However, they were not promised a UN mandate which would lead to them paying the bill, and countries like South Africa were already overstretched in Burundi (ibid).

The SADC was therefore sidelined and instead the UN went with a French-led operation under the EU flag. Western states were more in charge of the peacekeeping process than the SADC or the African Union, a sentiment shared by Source L a MONUC official in DDR/SSR unit. Coupled with this was the refusal by the UN Secretary-General of an African force, as proposed by Ugandan President Yoweri

Museveni. When deciding on which force to intervene in Ituri, it seems like the UN was looking for a self-supporting group of nations. Yet the refusal of Museveni's proposal was more confusing, as France itself has a tainted record in Africa.

The UN had constructed the identities of African states as being part of the problem. It had identified the African involvement with the escalation of the conflict. Plus its interests were to have a quick robust force to fight the marauding rebel forces killing in the region. The French-led EU force was capable of providing the resources the UN could depend on and in the appropriate time frame. For instance the Ituri region was brought from the brink of total anarchy in a short time. An African force would not necessarily have brought a swift end to the conflict and, due to the recent involvement of some African states calling for deployment of an African force in DR Congo, the UN felt it would be more of a liability than an aid in pacifying the region.

During the outbreak of fighting in late 2008, as Laurent Nkunda threatened the regime in Kinshasa, Congolese security officials called for the SADC to deploy; the UN had failed and they were reminded of the security pact they had with DR Congo. This was also precipitated by the fact that the global recession had affected the Western states and they did not have the stomach for involvement in another war (Lewis, *Reuters*, 21 November 2008). Plus 'SADC already has military planners on the ground in Congo, and Angola, which fought for the government in the last war, has offered troops' (ibid).

As the EU had turned down the UN request to intervene, the SADC would have provided a credible alternative. But that was abandoned altogether and instead Rwanda reached a bilateral agreement with the DR Congo regime to go into Eastern DR Congo and calm the situation, a feat that was completed and culminated in the arrest of Nkunda.

However, the failure of the UN to utilise SADC capabilities underlined the wariness the UN had over African states' involvement in DR Congo again. This can also shed more light on why the UN has not handed over to the African Union as the continental body. The African Union has gained experience in handling conflicts, especially in Darfur and Somalia. Nevertheless, the presence of minerals and the fact that over six African nations have clashed in DR Congo has made the UN cautious when choosing partners from within Africa.

As a sub-regional body desiring to fulfil its pact with DR Congo, the SADC felt incapacitated by the UN, which insisted on collaborating more with the EU. But if African solutions are to be found to African problems, then the SADC would have been a key player in the pacification of DR Congo. The UN did not totally ignore the SADC; it just chose not to engage with it when it came to military intervention. South Africa, a member of the SADC, has been at the forefront of the diplomatic initiative between DR Congo and its neighbours and the inter-Congolese dialogue.

It should be noted that the UN has collaborated with African regional powers, for instance, in Darfur where the UN is in collaboration with the African Union. South Africa also took part in Operation Artemis.

Still, it is the failure of the UN to utilise the SADC militarily that has remained contentious. Certain factors can explain this. One of the key actors who aided Laurent Kabila was Mugabe of Zimbabwe. He is not held in high regard in the international community due to the human rights abuses (especially muzzling of the opposition) going on in his country (Nyamutata, *Daily News*, 14 June 2011, p.1).

A multinational force including troops from Zimbabwe would not have been welcome, especially as President Robert Mugabe was also accused of plundering the diamonds in DR Congo (International Crisis Group Report No. 2, 17 November 1998, pp.20-21). Coupled with this is the fact that South Africa was wary of involving the SADC in security operations, as the case proved during the second DR Congo conflict. South Africa preferred a diplomatic approach and was not part of the forces that came to Kabila's aid (International Crisis Group Report No. 2, pp.23-24).

Therefore, the contradictions within the SADC did not make it a viable candidate for collaboration with the UN, especially in a state like DR Congo where many other states had key security interests. Plus the decision to let Rwanda solve the crisis seemed inspired, as Nkunda was suspected to be an ally of Rwanda and even after the demise of his rebel group; he was put under house arrest in Rwanda (*BBC news*, 1 March 2010).



## Conclusion

Political cooperation between the EU and UN is a complicated process. Although both organisations usually present a united front and have a deep respect for each other, there are factors that somehow change the dynamics of the relationship. Some of these factors have been related to particular motives of certain states and the sheer bureaucracy exhibited by both organisations. Nevertheless, it is imperative to put the political cooperation into a theoretical framework.

Overall, the cooperation between the EU and UN from a political perspective can be explained using a range of different theoretical frameworks. For example, the pursuit of national interests has been vital to cooperation and conflict between the EU and UN. French acceptance to lead the international emergency force is largely attributed to its pursuit of national interests aimed at stemming the influence of Anglo-Saxon client states in the Francophone territories. By drafting in the EU, France was also championing the cause of Europe which was striving to come out of the shadows of NATO.

It can further be argued that the UN, by calling on France, had identified its interests with the French and not the African states that wanted to form a force to pacify Ituri. The presence of minerals and the earlier exploitation by Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe of these minerals made the UN wary of the intentions of the aforementioned neighbouring states.

The EU and UN were desirous of using liberal peace ideas like democratic elections and the separation of powers, all of which were vital in pacifying the country. This created a common cause and was important for the cooperation. With a similar identity and goals, the cooperation is made easier between the two organisations.

Coupled with the above, the EU and UN have set up formal channels of cooperation which are proving successful. However, the only downside to this is the infrequent sharing of vital information, as the EU does not fully trust the UN's capabilities in trying to keep the information in confidence.

Kronenberger and Wouters (2004, p.362) postulate that there is a need for 'progress at the administrative/desk level, for instance between Commission/Council/member

state officials and the UN Department of Political Affairs with the UN department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Development Program and UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.' However, it should be noted that the EU and UN are cooperating well on the political level. The constant unrestricted dialogue between the top officials and the desk officers has helped remove obstacles to launching missions and also helped establish clarity on who was responsible for what. Despite this, cooperation on the political level does not guarantee the same at operational level.

## **Chapter 6:**

### **Cooperation and non-cooperation between the EU and UN at the operational level**

The relationship between the EU and UN peace missions at the operational level improved to some extent during their collaboration in DR Congo, as the organisations were able to work together in the same operational field. However, both were independent of each other as they had different command and control structures and could not automatically share information. Similarly, there was a need for clearance from above in order for logistics to be shared. This chapter will assess cooperation and non cooperation between the EU and UN at the operational level in its different levels, such as command and control logistics and communication during the different operations like Artemis, EUFOR RD Congo, EUSEC and EUPOL (Kinshasa and DR Congo) alongside MONUC. An examination of the reasons for the prevailing command and control, logistics and information sharing set up between the two organisations in DR Congo will have to be carried out.

## 1. Command and control

The nature of EU-UN collaboration in DR Congo was the first of its kind and represented a new development in inter-organisational cooperation. Although there had been collaborations between the UN and other regional actors like the African Union, the DR Congo scenario — for instance, the fighting in Ituri that led the UN to bring in the EU — presented a different situation. The EU opted for a separate command and control structure from the UN for a number of reasons, among which is the fact that they operate on different principles.

Source U (a senior DG E VIII official involved in strategic planning interviewed on 5<sup>th</sup> July 2007) contends that on principle the EU does not put its forces under UN command and control. This, he postulates, is partly due to the fact that the majority of the EU has a negative view of the UN as far as effectively managing command and control structures is concerned. This observation originated from the disastrous UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR). This perception was also held by Source H, an official in the administration department of the DG E VIII Council of the European Union General Secretariat Brussels interviewed 5<sup>th</sup> July 2007).

Source U argues that the UN failed miserably to use the mission to save lives. Hence, EU officers and military officials alike are desirous of exploring the notion of having separate command and control structure during future cooperation with the UN.

Although UNPROFOR was not such a success, it is rather suspect for the EU to make a crucial decision like that based on only one factor. Therefore, while the EU uses UNPROFOR failures as a reason, it is clear that mandate issues are some of the main reasons why the EU prefers to use a separate command and control. The UN, before Operation Artemis, operated under Chapter VI and a half of its Charter, whereby it would only use force in self-defence. The EU felt limited by this and preferred to have its own mandate under Chapter VII, as was the case during Operation Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo.

The preference for mandates under Chapter VII is rooted in the fact that the world is faced with new types of wars. These wars, as examined earlier, are characterised by a blur in the 'distinction between internal and external, public and private, political and economic, civilian and military and even war and peace itself.... occurring in failing or failed states, these are understood to be essentially non political, identity-based, organizationally deconstructed wars of aggrandizement waged among a myriad of actors unified only in their disregard for legitimacy, ideological goals and military restraint' (Melander, Öberg and Hall, 2009, p.7).

Coupled with this is evidence that in the post-Cold War era EU member states' contribution to peacekeeping forces has drastically dwindled (Ketevan, 2010, pp.5-6). At the moment, Second and Third World countries are supplying the bulk of the troops (UN peacekeeping resources 1991-2010). Western powers are mainly supplying the finances and the military hardware (ibid, pp.5-6). So, this shows a slow but steady disengagement by the Western powers from supplying troops to the UN peacekeeping initiative. Therefore, it was no surprise when the EU opted for separate command and control structures during a co-deployment.

Further, the EU pursues a policy of deploying forces on a short term basis. These forces are characteristically rapidly and robustly deployed. This therefore reduces the likelihood of EU military operations being under UN Command since the UN is normally deployed for long periods of time as the case is in DR Congo (Source H). The desire not to be tied down for long periods can be seen from a financial perspective, especially if the UN has just called on the EU at short notice. But overall, short robust missions give the impression of effectiveness. For instance, during Operation Artemis, Bunia town centre was declared a weapons-free zone even though the outlying territory was awash with weapons.

Not wanting to put its troops under UN command gives the EU a level of control over its forces, especially with the launching and termination of missions. UN missions that struggled to fulfil their mandates or protect civilians particularly after the end of the Cold War led it to be identified with messy and weak mandates. This identity led the EU to redefine its priorities in relation to joint operations with the UN. Further still, it is a main concern of the EU to minimise casualties as this bodes

well with contributing states. Successful missions make it easier for states to be willing to contribute to future missions.

### **1.1 Logistics**

Source B (MONUC official with radio Okapi) contends that MONUC is one of the most expensive UN missions with adequate logistical supplies especially through Entebbe in Uganda. Although the EU had adequate supplies during its missions, it sometimes had to rely on MONUC for the transportation of equipment and troops, according to Source H (an official in DG E VIII). The sufficiency of logistical supplies has helped MONUC to carry out its mandate, (Source J, a UN official in the JMAS/OSRSG department of MONUC interviewed on 11<sup>th</sup> March 2008) though as it will be discussed this has not necessarily dovetailed into great cooperation with the EU.

According to Source G (a top ranking UN military official in MONUC operations and plans interviewed on 7<sup>th</sup> March 2008), There is an understanding between the EU and UN if a situation of logistical shortage arises. The two organisations help each other out where possible in the field of operation. For instance, as revealed by Source H, MONUC had to transport EU equipment and troops during EUFOR RD Congo.

### **1.2 Communication**

The EU and UN have set in motion parameters for the sharing of information, particularly in the field. In order to facilitate operational cooperation during the elections, the EU Council passed declaration 2006/319/CFSP, stating that:

‘The SG/HR is hereby authorised to release to the United Nations, MONUC ..., EU classified information and documents generated for the purposes of the EU military operation up to the level of classification relevant respectively for each of them and in accordance with the Council Security Regulations’ (Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP p.4).

In addition, the SG/HR was instructed later to:

‘release to the United Nations, MONUC ...EU non-classified documents related to the deliberations of the Council with regard to the operation, covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Council Rules of Procedure’ (Council Joint Action, *ibid*, p.4).

Although the above declaration by the EU shows a desire to share information, this has not been the practice in the field. Source A and Source H agree that indeed the sharing of information between the two organisations is troublesome due to the fact that EU keeps to a stringent code of behaviour when it comes to sharing information with third parties. The EU is apprehensive about sharing sensitive information with the UN due to the fear of third parties getting hold of it. EU officials believe that if sensitive information is passed on to the UN it may be revealed to other parties that are not supposed to be privy to such information (Source H).

Nonetheless, it was stated that from an operational perspective, each EU mission is in touch to the corresponding UN sector, or keeps to a code of conduct that has been laid out in the mandate of that specific mission. However, Source G was desirous of a deeper cooperation between the two organisations which involved a joint pool for information sharing between UN and EU officials in the field

Although this cooperation was the first of its kind involving regional organisations operating outside their geographical location, there was a need to facilitate smoother cooperation between the two organisations. For its part, the UN officials argued that MONUC must fully cooperate with the EU and release all relevant information (Source F, UN official in Rule of Law Unit MONUC interviewed on 7<sup>th</sup> March 2008).

Therefore, although there is a formal network set up, as seen in the Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP above, sharing information between the two organisations has been interpreted as unsuitable, especially in terms of what is laid down in the declaration. When compared to the situation in the field on ground, it is a completely different matter; as seen earlier, the EU views the UN with suspicion as far as sharing information is concerned. So in view of that, an informal network has arisen

to bypass this rigid set up. On ground in the field of operation both organisations exchange information informally in order to accomplish their missions (Source B).

## **2. Overall cooperation and non cooperation**

The EU-UN cooperation on the operational level has been affected by the political manoeuvres of both parties while in the field. Although political cooperation has been discussed in the previous chapter, it is important to extend the discussion into this chapter to full understand the EU-UN cooperation from an operational perspective.

According to Source A (an official in the political affairs office in MONUC), the relationship between the UN and EU on the operational level has not been positive, mainly due to rivalry arising between the two organisations. The EU has been suspected of having designs on leading the restructuring process now that the transition period is over. However, the UN has filled this role since MONUC was launched. The situation has been aggravated by the infighting between the head of the army and the ministry of defence in the DR Congo government on the division of army reforms, which subsequently strained the EU/UN relationship, as they yet to develop a common position on this rivalry (Source A). The internal rivalry has hindered the actual execution of the roles of the EU and UN from an operational perspective.

Rivalry in the DR Congo government can be traced back to the transition period when the different factions came to form a government. Reyntjens (2009, p.268) contends that each faction leader maintained a force to protect his interests. Once the different factions were integrated into Les Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), Reyntjens (ibid, p.268) notes that renegades like Bizima Karah were of the view that the integrated Congolese army existed on paper. In a way, the different factions played the UN against the EU. For instance, Kabila was not prevented from hunting down his opponents like Bemba after the elections of 2006.

In essence, MONUC and the EU were already faced with factions within the DR Congo army, a major hindrance to the operational cooperation, especially when



trying to disarm and re-integrate the former combatants. By letting Kabila have free reign over his adversaries, the international community failed to facilitate the operations of the EU and UN through its political posturing. This was not missed by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (2006 p.3) which contended that:

'the international community also has coercive power beyond the borders of DR Congo. The DR Congo opposition leader's arrest by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and his indictment for crimes against humanity have been interpreted by his supporters as "this-is-what-happens-to-the-losers". As a result, politicians will use all the means at their disposal to ensure that they do not lose an election in future. Understanding and embedding this risk into international community scenario planning is crucial.'

Such a precedent hindered the disarmament, especially in Eastern DR Congo, where it is argued by Davis (2009, pp.10-11) that:

'Following the relatively successful and peaceful national elections in 2006, fighting resumed in North Kivu late that same year. Laurent Nkunda, leader of the CNDP and a dissident general, had refused to disarm during the pre-election transition, claiming that the Tutsi population was not adequately protected by the integrated government troops. A deal between the Kinshasa government and Nkunda (brokered by Rwanda) led to the compromise of *mixage* for Nkunda's men, resulting in divided loyalties within brigades. This strengthened Nkunda's forces, and fighting broke out again in the second half of 2007 in North and South Kivu. Throughout late 2007, the government sought to bring the CNDP to heel by force. When this ended in the military humiliation of integrated Congolese troops, the Congolese government was forced to the negotiating table.'

In addition, Source A argues that the government is not so keen on having a mutual structure for reforms such as the twofold quest of defence and justice by MONUC. This is because the EU's strong financial muscle has put it in the driving seat to gain leverage with the DR Congo government a situation that has been made worse for the UN due to the end of the transition period (Source A). The end of the transition period has removed the special status the UN had in that it is now like any other

organisation. This has removed any impediment to the EU engaging directly with an elected government in Kinshasa. This has given the EU a free hand to pursue its policies with the DR Congo leadership. This has hindered the operational cooperation, as the EU's political manoeuvres changed the dynamics of the operational partnership due to the suspicious feeling of the UN towards the EU.

This view is enhanced by Reyntjens (2009 p.284), who argued that prior to the 2006 elections DR Congo was under effective international trusteeship. The end of the trusteeship paved the way for actors like the EU to seek direct contact with the government and affect the policy making, which may have worked both for and against the policies still being pursued by the UN.

The competition between the EU and UN, as analysed by the MONUC officials, is driven by a pursuit of national and organisational interests. The different states within the EU may have interests that are well served now that the UN and EU are on a level playing field. The major player that needs to be satisfied now is the DR Congo government, which can play one organisation against the other. Although on the surface the UN does not seem to have as many ulterior motives as the EU, there is a desire to succeed, as this is one of the most expensively assembled missions ever.

The divisions within the DR Congo government also reflect the realisation of those in power about the influence they have, especially in relation to contracts to be awarded to companies involved in development programmes. EU member states especially those with historical links to the DR Congo may be more prone to pursuing their national interests working alongside the UN in pacifying the country. This loss of focus on the part of the EU, or the change of goals, hampers the original liberal-humanitarian motives of bringing peace and stability to the less able around the world.

Austesserre (2010, p.238) contends that EU members like Belgium had key interests such as ensuring the well-being of the Belgian diaspora in DR Congo and sustaining its economic ties with the country. Austesserre (*ibid*, p.238) further argues that there were fundamentally different positions taken on DR Congo among the various EU states which hindered its capacity to influence key sensitive political issues.

Although the EU-UN joint declarations set precedents for operational cooperation, the officials in the field were finding it hard to work together due to the lack of proper and clear objectives on the parameters of the cooperation. This has, in the end, restricted the cooperation as little information has officially been shared. Cooperation between the two organisations has been more on a personal level than an institutional one.

Source G asserts that there seems to be no special operational framework on the military and civil military level. Although they deal with different aspects like training the police and army and working together, e.g. during elections and dealing with crises like in Ituri, the lack of a special operational framework leaves many officials learning on the job and opening up new channels of cooperation with officials of the organisation they are collaborating with on their own. This view is reinforced by Source K, an official in the administrative department of the DGE IX Civilian Crisis Management in the Council of the European Union (interviewed on 5<sup>th</sup> July 2007), who states that there is no international agreement between EU and the UN in that regard, except for the joint declarations of 2003 and 2007.

Nevertheless, Source G argues that although the UN and EU do not have official cooperation structure from the civilian point of view, they do however have an official military cooperation set up (Source G). This is re-enforced by the two joint declarations of cooperation between the two organisations in 2003 and 2007. Yet it is evident that these declarations do not deal with the operational cooperation in greater detail.

Therefore, a mechanism of operation has arisen whereby the two organisations can work together informally in DR Congo, e.g. helping each other out logistically or sharing information. In case their partnership necessitates a higher level of obligation or if there is a possibility of complications arising while the collaboration is taking place then both the EU and UN personnel contact the different headquarters — a process that is rather officious. Therefore Source G asserts that a personality element is essential to the EU-UN collaboration at the operational level.

Improving cooperation between the EU and UN would need a harmonisation of command and control structures and information sharing. Alternatively, more

openness would be encouraged. As examined earlier, the rhetoric is quite different from what actually happens in the field. For example, although the EU Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP of 27<sup>th</sup> April 2006 called for the sharing of information with the UN officials, both organizations admit that this was not the case. The EU is wary of third parties gaining access to sensitive information if shared with the UN (Sources H and U).

Joint command and control structures would prove cumbersome, as the UN already has a complicated command and control set up made up of different nations with their own national commanders. Furthermore, questions arise as to whether the EU would just join the ranks of the different national contingents or if it would get special dispensation. Giving it special dispensation would affect the UN relations with the different contingents that supply troops to the UN peacekeeping mission. Other problems for the EU would involve its mode of deployment. With joint command and control, the framework nation concept would be of no use, and where would that leave the Berlin Plus agreement and arrangements with NATO?

Such operational questions would have caused a stalemate. Moreover, the UN needed a quick deployment in regions like in Ituri. Yet if the EU put itself under UN command and control before, for example, Operation Artemis, it would not have had to operate under Chapter VII, as it was only adopted after the completion of the operation.

Therefore, any cooperation between the two organisations lacking an operational framework can be explained from the perspective of informal networks — a key facet employed by inter-organisation theorists. The two organisations do not have a comprehensive working framework in the field of operation and the officials have resorted to working in informal networks to achieve their mandates.

This lack of formal structure on the operational level is not a one-off occurrence; it is an ongoing malaise during the EU-UN involvement in DR Congo. It can be explained in terms of the officials at the top not clearing the way for an operational cooperation framework. This failure can be explained from a social constructivist perspective mainly due to the fact that because the EU and UN pursue similar goals, especially in DR Congo, both sets of policy makers hope that the relationship at the political level will translate into cooperation at the operational level.

Since the UN was the lead organisation during the period before the election, the EU was expected to accept this in addition to its mandate, especially during Operation Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo, which were limited in time and scope. A case in point is the assertion by Source T that EUFOR RD Congo was mainly there to deter possible trouble makers.

However, UN officials must have been caught off guard when the EU set up EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC without consulting the UN. The UN has also run programmes similar to those mentioned above and it seems like a case of duplication. With hindsight, the EU and UN policy makers should have set up comprehensive guidelines for their collaboration.

Source B further noted a lack of cohesion within the EU in the field as he felt that the individual EU member states were more influential than the EU. According to Source B the different EU member state embassies wielded more power than the EU. The ambiguity of the EU structures has ended up making cooperation between the two organisations cumbersome as the UN is left unsure whether the different EU states will acquiesce to joint policies agreed between the UN and the EU.

Austesserre (2010, p.238) is of a similar view as discussed earlier she is of a view that certain states like Belgium have economic interests laced with a desire to protect its diaspora. Furthermore, there are radical and divergent views on DR Congo among different EU states which cause problems for MONUC when trying to figure out whether to deal with the individual states or the EU.

As examined earlier, some of the states within the EU have their own national interests and some do have a history with DR Congo. So there is a tendency for them to pursue certain interests and this may affect the ability of the EU to show a united front. Also, it is paramount to note that the EU set up is different from that of the UN. Although the UN may be run centrally from mandates handed down by the Security Council and leadership from the Secretary-General, the EU still lets its states pursue their own interests. There is reluctance in the EU to share its common foreign and defence policy (ibid, p.238).

Another component that played a key role in the EU/UN cooperation is the cultural background of the officials involved from both sides. The lack of a clear-cut formal

structure has led to the development of informal networks, but these have been based on similarity in cultural background. For instance if a UN official from a Nordic country has a counterpart in the EU also from a Nordic country it is the belief of Source F a UN official in the rule of law unit that they will work well together. Officials from a different cultural setting may struggle to work together. For instance, as Source L a high ranking UN official in the DDR/SSR Unit of MONUC (interviewed on 10<sup>th</sup> March 2008) noted officials from African states within the UN were struggling to work alongside their European counterparts. A similar situation may arise from the side of the EU.

The development of the informal network on cultural grounds is first and foremost a way of coping with the lack of cooperation through the formal structural framework set up by both organisations. Nevertheless informal networks set up on cultural grounds eliminate or limit people from other cultures and increase the likelihood of their effectiveness being limited if the contact in either organisation is transferred.

It is also clear that the issue of identity is a major component of conflict and cooperation between the EU and UN in DR Congo. Bereft of viable grounds of cooperation, UN and EU officials are seen here to cooperate on an identity basis. The sameness of identity conveys to the other parties that they can trust the officials in the organisation they collaborating with. In a way, it is a form of accountability as, for example, the two cooperating officials can be from neighbouring countries or even the same region.

An example of the use of informal networks was when the EU helped the UN monitor media information to prevent the spread of harmful propaganda during the 2006 elections. The EU officials in the field, according to Source B, did not get clearance from Brussels or Potsdam and may have broken EU rules on data sharing. The EU officials acted in a bid to save lives and prevent a crisis and were fulfilling their mandate indirectly. However, as explained, the EU and UN relationship in the field was based on a personal relationship and cultural aspects sometimes played a role. Therefore, questions linger regarding whether the EU would have responded in that manner had the request come from a UN official that was not known to the EU officials.

According to the Department for International Development (2006, p.3):

‘Despite tensions between different approaches and interests among donors, the various contributors developed a fluid but coherent approach to the elections, stemming from a strong consensus that the elections were too important to fail. Donor support for security was critical to the success of the elections. MONUC provided security throughout all the phases of elections (pre-voting, voting and post-voting). For the presidential run-offs there was a European Union rapid response force (EUFOR) in Kinshasa. The DRC army and police would not have been reliable on their own although equipment and training provided by the international community to the police throughout the country significantly improved their operational capacity to provide security during the elections. Moreover, donor mediation was critical in de-escalating the crisis that occurred when the Congolese army attacked Bemba’s residence in Kinshasa between the two rounds of the presidential election. The international community provided support to the justice system for election disputes. Some argue that otherwise the courts would probably have failed, given the deterioration they had undergone in the Mobutu years. Further work to re-focus the judicial system on the substance of electoral complaints, away from narrow technical grounds as the deciding factor in resolving disputes, would allow the public to better understand and accept court decisions.’

Therefore, the elections were a hallmark of the success of MONUC and EU involvement. They were also crucial, especially for liberal leaning Western states both within the EU and UN, to show that DR Congo was moving away from the dictatorial past and turning into a democratic state.

## **2.1 EU-UN operational cooperation during Operation Artemis**

As examined earlier, there was not much cooperation between the two organisations during Operation Artemis. Source L, however, (a high ranking UN official in the DDR/SSR Unit of MONUC interviewed on 10<sup>th</sup> March 2008) contends that the cooperation during Artemis was fruitful — discussions and coordination were started beforehand and a mechanism of cooperation was adopted early enough. However,

this is not entirely true, as the French kept the planning phase under wraps and its observer team, which was sent to gather information before the launch of Artemis, came and left without the UN being informed. Since Ituri was still volatile there was apprehension among the MONUC officials that there would have been casualties the UN peacekeepers had come upon the observers by accident.

Nevertheless, the operation was to some extent a success in terms of the EU troops being able to bring peace to Ituri region and successfully hand over the control to the Bangladeshi battalion of MONUC (Source M, a UN official with the MONUC military public relations department interviewed on 14<sup>th</sup> March 2008). However, the actual cooperation between the two organisations was limited, as will be examined later.

Morsut (2007, p.3) argues the success of Operation Artemis was ‘not taken for granted initially: at the UN there were doubts about the EU’s capabilities, since the industrialized countries, and not least the EU member states, had always given few contributions in personnel to the UN operations at short notice. Co-operation with the UN was good at the institutional level and on the ground. On the other hand, it should be recalled that this success was limited to a very small area of the DRC, and one nation – France – bore major responsibility for the operation.’

Morsut (*ibid*, p.4) further contends that the time limitation on Artemis ‘left Bunia as a ‘weapons-invisible’ zone, rather than a ‘weapons-free’ zone; secondly, the space limitation, since the troops were only active in Bunia, while elsewhere in Ituri, atrocities were committed against the population; thirdly, the presence of few foot patrols, which would have been more effective than vehicle patrolling in such a setting; fourth, some overly forceful behaviour on the part of EUCC soldiers – for example, involving damage caused by house-searches – that did not serve to build confidence between the population and the soldiers.’

All the same, Operation Artemis achieved the goals of weakening the militias — the Union de Patriots Congolais (UPC) stopped making attacks on the city and people returned to their homes in due course (*ibid*, p.3).



Furthermore, at the end of Operation Artemis in September 2003 the EU refused to re-hat its officials to help the UN take over from Artemis. The refusal of the EU to re-hat its officials, a practice that was so successful in Bosnia, showed that the EU had other interests apart from the humanitarian one. By refusing to re-hat its officials the EU deprived the UN of valuable knowledge gained during the operation. In its defence, the EU was operating on a time constraint as its mandate had expired. Nonetheless, the Security Council could have extended it if the need had arisen. The mistrust and the fear of sharing information with the UN may have been a driving factor in this development.

Kess (2007, p.3) noted that the refusal to re-hat by the IEMF put the MONUC forces at risk as it lacked the intelligence over flight capabilities and elite forces that was vital to the French-led IEMF. The above assessment is supported by Jakobsen (2007) who postulated that:

‘At the moment cooperation is taking place primarily on EU terms. The EU has more or less dictated the terms and place of the cooperation and has displayed little willingness to enhance its rapid reaction military support for UN-led peace operations, which is what the UN would prefer. It has thus reacted coldly to UN calls to use EU battle groups as strategic reserves for UN operations facing serious challenges or crises’ Jakobsen (2007, p.182).

## **2.2 Security sector reform**

The reform of the security sector organs of the D R Congo like the army and the police were a major facet of the peacekeeping process of the UN and EU. This is because the institution of the army and police had been badly administered by the Mobutu regime. (Crisis Group Africa, Report No. 104, 2006, p.4). This poor administration mainly in the form of poor pay, lack of training and poor facilities had led to high levels of corruption in the police and police (ibid, pp.4-5). On top of that the conflict in DR Congo had led to a proliferation of numerous rebel groups that had to be demobilised and re-integrated into society once peace was brokered. There was also a need to merge the different rebel groups which also represented diverse

ethnic backgrounds plus train the police to maintain law and order during the elections that were first approaching (Source F).

Therefore peacekeeping process had to go hand in hand with the reforming of the two institutions if sustainable peace was to be attained. MONUC had UNPOL/CIVPOL that was to carry out the reforms in the police. The EU missions included EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPOL DR Congo. EUSEC was deployed along with the UN and other international actors to help with the military reforms.

### **2.3 EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC)**

As discussed in chapter three, the EUSEC mission was launched in May 2005 the request of the DR Congo interim government which was acting on the transition process recommendations of the negotiations that had been held in Sun City and Pretoria in 2002 and 2003 respectively (Rogier, 2004 pp.30-31). Since the major objectives of EUSEC have been discussed in chapter three, the study will proceed by examining the structure of the mission.

The EU appointed General Pierre-Michel Joana as Head of Mission with duties such as daily management of the mission and responsibility for the staff and disciplinary matters. He was to work with experts responsible for:

‘the private office of the Minister for Defence, the combined general staff, the army general staff, the naval forces general staff, and the air force general staff.... team responsible for the chain of payments project comprising: project leader, based in Kinshasa, appointed by, and acting under the authority of, the Head of Mission, an ‘advice, expertise and implementation’ division, based in Kinshasa, composed of staff not attached to the general staff of the integrated brigades and including a mobile team of experts involved in checks on the military personnel of the integrated brigades, and experts assigned to the general staff of the integrated brigades’ Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP, 2005, pp.3-4)

EUSEC had a unified chain of command with Head of Mission reporting to the Secretary-General/Higher Representative (SG/HR) through the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) who was to report to the PSC, which then was to report to the Council. Although the PSC was to have political control and strategic planning, plus the ability to amend the implementation plan and chain of command, it was the Council with the help of the SG/HR that could terminate the mission (Ibid, pp.4-5).

In April 2005, the mission was extended until June 2007, with EU officials to key roles in the DR Congo administration, naval and air force and general staff (Council Joint Action 2007/192/CFSP, 2007, and amending Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP p.4). The mission was enlarged in that it came to consist of an expert at provincial administration under the Ministry of Defence and technical assistance project was commenced to support the modernisation of the chain of payments in the army (Council Joint Action 2007/406/CFSP, 2007, p.2).

The EU wanted to help the Congolese government put into place a clear separation of the chain of command from the chain of payment within the army. Morsut (2007, p.6) argues that the EU 'agreed to start a new programme (the Chain of Payment Project) in order to assure the soldiers a steady wage for their work. One of several problems that MONUC had to face was the consequence of a non-functional chain of payment for the soldiers. In theory, soldiers could choose between returning to a civilian life and a job in the national army. However, those who decided to stay in the army were not paid, so they lived off the very population they were sent to protect – which had a bad impact on population vulnerability. MONUC recognized that this situation was unsustainable and welcomed the EUSEC programme.'

### **EU-UN cooperation during EUSEC**

EU-UN cooperation was among the aims of EUSEC as the EU Council stressed that 'close cooperation and coordination with the other actors in the international community, in particular the United Nations, and in pursuit of the objectives laid down in Article 1, to provide practical support in the field of reform of the security sector' (Council Joint Action 2007/406/CFSP of 12 June 2007, p.2). However, even

with this in place Source G, (a high ranking UN military official in MONUC operations and Plans interviewed on 7<sup>th</sup> March 2008) still felt that cooperation between the two organisations was insufficient. This is because the two organisations did not exchange liaison officers (Source G). It is apparent that with few officials in the field of operation the EU did not have the luxury of sending a liaison officer to MONUC. However, MONUC could have been allowed to send one of its officials to liaise with the EU.

Source K stated that although the EU was desirous of having a security understanding with MONUC, this was shelved due to MONUC's pursuit of a policy of impartiality which was not welcomed by the EU. However, MONUC's officials' claims to impartiality are not entirely correct, as the Human Rights Watch report of July 2009 condemned its complicity in the sexual violence exhibited by the Congolese army. Almallahi 2010 (the *Palestinian Telegraph*, 28/10/2010, p.2), quoting from the report, stated that 'In DR Congo alone, "tens of thousands" of women and girls have suffered horrific acts of sexual violence at the hands of the government army...Little is done to stop it nor against culpable peacekeepers.'

After the 2006 election, MONUC had little option but to work hand in hand with the DR Congo army. It was an undisciplined army which, according to Aiden Hartley 2008 in his documentary about the DR Congo elections, left the UN culpable by overlooking the atrocities it carried out. In the documentary, FARDC (Les Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo) troops are shown carrying out joint operations with MONUC. During the operations, whole villages are burnt down, a process which is very similar to the scorched earth policy, with the MONUC forces participating or, at times, turning a blind eye. This nullifies any claims to impartiality of the MONUC forces in DR Congo.

One of the unfortunate scenarios in the EU-UN collaboration, according to Source G, is the lack of an EU-led nation in DR Congo. This view is reiterated by Henry Kissinger (quoted in the *Guardian* newspaper, 17<sup>th</sup> December 2004) who coined the phrase 'if I want to call Europe, who do I call?' This, according to James Meek (*Guardian*, 17<sup>th</sup> December 2004) was still the case as the EU expanded to 25 members with more waiting in the wings. It should be noted that the 2009 Lisbon Treaty tried to solve this problem through the creation and expansion of the office

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. However, this was only immediately beneficial to the political and not operational interaction. The European Commission has been trying to harmonise the EU voice in DR Congo. Yet this has been undermined by the different EU states that want to gain influence in DR Congo. For instance, the French at one point were running parallel training sessions for the integrated police unit, a role that was being handled by the Civpol branch of MONUC.

Besides, EU-UN cooperation has been complicated by the knowledge that MONUC's mandate will one day be terminated, making the EU less inclined to fully cooperate. The EU envisages potential partnerships among organisations like the United Nations Development Programme whose goals and timeframe are limited (Source L). MONUC has been in DR Congo since 2000 and although there has been talk of it leaving it is unlikely to be soon as DR Congo is far from stable, especially as the army and police are being trained. The presence of the FDLR and other dissidents like the Lord's Resistance Army pose a threat to the stability of the country. Further still, in 2008 Nkunda's forces easily put to flight FARDC troops, which meant that they were not yet ready to deal with the security of the country. So the views by Source L were really not without their demerits.

Concerning the rule of law, Source N (a UN official in the Rule of Law Unit MONUC interviewed on 12<sup>th</sup> March 2008) postulates the MONUC Rule of Law department, which partners with the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Defence and meets with the EU the Joint Justice and Coordination Mechanism (JJCM) committee. This reduces on possibilities of duplication of activities and creates a platform for the two organisations to share details and specifics of training as specified in the 'plus strategic' document. EUSEC and MONUC share public information with the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Defence.

On the other hand, the JJCM includes other organisations, thereby restricting UN and EU bi-lateral meetings or communication. The fact that the two organisations are dealing with sensitive issues in the security sector it is important that they have a form of special interaction yet this seems not to be the case. However, the EU seems content with having number of actors in the JJCM, since it prefers such a setting (Source F).

To compound the disadvantage of not having bilateral relationship, it has been noted both organisations tend to train the same soldiers at different times as they are tackling different aspects. So they can share information on what the different strengths of the people they are training are where to improve.

The MONUC officials are of a view that change from transition period to self-governance has affected the dynamics of the EU-UN cooperation. There is a held view that during the transition period cooperation with the EU was relatively good. However with the Congolese government now operating as an elected one the EU is less inclined to cooperate (Source L).

Due to its financial clout the EU has quite often had its way when interacting with the UN in DR Congo. For instance although the UN aspired to hand the justice system to the ministry of Justice, the EU objected insisting on continued court sharing subsequently slowing MONUC down (Source B).

Therefore, there is total disconnection in the policies pursued, especially in relation to the viable options that are relevant to DR Congo. MONUC's pursuit of handing over the justice system to the Ministry of Justice is in line with what Autesserre (2010, pp.129-179) refers to as a bottom-up strategy, which deals with the local dimension of the conflict. She believed this had been ignored as the international community pursued a top-down strategy, mainly engaging the elites and dealing less with the local people. By handing over the instruments of justice to the Congolese, MONUC was demonstrating its confidence in the Congolese to handle their issues.

However, according to Davis (2009, pp.21-22), there has been a miscarriage of justice. Soldiers who committed atrocities against women and children in 2003 were jailed in 2006 and escaped from jail. Davis notes a delay and sometimes failure in serving justice. For instance, between 2005 and 2007, 56% of the rape cases reported in 2005 were still under investigation in 2007, and 60% of these cases had been under investigation for over a year.

So, completely transferring the judiciary to the Ministry of Justice would be tantamount to promoting injustice because the structures in place were incapable of providing adequate justice. Thus, the UN seemed to be in a rush to draw the curtain on the security sector reform projects. Such policies were definitely likely to hinder

cooperation with the EU because it was desirous of a continued role in reforming the justice system.

Concerning information sharing, Source F highlighted the closed nature of the EU to sharing information as opposed to the UN which quite open. As an example, donors had clamoured for the department of Rule of Law to be put under the security sector reform, a move that brought both the EU and UN to work much closer but did not necessarily translate into cooperation.

So with the EU policy of not sharing much information, the Rule of Law department has been hamstrung by delays and indecision. On its own, working alongside the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Defence, headway was being made. But the changes meant the need to cooperate with the EUSEC, which has proven to be rather difficult.

Source L notes that the good cooperation at the political level for instance between the different headquarters in Brussels and New York is not reflected in DR Congo. This is aggravated by the limited level of guidance from the aforementioned headquarters which sometimes leads to misunderstandings and loss of time during the resolution of such developments.

Furthermore, the cooperation between the two organisations has stalled due to the belief by Source L that EUSEC does not comprehend MONUC's mandate. This has been exacerbated by the inability of both organisations to explain the different mandates to their staff. For instance, although the UN has been at the forefront in peacebuilding especially since the beginning of the transition, EUSEC officials thought that it should be instead take up the supporting role in the security reform.

The EU and UN have failed to present a united front when dealing with the Congolese government. Kabila's government has benefitted from this inability to have a free hand to pursue its own interests. Davis (2009, p.22) for instance highlights the lack of independence of the judiciary noting that 'President Kabila's dismissal of 89 magistrates and the appointment of 28 others (including a new chief justice of the Supreme Court and prosecutor-general) by presidential ordinances in February 2008', leading to protests from many non-governmental and human rights organisations. Although the protests are uniform, the mention of key actors in the

security sector reform is curiously missing. Although MONUC officials expressed discontent, the EU officials interviewed declined to comment on it.

As examined earlier, although MONUC is likely to stay in DR Congo for a while, it still has a time constraint, unlike EUSEC. This has caused a difference in the way it carries out its policies. But Sources L and F were of a view that the EU may have time on its hands and may stay longer in so there is an obvious disparity about the urgency with which policies are being pursued by both organisations. A case in point is that some of the policies drawn up in the 'Plus Strategic' adopted by the EU, UN and other organisations in the security sector reform are to last five to seven years. There is worry among MONUC officials that due to the unpredictable nature of the Security Council, its mandate may be terminated without meeting these goals.

Indeed as discussed earlier both organisations are run by member states which may decide on termination of the mandate due to their own interests. Therefore even the EUSEC mission faces the same dilemma as MONUC the only difference is that individual EU states like France or Belgium can carry on the work privately with the DR Congo government after reaching a bilateral agreement.

What's more, cooperation has been held up by the inability of MONUC sector to do with soldier demobilisation and re-integration and EUSEC to put in place a committee to coordinate their activities. The obvious cause of that for the EU is attributed to the fact that it has a small team (EUSEC team) on ground. Getting bogged down in committee meetings would slow it down leading to a failure to execute its mandate (Source P, An EU official with the European Commission in DR Congo interviewed on 13<sup>th</sup> March 2008). Nevertheless a bilateral mode of contact would be beneficial to both organisations especially when they interact with other organisations in DR Congo with a keen interest in security sector reforms. Plus a common ground on governmental policies would check the regime excesses to an extent.

It is a normal practice during reconstruction process, for the security sector reform (SSR) and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes to be carried out at separate time where by the latter is followed by the former. In the case of DR Congo the two are carried out simultaneously, requiring the development of closer cooperation. A joint commission on SSR was started during the transition and



later disbanded. Its set up was not followed through by Congolese government, the EU and MONUC (Source F).

On the other hand, both organisations have cooperated logistically the UN supplying the logistical needs of the EU. Although the EU is financially able to ensure that it is not lacking logistically it has frequently depended on MONUC, for instance during EUSEC operations (Source P). Overall MONUC availed EUSEC officials with cars, petrol and staff during the period EUSEC carried out a census of the Congolese army (Source H).

The UN availed logistics to EUSEC while execution of the reform of the chain of payment system. EUSEC has provided assistance to the armed forces in relations to the severance of the army chain of command from the salary administrative structure. The UN availed transport and lodgings in peacekeeping bases for the EU personnel (Source H). However, the International Crisis Group (African Report 104, February 2006, p.ii) called for far reaching amendments for the security sector reform. For instance, it recommended that MONUC 'Expand the EU plan to separate salary payment from the chain of command with salary increases and improved living conditions for rank and file soldiers, conditioning further aid to the military on prompt implementation.'

According to Source B, the UN avails advice to the EU in relations to different units of the army. On the other hand, the EU gives funds to the UN in support of different projects. However it was highlighted that after carrying out as army census, EUSEC shared some information in that regard with the UN when needed.

The International Crisis Group (African Report 104, February 2006, p.ii) was not content with the EU-UN partnership, as more needed to be done and the involvement of more actors, specifically regional powers, was necessary. It therefore called for the establishment of an:

'International Military Assistance and Training Team (IMATT), including the European Union's military mission (EUSEC) and participation from such major donors as the EU, Angola and South Africa, as a means of coordinating security sector reform and advisory programs and to:

- (a) take a hands-on approach by having technical advisers oversee the payroll and accompany training and subsequent operations of deployed units;
- (b) help establish standards and train Congolese trainers; and
- (c) oversee rehabilitation of the army's training camps and enhance its logistical capabilities.

Increase donor investment in army integration to match support for the demobilisation process, using funds in particular for equipment, housing, health care and school fees for soldiers' children, starting with the integrated brigades.'

According to Source G, the military aspect of MONUC and that of EUSEC are in regular contact. They tried to resolve their differences beforehand and later present a united front. Nevertheless, Source J argues that both organisations have no liaison officer at each headquarters to facilitate smooth information sharing.

Sources H and K concur that to the problems blighting both organisations related to cooperation when sharing information. This is due to the EU's fear that the information will be leaked to other organisations.

The EUSEC mission circumvented UN authorisation, which was requested by the DR Congo interim government. In a way, it was duplicating what the UN was already doing as part of the security sector reform in its peace building process. Cooperation was set to be difficult from the outset because the mission was independent of the UN. Although tailored to similar goals of the promotion of policies compatible support for human rights, democratic values like rule of law and accountably international humanitarian law, democratic standards, notions of good public rights, transparency and observance of rule of law, the mission was very different from operations Artemis and EUFOR RD.

Differences were to emerge on the policies of impartiality championed by the UN. Since EUSEC was brought in at the request of the DR Congo interim government, its allegiances were to the government and not to the UN. Also, roles were duplicated — as seen earlier, the UN runs security sector reforms under its disarmament, demobilisations and reintegration and security sector reform unit (DDR/SSR).

Nevertheless, the International Crisis Group (African Report 104, February, 2006, p.I) saw security sector reform as 'a neglected stepchild both financially and in terms

of strategic planning. While donors have already contributed more than \$2 billion to the Congo, including generous amounts for the demobilisation of ex-combatants, only a small fraction has been dedicated to improving the status and management of the armed forces and the police.'

Therefore, the EU can be seen as pursuing its interests as it ignores the DDR/SSR in place and, instead, forms EUSEC with similar roles to the aforementioned UN department but with DR Congo government backing. This partnership with the DR Congo government obviously assured the EU of influence with the regime. But it cannot be discounted that, from the objectives of the EUSEC mission, it seems like the EU is also pursuing idealist policies, for example, the reforming of the security sector involved promoting human rights, transparency, observance of rule of law and respect for international law.

Additionally, the DR Congo army was identified as having failed to observe human rights, international law transparency and rule of law, and although the UN already had a mission in DR Congo on ground, it was in the interests of the EU to reinforce the UN mission by setting up a separate mission to oversee security sector reforms. Since DR Congo had an interim government, the EU did not see anything wrong with setting up a parallel mission to deal with security, plus it was not doing anything illegal. A precedent had been set during the training of the police, as the EU had EUPOL and the UN had CIVPOL.

By forming EUSEC the EU did not deal with the informal network that was in place with the UN during the previous missions. However, cooperation was hindered as the officers in the field of operation on the EU side had to deal with the DR Congo government and the EU. It was increasingly harder for the EU to back MONUC if the latter did not agree with the policies of the DR Congo government.

### **3. MONUC Police (UNPOL/CIVPOL)**

The MONUC peacekeeping force has two components which include the military contingent and the police training programme identified as MONUC Police. The latter is under the Civilian Police division of UN peacekeeping (CIVPOL), has its origins in the peacebuilding initiatives mainly to do with the establishment of law

and order in states that have gone through conflicts which have affected the law and order enforcement bodies. CIVPOL carries out other projects like restoring the justice system if it has gone into disrepair and reinforcing internal security and criminal justice structures. Although it has just come into prominence as part of UN peacekeeping initiatives, CIVPOL has been in operation for more than fifty years, (UNDPKO Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, 2003, pp.83-84).

Its roles include 'monitoring and advising functions to reforming and restructuring and institutional building local police services and performing executive law enforcement' (ibid, p.83). It is also a separate division in a peacekeeping operation with its own police commissioner wielding operational control over it at the same time answerable to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). It should be noted that CIVPOL has a single chain of command with all personnel reporting to the commissioner (ibid, p.84).

The initial UN civilian police unit was in the 1960-1964 UN Mission to Congo (ONUC). Thereafter it was made a component of the United Nations Peace Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964. Some of its roles at the outset included supporting the UN military personnel and observers, monitoring and reporting on the activities of the local police activities. CIVPOL has gone through a transformation in the post Cold War as it has taken on more responsibilities. These were to 'monitor local police services, to assist in the development and restructuring of law enforcement structures and, in the cases of Kosovo and Timor-Leste, to also act as the executive law enforcement authority' (ibid, 2003, p.84).

This transformation was reiterated in the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809 (2000, p.54), which championed a doctrinal shift in the 'use of civilian police, ...in complex peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rules of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments.'

The number of CIVPOL officers has increased from the 35 deployed during UNFICYP in 1988 to 9500 officers deployed worldwide by May 2007. Although police officers made up only 2% of the peacekeeping force in 1995, by mid-2007 this had risen to 3%, (Smith, et al., 2007, p.16).

In 2001, Security Council (through SC/Resolution 1355) agreed to the updated concept of operations forwarded by the Secretary-General in the June 2001 (S/2001/572) report, that called for a 'more in-depth assessment of the policing institution, its needs, and capabilities [and] to prepare recommendations for an eventual expanded MONUC Civilian Police component wherever MONUC military personnel are deployed and to advise and assist the local authorities in the discharge of their responsibility to ensure the security of the population' (Smith, et al., 2007, p.16).

Following on to that, UN Security Council Resolution 1565 passed in 2004, specified that MONUC was to support the DR Congo transitional government by contributing 'to arrangements taken for the security of the institutions and the protection of officials of the Transition in Kinshasa until the integrated police unit for Kinshasa is ready to take on this responsibility and assist the Congolese authorities in the maintenance of order in other strategic areas,... training and monitoring of the police' (ibid, 2007, p.16).

MONUC Police commenced by training police trainers and the initial Integrated Police Unit, which was made up of 350 officers in 2003. According to the Crisis Group Africa Report No. 104, (2006 p.10), in 2005, MONUC trained 765 Congolese police instructors. Those later joined MONUC instructors in training territorial policemen who provided election security. MONUC claimed to have trained 17,855 territorial policemen by the end of November 2005.

However, the 160 MONUC instructors were insufficient to train satisfactory policemen for the elections. Therefore, Kofi Annan asked the Security Council for more personnel (UN Security Council Resolution 1621 (2005)). A total of 841 MONUC Police brought in, with 625 of their number forming five units of 125 officers executing roles in cooperation with the national police. Senior MONUC Police officials were co-located at general and provincial inspector level to offer direction on operations planning, organization and capacity building beginning from the foundation (Crisis Group Africa, 'Report No. 104', 2006, pp.10).

### 3.1 EUPOL Kinshasa

EUPOL Kinshasa was the harbinger civil military mission in line with the ESDP framework in partnership with the DR Congo government. Launched on 30<sup>th</sup> April 2005, it was tasked with re-establishing the essential functions of a democratic state based on rule of law by supporting the formation of an Integrated Police Unit (IPU). This was to be bankrolled by the European Community via the European Development Fund and the CFSP budget plus EU member states (Joint Press Release of the EU High Representative for the CFSP and European Commission, 2008 pp.1-2).

EUPOL was tasked with monitoring, mentoring and advising the IPU. According to Javier Solana (Joint Press Release of the EU High Representative for the CFSP and European Commission, 2008 p.3), 'the EU wanted to support DR Congo in the transition process and in the establishment of strong, efficient and professional police services, living up to the best international standard'.

The mission comprised of 30 personnel led by Chief Commissioner Adilio Custodia, who was to be guided (politically) by EU Special Representative Aldo Ajello. The EUSR other roles included facilitating and coordinating with other EU stakeholders in DR Congo, as well as maintaining good relations with the local authorities (ibid, 2008, p.6).

EUPOL was to be co-situated in the IPU operational base and was made up of the 'office of the Head of the Mission, a monitor, mentor and advisor branch, an administration support branch and liaison officers to the most relevant actors regarding the IPU' (Council Joint Action 2004/494/CFSP, 2004, p.2). The Head of Mission was to effect operational control and was to take on the daily running of the mission. He was further responsible for disciplinary control over the staff (ibid, p.3).

EUPOL was to have a unified structure of command with The Head of Mission reporting to the EU Special Representative who would then report to the Council through the Secretary-General/High Representative. The PSC was to effect political control and strategic direction with the ability to amend the OPLAN (operational

plan) and chain of command and the power make decision with regards to the purpose and ending of the operation. The PSC was to report regularly to the Council, taking into account the EUSR reports (Joint Declaration Joint Action/2004/847/CFSP, 2004, p.3).

The mission was extended on a regular basis<sup>23</sup> with regular expansion of the mandate. For example, Council Joint Action 2006/913/CFSP, (7 December 2006, p.1) extended the mandate mission to June 2007 and expanded the mandate to 'strengthen its advising capacity to the Congolese police with a view to facilitating the Security Sector Reform process in the DRC together with EUSEC RD CONGO' (ibid, p.2).

### **3.2 EUPOL DR Congo**

The EUPOL RD Congo mission launched on 1<sup>st</sup> July 2007 (Council Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP June 2007, p.6) at the end of EUPOL Kinshasa, and aimed 'to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform (SSR) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), called EUPOL RD Congo, with the aim of contributing to Congolese efforts to reform and restructure the National Congolese Police (PNC) and its interaction with the judicial system. The mission must provide advice and assistance directly to the responsible Congolese authorities and through the police reform monitoring committee (CSR) and the joint committee on justice, while taking care to promote policies compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards and the principles of good governance, transparency and respect for the rule of law' (ibid, pp.2-3).

The EUPOL RD Congo was to have a similar structure to EUPOL Kinshasa (ibid, pp.3-5) with Superintendent Adílio Ruivo Custódio appointed as head of mission

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<sup>23</sup>By Joint Action 2005/822/CFSP of 21 November 2005 (2), the Council amended and extended the mandate of EUPOL 'Kinshasa' for a first phase until 30 April 2006. By Joint Action 2006/300/CFSP of 21 April 2006, the Council amended and extended the mandate of EUPOL 'Kinshasa' until 31 December 2006 (3), which notably provided for a temporary reinforcement of EUPOL 'Kinshasa' during the electoral process in the DRC. On 30 November 2006, the Council adopted Joint Action 2006/868/CFSP, which extended the temporary reinforcement of EUPOL 'Kinshasa' until 31 December 2006 (Council Joint Action 2006/913/CFSP, 7 December 2006, p.1)

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(ibid, p.3) and the mission was to work in close coordination with the other international actors (ibid, p.2).

Fig. 5: Deployment of EUPOL RD Congo personnel in DR Congo<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> [http://www.eupol-rdc.eu/docs/ESDP\\_DR Congo\\_EUPOL\\_Mar2009.pdf](http://www.eupol-rdc.eu/docs/ESDP_DR Congo_EUPOL_Mar2009.pdf)

#### **4. Cooperation and non-cooperation between EUPOL (Kinshasa and DR Congo) and MONUC Police (UNPOL/CIVPOL)**

Morsut (2007, p.4) asserts that, prior to the elections in 2006, the UN had to contend with intricate and enormous assignments in civilian crisis management:

‘the UN Civilian Police had been operating since October 2001, mainly offering advisory, planning, training and assessment support to the local authorities in Kinshasa, Kisangani and Bunia. In Kinshasa, the UN Civilian Police were working together with the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC), the Police d'Intervention Rapide (PIR), the Police Special Roulage (PSR), the Territorial Units, the Close Protection Corps (CPC) and the MONUC's Neutral Force (NF). In particular, the Congolese National Police (CNP) were in no condition to fulfil their tasks properly due to various shortcoming and flaws, even if the belligerents had agreed to constitute a national police with their respective police components. When the UN Civilian Police started to plan, assess and advise the formation of IPU elements, in accordance with Resolution 1493, the UN realized that, also in this field, assistance from the EU would be significant.’

According to Source Q (a UN police official with the UNPOL interviewed on 14<sup>th</sup> March 2008), although EUPOL and UNPOL have been working together to train the DR Congo security structure they have no formal agreement. But the two organisations interact in the different fora like the earlier examined JCCM. However A technical group was established during the elections to support and aid the DR Congo police to oversee the security and proper running of the election process (Source Q).

Morsut (2007, p.5) argues that there was a requirement for ‘the definition of a close co-ordination process and clear delineation of tasks with MONUC’ if possible ESDP engagement in support of the reform of the Congolese police was to continue.

Cooperation can also be highlighted from a group set up by the EU and UN reflecting on the reform of the Congolese police. This group established a committee which came to be called the Committee for the Follow Up of the Police Reforms comprising of up to eight working groups consisting EU and UN officials (Source R,

UN Police official with Information and Documentation Cell of UNPOL interviewed on 14<sup>th</sup> March 2008). The working groups help EUPOL and CIVPOL to reduce or do away with replication of the training and instructions (Source Q).

When it comes to logistics, EUPOL and UNPOL have no formal agreement thereby precipitating the use of informal communication. The interaction is on individual basis and, as Source Q noted the two organisations have not shared logistics. EUPOL and MONUC Police are structured in a way that each has its own command and control structures. Source V (an EU official with EUPOL DR Congo interviewed on 21<sup>st</sup> March 2008) highlights that the harmonization of activities in the police section is supposed to be done by UN police.

According Source Q a police official in UNPOL, EUPOL is a provider of technical support and information on DR Congo police divisions to the MONUC Police. EUPOL further guides MONUC Police on how to deal with the country's police force. It should be noted that the EU and UN have not exchanged liaison officials and Source K reiterates the misgivings the EU has about sharing information with the UN.

The lack of a formal relationship between the UNPOL and EUPOL does not mean that there is no cooperation. The formation of a forum is one of the many steps organisations can set up to formalise their cooperation. But, as seen with the other three operations, the EU and UN officials in the field have been good at setting up informal networks within which to cooperate.

Morsut (2007 p.5) reveals that cooperation between the EUPOL and MONUC flourished during the elections. She states that as EUPOL DR Kinshasa implemented the IPU in Kinshasa, MONUC worked to support the Congolese National Police nationwide. She contends that good co-ordination and a productive relationship were fostered between the two missions. This way of complementing each other and sharing the burden helped MONUC to accomplish its duties better, while EUPOL DR Kinshasa focused on the tiny but vital issue of the Congolese police reform process.

The post-election involvement of EUPOL is a manifestation of the continued desire of the EU to support the DR Congo in democratising and therefore creating a culture

of good governance and rule of law. What's more is that since the EU sees a longer time engagement than the UN, there is obviously a need to secure influence. Therefore, the EU has embarked on expanding the EUPOL mission to the whole of DR Congo, not just Kinshasa. By continuously building its influence in the country the EU remains poised to be a key international player once the MONUC mandate has expired.

Consequently, the stage looks set for the EU to pursue its own interests as its influence grows. Countries like France and Belgium are looking to increase their influence in the region. As a former colonial master, Belgium's interests are mainly geared towards the pacification of the country and the continued EU involvement is testament to that.

However, just like the FARDC, the Congolese National Police (PNC) has been active in abusing human rights. In a damning report by the US Department of State (2010 Report on Human Rights, 2011, pp.4-5), it is alleged that in January 2009, a CNP officer shot a man during a protest in Kolwezi, Katanga. Furthermore, in June 2009 the State Department asserts that a woman was killed in her cell by PNC officers in Bena-Piano, Kasai-Oriental.

The Department of State (*ibid* p.5) goes on to highlight a conspiracy by the authorities to hide the human rights abuses and not prosecute the culprits. For instance, it is argued that:

'Authorities took no further action on the 2008 killing of a civilian in Bulukutu, Equateur, by a PNC officer, or the 2008 killing of an artisanal miner in Katanga by a police officer attached to the Provincial Mining Office in Kalukalanga. There was also no additional information regarding the arbitrary arrest and illegal three month detention of a man, who later died from mistreatment, by the commander of the Karawa Police Station in Equateur in 2008.'

However, even the UN cannot throw the first stone to condemn such actions because there have been gross human rights abuses in its own ranks. The Department of State (*ibid*, p.50) postulates that:

'A number of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) cases by MONUSCO

Peacekeepers were under investigation. MONUSCO reported that the number of the most serious SEA allegations decreased from 37 in 2009 to 33 during the year. MONUSCO repatriated 11 contingent members during the year on disciplinary grounds, a significant drop from the 33 sent home in 2009.'

This has also affected its cooperation with the EU and, in this case, EUPOL, as it portrays MONUC in a bad light. It causes embarrassment, especially for partners of the UN who may be questioned about why they are dealing with an organisation that cannot control its forces that routinely rape or sexually abuse the people they are supposed to be protecting.

The EU has not been very assertive in its pursuit of human rights in DR Congo. Smith, K, (2011, p.21) contends that in the Human Rights Council, the EU experienced difficulties in trying to bring about a resolution concerning the human rights situation in DR Congo. For instance, it is stated that when fighting broke out in DR Congo in 2008,

'France on behalf of the EU (and other countries including Canada, Japan, Mexico, South Korea and Ukraine) called for a special session on the DRC in late November 2008. No African country supported the call, and indeed the Africa Group accused the EU of 'forcing the special session down [its] throat' and of not consulting with it over the special session 29. The EU filed a draft resolution to the special session, but so did the Africa Group. After discussions between the two blocs, the EU agreed to withdraw its resolution. The final resolution did not add much to the March 2008 resolution on the DRC, though it did firmly express concern about the violence and deteriorating human rights situation in Eastern DRC. It did not include the EU's suggestion to send the special rapporteurs on torture and extrajudicial executions to visit the country. The final resolution (S-8/1) was adopted by consensus. Again, then, to maintain consensus in the Human Rights Council, the EU moved quite considerably from its initial position on the DRC' (Smith 2011, p.21).

This indecisiveness betrays a lack of interest on the side of the EU in pressing the issues concerning human rights abuse in DR Congo. It also undermines the

cooperation between the EU and UN. Although it has had its fair share of peacekeepers sexually abusing civilians, the UN has also been fundamental in highlighting the human rights abuses by the DR Congo government. However, an uninterested EU does not help matters, especially when faced with state machinery bent on covering up these abuses. This indecisiveness can end up being construed as part of the greater scheme of things for the EU to pursue its interest in DR Congo by appeasing the Kabila regime.

## **5. EUFOR RD Congo**

The EUFOR RD Congo mission as examined in chapter three was commissioned at the request of the UN to help deal with likely electoral violence in the build up to the general elections of 2006. It had been feared that MONUC did not have enough troops in DR Congo to secure the elections countrywide.

The EU Council as examined earlier in chapter three responded by endorsing to the Concepts of Operation for the EUFOR Mission on 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2006 and the UN Security Council authorised the mission on 25<sup>th</sup> April 2006 through Resolution 1671 (Hoebeke, et al, 2007, pp.11-12). The mission was launched on 12<sup>th</sup> June 2006 consisting of an advance force stationed in Kinshasa, a reserve in Gabon, plus an “over the horizon” reserve based in Europe. Germany was commissioned as the Framework nation with the role of availing its facilities to the European Union (ibid, 2007, p.12).

Morsut (2007 p.6) argues that France insisted on Germany becoming the framework nation, ‘thereby showing its willingness to contribute to the development of the ESDP, despite the failure of the national referendum on the European Constitution. It should also be noted that France did not have at its disposal combat-ready groups — but Germany did. Consequently, Operation Headquarters in Europe was established in Potsdam.’

The cooperation between the EU and UN during this operation, according to Gowan (2007, p.30), was facilitated by the ‘good chemistry between the senior officers on both sides. When ...it looked like militias in the city might explode, EUFOR and MONUC troops mounted an effective joint operation to contain it.’

However the two organisations had a bureaucratic set up that put the good chemistry noted by (Gowan, 2007) at risk of bearing little fruit. For instance even though EUFOR RD Congo was situated at Ndolo airport, MONUC could not necessarily contact it directly if it needed a contingent of EUFOR troops to intervene in a trouble spot in Kinshasa. The chain of command necessitated MONUC officials contacting UN headquarters in New York first. UN officials then had to make contact with their EU counterparts in Brussels who had to contact their contemporaries in lead country (Germany: Potsdam) who would finally get in touch with the military force in DR Congo to act. The whole process would take a minimum of three hours, placed the officials in the field in a precarious situation in that if fighting broke out casualties would be high (Source B).

In a way, the bureaucratic set up was meant to stop careless or unwarranted interventions on the side of the EU. Further still, risk assessments of such interventions needed to be carried out. This would prepare the contributing states for likely casualties. Indeed it would dent the commitment of EU member states if they lost soldiers in interventions they were unaware of. Source T (a high ranking official with MONUC, interviewed on 11<sup>th</sup> November 2009) asserted that EUFOR RD Congo was mainly sent in to show force. So there was not much combat expected on the side of EUFOR RD Congo troops. But this cautious approach hindered cooperation between the two organisations as MONUC found the bureaucratic set up rather cumbersome.

Gowan (2007 p.30) argues that although the EU and UN were striving for better cooperation, 'in the field a particularly worrying problem arose from the fact that the two missions generated independent threat assessments – creating differences over precisely when deterrent action was necessary.' Therefore, there was the danger of failing to coordinate action as both organisations interpreted the situation differently. This was in contrast with the seemingly good cooperation between the two organisations at the political level.

Morsut (2007, p.7) contends that this failure to replicate good political cooperation between the EU-UN on the operational level can be attributed to certain factors: 'EUFOR was engaged under a specific mandate by the UN, and could only intervene at the official request of MONUC. Furthermore the EUFOR troops were too few, since

only two companies – the Spanish and the Polish troops – were combat units. Only the 130 Spanish soldiers played an active role in the fights, whereas the Polish were charged with protecting the administrative and logistical personnel. By the time a task force from Gabon was sent, the violence was already under control.’ However, if the violence had not been brought under control, the casualties would have been greater had MONUC decided to wait for EU reinforcements.

Overall, the EU put its own interests and those of its member states first during EUFOR RD Congo. Precautionary measures in the bureaucratic set up and the few troops sent in are indications of the reluctance of the EU to take serious risks in the mission. The failure of large-scale violence to materialise greatly helped with masking the fact that the EUFOR RD Congo mission was actually too small to deal with such developments. Despite this, with an “over the horizon” force, EUFOR RD Congo served as a good deterrent to those bent on disrupting the election.

There was a difference in organisational culture as the EU’s request to have the mission publicised on Radio Okapi fell flat — MONUC refused because it does not carry out propaganda for soldiers as a rule. The EU may have seen the publication as a deterrent to would-be troublemakers, but MONUC may have been thinking about the security of the soldiers. Giving away their arrival date and location may have played into the hands of dissidents determined to cause chaos.

Although liaison officers were posted to share information, the old perceptions of MONUC by the EU did not go away, that sharing information with the UN was risky as it would end up in the media. Also, both organisations generated independent threats and assessed information differently. So there was the possibility of each of them taking different action or viewing a situation differently.

The overall lack of cooperation can be put in the context of identity and interests. EU interests were obviously the safe return of its soldiers. It was set on ensuring minimal casualties. However, its partner, MONUC, had been identified as quite unreliable, especially in information sharing. Source U asserts that if the mission in the former Yugoslavia is to be recalled, the UN made a lot of mistakes which led to EU officials deciding never to put their troops under the UN’s command and control. Thus, cooperation between the EU and UN was cumbersome, except of course in the logistics department where the two organisations cooperated.



Furthermore, EUFOR RD Congo (as examined in Chapter 3) was seen as a way of the EU asserting its independence from NATO and playing a major role in international relations. MONUC was not going to be given an opportunity to rock the boat. Besides, as this mission was helping to test the waters for EU autonomous missions, extra caution was taken to ensure that no mistakes were made.

Nevertheless, the two organisations cooperated during the quelling of the fight in Kinshasa. Their show of strength and unity helped assure the voters and parties involved that a fair and less violent election was to take place. The result was a free election and a re-run, which culminated in Joseph Kabila being installed as president.

## **Conclusion**

During the course of the research it has become apparent that EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping has been more positive on the political than the operational level. It is evident that massive effort and resources have been invested in the political cooperation, yet at the operational level it has been found wanting. However, it could be that EU and UN officials may not want to tamper with the way each organisation carries out its operations in the field in order to maintain the status quo. Also, it is possible that the officials believe that it would not be worthwhile, as each operation or field of operation is different. Therefore, they may only be interested in getting the job done.

From the above study it should also be noted that these organisations are run by states and, as in the case of the UN, it can only go as far as its member states are willing to let it. From the interviews, the UN officials painted a picture of wanting to cooperate in the field of operation but that they are being hamstrung both by the EU and the UN officials at the headquarters. However, UN officials were content not to highlight the organisation's failings. It is evident from the EU perspective that certain states have interests, especially when it comes to former colonial territories or a client state. So the likelihood of sacrificing the overall interests of the organisation in order to meet the national interests is high.

Besides, as independent states, they are exercising their sovereign right to pursue national interests. This, however, has been cumbersome for both organisations, as

joint action has normally been reduced to informal networks which are rendered ineffective if the help required or collaboration may be risky.

It is important to understand that the culture of the organisation may be a stumbling block to cooperation. For instance, the restriction the EU places on information sharing hindered cooperation with the UN, as the latter was not trusted with being able to keep information secret.

Nonetheless, with the creation of informal networks working alongside the formal ones, cooperation to an extent has been possible between the two organisations, especially during the Congolese general elections of 2006. In addition, most officials in both organisations have coincidentally been coming from the same, neighbouring or ideologically similar countries and collaboration has been enhanced fully. This has, however, left some people from different countries in the dark.

The mixture of organisational and member state aspirations on the side of both the EU and UN, coupled with ineffective formal networks, has hindered cooperation between the two organisations. However, the fact that both organisations embrace liberal policies, particularly with the rebuilding of the country, plus shared identities and interests, means cooperation has been fairly enhanced on the operational level. Cooperation has also been helped greatly by the creation of informal networks to counteract ineffective ones. Nevertheless, there needs to be an improvement as the EU and UN need to come up with viable operation guidelines to assist their counterparts in the field.

## **Chapter 7**

### **Conclusions**

#### **1. Comparative examination of the inter-organizational dimensions of the military missions and the civilian missions.**

In order to fully grasp cooperation between the EU and the UN it is important to compare and contrast the inter-organisational dimension of the military missions and the civilian ones. As noted earlier, one of the major differences between the military and civilian operations is that the former required UN legitimizing authority while the latter did not. The civilian missions EUSEC and EUPOL were put into place at the request of the DR Congo government which sent a direct request to the EU, while Operation Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo need Security Council authorisation.

Although Solana wanted to portray missions like EUPOL Kinshasa as aiding the UN and was satisfied with the possibility of close cooperation ((Solana, 30/4/2005, p.1),

this served to cause further duplication of roles. For instance, the separation of chain of command from the chain of payment under EUSEC was also being run concurrently by the UN.

Furthermore, individual EU nations like France were operating outside the EU framework to train the police force which led to confusion as the process was not streamlined since the UN was doing something similar. This observation shows that even with civilian operations the pursuit of state interests plays a great role in the cooperation between organizations.

Yet it should be noted that although the UN's legitimizing power was not sought for the civilian missions, there was better coherence of the political cooperation in comparison to the military operations like Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo. For instance, as noted earlier France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK and the European Commission were members of the Joint Security Sector Reform's sub-committee on policing set up by MONUC (Pauwels, N, 2005, p.1) so there was a need to harmonise policies. Also, during EUSEC there was a desire to align the mission within the aspirations of the UN even though it was never consulted on the viability of the mission. Therefore the recurrent aspect of the civilian mission is that the UN is not necessarily the legitimizing power unlike military operations which need UN authorization.

The danger with civilian missions from an interorganisational aspect is that confusion arises, especially when dealing with third parties. For instance, the EU and UN were unable to present a united front when Kabila fired judges who were not very supportive of his regime. Although the UN protested the EU did not back it up (Source A, a UN official in the political affairs department). The failure of the EU to stand with the UN can be attributed to the fact that the legitimacy of the civilian operations was not derived from the UN but from the DR Congo government; hence there was a need to placate the regime.

Civilian missions are also less cumbersome than the military missions because they involve the deployment of few members of staff and do not require large logistical supplies. Plus the EU could depend on the resources and networks established by

MONUC in order to achieve its end. While military missions involve the deployment of military forces and the taking of extreme caution to make sure that lives of the troops are preserved. So the mandate requested for by the cooperating organization is normally under chapter VII of the UN charter. Plus if a mission is viewed as potentially very dangerous the organization may refuse to respond to the request.

Further still, civilian missions as seen in the DR Congo can be carried out over a large territory. For instance, EUPOL and EUSEC officials in DR Congo could travel throughout the country to fulfil their duties. However, this was not the case for EUFOR RD Congo as it was limited to Kinshasa. In the same vein Operation Artemis was limited to the Ituri region.

Divisions within the host state can affect cooperation between organizations as epitomized by the DR Congo situation. Source A argues that the government was not so keen on having a mutual structure for reforms such as the twofold quest of defence and justice by MONUC. This is because the EU's strong financial muscle had put it in the driving seat to gain leverage with the DR Congo's government. In contrast to military missions, the modalities and scope of an operation were always discussed beforehand which gave direction to the operations. Although as noted earlier cooperation was not always smooth.

Nevertheless it should be noted that even with the legal parameters set out, Source G asserted that there seemed to be a lack of a special operational framework on the military and civil military level. Although they dealt with different aspects like training the police and army and working together, for example during elections and dealing with crises like in Ituri, the lack of a special operational framework left many officials learning on the job and opening up new channels of cooperation with the officials of the organisation they were collaborating with on their own.

Overall it should be noted that both military and civilian operations used informal networks in DR Congo to fulfil their mission obligations. This therefore points to the notion that bureaucracies, mandates and organisation cultures affected the cooperation, both in the field and on the political level when it came to civilian and

military operations. This subsequently led to the development of informal processes and networks in order to fulfil the objectives of the different missions.

## **2. Main findings**

Although the EU missions sent to assist MONUC achieved some success in the short term, the collaboration did not achieve any long-term results. It is important to examine the successes of the different EU missions and then analyse the reasons why the collaboration was not so successful and put the model of inter-organisational cooperation efficiency into perspective. The areas of further research will also be examined.

The notable success of the EU missions included a reduction in pre-election violence and successful elections when the EU sent in the EUFOR RD Congo mission. The EU provided officials to help monitor the airwaves (Source B) and with a strong military presence in Kinshasa and other forces in the Central African Republic, the EU showed that it was duly prepared to ensure calm reigned in the country.

The EU additionally beefed up its forces with an “over the horizon” force in Central Africa. This gave MONUC forces confidence when keeping the peace that there was support for them in case they were overwhelmed by the people trying to disrupt the elections. MONUC was also able to try out the police force it had been training, assisted by EUPOL Kinshasa. The police force was capable of getting first-hand experience of dealing with riots but also observing human rights while carrying out its duties.

The EU further participated in the demobilisation and re-integration of former combatants alongside MONUC through EUSEC. By 2008, the EU and UN were working on the separation of the chain of command from the chain of payment of soldiers in the DR Congo army. These and other policies have been put in place and the soldiers have been sensitised, especially on issues to do with rule of law and respect for human rights.

However, even with the aforementioned achievements, the EU-UN collaboration did not succeed in the long term. This was because of a combination of factors created by the EU and the UN, plus the continual existence of social, political and economic issues within the DR Congo that need to be addressed. For example, while elections were successfully carried out, the aftermath left the former contestant Bemba on the run from Kabila's troops.

In relation to the research question, what are the motivating factors for both the UN and the EU? Is the collaboration made up of equal partners and, if not, who sets the agenda? It can be observed that although one of the motivating factors of the EU was to portray itself as a global actor, it refused to get involved in stopping the fighting that erupted in Eastern DR Congo in 2008 (Trivedi, *Strategic Foresight*, 2008, p.1). This cautious approach represents a change in policy from a military interventionist to a key player using soft power. The outbreak of fighting in 2008 was a major opportunity for the EU to further portray itself as a global military actor, but it decided against it and instead pushed for a diplomatic solution to the problem (*DW-World.De Deutsche Welle*, 1 November 2008). This refusal to militarily get involved in DR Congo further confirmed the desire by the EU to influence international politics through soft power (Ferrero-Waldner EU External Relations, pp.2-3) for which it is very well known for.

Furthermore, the EU is more disposed towards heavy investment in civil military activities in DR Congo like training the police, demobilising, rehabilitating former combatants plus working alongside the different ministries like justice and defence. Rummel (2004, p.2) reinforces the EU's reliance on the civil military form of intervention by arguing that, 'In spite of its high ambition, the EU has recognised the inherent limit placed on external intervention. Therefore, it has begun to focus on encouraging regional actors especially in Africa to take more responsibility for conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization.' This reflects a desire to create conditions that would not necessitate the EU to intervene or make EU intervention a means of last resort.

In essence, by choosing to use soft power and also turning to civil military operations, the EU seems to be handing the role of military intervener back to NATO

as it is more disposed towards robust military operations. This tacit withdrawal from military operations has breathed new life into the Berlin Plus framework signed between the EU and NATO.

Therefore, the desire by key EU states like France to portray the EU as a global force and divorce it from NATO seems to have backfired in the meantime. This is given due credence by Benitez (4 December 2010, p.1) who argues that according to General Stéphane Abrial, NATO's supreme allied commander for transformation, the EU is not only going in the direction of soft power, if one is to look at the Anglo-Franco defence agreement on bringing together certain resources and the harmonisation of more military activities. But to him 'it's an agreement to make the best use of resources to be able to use hard power more effectively ... for the benefit of the EU and the benefit of NATO'.

Sidhu (2004, pp.34-35) further adds the interests of the United States as a factor affecting the EU's decision to intervene in conflict. Sidhu contends that 'the involvement of EU capacities in future out-of-area peace operation is likely to be determined by varying levels of interest of the United States in the potential target region...the role, interest, and commitment of the US to a particular target region are likely to remain primary determinants for EU involvement or detachment from that region. For instance, the EU missions in Macedonia (Proxima) and DRC (Artemis) were possible because these areas were not of direct strategic interest to the US, and thus the US was willing to allow other actors to intervene in these areas' (Sidhu, 2004 pp. 34-35).

Therefore, the above-mentioned factor can explain the increased role of US-led NATO in Afghanistan and Libya. The EU had a secondary role in Afghanistan and Iraq because these countries were of key strategic interest, according to Sidhu (2004, pp.34-35).

Thus, although the EU carried out Operation Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo, it seemed to have betrayed its identity as a soft power. Since both operations were championed by France and Belgium, with the former providing most of the troops and logistics, it is evident that the EU was not necessarily keen on intervening on a



constant basis. It is more of an endeavour that looked appealing, but the EU soon realised the impracticability of being caught up in international interventions and was more predisposed towards a soft power approach.

Quintessentially, the EU seemed to be flirting with the idea of portraying itself as a global military actor yet this was not in line with its new identity in the post-World War II era. This perception is supported by Gen. Stéphane Abrial who, according to Benitez (2010, p.1), argued that the EU's reluctance to employ hard power is rooted in its history tainted by warfare. He contends that 'if you look at Europe in history, for centuries Europe was very good at hard power, maybe too good. That period is over, fortunately,"... but it means that "most Europeans are tired" of war.'

The refusal to get involved in DR Congo in 2008 also lent weight to Biscop and Missilori's (2008) perception that EU member states are deeply divided over the use of force in general and under the EU flag. This can be attributed to:

'On the one hand, the so-called Petersburg tasks enshrined in Art.17 TEU (and now refurbished in the Lisbon Treaty) do also envisage high-intensity military peace-enforcement missions. On the other, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) launched in 1999 has translated so far into low- or at best medium- intensity ones.... Similarly, the 2004 blueprint for the establishment of EU battle-groups - albeit agreed and translated into a phased implementation plan - has yet to result in a concrete deployment, under whatever flag. The EU, in other words, tends to be as selective as possible in the missions it agrees to undertake under its own flag... The EU tends – to paraphrase Lawrence Freedman's distinction – to opt only for "operations of choice" rather than "operations of necessity" that are short-lived (following the 'quick in, quick out' principle) and/or relatively light in nature and scope' (Biscop and Missilori 2008 pp.16-17).

However, the selective nature of the operations in which the EU gets involved is contradicted by the assertion by Ortega (2004, pp.11-12) that the battle group concept was designed, essentially to respond to UN requests.

Another factor affecting EU decisions on intervention is rooted in public opinion. Biscop and Missiroli (2008, pp.16-17) contend that while the EU public is usually 'very supportive of humanitarian-motivated operations, in fact, it tends to be much more in doubt when such operations become high-end, risky and costly. The 'body bag' test remains a difficult one for many EU governments and publics, let alone the soaring financial costs of protracted military missions in countries far and away from the European continent.' Therefore, the EU decision-making has to accommodate risk assessment and this limits high-risk operations. For instance, there was a likelihood of General Nkunda's forces inflicting casualties on EU forces as they were highly organised and (as examined earlier) were suspected of getting support from Rwanda. So the EU could not risk waging a proxy war against one of the Great Lakes' key military powers.

Biscop and Missiroli (2008, p.16) further postulate that although the EU member states are not reluctant to deploy troops within and beyond its backyard, plus contributing to UN contingents like in Lebanon, there is a reluctance to deploy in Africa. The EUFOR RD Congo troops were reluctantly deployed and were not followed up. In Darfur, they contend that it was after the African Union (AU) took on the operation that the EU 'reluctance to intervene [gave] way to intense EU-NATO competition to gain visibility through second-line support for the AU. And only in mid-2007 did the EU start considering — on France's initiative — an operation in neighbouring Chad as an additional and specific contribution. And even then it took the Union several months of wrangling and bargaining before sufficient troops could be mustered for the appointed operational commander to be able to give the go-ahead — thus showing a certain inadequacy at linking strategic thinking with practical implementation' (ibid p.16).

The overriding motivating factor of UN collaboration, as examined in chapter one and also through the thesis, is rooted in resource dependence, especially as it is buckling under its burgeoning responsibilities concerning human security and the responsibility to protect Umezawa (2012, p.12). Therefore the ability of the EU to deploy quickly as was the case during Operation Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo works in favour of the UN. Although the UN is seen as the legitimising body

(Umezawa 2012, p.12), the EU chooses where it would like to intervene militarily, thereby showing that the collaboration is not made up of equal partners.

Umezawa (2012, pp.18-19) notes that:

While the UN has generally emphasised the need for complementarity between the UN and regional organisations, including the EU, the EU obviously favours a more flexible case-by-case approach so that its' autonomy of decision remains. The EU has more or less dictated the terms and the pace of cooperation and has not displayed strong willingness to enhance its rapid reaction military support for UN-led peace operations. Moreover, some member states are reluctant to accept overall UN command and control of their forces...the relation so far has been largely determined by the divide between what the UN wants and what the EU is willing to offer.'

Umezawa confirms Biermann's (2008, p.154) argument that organisations are exceedingly unwilling to give up their autonomy through substantial cooperation. Therefore, overall both organisations have different motivating factors ranging from resource dependence to self-interests of being portrayed as an international actor for the UN and EU respectively. The collaboration is not made up of equal partners mainly due to, among other reasons, a desire to preserve autonomy for instance the EU-UN relationship to some extent is guided by not what the UN wants but what the EU is willing to offer.

Concerning the question: is the collaboration between the EU and UN good on the political but not so impressive on the operational level, or vice versa? Why is this so? What does it illuminate in terms of the overall nature of this collaboration? There were contradictions between the UN officials interviewed in New York and the ones in Kinshasa on whether the collaboration was working or not. The UN officials in New York talked glowingly of the UN-EU collaboration, citing the joint declarations of 2003 and 2007. However, the UN officials in the field were of a not-so-positive disposition. As examined earlier, they argued that there was more competition than collaboration as the EU seemed to be disjointed in the field. Their perception was given validity as they were both well versed with the operational and political aspect

of the cooperation, as some were from the political affairs department and others from the MONUC contingents or military hierarchy.

Further still, the EU officials agreed with them on the aspect of the cooperation not being so smooth, although the EU officials pointed the blame at the UN. They cited inherent weaknesses, such as the UN's penchant for leaking information to the outside world, and the weaknesses in the UN's mandates which, prior to September 2003, were not under Chapter VII; therefore, the use of force to save lives was curtailed. However, this lack of substantial collaboration can again be seen from Biermann's (2008, p.154) perspective of a need by organisations to preserve their autonomy. Therefore limiting the UN to receiving what the EU is willing to offer.

Nevertheless, both EU and MONUC officials have found ways of collaborating as they try to accomplish the missions. They have developed informal networks mainly based on the cultural identity of a Western world perspective. As examined in chapter one informal networks form one of the frameworks of the inter-organisational cooperation efficiency model.

The downside to the model is the way the informal networks were created; that is to say based on the cultural identity of a Western world perspective because it alienated the officials from other continents like Africa, who have struggled to link up with their counterparts in the corresponding departments. For instance, officials from an African background in the MONUC security sector reform (SSR) find it hard to interact with their opposite number in EUSEC (Source L). Yet other officials from European countries, for example in the rule of law department can easily access their counterparts in the SSR (Source F). Nevertheless, informal networks come into play when the formal methods of cooperation are clogged up.

Credence is given to the model of inter-organisational cooperation efficiency by Sidhu (2004, p.35) who asserts that the EU does not lack the capacity to intervene but rather, 'the absence of decision-making freedom and the inability of the member states to mobilize the necessary forces in times of crises. Consequently, the present spate of out-of-area operations might be the result of exceptional circumstances rather than the norm.' The UN is also controlled by member states so it struggles

with flexibility in decision-making. Hence, with inter-organisational efficiency both organisations can utilise the available informal channels of collaboration as shown by the events leading up to Operation Artemis.

During the actual co-deployment, Sidhu (ibid, p.35) suggests that, 'the EU also needs to guard against the two charges of 'peacekeeping ghettos' and 'peacekeeping apartheid' by ensuring greater coordination with the UN and other UN troops in planning and conducting joint operations.' This may obviously go against one of the main cornerstones of EU policy of not sharing sensitive information with the UN. But as modes of cooperation were found in the field when the EU helped the UN in monitoring the media and sharing intelligence, the same concept can be applied when the EU and the UN are planning and conducting joint operations.

Overall there were instances of lack of collaboration on both the political and operational level. Although from a political perspective the rhetoric was that the cooperation was great, plus mechanisms had been put into place like the steering committee and desk-to-desk liaison between Brussels and New York was taking place, this was not true in practice. For instance in 2008 when the EU refused to send a mission to the eastern DR Congo when the rebels led by General Nkunda were threatening the newly elected government of Joseph Kabila. From an operational perspective there is a failure to share information, although as examined in chapter six the EU authorised the release of classified information to the UN.

This further proves the hypothesis of the study that although inter-organisational cooperation in crisis management is justified by the partnering organisations as motivated by efficient humanitarianism, this is not normally the only reason. Usually, the underlying aim is the pursuit of interests that are relevant to the organisations or their key members. The viability of the underlying motives normally affects both the political and operational cooperation negatively, usually resulting in a disconnection between the positive rhetoric on the political level and instances of non-cooperation on the operational level.

In relation to the question about understanding the perception of third parties regarding the EU-UN collaboration in DR Congo, for example the Congolese

people, and regional and sub-regional actors involved in the conflict such as Uganda, Rwanda and SADC States, it can be argued that most of the interviewees did not see it as a burgeoning relationship. The Congolese saw the collaboration as an attempt to keep Kabila. The overriding observation was the role of France which was seen as trying to keep its interests intact in the country.

Although Rwanda and Uganda were critical of the collaboration, it can be argued that they also had strategic interests in the country and they had been accused of stealing the mineral wealth (*DW-World.De Deutsche Welle*, 4 January 2013) during their time of occupation.

Nevertheless, the fact that the other UN countries like South Africa and the SADC sub regional bloc plus other African countries were not linked to the conflict showed that it had its own interests to meet. As noted earlier, the UN has worked with African states in Darfur and South Africa was part of Operation Artemis. Therefore, although the UN was hopeful for resources it was not so keen on African states getting involved in DR Congo. Yet, this wariness can be appreciated, as most of them were part of the conflict and had competing interests. However, the problems in DR Congo have a regional dimension which cannot be ignored.

Thus the African states and Congolese people saw the collaboration in terms of fostering outside domination and to them it was not working, especially as the EU did not come to the rescue of the UN in 2008 and the Kabila government had to negotiate with Rwanda which culminated into the arrest of Nkunda. Furthermore, Dagne (2011, p.2) notes that 'the two governments agreed to launch a joint military offensive against the National Congress for the Defense of the Congolese People (CNDP) and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). They also agreed to restore full diplomatic relations and to activate economic cooperation.'

Therefore although the collaboration between the EU and UN has come to show signs of a burgeoning relationship, especially with the different joint declarations by the EU and the UN, plus the advent of effective multilateralism, there have been instances of opportunism in the relationship. For instance, the EU in a bid to be seen as a global actor has used the legitimising power of the UN to foster its role in the international arena. The UN for its part has been in need of resources due to its

expanding role in the post Cold War period and the EU has been the most likely source of resources, leading to non-utilisation of the African states in the region that could play and have actually been playing a vital role in the resolution of the conflict in DR Congo. This has further proved the hypothesis that although inter-organisational cooperation in crisis management is justified by the partnering organisations, as motivated by efficient humanitarianism, this is not normally the only reason. Usually the underlying aim is the pursuit of interests that are relevant to the organisations or their key members. The viability of the underlying motives normally affects both the political and operational cooperation negatively, normally resulting in a disconnection between the positive rhetoric on the political level and instances of non-cooperation on the operational level. It is important not to forget that lack of cooperation still occurs at the political level too. It is essential to note that the EU and the UN are both run by member states and can only act as far as and in the way these states are willing to allow them

### **3. The impact of inter-organisational cooperation efficiency on the theory and practice of peacekeeping**

Peacekeeping as examined earlier has been going through changes over the past decades and it quite acceptable that change is part and parcel of peacekeeping. This acceptance is a result of the changing nature of global politics and conflicts as examined earlier. Therefore although the end of the Cold War and the rise of new types of conflict had changed the way peacekeeping was operating, the experience in this post Cold War environment has further brought about new developments. Among these developments has been the advent of inter-organisation cooperation especially in areas the UN has been unable to adequately prevent humanitarian crises or reoccurrence of conflict. Coupled with that is the fact that peacekeeping currently incorporates security sector reforms and return to rule of law among other things. In order to accomplish such endeavours the UN has needed organisations to work with. Since the UN Charter chapter VIII provides for regional arrangements, there has been a marked rise in UN collaboration with regional powers like the EU and AU with the former quite often operating outside its geographical area.

Furthermore after the trouble in Ituri in 2003 and the launch of Operation Artemis, the UN had to go through some changes. For instance there was a general acceptance that it had to operate under chapter seven of the UN charter. As discussed in chapter 7 missions like MINURCAT and UNAMID were launched under chapter VII of the UN charter. This made the collaboration easier especially in co-deployment like in Kinshasa 2006 when MONUC forces were working alongside EUFOR RD Congo.

The cooperation with regional actors led to a need to codify the relationship and so the EU and UN had the joint declaration in 2004 setting out the modalities of the collaboration. This was followed up by the joint declaration in 2007. However, even with the declarations and system of interaction being set up, the cooperation was not so successful. This led to the emergency of the soft cooperation dimension to the collaboration.

Some of the major factors which favoured its emergency were the use of frameworks like informal networks and processes; these helped the peacekeepers in the field interact with each other especially when the major channels of cooperation were clogged up.

The emerging role of the individual on both the political and operational level has helped improve the way peacekeeping is conducted. For instance through informal contact the Secretary General was able to approach President Jacques Chirac of France and got him to agree to intervene in DR Congo.

Individuals are further crucial to the formation and maintenance of informal networks. They form them and utilise them to the best of their ability. For instance one of the major layers of informal networks is identity. The people forming the informal networks normally do so because of some form of similarity they share with their counterparts.

The individuals further play a major role in what has come to be known as double-hatting. This can be because of either their knowledge of the region or have some complementary attributes relevant to the cooperating organisations.



Communication between cooperating organisations has been improved and as the EU-UN collaboration in DR Congo shows there is some level of information sharing. Though the directive by the EU to its personnel to share information with the UN was met with mixed feelings especially as shown by Source H an official in the Council of the European Union General Secretariat and Source U senior official in DGE VIII. The EU rhetoric was not met with the desired action. However through informal structures set up in the field the EU and UN shared information especially during the DR Congo elections of 2006.

Inter-organisational cooperation efficiency model has further impacted peacekeeping theory and practice by showing that the aims of international organisations can be met by a mixture of hard and soft cooperation. For instance, although hard cooperation has been known to have structures in place especially from a legal perspective, these have normally helped to launch the missions and provide a framework of cooperation. The soft cooperation has helped in situations where the structures of cooperation have become a hindrance to the accomplishment of the mission. However in situations where soft cooperation has proved too risky the legal structures have come into play in order to avoid casualties and help the missions not deviate from their mandates.

Familiarity with the field of operation can help foster cooperation between the UN and regional organisations. For instance as in the case of the EU most of its missions in Africa have been in areas where an EU member state was well conversant with. However sometimes deadlocks may occur within an organisation as the case was with the EU in 2008 when it could not help out the UN in DR Congo. Nevertheless the UN can still rely on regional and sub-regional actors to resolve conflicts. This has been the case in DR Congo in 2008 when Rwanda and DR Congo government reached an understanding to work together to end the fighting. Further still in 2012 when M23 rebels threatened eastern DR Congo, the neighbouring powers like Rwanda and Uganda helped birth a solution. Therefore the model can be of greater use as other regional organisations can fill the void left by others.

Through the dimensions, frameworks and layers of inter-organisation cooperation efficiency an evolution of inter-organisation collaboration has emerged. For instance

during the UN and EU collaboration in Chad the MINURCAT was set up with a EUFOR Chad/CAR component. Although it had a separate command and control structure it was an improvement from operation Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo. This shows a gradual improvement in the interaction between the two organisations as they continue to trust each other. Operation Artemis involved less interaction between the two organisations in the field. EUFOR RD Congo although co-located was a separate mission altogether. But the collaboration was better than during Artemis. MINURCAT/EUFOR RD Chad/CAR showed impressive progress with the collaboration between the two organisations as the EU force was actually a component of the UN mission.

The UN went a step further with the lessons learnt from the aforementioned missions to launch UNAMID which was a hybrid force incorporating AU led AMIS with UN forces under a single command and control structure. AMIS troops were re-hatted and benefitted from an improved mandate under chapter VII of the UN charter.

Therefore the UN has shown a marked propensity to change within when dealing with the new crises. Regional organisations have embraced the burden sharing in the international arena. Although the EU has been selective about intervening in conflicts after 2008, the ground work laid from 2003 to 2008 has helped the UN deal better with regional organisations and adapt to the changing nature of conflicts and the issues that cause threat to international peace and security.

#### **4. Lessons for future cooperation**

The success or failure of a mission, whether led by the EU or UN, is dependent on whether the member states are willing to equip it with all the required mandate and instruments to fulfil the task. It can be argued that, in the case of the UN, it has been a work in progress and this affected its collaboration with the EU; officials of the latter organisation do not fully rate the abilities of the former, especially in acting decisively and also on matters of data and information protection. Yet with inter-organisational cooperation efficiency as examined in chapter seven some of the

hindrances can be overcome when applying soft cooperation in case hard cooperation proves to be cumbersome.

The EU-UN cooperation overall was successful in the short run, especially in meeting the targets set out as seen from Operation Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo. The relationship between CIVPOL and EUPOL has been cordial and the same can be said, to some extent, of the different departments and people involved in the security sector reform. But, as explained earlier, both organisations are run by member states and can only act as far as they are allowed. So deadlocks in the cooperation, especially resulting from an officious framework, have led to a need to collaborate outside this bureaucratic set-up between and within both the EU and UN. This has ultimately led to the development of informal networks at both the political and operational levels of cooperation. Therefore it is important for both organisations to appreciate the role of soft cooperation because hard cooperation on its own cannot answer the questions of collaboration between the two organisations.

However it should be noted that although the informal networks have been fundamental in enhancing the collaboration where the two organisations have been held up by bureaucracy, this has not served as a magic bullet. Where there has been a need for deeper commitment or situations where, for example, a military engagement may lead to casualties, then the informal network has been bypassed. The subsequent heads are normally informed and the clearance to proceed is either granted or rejected.

Furthermore, although the relationship is constantly changing and new measures are set up and agreements are signed, cooperation is still limited as the member states have a say on when, where and how missions are to be launched by both organisations. If conflict broke out in Asia, the EU would not be immediately drafted in; ways of solving the conflict would be sought first with the regional powers and the neighbouring states. And since EU commitment is not tantamount to a blank cheque to the UN, it is highly likely that the EU will not respond to all the calls by the UN in peacekeeping or military intervention. The EU is becoming increasingly centralised and, in as much as the UN could rely on a few member states to convince the rest, it is not guaranteed that this will be the case in future.

Besides, EU states have interests and policies that have to be met. States that may have interest in a particular region like Africa may face opposition from those that do not but would prefer a UN mission to continue peacekeeping other than sending in an EU force.

Nevertheless, it can still be argued that the EU-UN collaboration was, to some extent, successful and it is on such a backdrop that the two organisations signed the 2003 and 2007 declarations. In addition to this is the actuality that they have taken steps to formalise their relations and, in times of crisis, the UN is sure it can call on the EU to help. Thus the two organisations are in constant dialogue and as the relationship improves, a blueprint for future missions and likely collaborations with other regional organisations within the UN is in the offing.

Both champion good governance, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights, so the relationship becomes less cumbersome. Even with the difficulties that may arise down the line, both organisations can deal with them due to the fact that they share a common heritage — a belief in the aforementioned values.

All in all, despite self-interest playing a major role in conflict and non-cooperation between the EU and UN on both the operational and political level, the pursuit of humanitarian goals like saving lives and fulfilling their respective mandates have led to the development of soft cooperation to bypass the restrictive policies to accomplish the mission. Soft cooperation has included among other layers informal networks which also highlight the commitment to multilateralism by the different officials even in an environment of restrictive organisational practice.

By deciding to work together, the EU and UN have also shown a commitment to multilateralism, even if the subsequent sidelining of the African actors has led to a belief that a social construct has been in operation where the Western states and a Western leaning UN have come together because of a shared identity. Nevertheless, it has been argued that most of the regional states had been party to the different wars in DR Congo and it would be a conflict of interest to draft them as part of the peacekeepers.

It is important to note that the UN could not involve both the EU and the African Union or regional actors. The EU was committed to come in but it would have been confusing to have two sets of peacekeeping forces plus MONUC in DR Congo. Plus all of them have their own command and control structures and mandates.

In conclusion therefore, joint military operation is new territory for both the EU and UN, with both operating on narrow briefs on the cooperation and aims of the cooperation. Consequently, although a lot of effort was put into the collaboration, the reality is that some cooperation was missing. This left no long-time legacy but institutions like the EU and UN need to think hard and work harder to ensure cooperation in the future has a solid base. The two organisations can therefore start from recognising that soft cooperation is as important as hard cooperation.

Further still with the UN taking on more responsibilities in the international arena like getting involved in internal conflicts coupled with increasing threats to international peace and stability like terrorism and climate change, different aspects of the model as shown above can be used to meet its needs especially for resources and support in dealing with these issues.

## **5. Further research**

As the EU and UN collaboration is a developing relationship, a lot will depend on what happens to the EU forces, especially since the Lisbon treaty came into force. In addition, it should be noted that the two organisations are in constant contact with each other so there is a likelihood of making changes to the way they collaborate.

There is a need to examine further the EU identity crisis that was made manifest when the request from the UN was rejected and the EU instead chose to pursue a diplomatic solution. As examined earlier, the EU seemed to be flirting with the notion of being a global actor, especially on the military front yet it was a soft power that was more predisposed towards diplomatic solutions to conflict. The conflict in Eastern DR Congo has provided a reminder to that and the EU refused to intervene

and had to depend on the UN and neighbouring states like Rwanda to intervene and bring order.

EU and UN collaboration in DR Congo sought to promote effective multilateralism as a new set of policies in which inter-organisational cooperation is a key component. Further research is therefore needed to confirm this, especially using a wide range of experience since inter-organisational cooperation has become very popular.

Further research is needed to verify and refine the model of inter-organisational cooperation efficiency. This is vital to understand inter-organisational cooperation but also to set up guidelines for future inter-organisational collaboration. This is because the factors that led to the collaboration are still rampart and inter-organisational cooperation is vital to dealing with them. For instance the EU in the European Security strategy (2003 p.9) asserts that; 'in a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.'

The EU therefore as a solution envisages deeper collaboration with the UN For example in the European Security Strategy (2003, p.11) it is stated that 'the EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations.'

The EU has tried to deliver on this promise by the collaboration in DR Congo and Chad. For instance Sheuermann (2011, p.20) notes the use of the bridging concept of cooperation used during 'Artemis/MONUC in 2003 and Chad/MINURCAT 2008/09 she asserts that; 'in such a case, the EU troops function as a bridge for an UN mission to gain time for a (re-)deployment of UN peacekeepers or the (re-)organisation of the UN operation' (Ibid, p.20).

Other examples of inter-organisational cooperation have taken place for instance the 'joint African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID)' which was launched in 2008 (UNAMID, p.1 accessed 21/5/2012). This is a clear indication that inter-organisational cooperation is a major factor in peacekeeping especially with an overburdened UN. Thus there is a need to study, verify and expand the model of inter-organisational efficiency.

Nevertheless the cooperation between the EU and UN achieved short term gains from a military point of view. However the continued engagement in DR Congo in a civil military capacity has gone a long way in helping establish a security apparatus in DR Congo after years of conflict. However due to the unstable nature of the country and region, it remains to be seen if the efforts and the years invested by both the EU and UN will reap rewards of sustainable peace.

Nonetheless the collaboration precedents in international politics like collaboration between international organisations and regional organisations with the latter operating outside their geographical settings. The study has been able to raise other issues that need to be examined in due course to provide a proper understanding of the dynamics of inter-organisational cooperation while utilising it at the same time to achieve desired goals in the international system.

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20. Ms. Evelyn Ngalonsa (Desk officer in the ministry of foreign affairs (Source W, interviewed on 5<sup>th</sup> November 2009).

21. Patrick Ifonge Congolese IT expert working for an emerging think tank called thinking Africa (Source X interviewed on 6<sup>th</sup> March 2012)

21. Mr. Julius Kagamba (Ugandan Diplomat Special Assistant to African Union Commission Source Y, interviewed on 9<sup>th</sup> November 2009).

22. Brig. Maj Rusagara, (Diplomat with the Rwandan embassy in London (Source Z, interviewed on 5<sup>th</sup> November 2009).