

# **Nihil ex Nihilo**


The archeology of Nothing:  
Heidegger and the inception of logos

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# Nichtendes Nicht

Reines Nichten:  
lichtendes Bergen  
anfänglich entzogener  
Austrag verwindender  
in ihr zurückschwingender  
eignender Fugnis<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Nihilating Nothing    Pure Nihilation:/ sheltering clarity/ inceived withdrawal/ coming over the extraction/ in itself re-turning in oscillation/ appropriating jointure (*GA81*, 296)

## Acknowledgements

A part as difficult as the whole. Since the whole is saturated with acknowledged voices, such *partes extra partes* should bear witness to the inapparent of the text, its invisible yet integral formative contributions, the contributions of those whose lack of a certain vocal spectrality—the very life of their contributions—confined them in shadows. As the whole, the part begins at the end, a medial movement towards those who stand closest to the conditions of its formation.

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Rarely however does a debt run as deep as the unassuming help and support of Dr. Aggelos Mouzakis has placed me over the course of eight years. My present *in toto* would be unthinkable had our encounter never been.

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A duty remains however, a duty beyond debt, a dedication beyond words.

To my father Eleutherios and my mother Kalliope,  
*charistērion.*

## Abstract

The essay at hand undertakes to think the inception of occidental thought as an event opening for the first time the horizon of the thought of Nothing. Although a study *with* and *from*, it is not a study of Heidegger, but a study of the inception (*archē*) of *logos*, as such an archaeology. The inception is delimited along the proper names of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides which we approach in reverse order, returning ever-closer to the origin that appears as ever-other, ever-distant. In this re-turn we try to understand the beginning, its truth and the task it presents us with, a task of essential thought. This task consists in the attempt of a turn of Being towards Nothing, a turn wherein essence is trans-formed *from* ex-istence, an existence foreign to every existentialism. In this thematization of the lesion between *essentia* and *existentia* comprising itself a distinct history of Being, a change of tone takes effect, a change of tone that corresponds to the essence of the turn that we come to know as *tropos*. The *tropos* of Being, its essence of turning, emerges inceptively thus in the re-turn of Nothing, the jointure and origin of presence and absence, what opens and maintains the field of their oscillation. This Nothing we try to trace across the inception so that a new beginning may be granted to us, a new beginning that is always the first.

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## Prolegomena

“Wir kennen nicht Ziele  
Wir sind nur ein Gang.”<sup>1</sup>

The genealogy of this study is precisely *the way*. It is the offspring of previous work on the ever more closely researched Heideggerian encounter of Taoism, the thought of the way. If however its point of germination is found at this jointure, at the interconnection, the inter-question<sup>2</sup> of Being and the way, this point offers the present work the origin of a return; the return to the origin of occidental thought, the thought of *logos*. The three questions appear to us<sup>3</sup> for the first time in essential proximity. We hear<sup>4</sup> Malabou, “[...] the question of Being, a question that henceforth cannot be dissociated from the thinking of the path or way [*Weg*]. In this sense, Heidegger would be the first thinker of the originary voyage (away from itself) of the origin”<sup>5</sup>—and hear the calling of an incessant opening that opens the threefold: the origin, the way, Being. Because of temporal and textual limitations this inter-questioning is here taken up in the amplitude of the origin. The question of the way is thus reserved as explicit undertaking; but this is neither a lack, nor an exclusion. The thought of the way remains our originary way of thought; withdrawing as explicit question, it allows the thinking of the origin to gain new clarity. For the origin, thought *from* the way, no introduction can be commensurate.

The incommensurability of an introduction, of introducing itself, to the way appears in another threefold. First, the most sensitive reading and writing has always been aware of the double truth that Hegel’s *Phenomenologie* made apparent and Derrida’s *Dissemination* enriched into a common ground—an introduction cannot be

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<sup>1</sup> “We know no aims/ we are but a passage.” (GA78, 272)

<sup>2</sup> Not a technical term, but the simple questioning-through, a horizon of relation from a mutual question, a reciprocal questioning.

<sup>3</sup> All instances of first plural in this essay refer to the author insofar as he finds himself speaking from the same origin and in jointure with the truest of Heidegger’s and Heideggerian intentions; an enjoining of voices, rather than a figure, an empty form, of speech.

<sup>4</sup> Hearing and speaking in this essay is not simply given precedence over reading and writing or the other senses (the Nietzschean smell for example), every one uniquely irreducible. We receive however the teaching of hearing from Heidegger and the limits of sight from Derrida and make our way of approaching Nothing a hearing, hearkening one. Why the aural should best guide us far exceeds the scope of this essay yet its close *reading* should make this *evident*, even if not, or better *precisely because not*, explicated.

<sup>5</sup> Malabou C. & Derrida J., *Counterpath*, p.127



the abridged truth of a book, all the more since the path of truth has been found superlatively perilous. “*Philosophical exposition has as its essence the capacity and even the duty to do without a preface.*”<sup>6</sup> For how is one to summarize in advance a way? What does it mean to have its sum? What does this quantity of a way amount to? Certainly a sum is not a mere equivalent of a map, a *carta*. Does it involve knowing its destination? We hear again Derrida’s words: “it is bad to predestine one’s reading, it is always bad to foretell. It is bad, reader, no longer to like retracing one’s steps.”<sup>7</sup> For destination is death. “Not in the sense in which to arrive at our destination, for us mortals, is to end by dying. No, the very idea of destination includes analytically the idea of death, like a predicate (p) included in the subject (S) of destination.”<sup>8</sup> A summary is the epitaph that replaces the guiding sign, a substitution of life—the life of thought—with cartographic paper.

Secondly, how does the ineluctable presentation of a map correspond not to the arrangement of the way, but to its ‘waying’ [*wegen*]? All the more, since the truth of the way, the voyage, is precisely the risk and the danger<sup>9</sup> thought runs in thinking what is most proper [*eigen*], most truthful [*alēthes*] to itself. For “we are like all that is only beings as what is wagered [*Gewagten*] on the wager [*Wagnis*] of Being.”<sup>10</sup> This is poetry in us and this is play with the world, the Heraclitean lesson. It is precisely waying, for weighing and taking the risk [*wagen*] is the waying opening of a way [*wegen* and *wägen*].<sup>11</sup>

Finally, beyond the wagering danger, a third impossibility of a summarizing, overviewing introduction emerges. If the only success of the way is not arrival, but the waying as the running of the uttermost danger, if thus danger is what we may only hope

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<sup>6</sup> Derrida J., *Dissemination*, p.8. Yet when Derrida evokes Hegel’s “There is no serious philosophy in introductions, only mythology, at most.” (Derrida J., *On the name*, p.110) one should think the pejorative ‘mythology’ with due caution; as becomes evident in the following for the whole of metaphysics, including Heidegger, myth is the protean figure of the adversary.

<sup>7</sup> Derrida J., *The Post Card*, p.4

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p.33

<sup>9</sup> The shades of meaning that distinguish risk from danger deserve fuller treatment. For now, we attempt to think both from the unsettling perspective of forest paths, where the possibility of losing oneself in their meandering constitutes the very experience of having traversed the forest (where light and darkness alternates even on the most dazzling of days). *Aside* however of Heidegger, we endeavour a parallel vocabulary, where the *risk* lies precisely in *arriving*, in making a distance of the way, a route that connects beforehand the points of the voyage; in the language of metaphysics: making presence of Nothing. While the *danger* lies in *never arriving*, being forever lost—in the language of metaphysics: discovering absence everywhere in presence. Danger thus always is in danger of becoming risk, while risk is in risk of itself. In this vocabulary the risk of danger is full of beauty (*kalos gar o kindynos*- Plato, *Phaedo*, 114d)

<sup>10</sup> *GA5*, 297

<sup>11</sup> *GA5*, 281

for and the impossibility of arrival<sup>12</sup> presents us with the simple necessity of failure, how does one summarize a failure? Formal logic finds no problem in the successful presentation of a failure. But *logos* on the way that precedes logic knows that failure is here of the order of truth, inexorable and ineluctable; one can only truly summarize a failure in failing. Failure then demands the passage and sets one underway; failure makes us travel. It is this unarriving need of the passage, which dictates the words of the late *Spiegel* interview: “The greatness [*Große*] of what is to be thought is *too* great.”<sup>13</sup>

At least for now, until a new god arrives, or until we prepare ourselves for another beginning. In the face of such greatness, of truthful failure a guiding cartography to help us across the forest can only be drawn from *the ever-new beginning*, from which every archeology has to begin.<sup>14</sup> Rather than another, this other archeology has nothing to do with the *archeio*, the archive, but concerns itself with the *archē*. Its thought, the thought of inception, we undertake extensively in *The beginning of truth*, the chapter that relates the thinkers of the origin to the origin itself and so prepares our way. Only in preparation, in the prolegomena of *logos* is introducing meaningful and for the time, we prepare ourselves for the inceptive pro-logue of *archē*.

Over against the history of classifications that the *archeio* comprises, allowing for ever-new structural discourses, this archeology is the *logos* of the ever-new itself. Such shift of meaning is here mutually significant. On the one hand, formally, with regard to the thinkers of the inception<sup>15</sup> there is no such thing as primary sources. The history of the dissemination of the fragments is well known and merely attests to the very necessity of discovering the origin of thought, the *archē* in the very interiority of

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<sup>12</sup> “There is no destination, my sweet destiny you understand, within every sign already, every mark or every trait there is distancing” Derrida J., *The Post Card*, p.29

<sup>13</sup> My emphasis; the discussion demands this intonation, lost in the transcribed excerpt, but contextually evident.

<sup>14</sup> While archaeology, the *logos* of the beginning, guides the whole of the essay, carto-graphy is our attempt to offer the impossible writing (*graphē*) of a summarizing introduction. Such writing however in re-placing introduction introduces in turn a number of difficulties, not least the relation of the transcription to the calling. Again this parallel theme, remains here best contained in the footnotes and the struggle for a carto-graphy of the origin is effectively left aside once it’s served its provisional aim—the word does not reappear in the main textual body. If nonetheless we should say something on the place of this carta we may repeat Angelus Silesius: “*Der Ort ist das Wort*” and yet disagree with Derrida: “It [the non-geographic place of the word] is not *that in which* is found a subject or an object. It is found in us.” (Derrida J., *On the name*, p.57) The non-objective plane of the originary word is not inside, but *there*.

<sup>15</sup> Calling Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides thinkers of the inception delimits the Heideggerian departure from the received Pre-Socratic or in the case of Nietzsche, Pre-Platonic classification. Not only it rests on an essentially different understanding of the beginning of thought, but sets intentionally the three thinkers apart. Thinking with Heidegger, we inherit this name and reserve the Pre-Socratic designation for quotations and explicit references to other thinkers.

its much later archivization. On the other hand, from truth, what is at work in our investigation is precisely not a discursive structure but the abyss of the origin (*archē*) itself. Insofar as the first occidental utterance of the *archē* was *logos*, we intend here but the truest, that is, the most originary meaning of archeology. Such archeology is, borrowing the construction of Maly, an *Er-(ur)-fahrung*, the experience of the origin that attempts the voyage “all the way into, into and out of the origin.”<sup>16</sup> Against the fear that Hölderlin incites in his *Brot und Wein* in the warning: “But of the origin/ One thinks with difficulty” we have the certain antidote of an assured failure: between the risk of arriving and the danger of never arriving,<sup>17</sup> our archeology follows the truthful failure of danger, incessantly not arriving, and only thus able to begin again.

This archeology does not, could not, intend an explication of Heidegger. It rather reads with him, through him,<sup>18</sup> as though over his shoulder, the inceptive fragments. A close reading of the original Greek<sup>19</sup> proceeds thus from Heidegger’s lectures and essays on Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides from the mid-30s to the mid-50s and the seminars of his final years.<sup>20</sup> Such proximity keeps itself however distant from reiteration. Neither does it exhaust itself in the observation of the fluctuations of the predominantly coherent Heideggerian thought. If it is Heideggerian, our voice resounds less the Platonism of Aristotle and more the Socratism of Plato: speaking through

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<sup>16</sup> Maly K., *Reading and Thinking: Heidegger and the Hinting Greeks*, in Sallis J. (ed.), *Reading Heidegger, Commemorations*, p.224

<sup>17</sup> See footnote 9.

<sup>18</sup> In Malabou’s sense of ‘within and beyond’. Thus through Heidegger becomes ‘through us’. Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, pp.1-2

<sup>19</sup> Placing the emphasis on the ‘original’ instead of the ‘Greek’ seems to contradict what a little earlier appeared not as given, but as a complex task of retrieval of the *archē* from the history of the fragments’ dissemination. Aside from clarifying that this essay suspends all ready translations to work with the Greek text as delivered (for the most part following the Diels-Kranz edition), it is informed precisely as mentioned above and now again, from the attempt that Heidegger inaugurates, to find what is most –most truly- Greek in the Greek itself. When reading the ‘original Greek’, we do not begin, but strive towards the originality of the fragments, an arrival, on the way, forever failing.

This striving of the origin, which is forever futural and forever new is what made a grateful anti-Heideggerian like Detienne exclaim: “The Hellenists are perhaps at fault in not realizing that the only real innovator in Greek thought is Heidegger.” (Detienne M., *The masters of truth in archaic Greece*, p.26) It is certainly not a matter of remaining ‘Heideggerian’, if such a word means anything, but of thinking the origin, the Greek anew. Heidegger is the indispensable guide of such thought.

<sup>20</sup> In particular the essay *Der Spruch des Anaximander* (1946) (GA5), the essays *Logos* (1951), *Maira* (1952), (1954) (GA9), the later seminars with Fink and the seminars of Le Thor and Zähringen (1951-73) (GA15) and the lectures of 1932 on Anaximander and Parmenides (GA35), the second part of the lectures of 1941 on Anaximander (GA51), the lectures of 1942/43 on Parmenides (GA54), the lectures of 1943 and 1944 on Heraclitus (GA55) and the lectures of 1946 on Anaximander (GA78). Although Heidegger undertakes an explicit study of inceptive thought only at these precise moments, inceptive thought is operative in most of his work even before the famous turn. We thus consistently turn to a much wider range of Heideggerian texts.

Heidegger it constitutes a constant departure, which by intending the origin, returns the teaching voice closer to its originary intention. In the boldest of our formulations we have to identify the *dominant* Heideggerian intention of the declarations on the overcoming of metaphysics not in the abolition, but in the reformation<sup>21</sup> of metaphysics. Heidegger is certainly aware of the insufficiency of metaphysics with respect to the aletheic<sup>22</sup> demands of thought and yet against his *originary* in-tension that invokes the thought of the origin he clings to the hopeless rescue.

Let us take a brief excursion. We hear from Hegel: “Herein falls the older Ionian philosophy. We should treat this as shortly as possible; and this is so much easier, as the thoughts are very abstract and barren. Others, except for Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, come only nominally to consideration. We have no more than half a dozen passages of the whole of the old Ionian philosophy; and this is then an easy study. Indeed learning accredits itself most for the ancients; but of which one knows the least, is what one may be most learned about.”<sup>23</sup> Metaphysics is forced to this judgement, for as Hegel affirms: “The form has to be the totality of form. [...] This is the deepest and thus the latest.”<sup>24</sup> The century of the archaeology of the *archeio*, the 19<sup>th</sup>, has made here little progress since Bacon and Descartes. Thus the Neo-Kantian Lange expresses merely the general in-tension of metaphysical thought when he identifies Hellenic independence, what is to be mostly Greek, not in what originally set it apart, not in its beginning, but rather in its *perfection*<sup>25</sup>—dissociating beginning and perfection, while violently reducing the meaning of both.

To recognize the metaphysical stakes of this reduction, Comte’s seemingly irrelevant maxim becomes pertinent: “one only learns to predict the future after having

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<sup>21</sup> The overcoming of metaphysics, or stepping beyond or before metaphysics has an independent and extensive history of interpretation, impossible to recount here. Often however it has been thought as the declaration of the end of metaphysics, its mere replacement by another thought. Heidegger *despite* or precisely *from* his long involvement with Tao confesses in the *Spiegel* interview: “I am convinced that a change can only be prepared from the same place in the world where the modern technological world originated. It cannot come about by the adoption of Zen Buddhism or other Eastern experiences of the world. The help of the European tradition and a new appropriation of that tradition are needed for a change in thinking. Thinking will only be transformed by a thinking that has the same origin and destiny.” (trnsl. by M. Alter and J. D. Caputo) This transformation is precisely a reformation, where the past is taken up in the new beginning.

<sup>22</sup> *Alētheia* is examined in the second part of Chapter 1. We use ‘aletheic’ as adjective to refer to the order of truth.

<sup>23</sup> Hegel G. W. F., *W18*, 194

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 205

<sup>25</sup> Lange F. A., *The History of Materialism and Criticism of Its Present Importance*, p.10

in some sort predicted the past.”<sup>26</sup> It becomes even clearer Heidegger’s reformulation: “Hegel saw everything that is possible. But the question is whether he saw it from the radical centre of philosophy, whether he exhausted all the possibilities of the beginning so as to say that he is at the end.”<sup>27</sup> Metaphysics, unable to predict the past, is left bereft of a future. For the past, at the point of origin, has greatly surpassed metaphysics. For the origin speaks always from the future, from the last, which Heidegger comes to think as *eschaton*. Only from the origin can we thus hear the words: “The Being of beings collects itself (*legesthai*, *logos*) in the last of its destiny.”<sup>28</sup> “The last of its destiny” against every culminating process, is a destiny, a future, (for-ever and for-ever as last) calling from the past.

In this brief phrase we witness the Heideggerian metaphysical operation at work. Precisely when the last of destiny is brought to speak (*legesthai*) from the origin, its collection (*logos*) amounts to the Being of beings, the hardest residue of metaphysical thought. Speaking through Heidegger with the Greeks we come to realize that the originary and last can never be Being, but only Nothing. Being is not the Nietzschean ontological *ressentiment* in fear of the primordial reality of ‘becoming’, but the violent metaphysical decision initiated with Parmenides against the actuality of Nothing. Our archaeology that re-turns before Being towards the origin, has thus the fullness of the double genitive of Nothing.

Yet we are not allowed merely to dispense with Heideggerian Being, for in all its transformations up to its final abandonment, it synthesizes the trace of a struggle with Nothing; although bound to metaphysics, such Being has witnessed<sup>29</sup> Nothing.

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<sup>26</sup> Comte A., *The Essential Comte*, pp.192-204 and Burns M. R. & Rayment-Pickard H., *Philosophies of History*, p.115

<sup>27</sup> GA24, 400

<sup>28</sup> GA5, 327

<sup>29</sup> A witnessing discourse beginning from Levinas, Derrida and Agamben (of course such beginning is *media res*, as already with Augustine) is here vital as it is impossible. We limit ourselves to two demarcations. Firstly, the employment of the word in this essay is neither theologico-messianic, nor ethico-political. If an attribution should be attempted, witnessing is here purely onto-nihilic, referring to the enjoining origin. Secondly, with Agamben we distinguish in witnessing the tones of *testis*, legal swearing, attesting the veracity of an event and *superstes*, having lived through—thus survived—an event (Agamben, G. *Remnants of Auschwitz*, p.17) and, again with Agamben, think from the latter. Witnessing is thus not “always a theological one” (Rahner K., *Theological Observations on the Concept of Witness*, p.157) nor is it accordingly swearing to someone “before God, in front of God, who is my witness; testis is [not] testis, the third one.” (Caputo J., *The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida*, p.17) Being witnesses Nothing *hypo-* and *hyper-ex-*istentially (see the Heraclitean chapter for *ex-*istence): *Being* is here precisely *unto-Nothing*. As soon as the thought of Being takes the way of Nothing it undergoes a *Grenzerfahrung* from which it cannot re-turn unchanged. The question whether it survives this way needs here remain open—if Primo Levi ultimately survived the camp, not everyone who came to walk

Thus if we want to ask why Nothing has been excluded and forgotten in thought, if we want to inquire into the reasons of such metaphysical *Nichtsvergessenheit*, the question of *Seinsvergessenheit* must guide our way.

Certainly, “the growing oblivion of Being” does not mean that with every great thinker, the oblivion of Being becomes increasingly more concealed. Metaphysics is as “essentially remote in its start as in its finish.”<sup>30</sup> This ever-accompanying proximal distance is precisely *of* Nothing, for every time thought attempts to think Being at the exclusion of Nothing, it forgets. The origin (*archē*) is precisely the point of inception, the point where thought begins in the direct command of Nothing<sup>31</sup> and steps into *alētheia*. If “returning to the early thinkers is returning to the questions in which the questionable first of all flashed up,”<sup>32</sup> this flash is invisible, it is indeed the roar of Heraclitean *keraunos*, not lightning, but thunder, where the originary question of Nothing is heard. This questioning roar echoes in the imposed silence of metaphysics, for which remembrance (*Erinnerung*) does not so much offer the unity of the latter, as it keeps the proximal distance (the way) to the origin open in its silent prevalence at the innermost of what follows.<sup>33</sup> What follows is of course the history of Being, that is, *contra* and yet *from* Heidegger metaphysics.

Bernasconi is right—this history is indeed ‘free’, the discontinuous sequence where Being occurs as the *excess* over what has gone before. Whether this excess makes the oblivion of Being impenetrable<sup>34</sup> or whether the impenetrability belongs to the origin as Nancy claims, needs to be decided. We turn to Nancy: “We do not gain access; that is, we do not penetrate the origin; we do not identify with it. More precisely, we do not identify ourselves in it or as it, but *with* it, in a sense that must be elucidated here and is nothing other than the meaning of originary coexistence. [§] The alterity of the other is its being-origin. Conversely, the originality of the origin is its being-other, but it is a being-other than every being *for* and *in crossing through* all being.”<sup>35</sup> The origin as being-other is the inaccessible. It is the incessant turning, which we call *tropos*, the

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back out of its gates did. And yet we believe with Primo Levi that not only the *Muselmann*, but also the one returning is a true witness and a witness of truth.

<sup>30</sup> Bernasconi R., *The Question of Language in Heidegger's History of Being*, pp.7-8

<sup>31</sup> According to Cicero (*De natura deorum*, 3.54) *Archē* is one of the four Muses, next to *Meletē*, *Aoidē* and *Thlexinoē*. We may then think the command of the inception, being incepted as being ‘enmused’, possessed by the use/need of *alētheia*.

<sup>32</sup> Biemel W., *Martin Heidegger in Selbstzeugnissen and Bilddokumenten*, p.101 (trns. K. Maly)

<sup>33</sup> Bernasconi R., *The Question of Language in Heidegger's History of Being*, p.10

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p.8

<sup>35</sup> Nancy J-L., *Being Singular Plural*, pp.10-11

modulation without substance to be examined in the chapter that follows (*The Tropos of Nothing*), that presents the world in the excess of the ever-other. For the ‘with’ that the ever-other grounds is not restricted to man but refers to the pure “alterity or alteration of the world.”<sup>36</sup> Nancy thinks here through Heidegger in a Greek tropos. Heidegger teaches us that the separation of the question of Being from that of *kosmos* lies far outside the Greek horizon.<sup>37</sup> And yet such *kosmos* as we will see with Heraclitus renders cosmology meaningless, opening precisely the space of the ever-other recognized by Nancy. Our question thus loses the problematic form of the dilemma. *Nothing taking effect as origin (archē) is the ever-other that has to remain remote to all metaphysics of presence constituting thus the excess (“within [the] immanence”<sup>38</sup>) of the history of Being.* Our study is its *logos*, its utterance and collection.

The question of excess and need culminates at the very first moment of the Anaximandrian beginning and its due thought is reserved for the ultimate –fifth–chapter. Now we want to clarify the constitutive effects of the excess of the originary otherness in giving the recurring event (*Ereignis*) that Heidegger first calls happening (*Geschehen*), whence history takes its start. Such start becomes a beginning as soon as it enters the need (*chreōn*) of being begun again, *evermore radically*, with all the strangeness, darkness and insecurity that attend a true beginning. Otherness (*from the beginning*) means thus a constant re-turn, the tropos of beginning again, embarking anew upon the way. *Thus the ever-other is always left unuttered by a thinker only to be brought to expression by another thinker.*<sup>39</sup> This is the meaning of the waying return and of every true archeology. In the otherness of such archeology the thinker finds the ‘with’ of previous thought and of *kosmos*. In its eventual<sup>40</sup> excess *Da-sein* is for the first time there (*Da*) in the openness of Being (*Sein*). The excessive openness of the ‘with’ is precisely the way in which we consistently employ the *hyphen* in this study; an employment that cor-responds not to the demands of a diction, but to the origin. In the words of De Beistegui: “Philosophy is the hyphen and hymen of Being, and difference is the trait that cuts across and unites the twofold side of Being.”<sup>41</sup> Hyphens are only

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p.11

<sup>37</sup> Gadamer H. G., *GW6*, 38

<sup>38</sup> De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.15

<sup>39</sup> *GA40*, 124

<sup>40</sup> The word made current in the English translations of Badiou, thoroughly corresponds to the Heideggerian intention.

<sup>41</sup> De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.25. And yet philosophy from the Hymeneal festival of its inception (as for example in Plato’s *Republic*, Book V), in its marriage with Being utters itself equally as the *hymn* of Being.

bridges across incessant chasms, an attempt in the face of the danger the cartography of the origin presents.

We have outlined our attempt as the un-arriving way, our response to the Heideggerian diction as a shared re-turn to the originary in-tension and our archeology as the *logos* that collects the ever-other of Being to the origin (*archē*) of Nothing. Before we proceed with our cartography some preliminary words on this Nothing in its relation to Being are thus indispensable, preparing the thematization of their relation the opening chapter *The tropos of Nothing* undertakes, precisely as inceptive prolegomenon.

In 1949, in his appended introduction to *Was ist Metaphysik?* Heidegger understands Being precisely as Nothing. Insofar as only beings *are* and Being appears as (ever-)other to beings, Being is not.<sup>42</sup> In the strictest of formulations we say: Being is *not/is* not. This is the most essential recasting in Heideggerian thought of the Leibnizean question: why is there Being rather than Nothing? With Heidegger we answer: there 'is' Nothing for Being is *not/is* not.<sup>43</sup> Clearly, our 'is' is problematic, for Nothing can never be. And yet Nothing takes effect; it effectuates without being a cause.<sup>44</sup> It works as the grounding un-ground<sup>45</sup>—the abyss—and thus as pure actuality. Its first act is Being. So that even though Being 'is' not, Being is given. *Es gibt*. It seems that the 'es', the 'it' could refer to what is given and so is often thought; a reduction of absence into presence. Yet thinking inceptively we need to re-turn the 'it' to the origin, and ask: what gives Being, *what is 'it'?*

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<sup>42</sup> GA9, 382. See also De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.110: "being 'is' not; it is literally, nothing."

<sup>43</sup> In this graphic moment when Heidegger seems to open to Derrida, it must be made clear: Heidegger only says "Being is not". However in this utterance a double intonation is at work. Our slash (/), another rupture in the landscape of the origin, is only again a carto-graphic attempt. The full implications of the double intonation, become clear in the third chapter (*Heraclitus*).

<sup>44</sup> "[...] Something takes place, something happens, not as a result of some agency and any doing, any cause and any effects. What takes place is place itself, the 'Da', or the clearing whence things emerge and come to constitute a world." De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.142

<sup>45</sup> See also De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.151. On the grounding of the abyss we hear further: "What is grounding, if not the granting (*Gönnen*) [and this in turn we should think as the *Ginnen* of the beginning] or the giving (*Geben*) of the proper, the originary operation of appropriation or owning? But, as we shall see, the ground grounds from withing the attuning oscillation (*Schwinkung*) of Ereignis." Ibid., p.154. This abyss or un-ground De Beistegui thinks after Heidegger as the 'hesitant refusal' of ground. In such reserve "the clearing occurs, but in such a way that the clearing is never quite completed, definitive: never will full presence be achieved, never will there be things only, never will the reign of metaphysics be fully consumed." [And he continues:] "For to the clearing belongs the hesitation of its counter-tendency." Ibid., p.155. The reserve of such counter-tension we shall come to think in Heraclitean palintropic harmony.



Heidegger, even in 1962 says: “‘It’ refers *ostensibly* [*vermütlich*] to something outstanding, into which we cannot get here.”<sup>46</sup> ‘Here’ means certainly ‘ever’, a deferral essential to the thought of Heidegger and to essential thought as such; a deferral belonging to Nothing, not as indeterminacy<sup>47</sup> but as waying. For Heidegger can certainly call the ‘it’ *Ereignis*,<sup>48</sup> but without anything either eventful or eventual left to it, no property of appropriation; with only the severing poverty of an *Eignis*. Heidegger knows that what is left to think in the event is the mutual oscillation of presence and absence, that ‘it’ names but a presencing from absencing (*ein Anwesen von Abwesen*),<sup>49</sup> in a word: Nothing. Nothing ‘is’ thus the origin and the actuality of its relation to Being. “No experience can assure us of the ‘there is’ at this point,”<sup>50</sup> for Nothing ‘is’ never present, nor ever mere absence, but, as origin of both presence and absence, what allows for the oscillation,<sup>51</sup> the en-joining col-lection of the two, “two opposite tendencies [intensions] in the opposition of which presence unfolds.”<sup>52</sup> When we think thus of Nothing we should replace ‘but’ in Arendt’s diction: “to act and to begin are not the same, but they are closely interconnected,”<sup>53</sup> with a ‘because’. The en-joining activity of Nothing gives difference—not absolute relativism, but absolute relation. Nothing remains other to every *-ism*, since every *-ism* means: merely present.

Nothing gives jointure. This originary jointure is effective in the *henology* of the inception/ “From its beginning, from the *hen panta* (one all) of Heraclitus and the *hen* (one) of Parmenides philosophy thinks not the plurality, but the manifoldness in the tropos (*Weise*), in which it is unified. [...] The need for unity exists, because unity is never immediately given.”<sup>54</sup> ‘Never immediately’, that is, ever-deferred and ever-differing. If in order to see pieces of a broken pot the *hen* of the pot is required,<sup>55</sup> the pot

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<sup>46</sup> *GA14*, 23

<sup>47</sup> ‘It’ saves for Marion the indeterminacy of the enigma of pure givenness. Marion J.-L., *Being Given*, p.36. ‘Indeterminacy’ however says too much and too little at the same time, as we shall come to understand from the Anaximandrian *apeiron*. The ‘event’ does not betray the enigma of the gift, yet insofar as even the enigma has a structure, this structure needs to transform from the pure origin of Nothing. See Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, pp.143-5

<sup>48</sup> *GA14*, 24

<sup>49</sup> *GA14*, 23

<sup>50</sup> Derrida J., *On the name*, p.141

<sup>51</sup> In the word that resurfaces a handful of critical times in this essay we hear rather than the electromagnetic appropriation, the Latin *oscillum*, the ‘little mouth’ (from the Indo-European root *os-*, the mouth) that re-turns us to the aural tropos of the origin. The little mouth is of none other than Bacchus, whose open-mouthed masks were hung up in vineyards and left to swing in the breeze.

<sup>52</sup> De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.156

<sup>53</sup> Arendt H., *On Violence*, p.82

<sup>54</sup> *GA15*, 294-5

<sup>55</sup> *GA15*, 302

as such is certainly not required. Indeed once given, something is *taken* from the pieces, now appearing as mere shards inciting no movement other than mechanical assembly<sup>56</sup>. Nothing is the *hen* of jointure of a unity that is not of the order of presence.

Effectuating without being a cause, inexhaustible in either presence or absence and grounding the oscillation between the two, finally enjoining in a unification beyond mere unity, Nothing emerges as essentially more than the 'or', the 'if/then' or the 'and'. It does not succumb to the noetic leveling of Carnap and positivism. Nothing is always more, pure excess. More than jointure it 'is' the origin. And then it 'is' in turn more than origin *and* Jointure. As jointure (*Fügung*) Nothing enjoins, ordering over *while* offering, setting at disposal (the double significance of *Verfügung*). Setting at disposal it constitutes a dis-position, a turning manner, a way, a *tropos*. What does Nothing enjoin and offer however? Nothing but ruptures. The nature of the *hen* of Nothing becomes clearer: rather than reconstructing the pieces into objective presence Nothing offers the absolute relation of discontinuities, of their very brokenness.

We make another break, another *excursus*. We have just offered the summary we deemed impossible—this appears to 'be' Nothing leaving nothing to be said. Being so simple, Bergson's remark that "philosophers have hardly occupied themselves with the idea of nothingness"<sup>57</sup> comes as a surprise, against which Beaufret's retort accusing Bergson of not having *read* philosophy, appears insufficient. The *idea* of Nothing has remained problematic for philosophy since such an idea is too little, too elusive, for thought. The idea, essentially commensurate to presence, discovers nothing to think in Nothing. Where should thought hold itself onto to think such *idea*? What sort of proof could be due to it? And yet if we readily think that *physis is*, that *physis* is presence, what proof could again prove its *ex-istence*? A *Da-sein* that requires such proof before it is, before it can be, finds itself in a *severance* of its *Da* more doomed than the effort of the blindman struggling to see colour.<sup>58</sup> Such severance leads to a presentifying (thus reifying, commodifying, etc) degeneration into extension and quantity, which only

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<sup>56</sup> If we choose to think of the very fragments of our investigation through this analogy, a true *logos* insofar as the thought of the inception is enjoined by Nothing, we need to take into account their exceptional uniqueness, in stark contrast to the established canons of pottery. This is not to deny the contribution of manifold influences and the resolute exchange of thought in the archaic world, but to recognize the necessity of the unrepeatability of its moments that proceeds from the necessity of thinking Nothing as the ever-other.

<sup>57</sup> Bergson H., *L'evolution creative*, in *Œuvres*, p.39

<sup>58</sup> See Aristotle, *Physics*, 193a3-9

Nothing may anew en-join. The *idea* of Nothing cannot contain such enjoining, for it is not of the order of presence; jointure consists in the waying, the danger of the turning towards the origin. We may have the summary of Nothing, but without the danger of traversing its way we have nothing.

If we want to wrest presence—beings in their Being—from its own dominion, and open this dominion unto absence—the emptiness for example in Zweig's *Schachnovelle* that reigns as ultimate terror and enslaving Master, as the undefeatable limit—we need to turn to the enjoining origin; “if we want to con-ceive what-is, the Greeks say, de-fine, set in limits, then we have to [*arrive*] at the limit of what-is [beings] and indeed necessarily—and this is Nothing.”<sup>59</sup> To think presence we need first not merely to think, but transverse the unarriving passage, find ourselves in the actuality of Nothing. Only so we find contra Beaufret<sup>60</sup> the absolute, groundless abyss of absence in which Being at last appears not as the divine but in “the dimension where the divine itself is as much absent as present and, *in the most intimate heart of absence, solidly present, as befits the harmony of being;*”<sup>61</sup> and then undo this harmony anew.

Nothing offers the emergence of Being and non-Being in their relation. Not by chance the epigraph of *Sein & Zeit* that announces the search of Being is taken from *The Sophist*, a dialogue on the search of non-Being.<sup>62</sup> Both attempts are fated to an *aporia*, unable to keep on the way insofar as they do not turn to their common origin, Nothing. No matter how much we learn from *Seinvergangenheit* on the meaning of history and the failure of historical thought to pose the *Seinsfrage*, this failure and the subsequent immersion of the whole history of metaphysics into the everyday<sup>63</sup> refers to the failure of grounding such question on the actual thought of Nothing. Plato has already realized, revising Parmenides, that “*to on ouden euporōteron eipein tou mē ontos:*”<sup>64</sup> “It is not easier to make way in saying Being rather than non-Being”—the difficulty of both lying in thinking them from their common origin. The metaphysics of presence,

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<sup>59</sup> GA35, 9

<sup>60</sup> Beaufret J., *Dialogue with Heidegger, Greek Philosophy*, p.42

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p.43

<sup>62</sup> Plato, *Sophist*, 244a4ff

<sup>63</sup> Sadler after Heidegger understands *Seinsvergangenheit* as the defining trait of everydayness (*Alltäglichkeit*). In conjunction he writes: “Heidegger proposes that Aristotelian ontology (and Aristotelian philosophy generally) is an articulation of the ‘everyday’ (‘vulgar’, ‘average’, ‘natural’ are other words used) understanding of Being.” Sadler T., *Heidegger and Aristotle, the Question of Being*, p.39

<sup>64</sup> Plato, *Phaedrus*, 246a1

understanding *ousia* as *parousia* and favouring thus a particular mode of time, namely the present,<sup>65</sup> does not result from a departure of what is present in presencing, wherein Being remains unquestioned and forgotten, generating figurations of nihilism. Nihilism is accordingly the non-relation towards *Nihil*; the ‘-ism’ re-introducing the order of presence to what precedes and grounds it. Presence as *parousia* is the only remnant of a thought exhausted by Being, yet untouched by Nothing.

If thus for the thinkers of the inception beings are grounded in Being as presencing, Being is nonetheless precisely not a ground. In ever-welling disclosure, Being appears as the abyss, the source of thought and wonder, calling everything into question, casting us out of any habitual ground and opening before us the mystery of existence. Such presencing is possible only from the origin of Nothing. If the thinkers of the inception can ask “What are beings as such as a whole?” and dare the answer: *alētheia—unconcealment*, it is because they have witnessed presence *out of* Nothing. Presencing, the originary actuality of presence is thus dis-closed.

If Nothing ‘is’ the transversing of the origin that enjoins presence and absence, *why its name?* Nothing is called Nothing, for *it has no Name*; it does not give itself away to calling, as it does not obey any calling-command; finally, for thought has shied away from this impossible calling. In Heidegger we discover the rare liminal attempt to say in Nothing more than non-Being. Yet, possibly because the sole language given to us is the language of beings,<sup>66</sup> this attempt is constantly diverted to Being (and yet already in this diversion Nothing is transformatively already at work, in the lesion known early as ontological difference). The thinkers of the inception think through Nothing, but do not attempt to name it—the end of the inceptive beginning taking effect precisely in the Parmenidean resistance to its call, a resistance compelled to name Nothing. Inceptive *sophia* lies precisely in this: not to attempt the impossible, yet undertake the task of thought it dictates. In their thought of the origin as the ever-other we find thus the source of “the ever-other of every linguistic interpretation of thought [that] is the sign of its unsaid fullness.”<sup>67</sup> Heidegger teaches us to hear this calling in silence. When “the saying of thought is silencing”<sup>68</sup> we can only hear its calling across

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<sup>65</sup> The recognition of such thought that we may call metaphysics of presence is clearly announced in the introduction of *Sein & Zeit*, constituting the consistent Heideggerian lesson.

<sup>66</sup> Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, p.10

<sup>67</sup> GA7, 265

<sup>68</sup> *Erschweigen* rather than *Verschweigen*. GA6.1, 423

the centuries by intensifying this silence. For this, metaphysics has not been too blind, but too little blind. Metaphysical clear-sightedness, too focused upon its own sight, the sight of its exclusive dominion, has kept thought from hearing. Unlike Sadler's suggestion,<sup>69</sup> the essential Heideggerian accusation of the tradition is not of blindness, but of deafness. How are we to bring about the silence in the name of Nothing, to hear its calling?

To speak *out of* silence and to preserve it. Heidegger at the end of his life says: "We are both [himself and Fink] agreed on this: when we talk *with* a thinker, we must pay attention to the unsaid within what is said."<sup>70</sup> How is this to be done? How should we prepare ourselves for such attention, the tending care that gives a thought over to its ownmost and sets it thus free for its unfolding and for us? Heidegger offers the guiding thread: "The difficult way of reading consists in not reading the fragments optically, like we read a newspaper, and that in reading the fragments it is not about things, that simply combine, but rather it is here evidently about a *tropos* of thought, that relies on something, that is not accessible in direct representation and opinion: this is the actual background."<sup>71</sup> This becomes all the more crucial insofar as before we advance in our discourse with the early thinkers a translation of their fragments is required that needs to emerge from such attentive silencing. Hearing in silence and translating the thought of the thinkers of the inception we need to transpose ourselves into another thought, we need to dare a leap over the abyss of language, since what is at issue is not merely another language as an aggregate of words, but another thought. It is because of the demands of the ever-other in the innermost of the seemingly given that one has long recognized the most difficult translation to be the one that takes place within a single language. It is precisely the difficulty of hearing the calling (*Ruf*) that gives a thought to its ownmost and yet such calling is not a *modus* of talk (*Rede*) as in *Sein & Zeit*,<sup>72</sup> but talk has become a *tropos* of calling, a calling not of conscience (*Gewissen*) but of the origin itself that allows us to talk with its first thinkers.

We are given an essential task. In accordance with the way, it is not a task that arrives, a task to be finished; the distance between, the difference of languages is not an

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<sup>69</sup> Sadler T., *Heidegger and Aristotle, the Question of Being*, p.97

<sup>70</sup> *GA15*, 113, my emphasis

<sup>71</sup> *GA15*, 125

<sup>72</sup> *GA2*, 355-8

obstacle to be overcome but a summit to dwell awhile before waying on.<sup>73</sup> So we tend to the fragments of the thinkers of the inception and try to hearken the unspoken in the spoken. Heidegger calls such tending, where the unspoken comes to us, poetry.<sup>74</sup> Claudel's is not a very different understanding as he writes in *La Ville*: "*Tu n'expliques rien, ô poète, mais toutes choses par toi nous deviennent explicable.*"<sup>75</sup> The thinker, who is not a poet, explains. Yet both essentially tend to and try to communicate the unspoken, where silence speaks, *from* the origin.

The warning of a historian should however also be heeded. Bloch writes: "In popular usage, an origin is a beginning which explains. Worse still a beginning which is a complete explanation. There lies the ambiguity, and there the danger!"<sup>76</sup> And then: "In any study, seeking the origins of a human activity, there lurks the same danger of confusing ancestry with explanation. [§] It is very like the illusion of certain old etymologists who thought they had said all when they set down the oldest known meaning of a word opposite its present sense"<sup>77</sup>—for indeed "to the great despair of historians, men fail to change their vocabulary every time they change their customs."<sup>78</sup> Heidegger, the tight-rope walker of etyma, balancing between fidelity and pure invention over the abyss of the origin that gives fidelity, is certainly aware of the danger. He reminds us, as much as himself: "hands off from all empty and incidental etymologies", for they become mere amusement when the way to the word has not been prepared long enough.<sup>79</sup> Such preparation (and here we have set ourselves ready to be prepared tends to the requirements the attunement, a turning towards the origin, presents us with. Only thus does the origin not become an empty explanation.

The preparation of an etymology is the waying of its genealogy, the transversing of the horizon of its significance *from* the origin that needs always to be undertaken *anew*. This 'anew' is what early Heidegger named *Destruktion*. *Destruktion* is a movement from the old (even if such old appears in times to come) towards the older. The oldest is indeed the inception and thus *Destruktion* is here—even though by now, when thinking *from* the inception becomes for the first time central, an abandoned word—more programmatic than ever. That *Destruktion* does not mean devastation has

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<sup>73</sup> GA78, 281

<sup>74</sup> GA78, 283

<sup>75</sup> "You explain nothing, poet, but all things through you become to us clear."

<sup>76</sup> Bloch M., *The historian's craft*, p.25

<sup>77</sup> Bloch M., *The historian's craft*, p.27

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p.28

<sup>79</sup> GA55, 195

long been a commonplace; and even though essentially the attempt is of a *Verwindung*, not an *Überwindung* of presence, it is rash to speak of *Destruktion*'s positivity. This *method*, indeed *meth' odou*, with a way, is never *positive* insofar as it (im-)poses *nothing*, but nonetheless draws the appearing trace of the positions along such movement. This way is preparation, preparing thought's own transformation.<sup>80</sup>

The sixth paragraph of *Sein & Zeit* faced already with maturity the preparation required in the face of the "violence that governs the history of ontology;" precisely not with a levelling and annihilating answer, but as the opening of a way through derelict, collapsing edifices that preserves originary difference. Heidegger after the inceptive encounter, in *Was ist das—die Philosophie?* returns to *Destruktion* to discover in it already the attentive attunement to the addressing tradition that calls for our response<sup>81</sup> and which organizes the preparation required for the retrieval of the origin that in response to the violence of the history of ontology is itself violent, still never arbitrary.<sup>82</sup> For this destructive attunement "ruthlessness toward the tradition is reverence toward the past, and it is genuine only in an appropriation of the latter (the past) out of a destruction of the former (the tradition)."<sup>83</sup> Such *destruction* clears the way to the clearing, prepares simplicity.

With such simplicity we approach the thinkers of the inception and the waying<sup>84</sup> danger in the thought of Nothing. It is precisely because of the requirements of simplicity that essential, that is inceptive, thought appears often incomprehensible; not because it lies too far away, but because it lies too close. We do not recognize here with Heidegger an irreducible difference between common and essential thought,<sup>85</sup> but if such a tentative distinction can be of value, this value lies in the exclusive inception of essential thought from simplicity over against the manifold initial possibilities of other tropes of thought. Science is complex; metaphysics is complex; everyday discourse is complex—depite the striving of all understanding to simplify, that is bring the infinite

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<sup>80</sup> GA14, 75

<sup>81</sup> GA11, 20

<sup>82</sup> Mouzakitis A., *Meaning, Historicity and the Social*, p.31

<sup>83</sup> GA19, 414

<sup>84</sup> This waying danger, is simply an *actual* danger, its actuality borrowing nothing of the order of certainty from the Kantian category, but merely its 'being at work', re-turning us further to the Aristotelian *energeia*. What is at work is Nothing, giving danger and offering the way. As such its actuality is neither merely in itself (*praxis*), nor in the thing (*poiēsis*) (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1050a30-35), but equally in both, or more precisely in their *between*. Here the break with the tradition becomes irreversible.

<sup>85</sup> GA55, 149

complexity of the world to the measure of man, the humanism of all that is to be known simplifies complexity in the formation of a new complexity.<sup>86</sup> The difficulty of essential thought on the contrary lies in its pervasive simplicity. It is a difficulty arising not only from the unknown rarity of such a demand, but from the strenuous requirements it poses itself on thought. *Simplicity overwhelms thought.*

For the present undertaking, the tropos of simplicity dictates a specific repetition, the need for a twice double reading. In this introduction we set up and set out for an aim at which we shall not arrive; Nothing. But unless we undertake the risk of transversing the way of thought Nothing dictates, our summary amounts to little more than empty words. This is the first double read: the cartography *and* the landscape. The very way of thought however exacts another repetition. As we think Nothing through the inception, our occupation with the fragments of the early thinkers is *sine qua non* for any thoughtful attempt; foregoing such preparation leaves us again with mere words. So that if we undertake the preparation of our encounter in the first chapter and throw ourselves ahead of the inceptive fragments and into Nothing, these opening words can only gain their true proximity to Nothing only once we have traversed the inception; only after we have thought with its thinkers in *alētheia* can our words that come first and pave the way, appear as last. So that after returning to the inception can need to return to the thought that seems to prepare it, hearing it this time as its result. This double return constitutes the second double read.

Our study of the beginning has thus no beginning proper and yet begins in the turning towards Nothing, that is, it begins in truth. After these few introductory pages we offer thus an opening chapter on the signs of i. *Being* and ii. *ex-isting Da-sein* that guide our iii. *tropos*, our turning, towards iv. *Nothing*. With these guiding signs, which after the journey of the inception should appear as its very destination, a destination which was always already with us and yet a destination which must be won in danger and truth; with these signs we attempt to think in the subsequent chapter i. the inceptive beginning (*archē*) and ii. truth (*alētheia*). Neither of the chapters (the fourfold of *The*

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<sup>86</sup> The atrocious perils hidden in simplification are brought forth with unparalleled intensity in Primo Levi's work. See for example Levi P., *The Drowned and the Saved*, p.22ff. At the same time abandoning humanism and delegating knowledge to machines complexly constructed to process complexity is not just dystopic, neither only blatantly criminal, the death of man showing as a cold-blooded murder; it is a future, a destiny man overcame upon constructing his first tool, relinquishing a hitherto integral function to an exteriority. What rather defines man is the possibility to rediscover his limit, after the expropriation of all functions, all complexity, after man is bared and left to stand in the simplicity of his bare origin.



*tropos of Nothing* and the twofold of *The beginning of Truth*) intend in the least a conceptual *expositio*. Rather they undertake to weave the very fabric of the inception, the infinite preparation, a *way* and a *tropos* to begin and set upon a way.

Upon retracing the truth of inception we devote accordingly a chapter to each of its three unique instances to each of the three thinkers of the inception. With Heidegger we distinguish *solely* three: Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides;<sup>87</sup> in their thought the inception reaches an intensity unknown to other early thinkers. The exact chronological placement of the three is problematic. Anaximander is clearly the earliest. Parmenides and Heraclitus appear as rough contemporaries of the decades between 540 and 460.<sup>88</sup> For Nietzsche, the thinker that devoted most effort and attention to Pre-Platonic chronology Parmenides and Heraclitus are also contemporaries. And yet he, like us, sides in the debate of understanding the Parmenidean *dikranoi*<sup>89</sup> as a reference not to Heraclitus, but to (the) Heracliteans.<sup>90</sup> Neither should one disregard a few lines later the words *palintropos keleuthos* (a returning way)<sup>91</sup> that resound the *palintropos/palintonos harmoniē* (counter-tending harmony)<sup>92</sup> of the lyre and the bow. Such evidence may seem scant in placing Parmenides after Heraclitus. Yet if not only the *who* but also the *when* of Parmenides and Heraclitus is determined by *what* they thought,<sup>93</sup> then the move away from the inception and into the metaphysical tradition which was soon to emerge is clearly witnessed in the thought of Parmenides. In the luminous wealth of the meta-phor then Anaximander may be thought as the morning, Heraclitus as the noon and Parmenides as the evening of the inception.

The question that seems thus to be as crucial as open for Heidegger in 1932 regarding the relation of Parmenides and Heraclitus—the question of who presupposes and opposes who<sup>94</sup> and which almost fifteen years later has complicated (although Heidegger has resolved in placing Parmenides after Heraclitus) in a series of presuppositions where Anaximander's *saying*<sup>95</sup> is to be understood out of the Parmenides' *saying* and this in turn out of the *saying* of Heraclitus,<sup>96</sup> attests to a simple

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<sup>87</sup> GA54, 10

<sup>88</sup> GA54, 1

<sup>89</sup> 'Two headed' Parmenides, B6, 5

<sup>90</sup> Nietzsche F., KG, II4, p.296

<sup>91</sup> Parmenides, B6, 9

<sup>92</sup> Heraclitus, B51

<sup>93</sup> GA55, 5

<sup>94</sup> GA35, 101

<sup>95</sup> The *saying* referring here to the totality of thought of each thinker.

<sup>96</sup> GA78, 319 -notes

conclusion: all thinkers of the inception think from a singular origin and yet the necessity of ever-other thought proceeds towards a culmination and transition away from the origin. Each thinker presupposes the other two, as every *one* presupposes the *other*; and yet while Anaximander stands at the beginning of the beginning, Parmenides stands at its irrevocable end. We decide to turn backwards; in our counter-chronology we begin with Parmenides, ending with Anaximander. We do not follow the common methodological principle 'from the clearest to the most obscure', but in essential fidelity to the in-tension of *Destruktion* choose a path that reserves the most initiatory for the end. Our path allows for the preparation essential to the simplicity of the beginning and for this preparation that is our destiny we are at last ready, prepared.

# I. The *tropos* of Nothing

## 1. Being

“*Jusqu’à l’Être exalte l’étrange  
Toute-Puissance du Néant!*”

—Valéry<sup>1</sup>

The question of Being itself is at the same time both a question of non-Being as well as of Nothing.<sup>2</sup> The two questions (that is the double question of presence and absence, constituting the history of metaphysics under the sign of Being and the singular/plural question of the jointure and origin of presence and absence that requires the sign of Nothing) are indissoluble as the inception testifies. The terms of this double questioning and the ground from which its answers are attempted open a manifold horizon. We turn to the intricacy of this double question, to pave our inceptive re-turn.

“The first of all questions” that opens the *Einführung in die Metaphysik*<sup>3</sup> hovers as the last, ultimate question at the end of *Was ist Metaphysik?*:<sup>4</sup> “Why are there beings instead of nothing?” This question Heidegger inherits from Leibniz. The hypothesis that in the 6 years from 1929’s *Was ist Metaphysik?* to 1935’s *Einführung* the end has been won and now is offering in its turn the beginning is both correct and insufficient. During these years Heidegger tirelessly treads the ground of the question and the transposition from the end to the beginning attests essentially an acceleration, the essential urgency of the question. This urgency signifies that in the terms given, the question can find no answer. Twenty years later, in the appended introduction of *Was ist Metaphysik?* Heidegger writes: “the essence of metaphysics is something else than metaphysics [...] Metaphysics remains the first of philosophy. The first of thought it never reaches. Metaphysics is overcome in the thought of the truth of Being.”<sup>5</sup> The question of beings over against Nothing cannot be answered in its terms—from metaphysics. One needs to

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<sup>1</sup> Valéry, *Ébauche d’un serpent*: “All the way up to Being, exalts the strange/ Omnipotence of Nothing!”

<sup>2</sup> GA55, 276

<sup>3</sup> GA40, 1

<sup>4</sup> GA9, 122

<sup>5</sup> GA9, 367

ask beyond metaphysics, that is, for Heidegger in 1949, to ask *from* the essence of metaphysics of the truth of Being. What has intervened is a struggle with Nothing that Heidegger feels to have integrated in the sphere of Being, a Being he thus equally feels infinitely different to the metaphysical tradition. It is of course an unresolved metaphysical struggle and an elusive feeling. It would take almost another twenty years (1966) for Heidegger to say of Being: "I do not use this word readily anymore."<sup>6</sup>

Yet, precisely, what is metaphysics? The question contradicts the conditions that prompt and require from it an answer at present. What we attempt is no more than an open parallel: Meta-physics is meta-phor. If *physis* is all that emerges and evades in the jointure of the whole, if it is thus the whole of beings and physics is the thought of this whole, metaphysics takes the necessary step back to reach beyond, an *after*-physics grounded in the *before*: the essence of metaphysics is the not-yet-physical. As such metaphysics is constituted as transference, a *meta-phora*. It exchanges its place with another, whence the essential difference (*dia-phora*) of Being and beings appears *before* their severance. *The essence of metaphysics consists precisely in the use/need that clears the in-between* so that the thought of this metaphor, this transference may occur from the clearing.

We must pause. Before we ask what is problematic about such *metaphora*, we must heed to the deeply Heideggerian word *essence*, which silently weaves what follows, interweaved often with *non-essence*. And it is clear: essence thought from the inception is a non-essence, allowing the plurality of counter-essences. Essence in truth always speaks from the *non-* and shares in the destiny of Being. We hear De Beistegui: "If Heidegger does indeed deploy anew the classical determination of essence (*Wesen*), rescuing it from its metaphysical appropriation, it is only at the cost of a formidable and daring *transformation* that equates the operation of essence with movement as such, verbalizing it, de-reifying it, allowing it to coincide with the very movement of unfolding, with being as such; it is only to overturn the notion of essence so that from being the first and highest substance, it becomes a pure event, being as becoming or happening."<sup>7</sup> The essence 'is' a manifold of transformation (*Wandlung*), itinerary (*Wanderung*) and turning (*Wendung*).<sup>8</sup> This transformation, we know with Malabou is

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<sup>6</sup> *GA15*, 20

<sup>7</sup> De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.114

<sup>8</sup> Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, pp.20-2

not itself an immutable structure, for “there is no Heideggerian invariant. [§] In effect, mutability itself changes.”<sup>9</sup> How does the trans-formation turn and transform? In a trans-ference, a *meta-phora*, a turning which finally, that is, inceptively, turns from the form and figure of Nothing to the Nothing of form and figure.<sup>10</sup> The essence of metaphor constitutes accordingly the *non-* of essence, grounding metaphysics and the metaphysic metaphor, the transference to Nothing.

There seems to be however something problematic with such metaphor, something to force eventually Heidegger to forsake the guiding word of his thought—Being. It is precisely nothing but the impossibility of the attempted opening, the impossibility of ontological *diaphora*. In Aristotle the unfolding of the inception inscribed by Parmenides resolves at absolute *emmeneia*—the Being of beings does not merely rest on beings, but constitutes their limit and destination, their *physis*. *Ousia* is never essentially other to beings, never a *chōriston*, whether thought as *eidōs* or even *theos*. Heidegger struggles against a metaphysical tradition of metaphor, of transference, that doesn’t reach far enough; Being remains always and everywhere *bound* to beings. However difference is precisely the setting free. This liberation is the deepest desire and fidelity of Heidegger, for which however metaphysics could never offer the ground of its fulfillment. The unifying in-tension of metaphysics is not unfamiliar to the inception. The *only dif-ference* is that the inception speaks *from* Nothing. When Heidegger writes: “Beings and Being, the present and presence are not separate and not separable, as being from being, and yet they are distinct from each other, in a distinction, that cannot be compared to any other,”<sup>11</sup> he tries precisely to trace the uniqueness of this relation *from* Being and still not *from* presence. He believes this possible precisely insofar as Being is thought to have inceptively encountered Nothing. Whenever this however proves true, there is a singular result as attested in 1973: “Being is not what-is [*das Sein ist nicht seiend*]: This is the ontological difference.”<sup>12</sup> Heidegger does not say: Being is not a being, a commonplace towards the understanding of ontological difference. He rather ultimately says: the only way to ground the essential *diaphora* of metaphysical *metaphora* is in the *not* of the permeation and saturation of Being by Nothing. “Beings have become porous, essentially porous, and this lets the truth of being pass across them

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p.124

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p.194

<sup>11</sup> GA78, 141

<sup>12</sup> GA15, 346

without this rendering it present (*vorhanden*).” This Malabou realizes is not merely the malady of technology, but “*always at the same time a promise, automatically opening the door to the essential.*”<sup>13</sup> Being at last comes to appear as it always ‘was’: on the verge of the / of is *not/is* not, which gives difference.

The question appears: “That, what-is, beings themselves we know, and that beings are, we come to know. But the ‘is’ – where in the whole world are we to find it, where are we to look for something like this at all?”<sup>14</sup> Being certainly evades. Its tropos is that of absencing withdrawal. Its col-lecting, en-joining, that is essentially erotic force, the *tauto* of *noein* and *einai*, derives not from a completed fullness, but from a useful/needful, an excessive emptiness.<sup>15</sup> Being as it appears in the withdrawing ‘is’, is left unquestioned in every questioning. It is left unquestioned for a question could never dare exhaust the wealth of a meaning that originates in the most essential void. Yet Heidegger could hardly be further from the Hegelian *allgemein*, from the emptiest generality of generalities. There is nothing formal, no simple equation for the source from which Being comes to speak. And when Heidegger cites Nietzsche’s reference to Being as “the last smoke of an expiring reality,”<sup>16</sup> he still in-tends a dif-ference. Nietzsche is right in the ultimate, essential withdrawal of Being, a withdrawal which does not result however from casting its idol to the pyre. We rather recall Benjamin’s sublime ode to the blue sky in the *Einbahnstrasse*, as it accompanies us gently unnoticed: Heidegger knows this in-tension of Being simply following as the mere shadow of beings, going past like a cloud, leaving no trace in the realm of all that-is<sup>17</sup>. We never notice the gentle accompanying of Being for we dwell temporarily-eternally (*Aufenthalt*) in dif-ference.<sup>18</sup> It is because of the concreteness of such dwelling that we may never be satisfied with a formal emptiness of the meaning of Being as we attempt a questioning of dif-ference.<sup>19</sup>

We follow Heidegger along such questioning, along his double *sign*-posting of a Being that has inceptively encountered Nothing.

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<sup>13</sup> Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, p.166-7

<sup>14</sup> *GA51*, 27

<sup>15</sup> De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.159

<sup>16</sup> *GA51*, 34

<sup>17</sup> *GA51*, 70

<sup>18</sup> *GA51*, 47

<sup>19</sup> *GA51*, 40

i. In Goethe's verse "over the summits/ is peace" this 'is' shows all the elusiveness of Being remaining irreducible and inexhaustible in all different transcriptions, in all familiar uses of the verb. The meaning of this poetic 'is' is neither copulative nor existential—its meaning has no ontic reference, flowing from the void, yet giving, infinite source of Being,<sup>20</sup> attesting Being as *the emptiest and at the same time the overflowing*.<sup>21</sup>

ii. While a being encounters everywhere another being as its same, Being is for all and every being unique. It has nowhere its same.<sup>22</sup> But being shared by all that-is Being is at the same time the most common: indeed insofar as Being speaks from the opening of the dif-ference it 'is' *the most unique and the most common*.<sup>23</sup>

iii. We may always turn to a being to determine another. But what is to be done with Being? For there is nothing outside Being except maybe Nothing, nothing whence to extract a determination but Nothing itself. Heidegger rejects Nothing as a tropos of the determination of Being, as it is the indeterminate par excellence.<sup>24</sup> It is essentially a Parmenidean argument forgetful of the inception. Indeed the very thought of a third next to beings and Being, that is, Nothing, is quickly dismissed as Hegelian formalism. This is correct. Yet Nothing is not a third, next to the dif-ference but the opening, the clearing of the dif-ference itself; precisely what Being is *not/is* not. Heidegger knows that Nothing does not presuppose beings and is not their abatement.<sup>25</sup> Itself 'indeterminate' it determines beings. This it does through Being. Being accordingly won't let itself to determination, for this is to be sought neither in beings nor in Nothing. And yet in the latter Being discovers the in-tensive determination from which its withdrawing agency will determine the earlier. Lacking every determination Being withdraws into incomprehension, yet only through it is any other understanding possible. As such Being 'is' *the most understandable and the most withdrawn*.<sup>26</sup>

iv. Being allows beings to spring-forth and as such it is their spring, their origin (*Ursprung*).<sup>27</sup> At the same time, advocating the tradition, Heidegger presents Being as

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<sup>20</sup> GA51, 49

<sup>21</sup> GA51, 48

<sup>22</sup> GA51, 51

<sup>23</sup> GA51, 54

<sup>24</sup> GA51, 59-60

<sup>25</sup> GA51, 53

<sup>26</sup> GA51, 60

<sup>27</sup> GA51, 62

the most general of concepts, the most empty, as such the most derivative of concepts, the most conceived.<sup>28</sup> Yet clearly Being is neither *the most derived nor the most original*. For the most derived are beings and the most original is Nothing. Being 'is' rather the jointure of the two that Nothing en-joins.

v. Whenever we may doubt beings we never doubt Being, for Being is a condition of our doubt and as such the most reliable. And yet it offers no ground to base our plans and intentions with regard to beings for it is saturated by Nothing. As such it is an un-ground, an abyss. Being emerges as *the most reliable and the abyss*.

vi. With every word or word structure Being is expressed although such expression does not always amount to a name; indeed most often Being is only approximately invoked but this invocation always affirms a deeper necessity. Being grounds all saying, for the sayable may only be said in Being. Yet Being withdraws. As such it is through and through eluding the sayable. Within language withdrawal becomes silencing. Silencing then is equally the origin of language. Thus animals<sup>29</sup> cannot speak—for they cannot silence. Heidegger thinks that insofar as the silence of Being has never been a human work, it must come from itself, as the condition of language<sup>30</sup>. However the silence of Being comes precisely from Nothing. How could otherwise Being speak as *the most said and the most silenced?*<sup>31</sup>

vii. So Being is something to be traced everywhere and yet rarely noticed. As soon as we notice it we realize how constantly we forget it and how much we have forgotten this forgetting. As such Being is the most forgotten. Still Being is the most reliable. In every encounter we face Being and it supports our comportment towards beings, it allows them to be as beings for us, for whom beings in their being are an issue. As such they may reach our innermost, so that they can be a member of our existence insofar as we are members, participants in their relation to Being. In reaching us in this tropos, be they present, past or futural, they constitute re-membrance. Re-membling thus totally dissociates etymologically from memory and mind and also from the subjective interiority of the German word (*Er-innerung*), as it opens out into the vistas of *Mnēmosynē*, the genealogies of the orders of truth, orders of *membering*,

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<sup>28</sup> GA51, 61

<sup>29</sup> As becomes evident in the following the word is employed with proviso. The question of the animal exceeds as it informs the scope of the present work.

<sup>30</sup> GA51, 76

<sup>31</sup> GA51, 63-4



the dis-membering and quartering history of the *Geviert* world.<sup>32</sup> In this world, the *membering* of belonging constitutes the re-membering, re-enjoining, belonging in the intimacy of pain. Being 'is' thus *the most forgotten and the most re-membered*.<sup>33</sup>

viii. Eventually, wherever we encounter beings, even in deepest boredom and indifference, they are forced to appear as beings in Being; beings are *forced* to come forth, in their 'is': thus Being is the most compulsive. As such however it remains unnoticed and is nowhere to be found. This is as it should. For Being is no-where, it's not there, but provides every there, opens up the place of the *there*, the place between Being and beings. As such it sets free beings to belong to Being—it provides the most essential freedom. Nowhere-Being 'is' thus, *the most compulsive and the most freeing*.<sup>34</sup>

Certainly our use of the expression 'Being is', here as elsewhere, is only granted by the greatest liberty of a language at its limit. For such expression *against* Parmenides is no less problematic than '*Nothing is*'. And yet if we also attempt to say that only *beings are* (the essence of all realism) we are still thinking within Being and evoke it indeed twice. As such we are forced to add another, ultimate double sign to Being: Being is *not*, yet Being *is* not. In this as in every other sign Nothing gives the opening of the twofoldness, Nothing gives difference. Only from Nothing do Heidegger's words receive meaning: "Nothing higher, nothing more originary, nothing more contemporary, but also nothing more un-showing and nothing more indestructible can be thought than Being itself."<sup>35</sup> Eventually in Zähringen's seminar in 1973, Heidegger having struggled with a Being in-ceived by Nothing, the temporary illusion of the overcoming and appropriation of Nothing by Being and the final re-turn to the eternal saturation of Being by Nothing, he is in place to call for "a phenomenology of the un-showing, of what does not show itself (*des Unscheinbaren*),"<sup>36</sup> an inceptive phenomenology of *harmonia aphanēs*.

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<sup>32</sup> "From this primal quartering, the framework of being originates." De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.177

<sup>33</sup> *GA51*, 65-6

<sup>34</sup> *GA51*, 67-8

<sup>35</sup> *GA55*, 278

<sup>36</sup> *GA15*, 399

## 2. Exeunt Da-sein: ex-istence

We turn now to look at the no-where of Being that always manifests itself in the locality of a there; we turn to *Da-sein*. *Da-sein* forms the crux of the earlier and later thought of Heidegger, as the vantage point of the access to Being, precisely because the *how* of the question of Being was never severed from the question of the *who* of man.<sup>37</sup> A tension rather than a discontinuity is again at work. In 1929, at the beginning of the alleged 'turn' Heidegger claims a twofold: first, every metaphysical question always encompasses the metaphysics in its totality and second, it does so insofar as in every metaphysical question the one who asks is drawn into the question setting his own existence as an inquirer into question.<sup>38</sup> This is clearly the initial definition of *Da-sein*: that being among beings for which its Being is at issue. As the understanding of *Da-sein* keeps transforming, a parallel transformation of its relation to *Sein* and all metaphysical questions as well as ultimately towards Nothing is at work. We follow their meandering.

In *Sein & Zeit* what *proximally* is, is not 'I', in the sense of one's own self, but rather the singularized others, in the specific tropos of the 'they'. Only in the otherness of the 'they' is one given proximally to oneself.<sup>39</sup> The Nietzschean dictum of dispersion, the never resting, never arrested point of subjectivity leaping across the world-horizon ('*der Subjektpunkt springt herum*') is re-located from the ontological to the everyday. This captivating mesh Heidegger regards as existential structure. The 'they' however can never re-place what *Da-sein* essentially is (even though it indefatigably replaces *Da-sein* altogether), nor certainly can it lead us beyond this to the origin of essence. From the irresponsibility of everybody/nobody of the 'they' neither Gordon's dialogic nor Sartre's monologic<sup>40</sup> antidotes of *Entschlossenheit* suffice. A different force of a different tropos is required for the inception of *Da-sein* into the use/need of the clearing of its being-there. Death is brought forth by Heidegger precisely as the measure of stepping out, of ex-isting from the immersive tropos of the 'they' and as the ground of ec-static temporality. Death is the not-yet, the remainder that determines *Da-Sein* as

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<sup>37</sup> De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.116

<sup>38</sup> *GA9*, 103

<sup>39</sup> *GA2*, 168-73

<sup>40</sup> Gordon H., *The Heidegger-Buber Controversy & Sartre J.-P.*, *Nausea*. Not specific passages, but the totality of the two works advance in varying degrees of explicitness the case of their choice remedies.

*Da-Zeit*.<sup>41</sup> Still what is this not-yet? The not-yet of what? Of Nothing. Of the demise of the possibilities of *Da-Sein*. This is the initial Heideggerian meaning of *Da-sein*'s nullity (*Nichtigkeit*) that grounds the limit of its finitude.

Insofar as man (*Da*) is (-) Being (*Sein*), man *is* never; man *is* rather *not yet*. Only death may transform man into a being. Man becomes, but man *is not*. *Da-sein* is the being that is no-thing—neither ob-ject nor the *res* of any reification. *Da-sein* is no-thing as always underway (*unterwegs*) and never complete. Only things are complete. By transforming *Da-sein* into a thing, death as being-dead, signifies being-being. Being-unto-death is thus both, according to the twofold nature of death: Being-unto-Being and Being-unto-Nothing. Insofar as death emerges as a defining horizon it sets us free *from* Being and free *for* Nothing. Being-unto-death is the appearance of Nothing as *what is more* than Being. *Da-sein* never *is*, for *it is more*: it is *not*. This is the specific locality of *Da-sein*: the more of the remainder, a u-topia. Reading Nothing in the place of the absent god Heidegger's words become clear: "so that we do not, simply put, die meaningless deaths, but that when we decline, we decline in the face of the absent god."<sup>42</sup> Being unto death is less Being than it is death; it is no permanent moment in time and yet neither is it permanence. *Bauen, Wohnen, Denken* affirms the *constant* death of man as long as man dwells on earth, under the sky and before the gods.

The thematization of life by Dilthey, a thinker of prominence behind *Sein & Zeit* accords with the not-being of Being. Precisely as Heraclitean lection: "life exists everywhere only as a nexus or coherent whole,"<sup>43</sup> as essential in-tension and never as fulfilled unity. Life affords the essential nexus between material causation, thought, feeling and will,<sup>44</sup> the mutually irreducible manifold of equi-primordial principals with their respective ideologies. Dilthey knows that no world-view can solve the world-riddle and yet he places his faith in *life*. What the different systems of philosophy and religion, as much as art, do, is present life over and again in different light;<sup>45</sup> they are expressions of the *tropes* of life and yet in these *tropes* "the unfathomable depth of the world"<sup>46</sup> remains. Life is never from itself; it never exhausts itself either in itself or

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<sup>41</sup> The *Daheit* of *Seyn* constituting indeed the enjoining horizon of place and moment (moment being to time what place is to space—much more than an 'instance'.) See De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.124

<sup>42</sup> Neske G. & Kettering E. (ed.), *Der Spiegel Interview*, in *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism*, pp.41-66

<sup>43</sup> Dilthey W., *Descriptive Psychology*, p.28

<sup>44</sup> Dilthey W., *The Essence of Philosophy*, p.26

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p.66

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p.66

discourse. From such life *Da-Sein* emerges as the no-thing unto the No-thing of death. Such no-thing no science can undertake to examine, insofar as the Being of its there needs always be thought anew,<sup>47</sup> from Nothing. Life is always and everywhere the existing task of *Da-Sein*; a task that is not.

Life as the remainder of an eruptive and unique<sup>48</sup> destiny reached further clarity in Simmel. Here *Erfahrung*, the 'waying' of the way emerges intensively against *Erlebnis* often duly and summarily translated into lived experience. The life of *Erlebnis* is the overcoming adventure, the Odyssey that heals upon its return. It presents us with a sense of completion unknown in *Erfahrung*. Only *Er-fahrung* can maintain *Er-lebnis* open. *Erfahrung* does not work in the thought Heidegger inherits from Simmel like the Hegelian integrative discourse of natural and absolute knowing, but is precisely the underway of all ex-perience. *Erfahrung* is not the profusion of life trophies or human capital, but signifies a use/need; a need that allows access to Being.<sup>49</sup> Hölderlin's default of the gods and George's absence of the word for the word, allow for the moment of realization of this need, for the inceptive event (*Er-eignis*) of the thought of such need. *Ereignis* is then not another name in the history of names of Being; it is precisely the *Erfahrung* of the *absence* of a name.<sup>50</sup> Such an event constitutes an overcoming in the sense of a turn (*tropos*); a crucial turn which instead of attempting to uproot enables a dif-ferent metaphysics, a metaphysical *Gelassenheit*. The thought of Nothing does not run counter to Being, but gives its origin and jointure.

Death is thus the horizon that allows for a thought of life as the giving of jointure from Nothing and a dif-ferent metaphysics. It is a horizon that gives Being from Nothing where Being occurs: in *Da-Sein*. Only from Nothing is Being not forgotten for *Da-Sein*. Nothing is hence opposite to Nihilism, which signifies the becoming nothing of Being to man. Nietzsche is accordingly as much a nihilistic thinker as Marx, who constitutes for Heidegger the most extreme moment of nihilism.<sup>51</sup> Nihilism forgets the question of Being and forgets having forgotten. The exclusive triumph of Being as much as the elimination of all metaphysics contain the same danger of forgetfulness, the same nihilism. After a series of distinctions such as between the unliving (*Unlebente*) and the lifeless (*leblose*) of *Sein & Zeit* or the world-less (*weltlose*) and the world-poor

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<sup>47</sup> GA40, 65

<sup>48</sup> Bernasconi R., *The Question of Language in Heidegger's History of Being*, p.81

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p.84

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p.86

<sup>51</sup> GA15, 393

(*weltarm*), thinking *Dasein* in the '40s as the Nothing-less (*Nichtslose*) poses a riddle. Yet the attempt at a complete dissociation of Being from Nothing is but one of the poles of oscillation of Heidegger's thought as it tries to harmonize Being and Nothing. Rather we should say the distinction between ground-less (*grund-los*) and un-grounding, abysmal (*un-gründig*) questioning<sup>52</sup> and the distinction of all *between*, becomes possible for *Dasein* only from it being Nothing-full, saturated by Nothing. *Da-sein* is not a substance, but the in-between, a gap and a gaping abyss where the question of Being may unfold.

In forgetting having forgotten, man reduces Being to the Nihilism of a world as the sum of beings-unto-use.<sup>53</sup> The animalistic world-poorness of Heidegger and against the in-tension of *Sein & Zeit* corresponds thus to the disenchanting world of Weber's 1918 *Wissenschaft als Beruf*. The science of a world reduced to tools has forgotten that its foundation as the foundation of all knowledge rests, in the word of Schopenhauer, in the unexplained [*Unerklärliche*],<sup>54</sup> in the clearing of what is never exhausted in clarity. In the Nothing-full *Dasein* the in-tension of de-severance has prevailed over severance. *Dasein*'s "essential tendency towards closeness"<sup>55</sup> has annihilated all distance, substituting it with the proximity of the telescope, the microscope, the internet. No-thing unexplained remains as the human masters infinite progress. Death has been evicted, its No-thingness reduced to a mere nothing. The deep boredom (*tiefe Langeweile*) of meaninglessness holds sway; no signs remain and the words of Hölderlin resound: *Ein Zeichen sind wir...*<sup>56</sup> When thought forgets the unthought and *a-lētheia* forgets the *a-*, Nihilism has prevailed.

Is death the only *pharmakon* against such forgetfulness? From Socrates, through Kierkegaard to Badiou a spectrum of a diverse *pharmakeia* concentrates in the word of love. We can certainly not undertake here the question of love.<sup>57</sup> We are obliged however to look past love and deeper into *Da-sein* for the severing in-tension that

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<sup>52</sup> GA35, 54

<sup>53</sup> Aho K. A., *Heidegger's Neglect of the Body*, p.7

<sup>54</sup> Schopenhauer A., *Sämtliche Werke*, vol.5, p.6 and Burns M. R. & Rayment-Pickard H., *Philosophies of History*, p.131

<sup>55</sup> Gordon H., *The Heidegger-Buber Controversy*, p.12

<sup>56</sup> Hölderlin F., *Mnemosyne*: "Ein Zeichen sind wir, deutungslos/ Schmerzlos sind wir und haben fast/ Die Sprache in der Fremde verloren." "A sign we are, without meaning/ without pain we are and almost have/ in foreign lands lost our tongue."

<sup>57</sup> A plain case in point provides Gordon's reading of Romeo and Juliet's story as an event of resolution (*Entschlossenheit*). See Gordon H., *The Heidegger-Buber Controversy*, p.105

allows for both Being-unto-death and Being-unto-love. This in-tension we have inceptively thought as ex-istence.

In his introduction to *Was ist Metaphysik?* Heidegger recollects that since *Sein & Zeit* more than 20 years earlier, the essence of *Da-Sein* was identified with its ex-istence.<sup>58</sup> Ex-istence in *Sein & Zeit* refers to the tropos of *Dasein* as it stands open for the openness of Being, in which openness it stands only by standing out of it. Heidegger, looking back, calls this openness *from* the 'out-of' care (*Sorge*).<sup>59</sup> Heidegger stands in the out-of in diametric opposition to Badiou's existence: "To exist is to be an element *of*. There is no other possible predicate of existence as such."<sup>60</sup> In truth this is in-sistence; the in-tension of ex-istence. *Ex-istence* as we have thought with Heraclitus refers to the stepping out, the annulling of the limit required for its reconstitution. Ex-istence is the ex-cess of the use/need of Nothing, in which only "the question of the human" may be posed "from that which, from the start ex-ceeds it, and in excess of which it finds its own humanity."<sup>61</sup> The question of humanity has to be asked *from* the question of ex-istence. A question, initially asking for a structure, eventually comes to ask of a nihilic event, the becoming of a transformation.<sup>62</sup>

Ex-isting *Da-Sein* transforms into the there of Being, for it is *not/is* not. In this sense the animal and the divine *are* but do not *ex-ist*. Indeed it is easy to see man as the only 'one' who is *and* ex-ists in the solitude of ex-istence. If this man as matter, animality or sociality *is*, *Da-sein* ex-ists insofar as it is not. Man ex-ists in "this emptiness, this apparent void at the heart of things, this absence that is not the negation of presence, but the originary absence at the heart of presence,"<sup>63</sup> man ex-ists in the *there*. Nothing is the condition of the-stepping-out-of-the-*there-of-Dasein*; of its being-unto-its-limit and its liberation from the order of presence. Nothing is the condition of ex-istence.

The thought of Parmenides in-tended Being against ex-istence, thinking of Nothing as what prevented Being from arriving to itself.<sup>64</sup> Yet Nothing gives both: the

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<sup>58</sup> GA9, 373. The early Heidegger often repeats the existentialist declaration. For example "The essence of man consists in his existence" (GA35, 90)

<sup>59</sup> GA9, 374

<sup>60</sup> Badiou A., *Ethics*, p.135

<sup>61</sup> De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.12

<sup>62</sup> Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, p.210

<sup>63</sup> De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.127

<sup>64</sup> Parmenides, B8, 45-6

incessant deferral and the uttermost possibility of a self. Mally touches on something original: "In tautological thinking and saying there is a lack of positions and of certainty. The words of semantic/logical consistency yield a certain certainty, but the imaging of tautological thinking extends and expands beyond the words, always to a 'more', an excess. That excess images the no-position, always ongoing and expanding, of being."<sup>65</sup> This is the language of inceived tautology.

The self inceived and speaking from Nothing is essentially severed in the saturation of Nothing. Ipseity appears coherently full of holes, from the two-foldness of a *res* that is *cogitans* in Descartes and Kant's disjunction of the transcendental 'I' from its categorial intuition, to Buber's *I-Thou* and *I-It*. Everywhere the thought of presence discovers unfailingly a threat in the opening of the abyss of the self. It constitutes its obsessive fear. Yet Being cannot fill the abyss, Being is not all; in truth Being is not at all. Nothing grounds in the abyss the irreducible duality of all Being, torn between *essentia* and *existentia*. Heidegger localizes the ground of this tear in ontological difference,<sup>66</sup> a difference Nothing gives. The en-joining of its abyss we call tropos; the tropos of Nothing. It is the turning which we now need turn to think.

### 3. A turn of topos: tropos

We encountered the Nothing of death and *Da-Sein's* anxiety in its face as well as the fear of Being in the face of the least fissure, the least point of entry of Nothing that could imperil the ipseity of Being. These two fears interrelate while deviating into different orders. The turning of Nothing to Being is returned by a turning away of Being from Nothing. A double fear afflicts Being: on the one hand a fear of the thought of presence presented with the spectre of degeneration into relativity and the complete loss of rigour into the vortex of absurdity and on the other an ontological fear of an absolute void and an irrevocable annihilation. What Being fears is that the least fissure should tear asunder its ontological and thought conditions into such fate. However the anxiety of death, as the specific suspension of a between (life and death) is forced into an overcoming confrontation. From this anxiety *Da-sein* becomes free for ex-istence. This

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<sup>65</sup> Mally K., *Reading and Thinking: Heidegger and the Hinting Greeks*, in Sallis J. (ed.), *Reading Heidegger, Commemorations*, p.228

<sup>66</sup> GA78, 213

order of freedom, the fear of Being for its ipseity attempts to suppress. The self of presence, desires no such confrontation—the Parmenidean ban of Nothing, which shall confront us, attesting this fleeing for the first time. And yet the in-tension of Nothing is at work. Being can only avoid ex-istence on pain of the uttermost metaphysical violence.

Tropos is the free turning towards and into the freedom of ex-istence or away from it, under the yoke of presence. Such turning is the radical how *before* all modality, more precisely, the pure modulation *before* substance, before the substantial topoi of presence and absence. For there is no ‘substantial form’, which historical metamorphoses would simply reincarnate; as we saw *from* essence, essence transforms itself in every essential transformation.<sup>67</sup> Tropos is not a Nietzschean tarantella whirling, a poisoned confusion that keeps what-whirls fettered, disallowing the step ahead; it is not a double will that wills both itself and its dissolution. Its turning should be thought in the sense one turns for help—in need. Since its Platonic beginning however metaphysics turns against such turning-for-help in the “fundamental change of direction”<sup>68</sup> of the topology of *idea*. Only after the end of metaphysics can the *there* of Being (*Da-Sein*) turn again for the help of Nothing. Only *here* can thought re-member that: “at the origin, metaphysics is nothing but a turnaround (*Umwendung*) or a changeover (*Umschlag*). It is the act of turning from one thing to another, and this original swerve decides its destiny. Metaphysics owes both its name and meaning to a change of direction alone.”<sup>69</sup> Only *here* may the tropic Being metaphysics has endeavoured to arrest, unaware of itself merely following Being’s transformations, appear in the exemplary simile: “The tropos [*die Weise* and may also say: *the way*], for example, in which the singing bird comports itself, we name singing. The tropos, in which the beings that-are comport themselves, we name Being.”<sup>70</sup> Being is the subtle how, the song of all that-is, a tropos *from* Nothing.

Being *from* Nothing ex-presses itself as the exiting of ex-istence and as the constitutive severance of the limit. Gold (a force that actuated the discovery of a new world, a new topoi, *nihilating* the limits of Renaissance in the *an-nihilation* of the old Indian *kosmos*) presents the complexity of the *tropic* event in radiant clarity. We will come to recognize with Heidegger the meaning the thought of Heraclitus brings to

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<sup>67</sup> Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, p.47

<sup>68</sup> See *Ibid.*, p.57

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p.257

<sup>70</sup> *GA35*, 10



Pindar's gold,<sup>71</sup> as it (the jewel) absences in favour of presence (the bejewelled). Yet the ex-pression admonishes: "not all that shines is gold". Such ex-pression dissociates the invariable association of the two only to re-associate them on a deeper level. Such dis-association is the *topos* that ultimately constitutes both.<sup>72</sup> Gold is in the trope of shining, yet such shining trope does not exhaust itself in gold, with infinite other dissembling manifestations; at the same time, gold only ex-ists in surpassing a mere shining trope insofar as its *originality* resides in the bejewelling withdrawal. Gold is essentially the ex-cess *from* the ex-pression "not all that shines is gold"; the 'more' that escapes the gravity of all that shines, the limit of dissemblance. It exits such limit in order to withdraw and bejewel.

Accordingly the way of Nothing is not the Parmenidean *atarpos*<sup>73</sup> that fails to conduce and turn one from the wrong direction, that makes one fall into a *topos* of barren absence,<sup>74</sup> but to the contrary the very way of ways, the pure turning as such, clearing the way of Being.<sup>75</sup> Underway along this turning the *essentia*, the 'whatness', that Being (re)presents in the history of metaphysics finally gives way to its saturation by the *haecceitas*, the 'thisness' of exiting ex-istence. An ever-new *topos*, the *topos* of Nothing, emerges as this original junction of *essentia* and *existentia*.

At the end of this preparation and in preparation of the inception, we come to hear the first and last words of Nothing.

#### 4. Nothing

We would like to ask: *What is Nothing?* But this question, we already know presents us with a contradiction preclusive of even the beginning of an answer. If Being is *not/is* not, what sort of presence could Nothing present us with? Even the most radical form of *is not/is* not appears here insufficient, while Nothing constitutes itself as an irreducibility to mere absence. At the same time, Heidegger is as correct as provocative: "we have not first Nothing and then particular beings, but firstly and lastly beings (*das*

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<sup>71</sup> See p.116

<sup>72</sup> GA78, 325

<sup>73</sup> Parmenides, B2, 6

<sup>74</sup> What we shall come to understand as *sphalma*, the falling.

<sup>75</sup> Thanassas P., *Parmenides, cosmos, and being*, pp.28-30

*Seiende*).<sup>76</sup> We have Nothing for Nothing is not, yet it is equally not an ‘is not’; Nothing is not a second-order subsistence. Indeed then all there is and everything that is, is beings. Nothing is *never* and never *beside, before* or *beyond* beings. We are subsequently left with the sole possibility of a *tropos*. Nothing is the *tropos* of beings. More correctly beings are *in* (as jointure) and *from* (as origin) the *tropos* of Nothing. Nancy articulates the programmatic phenomenology of the un-showing of the late Heidegger: “Not only is the *nihil* nothing prior but there is also no longer a “nothing” that pre-exists creation; it is the very act of appearing, it is the very origin—[...] the appearing or arrival *in nothing* (in the sense that we talk about someone appearing ‘in person’). The Nothing, then is nothing other than the dis-position of the appearing. The origin is distancing.”<sup>77</sup>

We only have beings. In them every positive discourse exhausts itself. Heidegger recites the voice of positivity: “With regard to the order of the world, there are beings—and nothing more.

Whence every *tropos* (*Haltung*) takes its direction, is beings themselves—and nothing further.

That with which the inquiring discourse (*Auseinandersetzung*) takes place in irruption, is being themselves—and nothing beyond this.”

And accordingly asks: “Is this then merely a figure of speech—and nothing further?”<sup>78</sup> Certainly *not*. For “science wants to know nothing of Nothing. But equally that much remains certain: there, where it attempts to invoke its own essence, it calls Nothing into its rescue.”<sup>79</sup> Nothing is what de-fines science, the territory beyond a final limit where science is *not*.

Yet the *not*, negation and the negating act do not constitute the highest determination of which Nothing is but a species, but rather the manifold of negation originates in Nothing.<sup>80</sup> Heidegger observes the expanses and depth of Nothing that negation shall always fail to summarize: “more abysmal from the mere adequacy of thinking negation is the hardness of acting in contrariety and the sharpness of

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<sup>76</sup> GA35, 3

<sup>77</sup> Nancy J-L., *Being Singular Plural*, p.16

<sup>78</sup> GA9, 105

<sup>79</sup> GA9, 106

<sup>80</sup> GA9, 108 and 116-7

abomination. More responsible is the pain of the failure and the vulnerability of banishment. Heavier is the acerbity of deprivation.”<sup>81</sup>

As the origin of negation, nihilating Nothing is the use/need of *more*—more than negation. “The essence of nothing consists in the aversion of beings, in the remoteness from them. Only in this remoteness can beings as such manifest themselves in the open (*offenkundig*). Nothing is not the simple negation of beings. In contrast, nothing in nihilation brings us into a topos of proximity (*verweist*) to beings in their manifestation. The nihilation of nothing ‘is’ Being.”<sup>82</sup> At the same time in bringing beings to the foreground, nihilating Nothing withdraws to constitute the heart of *lēthē* in *alētheia*—nothing easier to forget than what never was. To Heidegger’s question on the origin of this forgetting *nihilation*<sup>83</sup> we can by now answer that nothing but Nothing could offer it. Nothing is the origin as topos: Nothing, turning to beings withdraws, so that beings can be in the topos of presence.

The distinction of negation (absencing) and nihilation (the origin) may appear in a co-extensive parallel to the Platonic division of *mē* and *ouk on* of *Sophistes*. This is however misleading. *Ouk* for Plato designates a *nihil negativum*, the mere negation of beings: unintelligible absence. *Mē* on the other hand connotes a determinate lack with regard to Being.<sup>84</sup> *Mē on* is indeed the trade of the sophist insofar as he doesn’t deal with Being in its truth, but uses Being as the topos of instability and as ground of semblance. As such, the thought of *mē on* employs Being, yet only for Plato because Being grants a homology between *mē on* and *on*. The *mē* dissolves into the ontological order. The beginning of metaphysics has clearly no place for absence. In the complete banishment of *ouk on* and the complete subsumption of *mē on* metaphysics sets out the programmatic of Being—a programmatic of presence. Metaphysics will not allow a space for the opening difference of *negating* nothing (*nichtiges Nichts*)<sup>85</sup> and *nihilating* Nothing (*nichtendes Nichts*).<sup>86</sup>

Nihilation far from an act of obliteration is the essential giving of a world. “Nihilating (*das Nichten*) is no arbitrary event, but as the repelling referring of the fleeing totality of beings, it reveals these beings in their complete, hitherto hidden

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<sup>81</sup> GA9, 117

<sup>82</sup> GA15, 361

<sup>83</sup> GA15, 346

<sup>84</sup> GA15, 363

<sup>85</sup> GA78, 153

<sup>86</sup> GA81, 296; the opening poem

uncanniness as the complete other—in the face of Nothing.”<sup>87</sup> Neither the ultimate solution of the religious *one* of Levinas nor the partial possibility of the political *one* of Rancière, but only Nothing grants radical otherness: the world. Derrida reaches further when he says: “Sublime nothingness, you know that it preserves everything.”<sup>88</sup> For Heidegger when thought turns to this preserving granting it witnesses anxiety. “In the bright night of Nothing of anxiety” one realizes that there are beings and not Nothing<sup>89</sup> and *Da-Sein* becomes the placeholder of Nothing<sup>90</sup>. Only in this placeholdering does Nothing use/need man, not out “of a structural lack, but as a relation of generosity born of an irreducible plenitude.”<sup>91</sup> This is the favour and nobility of the poverty of Nothing,<sup>92</sup> which *Da-Sein* is placeholdering and safeguarding. The protection of poverty takes place in the collection of *logos*, at times as anxiety,<sup>93</sup> at others as love, always as the *lection* of Heraclitean *kosmos*, we shall come to know, the beginning of a world.

Heidegger reads metaphysics as a very narrow interpretation of the origin of this cosmology. Metaphysics understands Nothing as non-Being and this non-Being in turn as unformed matter.<sup>94</sup> What-is (a being) is accordingly thought as a forming formation (Cassirer’s *forma formans*), while “the origin, right and limits of this conception of Being are discussed as little as Nothing itself.”<sup>95</sup> It is Being, a Being thought from presence as forming formation, that proclaims in the negative: *ex nihilo nihil fit*. Only Being can give what is, for only Being forms. In the unfolding of the history of metaphysics the Christian dogma reverses for Heidegger the proposition; *ex nihilo nihil fit* becomes: *ex nihilo fit ens creatum*.<sup>96</sup> Again, Heidegger in the grip of a specific interpretation disregards for example the complexity of the thought of world-origin which Maimonides inherited, elaborated and bequeathed, exemplified probably best in the distinction *de novo*.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> GA9, 114

<sup>88</sup> Derrida J., *The Post Card*, p.171

<sup>89</sup> GA9, 114

<sup>90</sup> GA9, 118

<sup>91</sup> De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.138

<sup>92</sup> Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, pp.150-1

<sup>93</sup> GA9, 109

<sup>94</sup> GA9, 119

<sup>95</sup> GA9, 119

<sup>96</sup> GA9, 119

<sup>97</sup> Maimonides M., *The Guide of the Perplexed*, 2.13

At the same time, “if God is God, he cannot know Nothing, if otherwise the ‘absolute’ excludes from itself all nothingness.”<sup>98</sup> *From Nothing* God creates the world and yet God remains excluded from witnessing the absolute otherness of the origin; indeed this exclusion constitutes God’s own originary function. For Heidegger what God is unable to know, *Dasein* in-ceived by the use/need of Nothing is forced to experience. “In the Nothing of *Dasein* arrives for the first time to itself what-is in its wholeness according to its ownmost possibility, that is, in a finite tropos,”<sup>99</sup> so that in *Dasein ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit* and so that *Da-Sein* ex-ists. Only in ex-istence can the essential change of tone (*Wechsel der Tonart*) take place, a change of tropos that transforms not only the essential principle of reason from ‘Nothing is without reason’ to ‘Nothing is without reason’,<sup>100</sup> but further into ‘Nothing is without reason’ and finally into ‘Nothing from Nothing’: *nihil ex nihilo*, the purity of an ex-isting double mirror.

Only man is able for such change of tone, thus only man ex-ists. God and the angel are, but they do not exist. (Indeed, maybe talk should only be of angels, or of gods without a God and this precisely as the immanent attestation of the excess of Being<sup>101</sup> from Nothing). Rocks, trees and animals are but they do not exist. Man exists precisely only as the there of Being in-ceived by the nowhere of Nothing. Regrettably Heidegger in the appropriative epilogue of 1943 will re-attribute the ex-isting ex-perience of Nothing to Being: “Only man among all that-is experiences, invoked by the voice of Being that miracle of all miracles, that beings are.”<sup>102</sup> For in 1943 Nothing, as the other to what-is, becomes the veil of Being, the clarity that Nothing afforded briefly vanquished. The 5<sup>th</sup> edition of 1949 will restore Nothing to the nihilation of original difference, while *Beyng* emerges here as the event of use/need (*Brauch*).<sup>103</sup> The struggle of Heideggerian thought is all too evident.

Yet in the moments of clearest clarity, the truest intension of Heideggerian thought finds the voice: “Whatever each time presences, the present, essences from absence.”<sup>104</sup> Nothing, more than a Kantian condition of the possibility of Being is both the condition and the possibility of Being. This nocturnal clarity we have witnessed

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<sup>98</sup> GA9, 119

<sup>99</sup> GA9, 120

<sup>100</sup> Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, p.118

<sup>101</sup> De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.171

<sup>102</sup> GA9, 307

<sup>103</sup> GA9, 312

<sup>104</sup> “*Das jeweilig Anwesende, das gegenwärtige, west aus dem Abwesen*” (GA5, 350)

with Heraclitus and Parmenides. The night of Nothing implies darkness and readily darkness is thought as absence of light. Yet there are tropes of darkness as there are tropes of light; darkness is ever *different*. The dark can be the obscuring light or an illumination keeping itself to itself—a self-contained illumination.<sup>105</sup> Further the dark can be the hovering between the two tropes. When this hovering turns into a permanent indistinction, darkness becomes confusion. Yet darkness is essentially but a trope of clarity. Bereaved of light the blind are not denied clarity. Indeed the clarity of the invisible presents the *telos* of all visibility. The in-visible operates like the in-valuable. The in-valuable, far from having no value, so far surpasses the order of value that becomes its transcendental condition—only from the invaluable does value have any value. In essential parallel the world shows forth in the clarity of the invisible. From the *telos* of visibility, the invisible, we start to see the depth of the world, a depth Heidegger calls earth.<sup>106</sup>

Again the words of Nancy appear pertinent, almost internal, to this thought: “this is *we* as the beginning and end of the world, inexhaustible in the circumscription that nothing circumscribes, that “the” nothing circumscribes. [...] “World” does not mean anything other than this “nothing” that no one can “mean” [*vouloir dire*], but that is said in every saying: in other words, Being itself as the absolute value in itself of all that is, *but this absolute value as the being-with of all that is* itself bare and impossible to evaluate.”<sup>107</sup> Being is the absolute value granted in the invaluable clarity of Nothing. This granting we name tropes. It allows the passage from absence to the orders of presence. This tropic passage constitutes originary time.<sup>108</sup> The world that results as the fruit par excellence of this temporalizing, Heidegger names the *nihil originarium*, the world itself becoming this peculiar (*eigentümliches*) Nothing.<sup>109</sup> This refers to the world as the originary-factum that allows for History to take place.<sup>110</sup> Here lies the origin of the particular.

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<sup>105</sup> GA55, 242-3

<sup>106</sup> De Beistegui reminds us that this earth is precisely an order of *Mnēmosynē*. De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.134

<sup>107</sup> Nancy J-L., *Being Singular Plural*, p.4

<sup>108</sup> GA24, 443

<sup>109</sup> GA26, 272

<sup>110</sup> GA26, 270

A number of tangents emerge from this section of world and time proving us unable to follow and forcing us to defer. We only endeavor a handful of closing remarks.

In the History of the origin we find ourselves in the *'between'*. Heidegger sees himself as much as Hölderlin as a thinker in-between the flight and the new coming of gods. The *between* is different from the *within*. Bernasconi correctly observes: "The ability to say what metaphysics is, is granted only to those who are no longer bound by metaphysics in the sense of being within it; they can only say what it no longer is."<sup>111</sup> The *between* is what allows this exit, ex-isting from the *within*. "The forever evanescent 'Between' that sustains and traverses all things"<sup>112</sup> even if thought no more thought as *Differenz*, but as the lesion of *Unter-schied* and ad-justing *Austrag*,<sup>113</sup> it can never equate to any sense of Being, except insofar as Being is understood precisely as Nothing. For the *between* emerges from Nothing as the severing gap of originary difference, the en-owning cut of the event that allows Being and beings to shine forth in *tension*. In *tension* appears the *clearing*—not above or beyond, but *before* as much as *between* Being.<sup>114</sup> Heidegger thinks here from difference, so that the 'is' speaks neither from beings nor from Being, but from the *'between'*.<sup>115</sup>

The opening of the *between* is *History*: the child of Chronos and Dikē is but the severing activity of Nothing. Nothing is not forever tamed and well-tempered, but allows ab-solute pre-sence as much as ab-solute ab-sence; thus Nothing provides absolution, the forgiveness of presence for all its violence. This re-turning of violence is *tisis*, *eris* and *dikē*, as we shall witness with Anaximander and Heraclitus; a turning knife; a severance; jointure and disjuncture.

The opening of the *between* is also however intimacy [*Innigkeit*].<sup>116</sup> This *between* appears as the intersection of the 'middle' and the common that has been haunting these pages. The void that offers the centre of the Parmenidean sphere and its liminal beings, the Heraclitean *xynon* and the Anaximandrian *apeiron*, as much as the world it gives rise to, sustained amidst Nothing by Nothing, all these inceptive moments

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<sup>111</sup> Bernasconi R., *The Question of Language in Heidegger's History of Being*, p.46

<sup>112</sup> De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.18

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, p.183

<sup>114</sup> GA78, 329; notes

<sup>115</sup> GA78, 332; notes

<sup>116</sup> De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.181

speak of the *between* as the intimacy of col-lection, the intimacy of pain, of the lesion that offers and 'is' the world.

Nothing, even when the withdrawal of Being has made its naming impossible for a whole era, always supports and gives Being. Certainly "the abyss does not yield,"<sup>117</sup> incessantly offering the use/need of the *chreōn*. Nothing never absences for it was never present. If the early Heidegger recognizes its giving in anxiety, time teaches him to witness the profusion of its use/need in gratitude. "The thoughtful thanc (*Gedanc*), the heart's core, is the col-lection of all that concerns us, that touches us, that relates to us, us, insofar as we are as humans... We are in a certain trope, but not exclusively, this col-lection itself."<sup>118</sup> Our heart trembles neither in uncertainty (the Parmenidean anxiety), nor in anxiety (the Heideggerian certainty), but in gratitude for the opening of a gap in Being.

At the end of Nothing we must begin.

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<sup>117</sup> *GA5*, 372

<sup>118</sup> *GA8*, 149-50



## II. The Beginning of Truth

At the inception, the beginning (*archē*) of truth (*alētheia*) signifies the *archē* of *logos*, the first archeology, insofar as *logos* has its origin and principle (*archē*) in *alētheia*. Every subsequent attempt to refer to the guiding principle of a *logos*, whether appropriated as spirit or discourse, has its ground in this beginning.

### 1. From the Beginning

Too late. If we are to begin, if we are to begin in a certain tropos (*ei mellomemen arxasthai kata tropon*),<sup>1</sup> we can only begin too late. Sallis is right; the duplicity of *mellein*, the intention of beginning, being about to begin, means to delay, a deferral of the beginning. Hovering at the limit (*peras*) of the beginning we do not yet begin and we cannot yet know the truth of the limit, yet it is the limit from which we need to begin.<sup>2</sup> We are already too late and yet we are urged to begin. Where? In *Timaeus* whence the diction *mellein arxasthai* bids us, Critias answers: “at the natural beginning.”<sup>3</sup> And yet this beginning evokes already a re-turn, “a palintropic move [...], a turn through which one beginning (archaic Greece) is referred back to a still earlier beginning (the generation of the cosmos).”<sup>4</sup> At the same time a common subterranean Platonic sub-version is at work, whereby “if principle is taken as beginning, then one could say that nothing is more thoroughly put in question in the *Timaeus* than pressupposing a principle, that is, not beginning at the beginning.”<sup>5</sup>

Plato himself comes too late and we are merely the latest of latecomers. If we return earlier, this isn't because the earliest of thinkers are not themselves too late, but precisely because thought begins with the realization of its delay. Vernant draws a plain image: “To mythological thought, daily experience was illumined and given meaning by exemplary deeds performed ‘in the beginning.’ For the Ionians, the comparison was reversed. The primal events, the forces that produced the cosmos, were conceived in the image of the facts that could be observed today, and could be explained in the same

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<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Timaeus*, 54a

<sup>2</sup> Sallis J. *Chorology*, p.6

<sup>3</sup> Plato, *Timaeus*, 29b

<sup>4</sup> Sallis J. *Chorology*, p.45

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p.75

way.”<sup>6</sup> Inceptive thought begins at the end, begins to trace the beginning from the end and traces it as an ever other beginning, the deferral of the beginning moving not primarily towards the future, but towards the past; *to begin to think we postpone the past*. For the inceptive past is always futural; like Nietzsche’s murder of God<sup>7</sup> it consists in a deed of our own we still need to catch up with. To begin to postpone the past in order to *arxasthai kata tropon*, in a tropos that will allow us to catch up with the beginning, constitutes the other, ever-other, beginning, the transition and transformation that transforms not only those who return to the beginning, but the beginning itself.<sup>8</sup> In turn, the preparation that constitutes the postponement of the past is the very repetition of the beginning that allows for the plurality of inceptive times;<sup>9</sup> times that cede to the ever-new, as soon as the beginning begins anew, as soon as a re-turn is inceived.

It is thus clear. To be an inceptive thinker does not mean to be the first to have a thought or the first to have thought. Historiography is here as little relevant as the temporal allotment of thought along a line of successions. For certainly “not every thinker at the beginning of occidental thought is also an inceptive thinker. The first inceptive thinker is called Anaximander.”<sup>10</sup> The only other two for Heidegger are called Heraclitus and Parmenides.<sup>11</sup> Their original difference consists in the tropos, the way they stand in relation to the origin. Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides are inceived by the inception, seized, taken in by and collected in it.<sup>12</sup> Whether we insist with Burnet and Nestlé on the break between *mythos* and *logos* or emphasize the continuity of the two discourses with Cornford, our dialectic of transformation needs to allow space for the event of inception. Only on the closely-knit fabric of *mythos* and *logos* can the inception occur as original cut; the cutting of the umbilical cord of *logos* that marks its new, separate way. This lesion/lection we shall come to understand through this chapter and later with Heraclitus, as *more* than a break. So that when Jaeger realizes the birth of *logos* in the opening of a difference towards myth and subsequently observes the retraction from *apeiron* (Anaximander) to a *nous* (Anaxagoras) bordering on the

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<sup>6</sup> Vernant J.-P., *The Origins of Greek Thought*, p.103

<sup>7</sup> *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*, 125. See Nietzsche F., *KG*, V2, pp.158-60

<sup>8</sup> Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, p.103

<sup>9</sup> See De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, pp.148-9

<sup>10</sup> GA54, 2

<sup>11</sup> GA54, 10

<sup>12</sup> GA54, 11

theological figure of Zeus,<sup>13</sup> he registers indeed the historical beginning of *logos*, but leaves this history revolving around an absent event. Jaeger observes the effects produced by the inception on both *mythos* and *logos*, yet he eludes the thematization of its occurrence. 'Theology' becomes the placeholder of this absence, the *between* of *mythos* and *logos*, where the latter reverts into the tropes of thought of the earlier.

Clearly thought returns to mytho-theology<sup>14</sup> insofar as it proves insufficient to maintain the in-tensity of the inception, reverting to a place neither of *mythos*, nor of *logos*. This return sustains itself however from the gift the beginning brings: *logos*—for *nous* as Zeus is draped in *logos*. Adorno's thought offers a capital example, devoted to the tracing of this perpetual mytho-logical return of *logos*.<sup>15</sup> There is however another return; the return of the *singular*, of the event to the inception.<sup>16</sup> Whether original, mytho- or onto-theological, history is never a progression from a beginning to an end, but always a return. Yet onto-theology forgets both returns, the return to myth as much as to the inception, fabulating its destiny into heroic adventure, vanquishing the significance of the homebound journey; reducing *Odyssey* to *Iliad*. Here lies the shortcoming of Adorno's attempt, as he tries to heal onto-theological thought in and from itself. Exemplary is thus his understanding of *Odyssey* precisely as *Iliad*, Ulysses as an enlightened, thus essentially mytho-logical hero. Adorno attempting to show history as the return of *logos* to *mythos* must thus forget that onto-theology can never recognize itself as a return unless it returns to original thought; Adorno must remain an onto-theological thinker.

His vehemence against Heidegger is the mere utterance of self-imprisonment against the trace of a radically different return, the slowly rushing return to the origin, the passage through the forest of the inception.<sup>17</sup> If we hope to follow this trace, the *beginning* of inceptive thought, we need to think as beginners, that is, we need to think

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<sup>13</sup> Jaeger W., *The theology of the early Greek philosophers*, p.174

<sup>14</sup> Detienne employs the word mythicoreligious, attempting a classification of the transition. See for example Detienne M., *The masters of truth in archaic Greece*, p.25, 87, 89 (here appears unnuanced the word magicoreligious) & 104. On the side of *logos* we find the classification philosophicoreligious (for example, *ibid.*, p.123ff.), as referring for example to sects like the Pythagoreans. Clearly there is something unresolved, that calls for these rough sections. At the same time religion should not be conflated with theology. Theology is already of the order of *logos*. And if indeed, the Greeks did not have a religion proper, they certainly had *mythos* and theology.

<sup>15</sup> Adorno Th., *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, essentially the whole essay, more particular the first and second parts: *Begriff der Aufklärung* and *Exkurs I: Odysseus oder Mythos und Auklärung*, pp.19-99

<sup>16</sup> GA55, 288

<sup>17</sup> GA55, 62

simply,<sup>18</sup> for the origin always appears in utter *simplicity*. And yet the expression of simplicity, we know, remains the most arduous task.

The inception is forever singular and simple. A dimension of singularity is uniqueness. Unlike for example pottery, where reconstruction of fragments may refer to an existing canon of production, there is no possible object of comparison for the fragments of Heraclitus.<sup>19</sup> One could tangentially touch on the dialect and syntax employed by each inceptive thinker and recognize patterns of themes emerging in the Hellenic or even across the totality of Indo-Semitic and Asiatic civilizations at the turn of the 5<sup>th</sup> to 4<sup>th</sup> century, only on pain however of relinquishing the inception. The fragments of Heraclitus will forever elude the attempt to overcome their uniqueness grounded in the singularity of the inception. Parmenides will—precisely in affinity—forever stand apart from Melissus, Zeno or Gorgias. The search for the net of affinities is the veiling mesh behind which the inception withdraws. Only from the singularity of the inception can any subsequent uniqueness draw its distinction. From *idea* and *energeia* through the *Geist* to the body without organs a return to *logos*, *tauton* and the *chreōn* grounds each new singularity in the originality of the origin.

To find and discover the new is a matter of research and technics. Essential thought, on the other hand, constantly has to return to the identical-singular, to the old, the oldest, the inceptive.<sup>20</sup> Badiou speaks from Heidegger when he en-joins the singularities of love and thought in the event. As Paul propounds in the *First Letter to the Corinthians*, all other knowledge may be revised, but love “never faileth”—so with the event of thought: speaking from the rarity and uniqueness<sup>21</sup> of the singular it may never be undone. For a return to the singularity we need to set ourselves free from the illusion that incessantly feeds progressive desire, the stratified illusion that the old is the obsolete, the obsolete what is gone, what is gone what is no more and what is no more what is not, a non-being, a mere nothing.<sup>22</sup> Towards such progress the inception remains the most violent and uncanny, while the only way for progressive, that is, techno-logical thought to hold its ground against the inception is to construct for it an innocuous greatness, where what is great is techno-logically evaluated according to number and

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<sup>18</sup> GA55, 93

<sup>19</sup> GA55, 36

<sup>20</sup> GA54, 114

<sup>21</sup> GA51, 11

<sup>22</sup> GA35, 36

quantity.<sup>23</sup> What follows the inception does not follow from it, it remains un-in-ceived and as such constitutes an extensive-quantitative flattening of the original in-tension.

If it does not follow *from* the inception how are we to think what follows? “The Greek, Christianity, modernity, planetarism and the explicitly occidental, we think from out of a fundamental trait of Being, which it rather covers than reveals as *alētheia* in the *lēthē*. And yet, this covering of its essence and of its essential origin is the trait, in which Being illuminates itself inceptively, in such a way indeed, that thought precisely does not *follow* it.”<sup>24</sup>

What follows, the thought that no longer follows from nor flows out of the inception, is neither continuance nor opposition of the inception, but exists in the specific covering of the origin, what Heidegger calls the error of Being, the self-obscuring of Being that illuminates beings: “Without erring, there would be no relation from destiny to destiny, there would be no history. [...] We are, when we are historical, neither in a great, nor in a short remove from the Greek. But we are in the erring towards it.”<sup>25</sup> Each epoch has its own destiny, its own error that constitutes history. The techno-logical error Heidegger calls *Gestell* (en-framing); he says: “the en-framing is as it were the photographic negative of the event.”<sup>26</sup> And yet the fore-showing, the possibility of the event of our current return to the origin emerges under the very veil of the *Gestell*. This veil (*Schleier*) advances the metaphor in the most intricate of ways, a clandestine allusion to the dichroic and other forms of fogging that cause deterioration to a photograph. Indeed, fogging may or may not be voluntary. The play of the event against the will of man is best expressed in the 1969 Le Thor’s seminar, where Heidegger with the French participants hears in *bergen*, in sheltering and covering, in the veiling, the French *berger*, the herdsman who gives shelter to Being. Man who by the last chapter we shall know as the placeholder of Nothing, herds Being.<sup>27</sup> As we shall come to know with Parmenides, the error is always already there, while man as the placeholder of Nothing can only guard against the falsity, the falling that veils and forgets the error.

At the same time, *contra* Heidegger, what obscures Being is not Being itself, but Nothing. It is the very origin that obscures, so that beings may come forth. Nothing

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<sup>23</sup> GA40, 164

<sup>24</sup> GA5, 336

<sup>25</sup> GA5, 337

<sup>26</sup> GA15, 366

<sup>27</sup> GA15, 370

enjoins presence and absence in the absolute radiance of presence against the absolute negligibility of absence. Being withdraws to allow for the showing forth of beings because Being is not; only beings are. Being is saturated with absence. And thus it withdraws into the origin. Only at the inception does the origin and thus Being emerge.

Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides are the names of the thinkers that first witnessed this emergence. Today the emergency of this thought is calling us back to the origin, for the beginning emerges last in essential history.<sup>28</sup> If the inception means a turning towards the origin, its future lies not in what follows, but in what returns. The beginning is the last return to the inception from the *not yet* of its fulfillment. The absence of the *not yet* does not signify a Hegelian poverty and abstraction, but the true beginning from truth, the true return. With Heidegger we return.<sup>29</sup>

It seems that too much freedom has guided the alternating use of the *beginning* and the *inception*; before proceeding we pause for clarity. In the in-cception speaks the in-tensity of the seizing of the origin. The inception thought from the specific horizon of the *chreōn*, the use/need (*Brauch*), that its first thinker, Anaximander, brought to language is a *ginnen*, a beginning. In it we dare to hear with Heidegger the affinity of *gönnen* and *Gunst*, the *granting* of Being from the origin of Nothing. Beginning is the granting of Being inasmuch Being is in-ceived. The words run closely and interweave pointing to their beginning: the Greek *archē*. *Archē* signifies the opening of the thought of both and yet it is not the mere aggregate of their connotations. We attempt thus to *win* an understanding of *archē* at the dawn of its Homeric meaning: *archō*, to lead troops to battle.

For Heidegger *archē*, presents itself in a threefold unity.<sup>30</sup> It is first the *whence*, where things begin *from*. Heidegger amplifies while provoking the significance of this moment, its significance *as* moment, by confining the beginning to a fate of being surpassed and left behind. This falling fate is the withdrawing granting of the beginning, the use/need (*chreōn*) of the Heraclitean war.

*Archē* is second the paving of the way, the waying, opening-and-being-a-way itself. It clears the way, but in a tropos that retains itself as *archē*, as unremitting

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<sup>28</sup> GA54, 2

<sup>29</sup> Krell D. F., *Hegel Heidegger Heraclitus*, in Maly K., Sallis J. (eds.), *Heraclitean Fragments*, p.34

<sup>30</sup> GA51, 108

clearing *and* way, so that the *not yet* expressed Aritotelian pseudo-dilemma<sup>31</sup> between being an *archē* and having an *archē* resolves in the very twofold that the *archē* of Nothing signifies; accordingly, the *archē* does not implicate a *peras* and thus finitude. *Archē* is the ever-granting of the way.

*Archē* thus finally dis-poses and en-joins the *between* of emergence and evasion. Its second fold as ever-waying tropos, constitutes the *archē* as continuous transition, as the *ever-between*. Indeed: “the inceptive word demands in any case from us, to think the demise and disappearing in the sense of emerging/appearing into concealment,”<sup>32</sup> subverting our common representations in favour of the between. The beginning of *archē* means surpassing the emergence of the beginning and in-dwelling in it unto its evasion. As little as *archē* is the sum of translation of the beginning and inception, so little are its three moments merely homonymous significations, arranged next to one another; their unity rather commands each fold to always speak through the other two.

Looking at the *archē* through the first and second fold, that is, as the *whence* of the setting off along with the setting off—the way *and* the clearing—*itself*, is easy to understand how *archē*, originally neither a principle nor a cause, is made into an ‘agent’ and a ‘power’ and thought as rule and dominion. As such however the *archein* can only mean the reigning (*durchwalten*) only inasmuch it is a letting-follow and letting-succeed. As such it is the granting of a belonging (*Gehören*) and an obeying (*Gehorchen*).<sup>33</sup> What however succeeds without following from the inception succeeds only in retaining the meaning of power, while it lets go of the letting, the granting.

It is from this granting that we need to always begin to think Greek thought—from the *archē*. Greek is the condition of our thought, because the beginning is the condition, the granting. To think from the beginning is thus to always think anew, to think the origin and thus also Being anew, in a different tropos. This *anew*, this return requires a readiness, a “readiness for confrontation with the inception,”<sup>34</sup> where “the remembrance of the inception is [...] not fleeing into the bygone, but rather readiness

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<sup>31</sup> And yet a dilemma with immense consequences for the history of *oikonomia* in political theology as Agamben’s *The Kingdom and the Glory* throughout demonstrates. And yet already in this history the dilemma surpasses the impassable, mere point of ‘either/or’ as for example we read: “It is not so much that the effects (the Government) depend on being (the Kingdom), but rather that being consists of its effects: such is the vicarious and effectual ontology that defines the acts of government.” (Ibid., p.142)

<sup>32</sup> *GA55*, 51

<sup>33</sup> *GA78*, 222-23

<sup>34</sup> *GA51*, 9

for the forthcoming.”<sup>35</sup> Since we late-comers think from what follows the inception, without following from it, the inception appears more than radical: it appears subversive. The study however of the beginning reveals two subversions: in Heidegger’s observation, it shows what needs not to act and be useful in order to be.<sup>36</sup> Essentially however it brings forth what acts in need and use outside the order of Being, it brings forth the granting.

Such granting translates the *es gibt*. The letting of presence, where the essential emphasis is on *letting*, allows the possibility of the event *outside* causality, where the event can bring what-is to its own. The *own* of all that-is, of beings, is not Being, but rather Nothing. Only thus makes sense the rare, yet faithful observation of Heidegger: “If we want to grasp what-is, the Greeks say delimit, set in limits, then we must [arrive] at the limit of what-is and indeed necessarily—and this is Nothing.”<sup>37</sup> From the limit, Nothing, are beings brought to their own, they are en-owned. It is from the Nothingness of limit, to be explored with each thinker of the inception, that the event of Being takes place. To be thrown is thus to take a place in the taking place of Being. This event takes place as a response, one is in-ceived into the response, into the en-owning event as word and this response grounds the most essential responsibility,<sup>38</sup> the herding of Being. In this responsibility opens the dialogue of the event, the *Historical dialogue proper*.<sup>39</sup>

The responsible response that constitutes for Heidegger history is grounded on a decision, a decision on the essence of truth.<sup>40</sup> “With inception we understand the original decisions that pave and carry the essential of western History. To this essential belongs first the determination on the essence of truth.”<sup>41</sup> Certainly this decision is not whim and arbitrariness, but the result of a necessary freedom, where for Heidegger humanity relates with resolution to what is and its truth.<sup>42</sup> What does however the en-owning response say? Does it speak of Being or of Nothing?

Heidegger fluctuates between the two, but almost to the end returns to Being. His 1941 lectures for example: “The saying [of Anaximander] says the dis-posing en-

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<sup>35</sup> GA51, 21

<sup>36</sup> GA51, 10

<sup>37</sup> GA35, 9

<sup>38</sup> GA78, 337- notes

<sup>39</sup> GA78, 338

<sup>40</sup> GA51, 21

<sup>41</sup> GA51, 15

<sup>42</sup> GA51, 16



joining of Being and Being as the dis-posing en-joining. The en-joining however is the Inception [*archē*]. The saying is the inceptive saying of Being.”<sup>43</sup> Accordingly, “‘Ground’ means Being itself and this is the Inception.”<sup>44</sup> To conceive Being, means to conceive the ‘ground’, that is, to be con-ceived *in* Being *from* Being.<sup>45</sup> Two years later, in his lectures on Heraclitus, Heidegger hears in every word, even in the word ‘Nothing’, Being also at the same time thought and named, even if never *actively* thought and expressed. For this, “the word Being as the word of all words, is the inceptive word par excellence. The time-word ‘Being’ names as the word of all word ‘the time of all times’.” As such of course the word ‘*is*’ does not operate as a mere empty container. Everyone understands it and yet no one grasps what is thereby understood. And yet, at the same time, never does it unsettle us that we have for it no accompanying representation.<sup>46</sup> The inception for Heidegger names Being and the time of Being. Yet even in the handful of moments we chose to hear in passing, what shines strongest forth is the ambiguity of this Being. Uncanny and familiar, an empty most significant name, Being amidst all the conflictual intensity we have come to think it operating in, names a time other than the time of beings.

Nothing is everywhere at work. Yet Heidegger will consistently attempt to subsume this Nothing under Being. Consistently Aristotelian, the Heideggerian task is thoroughly informed by the declaration: *estin epistēmē tis hē theōrei to on hē on kai ta toutō hyparchonta kath’ hauto*.<sup>47</sup> The Aristotelian dilemma, between *being* and *having* an *archē*, makes Being into an *archē* without *archē* and philosophy the enterprise of i. its thought and ii. of the subsumption-subjection-subjugation (*hypotagē*) of beings to this *archē*. Such Being has not only subsumed non-Being and ultimately Nothing, but also the *tropoi* of possibility and necessity as the lectures on Parmenides attest. At the same time, “to what-is [beings] belongs the wealth of the possible and the sharpness of the necessary”, but while the possible *is*, its Being has a different character, a different *tropos*.<sup>48</sup> These *tropoi* that govern beings are however irreducible to either beings or Being itself. *Archē* is the giving of *tropoi*, of ways of Being and never Being itself. *Archē* is rather simply Nothing, while Nothing *is not* simply *archē*. *Archē* is what requires an unending beginning of new thought, the thought of the manifold

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<sup>43</sup> GA51, 123

<sup>44</sup> GA51, 88

<sup>45</sup> GA51, 92

<sup>46</sup> GA55, 60

<sup>47</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1003 a21-3

<sup>48</sup> GA51, 23

dispensations of the tropes of Being. In order for the *Geschick*, the sending of the destiny of these dispensations to take place, Being needs be held back and be restrained. This holding back is *epochē*. *Epochē* is not the Husserlian holding back of beings, but the inceptive time (*archē*) of the holding back of Being itself, a holding back in favor of the gift of the origin. Only in holding back, de-limiting Being is possible to experience the Nothing of *archē*, letting thus Being come forth in freedom; beyond all limitation.

We exit the limit in *alētheia*. *Alētheia* is the road that leads us back from phenomenology to the thought of the beginning. It may only be retrieved in the responsible response of the Historical dialogue, a dialogue with the Greeks, a dialogue from the beginning.

## 2. From Truth

In this originary dialogue *alētheia* appears at the same time as the intersection of *logos* and *mythos*. Before we thus proceed to think *alētheia* itself, some consideration on the beginning of *logos from truth* should map the landscape of the latter. For even if Nestle's intention was correction and enlightenment, his words speak *from truth*: "once the question of truth is posed, that already as such contains in itself doubt, the struggle of *mythos* and *logos* begins."<sup>49</sup> The struggle of *mythos* and *logos* occurs at the first moment of alethic negotiation, for the inception speaks both *in mythos* and *in logos*. Soon however, the appropriation of *logos* by metaphysics heralds the thorough desolation of *mythos*. We do not thus attempt here any more a general cartography of *mythos* or *logos*, or again of mythology as historiography, but merely bring forward a handful of observations relating to the alethic struggle of *mythos* and *logos*.

Heidegger sides with philosophic tradition *against* myth. Certainly not in the wholesale trope testified from Aristotle to Hegel in the words of the earlier "*peri tōn mythikōs sophizomenōn ouk axion meta spoudēs skopein*" translated by the latter: "*Von denen, welche mythisch philosophieren, ist es nicht der Mühe wert, ernstlich zu*

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<sup>49</sup> Nestle W., *Vom Mythos zum Logos*, p.2

*handeln*.”<sup>50</sup> Myth is here not unworthy of attention, an already long vanquished enemy, but an enemy still alive, exacting all our effort. Myth refers for Heidegger to the origination of beings from a source considered in turn in the exclusive trope of *parousia*, effectuating thus the obliteration of ontological difference. It is plain to see that like Adorno, Heidegger understands the progression of the project of modernity not as the overcoming of myth, but as its extreme elaboration, as forgetfulness driven to its limit (at least up to the double forgetfulness of having forgotten). While difference “gives us thought”, oblivion/myth persists as “what is un-thought.”<sup>51</sup> The proximity with Adorno of course harks back ultimately to the Marxist critique of ideology. More than chance, it is the destiny of the age of *Gestell* that brings a thinker as distant as Wittgenstein in proximity—‘mythology’ or ‘world picture’ consisting for him in the unquestioned frame of reference.<sup>52</sup> Finally, the wide current of post-modernism flows into the same enlightened sea, discovering the last ideology in *logos* itself, in ‘*logocentrism*’, the fixed conception of a human reason mirroring the structure of the world.<sup>53</sup> Certainly Heidegger does not think of *logos* as reason and this is one of the reasons that critics like Guilon view Heidegger’s thought itself as yet another myth “of pristine beginnings, a time of falling, and a final recovery of origins.”<sup>54</sup> What is crucial however is that in the heterogeneity of the philosophic thought of the previous century myth, as much as in the first days of metaphysics, consistently retains the role of the obscuring adversary, an evil to exorcize by *logos*, logic, or a *meta-logos*.

What answers *mythos* for Heidegger is not first of all *logos*, for *logos* is not reason, but *alētheia*. Neither is Heidegger alone in that. Antiquity already employs the aeolodoric word *homēriddein* to denote dissimulating (*pseudesthai*).<sup>55</sup> And yet precisely here lies the crux allowing us to see the inception both in *mythos* and *logos* insofar as i. they both partake of *alētheia*, ii. *pseudos* is not mere negativity, a lie or even less falsity, but as we shall see with Parmenides, a most *truthful* (reverting us to i.) structure of the phenomenality of *kosmos*. Plutarch best summarizes the way early metaphysics think of *mythos* as deceiving (*pseudēs*) *logos* (*mythos* not opposed to *logos* but to *alētheia*), that appears like a true one. *Mythos* finds itself last in a Platonic structure, where *logos* is the image (*homoiōma*) of the true and *mythos* an image of *logos*, twice removed from the

<sup>50</sup> Derrida J., *On the name*, p.102

<sup>51</sup> Mouzakitis A., *Meaning, Historicity and the Social*, p.15

<sup>52</sup> Wittgenstein L., *On Certainty*, props. 94, 95

<sup>53</sup> Burns M. R. & Rayment-Pickard H., *Philosophies of History*, p.31

<sup>54</sup> Mouzakitis A., *Meaning, Historicity and the Social*, p.35

<sup>55</sup> Nestle W., *Vom Mythos zum Logos*, p.58

thing.<sup>56</sup> The conflation of truth and beings (the thing), although in true Platonic spirit (the idea as true being, the thing of thought, *to pragma auto*)<sup>57</sup> maximizes the complexity of relations— what it however confirms is the prime opposition in ancient language as much as in Heidegger not between *mythos* and *logos* but between *mythos* and *alētheia*.

Nestle thus operates in a tradition of millennia when in 1941 he translates *alētheia* as the unconcealed: *das Unverborgene* next to the *Aufgehellte* and *Aufgeklärte*. At the same time he misunderstands unconcealment as the turn of thought against *mythos* and *physis*, the primitive forces of hiding.<sup>58</sup> Yet hiding is not the meaning of the Heraclitean *kryptesthai*. Neither should the enlightened words *Aufhellung* and *Aufklärung* be readily applied to the inception, rendering it a beginning of rationality, in turn often understood as free debate, the summary of Lloyd's work,<sup>59</sup> or the affirmation of fundamental moral values. Metaphysics is born from a moment of unconcealment, a moment of *alētheia*, yet this moment takes place as much against the explicit intentions of *mythos* as of philosophic *logos*.

Heidegger attests this in *Zur Sache des Denkens* of 1964 where he admits in an implicit allusion to Friedländer that even the Homeric uses of *alētheia* have been shown to function in the predominant sense of correctness and reliability. Heidegger simply confesses: “the natural concept of truth means not unconcealment, also not in the philosophy of the Greeks.”<sup>60</sup> From Homer to philosophy as much as in everyday life (the second pole of myth next to poetry) *alētheia* operates as correctness.<sup>61</sup> For Heidegger this is but the expression of a failure to pose the question of how correctness is based on the clearing. He says: “If I obstinately translate the name *alētheia* with unconcealment, this does not happen for the sake of etymology, but because of what needs to be thought, if we are to think what is called Being and thought in accordance with the thing (*Sache*).”<sup>62</sup> *Alētheia* requires to be thought as unconcealment if one is to remain truthful (inceived) to the thing of thought—for Heidegger Being, for us Nothing. And yet neither myth nor metaphysics think thus of *alētheia*. This, repeatedly stressed

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p.9

<sup>57</sup> Plato, *Seventh Letter*, 341c7

<sup>58</sup> Nestle W., *Vom Mythos zum Logos*, p.10

<sup>59</sup> See for example, Lloyd G. E. R., *The Revolution of Wisdom*, pp.79-80 and Lloyd G. E. R., *The Ambitions of Curiosity*, pp.124-5

<sup>60</sup> GA14, 87

<sup>61</sup> See also Naas M., *Keeping Homer's Word*, pp.83-84 in Jacobs D. C. (ed.), *The Presocratics after Heidegger*

<sup>62</sup> GA14, 85

in this section, does not mean a detachment of either from its aletheic origin, from the un/concealing operation of *alētheia* in both.

Before advancing to this operation of *alētheia* in thought a few indications of its mythic expressions are in place. Indeed it is easy to see, how despite a principle opposition to myth, Heidegger consistently invokes the truth of poetry that sculpts on the material of myth. A brief look into *dikē*, the guiding word of Anaximander's thought illuminates the aletheic import of myth.

Reason, ethno-anthropologically articulated would thus be satisfied with Nestle's account of *dikē* as justice, essentially roman *jus*, in relation to the gods taken as mythic religion. Reason would find men in Homer standing *upright* against the Gods, even when faced with their ineluctable demise. In the absence of moral normativity (even the word *dikaiosynē* does not appear in Homer) *dikaioi* is the one who is simply right, for Nestle the one who acts according to the Ionian aristocratic code of honour.<sup>63</sup> the Homeric hero faces his peers in the equality of distinction, while Zeus in the divine aristocratic order is but the first among equals. In Hesiod—the underappreciated contributor to the transformation of truth into a word of thought—reason discovers awe and subservience at a time when the power of Zeus grows, overseeing all and bringing war, famine and pestilence to those transgressing his law. Then in the 7<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> centuries a gradual intensification of a certain feeling of guilt and fear for the ensuing punishment of the guilty grows dominant. In tragedy finally reason discovers an exit from this guilt in *katharsis*. It is a correct, if only singular image of the *dikeic* landscape in which Anaximander writes. (As for example a parallel transformation of the spatiality of *polis* is unraveling, crossing at the same time the trajectory of a process of democratization of speech.)<sup>64</sup> Yet *mythos* should also be allowed to speak from itself.

Instead of asking what *dikē* is, *mythos* asks *who* she is and of her place in the divine genealogy. In the Orphic tradition Chronos—a word as important in Anaximander as *dikē*—although possibly co-primordial with chaos, is the original

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<sup>63</sup> Nestle W., *Vom Mythos zum Logos*, p.34

<sup>64</sup> Vernant sums up concisely the intersection: "By carrying the 'mystery' into the market place, right into the *agora*, he [the philosopher replacing the shaman] made it the subject of public and argumentative debate, in which dialectical discussion finally assumed more importance than supernatural enlightenment." Vernant J.-P., *Myth and Thought*, p.387. And again: "With Solon, Dike and Sophrosyne came down from heaven to take up residence in the *agora*." Vernant J.-P., *The Origins of Greek Thought*, p.87. Detienne seconds the explication: "At this point, dialogue —secular speech that acts on others— began to gain ground while efficacious speech [the speech of the king, the shaman and the bard] conveying truth gradually became obsolete." Detienne M., *The masters of truth in archaic Greece*, p.17. See also the footnote p.85 below on the significance of the centre, in relation to the Parmenidean sphere.

source of all, a cosmic egg, from which everything springs forth. From it Phanēs (he who appears) appears first (Protogonos). At the same time Phanēs appears under different names: Erikapaios and even Erōs and Mētis. From the appearing erotic god with the intervention of Anankē (need) (or Dikē, or Adrasteia) all other gods are born. The Orphic is a misty picture, obscured by layers of previous mythic traditions. Yet a deep clarity appears to escort the first of births, that of *Eros* the ‘son of the everlasting night’ coming forth into unconcealment as the appearing, the showing. What is also of utter importance is the alternate name of Eros: Mētis—commonly translated as intelligence or wisdom. Otherwise a Titaness and the first wife of Zeus appears here as the inverse of male Eros. Theogony and other sources recount the fate of Mētis: tricked by Zeus into first turning into a fly and then eaten by him to prevent the birth of the prophesied child that would overthrow Zeus, as he had overthrown himself his child-eating father Chronos/Kronos. Yet Mētis was already pregnant with Athena, so that Zeus had to bear and give birth to the goddess from his own head in excruciating pains relieved by an axe blow from Hephaestus; the new-born goddess emerging fully grown and armoured. Subsequently Zeus marries Themis, the Titaness of law. From their union among other divinities—the Hours to be thought from their *Chronic* ancestry—Eunomia (good-order), Dikē (justice as the right) and Eirēnē (peace) are born. Dikē aids her father Zeus in detecting the unjust and handing out punishment as veiled in mist she fulfills her sorrowful pursuit.

This is the mythic background of *Dikē* against which Anaximander writes: the grand-daughter of time (Chronos—the other major thought in the Anaximandrian fragment), the daughter of the king of heavens (Zeus) and of wisdom (Mētis), or in accordance with the Orphic picture (also) of love (Erōs). This background shares as much in significant *alētheia* as the foreground in which the fragment explicitly operates. It is the same *Dikē* that appears in the Parmenidean poem as significant and true as the prominent Parmenidean word *moira* that with Pindar we need to see preceding the Olympian order and binding it to apportioning necessity. The myth permeates the inception and its thinkers. There is no overcoming, but a welcoming of its themes. The myth is the creative abyss of thought, as ineluctable as language itself. And if the Academy commonly defined man as *zōon logon echōn* and Aristotle as *zōon politikon* they were partaking no more in *alētheia* than the popular recognition that *dikē* together

with *aidōs* (shame and humility) are the highest goods of man, to man's distinction from the animal. It is man's response to *dikē* that constitutes human responsibility.<sup>65</sup>

*Mythos* and *logos* respond and correspond thus in different *tropoi* to *alētheia*. So that when the Japanese in *Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden* (1953/54) asks what it means to think the Greek in a more Greek tropos (*griechischer*) the answer of the inquirer: *to let oneself into the thought of the unthought*, should be sought in both *mythos* and *logos*. In order to approach what is thought by the Greeks in a more originary tropos and open a Greek tropos of seeing which is destined to witness a new world that can never be Greek again,<sup>66</sup> one has to engage with the *alētheia* of both. Both *mythos* and *logos* correspond to *alētheia*, inasmuch they respond to the call of Nothing. It is *from alētheia* that we need to think both.

Only in thinking *logos* from *alētheia* can we proceed to logic and the logical. For if the logical can be commensurate to the norm of thought, this normality that constitutes the common and regular can never raise itself to an instance of the true,<sup>67</sup> the logical as such is not instance, let alone origin of the true.<sup>68</sup> Neither is *alētheia veritas*; it is the correspondence of a response irreducible to *adaequatio* (the bastardization of *homoiōsis*<sup>69</sup>—a word already far from *alētheia*):<sup>70</sup> neither *adaequatio rei (creande) ad intellecum (divinum)*, nor *adaequatio intellectus (hunani) ad rem (creatam)*—neither a theological, nor an epistemic *adaequatio*. Rather, in the words of De Beistegui, truth as an event of appropriation constitutes “a relation of cor-respondence in which man [...] receives the truth of being, grounds it in a work, repeats it in such a way that this truth is now preserved, sheltered in the work, in thought, or even in sacrifice.”<sup>71</sup> *Man responds in truth.*

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<sup>65</sup> In the tormenting attempt of stepping beyond the (Lacanian) dichotomy of reaction/response, that runs through Derrida's *The Animal that therefore I am* (see for example pp.123-6), one should make clear: the response is a necessary but insufficient condition of responsibility. And while this clarification runs the danger of re-instating the dichotomy, it is only in the face of *dikē* that thought discovers for the first time responsibility.

<sup>66</sup> GA12, 127

<sup>67</sup> GA55, 115

<sup>68</sup> GA55, 125

<sup>69</sup> Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, p.62

<sup>70</sup> GA9, 233. After the aforementioned Friedländer disputation this distance is certainly minimized, possibly vanquished, yet in reverse proportion to the force of Being's originary withdrawal that speaks in *alētheia*. If *alētheia* is from the first instance of time subsumed under *homoiōsis*, *alētheia* speaks all the more strongly of the Nothing of Being. See also Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, p.29

<sup>71</sup> De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.140

We see thus again that the correspondence of truth has nothing to do with correctness, all the less so in the sense of certainty, for *alētheia* does not refer to the affirmation of an object *for* a subject or of the subject *from* an object and certainly not so in the sense of consciousness. *Alētheia* as cor-respondence is the response to the disclosing; for Heidegger of Being, for us,<sup>72</sup> of Nothing. So that when Heidegger hears in the response of thought “the dictation of the truth of Being,”<sup>73</sup> where this *dictation* is poetry (*Dichtung*), we rather hear the *thickening* in the double meaning of the word, a *densation* of the frequency of Nothing, to the point where it allows for a response, to the point where it –and thus man– becomes *responsible*. The responsible event of this disclosure<sup>74</sup> is the clearing (*Lichtung*) which we need to dissociate from light (*Licht*); we already know that thinking from the inception, Being, no matter how the spell of its spelling is cast, can never suffice for this dissociation—clearing has to be thought from Nothing. And yet as we observed earlier, Heidegger comes to fully realize that the fact that *alētheia* is in the clearing essentially dissociated from correctness, doesn’t mean that its actual earliest uses, in Homer or elsewhere, could attest this distance. In what sounds almost as resignation we hear: “In the scope of this question [the question of how truth is granted only in the element of the clearing, for Heidegger *of* presence, for us *of* Nothing *for* presence], we must acknowledge the fact that *alētheia*, unconcealment in the sense of the clearing of presence, was originally experienced as *orthōtēs*, as the correctness of representations and statements. But then the assertion about the essential transformation of truth, that is, from unconcealment to correctness, is also untenable.”<sup>75</sup>

What appears as resignation is in truth a new start. It is the *deuteros plous*,<sup>76</sup> the second, more difficult sail, when the sails have failed and one turns to the oars—arduous and slow, yet self-reliant and confident. In the second sail the view of the corruption of truth into correctness becomes untenable, yet also unnecessary. As *alētheia* guides *mythos* in its truest moments, the moments of witnessing Nothing and pure origination, while in *mythos* the word appears in a number of non-inceptive meanings, so does early thought think from *alētheia*, while effectuating at the same time a divergence from its inceptive significance. It is not by chance that *alētheia*, guiding the thought of Anaximander and Heraclitus is not employed by either. Indeed truth is

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<sup>72</sup> The departure from the standard use of ‘us’ in the text is only seeming. Heidegger himself splits here. We speak with Heidegger from his truest intention, as should subsequently become clear.

<sup>73</sup> *GA5*, 328

<sup>74</sup> It is no coincidence that a thinker like Badiou approaches the event precisely as responsibility.

<sup>75</sup> *GA14*, 87

<sup>76</sup> Plato, *Phaedo*, 99d



the inception itself offering the strange inceptive essence of Being<sup>77</sup> in which both thinkers breath. The inceptive intensity of *alētheia* for both is so strong that every invocation would only tarnish it with presence. *Alētheia* is most true as presencing, that is, active absence precisely as the call of Nothing. Only at the end of the inception, when Parmenides attempts the passage to metaphysics is *alētheia* uttered in thought and destined to lose its inceptive intensity. And even in Parmenides, this transition is not a peaceful decision, but the ambiguous result of the most intense struggle, which in the next chapter we will closely follow.

For now we concentrate on the corresponding structure of *alētheia*. The true as the corresponding is what responds to the call of Nothing in an attuned voice (*das Stimmende*.)<sup>78</sup> Accordingly, correctness, as correctness of the utterance, can only take place as being-free for the response, as the opening that gives itself to the openness of the clearing. This is why freedom is the essence of truth.<sup>79</sup> Freedom is not an unfettered choice between doing and being unable to do, but is rather preparedness for the required and necessary (“and thus of what somehow is”). Freedom means letting oneself in the unconcealment of Being as such, letting oneself in what ex-ists as open.<sup>80</sup> Freedom is thus not a human property; in contrast freedom possesses, *inveives* humanity. It is easy to think of this freedom as necessarily determined. And yet at the very dawn of language man in freedom gives two discrete responses: *mythos* and *logos*. Only from this freedom does man enter history. And it is only man who can enter history as the existing *Da-sein*, for only the being called forth and summoned in the *who* can stand in unconcealment, in *alētheia*;<sup>81</sup> only someone who is *one* can assume the *responsibility* of Nothing. The meaning of this ex-istence in relation to *chronos*, is opened by the first thinker of the inception, Anaximander.<sup>82</sup> From Anaximander we come thus to realize with Heidegger that “only ex-isting man is historical.”<sup>83</sup> In this history finally, the turn from *Sein & Zeit*’s resolution (*Entschlossenheit*) to *allowing the responsibility* (*Gelassenheit/Gestimmtheit*) often interpreted as the struggle for the overcoming of metaphysics, does not abandon, but incorporates resolution. Ex-istence as history is resolve for the stepping out.

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<sup>77</sup> GA55, 175

<sup>78</sup> GA9, 179

<sup>79</sup> GA9, 186

<sup>80</sup> GA9, 189

<sup>81</sup> GA55, 174

<sup>82</sup> See p.154ff.

<sup>83</sup> GA9, 190

What takes place in ex-isting history? Thought, forgetful of the responsibility of Nothing, thinks of *alētheia* as correctness. In the pursuit of the correct one form of *adaequatio* replaces another, as each proves successively *inadequate*. Lastly, from Bacon to quantum physics, number in the specific sense of quantity exhausts the spectrum of truth. Max Planck says: “actual is what is countable.”<sup>84</sup> The actuality of truth is simply calculation. How can however what enters the matrix of calculation retain actuality? Calculation is exhaustive, the principle of deactivation. Calculation renders inactive. Even if it’s possible to hold it accountable for a certain semblance of production, such production is fated to inactivity. What is thus produced is never created, its actuality already summarily deactivated. When thus Beaufret participating in the 1969 *Le Thor* seminar makes the connection to the relative passage in the *Vorträge*<sup>85</sup> and remarks: “phenomena no longer show but announce themselves,” one understands Heidegger’s interpretation of this necessity of announcement as the response of an extremely developed system of science, forced to give reports on nature, yet still unable to exhaust it.

Nonetheless, Heidegger knows that science is a response *from logos*. If nature is reduced to the announcement of the number, unable any more to show itself, this is part of ex-isting history. If the thought of *logos* has forgotten how to let beings show themselves, forcing them into an operative system of announcements, this forgetfulness is not something let go missing, but “the richest and widest event”, in which occidental history is instigated.<sup>86</sup> In face of the destiny of such forgetting our first, indispensable step is the famous step back (*Schritt zurück*), before the forgetting of the difference that allows for true actuality.

If *Wahr-heit* is to be thought as the preserving persistence (*bewahrendes Währen*) of the actual (*das Wirkliche*), then we can only find the serenity of the serene that Heidegger hears as *das Heitere/Heiternde* in *-heit*,<sup>87</sup> in this stepping back, in the ex-isting exit from the loud proclamations of correctness.

Correctness as such is erring in its persistent adherence to falsity in the specific sense of *pseudos*. *Pseudos*, thought from its difference to *alētheia* is the wandering away from the secret and into the accessibility of erring, insofar as “the proper non-

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<sup>84</sup> *GA15*, 355

<sup>85</sup> *GA7*, 51-52

<sup>86</sup> *GA5*, 365

<sup>87</sup> *GA9*, 179

essence of truth is the secret.”<sup>88</sup> Heidegger here asks us to think non-essence without presupposing essence in the sense of species, possibility or ground, but as the tropos preceding essence and signifying the defacement of every fallen figuration of essence.<sup>89</sup> The secret is the ground preceding *alētheia*, offering itself to disregard and neglect, to the forgetfulness that constitutes correctness. The *pseudos* that enables the error of correctness is the neglect of the secret ground, “the playfield of that turn, in which the in-sisting ex-istence constantly forgets and confuses itself in turning.”<sup>90</sup> From the non-essence, the nihilating essence of truth, *pseudos* constructs a counter-essence of truth in correctness. Still for Heidegger the *pseudos* of error retains a positivity in offering itself *as such*, and thus opening the possibility of turning to the secret.<sup>91</sup> Error for Heidegger enables the turn, the truth of error consisting in the turning (tropos). Certainly however tropos is not an attribute of either *alētheia* or *pseudos*. It is the *alētheia* in *pseudos*, the preserving of the actuality of the hidden in erring correctness that incites and guides the turn. In the error of correctness, there is no place for need, need is as little needed as the secret. *Alētheia* is the remembering of the need that allows Da-sein to ex-ist, for “Dasein is the turn to need.”<sup>92</sup>

We will have occasion for a more detailed examination of the relation of *pseudos* (falsity) and *sphalma* (error) to *alētheia* with the thinker that introduces *alētheia* to the language of thought, Parmenides;<sup>93</sup> and with Parmenides we shall hearken to the third word that resounds in *alētheia*, the double word *lēthēs* (the forgetting)/*lathes* (the concealing) and the attempt of late Heidegger to dissociate the two in favour of concealment. The extraction however of forgetfulness from any understanding of *alētheia*, the violent de-Platonizing erasure of all anamnestic traces, not only tears asunder the best moments of Heideggerian thought, but it undoes its truest nihilating in-tention, in an almost desperate attempt to preserve presence in a Being found saturated by absence. We are better guided by the younger Heidegger, reminding us the teaching of the ‘agonal principle’ in Greek thought by Burckhardt and

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<sup>88</sup> GA9, 194

<sup>89</sup> GA9, 194

<sup>90</sup> GA9, 196-7

<sup>91</sup> GA9, 197

<sup>92</sup> GA9, 198

<sup>93</sup> The story of the Cretan herb gatherer and shepherd Epimenides who slept 57 years during which time he discoursed with truth and from which he emerged to become a sage of legend, curing Athens of pestilence (Laertius, I, 109-115), is the earliest instance of a defining encounter with truth. Yet it is uncertain whether this encounter was ever textually recorded, or whether such record was of thought or myth. What is certain is that in the surviving textual crumbles –for hardly are they even fragments- truth remains unmentioned.

Nietzsche<sup>94</sup> (a principle elaborately adopted by Vernant and Detienne and eventually reduced by Lloyd to mere eristics), forming the very preserving tension within *alētheia*, between itself and *lēthē*.<sup>95</sup> The *agōn* of *lēthē* in *alētheia* constitutes its truest intention.<sup>96</sup>

And if we are to ask *mythos* of the *alētheia* of *lēthē*, we are to be informed of its descent from Eris (strife), in turn the daughter of Night, called *oloē*, an adjective Homer and Hesiod often attribute to Moira. *Oloē* is often translated as ‘the corrupting’, in the sense of annihilation; the night is *oloē*, because it lets beings vanish through concealment.<sup>97</sup> And yet, this is also Moira: *oloē*. *Moira* generally thought as allotment and accordance of what is pro-per, that is, of-one, is distinguished by myth in the three figures of Klōthō (spinner), Lachesis (alloter) and Atropos (unturnable) while its Indo-European root, *per-* “to assign, allot” speaks also in the Greek *peprotai* “it has been granted”. What the beginning grants and allots, is *lēthē*, the progeny of Night, the forgetting concealment. Only from the concealing withdrawal of *lēthē*<sup>98</sup> brings the wresting *agōn* of *alētheia* the secret of the world into expression.

The wresting of the secret that Heidegger most beautifully invokes in the words: “to attend, singing, to the trace of the fugitive gods,”<sup>99</sup> is the inceptive struggle that has forever left the trace of *lēthē* in *alētheia*. The history of the trace that begins in *Timaeus’ ichnos*, and which again we shall retrace in relation to *pseudos-alētheia* in Parmenides, finds its last expression in fidelity to Heidegger in Nancy: “Meaning begins where presence is not pure presence, but where presence comes apart [dis-joins, *se disjoint*] in order to be itself *as* such. This ‘*as*’ presupposes the distancing, spacing, and division of presence. Only the *concept* of ‘presence’ contains the necessity of this division. Pure unshared presence—presence to nothing, of nothing, for nothing—is neither present nor absent. It is the simple implosion of being that could never have *been*—an implosion

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<sup>94</sup> The *agon* that explicitly informs most of young Nietzsche’s work remains implicitly operative until the end. See for example Nietzsche F., *Homer’s Contest* in Lungstrom J. & Sauer E. (eds.), *Agonistics: Arenas of Creative Contest*, pp., 35-45 and in the same volume Sax’s essay *Cultural Agonistics: Nietzsche, the Greeks, Eternal Recurrence*, pp.46-69. A devoted contribution to the Nietzschean *agōn* is Herman Siemens’ work—see for example: Siemens, H.W., *Agonal Configurations in the Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen: Identity, Mimesis and the Übertragung of cultures in Nietzsche’s early thought* in *Nietzsche-Studien* 30, pp. 80-106.

<sup>95</sup> GA54, 26-7

<sup>96</sup> The revering anti-Heideggerian Detienne speaking from the *agōn* finds no difficulty in *outlining* the proximity of *alētheia* with *lēthē* and *mōmos* (Detienne M., *The masters of truth in archaic Greece*, p.49) and *lēthē* and *apatē* (ibid., p.83: “Rather their *Alētheia* is edged with *Lēthē* and lined with *Apatē*.”)

<sup>97</sup> GA54, 108

<sup>98</sup> GA54, 123

<sup>99</sup> GA5, 272

without any trace.”<sup>100</sup> The world however is precisely the beginning of meaning, the inscription of the trace, it is “the explosion of *nothing* [...] The *nihil* of creation is the *truth* of the meaning, but meaning is the originary sharing of this truth.”<sup>101</sup>

It is to the trace of the secret that man corresponds. Man speaks corresponding, in responsive accord (*entsprechend*) to language.<sup>102</sup> Rather than possessing language, language possesses and receives man. In language the secret is called the unsaid. In language the unsaid exists through man, where to think is to let the unsaid exist. Heidegger says: “The true is the unsaid, which only in the rigorously and accurately said remains the unsaid that it is.” If man dwells in language, the fate (*moira*) of the unsaid forever preserves an ineluctable trace. Man cannot escape language and the unsaid; with Heraclitus and Heidegger we repeat: *to mē dynon pote pōs an tis lathoi?*<sup>103</sup>

The liminal point of the unsaid and thus of *alētheia*, silence, forms its abysmal ground. Emad is right to observe that “by determining the essence of language as *Sage*, or saying, Heidegger is not determining the *essentia* of language, but the basic way in which language comes to presence, is issued forth, and abides.”<sup>104</sup> This tropos of presencing from absence, the saying of Nothing in the truth of a double genitive, is precisely the event of silence (*Ereignis der Stille*). In the chiming of stillness (*das Geläut der Stille*),<sup>105</sup> the onto-linguistic rift (*Riss*) between the said and what is “unsaid in what is said” opens to our hearing. Language, founded in the jointure of silence presupposes no-thing, no presence, precisely presupposes Nothing: “Because the word is not grounded in the sounding of words (*Lauten der Wörter*), but rather the sounded word (*Wortlaut*) rings (*erklingt*) as what it is only from out of the initially silent word, therefore the words and the groups of formed words in a piece of writing or in a book may break apart while the word lasts.”<sup>106</sup> The word is preserved as a trace.

Language speaks *from* silence. In silence language finds its corresponding *alētheia* and in *alētheia* it responds to Nothing. This response is never limited to the word. We could turn to various existing expressions of silence from music to

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<sup>100</sup> Nancy J-L., *Being Singular Plural*, p.2

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, p.3

<sup>102</sup> *GA12*, 33

<sup>103</sup> *GA55*, 180

<sup>104</sup> Emad P., *Word at the Beginning of Thinking*, in Emad P., Maly K. (eds.), *Heidegger on Heraclitus*, p.126

<sup>105</sup> *GA12*, 215. *Stille* requires us to hear in it both stillness and silence (otherwise often in German *Schweigen*). The intricacy of this relation exceeds the scope of any footnote. We may register in passing what silence is precisely what is heard in the clearing that ‘stillness’ [*Stille*] constitutes.

<sup>106</sup> *GA55*, 27 trsnl. Parvis Emead, in Emad P., Maly K. (eds.), *Heidegger on Heraclitus*, p.120

mathematics, but instead of the duplication of the sound of silence by the sound of music or the reintroduction of the sign of the word in the sign of the number, we choose an iconistic jointure. Nothing privileges this choice<sup>107</sup> insofar as it undoes the seemingly vast heterogeneity between the voicing of silence and the self-asserting loudness of the image, a distance imposed indeed between the two as often and easily as it is proclaimed self-evident by a second imposition, that of muteness on the eloquent silence of the image. We choose two complementing pictures:

Michelangelo teaches us the meaning of response. In his late work where religion has gained ground against the neo-platonic affirmation of *kosmos*, we find the drawing of *The Archers* (or the *Saettatori* as Vasari calls it). As Panofsky most perceptively observes: “it is as though they were under the spell of an irresistible power which makes them act as though they were shooting, while in reality they themselves are darts.”<sup>108</sup> The error of correctness in thinking itself dominant over its objects, the world it encounters only as tool, is revealed in the *alētheia* of correctness, itself being shot as an arrow into Nothingness: there is no one the archers are aiming at. The archers possessed precisely in the way they believe to possess, fall into the falsity of error and yet are in the use/need of truth.

The opposite response is given by Munch. In 1889 he writes in his diary on the famous *Scream*: “One evening I was walking along a path, the city was on one side and the fjord below. I felt tired and ill. I stopped and looked out over the fjord—the sun was setting, and the clouds turning blood-red. I sensed a scream passing through nature; it seemed to me that I heard the scream. I painted this picture, painted the clouds as actual blood. The colour shrieked.”<sup>109</sup> The painter hears the silence and responds; the silence screams, the painter screams. Nothing is witnessed not in error but in truth.

*Alētheia* presupposes as little *mythos* or *logos* as it presupposes the word. Rather every expression is grounded in *alētheia*. The fact that from very early *alētheia* is

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<sup>107</sup> Certainly other contextual connections could be traced. With regard to Michelangelo, Sinclair’s observation that for both (Michelangelo and Heidegger) the work of art is not in the service of a finality, but “is brought forth to stand for itself in its irreducible individuality and self-sufficiency” hints to the *nihilic* excess of nature, which Sinclair citing precisely Panofsky recognizes as ground of the ‘commonplace’ Renaissance belief in creation as a process of unearthing this excess from the work-material. A de-layering, until the proper, the masterly form is reached; a deconstruction. See Sinclair M., *Heidegger, Aristotle and the Work of Art; Poiesis in Being*, pp.146-7. The connections to Munch revolve commonly around the theme of *Angst* (Munch’s painting *Anxiety* taken at face-value) and offer ready evocations of Sartre’s *Nausea* and Camus’s *The Outsider*—while a rigorous investigation of their proximity is missing. And yet, despite the irreducible significance of these connections, our choice of these images is the simple need to traverse the wide gulf between the icon and silence.

<sup>108</sup> Panofsky E., *Studies in Iconology*, p.226

<sup>109</sup> Hodin J. P., *Edvard Munch*, p.48

moulded into correctness only attests the inability of man to adhere to silence. The *alētheia* of silence breeds forgetfulness, *lēthē*. Silence gives rise to tropes of thought *inceived* in their falsity as much as to the true utterances of those who remained in attentive fidelity to the inception: Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides.

We start from the one who comes last.

### III. Parmenides

#### Introduction

Parmenides presents us with a specific demand as the last thinker of the beginning. Under the sign of a thought that oscillates between absurdity and profundity we face the moment of the ultimate and ultimately fragile triumph of presence over absence for the determination of thought. For the ban of Nothing to take effect under the pressure of presence, Parmenides has to become the first thinker to evoke, the first thinker to call Nothing to thought; an evocation and a subsequent ban necessitating its reduction to absence or non-Being. This necessity is precisely present, a necessity of presence. Parmenides does not present, as the young Nietzsche maintained “a moment of purest, absolutely bloodless abstraction, unclouded by any reality.”<sup>1</sup> Not only is the actuality of all that is actual in reality active in both parts of his poem, but the purity that his abstraction required has been the bloodiest of metaphysics, if metaphysics was ever alive, that of the first and ultimate reduction of Nothing into absence: the reduction, the amputation of the origin.

This is not for Parmenides a predetermined event, but a struggle. In-ceived by Nothing Parmenides remains a thinker of the inception. In his thought Nothing is pulsing under the shroud of Being with a first and last, a unique in-tensity. This constitutes the fragility of the triumph of presence and its accompanying ontological fear. Beyond all psychologism Being fears a second eruption of Nothing, like the one that B11 informs us gave the manifold of the world and the heated rage of stars, which *ōrmēthēsan gignesthai*, “broke out into appearing.”<sup>2</sup> This shroud is the limit. As a thinker of the inception and as Heraclitus and Anaximander before, Parmenides is a thinker of the limit. In truth, the strictest.<sup>3</sup> It is a rigour dictated by the fear of Being, which strives to identify itself with Thought.<sup>4</sup> Parmenides presents us with the task of this, *the*, tauto-logy.

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<sup>1</sup> Nietzsche F., *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, p.69

<sup>2</sup> *GA35*, 191

<sup>3</sup> This does not contradict the remark of Plato in *Sophist* (242d) on the severity of the Ionian Muses, but is its reverse affirmation.

<sup>4</sup> Parmenides, B3



The specific place of this task in the preceding and subsequent thought forms an integral part of the task itself.

Hegel also discovers a beginning: “With Parmenides did actual philosophizing begin; the elevation into the kingdom of the ideal is here to be seen. [...] Only the necessity, Being is the True. This beginning is indeed still blurred and indeterminate; it is not to be further explained, what herein lies; but precisely this explanation is the formation of philosophy itself, which is here not yet at hand.”<sup>5</sup> The beginning of Being is for Hegel in-formed by an absence, the absence of the thought that can assume the task that thought in accordance to Being has set to itself. This ‘itself’ is but the freedom of Enlightenment. Hegel sees thought becoming free for itself in Elea as the pure movement of thought in concepts, instigating *here* dialectic. Here also takes place the dialectic separation of thought and sensibility.<sup>6</sup> The Eleatics (who Hegel regards as later than the Pythagoreans) tore apart thought from its sensible form and the form of the number allowing thus a stepping forth of pure thought.<sup>7</sup> With them a dialectic that negates the many towards the one is however still a subjective process to be transformed into objective consciousness in Heraclitus.

Hegel is clear: dialectic begins not with Heraclitus, but with Parmenides whom the architectonic of his history of philosophy places first. Heidegger in 1973 formally opposes the conjecture. From a merely historical point of view, Heidegger says, Heraclitus appears as the founder of dialectic. With regard to this ‘merely’, Parmenides’ thought appears deeper and more essential, for the tautology is the sole path (an un-turning trope) of thought which dialectic can only blur.<sup>8</sup> Heidegger bestows us thus with two tasks: to discover the essence of dialectic in tautology by turning to Parmenides and secondly to think Heraclitus outside the confines of the projection of historic dialectic. Two awakening tasks to confront the essence of thought in fidelity to the truest intension of both awakeners: Heraclitus and Parmenides.

All inceptive thinkers are thinkers of the turn. This Hegel—and even Heidegger often—calls *Becoming*. Heraclitus is not the first to think *Becoming*, a lesson already offered by Anaximander.<sup>9</sup> Nor is he the last. We saw the narrow Platonic schematism of

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<sup>5</sup> Hegel G. W. F., *W18*, 290

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 275

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 194

<sup>8</sup> *GA15*, 400

<sup>9</sup> *GA78*, 107

all preceding history of thought into that of Becoming (Heraclitean) and that of Being (Eleatic) undone by the even stricter Hegelian schematism, retaining nonetheless enough freedom to discover the Parmenidean dialectic. The meaning of dialectic is not merely the birth of the argument that modernity was pleased to discover in the Parmenidean poem and which Zeno was already to push to its limit. It is rather the indication of the *dia-*, opening the *odoi* (paths) of thought and Being, in the collection of *logos*, a relation of opening (*dia-*) and collecting (*-lectic*), which presence would soon exhaust.

Such presence is the severance and loss of origin and the loss of the irreducible absence. In his best moment Wilkinson writes: "One of the purposes of Parmenides' poem, then, might be to revert to the beginning or origin for speaking and thinking rather than lead us to its just or 'correct' conclusion. For what conclusion can one reach concerning a nameless *esti*? That 'it disappears with the breath that carries it'? Or that it carries the breath that cannot disappear?"<sup>10</sup>

## 1. Structural Pathmarks

As source of all true understanding of Parmenides needs be taken his poem, while the reflections of other Eleatics cannot but remain limited and secondary in this illumination. The poem which (especially in German) is customarily called 'didactic' is neither a poem in the sense of 'poetry', nor is it 'didactic'.<sup>11</sup> Its lesson lies in thought itself, which is never taught, but evermore in-cieved while the truth for which it struggles constitutes its poetry. The fragmentary and unevenly preserved body of the poem (In Diels' estimation we have 9/10 of *Alētheia*, while only 1/10 of *Doxa*<sup>12</sup>), does not suffice to misguide us on the presence of a coherent text. For the first time in the history of thought fragments become extensive and readily refer to a unity, the exhaustive reconstitution of which they simultaneously preclude. This ambivalence affirms the birth of the argument. The question whether the poem was created and preserved in coherent units according to the demands imposed by this birth, or whether this birth became possible according to a transformation of the language of thought

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<sup>10</sup> Wilkinson L. A., *Parmenides and To Eon*, p.117

<sup>11</sup> GA54, 3

<sup>12</sup> Diels, H. *Parmenides*, p.25-6

towards extensive unity that Elea witnessed, or whether finally we are merely recipients of an appearance of an instigation, which in truth already existed, but was simply lost through centuries of doxographic fragmentation needs to remain open. What however the incomplete structural-textual unity attests for us is the precise struggle of thought against the absences invoked by fragmentation and towards the essential unity of presence. The torso of the Parmenidean poem is more than a form corresponding to content.

The poem opens with what is termed a *proemium*, a foreword (B1) and is subsequently divided in the aforementioned parts of *Alētheia* (B2-B8, 51) and *Doxa* (B8, 51-B19). The *proemium* informs us of the invitation to a journey Parmenides is taken on, by the daughters of the sun, away from the palaces of night towards the light (B10 *eis phaos*, towards what shows), towards precisely where the gates of the paths of day and night are.<sup>13</sup> These gates have keys held by the vengeful *Dikē*, a place where the nameless goddess, whom Heidegger identifies with *Alētheia*, dwells. The question of the person of the goddess needs to be reserved along with the closer examination of the paths of *Alētheia* and *Doxa* and of the last verses of B1 (29-32), which are often thought as belonging to the former. A closer examination of the rich stage that the *proemium* opens cannot be here accommodated. We endeavour only a triptych of observations.

The first regards the very question of the journey and its necessity. Wilkinson says: “there is no need for a journey or for a ‘quest’ if the goal is to reach ‘is’; there is no need to go anywhere for ‘is’ is all around.”<sup>14</sup> And yet there is a need of a certain distance, which Husserl conceives as *epoche*, in Cartesian fashion, originating in confined solitude. For this lineage of thought distance, the *sub-* of *subjectum*, is an issue of consciousness. Yet Parmenides conceives its use/need (*chreōn*) in a more originary tropos. Indeed what-is (*eon*) is everywhere. And thus Parmenides mollifies our potential worry on our trajectory making a community (*xynon*) of the point of entry with that of arrival.<sup>15</sup> Like Heraclitus he thinks the *archē* and *peras* of the circle in their identity. And yet the journey is necessary, as the distance from what is incessantly and always already there. And if Wilkinson sides in the old Platonic dilemma with truth as our

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<sup>13</sup> Parmenides, B1, 11

<sup>14</sup> Wilkinson L. A., *Parmenides and To Eon*, p.99

<sup>15</sup> Parmenides, B5

guide rather than a quest,<sup>16</sup> the *aporia* can only resolve in welcoming both. Truth is both a guide and a quest and yet never a guide to itself.

The second regards the direction of the journey, customarily taken to be an ascent. There is no firm textual ground of this in the poem affirming the mytho-metaphysical prejudice of verticality. The only relevant line (B1, 11) says: “There are the gates of the paths of Night and Day”, referring if anything, to the vanishing *point* of the horizon, where the sun sets and vanishes together with the horizon into the night and whence the night enters. This point points again to a relation of Parmenides to Heraclitus we shall come to examine.

Finally, the destination of the journey is of significance. Where does the poet meet the goddess? It is customary to think of an adobe—a house or palace. To this attests the strange word *dō*,<sup>17</sup> the accusative of *dōma*. Discounting the less likely possibility that the Eleatic dialect commonly abbreviated the word, the abbreviation is poetic. In this poetic form we hear *against* philological correctness the adverbial ‘here’ (*dō*), for we know, truth is always a journey ‘here’. The gates of the paths of day and night cannot but open to these two paths; behind them lies no palace, indeed behind them lies no sight at all, but only a hearkening to the word of the goddess, that testifies again the proximity of Heraclitus and Parmenides. A palace is here less faithful to the Parmenidean in-tension than the uncommon to Greek imagination topography of a forest behind the gates containing the paths and forming an embracing wall. The nameless goddess in this picture appears as sylph, rather than a *regina sanctum*. Eventually, even if the gates are of an abode, the abode itself needs be located at a crossroad,<sup>18</sup> amounting to little more (or less) than an in-ceptive ‘here’: against the detailed description of the gates themselves and even the chariot that carries the poet stands a complete lack of a description of the purported ‘palace’; the goddess is a goddess *of* the way as much as the way is *of* the goddess.

A few remarks on the two paths of *Alētheia* and *Doxa*, before we re-turn for a closer reading, can here pave the way.

Like truth (*alētheia*), error is not a remote abstraction, but always already here, even if one may always fall ever-deeper in it. This thought corresponds to a lineage of

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<sup>16</sup> Wilkinson L. A., *Parmenides and To Eon*, p.117

<sup>17</sup> Parmenides, B1, 25

<sup>18</sup> Parmenides, B11

manifestations in the history of thought, forming in early Heidegger *das Man*.<sup>19</sup> There is no determinate moment in which those who have no knowledge of the ways enter error. They are constantly errant, trapped in an error from which only knowledge of the two paths can set free.<sup>20</sup> This knowledge is the result of an *eleghon polydērin*<sup>21</sup> a much-struggling (*dēris*, struggle, echoing Heraclitus) proofing of the way, a painstaking signposting. What this *eleghos* attests is the actuality of *three* ways. The *first*, the way of truth, the way of Being and presence is both accessible and admissible, it is in truth necessary. The *second* is the impossible way of non-Being and absence, which is essentially inaccessible, rendering the question of its admissibility irrelevant. Between these two lies the *third* way, the way of seeming and error, the way of *doxa*. This way is accessible but also inadmissible. It is here that essential caution is required.

In this Chapter we follow Parmenides along the ways of *alētheia* and *doxa* and touch only tangentially on the trajectory of the inaccessible way of absence, exceeding the limits of Parmenidean thought. This way is the tropos of Nothing we have already encountered, a given which however we are yet to win (*gewinnen*).

At the same time we wish to extricate Parmenides from both an alethic interpretation of orthodox Parmenideanism that dictates unconditionally and irrevocably that *falsity is not* and a doxic interpretation of sophistic Parmenideanism that interprets orthodox Parmenideanism into the doctrine that *everything is true*. Indeed *falsity is-not*. But how are we to understand this insofar as falling into falsity *is*? Falling into falsity is precisely falling into the *not*. This is the thought the Parmenidean struggle tries to think.

The triptych of ways, with that of absence absent, relates to the paths of day and night we encountered in the *proemium* and to which we shall return. Scholars have attempted all three available interpretations of their relation. Most commonly the tropos of truth is related to light, while that of seeming, (together with that of the banished tropos of absence) to night; further, certain interpretations make absence into a pure night, while seeming becomes a *krasis* of light and night. The opposite allocation has also found support: indeed, the adjectives of night (grave, firm, full and tight) are taken

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<sup>19</sup> A moment in Heidegger's thought evoked and employed with little ado, verging on becoming itself a philosophical case in point of the 'they', a moment in need of a radically new foundation, a foundation laid from the beginning, if a claim to the future of philosophy is to be laid. As such authenticity could be Heidegger's most superficial word, never itself de-constructed, perhaps for the better early abandoned. We invoke it here as elsewhere mindful of its provisional, elusive familiarity.

<sup>20</sup> GA35, 124

<sup>21</sup> Parmenides, B8, 5

to correspond rather to the *eon*, while the fire and colour-play of day marks the unreality that appears at the end of the tropos of *alētheia*. Wilkinson is one of a third group of thinkers who appear more sensitive to the poem's in-tension, recognizing the community of the two: "It cannot be the case then, that the youth is singularly destined 'for the light' or the dark: both are characteristic of what we call the 'Way of Truth' and the 'Way of Seeming'."<sup>22</sup> The exact foundation of this 'and' we shall come to examine in the respective sections of *Alētheia* and *Doxa*. This much however is clear: rather than opposing them this 'and' attests anew the community between Parmenides and Heraclitus.

## 2. Three propositions

Heidegger in 1932 proposes a threefold schema for the essential thought of Parmenides, a schema of propositions (*Sätze*) that de-limit the totality of the poem: an original (*Ur-*), an essential (*Wesens-*) and a temporal (*Zeitsatz*) proposition. We follow their contours, the contours of themes to re-turn.

In B2 *two* ways are de-limited: the one is the *how* of being and of not being non-being (*hopōs estin te kai hōs ouk esti mē einai* B2, 3); the other the *how* of not being and of the use/need<sup>23</sup> of being non-being (*ouk estin te kai hōs chreōn esti mē einai* B2, 5). In these formulations being is thought as pure activity and thus not-being (*ouk einai*) plays sharply against non-being (*mē einai*). In this play lies the source of the essential distinction of *ouk* and *mē on* that will encompass the groundwork of the Platonic *Sophist*. Yet even before this distinction, the most fundamental of fissures is effectuated in the *how* (*opōs, ōs*), in the tropos of being and non-being; the turning of the one to the other and their re-turn. The two ways, the two tropoi (*hows*), are presented, the one to be walked, the other totally inaccessible, unthinkable from itself, only its ban to be described, with language rendered barren on the aftermath of this description, a desert of all thought.<sup>24</sup> These two *tropoi* do not appear as mere names, but we are upon their

<sup>22</sup> Wilkinson L. A., *Parmenides and To Eon*, p.79

<sup>23</sup> See p.157ff.

<sup>24</sup> "Isn't the desert a paradoxical figure of the aporia? No marked out or assured passage, no route in any case..." Derrida J., *On the name*, pp.53-4. Moreover, an *aporia* destined to *death*, insofar as the desert exhausts exponentially all vital force, every source of sustenance.

emergence told *what* it is to be asked and sought along the one, where truth is ever-turning, and *what* the other forbids, re-turning us to the use/need of a beginning that never begins.

The second returning way is a turning away of being *from* nothing. Being is deeply allergic against what may not be build upon; *what dis-allows the foundation, dis-allows Being*. The first construct, the essential founding is *noein*, what Heidegger translates as *Vernehmen*, receptive perception. Where Being, there also reception and where reception and its possibility only there Being; *Nothing*, excluding reception (*noein*) in both directions, can thus never be. This Heidegger terms the primordial, originary proposition (*Ursatz*): the *noein-einai* identity.<sup>25</sup> He offers multiple formulations: “*Being has as such* [as a reception] *only the enjoining authority (Befugnis) in reception (Vernehmen) and the reverse*. Being ‘as such’ has no authority; it does not reign (*west*) at all as Being.”<sup>26</sup> This is not idealism. Only in *noein* can Being show forth *as* jointure and only *noein* can found this emergence of Being. The young Nietzsche traces the Parmenidean origin when he claims that the rejection of Nothing is grounded in its denial of *representation* insofar as Being and representation (*Vorstellung*) belong together. There *is* indeed *no* Nothing because Being and *noein* belong together; yet *noein* is at most only secondarily representation.

The necessity and exclusiveness of this togetherness constitutes the locus of the origin, or more specifically the conditions of its exclusion. Being is originally without origin. It cannot have come from no-thing while no other possibility of origin offers itself.<sup>27</sup> At least, that is, to *noein*. *Noein dictates that the whence of Being must be another. Nothing* (which at times Heidegger in unison with Parmenides seems to delineate to non-Being) *is* the only *possibility* that offers itself. And yet nothing is neither *phaton* (saybale) nor *noēton* (thinkable), even if its tropos *is thinkable (odoi mounai dizēsios eisi noēsai)*,<sup>28</sup> but *un-turning (atarpos)*.<sup>29</sup> Nothing itself as origin goes against the *Ursatz* of *einai-noein*. Gadamer refers thus the exclusion of Nothing to this inversion of the identity,<sup>30</sup> insofar as in Nothing *noein* could not arrive in the *auto* of *einai*, while localizing the ban of the *atarpos* (a-tropos) of the *noēton* way of Nothing, its disqualification from offering the origin of the community of *einai* and *noein*, in it

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<sup>25</sup> Parmenides, B3

<sup>26</sup> GA35, 119

<sup>27</sup> Parmenides, B8, 5-13

<sup>28</sup> Parmenides, B2, 2

<sup>29</sup> Parmenides, B2, 6

<sup>30</sup> Gadamer H. G., *GW6*, 41

being conducive to no purpose (*Ziel*).<sup>31</sup> Yet what purpose could guide the ban on Nothing? What instrumentality could decide the destiny of thought? If not irrelevant, this is the bleakest, most dis-topical of thoughts.

Another possibility of an other origin (what demands to be an-other) appears in appearing. Appearing, as possible *whence* of Being runs again however against the *Ursatz*. If this origin is to be grounded it has to be grounded in the truth of thought, as a power of entrustment (*ischys pistios*).<sup>32</sup> And *this* Appearing cannot offer. *Doxa* may only generate *doxa* and never the *eon*.<sup>33</sup> Eventually, *polydēris eleghos* reveals *doxa* to be infected by non-being (the *mē on* of the *Sophist*).

Here emerges the second proposition; a proposition as little demonstrated and grounded and yet as important as the *Ursatz*; the *Wesenssatz*, the proposition of essence: Being is thoroughly un-nihilic; there is nothing of the order of Nothing in Being.<sup>34</sup> This total exclusion precedes and intensifies what Nietzsche regards as the Parmenidean ‘cardinal-conception’: “only being is, non-being cannot be”; erasing every trace of the latter in the earlier. This exclusive erasure Parmenides leaves to *dikē* to vouchsafe. The enjoining *dikē*, fends off all annulling from Being and has *in advance* disallowed emergence and evasion as the tropos, the being-character of Being.<sup>35</sup> This thought distances Parmenides from his predecessors Heraclitus and Anaximander, inaugurating the end of the inception and the rise of metaphysics. What is crucial is the meaning of the *in advance* (*von vornherein*): *when* exactly is this before—if not *when*, *where*? The domain of the before of *dikē* is precisely but a field lending and accordingly borrowing the voice of the *Ursatz*; it is to this identity that *dikē* holds and fixes Being and excludes its birth (*agenēton*) and demise (*anōlethron*).<sup>36</sup> What distance has thought transversed since *dikē* gave emergence and evasion, since the inception of Anaximander; still thought remains alive and Being restless!

Being neither emerges nor evades, insofar as both would carry the infection of Nothing, the only originary possibility of an-other as origin. Such Being is not *in* time. Its relation to time takes the specific form ‘neither was, nor will be’. For if the essence of Being consisted in being-past, it should never come to be. It would retain a Nothing as it could receive Nothing: only where ‘*is*’—there Being. This ‘*is*’ denotes the

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<sup>31</sup> Gadamer H. G., *GW7*, 24

<sup>32</sup> Parmenides, B8, 12

<sup>33</sup> *GA35*, 159

<sup>34</sup> *GA35*, 162

<sup>35</sup> *GA35*, 159

<sup>36</sup> *GA35*, 161



exclusive relation of Being to the present (*Gegenwart*).<sup>37</sup> Time does not become irrelevant as Thanassas maintains,<sup>38</sup> even if Being is set outside duration, outside all ‘from-to’.<sup>39</sup> Even if Being is not the *permanent-enduring now* (*nunc stans*), or any *now* at all, but a binding present and presence enclosed to itself and even if it is without history or eschatology or transforms these dimensions to presence,<sup>40</sup> this does not equate to a teaching of non-temporality. And even less can the supposed non-temporality become extra-temporal, in the sense of eternity. Nowhere do we read in Parmenides that Being stands in no relation to time or that Being is timeless; it is a total infidelity of thought towards thought to proceed in transforming this fictive timelessness into eternity. The absence of future and past do not refer to such eternity or timelessness, but are to be thought from the now (*nyn*), from the present; this is the proposition of time, the *Zeitsatz*. The *nyn* is the *fundamental phenomenon of time*. According to this *nyn* Being is *homou pan*.<sup>41</sup>

It is here also that the play of Heraclitean *aiōn* will be transformed forever into the Platonic *aiōn* which abides in the one (*menontos...en heni*), an ever-present image (*aiōnion eikona*) of the forever self-same (*aidion*) gods.<sup>42</sup> And yet even to the Platonic *aiōn*, as much as to the Parmenidean *nyn*, correspond certain tropes of *kinēsis*, so that Sallis correctly warns against conflating this time with Augustinian *aeternitas*, a presence that simply does not pass,<sup>43</sup> a ‘stuck’ present. The Platonic *aiōn* is still revolving in accordance with Anaximandrian tactic time, while the *nyn* of Parmenides that transforms *aiōn*, is forever renewed, an incessant implosion of time, an unceasing return to the tropes of present presence.

Now we can see the interplay of the three principles: Being is in a necessary relation to reception (*Ursatz*) and to the Present (*Zeitsatz*). Being is *without* Nothing (*Wesenssatz*) and *with* Present (*Zeitsatz*). The now of the *Zeitsatz* functions as the

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<sup>37</sup> GA35, 164

<sup>38</sup> Thanassas P., *Parmenides, cosmos, and being*, p.47

<sup>39</sup> GA35, 168

<sup>40</sup> What is without history, does not by itself suffice to annihilate history. The Parmenidean awareness of this insufficiency bears the name of *Doxa*. And yet, what is without history is the source of this constant transformation, an incessant *presentification*. What is without history creates thus a history of the present, a history condensed *in itself* to a point, but *from* the opening of Nothing eloquent as the most eventful of narratives.

<sup>41</sup> B8, 5 and GA35, 165

<sup>42</sup> Plato, *Timaeus*, 37c-d. “*menontos aiōnos en heni kat’ arithmon iousan aiōnion eikona*”

<sup>43</sup> Sallis J. *Chorology*, p.79. This difference is certainly infinitely amplified in the transformation of cosmological to psychontological time, a transformation which cannot be here examined.

middle term uniting receptive thought and the absence of Nothing. Moreover, the present as counter-warding is the self-counter-constructing of presence; the present is the tropos of the building insight of presence.<sup>44</sup> This building and counter-holding, this maintaining sight has the character of *noein*; and thus the *Ursatz* and the *Zeitsatz* say the same. Subsequently, time as present and presence dominates the whole spectrum of Being. In this time all the *sēmata* unify to overcome a mere parataxis. The unity however does not resolve the causal dilemma: is time without Nothing because it is with Present or is it with Present because it is without Nothing?<sup>45</sup> It sounds in truth an empty dilemma. One discovers the exit from its void in the misunderstanding of Nothing. Receptive thought, the thought of Being that takes and takes in, is insufficient to think the wealth of Nothing. In order to achieve this it effectuates an amputation, in the language of psychoanalysis,<sup>46</sup> a castration of time, of its pro-creative essence that requires absence. By excluding absence time becomes the dominion of the present that believes to be without Nothing, without origin.

Out of the wealth of the origin speaks *alētheia*, which we turn to attend anew and attempt a different reading of the propositions with Parmenides.

### 3. Alētheia

Across the decades the Heideggerian interpretations of Parmenidean *alētheia* unfold a spectrum as diverse as the first chapter delimits. In this re-turn we thematize the Parmenidean imprint on *alētheia* before its metaphysical conceptualization along the threads of these interpretations.

We know that Heidegger makes *alētheia* the unnamed goddess to whose presence the poet is summoned. Except for her, a number of other deities have been suggested: *Sophia*, *Themis*, *Physis*, *Peithō*, *Aphroditē*, *Persephonē*, and even *Nyx*, are not beyond the bounds of philological speculation. Undoing a seeming contradiction

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<sup>44</sup> GA35, 178

<sup>45</sup> GA35, 166

<sup>46</sup> Psychoanalysis is not here evoked as arbiter, but only as the source of a discourse of castration.

insofar as she already appears holding the keys to the gates of the way<sup>47</sup> *Dikē* should be included in this candidacy with better claims than any, had the goddess not to remain *essentially* nameless. Her name is not merely untold, but unsayable. If the goddess is of the way, that is, the way of Being, then her anonymity is redoubled throughout B8 where *esti* appears subjectless. What-*is*-one does not have one as its subject, it is *not/is* not one. This *hen(/panta)* we shall encounter again in the lection of Heraclitean *logos* both *desiring and refusing* the name of Zeus.<sup>48</sup>

If however we insist on the *desire* of *logos* to name the one, we can indeed see with Heidegger the questions of the name of the Goddess and the nature of what the tradition calls the *Way of Truth* converging. *Alētheia* appears twice in B2 and B8, while the way of correct thought of Being expounded in-between, is termed the *Way of Truth*. To understand such a way we heed Gallop's observation: "Nouns in the genitive case used with words for 'route' refer either to the traveller or to his divine guide... but not to 'Truth'... as constituting or defining the route(s) in question."<sup>49</sup> Thus if there is a *Way of Truth*, *never itself called true*, the genitive binds it rather to the Goddess than to the actual correctness of the thought of Being; this is the *Way of the Goddess called Truth*; a way upon which truth is called and calling. It may thus appear trivial insofar as the Goddess and Truth are identified, whether the actual occurrences refer to the former or later. And yet, this linguistic observation affords us a significant distance: *Alētheia as Goddess is not mere thought, the way of truth isn't exhausted in a way of thought*. The thought of truth happens *within* truth, along the way opened by the goddess, *while* the tropos of this opening, the tropos-of-*alētheia* converges with the tropos-of-*eon*.

The fact that the truth is the goddess and the goddess the truth, does not amount either to a hypostatization or to a mere colouration of an abstract concept.<sup>50</sup> Heidegger in 1942/3 interprets differently this intersection of *mythos* and *logos*. He hears in *thea* (goddess), the word *thea* (sight), a play of intonation.<sup>51</sup> For Heidegger the Greek gods are not personalities or persons who possess Being, but Being itself that looks into beings.<sup>52</sup> Heidegger moves here in the opposite direction of his best thoughts. We know that the gates do not protect a sight, but a word, the goddess delivers a word, rather than

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<sup>47</sup> Parmenides, B1, 14

<sup>48</sup> Heraclitus, B32

<sup>49</sup> Gallop D., *Parmenides of Elea*, p.30, in Wilkinson L. A., *Parmenides and To Eon*, p.88

<sup>50</sup> *GA54*, 8

<sup>51</sup> *GA54*, 155

<sup>52</sup> *GA54*, 164

a sight. The violence becomes unmistakable as he says: “From the light and bright and transparent (*diaphanes*) of light it is only a step to the clearing (*Lichtung*) and to the lighted and that is, also to the open and thus to the unconcealed as the essential.”<sup>53</sup> In 1973 Heidegger will reverse the step, completely disconnecting light and the clearing, as we shall come to hear.<sup>54</sup> The statement: “if man did not already have Being in sight, one could never think Nothing, let alone experience beings”<sup>55</sup> sounds forged in the clearing where the calling of Nothing can always be clearly heard. The tension of the optical and the acoustic testifies the deeper autonomy of the clearing that Heidegger will come to realize at the end of his life: in the clearing resounds Nothing.

Yet, the most essential tension in the Heideggerian grid of interpretation of Parmenidean *alētheia* rests in the polarization of *lēthē* (forgetfulness) and *eon* (being) at the *heart* of truth; the crux lies with the precise understanding of the two poles.

In the early 60’s Heidegger still sees in *lēthē* not the shadow of the light of *alētheia*, but its very heart,<sup>56</sup> its ultimate essence in concealing *while* and *in order to* reveal. But in the Zähringen seminar of 1973 Heidegger will revoke this attribution of meaning to Parmenides— the *alētheiēs eukukleos atremes ētor*,<sup>57</sup> truth’s well-rounded un-trembling heart is re-approached as the fullness of Being. Indeed in B8, 4, Parmenides calls *eon* also *atremes*. It seems then that *eon* lies at the heart of *alētheia*, precisely as their *tropoi* were seen to converge. Accordingly *alētheia* is aligned with what presences (*Anwesend*); and eventually becomes the presencing itself (*Anwesen selbst*)—*eon emmenai*: the present presenting.<sup>58</sup> Mally attests this shift: “Heidegger says that what he suggested in that earlier essay [*Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens*] – that *lēthē* lies in the heart of the root of *a-lētheia* – is simply not true; Parmenides did not say anything like that.<sup>59</sup> Rather, to think the whole of *a-lētheia* is to think *eon*: emergent emerging.”<sup>60</sup> Yet how can a thinker who has escaped the tyranny of light while remaining in the clearing, opening thus the fullness of the origin, reinstate

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<sup>53</sup> GA54, 215

<sup>54</sup> See p.121

<sup>55</sup> GA54, 217

<sup>56</sup> GA14, 88

<sup>57</sup> Parmenides B1, 29

<sup>58</sup> GA15, 398

<sup>59</sup> GA15, 395

<sup>60</sup> Mally K., *Reading and Thinking: Heidegger and the Hinting Greeks*, in Sallis J. (ed.), *Reading Heidegger, Commemorations*, p.234

also a fullness of presence that is essentially hostile to all that is not present? Can this presence be *dif-ferent*? This struggle does not concern the mere case of Heidegger, but charts the essential Parmenidean crux of the transformation of the inception into metaphysics.

We return to the lectures of '42/3 for a deeper understanding of this crux. The lectures identify as opposite of *alētheia* not the *lēthēs* or *lathes*, that precisely allies to the tropes of *alētheia* as its very heart, but *pseudos*, the false.<sup>61</sup> Here we are reminded that we are unable to think the true, because we know and want to know nothing of the essence of the false. Like the essence of death is not a non-essence and the essence of negativity neither something negative, nor merely something 'positive', the essence of falsity is nothing false.<sup>62</sup> We understand that *pseudos* points towards the origin.

Why then not '*apseudos*' instead of *alētheia*? Greek language ventured such constructions as for example when Homer in *Iliad* XVIII, 46 calls one of the Nereids *Apseudē*, or when Plato in *Politeia* 382e calls the *daimonion* and the *theion apseudes*.<sup>63</sup> In opposing *pseudos* to *alētheia*, Heidegger invites us to ask on the relation between the root *lath-* and *pseudos*. In *lath-* *lanthanō*, not to conceal, but to be concealed, is to be heard. The past participle of the verb is *lathōn* or *lathon*. The *lathon* is what remains concealed, while *lathrai* means in a concealed trope, secretly.<sup>64</sup> In the next chapter we re-approach *lanthanō*; significant is here that *lath-* still refers to the heart of truth: "concealment permeates thus the inceptive essence of truth,"<sup>65</sup> while the opposite of unconcealment is not concealment but falsity.<sup>66</sup> What we have clearly not invited to consider is the relation between *lath-* and *lēth-*, between concealment and forgetfulness, both of which seem at this stage to form the heart of truth; only the assurance that Greeks experienced forgetting as an event of concealment,<sup>67</sup> addresses the demands this relation presents, without however undertaking them.

So what is the opposite of *alētheia*? What is that we need to hear in contrast to the *lath-*? If we understand *pseudos* as the false, before we turn to think *pseudos*, we

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<sup>61</sup> GA54, 32

<sup>62</sup> GA54, 64

<sup>63</sup> While the three epithets that "conferred exceptional importance" to Nereus were *alēthēs*, *apseudēs* and *nēmertēs*. Detienne M., *The masters of truth in archaic Greece*, p.53

<sup>64</sup> GA54, 33

<sup>65</sup> GA54, 38

<sup>66</sup> GA54, 39

<sup>67</sup> GA54, 42

must delineate the manifold meanings of falsity in our modern languages. First, the false appears as the forged, the inauthentic, as the expression ‘a false Rembrandt’ testifies.<sup>68</sup> False however is also an utterance in the sense of incorrectness. The incorrect is not however by default the mistaken. When one gives a false testimony in court one needs to know the ‘facts’; one cannot be mistaken in order to deceive. Moreover, next to the meanings of inauthenticity, incorrectness and deception, the false means the wrong, as when the police arrest the false man, someone not ‘identical’ with the one sought.<sup>69</sup> Finally, we hear *pseudos* in the pseudonym; not merely a wrong, a covering or deceptive name, but a name that in covering, also allows its bearer to appear as who he is in truth in accordance to the pursuit at hand, Kierkegaard for example signing *Fear and Trembling* as *Johannes de Silentio*.<sup>70</sup> From these examples, we can grasp the interplay of the forces at work, behind the further par excellence example of false gold: in falsity it appears like gold and in appearing thus, it conceals what it is in truth: not-gold.<sup>71</sup> *Pseudos*, concealing, understood thus as the false, signifies a certain dissembling; in dissemblance lies for Heidegger its *fundamental significance*.<sup>72</sup> Thus when we return to the Greek, to hear Homer raise in *Iliad*<sup>73</sup> the question of *pseudos* of Zeus’ thunders, we are aware of their dissembling potential. Zeus is called *phainōn*, he who lets appear. So how can he who lets appear conceal? It is because Zeus thunders are precisely *sēmata*, signs. What he lets appear are not things, or the *eon* itself, but signs. As we will know of Apollo in Heraclitus, Zeus *indicates*. His thunders neither reveal, nor conceal, but show; thus he is *phainōn*.

And thus we need understand the indication of the lectures of ’32 that “The truth of *doxa* is evidently to be gained on the way of truth.”<sup>74</sup> When the *sēmata* of the *eon* found on the way of truth are not thought *in* truth, they dissemble; this is *doxa*: what appears as truth, concealing the truth of its origin *outside* truth. If with Parmenides *alētheia* finds expression for the first time in thought, this is not because the question of *alētheia* is raised and thematized. Parmenides invokes *alētheia*, but its uttermost truth

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<sup>68</sup> GA54, 42

<sup>69</sup> GA54, 43

<sup>70</sup> GA54, 44

<sup>71</sup> GA54, 53

<sup>72</sup> GA54, 47

<sup>73</sup> Homer, *Iliad*, II, 348ff

<sup>74</sup> GA35, 112

speaks *in* and *as* the *auto* of *noein* and *einai*.<sup>75</sup> The failure to remain in this proximity is *the fall*.

It is an essential affinity thus that leads Heidegger to trace the origin of falsity to the roman *falsum*, which he believes related to the Greek *sphallō*, to bring to a fall make fall.<sup>76</sup> Bringing to a fall however is a specific roman, imperial act that relates to the commanding sight and is foreign to *pseudos*<sup>77</sup> and at most only a consequence of the latter.<sup>78</sup> Indeed no etymological casuistic could relate the two. The essence of the *fallere* that resounds in *falsum*, is the bringing to a fall through a high command (*Oberbefehl*), that keeps the subordinate standing, yet standing lower.<sup>79</sup> For Heidegger *pseudos* becomes through secular and ecclesiastic imperial dominion the 'false'.<sup>80</sup> Its opposite is the Indo-Germanic *verum* where speaks the *ver-*, to hold one's stance, to remain standing,<sup>81</sup> which again refers to the specific sense of the high command: to stand and stand over the one who falls. It is this command that raises anthropologically the *homo erectus* of the occident; a moment of forceful clarity in the history of Being. Heidegger however wants to hear in *ver-* more. He traces in the old Latin word *veru-* the meaning of gate, but in the specific sense of sealing. What is essential in *verum* is the sealing and concealing.<sup>82</sup> Such closing and sealing has its opposite in the *apertum*, the open. So that the *verum* corresponds to the *pertum* and to the Greek *lathon*; the *verum* is the original standing that seals the command. *A-lētheia* in contrast is the *a-pertum*.

It is in *veritas* ultimately that the essence of truth yields irretrievably from its inception and falls.<sup>83</sup> This is for the Greeks not *pseudos*, but precisely *sphalma*. This fall blinds by giving *only* sight. In it we fail to see that perhaps there are tropes of concealment, which not only reserve and preserve and thus in a certain sense withdraw, but let the essential come forth and present the present within its presence.<sup>84</sup> In contrast: "the way of Parmenides leads to the open, where indeed the complete opposition of truth and un-truth opens for the first time [*frei wird-* becomes *free*]. It is about *the way*,

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<sup>75</sup> GA15, 332

<sup>76</sup> GA54, 57

<sup>77</sup> GA54, 62

<sup>78</sup> GA54, 65

<sup>79</sup> GA54, 66

<sup>80</sup> GA54, 68

<sup>81</sup> GA54, 69

<sup>82</sup> GA54, 70

<sup>83</sup> GA54, 79

<sup>84</sup> GA54, 92

which *makes* and *keeps* itself *open* to the *opening* – *the method*<sup>85</sup> par excellence.”<sup>86</sup> With Mally we see at the heart of truth a well-rounded disclosure,<sup>87</sup> an opening however that opens not only the *eon*, but the possibility of its hiding and absence. The fall consists precisely in the forgetting of the opening *in favour* of the *eon*. Heidegger eventually succumbs to this in-tension of Parmenidean thought, exemplified in the construction of the *Wesenssatz*, which reduces Nothing to absence and then excludes its every trace from Being. Thus is banned forgetfulness from the heart of truth. It is only however because forgetfulness resides in truth that in truth we can discover having forgotten falling from the open, the clearing of Nothing, where the *eon* in its distinction to *doxa* is to be sought.

We now turn to re-search *doxa*, where the saturation of presence with absence first manifests itself *from* the origin of Nothing as *kosmos*.

#### 4. Doxa

Could we still speak of truth as *veritas*, we would subtitle *doxa: sub specie veritatis*. For we examine not the cosmological manifold of *doxa*, but its *aletheic* conditions, which for Heidegger cor-respond Becoming to the appearing of Being.<sup>88</sup> This is the locus of re-turn. We adhere to the long German philological tradition of translating *doxa* into appearing, yet also retain the connotation of opinion that later informs Aristotelian epistemology, precisely as the *expression* of appearing; another name for *doxa* is indeed *gnome*.<sup>89</sup> This appearing and its expression, neither cognition nor reality can exhaust as it ventures between Being and non-Being<sup>90</sup> a trajectory infinitely parallel to Becoming: a parallel of tautology.

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<sup>85</sup> Method, *methodos* literally meaning ‘with, according to, a way’

<sup>86</sup> GA35, 113

<sup>87</sup> Maly K., *Man and Disclosure*, in Maly K., Sallis J. (eds.), *Heraclitean Fragments*, p.50

<sup>88</sup> GA35, 150

<sup>89</sup> Parmenides, B8, 61. The use of the word in Parmenides generates a discursive tension with its use in Heraclitus. See p.117

<sup>90</sup> The referral of *doxa* to the relation of Being and non-Being, that steps beyond a mere opposition to ‘truth’ attests Detienne: “Whereas, for them [the philosophicoreligious sects], *Alētheia* was absolutely opposed to *Lēthē* and *Apatē*, in Parmenides’ system this choice is no longer exclusive but may be modified according to the needs of the discussion. The radical opposition is now between Being and non-Being, not between *Alētheia* and *Apatē*.” Detienne M., *The masters of truth in archaic Greece*, p.134



Nietzsche, who makes Anaximander identify respectively Being and Becoming with the warm and the cold, sees in Parmenides a mere reversal where the opposition reverberates across a series with numerous, not least Pythagorean, affinities: being/non-being, fire-light/darkness-night, fire/earth, warm/cold, light/heavy, thin/thick, the acting/the suffering, male/female. The *drive* of these 'elements' is *Aphrodite* (her candidacy as the nameless goddess) who is *kybernētēs* (governor), *dikē* (justice), *anankē* (necessity) and yet also expresses herself in *polemos* (war), *stasis* (revolt) and *erōs* (love), in attraction and repulsion, that is, in Becoming.<sup>91</sup>

The attributes that Nietzsche cumulates in the Aphroditean drive attest the confusion he swiftly projects into Parmenides. He affirms the Aristotelian characterization *aphysikos*, an unnatural thinker, as Parmenidean thought becomes empty and barren (yet every inceptive thinker is un-natural precisely *while*, even more *when*, thinking *physis*). Young Nietzsche depreciates the immense force of the Parmenidean tautological austerity and merely concedes to it sharp but shallow dialectics, another proof of the Hegelian sway under which Nietzsche still thinks.<sup>92</sup> His lecture on Parmenides closes with a series of unresolved questions on the sensibility of *doxa*: "For the principal mistake remains, that then the sense apparatus is inexplicable: it moves, it is in multitude: if it is itself an illusion, how can it be the cause of a second illusion? Senses deceive: yet if the senses did not *exist!* How could they deceive?" Upon which Nietzsche unlooses the Parmenidean knot with the stroke: "As certainly however the multitude and motion of the senses exist, so certainly can everything else be moving and plural."<sup>93</sup>

The haste behind such indiscriminate rejection is however at once the source of an appreciation that involves again Anaximander. He who was thought to place Becoming in the cold, is now regarded a monist, lacking a principle of Becoming: "From the one world of *apeiron*, becoming could not be deduced: it must have something added and this can only be its complete opposite, the world of non-being. A third does not exist."<sup>94</sup> This is the Parmenidean contribution. Of course the monikers of monism and dualism are utterly alien to the inception and *apeiron* does not merely allow absence, but as we shall see, founds it; but the suggestion that the introduction of absence towards the thought of Becoming is the essential contribution of a precisely

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<sup>91</sup> Nietzsche F., *KG, II4*, p.290

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, p.296

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, p.296

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, p.290

*empty* thought, demands immediate attention. Becoming, which can belong neither to Being, nor to non-Being, as the latter is simply not, is made to belong to the sphere of illusion (*Täuschung*),<sup>95</sup> for Nietzsche understands *doxa* as illusion. Nietzsche admits that *in thought* Parmenides was not yet a *stasiōtēs*, a rebel, *retaining there* Becoming; the Parmenidean failure consists in neglecting the search for the origin of semblance, illusion and the senses.<sup>96</sup> In the *Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen* of the same period as the lectures the accusation reformulates: “Non-being cannot even practice deceit. Therefore the whence of illusion and of semblance remains an enigma, in fact a contradiction.”<sup>97</sup> This tradition of identifying *doxa* with illusion and illusion with the senses continues uninterrupted to the present; Tallis, for example, sees Parmenides, in the steps of Xenophanes, as discovering ignorance at the heart of knowledge,<sup>98</sup> an ignorance that originates in the senses. But most significantly in this tradition the senses refer to a sphere of absence, which is required if one is to think Becoming.

It is easy to reduce this tradition to Platonic themes of the transient, ultimately unreal and thus absent, sensible and the true presence of the ideal. Plato is not a thinker of the inception, although its echo is far from silent in him. Our attempt is to read the best of in-tensions towards recognizing the constitutive force of absence *for* Becoming. For *doxa* is Becoming, and Becoming is not an illusion. Such is not the intention of the Platonist Gadamer who refers to Aristotle<sup>99</sup> to condemn Elea as the tradition of thought that misapplied the rules of the invisible (respective to change in the Aristotelian text) to the visible. The Eleatics, Aristotle and Gadamer tell us, only knew the sensible; to it they transferred the *nomos* of thought, a misapplication that constitutes the *totality* of beings, the *eon* itself.<sup>100</sup> Could it be that the first unification of beings, the first ontological singularity, the *eon*, is but a false transferral of an alien *nomos*?

The Platonic struggle to encompass this *nomos* resolves in the sophistic *mē on*, that referring back to Parmenidean *doxa*, is far from mere illusion, or the simplicity of absence. The thought due to the Platonic *mē on* must be reserved for a future time; it is significant however that precisely this *mē on* corresponds to *doxa* and essentially

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p.293

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., p.295

<sup>97</sup> Nietzsche F., *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, p.89

<sup>98</sup> Tallis R., *The Enduring Significance of Parmenides*, p.169. Still this is a very different discovery from finding forgetfulness at the heart of truth.

<sup>99</sup> Aristotle, *De Caelo*, III, 1

<sup>100</sup> Gadamer H. G., *GW6*, 12-13

requires Being. In contrast, Plato names *ouk on* the ‘mere’ Nothing that Parmenides addresses as *ouk esti te kai chreōn mē einai*.<sup>101</sup> The Platonic *mē on* eventually understands the flirtation with absence as *sterēsis* and thus re-turns it to the order of Being. *Doxa* in contrast does not resolve this dangerous play, but always invokes *alētheia*: it attempts to encompass absence *en alētheiēi*. The danger lies in the tendency of truth to say only: *is*. Thus for example when Gadamer contra Nietzsche discovers a second principle in Anaximander, a principle of Nothingness that enables the emergence and evasion of beings and makes Parmenides its polemicist, the crux lies in the frustrated persistence of *alētheia* to exclaim: Nothing: *is*!

Still all the intervening centuries have not resolved the enigma: why cannot Becoming occur (not ‘be’) if (and precisely *only if*) Nothing is *not/is* not? Nothing is here as everywhere not absence, but the giving of its specific equi-possibility with presence. Parmenides not only refrains from disallowing negation, but negation becomes his prime tropos to thematize the ban of absence. As little as Parmenides uses *estin* in the copulative, is absence exhausted in negation. This is why Parmenides can negate absence. And this is also why Gadamer can readily see that Carnap’s logical criticism of the Heideggerian thought of Nothing is simply irrelevant.<sup>102</sup> But our enigma asks: what, but Nothing could give absence? And how could such giving amount to negation? Clearly, if Parmenides uses the language of movement to demonstrate the need of rest and that of absence to describe the absolute need of presence, this use deserves the essential detailed attention that a disposable Wittgensteinian ladder can never merit.<sup>103</sup> If Parmenides is the father of the double thought that prescribes the laws of contradiction and the excluded middle, he is also the first to ground presence in absence by an irreducible to calculus act of negation that forever permeates it. The expression of this saturation is *doxa*.

One could refer the relation of negation to absence to a commonly rediscovered tension between *doxa* as illusion lacking any conviction and *ta dokounta*, which in the two last verses of the *proemium* of the poem (B1, 31-2),<sup>104</sup> appear to hold a certain validity.<sup>105</sup> Against the standard Diels translation “appearing things [...] should pervade

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<sup>101</sup> Parmenides, B2, 5

<sup>102</sup> Gadamer H. G., *GW7*, 16

<sup>103</sup> Wilkinson L. A., *Parmenides and To Eon*, p.111

<sup>104</sup> *hōs ta dokounta chrēn dokimōs einai dia pantos panta perōnta(/per onta)*

<sup>105</sup> Thanassas P., *Parmenides, cosmos, and being*, p.23

(*perōnta*) everything”, which leaves in itself unexplained what exactly pervades what, and the irrelevant rendering of Burnet “judge approvedly of the things that seem to men as thou goest through all things in thy journey” Thanassas breaks *perōnta* into *per onta* and translates: “how appearing things should be accepted: all of them altogether as beings.”<sup>106</sup> Accordingly for Thanassas, the two parts of the poem refer to two different modes of cognition that apply to the same objects: once as mere appearance (*doxa*) and again as beings (*alētheia*).<sup>107</sup> However it is not the objectivity (the distinction that inceptive thought lacks in the lack of wealth) but truth that corresponds *doxa* to *eon*, so that what-appears should not be accepted *as being*, but rather *in truth*. And we shall see the truth that Diels’ translation has found in the obscure pervasion as we search for the trope of actuality that corresponds *eon* to *doxa*, for the relation of absence to negation in the heart of *doxa* that is always in the double genitive of truth.

We delimit territory: Diels sees in the treatment of *doxa* a philosophical propaedeutic for the Eleatic school,<sup>108</sup> which Reinhardt easily undoes in view of the absence of polemics and the actual originality of *Doxa*, pre-emptying at once eristic histories such as the one we have seen Geoffrey Lloyd to propose. For Diels, in the general tradition we encountered Nietzsche, *doxa* is essentially the error of the many who confound presence and absence, to which Heraclitus is included. Gadamer notes against this speculated inclusion a misrecognition of style<sup>109</sup> while Burnet replaces the supposed philosophical rival with the Pythagoreans. The delusion however of thinking *doxa* as either illusion or error is by now evident: this is just a doxastic understanding of *doxa*—*doxa* severed from the truth; the truth of absence. Untenable is also the position Wilamowitz adopts from the indication of two Parmenidean principles by Theophrastus that *doxa* constitutes a “self-sufficient and consistent [although inferior] hypothesis alongside the truth.”<sup>110</sup> With Reinhardt and Thanassas again we stress the apodictic tone of *Doxa*, as well as the “absurdity” of a “consistent hypothesis” running against truth.<sup>111</sup> The specific position Reinhardt takes on *Doxa*, as cosmogony, is that of a part in relation to the whole that is truth, ontology. *Doxa* is for him equi-primordial with truth;

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<sup>106</sup> Ibid., p.23-5

<sup>107</sup> Thanassas P., *Parmenides, cosmos, and being*, p.26

<sup>108</sup> Diels, H. *Parmenides*, p.63

<sup>109</sup> Gadamer H. G., *GW7*, 25. We take Parmenides as thinking in fidelity and debt towards Heraclitus; on grounds of the scantest of evidence we see in this passage a condemnation not of Heraclitus but of the reception of his thought, which does not postulate the existence of ‘Heracliteans’.

<sup>110</sup> Wilamowitz U. von, “*Lese Früchte*”, p.204-5

<sup>111</sup> Thanassas P., *Parmenides, cosmos, and being*, p.19

not an epiphenomenon of truth but a dimension accompanying it throughout its fate.<sup>112</sup> And yet also Reinhardt remained ultimately essentially bound to an interpretation of *doxa* as essential illusion, denying its force to account for *kosmos*.<sup>113</sup> Although in the error of *doxa* there is as much truth as in truth's account of itself, for Reinhardt *doxa* remains *an error in truth*.

And yet with Reinhardt the *alētheia* of *doxa* (which does not simply correspond to the *Being of beings*) has to be seen in all its possible involvement in *kosmos*. Parmenides certainly does not abandon appearance, but permeates it with Being—the permeation itself being *doxa* as a tropic act of Nothing—understood for example by Gadamer as a phenomenology of nature,<sup>114</sup> where nature is *kosmos* as *omnitude rerum*. Heidegger finally appears on the trace of this discourse at the heart of which Reinhardt stands. We recall the opening observation that delimited *doxa* as the Becoming that is precisely the appearing of Being. Now we see that Heidegger also requires the clarity of the first way of truth to access the third of *doxa*.<sup>115</sup> Heidegger will never say that *doxa* is the truth of appearing. Still, *doxa* has a double character,<sup>116</sup> that of the double genitive: the view of the appearing—*doxa* is seeing the manifestation of appearing, appearing in its simplicity as much as the sight and view of this appearance. This view of '32 however implies what Heidegger never says: *doxa* is the view of appearance insofar as and inasmuch as it is its truth: the nameless goddess who in the 40's is identified with sight itself. We know the *aporia* of this thought; the clearing precedes sight and gives truth. Ultimately it is only in the clearing that *doxa* can appear as *kosmos*. This appearing is Becoming as the clarity of Nothing. When Heidegger translates B11 where the manifold of the world and of the heated rage of stars is said to have burst into *becoming* (*ōrmēthēsan gignesthai*): “broke out into appearing,”<sup>117</sup> he summarizes the demands of *doxa* as *kosmos*. This *kosmos* however does not yet speak out of the clearing, or more precisely it speaks still out of a clearing (*Lichtung*) bound to light (*Licht*).

Of this *kosmos* that is *doxa* (Becoming *beyond* appearing) the last extant fragment of the poem gives us a glorious (*en-doxos*, in the latent, developed by

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<sup>112</sup> Beaufret J., *Dialogue with Heidegger, Greek Philosophy*, p.33

<sup>113</sup> Thanassas P., *Parmenides, cosmos, and being*, p.20

<sup>114</sup> Gadamer H. G., *GW6*, 33

<sup>115</sup> *GA35*, 184

<sup>116</sup> *GA35*, 185

<sup>117</sup> *GA35*, 191

Christianity meaning of *doxa*) account. We translate B19:<sup>118</sup> “This [the world, in the exposition of *doxa*] emerged thus according to the tropos of *doxa* and now is and afterwards from now on will feed [on *doxa*] to its ending. Yet humans bestowed upon each names as covering signs (signifiers).” Certainly this is not linguistics. A covering sign (*epi-sēma*) is the death mask men put on appearing. Their need emerges when men forget the signs (*sēmata*) of Being and its use/need (*chreōn*).<sup>119</sup> *Doxa*, is not mere opinion, but the essential opinion of the *nomos* of the earth that is Becoming. This isn’t the *nomos* of Being, for its *nomos*, its *chreōn*, only Nothing can give, together *with* and *as* absence. This absence we re-encounter everywhere in *doxa* as the saturation of *kosmos*.

## 5. Day and Night

The pre-eminence of day and night as defining vectors of the doxastic spectrum invites our attention.

Diogenes Laertius reports the legend of the Parmenidean identification of the Evening and Morning Stars. What however the poem indubitably attests is the tautology of day and night. Only by neglecting the recognition of light and night’s equality in B9, 3-4, can we with Diels of the *Urausgabe* call this night Nordic, a bi-directional inequity. Such inequity and finally separation seeks a *dokein* that has forgotten *alētheia*, that has forgotten the forgetfulness in its heart and can thus speak as little of *kosmos* as of the *eon*. This separation, this bisection of unity is described in B8, 53-9. Thanassas after Schwabl refers also to the gates of Night and Day in the *proemium*<sup>120</sup> to prove the evident reference of this act of severance to light and night.<sup>121</sup>

If the tradition of thought that discovered in *doxa* the illusion of senses has more than its overcoming to contribute this lies in the caution against any depth of sight’s ontologization becoming truth—from Plato to Heidegger the goddess replies to her visualization with anonymity. When *doxa* forgets the heart of *alētheia*, it becomes sight,

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<sup>118</sup> *outō toi kata doxan ephy tade kai nyn easi kai metepeit’ apo toude teleutēsousi traphenta tois d’ onoma anthropoid katethent’ episēmon hekastōi.*

<sup>119</sup> Parmenides, B8, 54

<sup>120</sup> Parmenides, B1, 11

<sup>121</sup> Thanassas P., *Parmenides, cosmos, and being*, p.66

dividing the unity of day and night; here knowledge and thought part, insofar as such distinction is not an epistemic,<sup>122</sup> but a metaphysical fallacy (the *fallere* of *falsum*). In truth the invisible night *is* however as much (Thanassas)<sup>123</sup> and as little (Popper)<sup>124</sup> as light. This is the lesson of Heraclitus we shall come to hear in time.

We look closer into B9, 3-4: “*pan pleon estin homou phaeos kai nyktos aphantou/ isōn amphoterōn, epei oudeterōi meta mēden*” and adopt Heidegger’s translation: “the all is filled already with light and un-showing night, both equal to each other, for Nothing (is) not along with either,”<sup>125</sup> which we adapt into: “for neither is with Nothing”. The passage not only advocates the ontological equality of light and darkness, but effectuates this on a recast ground of their inceptive filiation. Heidegger after Kurt von Fritz<sup>126</sup> and a tradition of attentive reading discerns clearly the naivety of the equation of Being with light and Nothing with darkness. That far extends precisely the Heraclitean lesson that future millennia were slow to recognize. Even the thought that approached identity with uttermost intensity failed to find here more than the *between* of semblance. Heidegger sees in the recast ground of night and day the Being of their appearing. Yet they themselves although not Nothing are neither Being. They are the appearing that has the character of the *between*: what looks like Being, and precisely as thus appearing it is not it;<sup>127</sup> we remember this as Heidegger’s definition of false gold. But this is not the truth of *doxa*.

Although neither light nor darkness are with Nothing, they are clearly not Being; yet they are irreducible to falsity, in the mere sense of deception. Being can only speak through them as the *eon* and as presence insofar as Nothing *gives*. And Nothing gives equally absence. *Who* gives, *who* is Nothing? Precisely the nameless goddess, the demon who rules amidst fire and night and distributes them equally.<sup>128</sup> Again in this equal and due distribution the goddess appears as *Dikē*. Essential is however that what *is not* Being (presence) and *not* again non-Being (absence) can only emerge from the *is not/is* not of Nothing.

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<sup>122</sup> Ibid., p.69

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., p.72

<sup>124</sup> Popper K., *The World of Parmenides*, p.88. Popper excludes light and night completely from the ontological order, but then proceeds to consider the two as building materials (!) of *kosmos* according to necessity (*Anankē*). This is but a glimpse of the thorough inconsistency of Popper’s understanding of Parmenides.

<sup>125</sup> GA35, 187

<sup>126</sup> Fritz K. von, *Nous, noein and their derivatives*, in Mourelatos A. P. D. (ed.), *The Pre-socratics*, p.50

<sup>127</sup> GA35, 188

<sup>128</sup> Parmenides, B12. And in exact parallel masculine and the feminine.

Next to the three Heideggerian propositions Gadamer following Riezler offers us the negative methodological proposition of the fundamental fallacy, the *Grundirrtumsatz*.<sup>129</sup> The fundamental fallacy is precisely the separation of day and night into two entities and thus the failure to recognize *kosmos* as their admixture and dissolution, as *saturated*. Now at last we understand fully the *perōnta*, the pervasiveness of all that appears, that Diels' translation could only render, yet not explain. Gadamer thinking with Diels' this saturation is thus able to speak, despite his intention of nullifying the day, of its Nothing.<sup>130</sup> To witness and live the Nothing of the day, to see Nothing is the brightness of light is however rather to enter the sublime *madness of the day*.<sup>131</sup>

And when we finally relate this to the third interwoven Heraclitean lesson of the community of the living and the dead, we can see with Fränkel and Gadamer the *Grundirrtum* of forgetting not the equality of opposites<sup>132</sup> but the saturating of *kosmos* by their tropes. Theophrastus reports<sup>133</sup> the Parmenidean intuition of the ability of both to sense. For neither is this sense in itself an illusion or error. The living see the light, while the dead stare into darkness; the children of day possess the voice, while those of night command silence. Both however require the remembrance of Nothing in order not to fall into the illusion that what appears to them, their Becoming does not exhaust Being. This remembrance dwells at the heart of truth as the forgetfulness of the fall, guarding Being from its own excess.

In exiting the section we trace this saturation in the most beautiful and poetic of Parmenides' verses. B14 says: "*nyktiphaes peri gaian alōmenon allotrion phōs*." We translate: "showing by night around the earth wandering another's light." The fragment refers to the moon where in sheer poetry a profound philosophical insight intersects with a radical scientific discovery. The stress is commonly laid on the latter, as the fragment explains that the lunar light is *allotrion*, 'borrowed', in Burnet's translation, from the sun. Already here we can see the depth of saturation. The light is *of another*. It is far from a generalization to say that light always shows forth as borrowed, as *of*

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<sup>129</sup> Gadamer H. G., *GW6*, 35

<sup>130</sup> Gadamer H. G., *GW7*, 13

<sup>131</sup> We (in-)cite without quoting here all and every of Blanchot's words; we invest ourselves in his voice.

<sup>132</sup> Gadamer H. G., *GW6*, 48

<sup>133</sup> Theophrastus, DK28, A46



*another*. This is the incessant heterology of light, which can only rest in Nothing; which in truth can never rest. This heterology is not a generalization of the particular lunar case, for in it speaks the truest Parmenidean in-tension of *kosmos*. *Selēnē*, the moon, is no less than a goddess. And yet her divinity is deferred to the anonymity of the goddess that shows, without being sight. Here intersects the second, neglected in proportion to its depth, moment of the passage. This wandering light is called *nyktiphaes*, showing *by* night. This *by* does not signify a temporal overlap, but an ontological condition. Parmenides knows that the moon is visible in the day. But its light is proportional to the receding of the origin that confers upon it its brightness. The absencing of light is the giving of light beyond possession. The *kosmos* is lit twice and yet the sun can show itself *as* origin only in the absence of light. As such its light is again but another's unto the origin of Nothing.

## 6. Thought/Being

Our wander through *alētheia* and *doxa* has re-traced the contours of Parmenidean thought demarcated by the three Heideggerian propositions, while de-structuring the foundation of *Wesenssatz*'s orthodoxy. Here we observe the corrosion of the *Ursatz* as a work of Nothing.

### A. Three traditions

The original proposition rests on the conciseness of the third fragment “*to gar auto noein estin te kai einai*”<sup>134</sup> unfolding in the intensifying reformulation: “*tauton d’ estin noein te kai ouneken estin noēma*”<sup>135</sup> and numerous acts of banishment and filiation among which the exemplary crux of “*chrē to legein te noein t’ eon emmenai; esti gar einai, mēden d’ ouk estin.*”<sup>136</sup> A ready translation of the singular thought that necessitated an “explanation [that] constitutes the development of philosophy itself,”<sup>137</sup> comprising its history as “fundamentally a sequence of variations on this one theme,”<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> Parmenides, B3

<sup>135</sup> Parmenides, B8, 34

<sup>136</sup> Parmenides, B6, 1-2

<sup>137</sup> Hegel G. W. F., *W18*, 290

<sup>138</sup> *GA8*, 246

can only at best mislead us. We know however: this thought, this one theme equals to *the equation itself*, essentially expressed in the use/need of the tautology of thought and Being. On this equation Heidegger presents us with another threefold, three exhaustive interpretations, three traditions: a. the first transforming thought into a being among beings and subsuming it in their order. b. the second exhausting Being in representation, that is, the representation of objects reserved for a subjectivity c. the third running from Plato through Plotinus to all neo-Platonic readings the double thread of recognizing the essence of each being in its Idea, adjoining thus Being's purely non-sensible locus to the non-sensible territory of thought.<sup>139</sup>

We hear thus Kranz's translation of B8, 34-6 speaking from the first tradition: "identical is thinking and the thought that IS is; for not without the being, in which it is as expressed, can you find thinking."<sup>140</sup> The translation emerges from the reduction of both thought and Being to what-is, namely beings; this reduction constitutes their identity. For Heidegger however nowhere in the poem does thought appear *also* as being; he finds nowhere the attestation of this reduction.<sup>141</sup> This assurance of 1952 is however not enough to repress the doubt: Heidegger in his final seminars dares question the text: does not *estin gar einai*<sup>142</sup> amount to a degradation of Being to the level of beings?<sup>143</sup> *Being is*. But only beings are and if Being is, it can be only as being. If however Being is (as being) so is *in tautology* thought (after all B3 says: *noein estin*): the abyss for Heidegger yawns. He is of course no stranger to the abyss: since the question of *Was ist Metaphysik?* layered from '29 to '49 and the deeply personal exploration of the *seynsgeschichtliche* works of the same era Heidegger knows: Being is *not/is* not. And yet until the very end Parmenides will constitute for Heidegger the reassurance that this Being, that presence cannot contain, may both exhaustively manifest itself in a presencing tropos *and* function as origin.

As in *cogito ergo sum* an infinite discourse springs from each of the three terms as well as from the clandestine fourth, the subjectivity of the *ens cogitans*, the Saying of Parmenides presents us with a fragile constellation of thought, a sensitive equilibrium;

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<sup>139</sup> GA7, 243

<sup>140</sup> GA7, 237

<sup>141</sup> GA7, 239

<sup>142</sup> With utter caution we translate: "for Being is". Parmenides, B6, 1

<sup>143</sup> GA15, 397

the intensity of the Heideggerian agony unravels only in thinking *einai/eon*, *estin* and *noein* from their own ground. We stay on the side of the *eon*.

Already in early Sanskrit the plural of the neutrum means beings not as merely many, but in their unity.<sup>144</sup> In Greek, Parmenides is the first to stress this unity in the singular: *to eon*. Kahn will say of it: “The *eon* of Parmenides is itself no technical expression, but means ‘what is the case, what is real and true’”<sup>145</sup>—and even though ‘the case’ and technics stand in an opposition as fierce as that of truth and reality that Kahn casually levels, this opposition is not parallel: the alien to reality *eon* is of the order of truth and yet is neither technical nor veridical (in accordance with Wittgenstein’s *it is the case*). Eventually, Kahn would turn admirably against his earlier proposal, deeming the identification of the Parmenidean ‘is’ with other uses of the verb “naive” and making the Parmenidean employment a *sui generis* “metaphysical innovation.”<sup>146</sup> It was the path much earlier indicated by Tugendhat: “what Parmenides meant by ‘be’ ultimately corresponds to none of the meanings of the word ‘be’ in our own (or in the Greek) language.”<sup>147</sup> The meaning of this evental, this unique *eon*, yields with difficulty.

For Heidegger *eon* opens the very collection of beings and Being. *Eon* summarizes the ontological difference at the last moment of the inception. Already Being withdraws, leaving behind its representation in the generality of beings (the abstract being) and the reality of beingness (the ‘most being’)—to representation everything is already *a being* at this moment.<sup>148</sup> Parmenides presents the last resistance to representation, retaining the opening of the two-fold in the *eon*. Thanassas interprets the difference maintained in the *eon* as a nominal (*what is*) and a verbal (*what is*) meaning, and chooses to read the latter to the exclusion of the earlier.<sup>149</sup> Certainly it is not lack of clarity that Heidegger discovers in the two folds of the *eon*; it is not mere indistinction, but the essential grounding play of metaphysics. And it is the in-tension of the opening that animates the *eon*. Thanassas senses the in-tension, but his attempt at intensification requires another ground without which the retreat to the two-fold is the

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<sup>144</sup> GA35, 3

<sup>145</sup> Kahn C. H., *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*, p.175

<sup>146</sup> Kahn C. H., *Being in Parmenides and Plato*, p.34

<sup>147</sup> Tugendhat E., *Das Sein und das Nichts*, p.34

<sup>148</sup> GA7, 245-6

<sup>149</sup> Thanassas P., *Parmenides, cosmos, and being*, pp.43-4

most faithful consequence: eventually Thanassas reads in the *eon* the Aristotelian *on hē on*, the first *on* denoting the totality of beings, the second their beingness.<sup>150</sup>

Only the abyss of Nothing can ground the in-tension of the opening.<sup>151</sup> For if Being is *not/is* not, how can the opening *be*? And how could Being be itself *and* the opening unless as Nothing? Being can give the opening as little as beings can. If however Parmenides says *estin gar einai*, this is because the transition to representation has begun and the inceptive beginning is ending. The Parmenidean *esti* wants both: to speak as pure activity, as the tropos of Nothing and to speak as Being. Heidegger has already in '32 understood the essential in this contra-diction. Infesting truth, contra-diction becomes a diction of the event (of Being) against Nothing and Appearing.<sup>152</sup> This is the Parmenidean 'ban': not a simple exclusion of Nothing, but the playing of its in-tension against itself, for the singular establishment of presence.<sup>153</sup> This 'ban' enables the predication of existence. Parmenides does not confuse the existential and the predicative, as the confused commentators of the ages unfailingly observe, but uses the full force of the trope of ex-istence, as he receives it from Heraclitus, against itself. Critical philosophy will in turn ban the possibility generated by the inceptive ban. Against both bans, we think the predicate of existence as *the modulation without substance*, as an incessant activity, the incessant turning, the tropos that Nothing gives.

We thematize as most appropriate *noein* in confrontation with the second and third traditions. So can Berkeley's equation *esse=percipi* be thought a summary of the second. Heidegger in 1952 founds the equation in Parmenides' thought, in accordance to a reversal: Berkeley delivers Being to Thought, while as Parmenides Thought to Being.<sup>154</sup> But a reversal can never solve an essential problem. We remember indeed from the analysis of the *Ursatz* that only in *noein* can Being present itself as jointure. The tautology is not an interchangeable mathematical equation, but neither does it

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<sup>150</sup> Ibid., p.45

<sup>151</sup> "And if it is true that 'all tension is experienced in a fall,' then it must be added that 'all fall is experienced in a tension.'" Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, p.238 The fall, is the cor-responding trope of *Da-Sein* in the face of the opening of the abyss of Nothing.

<sup>152</sup> GA35, 257

<sup>153</sup> This ban is deeply political in parallel to Agamben's inclusive exclusion of *zoē* from/in *bios*. It is precisely this inclusive exclusion, this ban of bare life that constitutes Western politics. Bare life is not merely excluded, for this exclusion could only found a necropolis. But its ban is precisely the turning against itself, its politicization that enables the *eu zēn*. Agamben, G., *Homo Sacer*, pp.2-9

<sup>154</sup> GA7, 242

amount to a mutual conditioning,<sup>155</sup> which preserves interchangeability as abstract qualitative presuppositions. Rather the essential structural formulation: *Thought* 'is' for the sake of *Being*, while *Being* can only show forth as jointure and as the demand for thought only in thought, can only emerge as true in the *alētheia* of their mutual constant re-turn.

Heidegger sees Hegel, who represents an overcoming of the second and third traditions, still thoroughly defined by them, transforming the tautology mediated by the equation *esse=percipi* into the identification of *Being* with self-producing thought, an identification of thought with its expression and affirmation.<sup>156</sup> Hegel translates thus B8, 34-7: "Thought and that, for the sake of which the thought is, is identical. For, not without the being, in which it expresses itself (manifests itself) will you find thinking; for it is nothing and will be nothing outside of *Being*" and explains: "This is the principal thought. Thought produces itself; what is being produced, is a thought; thinking is thus identical with its *Being*, for it is nothing outside *Being*, this great affirmation."<sup>157</sup>

Hegel does not merely render anymore *einai* to *noein*, but replaces their essential structure with the structuring regime of re-presentation: the constant affirmation of presence. Such re-affirmation becomes a re-turn that can no longer turn (*atarpos*), held fast in the in-tension of the exclusion of absence; it has nowhere to turn to for it everywhere finds itself. This is the very Parmenidean logic. Yet Parmenides is not a slave to his logic, in him inception maintains the primacy of *logos*. And *logos* finds itself always in the Heraclitean lesson in the correspondence of use/need—*chrē to legein te noein t' eon emmenai*. Stein interprets: "no necessity is or will be apart from *eon*", a necessity that Thanassas<sup>158</sup> after Heidegger believes to correspond, to deliver, *noein* to *einai*, with the force of a striving. We know now this use/need as the specific structure of the tautology. Thus we hear B1, 28: *chreō de se panta pythesthai*. Regardless of whether we decide to follow Heidegger in translating *pythesthai* as *erfahren*,<sup>159</sup> the use/need clearly indicates the all (not everything) of *alētheia*. It indicates a passage through the *tauto* of *noein* and *einai*—through the thought of tautology. Like Hegel later demands not a reflection on the absolute, but the reflection

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<sup>155</sup> Thanassas P., *Parmenides, cosmos, and being*, p.39

<sup>156</sup> GA7, 241

<sup>157</sup> Hegel G. W. F., *W18*, 289-90

<sup>158</sup> Thanassas P., *Parmenides, cosmos, and being*, p.41-2

<sup>159</sup> GA15, 406

of the absolute, Parmenides demands not a thought on tautology, but tautology itself. The passage of the thought of tautology thinks the identical (*tauto*) of *noein* and *einai*; it asks: *is* the identical? Parmenidean thought has recognized itself as identical with Being. Itself and Being are *tauto*. Yet only the passage can pass through the question: *is the tauto?* And yet the passage of thought has no place to pass into. *In thought*, it thinks only of stepping out, it thinks the *ex-istence* of the identical of Being and thought.

## B. The absence of thought

A crucial fragment towards the thought of thought is B4. The original runs: “*Leusse d’ homōs apeonta noō pareonta vevaiōs;/ ou gar apotmēxei to eon tou eontos echesthai/ oute skidnamenon pantē pantōs kata kosmon/ oute synistamenon.*” Heidegger translates: “But see now: how the afore-absent is constantly present to receptive thought, for (no thought) can sever the holding together of Being as Being, neither towards the dispersal towards everywhere completely throughout the world nor towards composition.”<sup>160</sup>

This fragment attests a horizon of absence. As such it constitutes neither a contradiction to Parmenides’ ‘ban’ of *mē eon*,<sup>161</sup> nor to our consistent thought of it in the trope of absence; to the contrary it affirms both. For we have witnessed the saturation of *kosmos* with and the use/need of *eon* for absence, both expressed in the ‘ban’ as the turning of the in-tension of Nothing against itself to give the singular reign of presence. This fragment affirms this with regard to *noein* that grants the showing forth of Being as (the jointure of) presence. With regard to *noein* it refers us to the *Zeitsatz*. What it says is that constantly everywhere, through the whole world and in every direction (*pantē pantōs kata kosmon*) Being absences in *noein* as presence. Neither Parmenides nor Heidegger will go as far as to attempt the appropriation of Nothing *for* Being. Yet every absence is set in the *chreōn* of presence.<sup>162</sup> Saturation is driven away from all the pores of presence, so that each and every socket of it may be refilled by presence. In *nous* Being is not to be severed; in *nous* a locus appears where

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<sup>160</sup> GA35, 174

<sup>161</sup> Unlike the precise Platonic demarcation of *mē on/ ouk on* in *Sophist*, Parmenides maintains a flexibility that refers the rigour of terms to the rigour of thought. He uses thus interchangeably, *mē eon* (B7, 1 & 2, 7)/ *mē einai* (B2, 5), *ouk esti* (B8, 3), *mēden* (B6, 2) and here *apeon* (B4, 1).

<sup>162</sup> GA35, 179

Being can claim itself as continuous and infinitely cohesive—without pores. In 1932 Heidegger says: “The present *embraces (umfaßt)* the absent.”<sup>163</sup> However, Parmenides will not raise and Heidegger won’t answer the question of the origin of such *apousia*.

Tallis in the tradition of consciousness running from Descartes discovers this origin in an intrinsic power of thought to think what-is-not, a power he baptizes propositional awareness.<sup>164</sup> And yet even a thinker in the fetters of consciousness and its faculties is afforded a glimpse of truth: “thought would not be possible unless what-is-not were thinkable.”<sup>165</sup> Our thought could never give absence in order to think it—only in the guiding double genitive of the thought *of* nothing, could the origin of the ‘*of*’ inceptive thought.

And yet this is what thought thinks of itself as soon it becomes sight: The fragment begins with the commandment of sight: *leusse d’ homōs*: but see! Sight much before Plato becomes a summary word for understanding. And yet *noein* is essentially other to sight and thus more; *noein* appears in the unground of the *more*. *Nous* has the unexpected root meaning of sniffing, smelling; the word *nose* is precisely of this origin. By Homeric times however the meanings of understanding and recognition are already connoted.<sup>166</sup> In events such as the recognition of Aphrodite hidden in the form of an old woman the distance of *noein* to *gignoskein* becomes clear; *nous* will elaborate, but is not a logistic function. At the end it rediscovers its inceptive reception; *nous* is the discerning.<sup>167</sup> This is the true guide of Parmenides, the male name of the goddess, distinct from all modulations of *cogitare*, the revealing star that guides him through the paths of *alētheia* and *doxa*. Of course truth can err, this is *planktos noos*;<sup>168</sup> this possibility is not its refutation, but its essential condition, which truth discovers as *lēthē* in its heart.

A doxastic fragment affords us a closer approach. B16 reads: “*Hōs gar hekastos echei krasin meleōn polyplanktōn,/ tōs noos anthrōpoisi paristatai; to gar auto estin hoper phroneei meleōn physis anthrōpoisin kai pasin kai panti; to gar pleon esti noēma.*” We attempt the translation: “for as each [of the tropoi of light and darkness] seizes the admixture of the much erring body constituents (*melē*), thus does significant

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<sup>163</sup> GA35, 175

<sup>164</sup> Tallis R., *The Enduring Significance of Parmenides*, p.40

<sup>165</sup> Tallis R., *The Enduring Significance of Parmenides*, p.41

<sup>166</sup> Fritz K. von, *Nous, noein and their derivatives*, in Mourelatos A. P. D. (ed.), *The Pre-socratics*, p.23

<sup>167</sup> Even though starting with Kant, *nous* is correlated to *Vernunft*, often equally misleadingly rendered *logos*, *Urteilkraft* is the true kindred concept.

<sup>168</sup> Parmenides, B6, 6

thought stand by humans, for it is the identical, that which apprehends (*phroneein*) in the constituents of the human nature (*physis*) and in the all and everything. The more (*pleon*) is significant thought (*noēma*).” The talk is here of constituents, *melē*, commonly rendered *members*. It presents us with the double intersection of thought with the corporeal *and* of apprehension with *kosmos*: the two intersections crossing each other a second time. A second, neglected tautology is thus grounded between *phrēn* and *kosmos* and subsequently the human body. This is another Heraclitean lesson. The *phronimon pyr*, fire in the jointure of *dikē* gives life *from* the ‘is *not*/is not’. Forgetting the homo-logy (which Parmenides transforms into tauto-logy), allows the illusion that the *kosmos* is not constantly on fire, not constantly ex-isting. This forgetting is a specific distortion that turns *nous* ‘*plankton*’ (literally ‘twisted’).

Certainly *nous* is not *phrēn*. It is the more (*pleon*), the ex-cess of ex-istence, its tautology a pleonology. It operates from the remainder, from what *is not* in *kosmos*. For in *kosmos* are beings and only beings *are*. If *noein* offers the essence of humanity, this essence is not human precisely in the way the essence of technology is not technological. What is human and cosmic is *phronēsis*. *Noein* is precisely ex-istence. The overflow that crosses the limit of the essence towards the apprehension of *phrēn*; thus *phronēsis* is taken into the sign of the sign: *noēma*. *Noein* gives itself in a tautology with *einai* and ex-ports the tautology into the *pleon* of ex-istence. Humanity approaches its essence as it steps out into *noēma* towards the encounter with *eon*. This rare encounter takes place precisely from out of Nothing. Its remembrance is *alētheia*. Most of the time the human dwells in *lēthē*, but not from out of it— the human predominantly sub-sists in the apprehension of *phronēsis*, which however intersects and passes over into *nous*. The body, the *kosmos* and *eon* are aligned; in accordance with the *deepest* in-tension of Parmenides *outside* presence.

Outside presence resides the remainder of difference. Heidegger aligned with this deeper in-tension can see thought dwelling (*west*) and presencing (*an-west*) for the sake of the unthought that remains in the two-foldness of the *eon*.<sup>169</sup> He is however as quick as Parmenides to re-turn thought to presence, to forget its ex-istence from the *more*. Accordingly only in presence will thought be found belonging to Being.<sup>170</sup> In 1952 this reassurance intends to cover the fear of the unavoidable fall of Being into presence. It suppresses the distinction gained over the two previous decades as we shall

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<sup>169</sup> GA7, 247

<sup>170</sup> GA7, 248



see in Heraclitus<sup>171</sup> between *Gegenwart* and *Anwesenheit*, subsuming the former into the latter. This is metaphysical violence. And yet according to the deep in-tension of inceptive thought we set free *Gegen-wart*: this counter-tending can only have to do with presence as little as the clearing exhausts itself in light. And thus *nous* counters and tends presence, wards in wait (*wartet*), while upkeeping, building and maintaining *eon*. This it can never do from presence itself, but is the gift of Nothing.

How does Nothing give presence? Precisely in the *more* of significant thought (*noēma*). From its pleonology speak the signs of the *eon*, which we may lastly turn to tend to.

## 7. Signs

The more of *noein* signifies *from* out of the remainder of *kosmos*, Being is spoken of *from* this absence of *kosmos*, *from* the absence of all that is. In the most sensitive and boldest of Beaufret's passionate prose: "Parmenides thus meditates on the scarcity of Being which no presence ever exhausts and whose fullness always includes absence."<sup>172</sup> This is precisely the meaning of the Heideggerian trace, the remaining residue from the exhaustive in-tension of Being. The trace is the un-vanished yet hidden. As such what denies the filiation of both presence and absence. This is the inceptive meaning of all that is significant, of Zeus *phainōn* and the Delphic Apollo<sup>173</sup> who signifies and traces (*sēmainei*); this is the true meaning of the sign (*Zeichen, Wink, Be-deutung*). At the inception a strict *semantic* clarity is at work: all that-is shows forth; yet in this showing *eon* itself is indicated by absence. The trace of this indication is the sign. We hearken the truth of Nothing so that we give Being truth—Derrida is one of the few to undertake the task: "As rigorously as possible we must permit to appear/disappear the trace of what exceeds the truth of being."<sup>174</sup>

Being in truth has no properties, it hardly 'has', yet it affords us with signs. Heidegger in a traditionally scholarly manner divides them into negating and affirming. Yet both categories quickly appear to share a double function positively guiding thought

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<sup>171</sup> See p.104

<sup>172</sup> Beaufret J., *Heraclitus and Parmenides*, in Emad P., Maly K. (eds.), *Heidegger on Heraclitus*, p.84

<sup>173</sup> Heraclitus, B93

<sup>174</sup> Derrida J., *Margins of Philosophy*, p.22

along the way of Being and negatively preventing its loss in the forest paths of absence, while fending-off Nothing like scarecrows. The quick realization of the metaphor is misleading: Nothing already gives, is *not/is* not already there. It is already there as jointure. The jointure of the symbol deepens the furrow of inceptive semanticity. The symbol grows from the *symbolē*, throwing one thing together with another, holding something together with something else, i.e. keeping them alongside one another, joining them to and with one another. *Symbolon* is the joint, seam, or hinge, in which one thing is not simply brought together with another but the two are held to one another, so that they fit one another. "Whatever is held together, fits together so that the two parts prove to belong together, is *symbolon*."<sup>175</sup> As such the positive and the negative functions are joined. The sign from the Nothing not only shows the way, but en-joins the waying, opens and keeps the way open, *un-* and *re-*folding its folds.

Out of this understanding we turn to the distinction of the affirming and negating categories, the signs protecting *eon* from the forces of absence and those constructing its presence on the basis of this exclusion to re-discover the deeper intensity of Parmenidean thought, at its most explicit and decisive attempt to 'ban' Nothing. Neither prescriptive nor syllogistic reason is here at work, but the very voice of Being is invoked to dis-solve in one breath<sup>176</sup> the significant silence of Nothing.

### A. Of protection

The en-joinings of *a-genēton*, *an-ōlethron*, *a-teleston*, *a-tremes*, together with the two-fold expression *oud' ēn/ oud' estai* offer presence under the direct impression of an exclusion. Heidegger translates *sēmata* as *Hinsichten*: regards, aspects. He regards these *a-spects* as empty sights, evocations of an empty spectacle. The Parmenidean intension of presence would haste to attribute this spectral evocation to *doxa*, but is in truth the voice of Being itself. In the *a-*, Being de-limits this void, while its voice commands our sight away from it. The pre-eminence of Being has no place for what

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<sup>175</sup> GA29/30, 445

<sup>176</sup> All *sēmata* (except for the *atremes ētor* of Being, referring equally to Being's non-semantic sphericality) are condensed in four verses: B8, 3-6

requires none, for the void. Having no place for it, Being presents itself as a lack, an absence that against Heidegger attests its saturation of presence.<sup>177</sup>

### **i. a-genēton, an-ōlethron**

Gadamer notes correctly that “*ōs agenēton eon kai anōlethron estin*” does not mean that *eon* is unvanishing *because* unborn, but rather unborn *as much as* unvanishing.<sup>178</sup> E-mergence and e-vasion are of the same order—the Anaximandrian lesson. But the tautology of the whence and whither of Anaximander in fidelity to both the *tauton* and *logos* becomes a tautology of presence. Parmenides does not eradicate the whence and whither, but defers it to the temporality of the *nyn*, of presence. This *nyn* is not stillness, but an incessant presencing. If the Parmenidean Being of beings was sluggishness of change and the beingness of this Being stasis, Tallis would be right to declare its sight unattainable;<sup>179</sup> but the *eon* is not the frozen Becoming or possibility of possibilities, least so in pure abstraction. What-becomes in Parmenides is the present as presence, a *contra-diction* against Nothing and only thus, secondarily, against Becoming. This is the task of thought, this is tautology at the limit of inception: infinite activity, a constant realignment of the *vistas* of the origin with presence, indefatigable *re-vision*. Being claims the origin for itself.

The present incessantly becomes and this Becoming is *a-genēton* and *an-ōlethron* in tautology. Only this pure activity can fend off the only alternative: e-merging from, e-vading into Nothing. Only the infinite Becoming of presence can claim to never require absence: a nocturnal illusion of insomniac presence. In truth, *apeiron*, Anaximander teaches, is an indication, the sign of Nothing that oversteps in order to offer the limit of its emergence, the infinitude of the incessant becomes from the origin. At the end of the inceptive force of the origin Parmenides claims the Anaximandrian *apeiron* for Being.

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<sup>177</sup> GA35, 145

<sup>178</sup> Gadamer H. G., *GW6*, 42

<sup>179</sup> Tallis R., *The Enduring Significance of Parmenides*, p.84-6

## ii. oud' ēn/ oud' estai

This two-fold inverts the two-fold of *a-genēton/a-nōlethron*. The first said: neither was-it-not, nor will-it-not-be. Now we learn: neither was, nor will it be. As every inversion, it speaks from the same, condensing temporality in the *nyn*.

Heidegger finds the structure of this condensation exemplified in the Aristotelian *to ti ēn einai* – what was to be; Aristotle summarizes the triumph of presence that the Parmenidean end of the inception enabled in the *nyn*. In this formulation Being is what was there.<sup>180</sup> Being, as beingness of beings, is what every being insofar as it is a being already was.<sup>181</sup> In the *meta-* of metaphysics condenses precisely the temporality of the *nyn*, as Being moves from what it always was to what is to become. In it the *physei onta*, emerging into presence are carried over into the *Being* of what-emerges, that signifies in them what is to become.

The intersection of beings—what always already is—and of their beingness—what they are to become—constitutes the temporal twofoldness of *eon* unified in the *nyn*. Being is the temporality of the *now* that holds together the temporalities of the *no-more/not-yet*.

## iii. a-teleston

A seeming contradiction surfaces in the text: in B8,4 Being appears in the sign of *ateleston*, while in B8, 32, a recasting of the sign reads: *ouk ateleutēton*. Neither *ateleston* nor *ateleutēton* mean merely unfinished; rather, both indices converge—*ateleston*: without finitude, that is, denying man the possibility of performing the end of Being, finishing and exhausting its path. What *ouk ateleutēton* contributes *outside* the semantic collection is to deny man the possibility of escaping this inexhaustible path. *Ouk ateleutēton* thus means that Being cannot be without the attempt of a *teleutē*, without the attempt of a traverse, offering itself as destination and destiny of man. Being appears under both signs outside the use/need of completion and finitude,

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<sup>180</sup> GA55, 56

<sup>181</sup> GA55, 73. De Beistegui is right to note with Aubenque that by the time of Aristotle, this *quidditas* appears in retrospect, upon completion, in the no-longer-becoming. De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.46. This trope of thought is granted in the Parmenidean groundwork of the *nyn* and yet it is only a trope of it; a trope of presence.

inasmuch as it desires to provide those to itself; providing their *chreōn* as *auto-dikē* and indeed in the fore-encompassing of the *nyn*.

Man is certainly insufficient to complete this journey and provide the limit of Being, yet a limit (*peiras*) is necessary (*chreōn*) to Being<sup>182</sup> and man needs to follow this limit, man's destiny bound to the self-limitation of Being. This limit accordingly constitutes the in-tension of the sphere of Being to be examined once the series of signs have rendered their significance. For this Being, the limit is the *chreōn* itself, that Being claims for itself. For certainly the limit (*peiras*) does not refer to a spatiality, but to the replacement of the guardianship of Nothing *over* presence by the guarding of Being *against* absence.

#### iv. a-tremes

This guarding is the arrest of which B1, 29 speaks: *atremes ētor*—the heart of Being does not tremble. But does it beat? Unless it beats can it be anything but the heart of a carcass? And if it beats how does it not tremble? The untrembling heart: a contradiction more severe than any Heraclitean diction. *Essentially*, the trembling does not refer to the life of Being itself but to its power. Heidegger embraces its terminal stability, as the steadfastness on the way of truth; as a “hard clarity.”<sup>183</sup> This is the playing of the in-tension of thought against itself. Being against Nothing exchanges life for power; an arrest of the heart to found the un-forming substance of essence.

In this in-tensity Being tries to bring the remainder from out of which it speaks into its power, so that all the hither and thither (trembling) of *kosmos* has no bearing upon it. The remainder that is *not/is* not comes into the untrembling power of Being so that Being can become incessantly in the *now* from itself. But a lifeless heart of pure power can give no birth, a heart as this is barren.<sup>184</sup>

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<sup>182</sup> Parmenides, B8, 26-31

<sup>183</sup> GA35, 143

<sup>184</sup> Chagall's simple words express a deep creative necessity: to paint *from the heart*. This necessity precisely finds no place in a *chōra* that doesn't tremble.

## B. Of conduction

Here the en-joinings of *oulon*, *syneches*, *hen*, *mounogenēs*, and *nyn homou pan* affirm the in-tension of power in Being, indicating the turning of the residue into the purity of presence.

### i. oulon

Whole: Being misses no parts, but equally consists in no parts.<sup>185</sup> The immediate thought that the latter forms the ground of the earlier, is soon overturned: it is because Being incessantly attempts the elimination of all use/need in the now of presence, eliminating thus every lack and all ‘missing’, that Being has no parts. Its wholeness is constituted by the absence excluded in its power.

For Gadamer this sign prefigures the Aristotelian *ou mēden esti exō*.<sup>186</sup> The beginning of the thought of presence at the end of the inception validates Gadamer’s observation: “The Eleatic teaching on Being had, insofar as it thought Being as the unshakable presence of the totality of Being, to take the form of a totality-unity teaching.”<sup>187</sup> This totality is *oulon*.

And yet Being is only whole by missing the ‘missing’, in the absence of absence, through the e-vasion of its origin: as every totality Being is founded in the exclusion of originary difference.

### ii. syneches

Being is not the continuum, but what holds (*echein*) together (*syn*)—for Heidegger a gathering.<sup>188</sup> This is the en-joining lesson of Heraclitean *logos* and Anaximandrian *dikē*, but at the end of inception Being appropriates this intensity into its sphere of power, through the subjugation of *noein*, invoked to absorb the forces of *logos/dikē*.<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>185</sup> GA35, 145

<sup>186</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, III6, 207a. An expression often interchanged with *ou mēden apesti*. See Gadamer H. G., *GW6*, 20

<sup>187</sup> Gadamer H. G., *GW6*, 19

<sup>188</sup> GA35, 148

<sup>189</sup> GA35, 169

Now we see that in this sphere of power there is no room for trembling. Having attained totality (*oulon*) and col-lection<sup>190</sup> (*syneches*) Being can claim for itself the exclusion of absence.<sup>191</sup> Being holding itself together disallows all between, all intervention, since the least seam equals a fatal chasm, a source for Nothing. The power of Being tolerates no intervention. And yet Being needs a constant intervention in the *now* to preserve itself in ipseity. Heidegger prefers to see in this holding together in the simplicity of the present, the fulfilment and mastery over the intersection of the vectors of proximity and distance.<sup>192</sup> In truth, all play of depth is lost. For the in-tension of Being in the temporality of the *now* corresponds to the singular dimension of the point. The point is last of all spatial and still not an event in the sense of Badiou. We shall return to it when Being appears as ‘sphere’.

In Parmenides Being is the gathering inasmuch as it is the point; Being gathers in pointing. To think the impossibility of its division (*oude diaireton*),<sup>193</sup> the later Platonic *idea ameristos*,<sup>194</sup> under the sign of the infinitely great is misleading. If all division requires the other that divides and if Being has excluded all such other (Nothing), it is not because “everything is full of Being”, as Thanassas translates B8, 22, but rather because Being has condensed its sphere of power into the point of presence. As such Being usurps the sign by becoming the point that points presence.

### iii. hen

One. Laden with signs the affirmation of Being’s oneness is crucial to establish in clarity its singularity and precedence. Being is what is not two or three and yet also the first.<sup>195</sup> This is Being as *one archē*—and for the thought of presence *archē* can only be one: As *archē* we *speak* of Being in the singular manifold: principality-ipseity-simplicity-uniqueness-completeness, what Heidegger formulates as: “the simple-sole-identical unifying unity.”<sup>196</sup> The first and only (literally) one, with all the simplicity of what doesn’t even know in itself the other, creating for itself and the whole world (for insofar as Being is concerned, it is itself the world) an ineluctable identity. The unifying

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<sup>190</sup> Con-nection as correspondent to *dikē* and *logos* is but *col-lection*.

<sup>191</sup> GA35, 167

<sup>192</sup> GA35, 168

<sup>193</sup> Parmenides, B8, 22

<sup>194</sup> Plato, *Theaetetus*, 205c

<sup>195</sup> GA35, 147

<sup>196</sup> GA35, 259

attraction of its unity makes both the world and thought one and both in itself identical—*one eon*.

Aeons of Platonism have thought of this *one* as the essential Parmenidean doctrine. Plato in Socrates' voice was the first to attribute in the homonymous dialogue the teaching *hen to pan* to Parmenides.<sup>197</sup> Being henceforth will be the one, the oneness of which Neo-Platonism<sup>198</sup> and Christianity will exploit. For Hegel this event signifies that "Being, the One, of the Eleatic school is only this abstraction, this sinking into the abyss of the identity of understanding."<sup>199</sup> In this abyss there is not Nothing but only presence. "For from the one, Being is removed from the determination of the negative, of plurality."<sup>200</sup> Being is the one that excludes all Other. This one is the nothing of motion and the nothing of the many. It is the power of the absolute-non-being of another, the empty.<sup>201</sup> It is not Nothing that is first empty, but Being. Only in the unifying identity of Being's emptiness would Hegel discover the emptiness of Nothing. And yet the emptiness of the one is the emptiness of its point. In its singular pointing of presence Being is the one point that fails to point. Its pointing is emptiness.

#### iv. *mounogenes*

The word appearing in B8, 4 that we provisionally understand as 'of singular birth/of single progeny', has a distinct history of reception and revision. Diels in 1897 still left the word open, but the later Diels-Kranz editions substitute it with Plutarch's suggestion *oulomeles*—a completion of members in Being—which most later editions of the poem follow. According to this reading a scribal corruption in the transmission of the text took place very early. Yet what does Plutarch's revision offer and why was *mounogenes* dismissed?

It is difficult to extract from *oulomeles* much more than *oulon* already offers. At the same time the dense precision of the four sign-collecting verses (B8, 3-6) hardly allows room for repetition. Plutarch's suggestion grounded on this repetition is thus as valid as it is superfluous. The reason on the other hand that Diels rejected *mounogenes*,

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<sup>197</sup> 128a-b; a summary account also found in the *Sophist* 242d, 244b and *Theaetetus* 180e

<sup>198</sup> Thanassas P., *Parmenides, cosmos, and being*, pp.14-6

<sup>199</sup> Hegel, G. W. F., *W18*, 299

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*, 300

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*, 301



was its seeming contradiction with the *a-genēton* of the previous verse. For how can what is un-born (*a-geneton*), be of singular birth, an only-child (*mounogenes*)?

Curd and Tallis, among the few commentators to endorse the sign do so for the wrong reasons. They think of *eon* as “internally ‘monogenous’.”<sup>202</sup> The meaning of the interiority of the point-Being is unclear. What however they clearly aim at is the discovery of a continuity between *eon* and the Ionian *archai*. Such violent integration presupposes however both i. a confidence in the existence and meaning of these *archai*—duly thought as elements—as well as ii. the abridgement of the infinite chasm between the purported elemental order and the order of the *eon*. But even if we strived to think the plurality of such *archai* cosmologically, we should not do this in the elementality of *hypokeimena*, but with Riezler and Gadamer in the actuality of forces (*Mächte*);<sup>203</sup> in *kosmos* as much as in thought, an *archē* signifies an in-tension. For regardless whether Hegel is right in saying with Aristotle: “Parmenides seems to conceive of the one according to the concept (*tou kata ton logon enos*), Melissus according to matter (*tou kata tēn hylēn*); this is why the first says that it is limited, the latter unlimited”<sup>204</sup>—in *kosmos* as in thought, in matter as in *logos*—the tropes of the one refers to an essential in-tension.

Heidegger returns to the *mounogenes*. Against Diels he maintains that the contradiction resolves into an inversion. The negating *a-geneton* is grasped in positive affirmation in *mounogenes*.<sup>205</sup> The wresting of the origin from Nothing (*a-geneton*) is precisely its self-appropriation (the tauto-logy of *mounogenes*) by Being. The singular birth of Being means precisely this: *unlike all else born* Being is born, not *from* itself but *in* itself, it has consumed the origin, as such it is un-born.

Unlike *oulomeles*, *mounogenes* does not repeat another sign. It shows in language what Being undertakes in thought: the in-version and absorption of all negation into presence. As such *mounogenes* becomes what-brings-forth-and-together-as-presence, the con-nection *from* presence.

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<sup>202</sup> Tallis R., *The Enduring Significance of Parmenides*, p.21

<sup>203</sup> Gadamer H. G., *GW6*, 53

<sup>204</sup> Hegel, G. W. F., *W18*, 276

<sup>205</sup> *GA35*, 146

## v. nyn homou pan

Ultimately we come to witness the most radical of signs. We translate with Heidegger: “Foremost, the *pan* is given with the *nyn*.”<sup>206</sup> This *now* is neither the *nunc stans* nor *fluens*. Heidegger renders this *nyn* into *Gegenwart*<sup>207</sup> and yet we know that what we hear for example in the French *maintenant*, the maintaining, is never of the order of presence. The counter-tending countenancing that Heraclitus is the first to think, Parmenides appropriates into Being. This Being equi(*homou*)-permeates the whole in the now, affirming its point of presence. In this now takes place the ultimate summary of Being into presence.

## C. The sphere of Being

We finally turn to the much-commented well-rounded sphere of Being (*eukyklou sphairēs*).<sup>208</sup> Although not strictly a sign, this sphericity remains irreducible to a predicate and offers the Parmenidean collection of the signifying signs of the *eon*.

The perplexity at the enigma of this sphere is justified. For Jaeger it presents the “last vestige of world-form which [Parmenides] has not succeeded in removing.”<sup>209</sup> Thanassas traces the ontologically external appearance of the sphere in culture: “The Greek ideal of perfection, the preference for measured completeness rather than infinite progress, is here given its ontological foundation in an utter self-sufficiency of Being that does not let even the smallest “need” arise.”<sup>210</sup> If *eon* speaks out of the remainder this is not the present residue of a natural or cultural world, but the residue from the complete absencing of *kosmos*. As such the sphere is not the trace of an incomplete removal, but the con-summating collection of the active involvement of thought in the project of presence. Neither is it the trace of the reflection of all lack of need, but the most profound use/need of measure. Being essentially needs to become the sphere to satisfy the hunger of presence. It expresses nothing but the trace of this use/need.

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<sup>206</sup> GA35, 146

<sup>207</sup> GA35, 146

<sup>208</sup> Parmenides, B8, 43

<sup>209</sup> Jaeger W., *The theology of the early Greek philosophers*, p.107

<sup>210</sup> Thanassas P., *Parmenides, cosmos, and being*, p.53

What is this sphere? It is the *eon*; the holding together of Being and beings. Like a circle its definition is given sufficiently only by *tracing*, tracing its circumference. It consists in the equidistance of each of its liminal points. For Thanassas such equidistance refers to the equality of every being that each liminal point represents precisely *as* being.<sup>211</sup> Gadamer thematizes further this limit: “The last limit, of which the didactic poem speaks, does not imply a boundary against something, but rather to the contrary, it means, that there is nothing, against which the being of the world could border. The form of the sphere is the figure of what-is, which does not border against something, but is limited in itself.”<sup>212</sup> The sphere does not represent an arranged extension but a self-necessitating in-tension. All of inceptive thought is in-tensive.

Such self-necessitation replies to the use/need of limit by itself providing it for itself—as presence. But the limit is precisely the manifold of beings. The limit constitutes beings as beings, precisely for the first time in their liminal equality.<sup>213</sup> The *eon* attempts to open itself in the two-foldness of Being (centre)<sup>214</sup> and beings (circumference) in a cohesion that transcends both. Yet in every sphere a silent element is at work. The void in between. Only this constitutional opening of the void can guarantee both: that the sphere is i. not a solid thoroughly saturated by presence

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<sup>211</sup> Ibid., p.54

<sup>212</sup> Gadamer H. G., *GW6*, 37

<sup>213</sup> We thus have to hear all ontological tradition *from* Parmenides. In Heidegger’s and Malabou’s words: “However one being might surpass another [...] every being has in every being, insofar as it is a being, its equal.” Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, p.171

<sup>214</sup> Vernant opens up the rich problematic of spatiality and its prominent ‘middle’ (*meson*) in Greek thought. The creation of a new spatiality where the middle is no longer occupied by the Mycenaean palace, but by the *agora* with its *bouleutērion* hall where the *ekklēsia* (the people’s assembly) gathers, is a constitutive moment in the passage to classical Greece. The case of the *Mesa* site in Lesbos identified by Louis Robert as the sanctuary described in a seventh-century poem of Alceos, may very well be the first allusion to the significance of the middle, already coupled with that of the *common*. We shall in the following try to think this *xynon* with Heraclitus. Yet, the transformation of *meson*, with its possible first instances in the medial setting and apportioning of the loot in *epos*, a loot that is precisely *xynēia keimena*, what lies in common, in the middle of the circular assembly of warriors and its subsequent manifestations in Thales’ proposal and creation of a *bouleutērion* in the centre/middle (*meson*) of Ionia, in Teos (or his alleged rejoicing in Pherecydes’ decision to make his work, the first work to be published in prose, available, common (*en koinō*) to all—another indissoluble tie between the middle and the common—see Vernant J.-P., *Myth and Thought*, p.204-5) or again Demonax’s divesting of the religious power from the monarch and its placing in the middle (*meson*) for the people in accordance to the Delphic oracle, this paramount transformation finds in the Parmenidean sphere its most rigorous formulation. Parmenides does not merely fail to erase the last ‘world-form’, but thinks from the same centre (and yet is this the same point, the empty pointing?) that gives birth to a whole culture, a whole world. When Plato, whose time is already different, a time demanding the simplicity of *isonomia* replaced by political *analogy*, when Plato the thinker of his time, founds his city in the *Laws* around the Acropolis erected in its middle (*en mesō*) and makes his legislator seek the territorial and political equivalence and symmetry of all the parts arranged around this middle, he still speaks from the identical (*tauto*) world-forming centre. See Vernant J.-P., *Space and Political Organization in ancient Greece*, in *Myth and Thought among the Greeks*, pp.235-259 and Detienne M., *The Process of Secularization in The masters of truth in archaic Greece*, pp.89-106

shattering the equality of in the most un-Hellenic manner by producing a graded theological spectrum of reality and ii. that the sphere does not collapse into a point. I. presents us with an infinite problematic as Neo-Platonism and Scholasticism exemplify. Our firm belief is that the use/need of absence is still essential to distinguish the central *realissimum* from the next point—otherwise again as in ii. the sphere collapses into the point. The thought of Parmenides attempts to think both. It offers the first ground for an onto-theological thought, which it still cannot itself think. Essentially, the Parmenidean sphere reverts to a point. The opening of the *eon* remains impossible *from* presence. The impossible attempt to present presence from itself leaves the singular trace of a point—a point no more able for the in-ceptive pointing.

### 8. Tautou synopsis<sup>215</sup>

This completes the cycle of retribution of Being against Nothing, a cycle we are just beginning to counter-trace towards the beginning of the pre-ontological struggle, the inception of Nothing. Parmenides draws the last section of a trajectory, whereby presence under the pretext of ontological justice attempts to usurp the origin for itself. Yet Parmenides remains in-ceived by the origin. The struggle to think the Nothing of origin in Being forms the most in-tense collection of dialectics: *tautology*. In-tension trans-forms for Parmenides into *tauton*.

In-ceived, Parmenides allows the nameless, a divinity, to speak of the way, to become his destined destination and his guide. He is to follow the nameless goddess to the end of inexhaustible ways, praise the splendor of their wondrous truth and forewarn of the perils they hold in store. The way of *alētheia* as the way of Being, the way of *doxa*, as the way of *kosmos* and a third way, the un-waying way of absence, of all that is-not (for no-thing is not) form a triptych, held together by a secret origin exceeding Parmenidean thought.

This thought undertakes to think the tautological in-tension of the absence of falsity and the presence of falling into falsity, that is, falling into the falling. Indeed, “if it is true that ‘all tension is experienced in a fall,’ then it must be added that ‘all fall is

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<sup>215</sup> Not merely a *synopsis*, an overview, the last section of each chapter devoted to a figure of the inception, attempts the impossible cartography, the *summa* of the aforesaid, in the Heraclitean sense of *synopsis*, a touching-together that lights up a region of thought. The sense of *synopsis* clarifies in the following.

experienced in a tension',"<sup>216</sup> and this tension forms the field of the opening, to which *Da-sein* cor-responds in its proper fall. So that unless we are prepared for the fall of falsity, no truth is reserved for us. The fall and truth, a double reflection.

We are already falling, as we are already too late. And yet we may fall deeper, or be brought to a fall, under a *veritas* that has forgotten its falling. Thought, in forgetting the fall, in subsuming its intensity, manages to utter the triptych of propositions that guard the triptych of ways. Thought de-saturates the absence from presence (*Wesenssatz*), condensing it (and this *densation* comprises the unique Parmenidean *Dichtung*) in the ever-new now (*Zeitsatz*) so that *noein-einai* may be (*Ursatz*), that is, *become* presence in the present of the *tauton*. In the presence of the *tauton* of *noein-einai* Being discovers its possibility against the fall in the exclusive presupposition of a foundation (that is precisely *noein* itself), in the falsity that the foundation and the fall are two separate, untouched tropes, two ways against which an inadmissible third looms.

To fall. First, to forget the *apertum* of *alētheia*, the opening, for the sake of presence, thereby forgetting the *alētheia* of *doxa*, the *apertum* of *kosmos*. This is the falling trope of Parmenides, a falling he senses and turns against, even if in his truest intention he wants to salvage the *kosmos* of opposition, the world of night and day. For his prime attempt is to safeguard against the second falling, the falling that forgets Being, by falling into mere appearances, stumbling on everything, touching on nothing. Yet only by touching on Nothing may Being be saved, only then does *eon* open as difference. What Parmenides fails to think is that the danger of the second fall is the way of Nothing to guard against the first fall. *In the ex-cess of Becoming, in letting Being be forgotten, Nothing saves absence from being consumed by Being and lets Being take place in the alētheia of its tropes, it lets Being ex-ist.* As we shall come to understand better with Heraclitus, to ex-ist is to ex-ceed and Being requires its proper ex-cess. This in turn Nothing grants too, by in-ceiving a thinker like Parmenides. Thus *Parmenides vouchsafes the essential ex-cess of Being.*

This ex-cess is formulated in the ban of Nothing, by turning its actuality against itself, so that the predication of ex-istence as presence becomes possible. *Tauton* claims this actuality for itself, a pure activity it can only contain in the presence of the *nyn*. Thus *tauton* transforms its becoming and thus it *is*, as the point that points itself, points

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<sup>216</sup> Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, p.238

the absence at its trembling/untrembling heart. Like every point however it has to discover absence at its heart, its sphere has to collapse—for what is a point, but precisely what is *not/is* not?

The force of this vanishing point, points to the inceptive thinker par excellence, the thinker who fulfils the inception and allows for the Parmenidean ex-cess. We turn thus to Heraclitean *logos*.

## IV. Heraclitus

### Introduction

Modernity famously and ambiguously attempted a summary of Heraclitus in the sign of a Hegelian exclamation, a shout in behold of the first philosophical shore: “here we see land; there is no proposition of Heraclitus, which I haven’t taken up in my logic.”<sup>1</sup> Not against Hegel’s intention this simultaneously commenting and self-commenting quasi-identification opened a spectrum of possible understandings, while desiring and accomplishing the resolution of none. So that two centuries later Derrida could repeat: “Yes, there is much of the ancient in what I have said. Perhaps everything. It is to Heraclitus that I refer myself in the last analysis.”<sup>2</sup> Hegel and Derrida attest a mere identification with Heraclitus as little as the intervening, tacit, figure of Nietzsche. With Heidegger, we know that the equation of any of these *corpi* of thought with Heraclitus is a mere evasion of the task of thought.<sup>3</sup> Rather, Hegel, Nietzsche and Derrida thoroughly understand themselves as Heraclitean interlocutors, in a dialogue defining the dia-logging itself of modernity. The layers of *différance* between all possible correspondences (Heraclitus and Hegel, Heraclitus and Derrida, finally Hegel and Derrida, regarding the two declarations of kinship—each new interlocutor exponentially intensifying the density of correspondences) manifest exemplary thus the essential in-tension of the Heideggerian *tauton* (*Selbe*).

Unless one enters into the dialogue of this identifying difference, one is bound, like Gadamer, to ask in vain for the missing fundamental orientation to gain access to a figure allegedly oscillating between moralism and metaphysics.<sup>4</sup> Heraclitus is as far from both, as little he is trapped in the motion of their artificial between. Comparatively, Jaeger, while simplifying the Heraclitean in-tension, remains more faithful in commenting, with regard to fragment B1: “He has no desire to be another Prometheus, teaching men new and more ingenious methods of reaching their ultimate goals; he hopes rather to make them capable of leading their lives fully awake and aware of the

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<sup>1</sup> Hegel G. W. F., *W18*, 320

<sup>2</sup> Derrida J., *The Original Discussion of Différance*, in O’Connell E., *Heraclitus & Derrida*, p.1

<sup>3</sup> *GA* 6.2, 456. See also Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, pp.81-2

<sup>4</sup> *GW7*, 43

*logos* according to which all things occur.”<sup>5</sup> Accordingly, Jaeger says: “[Heraclitus] thinks of the philosopher neither as the man who sets forth the nature of the physical world, nor as the discoverer of a new reality behind sense-appearance, but as the solver of riddles, the man who interprets the hidden meaning of all that happens in our lives and in the world as a whole.”<sup>6</sup> This interpretation however won’t settle in the confines of an arid formula, but always comes inscribed in the homology of a further riddle under the sign of the Delphic king.

This is why antiquity, in contrast to the series of differing identifications of modernity, offers a singular, austere adjective on Heraclitus: *the obscure*. It was Timon of Phlius a satirist of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century B.C. who, bluntly contradicting the surface meaning of Jaeger’s judgment, named Heraclitus *ainiktēs*, a riddler,<sup>7</sup> an epithet to transform later into *skoteinos*, *obscurus* in Cicero’s Latin. Hegel, following Aristotle, would locate Heraclitus’ obscurity in a purported neglect towards word-construction and a rudimentary language.<sup>8</sup> For Heidegger, the futility of such an approach of thought in language makes itself most palpable to us precisely in translation: “precisely the completed translation of Heraclitus’ words must necessarily remain as obscure as the original word.”<sup>9</sup> It is because thought is constantly translating the *kosmos* that the thought of Heraclitus needs remain obscure; for thought is precisely this homology to *kosmos*, which shows itself in self-concealing, and as such appears as essentially ‘obscure’.<sup>10</sup> This certainly refers us back to the withdrawal of Being in favour of the emergence of beings. It is Being thought as this self-concealing, that grounds the inceptive word, so that “the word of inceptive thought herds ‘the obscure’.”<sup>11</sup> When thus Kenneth Maly, after Heidegger, writes: “Heraclitus is ‘the obscure’ because the issue in his thinking (disclosure) is essentially—for him and for us—a question,”<sup>12</sup> this refers to a never closing circuit of language and world, as a sub-versive short-circuiting keeps it in the open of the question, the open of the luminous clearing: “Heraclitus is

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<sup>5</sup> Jaeger W., *The theology of the early Greek philosophers*, pp.113-14

<sup>6</sup> Jaeger W., *The theology of the early Greek philosophers*, p.121

<sup>7</sup> This valuation needs however be seen through Timon’s general polemic against all except his teacher Pyrrho.

<sup>8</sup> *GA55*, 21

<sup>9</sup> *GA55*, 45

<sup>10</sup> *GA55*, 31

<sup>11</sup> *GA55*, 32

<sup>12</sup> Maly K., *Man and Disclosure*, in Maly K., Sallis J. (eds.), *Heraclitean Fragments*, p.45



called 'the obscure'. But he is the luminous. For he says the lighting (*das Lichtende*), insofar as he attempts, to invoke its shining into language."<sup>13</sup>

Diogenes Laertius takes a seemingly different path. Instead of attempting to fix Heraclitus in a *who* or *what*, he refers the *who* or *what* to us. He alludes thus twice<sup>14</sup> to the need of a Delian diver to bring the treasure of Heraclitus' thought to light; a remark less external than its initial ring. We learn from Heraclitus the abysmal sense of *psychē*,<sup>15</sup> so that the Heraclitean enterprise itself appears in turn as a diving into the abyss. Heraclitus calibrates thus an aligning homology between *kosmos*, *psychē*, himself and us. It follows naturally, that if anyone is to follow a diver, one needs also become one. But there is certainly more to it. Certainly: why Delian? One hastily presumes the divers of Delos to have been exceptional. And valid as this presumption may be, the significance of the tiny island of Delos is much richer, exceeding the possibility of an exhaustive summary. We only dare a few indications. Delos was the holiest of islands hundreds of years before the rise of archaic and classical Greece, its name itself a sign. *Dēlō* means showing, manifesting, so that in B93 the alluded Apollo who is said to *sēmainei*, to indicate, to offer signs, could equally be said to *dēlei*, to show. Indeed Apollo, like his sister Artemis, the goddess of Ephesus and Heraclitus, was born on its very soil. Their mother, Leto, chose the island for its bareness, an austerity consonant with the clarity of the most sacred and hidden. As though in confirmation, Heraclitus must have been still alive when Athens chose the island to base the Delian League in 477 BC, an alliance of *poleis*, for which Delos would function as the sym-bolic *logos* and jointure, while Athens as the constant force of severance from this jointure, towards imperial hegemony.

Hegel after Diogenes reports that Heraclitus set down his work (speculatively called *The Muses* or *On Nature*) at the temple of Artemis.<sup>16</sup> This confiding is again more than a trifling sign of piety as Artemis, the Delian goddess of Ephesus, has a significance for Heraclitean thought equal to the Parmenidean nameless goddess. This is

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<sup>13</sup> GA7, 265

<sup>14</sup> DK 2.22 and 9.12 See Bordoy F. C., *Why understanding Heraclitus requires being a Delian diver?*, at <http://www.presocratic.org/pdf/casadesus.pdf>

<sup>15</sup> Heraclitus, B45

<sup>16</sup> Hegel G. W. F., *W18*, 322

why Heidegger impels to an uncommon start of the reading of Heraclitus at the beginning of the cannon, at A1.<sup>17</sup>

Here we find Heraclitus at the temple of Artemis playing with children *astragalous*, ‘knuckles’, animal knucklebones used as ‘dice’<sup>18</sup> Jointure is here enjoined to chance, the most fascinating, the most divine significance of the game, enjoining it in turn to the play of a child. In this picture Artemis is rather the goddess of Heraclitus, not merely the goddess of Ephesus and the Ephesians, who when they come to him are turned away for they vulgarity in favour of this play. For Heidegger, Artemis is the goddess of Heraclitus because she is the goddess of what he attempts to think.<sup>19</sup> So who is Artemis?

We know her already as the sister of Apollo and know her birthplace, Delos. Her blood-tie to Apollo is not fortuitous. She bears the same symbols as he: the lyre and the bow; the lyre symbolizing the string play and its harmony,<sup>20</sup> the bow a symbol of hunt. Artemis is the goddess of *physis* and her play-mates the nymphs, play the game of *physis*.<sup>21</sup> In her the harmony of the lyre and the harmonics of *physis*, in which hunting is irreducible are enjoined. “Her symbol is the lyre, which appears in the form of the bow and which thus to Greek thought means it is the same as the bow.”<sup>22</sup> Nietzsche, is as right in tracing the identity of the two symbols in their stringed structure maintaining harmonic tension,<sup>23</sup> as is Heidegger, in tracing both back to the essential character of the goddess. Artemis is nonetheless related to a third symbol; she is at times depicted carrying a torch and is accordingly named *phōsphoros*,<sup>24</sup> the lightbringer. And yet she

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<sup>17</sup> GA15, 220

<sup>18</sup> The exact nature of the game of *astragaloi* is certainly disputable. There is general agreement however over two forms. The first, in all its numerous variations, involves throwing and catching the knuckles, essentially a game of motor-skill. The second, held to be a precursor of dice, relied on the exact landing position of the knuckles bestowed with different qualities. Even if the origin of the two forms is ultimately common, we consider unlikely that Heraclitus would compete with children in a game of skill. Moreover, the most significant ancient mentions of the game refer predominately to chance as for example the narration of Pausanias where Palamedes, the alleged inventor of the game, dedicates it to a temple of Fortune.

<sup>19</sup> GA55, 14

<sup>20</sup> The myth teaches us further on this crucial Heraclitean word, that Harmonia was the child of Venus (love, the mother of Eros) and Mars (*polemos*). See for example Panofasky E., *Studies in Iconology*, p.164. Myth is here at one with (Heraclitean) *logos*, as *polemos* finds its fulfilment through *eros* in harmony. Polemic harmony is thus for Heraclitus not a contradiction, but an advancement of *mythos* into *logos*, both sharing in *alētheia*.

<sup>21</sup> GA55, 16

<sup>22</sup> GA55, 17

<sup>23</sup> Heraclitus, B51

<sup>24</sup> The unavoidable allusion to *eōsphoros*, luci-fer, is not without a stellar and divine history of its own, but this history needs here remain a mere allusion; Artemis does not constitute a side of a polarity, nor has her luminating function the faintest ethical tint.

complements the symbol of light with the symbols of play and death. This is again bound to a certain understanding, as the torch, which when lit is a source of life, signifies when extinguished, death. The light-bringer can allow death by dimming her torch. As such she carries in her the strife of day and night, life and death. She is the very bringer of strife, *eris*. *Eris* precisely as essential *necessity*,<sup>25</sup> the *chreōn* (use/need) in the teaching of Anaximander, no longer the reign of mere evil at the end of the age of iron as narrated by Hesiod.<sup>26</sup>

In the divinity of Artemis the themes of light, death and musical play unite in struggling necessity. At her temple, Heraclitus plays with children a game of chance. Out of this setting speaks B52: “aeon (*aiōn*) is a child playing with pieces; the kingdom is of a child”. *Aiōn*, not the quantifiable time of science, not yet the Parmenidean time of the *now*, but the accorded and according time of *kosmos*,<sup>27</sup> is play. Thus, accorded time affords the best understanding of what the young Nietzsche in Hegel’s shadow calls Becoming— either as artistic activity or as a child’s play; for only in these two tropes can becoming be conceived without moral responsibility. And as Nietzsche deems Heraclitus inartistic, he believes him left only with play as the essence of the *dikē* of time, the enjoining force we shall encounter with Anaximander. Nietzsche sees himself standing on the other side, giving here one of the earliest formulations of the thought later to ground *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, the justification of *polemos*, *exclusively* as an *artistic*, not yet *aesthetic*, phenomenon.<sup>28</sup> What is even more important however, is the jointure of the two tropes of art and play, precisely in necessity. In tracing the play, like the work of art for the artist, in *chrēsmosynē*, need,<sup>29</sup> Nietzsche shows the significant distance he has already taken from Hegel.

For it is here that the ambiguity of the Hegelian identification that opened the chapter finds one of its most pertinent and concrete expressions; Hegel appears permeated by the thought of Heraclitus, yet channelling it towards something *other*. Discussing, in his *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, Flemish and Dutch genre painting Hegel refers in passing to the paintings of beggar boys done by Murillo, kept in Munich’s *Alte Pinakothek*. In these paintings of children Hegel recognizes a freedom

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<sup>25</sup> GA55, 26

<sup>26</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 180-201

<sup>27</sup> Heraclitus, A19.3 offers an example

<sup>28</sup> Nietzsche F., *KG, II4*, p.278

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p.280

from all external concern towards things, grounding an inner freedom that refers to the essence of painting itself. Hegel places thus the depicted beauty of these children next to that of Olympus. Rancière attempts an analysis of this interpretation. He believes it to presuppose a conception of the divine as what cares about nothing, wants and does nothing and an identification of (artistic) beauty with this indifference. An adopted ideal instigated by Winckelmann's *Apollo Belvedere*.<sup>30</sup> This is far from the case. The boys, like the Olympians, are not beautiful in inactivity, but in activity. They care, want and do and are completely engaged. And if their world appears to Hegel freed from a concern for *outer* necessity, this is because it obeys its own law of necessity, a law of use/need. Is it by *mere chance*, that in one of the most beautiful of Murillo's paintings the beggar boys are playing, *playing dice*?

### 1. En-joining polemic harmony

Heraclitus' thought is fractal. The network of its moments constantly reappears in each of them, overflowing its limits, showing the limitation of all limitations, enabling every start. With Heraclitus, the Parmenidean maxim validating every point of entry<sup>31</sup> does not hold because of the inevitability of the end-position, but because of the very infinitude of returning thought. No truthful beginning is to miss anything, no matter where it may terminate.

Although however every moment of this thought can become its ground and beginning, not any principle will apply to it. The Platonic schematism of preceding philosophy into Heraclitean (of Becoming) and Parmenidean (of Being), offered the most misleading and persistent of such principles. Nietzsche, clearly still understands Heraclitus as a thinker of Becoming, the thinker of *ta panta rhei*, alluding ultimately to the Platonic *Cratylus*. Yet, precisely as Plato thoughtfully avoids the formula *panta rhei*, writing instead *panta chōrei*,<sup>32</sup> Nietzsche understands Becoming not as chaotic change, but as the very permanence of change, a river remaining the same while its waters change.

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<sup>30</sup> Rancière J., *The emancipated spectator*, pp.119-20

<sup>31</sup> See p.114

<sup>32</sup> Plato, *Cratylus*, 402a

Here Nietzsche's thought on Heraclitus enters a tension. He takes as Heraclitus' fundamental intuition that "there is nothing, of which one may say 'it is'."<sup>33</sup> He thinks thus the essential illusion of time as biological construct referring to the speed of pulse of a species. Accordingly, he places the incongruous pulse-time of each species in the common astronomical time-space, only to relativize this in turn. Time as such is no more, yet its law still applies. In a fractalizing gesture Nietzsche discovers the law of transformation, its *logos*, in fire, *pyr*, so that the *one* universally becoming (*überhaupt Werdendes*) is itself law.<sup>34</sup> We have definitely leaped ahead. The tension however, in which Nietzsche's thought has entered, is precisely the desire to think the Becoming as a *one* that *is not*.

Nietzsche believes thus Heraclitus to be offering a solution to the Anaximandrian inability to think the existence of cosmic punishment as exteriority, to the problem thus of a 'cosmodicy'.<sup>35</sup> He localizes this solution to the interior of the *one* that is Becoming itself, having all qualities *in itself*; the major properties of this principle being the Anaximandrian 'categories' of emergence and demise. Nietzsche could here benefit from Beaufret's contribution, drawing on the Heraclitean fragment<sup>36</sup> on the limitations of the sun imposed by the goddesses of avenge, Erynnies, guarding the sun in aid of Dikē: "the permanence of measures that ceaselessly reigns over movement is more radical than movement itself."<sup>37</sup> And: "the movement of flux and reflux is the very movement of struggle."<sup>38</sup> The solution to the constructed question: 'how can there be emergence and demise, if there is *kosmos*', which Nietzsche believed Anaximander left unanswered, is found in the identification of *kosmos* with *dikē*; cosmodicy resolved.

We do not wish here to dwell on Hēlios, a moment of *pyr* we shall examine later. We are primarily interested in Heraclitean *dikē*, as this relates to the *one* of Becoming. Dikē harmonizes Hēlios with the help of Erynnies,<sup>39</sup> keeping him in the horizon defined by the 'Bear' and the 'Warder', the two hound-stars of Zeus, binding sun.<sup>40</sup> Zeus and Dikē seem here to converge into a significant androgyny beyond divine

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<sup>33</sup> Nietzsche F., *KG*, II4, 268-270

<sup>34</sup> Nietzsche F., *KG*, II4, 270

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 271

<sup>36</sup> Heraclitus, B94

<sup>37</sup> Beaufret J., *Dialogue with Heidegger, Greek Philosophy*, p.22

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p.23

<sup>39</sup> Heraclitus, B94

<sup>40</sup> Heraclitus, B120

personality and sex. This is another theme that permeates Heraclitus, a theme to return to later: *dikē* as guardian of the sun and of all is precisely the never-setting, the never-evading (*to mē dynon pote*).<sup>41</sup>

For Nietzsche *dikē* is the second major Heraclitean concept next to Becoming and the tropos of *dikē* is *polemos*, the third major concept.<sup>42</sup> *Polemos* is guided by *dikē*-Hesiodic *Eris* inversed into a principle.<sup>43</sup> Nietzsche traces the origin of polemic jointure (*dikē*) in the agonistic essence of Greeks. The *agōn* is thus “an incessant effectuation of a unique lawful rational *dikē*.”<sup>44</sup> For Nietzsche this is Heraclitus’ prime contribution to thought: the unity and eternal lawfulness of natural processes.<sup>45</sup> We shall in time know however that unity and law are already operations of the Anaximandean lesson, while neither of the philosophers is simply what Aristotle called *psysikos* and the West translated: *natural*.

As mentioned, fire is a theme to be reserved, until attention is paid to what Nietzsche believes to be the concept that completes the Heraclitean fourfold, with regard to the enjoining *dikē*. From the turnings of fire (*pyros tropai*) sea, earth and lightning emerge.<sup>46</sup> These transformations take place in accordance with the jointure of *dikē*. As such *chrēsmosynē* (need and poverty) brings fire back into harmonic jointure, sentencing it for its *hybris*- thus the world is born out of the excess of fire checked by poverty and the world ends in *ekpyrōsis* (conflagration) by the conquering satiety (*koros*) of fire.<sup>47</sup> The Stoic influence in these fragments transmitted by Hippolytus is undeniable, yet the role of *dikē*, as the enjoining, remains undiminished. Nietzsche would thus easily turn against the moralism of Stoicism and early Christianity associated with conflagration, yet retain the Stoic term *heimarmenē*, a word of the same root as *moira* and so translate for example B119 *ēthos gar anthrōpō daimōn*, as: “destiny of man is his inborn character.”<sup>48</sup> Nietzsche’s insight into Heraclitus is crucial: neither in man, nor in *kosmos*, does *dikē*, have a moral sense, but as with Anaximander,

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<sup>41</sup> Heraclitus, B16

<sup>42</sup> Nietzsche F., *KG, II4*, p.271-2

<sup>43</sup> For Hesiod *eris* is pure desolation. “As we have seen, by the end of the age of iron, the evil *eris* will reign supreme. Neither *dikē* nor oaths nor the gods will be feared or respected.” Vernant J.-P., *The Origins of Greek Thought*, p.78. Yet even for Hesiod *eris* conduces the revolving of what we will come to understand with Anaximander as tactic time.

<sup>44</sup> Nietzsche F., *KG, II4*, p.272

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p.266

<sup>46</sup> Heraclitus, B31

<sup>47</sup> Heraclitus, B65/66

<sup>48</sup> Nietzsche F., *KG, II4*, p.280

it is the en-joining, the harmonizing against the *hybris* of ex-istence, of stepping out of measure.

Ex-istence is the stepping out of man. Stepping out of what man *is* into man's *not*. For Heidegger this *not* constitutes the foundation of both excellence (*aretē*) and measurelessness (*hybris*).<sup>49</sup> Measurelessness is the ground of man's measure and excellence as much as the world and its harmony is grounded in a primordial excess of fire emptied into need and poverty. The world is ultimately not a divine creation, but the calibration and harmonization (by *dikē*) of an order of measures of fire.<sup>50</sup> Measure alludes in its ex-istence to harmonization. Measure is not measurement displayed on our countless devices, but what gives itself to measuring, the original di-mension. Thus for Heidegger the fundamental significance of measure is the breadth, the opening, for which he cites the expression: *metron thalassēs*, not the measurement of the sea, but the open sea.<sup>51</sup> The harmonization of the open di-mension is rhythm, the tropos of harmony. Heidegger refers in admiration to the work of Thrasyboulos Georgiades who interprets *rhythmos* not in the light of *rheō*, flow, but as imprinting and attuning. Heidegger refers to fragment 67a of Archilochos where is said: *rhysmos anthropous echei*, rhythm holds humans, and where the main di-mension of *rhysmos/rhythmos* is the *rhythmizein*, the attuning.<sup>52</sup>

It is fragment B80, delivered by Origenes that best combines the themes of *dikē* and the need of/from measure. It reads: *eidenai de chrē ton polemo eonta xynon, kai dikēn erin, kai ginomena panta kat' erin kai chreōn*. The word *chreōn* closes the fragment like the first clause of Anaximander's *Saying*.<sup>53</sup> It is precisely important to localize the Anaximandrian influence, in the two words Heraclitus adopts: *dikē* and *chreōn*. At the same time, the Heraclitean substitution should also be born in mind. In Anaximander *dikē* is accompanied by *tisis*, which we translate with utter caution as vengeance,<sup>54</sup> while in Heraclitus by *eris*, strife. And as much Heidegger wants to hear in *tisis* the care, Gadamer wants to hear in *eris*, *eros*<sup>55</sup> and extract an erotic struggle. As

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<sup>49</sup> GA55, 375

<sup>50</sup> Heraclitus, B30

<sup>51</sup> GA55, 170

<sup>52</sup> GA15, 94

<sup>53</sup> *ex hōn de ē genesis estin tois ousi kai tēn pthoran eis tauta ginesthai kata to chreōn* See p.140

<sup>54</sup> See p.160-3

<sup>55</sup> Gadamer H. G., *GW7*, 54

*tisis* is still a word obscure, we shall not attempt a comparison with *eris*. But the reason of the substitution is clearly to be understood less as a revision of Anaximander than a precise accentuation.

*Dikē* in Heraclitus is the opening where harmony operates and where beings are en-joined and set apart through *polemos*. *Polemos* is the harmonizing trope. In its opening, *eris*, strife is precisely the *turning* of one against another. Heidegger names *thinker* precisely the one who dwells in the proximity of what is in the trope of strife.<sup>56</sup> Strife is more essential than any combat. Beaufret, referring to Heidegger's *Wege zur Aussprache* of 1937, observes that contrary to the atrocity without combat that was to follow in the Second World War Heidegger's exhortation was for a search of this conflict, this never resolving essential strife harmonizing ex-sistence.<sup>57</sup> From the clarity of the harmonizing strife should we thus hear the difficult words Janouch put in Kafka's mouth: "The [Great] War didn't only burn and tear the world, but also lit it up."<sup>58</sup> For a fleeting instance in the war's uttermost darkness the past and future of the West were luminous. What the question regarding the absurdity of two wars (and of colonialism) constituting the endowment of Enlightenment fails to think even when answering with a 'because'<sup>59</sup> instead of a 'despite', is that Enlightenment needed these wars to lighten itself, and more than that, more than seeing itself in its own light, see the light itself. If *the end of history* has any meaning this isn't peace, but war. And yet as certainly, war is neither mere combat, nor senseless devastation.

We return to *polemos* and *eris*. The sometimes seemingly<sup>60</sup> unregulated strife in Anaximander is always guided by the *apeiron*. Yet the stage of opposition is enriched by the fold of *polemos*, arranging and re-arranging the world. The famous fragment B53 sets thoroughly this stage: *polemos pantōn men patēr esti, pantōn de basileus, kai tous men theous edeixe tous de anthropous, tous men doulous epoiēse tous de eleutherous*. *Polemos* is the father, the origin of all and the king, the reigning force over all. *Polemos* dethrones Zeus, becoming the most originary father-king, bringing forth a progeny not only of humans, but even gods, while setting apart the free from the enslaved. *Polemos* is the father of all not in producing the world itself (this is war as *mother*), but in arranging it into a *kosmos* and a harmony, in showing each as what is. *Polemos* is a

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<sup>56</sup> GA55, 9

<sup>57</sup> Beaufret J., *Dialogue with Heidegger, Greek Philosophy*, p.xxii

<sup>58</sup> Janouch G., *Conversations with Kafka*, p.56

<sup>59</sup> Lenin's *Imperialism, the Highest stage of Capitalism*, being one of the numerous aitiologic formulations to turn against Enlightenment without abandoning it.

<sup>60</sup> Seligman, P., *The Apeiron of Anaximander*, p.81



pointing arrow, an indication and indexicalization of the world; *polemos* retains the thunder of the deposed Zeus, to guide and steer as we shall see the indexicalized world.

We need to clarify the family of war, since *polemos* as double origin is at stake; war gives-forth a world both as father and mother. The paternal origin is what illuminates and guides, the maternal what gives birth. It is from the maternal origin that Braudel writes: “The modern state arose from the new and imperious needs of war: artillery, battle fleets and larger armies, made combat ever more costly. War the mother of all things—*bellum omnium mater*—also gave birth to the modern world.”<sup>61</sup> The thought of Heraclitus and Heidegger does not centre around the mother, but is guided by male *polemos* entwined with *eris*.

So, when B8 says: *to antixoun sympheron kai ek tōn diapherontōn kallistēn harmonia*, *polemos* is precisely the father who *sym-pherei*, who brings together the *antixoun*, what strives-away-from-each-other, in the counter-trope of strife. Polemic strife does not merely render asunder, but its every parting instance withholds and effectuates a ‘together’. Whether violence is excluded from this holding together, as Heidegger thought,<sup>62</sup> needs to remain open, all the more insofar as an understanding of violence is here lacking.

We shall only attempt an allusion, if we can make tearing an index of violence. One of Heidegger’s favourite Hegelian dictions pronounces: ‘a torn sock is better than one darned’. Heidegger explains: being-torn is what makes the unity of a sock present—it makes present the lost unity. This being-torn is not to be subtracted, as it is fundamental—in being-torn dwells the necessary unification, the living unity.<sup>63</sup> Forty years after *Sein & Zeit*, in Le Thor’s seminar of 1968, Heidegger makes absence, not just the backdrop of the emergence of presence (-at-hand), but the ground of its unity and structuration. Of course for Hegel, the sentence refers specifically to consciousness. Yet, as soon as we step out of idealism, we see *polemos* as what in tearing unifies beyond unity, what, in presenting absence and absencing presence, makes both possible. This lesion is an index of violence; violence indicates through it Nothing while itself indicating the horizon of absence lurking behind it.

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<sup>61</sup> Braudel F. *A History of Civilizations*, p.323

<sup>62</sup> GA15, 257

<sup>63</sup> GA15, 289

## 2. Logos

*Dikē* through *polemos* unifies in a separation that is to be understood as harmony. What makes however possible this harmonization, the commensurability of the harmony of gods, humans and *physis* is *logos*. The Hegelian Gadamer reads in Heraclitean *logos*, reflexivity, the *itself*. “This ‘it-self’, which remains one and the same in all ‘changes’, Heraclitus sets up against the Milesean thought of opposites. The self-kindling of fire, the self-movement of the living, the coming-to-one-self of the awaking and the thinking-it-self of thought are manifestations of the one *logos*, that always is.”<sup>64</sup> This distortion of Being (*on*) that Derrida calls logocentric, an exclusive understanding leaving “*nothing* before the *logos* and outside of it,”<sup>65</sup> is primarily misguided not because of the before and outside of *logos*, but due to an understanding of *logos* as what-is. Logocentrism is always strictly onto-logical, allowing *nothing* before and outside *logos*, but most essentially disallowing *Nothing* in it. *Logos* thought from the inception is neither of the order of presence, nor of absence. It is rather what we have come to know and must think as *tropos*, a turning transformation—of animal cry into discourse; of smiting a smile in the place of reflexive laughter, of the re-refinement of environment into a world. *Logos*, we shall come to hear as *laying*, lays meaning.

The spectrum of the significations of *logos* has been vast: *ratio*, *verbum*, world-law, the logical, the necessity of thought, meaning and reason mark its horizon.<sup>66</sup> *Logos*, as a mere nominal formulation of the verbal *legein*, has had a wide consensus for philologists like Kurt von Fritz. Accordingly *logos* is thought as what-is common, insofar as its truth is common, yet this not due to a *shared* understanding, but on account of the impossibility of a different truth.<sup>67</sup> Yet precisely as *legein*, *logos* collects difference; *logos* shelters eternal strife.

If we take the ambivalent onto-historical step and tend to the Latin reception of *logos* we may gain a foundation for translation as originary understanding. *Legein* is carried over in the Latin *legere* the laying out and the lecting, of collecting, the bringing together. This bringing-together of the lecting is a rescuing, in line with the Platonic prescription, *sōzein ta phainomena*, to rescue what shows itself.<sup>68</sup> As with the

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<sup>64</sup> *GW7*, 80

<sup>65</sup> Derrida J., *Of Grammatology*, p.129

<sup>66</sup> *GA7*, 214

<sup>67</sup> Fritz K. von, *Nous, noein and their derivatives*, in Mourelatos A. P. D. (ed.), *The Pre-socratics*, p.43

<sup>68</sup> *GA55*, 398

reception of *ousia* mediated by *hypostasis* and the diverging history of *essentia* and *substantia*, *logos* means not only *legere*, but also the *ratio*, in which *reor* should first be heard. *Reor*: to hold something as something, a word more akin to *krisis* (judgement)<sup>69</sup> and *katēgoria* (attribution), than reason. Certainly, in *reor* the holding together as such is *logos*. *Logos* is also the *as* of this together. Yet *logos* does not offer the thing. In laying meaning, it gives not the thing, for *logos* is never present. *Logos* gives only meaning. Subsequently, as holding together and as the *as* of the together, *ratio* remains faithful to *logos* as ana-logy.

Keeping the (col)lection of *legere* and the *as* of *reor* we re-turn to the native language of Heraclitus. *Legein* in medial voice becomes *legesthai*, to lie in quiet collection; *lechos* is the place of peace and rest, while *lochos* the reserve.<sup>70</sup> Laying is the bringing together in which Heidegger sees the act of reading (Latin: *lego*) as bringing-together-into-lying-in-the-foreground, which foreground Heidegger understands as elevation, adopting the Hegelian *Aufhebung* in both of its senses of lifting-raising-elating and preserving.<sup>71</sup> Further, in Aischylos and Pindar we encounter the verb *alegō*, where the *a-* has the role of a *copulativum* and signifies what lies close to one, what is one's concern.<sup>72</sup> This harmonizes the *chreōn* (use/need) of ex-istence with the *chreōn* (use/need) of beings. For in *alegō*, one finds one's concern. Accordingly, an essential proximity and need lies in the *lection*. For col-lecting is not mere hoarding, but the salvaging taking in, as such a protecting.<sup>73</sup> A *lection* that does not shelter (*Bergen*) amounts to random heaping or idiosyncratic se-lecting; a *lection* is always a col-lection of what essentially uses/needs sheltering. If then we hear with Heidegger in *alegō* the *algos*, the pain, it is no other but the pain of a lesion that holds together, not what tears apart (*zerreißt*), but what tears unto a mutual tension (*reißt...auseinander*), "difference itself,"<sup>74</sup> a difference that col-lects to the innermost (*das ins Innigste Versammelnde*).<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Judgement should be heard in the specific sense we will come to think in Anaximandean *dikē*. For now, we should only indicate *krisis* as *Ur-teil*: the originary lesion that col-lects. See De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.101. At the same time as Hippocratic *krisis*, it constitutes the limial point between the tropes of life and death, col-lecting both at its point of decision.

<sup>70</sup> GA7, 214

<sup>71</sup> GA7, 215 & GA55, 267

<sup>72</sup> GA7, 215

<sup>73</sup> GA7, 215

<sup>74</sup> De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.182 We read also: "These motifs all revolve around the central and governing concept of the sundering, the section, the separation, the stice, the schism, or the schize (the *Schied* and the *Scheiden*, a motif which has already been referred to in passing, and which we find in *Entscheidung*, *Unterscheidung*, *Unterschied*, *Geschiednis*...) in its counter-effectual relation to the concept of oneness (*Einheit*), which Heidegger, already in his lectures on Hölderlin's hymns *Germanien*

Every lection involves a laying; and in every laying there is already a lection – for the laying brings something to lie, it lets something lie-together-afore<sup>76</sup>. This fore-lying-together is laid away and into unconcealment, it takes shelter in unconcealment and presences-together in it<sup>77</sup>. In the Heideggerian definition: “the de-concealment of the concealed in the unconcealed is the presence itself of the present. We name this the Being of beings.”<sup>78</sup> Or, for Heidegger *logos*. This identification is however dubious. Certainly not because of an incongruity of a consciousness (*logos*) and a reality (Being), since neither *logos* nor Being have anything to do with the categories of consciousness and reality. Neither because of any incongruity at all. Rather because *logos* is never exhausted in Being. *Logos* does not merely shelter the concealing into the unconcealment of the *together-as*, but is the very structure of concealment. *Logos* is always striving strife, lection is always a lesion.

It is evident accordingly, that *logos* relates originally neither to voice, nor to signification; its essence, even in laying meaning, the *together-as*, is not linguistic.

For Heidegger this lecting lays *one and the same* (the identical), what he equates to the Heraclitean *homou-*. Yet the lection, lays difference, not the difference of the identical, but the difference that allows the identical to be. The lection is an act of existence, nihilating the identical, in order for the identical to be. This in-order-to is *homologein*. Homology is the very *activity* that brings into correspondence the use/need of ex-istence and beings, the inner tension of their lection. The identical *is* this correspondence. Homology is what allows this correspondence to appear as one and the identical; lying-forth *collected* and *let* in the identity of its lying-forth.<sup>79</sup>

We arrive at a crossroad. The themes of *logos*, the *sophon* and the *hen panta*, can now, provisionally be heard in their original mutual arrangement “... *ouk emou, alla tou logou akousantas, homologein sophon estin hen panta...*”<sup>80</sup> We translate: “not to me, but hearing to *logos*, it is useful/needful to ex-ist in the correspondence of lection in which the correspondence one/all *is* wise.” Because *legein* is *homologein* is there

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and *Der Rhein*, but most significantly in subsequent texts, understands as a movement of gathering into *Innigkeit* or intimacy.” Ibid., p.152

<sup>75</sup> GA9, 404

<sup>76</sup> GA7, 216

<sup>77</sup> GA7, 216-7

<sup>78</sup> GA55, 218

<sup>79</sup> GA7, 220-1

<sup>80</sup> Heraclitus, B50

hearing. Not because we hear can we respond, but because we can respond do we hear; the response to *logos* affords us the responsibility of hearing. Heraclitus says: *not to me, but hearing to logos*, and for Heidegger it is clear: to hear (*hören*) the *logos* is to belong to it (*gehören*).<sup>81</sup> The *homologeîn* of this belonging is the *sophon*— in this hearing the event of destiny (*Geschick*) that *logos* sends (*schickt*) is heard.<sup>82</sup> And the *sophon* says: *hen panta*; not the content however of *logos*, its message, but the trope of its reign.<sup>83</sup> As said, we shall need to re-turn to the nucleus *hen panta*. Some preliminary remarks and an extension of our horizon will pave the way. In B10, a passage salvaged in Aristotle’s *De Mundo* (396b20)—after a mention of Heraclitus’ obscurity—we hear: “*synapsies hola kai ouch hola, sympheromenon diapheromenon, synaidon diaidon, kai ek pantōn hen kai ex henos panta.*” We translate with proviso “Nexuses everything and not everything, tending-together tending-apart, concordant discordant, and from all one and from one all.” This passage is guided by the word *synapsies*, what touches together and forms a con-nection, adopted by modern neuroscience as *synapse*.

*Syn-apsies* has the primary meaning of a touching together. A different reading of the word often proposed is *syl-lapsies*, in which taking-together, from *lambanō* is rather to be heard. Heidegger in the Fink seminars does not exclude this reading, but prefers to keep the word in a specific proximity to the sun as *pyr*. For him the *haptō*, in *synapsies*, the touching, refers not to what is held together, but to what lets belong together,<sup>84</sup> in touch. Letting refers also to the dynamic of touch, for what is in touch, is never fixed, in it resounds fluid harmony.<sup>85</sup> As such, *synapsies* are the belonging together of *sympheromenon* and *diapheromenon*, in which *ta panta* are brought into relation to the *hen* as the *synaptomena*, as attached. The *haptesthai* is accordingly the common- so that pyrologically, the light as well as the darkness of sleep and death are brought into proximity.<sup>86</sup> This is precisely not a subsumption of darkness into the order of light, but their common dependency on haptic darkness, deserving an exploration still due for philosophy, except for the Derridean undertaking, along the Cartesian tradition

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<sup>81</sup> GA7, 222

<sup>82</sup> GA7, 223

<sup>83</sup> GA7, 225

<sup>84</sup> GA15, 217

<sup>85</sup> Even if however we should hear in *synapsies* the binding, this binding is always of the order of movement. We hear Derrida: “paralysis does not mean that one can no longer move or walk, but, in Greek if you please, that there is no tie, that every bind, every liaison has been unknotted (in other words, of course, analyzed) and that because of this, because one is “exempt,” “acquitted” of everything, nothing oges any more, nothing holds together any more, nothing advances any more. The bind and the knot are necessary in order to take a step.” Derrida J., *The Post Card*, p.127

<sup>86</sup> GA15, 243

where blindness intersects with touch, touch outside the order of light. What is however here crucial is what en-joins light, fire and touch: the specific friction that is required to light a fire, a touch persisting in utter proximity, until the fire is born, yet never petrifying into the permanence of a presence, never a *fixity*. So we understand the nucleus *hen panta* as a *synapse*, a nexus pointing to the abyss of infinite disconnections, the guiding word of the fragment attesting a togetherness permeated by holes and gaps of absence. Only against this background should we understand the Heideggerian formulation: “the *hen panta* is as *logos* the letting-presence of all that-is-present”<sup>87</sup> where “*logos* names that, in which the event of presencing of what is present takes place.”<sup>88</sup>

*Logos* is accordingly the uniting of all in a specific tropos; *logos*, one in itself and unique and only as such unifying as making one: making each one, one, offering it its oneness and thus unifying each one; thus unifying all.<sup>89</sup> This is the condensed meaning of the *hen panta* thought from *logos* as a synapse of the one. The uni-logic of *logos* appears necessary. *Logos* has only itself to relate to, the Hegelo-Gadamerian reflexivity, penetrating the defences of Heideggerian thought, arguing: *logos* cannot reveal but itself, for if it was revealing another thing it would be two, something next to the one and the all.<sup>90</sup> This is precisely insofar as *logos* is thought to be. *If logos was*, then it could reveal only itself, except on pain of splitting all into a determinate two. If however *logos* was, and was the one of the all, phenomenology would denote an empty repetition. If the phenomenon that *logos* shows forth was *logos* itself, while the *logos* in turn was a phenomenon, then ‘logo-logy’ or ‘phenomeno-phenomenism’ would equally describe the togetherness that *logos* affords. However, *logos* exceeds logic, its condition never exhausted in presence, but manifesting itself as ex-istence, that is, a purely tropic-synaptic operation.

It is true that we have used the verb *to be* to refer to *logos*; touching thus on the limits of language. For as much *logos* is *not*, it also *is not*. This does not equalize *logos* to either presence or absence, but refers to their eristic togetherness. When we say *logos* is, then it is always in the trope of the *not*. This is “the absent ‘presence’ (*abwesende Gegenwart*) of *logos* for man.”<sup>91</sup> In what often, as Derrida observes, remains

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<sup>87</sup> GA7, 228

<sup>88</sup> GA7, 231-2

<sup>89</sup> GA55, 395-396

<sup>90</sup> GA55, 285

<sup>91</sup> GA55, 295

ambiguous, namely the relation of *Gegenwart* to *Anwesenheit*, an essential tension of Heideggerian thought is at work, as we saw with the Parmenidean *nyn*. The two words often conflated in colloquial German, have however a distinctive sound. *Gegenwart* is not the pure presence of *Anwesenheit* but an enduring en-countering countenancing, so that presence as countenancing may occur without presencing. In Heraclitus, Heidegger discovers precisely the thought of a countenancing presence that lies closer to absence. Such a thought is without a domain and without use. Yet such useless thought is the most needed, fulfilled by man's essential need, irreducible and inexorable.<sup>92</sup> From the depth of need and denying every use, but the very use of need, it balances on the / that underlies *chreōn* (use/need).

This irreducible *logos* that is *not/is* not, may be without use, yet is all but inoperative. It is lection and homology. This col-lecting *logos* incessantly counter-tends (*entgegenwartet*) man, countenancing and constituting man's own countenance, offering accordingly for Heidegger a constancy<sup>93</sup> (in *to mē dynon pote*, to be examined later). This calibration of the countenancing presence of soul and *logos*, that is the *homou* of homology, refers *contra* Heidegger to a plurality of *logoi as much as* to the singularity of *logos* as the purity of relation, the pure between, constituting relatability.<sup>94</sup> *Logos* is thus a pure *periechon* as reported by Sextus.<sup>95</sup> It environs beings and *has* them, holds sway over them, with regard to their harmonization and their appearing in the togetherness of the *as*. *Logos* is *peri-* around beings, giving in Heraclitus a harmony of beings and further harmonizing them with existence, in contrast to Parmenides, where harmony is internalized as unity. The difference of the two thinkers is not of movement and rest, singularity and plurality, but a difference of an interior and exterior perspective of Being. For Heraclitus the force of *logos* is not *of* man, but *surrounds* man. Only in surrounding man, does it *enter* man, so that man may respond to *logos*, undertake the col-lection of *homologeîn*.<sup>96</sup> If *logos* was of man, man would always be in possession of it. But man is bereft of *logos* in sleep, where he abides in privacy.<sup>97</sup> In parallel to sleep man forgets *logos*<sup>98</sup> and its communality<sup>99</sup> even when most awake. This could hardly be

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<sup>92</sup> GA55, 308

<sup>93</sup> GA55, 320

<sup>94</sup> GA55, 345

<sup>95</sup> Heraclitus, A16

<sup>96</sup> GA55, 280

<sup>97</sup> Heraclitus, B89

<sup>98</sup> Heraclitus, B1 & B72

more akin to the Heideggerian thought of the forgetfulness of Being. Precisely in B72 *logos* appears in all its uncanny familiarity: man dwelling in constant proximity to this *logos*, yet constantly forgetful of it: a most condensed expression of *Sein & Zeit*'s everydayness.

It is fidelity (homology) to *logos* that constitutes the *common*, while the turning away from *logos* (sleep as liminal example), implies its dissolution. It is *logos* as the lection of divine law that en-joins all human law, holding sway and prevailing over all.<sup>100</sup> This is the first appearance of law (*nomos*) in western thought and needs to be thought as an *archē*, exactly as *dikē* previously, a law beyond all legality.

We should understand the political character of Heraclitus, his engaged/disengaged relation to the *polis* of Ephesus, through this fidelity to *logos* that constitutes the common (*koinon*), for the *common* is the essence of the political and is itself essentially the shared. B2 opens with the words: *xynos gar o koinos*: for, the common is the *xynon*. *Xynos/xynon* is a recurring word in the Heraclitean corpus. Heidegger advises us to think *xynon*, even against grammar, as *xynienai*, as coming together rather than in the totality of the *koinon* as the *katholou*, that is, as a species.<sup>101</sup> We take another step and think of the *xynon*, not only as what-has-come-together, opposed to structural totality, but as event and the region emerging from the co- of every copula.<sup>102</sup> This is what speaks essentially in *koinon*. Those who shun from the *xynon* are *axynetoi*, they are unable to col-lect themselves to the unity of *nous* (*xyn noōi legein*),<sup>103</sup> but act according to a privacy that equates to sleep, according to *idia phronēsis*; in Periclean Athens they will be called idiots. The wordplay in the fragment, entailing the identification *xyn noōi* (with thought) = *tō xynōi* (the coming together of the common) is not an empty figure of castigation, but an inherent relation of *logos*. The thoughtless, the idiots are the severed (from the common). According to the portrait of B34 they listen without hearing, in absent presence (*pareontas apeinai*). Since they are incapable of homology, we know that they cannot hear, even as they listen. Because what hearing hears is silence. Heidegger says: “*Logos* is originally the silencing.” In the composition of silence rests all self-composure and self-comportment of man towards

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<sup>99</sup> Heraclitus, B2

<sup>100</sup> Heraclitus, B114

<sup>101</sup> *GA15*, 276

<sup>102</sup> It is in this sense of *koinon* that Heidegger wants to make Being (as beingness) what is common for every being. Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, pp. 38-9. Yet we ask again: what is truly common for every being? *Nothing*. Being is only *koinon* as *Nothing*.

<sup>103</sup> Heraclitus, B114



beings and every relation towards men and gods.<sup>104</sup> *Logos* is not the word. It is rather the pro-logue of every language. Its claim on man is that of a silent fore-word that keeps Being silent for man.<sup>105</sup> In this silence of Being its *tropic* essence—and silencing is essentially *tropic*—echoes in the abyss of Nothing.

### 3. Psychē

We take a closer look at the ex-isting part of homo-logy. The Heraclitean word for existence is *psychē*, commonly translated as soul. Claiming the existence of soul, we are combating as much idealism and cognitive realism, as existentialism.

For ex-istence in idealism Heraclitus represents “the completion of the hitherto consciousness— a completion of the idea into totality, which is the beginning of philosophy or the essence of the idea.”<sup>106</sup> It is by now clear that *koinon*, understood through *xynon*, is alien to every totality. And even though consciousness is equally alien to the thought of Heraclitus it is important to give some thought to the attempt of idealism to (de)localize this consciousness. Its completion does not imply a consummation of the subject. Quite the opposite. Hegel, making Parmenides a precursor of Heraclitus, says: “In Parmenides we have Being and dialectic as movement in the subject. Heraclitus conceives the absolute itself as this process, as dialectic itself. Dialectic is a. external dialectic, reasoning back and forth, not resolving itself the soul of the thing. b. immanent dialectic of the object, falling however within the consideration of the subject. c. the objectivity of Heraclitus, i.e. to consider dialectic itself as a principle. [...] Being is the One, the first; the second is Becoming.”<sup>107</sup> So that in Heraclitus, there is the specific consciousness of the progression from a. to c., a progression that appears to –almost– exhaust Hegel—conceiving the consciousness of phenomeno-logy, being aware of the evolution of spirit as dialectic. Almost. For the ‘completion of hitherto consciousness’ that makes dialectic itself into a principle is not yet conscious of itself as this completion.

This unconscious consciousness of dia-lectic is clearly neither in the soul nor in the world. It has to wait for more than two millennia to be localized in either (the

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<sup>104</sup> GA55, 383

<sup>105</sup> GA55, 383

<sup>106</sup> Hegel G. W. F., *W18*, 323

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, 319-20

Hegelian *Seele* as spirit developing through consciousness and the world that receives its utterance). What this homeless (unaware of its sadness) consciousness thinks is for Hegel the identity of Being and non-Being, their voidance and nihilation in favor of Becoming (as change).<sup>108</sup> “It is a great insight, that one recognizes that Being and non-Being are only abstractions, without truth, that the first true is only the Becoming.”<sup>109</sup> In parallel this consciousness thinks the formal “identity of the real and the ideal, of the objective and the subjective; the subjective is only the becoming unto the objective, otherwise it is without truth; the objective is the becoming unto the subjective.”<sup>110</sup> This is precisely dia-lectic. But Heraclitus is not a thinker of dialectic, a construct partly originating from a history of Platonic hermeneutics. Heraclitus thinks homology. And if it is difference that founds the *homou*, this isn’t a difference of beings or of forms, it is the difference of *polemos* and lection. *Psychē* has a role in that; it is the activity of the *homou*. Insofar as it steps into the lection of *logos* it suffers no deficiency, but that of the irreducible abyss of *logos*. It suffers no sadness and needs not the Hegelian *eschaton*. *Psychē* is neither subject, nor object, not yet the formal equalizing void of both, as unconscious consciousness, as crippled principle. It is the pure activity of belonging to the lection.

At counterpoint Kahn represents an antagonistic tendency of realism, correcting *synapsies* into *syllapsies* and translating the word as a “cognitive act of collecting together, comprehending, or summing up”. Similarly, Kahn sees in the mention of *psychē* in B107, which discredits the witness of eyes and ears that belong to barbaric souls, the first appearance of the power of rational thought; a Neo-Kantian reading. *Psychē* becomes thus a faculty or a structure of faculties: cognition and reason, being the first.

Against Kahn, Wheelwright accomplishes a step towards the thought of Heraclitus, observing that with the exception of B117 *psychē* appears without the company of an article: *psychē* is thus “almost a noun; it is more of a noun than it is anything else. Yet by employing it without the article he avoids a full grammatical commitment, and the noun... hovers on the brink of being an adjective, perhaps also a verb... Soul to Heraclitus, is quality, substance, and activity in one.”<sup>111</sup> We press

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<sup>108</sup> Ibid., 324

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., 323

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., 326

<sup>111</sup> Wheelwright P., *Heraclitus*, p.85

harder: *psychē* is pure activity and only as activity, is it quality or substance; *psychē* is pure tropos.

Clearly, the Heraclitean soul is highly contested territory. The two words that constitute B101 “*edizēsamēn emeōuton*”, “I searched for myself”, had for antiquity the meaning of self-taught wisdom, while to the Socratic-Christian modern heirs the fragment offered a manifesto of interiority. The fragment however does not say I searched myself (*eautōi*), but: *for* myself. The *self* is something to search for, a quest. The horizon in which it vanishes is *logos*. Nietzsche interprets this search as a visit to selfhood and a research in the way one researches (*erforschen*) an oracle, so that the Heraclitean fragment becomes “The most proud interpretation of the Delphic saying (“*know thyself*”).”<sup>112</sup> But does one research an oracle? To search for something, to look for something, is neither a thematic search, nor an examination or research.<sup>113</sup> The Heraclitean fragment is neither a reformulation, nor an interpretation of the Delphic oracle, but points to the specific domain of the search. I searched for myself, I looked for myself, I pursued myself. Whither? The fragment asks for the domain, where the self belongs. Thus Heidegger understands the fragment as a search for the essential place (*Wesensort*) of man.<sup>114</sup> This dwelling place, the house of man, is not language understood linguistically, but the *xynon* lection of *logos* that retains human existence collected amidst what-is.<sup>115</sup> Yet, if so, this house is without floor; it is abysmal for man dwells in the abyss. This abyss is *logos* and understood through homology it is *psychē*.

This is the purport of B45: “*psychēs peirata iōn ouk an exeuroio, pasan epiporeuomenos odon; outō bathyn logon echei*”. “You shall not discover wandering the *peirata* of *psychē*, may you even walk all paths; that *bathys* is the *logos* it has.” The two foci of the fragment are the *peirata* of the first clause and the *bathos* of *logos* of the second. Heidegger translates *bathos*, normally rendered as depth, as ‘wide-ranging’, *bathys logos* meaning a wide-ranging col-lection. This is because for Heidegger, “the deep is the wide.”<sup>116</sup> This is *more* than a radical axis reversal. It is a truthful destruction of the edifice of interiority, so that the native region of man, the horizon of man, may appear. This horizon is *logos*. And indeed, it has no depth since it is abysmal. When

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<sup>112</sup> Nietzsche F., *KG, II4*, p. 264

<sup>113</sup> *GA55*, 313

<sup>114</sup> *GA55*, 325

<sup>115</sup> *GA55*, 326

<sup>116</sup> *GA55*, 282

Heraclitus speaks of a *logos tēs psychēs* he is not instigating a proto-psychology. Foucault has taught us that the *-logy* of psychology, does not belong to *psychē*, but to the institutions that undertake to tend to it. The *logos* of soul is in contrast the *logos* that essentially belongs to *psychē*, the *logos* to which it belongs; it is the *homou*. The abyss of *psychē* has thus no depth, yet it belongs to a specific region (a region of homology implicating further for Heidegger *zoē* and *physis*).<sup>117</sup>

The abysmal tropes of *psychē* finds expression in *peirata*, what is commonly translated as ends, terminations. We are however to be more faithful to Heraclitus if we hear rather with Heidegger in *peirata* the exits, the paths of stepping out.<sup>118</sup> Man cannot reach the outermost of these paths, exhaust them, because of the abysmal tropes of the horizon of *logos*. Man cannot exit these paths, yet man ex-ists in the abyss, so that these paths unto the horizon of *logos* become possible. This is the meaning of the most cryptic of Heraclitean fragments: “*aghibasiēn*,”<sup>119</sup> “stepping into proximity.” Into the proximity of *logos*, the abyss that man may not exit, even as man ex-ists; constantly stepping-out into the abyss to step into the proximity of the *xynon*.

#### 4. Hen panta

*Koinon* as *xynon* and dialectic as homology. Indexes of the synapse of *hen panta* in *logos*. We return to think anew this relation and its specific meaning in itself. *Sophia* consists precisely in two words: one all.<sup>120</sup> The thought of *hen panta* saturates each fold of this fractal thought. Nietzsche attests this saturation in translating B41: “One is thus the *sophon*, to recognize the *logos*, that steers all through all.”<sup>121</sup> The word steer (*lenken*) is used to translate *ekybernēse*, which has the specific meaning of governing, commonly encountered in a nautical context, where *kybernētēs* is the ‘steersman’ (instigating the guiding metaphor of cybernetics), alluding thus in this translocation to B64 where it is said that “thunder steers (*oiakizei*) all”. Similarly the Greek word *gnōmē* is translated by another Greek word: *logos*. This replacement remains more faithful to the Heraclitean in-tension than the common rendition: *opinion*; as B78

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<sup>117</sup> GA55, 300

<sup>118</sup> GA55, 304

<sup>119</sup> Heraclitus, B122

<sup>120</sup> Heraclitus, B50 (...*homologein sophon estin hen panta*...)

<sup>121</sup> Nietzsche F., *KG, II4*, p.267

delivered by Origenes affirms, when the *gnōmai* of gods are invoked, *gnōmai* which the *ēthos* of man lacks, we need to think of the word as guiding counsel,<sup>122</sup> as the guidance of *logos*, what homology hears when it attends to *logos*, the specific lack of man, which can only be filled by attending to the Nothing of *logos*.

This lack finds expression for Heidegger in the *sophon*, which he translates as what-remains-to-be-thought.<sup>123</sup> Accordingly, as human *philia* remains outside planning, the *philia tou sophou*, philosophy, is essentially outside the power of planning of the thinker. And yet it is a task, the task of thinking and naming the one and only *sophon*, which complies and doesn't comply with the name of Zeus.<sup>124</sup> This is the essential un-resolvability of thought. Thought is tropos in homology to the tropos of Nothing. As tropos, as turning, it may never rest, it may not be arrested in the name. It turns from name to name, from Zeus to idea, to hypokeimenon, to substance, to will and yet this errancy does not exhaust the *sophon*, philosophy finds itself in the use/need (*chreōn*) of persisting.

Thus Hölderlin will have Hyperion comment on the Heraclitean quote<sup>125</sup> in the Platonic *Symposium*:<sup>126</sup> “The great word, the *hen diapheron eautō* (the one differing in itself) of Heraclitus, could only be found by a Greek, for it is the essence of beauty, and unless this was found, there could have been no philosophy.”<sup>127</sup> Philosophy is precisely the thought of the one as self-differing, a tropos. In this tropos lies for Hölderlin the essence of beauty. And only in this tropos can we think for example the plurality of gods or *logos* as *hen*; only as *diapheron/diapheromenon*. The one is different (*diapheron*), it leads outside (*diapheromenon*). According to *logos* (homologically) that is *not/is* not, we can at last accommodate the dia-lectic we had left aside. Neither Hegelian, nor Platonic, indeed no dialectic at all.<sup>128</sup> *Hen* as *logos* (dia-lectic), *always different*, is *not/is* not; it rather offers an exit (an evasion). We know however that in B10 the *hen* as *diapheromenon* is also *sympheromenon*. This is the in-tension of *hen*. The one *keeps* in itself the difference. It is a field. In it is kept in opposition what is not opposite, but emerges as a turning against (*Widerwendige*); this turning is “grounded in

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<sup>122</sup> GA55, 351

<sup>123</sup> GA55, 3

<sup>124</sup> Heraclitus, B32

<sup>125</sup> Another translocation, confessing the saturation of *hen* in Heraclitean thought, by ‘misquoting’ B51.

<sup>126</sup> Hölderlin F., *Hyperion*, p.67

<sup>127</sup> GA55, 31

<sup>128</sup> The *one* way leading equally upward as downward (*hodos anō katō*) becomes after Plato a fear: *anō katō panta* (Theaetetus., 153d)

the un-appearing of *logos*;<sup>129</sup> taking a full step, we ground the turning in the is *not/is* not of *logos*. Thus Aristotle goes on to say in B10 that in the evasive intention of the *hen*, “*ek pantōn hen kai ex henos panta*” (“all from one and from one all”). The *ex*, the out from, here means the origin. The origin as such is not one; it only speaks in the *ex*. The one is *not/is* not, but attests the origin of difference, by being itself incessantly different. Accordingly, it enables the difference of all. This difference is not mere opposition, yet neither is it, as Fink understands it, a unification,<sup>130</sup> except as *tension*. All is what tends and is tended in the one, all strives in its care, while the one is precisely the *in*; the most concise translation of *hen panta* is thus: *in-tension*.

As intending intensity and only as such *hen panta* is a *kosmos*. This has the specific meaning of what we shall come to know from Anaximander as tactic time, the *chronos* of *taxis*, the allotting of the while.<sup>131</sup> It is the lesson of Anaximander that is taken up in B100: “*hōras hai panta pherousi*”, the hours that bring all. The *kosmos* of Platonic order has not yet been established; for, when Plato says in *Politeia* “*taxon auta ana logon*” or Plotinus says “*syntaxei mia*”<sup>132</sup> little more than the sound of the language of Heraclitus remains. *Hen panta* is a never settling *kosmos*. The very tension one all is not a world given, but the very giving of the world, a world as *kosmos*.

In this world all is not merely amassed in the one, as aggregate in a box, but the one as differing in-tension en-joins all. This en-joining however is not that of a totality and does not refer to the *panta* as ultimate units, as *hekasta*.<sup>133</sup> All is as all only in the relation *one all* that is a relation in itself as much as a relation to ex-istence, the relation of ex-istence to *kosmos*; as such a relation of ex-istence to in-tension. Thus, Fink will try to understand *panta* as the ‘in-cept of the individual’ (*Inbegriff des Einzelnen*),<sup>134</sup> as the *synechon*, the con-nection of individuality.<sup>135</sup> Heidegger, not only opposes any introduction of individuality (the *hekaston*) even in connecting in-ception, but sees in *panta* as in-cept no seizing, only the *periechon*, the encompassing,<sup>136</sup> all is what accommodates every-thing. Whether as *syn-* or *peri-echon*, *logos* has (*echei*), holds sway over the relation. The *panta* as much as the *hen* carry the relation into themselves,

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<sup>129</sup> GA15, 278

<sup>130</sup> GA15, 40

<sup>131</sup> See p.154

<sup>132</sup> Beaufret J., *Dialogue with Heidegger, Greek Philosophy*, p.74

<sup>133</sup> GA15, 52-3

<sup>134</sup> GA15, 49

<sup>135</sup> GA15, 50

<sup>136</sup> An adjective found in Anaxagoras, among others and used by Aristotle (i.e. *Physics*, 207b35), to think the apeiron of Anaximander.

in the same way they relate to ex-istence, completing thus the triptych of presencing nothingness. *Hen panta* is differing in-tension i. in both *panta* and *hen*, as such ii. in their mutual relation as *kosmos* iii. in their relation to *ex-istence*. Thus when Heidegger asks whether *panta* are *panta* because they are first *onta*, or whether they are *onta* because they are first *panta*<sup>137</sup> and Fink discerns in the question two fundamental (and fundamentally different) philosophical approaches, it is clear. Difficult as it is for Heidegger, he must, in fidelity to Heraclitus, understand *onta* through *panta* and accordingly *panta* through the *hen panta* governed by the in-tensity of *logos*.

The reasons for Heidegger favouring an understanding of *panta*, from out of the *all one*, as the *periechon* of everything, will become clear as we finally turn to listen to the rarest of *logoi* Heraclitus presents in B108: "...*sophon esti pantōn kechōrismenon*." Nietzsche offers again an integrative translation, invoking a number of other passages: "That which alone is wise, the *gnomē* is separate from *ta panta*, it is one in all."<sup>138</sup> Nietzsche understands *kechōrismenon*, the crux of the fragment, like most translators as the severed, the separate. As such, *kechōrismenon* becomes the absolute, *ab-solutum*, what stands alone, an approach Heidegger deems misleading.<sup>139</sup> Further misleading is thus Reinhardt's interpretation of this absolute as a liminal moment at the doorstep of transcendence.<sup>140</sup> Heribert Boeder makes a further suggestion Heidegger is bound to dismiss. He understands *aghibasiēn*<sup>141</sup>—which we<sup>142</sup> translate as approaching—as withdrawal, the withdrawal of the *hen* from *panta*; this withdrawal is the *kechōrismenon*.

Heidegger initially proposes to think rather *kechōrismenon* as what unfolds from its own specific, objectless region.<sup>143</sup> He traces the meaning of *chōrismos* in *chōra*, the environing region, where something sojourns, the whence or whither of things. Region (*chōra*) and place (*topos*) are not the same. *Topos* is the place of coming forth, the place of persistence. A place is however always in a region that encircles and places it. Thus *chōra* may obtain the meaning of *topos*, as place occupied, as a determinate de-

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<sup>137</sup> *GA15*, 144

<sup>138</sup> Nietzsche F., *KG, II4*, p.279

<sup>139</sup> *GA55*, 351

<sup>140</sup> *GA15*, 47

<sup>141</sup> Heraclitus, B122

<sup>142</sup> In rare concordance with both Heidegger and prevailing philology. Boeder's suggestion is as radical as it is dubious.

<sup>143</sup> *GA55*, 330

limitation of a region. In *chōra* however always echoes the origin—*chaō*; a yawning chaos, the gap of the original opening that gives a region.<sup>144</sup> Of this *chōra* Derrida instructs us: “the referent or this reference does not exist” and then: “there is *khōra* but the *khōra* does not exist,”<sup>145</sup> which in our language we have to translate as: *chōra* is not, but ex-ists as the giving. Misleading as the surface of words can be the two utterances speak of the identical (*tauto*)—*es gibt*.

The most inceptive moment of Platonic thought, *chōra*, would occasion a thought of the origin with equal force; yet this occasion must be deferred. A few remarks however, to ground an understanding of *kechōrismenon* are integral. Plato calls *chōra* a third kind, “though in a sense of a kind of kind beyond kind [...] neither an intelligible nor a sensible being. If it can be called a being at all, it can only be in a sense of being that exceeds being, in a sense of being that is beyond being (*epekeina tēs ousias*).”<sup>146</sup> To this region a way and movement corresponds: *hyperbolē*. The *agathon* presents thus the way of *daimonia hyperbolē* (divine transcendence) constituting the excessive Platonic moment, the moment of proper ex-propriation. As way and movement, *hypebolē* is an announcement “in a double sense: it signals an open possibility, but it also provokes thereby the opening of the possibility. Its event is at once revealing and producing, *post-scriptum* and prolegomenon, inaugural writing.”<sup>147</sup> In this duplicity *chōra* provokes thus the question of *Er-ignis*, the question of *propriation*. With Derrida we ask: “But what is this proper, if the proper of this proper consists in expropriating itself, if the proper of the proper *is* precisely, justly [*justement*], to have nothing of its own [*en propre*]? What does ‘is’ mean here?”<sup>148</sup> *Dikē* is here again at work *from* Nothing; more importantly however the very movement, the very being-at-work of *chōra* is inceived as ex-cessive ex-propriation.

Again, we find ourselves at present surpassed by the total question of *chōra*. We return however to its chaotic *etymon* and hearken a second time. The originary *chaō* gives way to *chōreō*, ‘to make room for another in receding, withdrawing’. We read for example in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter: *gaia d’ enerthe chōrēsen*, “the earth gave way from beneath.”<sup>149</sup> Next to such recession we find however in the famous Platonic passage on the Heraclitean river a second sense of *chōreō*: everything moves [*panta*

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<sup>144</sup> *GA55*, 335 in passing

<sup>145</sup> Derrida J., *On the name*, p.97

<sup>146</sup> Plato, *Republic*, 509b-b. See also: Sallis J. *Chorology*, p.113

<sup>147</sup> Derrida J., *On the name*, p.64

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, p.69

<sup>149</sup> Homeric Hymns, *To Demeter*, 429f.



*chōrei*], says Plato, tying indissolubly *chōra* to movement.<sup>150</sup> *Chōra* inceptively is a waying withdrawal. So that it is necessary to think with Sallis the *chōra* “as itself moving,”<sup>151</sup> indeed further as a wandering, errant womb.<sup>152</sup> Only as such can *chōra* be the forming, since “form is the chance randomness of this path—the new theory of itinerary/the plasticity of errant roaming.”<sup>153</sup> *Chōra* forms the ex-cess as the propriety of ex-propriation and as such forms pure movement, yet *chōra* remains forever gaping, the abysmal opening of chaos.

We appear steeped in metaphor. Yet *chōra* has something to teach us here too, something essential to all inceptive thought. We hear Derrida at length: “Almost all the interpreters of the *Timaeus* gamble here on the resources of rhetoric without ever wondering about them. They speak tranquilly about metaphors, images, similes. They ask themselves no questions about this tradition of rhetoric which places at their disposal a reserve of concepts which are very useful but which are built upon this distinction between the sensible and the intelligible, which is precisely what the thought of *khōra* can no longer get along with—a distinction, indeed, which Plato unambiguously lets it be known that this thought has the greatest difficulty getting along with it. This problem of rhetoric—particularly of the possibility of naming—is, here, no mere side issue.”<sup>154</sup> If we are to step out, ex-ist, *epekeina tēs ousias*, into the third kind, a kind ever-other to both presence and absence, the distinction of sensibility and thought (idea, concept, will) on which metaphor is based can only prove its use by proving insufficient, indeed misleading. Language stands at the limit, ex-ists and exits its limit to trace its contours; the community (*koinon*) of mythic and metaphysic *alētheia* is trans-formed in thought. Thus for example<sup>155</sup> when Plato calls the earth *trophos*,<sup>156</sup> a nurse and also the one who sustains, and uses again much later the name for *chōra*,<sup>157</sup> one can and must leap ahead into the earth of the *Geviert*, from which for Heidegger we come to see and which constitutes the depth of visibility, the depth of the world as such.

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<sup>150</sup> Plato, *Cratylus*, 402a

<sup>151</sup> Sallis J. *Chorology*, p.127

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, p.137

<sup>153</sup> See Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, p.285

<sup>154</sup> Derrida J., *On the name*, p.92

<sup>155</sup> The word ‘example’ remains on *this* side of language, on the side of polarity, or mere contrariety. We thus allow for another ‘example’ of Derrida: “If on the contrary (but this is not simply the contrary), I think the postal and the post card on the basis of the destinal of Being, as I think the house (of Being) on the basis of Being, of language, and not the inverse, etc., then the post is no longer a simple metaphor, and is even, as the site of all transferences and all correspondences, the ‘proper’ possibility of every possible rhetoric. [...]” Derrida J., *The Post Card*, p.65

<sup>156</sup> Plato, *Timaeus*, 40b

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, 88d

Thus in earth the sensibility and intelligibility are severed from their polarity, re-enjoined in *alētheia*.

This is how we must start to think of *chōra* and for now of *kechōrismenon*. In *kechōrismenon* the traditional translation of severance and the Heideggerian interpretation of the accommodating finally converge. *Kechōrismenon* heard medially offers a relation to the whole that it counter-tends not as presence, but as countenance, as the all-accommodating, all-encompassing, thus as the possibility of orientation.<sup>158</sup> It does this because it is severed. Not from everything else, but in itself. It is chaos, the inceptive lesion; the *sophon* being precisely the orientation of its lection. Chaos offers the possibility of orientation, of turning in accord, in the accorded turning (*tropos*) of the *sophon*.

## 5. Fire

The appraisal Axelos<sup>159</sup> confers upon Heraclitus as a Promethean hero bringing fire to the sleeping masses or the thought of Bachelard<sup>160</sup> of fire as *eros*, making Heraclitus, the thinker of fire, the most erotic of thinkers, burning for ever in the love of fire, are inspiring initiations, fascinating departures, that exhaust themselves underway to the heart of the intensive wealth of Heraclitean fire.

We rather begin our approach neither in heroics nor in erotics, but in the wisdom of the *sophon*. In it resounds the *saphes*, originally meaning the bright, the open, the luminous. *To sophon mounon* of B32 is thus the singularity and uniqueness of the luminous.<sup>161</sup> This differing singularity (*hen*) turns to chaos in what Heraclitus calls *pyros tropai*,<sup>162</sup> the turnings of fire. *Tropai* signifies here as little a locomotion as fire refers to a primordial matter.<sup>163</sup> Still fire could be said to 'stand' behind all, grounding the relation *hen panta*. This is because fire, *pyr*, is simultaneously *physis* and *logos*, the heart, the lighting-covering breadth of the world. *Physis* and *logos* are thus only transformative turnings of fire in the series of *pyr*, *physis*, *logos*, *harmoniē*, *polemos*,

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<sup>158</sup> GA55, 338

<sup>159</sup> Axelos K., *Héraclite et la Philosophie*, p.65

<sup>160</sup> See Bachelard G., *The Psychoanalysis of Fire*

<sup>161</sup> GA55, 128

<sup>162</sup> Heraclitus, B31

<sup>163</sup> GA15, 117

*eris*, (*philia*), *hen panta*, that like the parallel Anaximandrian series constitute for Heidegger the essential fullness of the identical.

This is the onto-logical sense of the turning of fire, which refutes change according to the traditional metaphysical schemes of alteration (*alloyōsis*) and emanation (*aporrhōia*). This onto-logical sense is attested in B90, where is said: “*pyros te antamoibē ta panta kai pyr apantōn*” (the recompense of fire is all and fire of all). Aristotle speaks here of exchange,<sup>164</sup> which Cherniss believed to give *panta* a fire-value. It is important that in this recompense there is no economic element, an interpretation that lends itself easily, since in the passage the exchanges of fire are compared to that of gold. Even if however this is not an illustration inserted by Plutarch who transmits the passage, the meaning of gold is essentially counter-monetary, insofar as money constitutes precisely a veil, an obscuring of value and relations. Rather gold is gold and jewellery jewellery, only where these step back allowing what they bejewel to shine forth. In its splendour gold draws everything else and lets it appear through this splendour, in itself; this is why gold is for Pindar *periousios* and *megasthenēs*.<sup>165</sup> Heidegger will even say: “Man is, experienced in a Greek manner, of an essence, that he has the essential sight for gold.”<sup>166</sup> Gold is what recedes in splendour to bejewel *kosmos*. And if the metaphor of gold is Heraclitean, its significance as exchange lies precisely in the absencing that favours presence. And yet this trope of thinking exchange we must complement in another voice. With Nietzsche we understand the fact that fire does not always remain self-same, a mere fire, but is *hen* and *panta*, as *game*.<sup>167</sup> When fire is exchanged, receding in favour of all, this receding of an absence (the fire as one), that presents itself (as the bejewelling phenomenon), is but a game—a game of presence and absence, enabling the impossible, actualizing the absent. It is finally clear that the exchange of fire and all refers to a commonality, not a commensurability according to an exterior quantifying measure. And this, in the specific sense that *fire is the fold* of the threefold relation we have come to know: i. both in *hen and panta* ii. as the *hen panta itself* iii. as the relation of in-tension to ex-istence.

We need to understand the turnings of fire accordingly. Gadamer is on the wrong path, despite departing from an inceptive Platonic truth. He understands fire as a singularity that attests to *tropai* as a central cosmological notion. Thus *tropai* become

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<sup>164</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 984a7-8

<sup>165</sup> GA78, 73

<sup>166</sup> GA78, 82

<sup>167</sup> Nietzsche F., *KG, II4*, p.281

transformations (*Wandlungen*) rather than turning points (*Wendepunkte*).<sup>168</sup> Yet the actual meaning of transformation remains unthought. When we turn to the essence of transformation we come across precisely a turning; a radical turning, a *tropos*. A turning that does not presuppose the one, indeed precludes it, by becoming its origin. Thus Gadamer is able to understand the first of *pyros tropai*, the turning of fire into sea (*prōton thalassa*) only as a modification of fire into water.<sup>169</sup> So that the *one* of fire first turns to water, while somehow *remaining fire and one*. All the *tropai* coexist however, precisely because the *one*, is *not/is not*, as differing in-tension. The first *tropē* of fire is thus not a mode of the *one*- it is itself one and many. Fire turns to water *and* air *and* earth in *a constant turning that the fire itself is not/is not*. It is more than a paradox to want to place fire as an element next to the others.<sup>170</sup> Fire, not only constantly re-negotiates its visibility in an oscillation that constitutes its vitality and differing oneness *over against, as much as* everything living, thus constituting the homology of fire and life, but this visibility is like that of harmony<sup>171</sup> profoundly *aphanēs*, absencing in a radical turning towards presence.

Gadamer definitely glimpses this radicalism through his long Platonic study. He is aware of Plato's remark in *Sophist*<sup>172</sup> on the severity of the Ionian Muses, as well as of the gravity of the *exaiphnēs* in *Parmenides*:<sup>173</sup> the Heraclitean *metapesonta*<sup>174</sup> are not a mere transition from one to another, as in the Eleatic *doxa*, but the one *as much as* the other *without* transition. How much more severely could thought *turn against* the one? *The one 'is' the many, always, precisely because the one 'is' only the turning, tropos.*

The one turns itself in difference and turns beings and ex-istence towards it. This is a guiding turning, a *gnōmē*, as guiding counsel.<sup>175</sup> Thus thunder, *keraunos*, exemplary fire, relates to *pyros tropai*. For Fink the mutual exchange of all into fire and fire into all<sup>176</sup> grounds the governance of all through all<sup>177</sup> and the steering of thunder.<sup>178</sup> We

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<sup>168</sup> Gadamer H. G., *GW7*, 73

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, 74

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, 75

<sup>171</sup> Heraclitus, B54

<sup>172</sup> Plato, *Sophist*, 242d

<sup>173</sup> Plato, *Parmenides*, 156d

<sup>174</sup> Heraclitus, B88

<sup>175</sup> *GA55*, 351

<sup>176</sup> Heraclitus, B90

<sup>177</sup> Heraclitus, B41

<sup>178</sup> Heraclitus, B64 & *GA15*, 24. Heidegger and Fink translate consistently *keraunos* as lighting (*Blitz*) according to a programmatic of metaphysics of vision. Not only is however thunder the correct translation

shall return to thunder, the most prominent of fire's turnings. We have come to know the onto-logical sense of *tropai*, constituting the series of essential Heraclitean words (corresponding to the relation of fire, as in-tension, to ex-istence, as the thought of this series), and the specific sense of *tropai* as the exchange of fire for all (corresponding to the *hen panta* as a *relation* in itself); now, by turning to thunder, we come to know the final meaning of *tropai* as the very differing of *hen* in itself. For *pyr*, fire, is a. burning fire, b. the illuminating sun and ultimately, c. thunder.

## A. Burning

When we come to think fire in a burning trope we set ourselves in the horizon delimited by the fragments delivered by Hippolytus, where *pyr* appears as both "*phronimon*"<sup>179</sup> and as what shall "*krinei kai katalēpsetai.*"<sup>180</sup> If we are to attempt to translate *phromimon*, adhering to the established rendering '*intelligent*', this can only have a place in Heraclitus' thought only as the *inter-ligere*, the inter-lection, what en-joins essential difference. Yet there are a number of dangers in this translation, from the most vulgar of making a cognitive principle out of fire to the most refined of fixing the inter-lection in permanent presence. In *phronimon* an under-standing reckoning is rather to be heard. This reckoning that we shall come to see in Anaximandrian *tisis* as care, finds here a clearer expression.

Gadamer translates *pyr phronimon* as *Seelenfeuer*,<sup>181</sup> a fire of souls. If there is ground for this bold reading fire is to be understood as the differing one that col-lects the pure trope of activity of *pschyai* into a pyrological homology, a *pyrhomology*. For indeed *phroneein* is the *xynon*,<sup>182</sup> a rootedness in the common, a pure en-joining force of *logos*. Yet it seems that Gadamer is rather influenced by the pervasive patrological tone of B30-31 and B63-66, transmitted by Clement and Hippolytus respectively. The fragments are not inaccurate or forged as often contested; yet they clearly balance on a thin line, where the accent is crucial. When for example Clement from whom we hear in B31 of the *pyros tropai*, calls in B30 *pyr aeizōon*, all pneumatological connotations should be withheld as made clear by the rest of the fragment; we need thus first to be

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of *keraunos* (lightning being *astrapē*), but this rendering remains faithful to the acoustic thought of Heraclitus, to which Heidegger's is otherwise extremely sensitive.

<sup>179</sup> Heraclitus, B64

<sup>180</sup> Heraclitus, B66

<sup>181</sup> Gadamer H. G., *GW7*, 7

<sup>182</sup> Heraclitus, B113

able to understand *zōē* in a Greek way<sup>183</sup> and accordingly refrain from thinking fire as the ever-alive and ultimately eternal, and instead as the ever-life-giving. This ever-life-giving fire, *is* the uncreated *kosmos*, the intending intensity; the kindling and extinguishing of which fire is taking place according to measure. Fink reads this passage well when, reversing the theologizing Hegel, who precisely thinks fire as eternal, that is intra-temporal, argues that this interiority of fire would make of fire just another thing, even if the highest. Fink says: “Fire hasn’t for ever been, present and futural, but fire is what, first ruptures the being-past, being-present and being-future” Thus, “*kosmos* as the beautiful jointure of all, is what shines forth in the fire.”<sup>184</sup> As intending intension according to the measure of tactic time (the Anaximandrian lesson), fire clears the way for the intra-temporal emergence and evasion as well as for the whiling: fire is the letting-be of time not as empty form but as a letting-shine-forth (time as bejewelling gold).

In the Hippolytian pyrological fragments the pneumatological tone is heavier, calling for sharper caution. The *phronimon* that led Gadamer to speak of a fire of souls appears to border on divine wisdom and providence; even harder is to accommodate “*krinei kai katalēpsetai*” outside a theological horizon. Yet we need to examine the possibilities of the ‘almost’. The question clearly revolves around whether *krisis* is judgement in a judicio-moral sense or whether it merely refers to division as distinctive appropriation. Similarly, *katalēpsis* may refer to a manifold seizing or to an arrest and occupation, taking hold of and reigning over. Fire as reigning judgement coupled with the word *ekpyrōsis* (conflagration) of B65 is laden with Stoic-Christian eschatology.<sup>185</sup>

It is not merely an issue of thinning like Gadamer the fragment into a safe cosmological account. We have seen the role of *dikē* and *heimarmenē* in en-joining and keeping within measure; “for all happens according to *eris* and *chreōn*.”<sup>186</sup> Thus the *phronimon pyr* is fire in accordance with *dikē*. As such it always is *not/is* not, while incessantly giving life. It is a mere illusion, a stepping out of *logos* to believe that things are not constantly on fire. This fire is insatiable, yet never greedy. It eventually (and yet this eventually has again but the meaning of a moment) shall devour everything, not out of lack but out of use/need: the conflagration shall take place at the moment of satiety

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<sup>183</sup> See p.127, as well as p.70, the footnote regarding Agamben’s *Homo Sacer*.

<sup>184</sup> *GA15*, 96

<sup>185</sup> *Ekpyrōsis* is taken as Hippolytian elaboration, absent in collections extricating the body of the fragment that is considered genuine from the surrounding text delivering it. Yet for Hippolytus *ekpyrōsis* is the excess of the *more*, *koros* (a genuine in turn word) and so it must be thought.

<sup>186</sup> Heraclitus, B80

(*koros*), as need beyond necessity. Is this all-consuming fire to be contained? Heraclitus affirms this containment, both here implicitly and again explicitly with regard to the sun. Clearly, insofar as fire gives the world, only *dikē* may restrain its dominion and force it into giving the world anew. Yet precisely in accordance to en-joining *dikē*, fire needs to appear as the unrestrained; it needs to overstep the last limit of the world and consume it in its flames. Nothing resists it, except the need of a new world. This need seems to be dictated by *dikē*, which appears thus as a second *archē*. Yet talk of a dualism is here utterly out of place. Fire expresses with regard to *kosmos* what *dikē* expresses with regard to the purity of the tension of presence and absence and what *logos* expresses with regard to homological ex-istence. All tropes of harmonizing refer to the actuality of differing, which needs to overstep in order to pose its limit. Fire *needs* to consume the world in order to create it, *dikē needs* to transgress its own justice and punish presence for having presenced in order to en-join presence, while ex-istence *needs* to step out of *logos* into the abyss of Nothing, to discover the law of the *homou*. This is *the* liminal moment of inceptive thought. Heidegger will also hesitate to pursue it. The perils of Nothing are to be heard in this overstepping. And yet, this overstepping remains most faithful to the in-tension of all inceptive thought.

## B. The sun

We undertake to think fire as the sun, according to *dikē*. Our thought revolves around B94, of which Fink gives an insightful account: “Dikē is the goddess of the rightful, who guards the border between the domain illuminated by the sun and of what finds itself in it, and a withdrawn from us domain of the nocturnal abyss. The guardians of this border are her aids. What they guard is that Hēlios does not overstep the limit of his own domain of power and attempts to invade the dark abyss.”<sup>187</sup> What the Furies (Erinyes), the aids of Dikē guard against, is the overstepping of measure. The precise meaning of measure which Fink traces along the border of the nocturnal abyss has often been sought in the confines of the trajectories of the sun on the firmament (based on B120). And valid as this understanding may be cosmologically, this limit of measure imposed by *dikē* has a different inceptive meaning. We start to approach this meaning

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<sup>187</sup> GA15, 72

insofar as we think of *hēlios* as the highest of fires, the most powerful and present of presences, to be restricted by a limit so that the order of *kosmos* may prevail.<sup>188</sup>

According to Plutarch in B100, the sun surveils and guards, by de-limiting, rewarding, indicating and showing forth changes and the hours that bring all. This *all*, is the essential difference of sun and man. Man is the one who has ‘won’ (in the Heideggerian sense of winning, gaining an understanding) the Promethean fire and lights up the night- the night inside<sup>189</sup> and the night of *kosmos*. As the one who brings forth light, man is also the one to touch upon a nocturnal understanding.<sup>190</sup> Ex-istence, by touching upon this night, by stepping into it and outside its limit, is able to light it. This lighting is *saphes*, clear in its luminosity, showing things as *saphē* in their own clarity. As such it belongs to the *one* that is *saphes* and *sophon*, the sun that allows the essential approach of things in their essence.<sup>191</sup> It is because man carries this approaching light that in Aristotle soul is in a certain way everything.<sup>192</sup> Yet only in a certain way; this light is lit and sustained in the *homou* of homology and even there it may bring many things yet not all into its shining.<sup>193</sup>

The relation of sun to man unfolds thus according to another relation, that of clarity and light. We may have been led to think of clarity as an effect of light, yet the essential origin of light is the clear, the *saphes/sophon* itself. Heidegger does not read the *saphes* in *Lichtung*. In English however the clarity of the clear (*saphes*) resounds clearly in the clearing (*Lichtung*). Accordingly we turn with Heidegger to its relation to light as he provokes: “Have clearing (*Lichtung*) and light (*Licht*) anything to do with each other? Evidently not. Clearing (*Lichtung*) means: lighting, to weigh the anchor (to unbind and set free—Heidegger implies the German expression: *den Anker lichten* and yet in English we hear further weighing as waying, making way), the clearing as uprooting (*roden*- another word for *Lichtung* now as a human activity, an agricultural removal for the sake of cultivation). This doesn’t mean that where the clearing is, is bright. The lit is free, the open and at the same time the lit of something self-concealing. The clearing should not be understood as light, but we must think in a Greek tropos

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<sup>188</sup> Gadamer H. G., *GW6*, 239

<sup>189</sup> Heraclitus, B26

<sup>190</sup> *GA15*, 233

<sup>191</sup> *GA15*, 232

<sup>192</sup> Aristotle, *De Anima*, 431b21: *hē psychē ta onta pōs esti panta*

<sup>193</sup> *GA15*, 225



(Weise). [...] Darkness is indeed without light, yet lit.”<sup>194</sup> *Lit*, may be *unclear*. Heidegger forges too strong a bond between the clearing and light to undo their nexus. Instead, and according to the *saphes/sophon*, we say: Darkness is indeed without light, yet *clear*. In taking another essential step into darkness we witness it as the purest of clarities.

It is in clarity that the polysemy of shining announces itself. The sun shines as what gives light and enables what shows itself to appear, bringing thus forth beings into showing themselves, but also shows itself in the shining as itself, that is, as what shines. In bringing-forth-into-showing the sun is neither creation, nor illumination, nor constitution, nor the production of *technē*.<sup>195</sup> It is rather the differing one (*hen*) that makes each thing (*hekaston*) show itself in the in-tension of all (*panta*); yet at the same time in showing itself, makes itself another *hekaston* among everything else appearing thus as *panta*. The sun is both *hen* and *panta* and their relation, conforming thus to the law of its own legislation.<sup>196</sup>

This law is nihilated every night invoking the fear we saw guiding Fink’s interpretation of the sun forever vanishing in the abyss of night. The Erinyes of Dikē do not protect the sun from vanishing, for the sun itself shows forth as Dikē with relation to all as showing-forth, including itself. The sun however will always return, new every day.<sup>197</sup> This means only secondarily the obligation to “think the concepts every day anew”<sup>198</sup> insofar as we strive unto homology. It is rather in the essence of the sun to overstep its limits every night, to constantly re-new the promise of its reappearance, which as a promise preserves the danger of remaining unfulfilled. This is a fear that belongs essentially to the sun and equally to *dikē* and neither can vouchsafe for the other. The promise of a law of all that shows-forth and their showing-forth requires the night and its essential fear, the overstepping of the sun’s limit to be renewed and arrive as a gift.<sup>199</sup> For the Heraclitean sun the Heideggerian language is at home: *es gibt*; it ‘is’ and gives itself. It is because Hesiod did not understand the way the sun *needed* the

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<sup>194</sup> *GA15*, 262

<sup>195</sup> *GA15*, 142

<sup>196</sup> Louis XIV was only explicit on what constitutes the essence of every true kingship. The nature of the king as sun, thought from the inception, accounts for the two bodies of the king. Certainly a footnote cannot contain the magnitude of this claim, nor the according certitude that Kantian transcendental practical reason is but the democratization of the royal prerogative of universal self-legislation. It remains an indication.

<sup>197</sup> Heraclitus, B6

<sup>198</sup> *GA15*, 128

<sup>199</sup> Capuzzi F. A., *Heraclitus: Fire, Dream, and Oracle*, in Maly K., Sallis J. (eds.), *Heraclitean Fragments*, p.138

nocturnal passage to become itself *one* and one all, that Heraclitus reserves scorn for the teacher of Greeks.<sup>200</sup>

### C. Thunder

Fire manifests itself finally as *keranos*, thunder. The word refers originally to the *keras*, to the horn that descends from the night sky splitting the night apart. Although it certainly appeals to an image, *keranos* does not primarily refer to the luminosity of the phenomenon for which *astrapē* is the specific word, relating to the word *astēr*, star. *Keranos* is equally an aural word, insofar as a horn may blow; its sound, *brontē*, the roar, is essential to it. We thus translate *keranos* against Fink and Heidegger not as lightning (*Blitz*), but as thunder. In B64 we hear of this thunder that it steers all (*panta oiakizei Keraunos*).<sup>201</sup> Here again fire manifests itself as a particular harmonization of one all. Thunder as fire is this specific in-tension: outside of all and yet one (of them); as such inside of all and yet not (one) of them. Only thus can *keranos* steer all.

By stressing its distance from *panta*, Fink makes thunder what forms (*bildende*) the all, the world-forming moment.<sup>202</sup> He is thus drawing on the teaching of *Sein & Zeit* and the subsequent lectures *Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*,<sup>203</sup> where the lightning of the instant (*Augenblick*)<sup>204</sup> lights up a world by ‘refusing’ things *as a whole*.<sup>205</sup> In the opening of such distance, thunder opens the cosmological horizon of Being, the very worlding of things, their holding together in a jointure that is the world itself. Only in the resounding of thunder should Fink’s words be heard: “To the movement of the lightning (*keranos*) corresponds the movement of the *hen to sophon*.”<sup>206</sup> If we think of *hen to sophon* as the origin of differing, *keranos* appears as the clarity of its expression.

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<sup>200</sup> Heraclitus, B57

<sup>201</sup> The fragment that famously hung above the threshold of Heidegger’s hut in *Schwarzwald*.

<sup>202</sup> *GA15*, 31

<sup>203</sup> These lectures were of paramount significance for Fink. He was there in the winter semester of ’29/’30. Upon his death almost half a century later Heidegger dedicated them to his memory mentioning Fink’s insistence on these lectures being published before any other.

<sup>204</sup> On *Augenblick* as the foundation of the threefold of the questions “What is world?”, “What is finitude?” and “/what is solitude?” see also Derrida J., *The animal that therefore I am*, p.150

<sup>205</sup> *GA29/30*, 251-6

<sup>206</sup> *GA15*, 21

A criticism as that of Maly for example, that Fink, proceeding from *keraunos/pyr* to *logos* (Heidegger traversing in a reverse trajectory), is only able to think the emergence of the many from the one, while the opposite must elude him,<sup>207</sup> fails essentially, as much as what it criticizes, to account for the integrity and structure of *hen panta*, bound to no directionality. It also fails to see that, in the truest Heraclitean spirit, fire *is logos*: an incessantly receding exchange of presence in the collection of *logos*. The question however remains: How does thunder steer *panta*,<sup>208</sup> the beings of nature (*physei onta*) as much as the beings of art (*technē onta*)?

Fink and Heidegger are primarily searching for the trope of steering in the order of visibility of the thunder, precisely in lightning. Fink understands *keraunos* as the lighting eruption in the darkness of night, an eruption which shows things for a second, the way they are divided but also collected. *Keraunos* severs the lighted and the dark, its ignition constituting their jointure as they counter and enter one another. In the ignition of *keraunos* as lightning an event takes place, an event that the eye captures in a blink, as the momentary and unique where an incision and decision of the lighted over against the dark actualizes.<sup>209</sup> Thus the essential duration of *keraunos* is –still– for Fink the momentary, while Heidegger in these seminars of 1966/67 has come to think of this duration as eternal.<sup>210</sup> The suggested eternity may help us with the difficult task of liberating the essence of thunder from its order of visibility. Its luminosity has left the question of steering undecided. For what precisely steers this incisive/decisive sight?

At the same time our question refers us back to the undecided question of violence. Fink remarks in the Heraclitus' seminar that a ship without a rudder and helmsman is a play of waves and winds (the essence of play itself unquestioned); as such, the steering that overcomes the complete surrender to this play amounts to a moment of violence.<sup>211</sup> Heidegger retorts with a question: "But isn't there also a non-violent steering?" To which Fink's solution is a division: he reserves this possibility for the divine realm, denying it to humans; a resolution Heidegger seems to grant. This resolution is however an expression of theological prejudice. If violence has any meaning, it is precisely the Gods who steer in an ultimate exercise of violence. For they,

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<sup>207</sup> Maly K., *Man and Disclosure*, in Maly K., Sallis J. (eds.), *Heraclitean Fragments*, p.57

<sup>208</sup> The word appearing according to Fink 15 times in Heraclitus.

<sup>209</sup> GA55, 161

<sup>210</sup> GA15, 22

<sup>211</sup> GA15, 25

like fire, can lay the rules of play and also annihilate it. Yet they are always only left with the play and its need. In contrast, the human steering takes place for the most part as playing-along. It rides the waves of the world and history, it responds to a correspondence decided by gods. Only when man steps-out, only in the rare moments man ex-ists,<sup>212</sup> does this violence become man's responsibility.

The suggestion of Fink is revealing. He turns to read B11, where is said "*pan gar herpeton plēgēi nemetai*", roughly and provisionally translated as "for all that crawls is driven to graze by blows," in relation to *keranos*, the herding blow corresponding to thunder's striking steering. There is clearly no *herpeton*, nothing that crawls, literally a serpent, that *nemetai*, grazes. Thus Fink and Heidegger are led to think *herpeton* as the living in general, according to the root *za-*, precisely not in its narrow zoological sense. *Herpeton* does not refer subsequently to a specific zoological domain, neither to the zoological in general as *scientia animalum*, but to all living as crawling. Crawling life is thus led to grazing by the herder's flagellation; a way of protection according to Fink.<sup>213</sup> To make sense of the ramifications of this fragment and its relation to thunder, we need to understand the verb that guides the very sentence: *nemetai*. It is a polyvalent word, exceptional even among the series of such Heraclitean words. It means first the grazing as best exemplified in the *nomē*, the pasture and the feed; but it means also the dividing and apportioning, which Heidegger invites us to hear through *nemesis*.<sup>214</sup> *Nemesis* is neither arbitrary violence nor universal malign, but the apportioning of the right, according to the order of *dikē*. Its essence is *nomos*. *Nemetai* thus refers to grazing, but in the sense of nourishment on the allotted, not overstepping into another's lot. *Plēgē* ensures this by the infliction of a blow afflicting a wound. Keeping the biblical reverberations aside, we translate again B11: "all crawling is afflicted with the wound of its lot." This wound essentially constitutes it as crawling: it is the punishment of ex-istence for having existed, the need of *dikē* to overstep the right in order to offer justice, the violence of gods who steer; as such, it is thunder.

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<sup>212</sup> Children as children, that is, as playing, always find themselves in the stepping-out of ex-istence; one of the rare moments of man's existence is becoming child.

<sup>213</sup> *GA15*, 87

<sup>214</sup> *GA15*, 57

## 6. Physis

### A. Fire ever-giving-forth the-emerging-world

One of the adjectives that guide the Heraclitean thought on fire is *aeizōon* reported by Clement in B30 as we saw earlier. Having attained a better understanding of fire, we return to think again its essence as *aeizōon*, that is, the essential relation of fire to the temporality of life and *physis* as *kosmos*. In conjunction we saw Fink opposing the Hegelian understanding of fire as intra-temporal. For B30 informs us that *kosmos* is not a creation of gods or humans, but of fire *aeizōon*. Fink concludes that fire can be as little temporal as it can be a predicate of the world.<sup>215</sup> Accordingly he proposes to think this fire, in the tropos of giving, as ‘*es gibt*’: the fire is and gives *kosmos*. This is for Fink the specific meaning of *aei*: a temporality that steps out of the time of the world to give the world. We need to pause at the problematic of this temporality.

Contextually, it is important to note with Heidegger the absence of a conceptual determination of time in Homer and Hesiod; time refers in these authors to experience and is referred to by it: in Homer time features exemplary as waiting time and the mortal time that remains,<sup>216</sup> and in relation to both, equally as the time of remembrance (*Mnēmosynē*). Heidegger accordingly questions the very role of time in Heraclitus and warns against interpretative constructions. In Heraclitus we have the temporal forms of the verb to be (*ēn*, *esti* and *estai*) as well as the *aei*, yet time is not thematized.<sup>217</sup> Valid as such caution of the late Heidegger is, ‘un-thematized’ does certainly not amount to ‘inoperative’; mostly the opposite is of truth.

It is thus a rare moment, when Hegel would lie much closer than Heidegger to this truth of Heraclitus—if we could only discount the speculative tone. Hegel reads his time in the un-thematized time of Heraclitus: “Time is pure Becoming, as intuited. Time is pure change, it is the pure concept, the simple that from absolute contraries is harmonic. Its essence is to be and not to be, and otherwise no determination—pure abstract Being and abstract non-Being unmediated in unity and separated.” Furthermore, “in time there is not the past and the future, only the now; and this is, so that it is not, it

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<sup>215</sup> *GA15*, 107

<sup>216</sup> *GA15*, 103

<sup>217</sup> *GA15*, 105

is at the same time annihilated, gone.”<sup>218</sup> The presencing non-present essence of time is a Hegelian lesson, which is precisely operative in Heraclitus. In this time Hegel sees Being and non-Being as identical. This is speculation. Thought otherwise, non-present presencing (ex-isting) time is what gives *the order of opposition*, not its in-dif-ferent identity. This giving cannot be indifferent because, as Hegel otherwise understood, it constitutes the specific force of time; it is destiny (*eimarmenē*) and necessity (*chreōn*).<sup>219</sup> To this temporalizing necessity corresponds *physis*, “this ever resting, the whole, the transition from the one into the other, from the division into unity, from unity into division,”<sup>220</sup> “nature is this cycle.”<sup>221</sup> Again, despite speculation, the harmonics of *physis* is ineluctably thought; and thought in accordance to time. If the *aei-* has any meaning this is neither the eternity of *nunc stans*, nor sempiternal persistence, but is to be found in the unceasing play, the harmonics, of presence and absence.

We turn now to the *-zōon* that comprises the latter half of the adjective. It refers to *zōē*, life, understood in its specific Greek sense. Fire belongs ordinarily to the inanimate. Still most scholars render *aeizōon* as the ever-living, without concern for the problem, or at best relying on the implicit panacea of hylozoism. An hermeneutic generality such as hylozoism can never seize and arrest a thought that grapples with Nothing. So are we to make with Heidegger the theological claim that what gives life is itself mostly alive? To answer that we need to attend closer to the essential meaning of *zōē*. In *zōē* we hear the word *zōon*,<sup>222</sup> commonly translated as animal; it is necessary however to exclude its zoological understanding as systemic actor, its biological understanding as organism, or its theological understanding as creature. And yet its essence belongs to the living activity of *zēn*, in the unique way that *revealing and concealing unite in the animal*, so that neither a mechanical (scientific), nor an anthropomorphic (theologizing) explanation is relevant.<sup>223</sup>

Heidegger points to the essential function of the root *za-* in the Greek language as intensifier.<sup>224</sup> We hear this intensity (in-tension) in words such as *zatheos* (most divine), *zapyros* (most blazing) and *zamenēs* (most fierce), etc. This in-tension of *za-* in-

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<sup>218</sup> Hegel G. W. F., *W18*, 329

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*, 337

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*, 332

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*, 333

<sup>222</sup> The noun *zōon* is accented, in contrast to the unaccented adverbial component *-zōon*, a difference invisible in Latin transcription.

<sup>223</sup> *GA7*, 281

<sup>224</sup> *GA7*, 281

tends *physis* in a correspondence that refers to the pure radiance of emergence. This is an emergence into the clearing (*saphes/sophon*),<sup>225</sup> into the realm of breaking-forth, of opening into the open.<sup>226</sup> For Heidegger *aeizōon* thus thought, pronounces the identical as *to mē dynon pote*,<sup>227</sup> a claim we shall only be able to evaluate, after we examine the latter. For now that much is clear (*saphēs*): fire does not refer to a substance, but to the *es* of the *es gibt*, while the *gibt* is the *aeizōon*, the *ever-giving-forth-the-emerging*. What *ex-ists* in this giving, what the giving gives to be and only thus is, is *kosmos*. We turn to this *kosmos of physis*.

We know (B30) that this *kosmos* as the subject of the first clause of the *subject* is what evades the creative power of gods and mortals and as the object of the second what is brought forth by the fire. Indeed gods and humans receive their creative power for ordering the world and for *technē* respectively, in and from this world (*kosmos*) of fire.<sup>228</sup> This world that is brought-forth, is for Heidegger brought-forth-into-shining. It does not consist in the totality of beings, but constitutes the en-joining jointure in which and out of which beings may radiate.<sup>229</sup> In the seminars with Fink this thought is repeated in the word *diakosmēsis* thought as the radiant en-joining of the whole (*Gesamtfügung*), corresponding *kosmos* to the fundamental pyrology of burning fire, sun and thunder.<sup>230</sup> *Kosmos* is thus radiant harmony. *Erglänzen* (glowing), like *Erstrahlen* (shining), are the words Heidegger uses to refer to *kalos kosmos*, the world as primordial adornment (*Zier*). This *kosmos* Heidegger will come to think as pre-temporal, as initiating and grounding temporality,<sup>231</sup> grounding Fink's later anti-Hegelian interpretation of fire as extra-temporal, that is, as constituting itself the temporality of *kosmos*. Of course only with regard to fire can we understand the *kallos*, the radiant beauty, of *kosmos*.

According to B124 the most beautiful of worlds is like a heap of waste thrown at random (*hōsper sarma eikē kechymenōn o kallistos [...] kosmos*). Heidegger offers two akin but not identical paths of understanding the provocative fragment. Either the

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<sup>225</sup> GA7, 281

<sup>226</sup> GA55, 94

<sup>227</sup> GA55, 96

<sup>228</sup> GA15, 109-10

<sup>229</sup> GA55, 164

<sup>230</sup> GA15, 131

<sup>231</sup> GA55, 168

ugliness of the world becomes evident *in contrast to* the deeper harmony of fire,<sup>232</sup> or in connection to B54, where ‘hidden’ harmony appears more powerful than the blatant, the hidden en-joining of the world *as* fire, is more most beautiful than any other obvious arrangement or order.<sup>233</sup> We take the later path, as it harmonizes with the whole of Heraclitean thought. This thought, a thought of *logos* and *logos as* analogy, gives us plenty examples of the ‘*as*’. Men are *as* children<sup>234</sup> or monkeys<sup>235</sup> to gods, *as* children or monkeys are to men. Accordingly *logos* shows that the world *as* any other ordering is but a heap of waste in regard to world *as* fire. The analogy of *logos* reveals the ugliness of even the most visible orderings *in view* of invisible harmony. What serves as the ‘*as*’, the ‘/’, of analogic *logos* is fire.

Fire ever-giving-forth-the-emerging world radiates and shows forth this world *as* emerging. We turn now the precise meaning of this emergence.

## **B. Physis kryptesthai philei**

We are to examine the meaning of this emergence in relation to and through the famous words attributed to Heraclitus by Themistius:<sup>236</sup> *physis kryptesthai philei*.<sup>237</sup> We will not attempt a direct translation, but try instead a separate recovery of the three words, which in unity constitute and unfold the fullness of the spectrum of the fragment.

The word *physis* provides the locus where the meaning of emergence itself is to be sought. Heidegger’s deepest consistent conviction that the essence of the Greek understanding of *physis* lies not in persistence (*Bestehen*), but in emergence (*Entstehen*), is one of the most important contributions of Heideggerian philology; a lesson that Heraclitus already found philosophically founded in the thought of Anaximander. This lesson would find an ever deeper founding in Greek thought and simultaneously form

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<sup>232</sup> *GA15*, 108

<sup>233</sup> *GA15*, 283

<sup>234</sup> Heraclitus, B79

<sup>235</sup> With regard to beauty and wisdom, Heraclitus, B82-83

<sup>236</sup> The 4<sup>th</sup> century orator, statesman and primarily Aristotelian commentator, highly celebrated during his lifetime, a personal friend of numerous Byzantine emperors as diverse as Julien and Theodosius, a pagan who Gregory of Nazianzus, would praise as “king of arguments” (Epistle 140); in coming ages his prolific contributions faded into relative oblivion, the salvaging of this single Heraclitean fragment constituting the most radiant of exceptions.

<sup>237</sup> Heraclitus, B123



the foundation of its subsequent unfolding, receding thus in turn into forgetfulness. It probably received its most complete and articulate expression in the Aristotelian division of *physis* and *poiēsis*, the first as proceeding and letting come forth from itself, the latter as the activity of a distinct agent. However *physis* and *poiēsis* remain in their difference essentially connected, as *poiein* is at first knowledge; not just because in every production a definite know-how is required, but because in the Greek sense *poiēsis* as knowledge is the knowledge that relates this production to *physis*, to the world as emergence. It is the knowledge of an attunement and harmony.<sup>238</sup> What is crucial however is that this emergence of *physis* from itself happens as other. An essential difference is at work. The word *physis* is most often coupled with the genitive *tōn ontōn*, of beings. *Physis* is the emergence of beings. Beings are *physis* as emergence and *physis* emerges as beings.

*Phyein*, the verbal form of *physis*, appears accordingly as the counter-concept of *kryptesthai*,<sup>239</sup> understood as concealing. This however does not mean the hiding of *physis* from man. Beaufret speaks in the truest Heideggerian spirit when he thinks concealment as a phenomenon, which, as every phenomenon bears a *not* in itself, which is other to logical negation.<sup>240</sup> With regard to emerging *physis*, concealment offers the shelter in which the granting of its essence occurs. The essence of nature does not remain covered and inaccessible, but offers itself precisely in this tropos of concealment.<sup>241</sup> This doesn't mean that concealment is the mere mode of appearance of *physis*, but the giving, the emerging of *physis* happens in essential accordance to this *not* that manifests itself as concealment. Accordingly, *physis* does not hide; as a simple emergence it is the open and the most proximal of all proximities.<sup>242</sup> As such the concealing emerging, the *physis* that *kryptetai* does not manifest itself as a stale contradiction, but as a trace.

This trace appears as a sign or riddle. For Heidegger the riddle of *physis* presents a twofold character: 1. *physis* as emergence appears distinct from vanishing and thus in contrast to *kryptesthai*, the concealing; 2. *physis* constitutes the unifying essence a. of the jointure of *physis* as pure emergence in 1. and b. of the *kryptesthai* as such.<sup>243</sup> This riddle persists for Heidegger twenty-five centuries later, because he is still attached to

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<sup>238</sup> GA55, 369

<sup>239</sup> GA35, 20

<sup>240</sup> Mouzakitīs A., *Meaning, Historicity and the Social*, p.131

<sup>241</sup> GA55, 140

<sup>242</sup> GA55, 141

<sup>243</sup> GA55, 158

an understanding of *physis* according to presence, according to the equivocal 'unifying essence' of jointure. *Physis* is rather emerging in the *not* of every phenomenon, in the *kryptesthai*, the *kryptesthai* being its tropos, a tropos of Nothing. *Physis* does not unify into a unity, nor is it an essence in a trope of presence, but only the essence of giving-forth of the world, that is, the giving-forth of essence, in essential accordance to (enjoined by) the *kryptesthai*, the withdrawing concealment. This concealment does not protect the way Heidegger attempts to think it, as for example the fog in which Zeus envelopes the Trojans and which Ajax begs him to lift so that at least the Greek warriors may, if they have to, die in light.<sup>244</sup> Concealment does *not* protect, for there *is* nothing to protect. Precisely, it protects *Nothing*. Concealment is an essential (to *physis*) tropos.

If *physis* poses a riddle, this consists in its signification. Its trace as sign is an oracle, as those given in Delphi in the name (under the sign) of Apollo. Apollo according to B93: *oute legei oute kryptei alla sēmainei*. He neither says, nor hides, but indicates in a sign. Obviously *legein* and *kryptein* are here used by Heraclitus (if the testimony of Plutarch, who delivers the fragment, is to be trusted) in a non-inceptive sense. Yet we are to understand this not as lack of rigour and consistency, but as the specific necessity to let both forces of *legein* and *kryptein* recede in favour of the sign. Brogan has thus understood something essential in calling Heraclitus the philosopher of the sign.<sup>245</sup> *Sēma*, the guiding word we know from Parmenides and another sign of the proximity of the two thinkers, Heraclitus repeats in the *sēmainei*— an index for Heidegger of a more originary letting-appearing *behind legein* and *kryptein*.<sup>246</sup> A sign is what shows, and in showing reveals itself (as such as sun); yet it always shows in the trope of hinting at the non-shown, non-appearing, at the concealed,<sup>247</sup> that is, at the essential trope of emerging.

*Physis* thus in the sign of its trace reaches out for man. Yet man through lack of openness (*apistiēi*)<sup>248</sup> levels the accord, discords with the openness of *physis*, unhinges the jointure. Man's readiness for the open (*elpis*) is thus the essential guiding need (B18 to be understood in the sign of the *chreōn*). This severance and disregard for the traces of the sign that signifies the trace of *physis*, constitute an exit from *logos* that turns man

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<sup>244</sup> Homer, *Iliad*, XVII, 597-655

<sup>245</sup> Brogan W. A., *Heraclitus, Philosopher of the Sign*, in Jacobs D. C. (ed.), *The Presocratics after Heidegger*, p.274

<sup>246</sup> GA55, 178

<sup>247</sup> GA55, 179

<sup>248</sup> Heraclitus, B86

into a barbarian.<sup>249</sup> Man is in accord to *logos* (in homology) and thus in harmony to the emerging only in such *pistis* and *elpis*. What is missing from the Paulian catechetic triptych is *love*. Precisely here, we hear the third of the words of B123: *philei*. This word, commonly rendered ‘love’, has for Heidegger the meaning of according necessity (*zugehörige Notwendigkeit*, which we need think again as the *chreōn*), so that B123 can be at last translated (and yet only as a sign): “emergence has as according necessity concealment.”<sup>250</sup> This according necessity is for Heidegger an essential opposition. Because of this opposition *physis* can love concealment, for this love is not narcissism, a self-love of the same. Clearly it is also not love as preference of *any chance* other. And yet, this does not amount to a love of *an essential other* that is of the other as essence, since such otherness would revert to the same. What *physis* loves is the *not*, in the concealment of which we saw it always emerging *as* and *in* the *other* of beings. This love is dif-ferent, ever-upholding a tension beyond the barren oppositions of essence.

Certainly Heraclitus did not speak of or intend *agapē*; this was the specific trope in which Paul attempted to calibrate the Greek to divine *logos*, still under the sign of the Heraclitean trace. After tracing the character of this trace and its significance for (human) ex-istence, we turn to its specific structure: harmony.

### C. Harmony

Heraclitus mentions harmony thrice in the extant fragments: in B8, B51 and B54. In B8 the most beautiful (*kallistē*) harmony is said to emerge from the dif-fering, the counter-tensive (*diapherontōn*). In B51 harmony is called *palintropos* (counter-turning), while B54, already encountered (specifically with regard to *kosmos*) affirms the power of the un-showing harmony over the showing.

The dif-fering of which the most beautiful harmony emerges we have seen in the in-tension of *hen panta*. We lay the emphasis here on the harmonizing itself as *physis*. For Hegel this constitutes a preliminary form of consciousness presenting *physis* as “the concept of the existing unity in opposites, not in the reflective.”<sup>251</sup> What for Hegel is a

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<sup>249</sup> Heraclitus, B107

<sup>250</sup> *GA15*, 343

<sup>251</sup> Hegel G. W. F., *W18*, 337

*not-yet*, grounds the inceptive force of a thought which attempts to approach *physis* in terms other than unity; the unity of *physis* is *not-yet* reflexive in Heraclitus, because he thinks *from* the inceptive difference to presence. Hegel of course knows that: “the simple, the repetition of a sound is not harmony. To harmony belongs difference.”<sup>252</sup> But Hegelian and Heraclitean difference are very different. Heidegger translates Heraclitean difference in rendering the whole B8: “counter-striving a bringing-together (*to antixoun sympheron*) and from out of bringing-asunder the one radiant jointure (*kai ek tōn diapherontōn kallistēn harmonia*).” In this translation we need to think to *antixoun sympheron* as (in the precise tropos of the ‘is *not/is* not’) *hen panta*; the ‘and’ of the fragment has the sense of ‘thus’, ‘accordingly’.

In accordance with the *antixoun sympheron* of B8, in B51 we hear first that what dif-fers (*diapheromenon*) *eōutōi homologeei* (is in homology with and towards itself). Again this re-turns us to the tropos of the ‘is *not/is* not’. In this outward striving movement (*diapheromenon*), beings, and *physis* as beings, are not self-identical or in self-unity, but in the lection of the *homou*. The second clause regards the bow and lyre, not just any objects, nor objects with certain properties, but the precise signs (symbols) of Artemis, the first signifying the decision (*krisis*) over life and death, the second of harmony itself. In view of them, harmony appears as *palintropos* (counter-turning) or as often corrected and read as *palintonos* (counter-tensive). Both readings are equally valid, that is, in accord with Heraclitean thought. What turns and strives against self-identity is precisely what harmonizes. The task of thought is thus for Heidegger not to en-join this counter-tension, but to show that what tends counter and against each other belongs to the essence of jointure,<sup>253</sup> that is, to the counter-effectuation of presence that discovers the excess of absence in its heart,<sup>254</sup> in the counter-turning of a lesion that is the event of the world.<sup>255</sup> We should thus think jointure, precisely as the counter-turning, counter-tending of essence, in the tension of a jointure where *hen belongs to the counter-turning, and the plurality of turnings becomes panta only in the dif-fERENCE of jointure*.

The dif-fERENCE of this jointure is *polemos*, showing in *kosmos* some as gods, others as men, enslaving some, liberating others.<sup>256</sup> This counter-turning, this polemic

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<sup>252</sup> Ibid., 327

<sup>253</sup> *GA55*, 147

<sup>254</sup> De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.170

<sup>255</sup> Ibid., p.163

<sup>256</sup> Heraclitus, B53

harmony is not a unity, but a contact and communication of counter-tensions, paradigmatically of the one often called being and appearing, to which we subsequently turn. This merely apparent opposition is relegated to the order of polemic harmony of B54. The un-showing (*aphanēs*) harmony shows itself in *polemos* more powerful than the showing (*phanerē*), a ‘transvaluation’ of the ancient economic precedence of *ousia phanera* (landed property) over *ousia aphanēs* (money).<sup>257</sup> *Phanerē*, does not refer here to the clarity of the abyss we approached earlier, but to mere light deprived of such clarity. In parallel, the *aphanēs* is not merely hidden harmony, but the clearing, the evermore manifesting accord, the most open of all that is open. Yet (and precisely in accord with the tropos of the open) something ineffable remains in its en-joining, the ineffable that is not hiding, but offering itself. This is the inception (the origin) of Platonic eidetic *methexis*, alien to all mysticism, a community directly seen,<sup>258</sup> yet never seized. It is only Platonism (and Plato as Platonist) that attempts this vain seizing. Un-showing polemic harmony is accordingly *kreittōn* (more powerful), not because as Heidegger thinks it is a more potent, more enabling unity,<sup>259</sup> but because in harmony *polemos* shows itself as what guides all polemic harmony. Heidegger has understood that “*physis* as *harmonia* is the ignition (*Entfachtung*) of the lighted, which self-simplifies (*sich einfacht*) in the unlighted;”<sup>260</sup> that the un-showing is the need (*to chreōn*) of the showing. What he is reluctant to admit is such a harmonizing *beyond* all unity: the cor-respondence of the ignition of light, the inflammation (*Entflammen*) of the flame that is *physis* as pure emergence, to the simplicity (*einfachen*) of *physis* as jointure; an ineffable, manifest need of the open.

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<sup>257</sup> Philosophy begins thus from an order of invisibility, a sight of the invisible denoted by the obsolete name of *speculation*. For economy, the spectrality of *ousia aphanēs* has always been evident as attested precisely in *speculation*. At one, the possibility of exiting the sponsoring function, avoiding its cumbersome obligations in ancient Athens took place mostly in the *exchange* of *phanera* into *aphanēs*, which enabled the *hiding* of property (*apokrypsis ousias*). Money was and remained thus of a lesser – ontologically and ethically – *reality* than land. Philosophy, only of late recognizing the spectrality of hiding, in its return to the inceptive Heraclitean moment, a moment forever fixed in the order of presence in the Platonic-Aristotelian horizon of *ousia*, *accepts* at last the duplicity the spectre *ousia*, like every spectre, evokes: the truth of the unshowing, even if the origin is more true and precisely because of this, it is not *merely* more *real*.

<sup>258</sup> See Kurt Riezler’s *Traktat vom Schönen*.

<sup>259</sup> *GA55*, 143

<sup>260</sup> *GA55*, 161

#### D. The never setting

The question of the how, of the manner and way, of the tropos, one may evade this need is posed in B16, which Clement equates to a decided answer, the impossibility, unlike with sensible light, to hide from the intellectual light. We turn to the question of the possibility of this evasion and hear the precise words of Heraclitus: “*to mē dynon pote pōs an tis lathoi?*”

The question asks: *pōs an tis*—how could anyone? Anyone; a man or god as differed in *polemos*. How can anyone evade (*lathoi*) the never setting (*to mē dynon pote*)? From the preceding it is clear that we think of the never setting in the sign of use/need (*to chreōn*). Yet, we need look closer. In *dynon*, speaks the verb *dyō*, to set, like the sun sets. One says: *pros dynontos hēliou*, towards (the time of) the setting sun, towards (about) the evening or *nephea dynai*, to set and hide behind clouds. *To mē dynon pote*, appears thus as a never setting sun, what does not revolve and turn, what has no tropos.

Heidegger adapts a Nietzschean equating interpretation: the never setting is thought as the never disappearing. Accordingly, Heidegger says that in Greek words (as if *to mē dynon pote* had not already an autonomous inceptive significance), we need to think the never disappearing as the ever-emerging, *to aei phyon*, as *physis*. It is important to keep in mind the double significance of *dynon* as both what sets and disappears and as the setting, the disappearing itself and as such, withholding with Heidegger both senses of the word.<sup>261</sup> It is precisely in this argument that the duplicity is put into use in transforming *to mē dynon pote* into *physis*. *To mē dynon pote* is originally: i. what does not ever set, then ii. the ever not-setting or iii. the never-setting, and then iv. the ever-emerging, which iv. constitutes the essence of *physis*.<sup>262</sup>

In this transformative equation unconcealment and concealment are not two distinct events, but one identical.<sup>263</sup> Emergence is thought to incline towards demise and thus pass into it.<sup>264</sup> It is also thought that emergence gives grace to the demise; giving grace, an erotic *metaphor*, is transformed into identification: emergence becomes already in itself demise.<sup>265</sup> Yet this identity accords to a specific sense of grace. Grace (*Gunst*) is thought as granting (*Gönnen*) and affording (*Gewähren*). In *philia* (the play

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<sup>261</sup> GA55, 53

<sup>262</sup> GA55, 101

<sup>263</sup> GA7, 277

<sup>264</sup> GA55, 117

<sup>265</sup> GA55, 118

between *philia* and *eros* is irreducible) one grants the other the essence that is of the other, but in a trope that affords this essence to flourish in its own freedom.<sup>266</sup> It is precisely as this granting and affording that the grace of emergence belongs to self-concealment.<sup>267</sup> Ultimately for Heidegger “grace is the innerness of simple differing”, allowing the towards and against one another of emergence and demise to appear in clarity and constituting the elemental trait of *eris* (strife).<sup>268</sup> We know however that it is not the grace of innerness, clearly not in any sense of unity that allows the one to differ; the difference of the one is pure in-tension, an inward force of what never constitutes an interiority. Neither is in-tension grace, but the *polemos*, the struggle of emergence against absence, to which it belongs.

It is possible to hear *to mē dynon pote* twice in *physis kryptesthai philei*. *Physis* as emergence and letting-emerge corresponds to *to mē dynon pote*<sup>269</sup> insofar as the latter is thought never to enter *into* concealment, precisely *in grace*, as a constant emerging *from* concealment. Because however concealment accompanies every emergence, *to mē dynon pote*, as the ever-emerging from concealment, conceals in its very never-setting. This ‘never’ means for Brogan that *physis* “never gives itself over to be revealed, never abandons its friendship with the dark and hidden sources of revelation.”<sup>270</sup> This accordingly means that *to mē dynon pote* speaks also in *kryptesthai*. And thus *philia* appears as love of i. *physis* as the unconcealed emergence *from* unconcealment ii. the *kryptesthai* as the concealment *in* emergence. We know by now that this is not a love of an opposition in essence, which always becomes a love of identity, nor a love of identity that always turns into essential opposition, but a love of *the origin of not*. What never sets is never the presence of the sun, but sun as origin.

The question however asks also of a specific relation towards the sun of the *not*. This relation is expressed in ‘*lathloi*’, that is, in *lanthanō*. Heidegger understands *lanthanō* accurately as remaining concealed; his favourite example depicts Ulysses in the palace of the Phaeacian king, who, hearing the song of the singer Demodokos, *enth’ allous men pantas* (among everyone else) *elanthane dakryas leibōn* (remained

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<sup>266</sup> GA55, 128

<sup>267</sup> GA55, 131

<sup>268</sup> GA55, 133

<sup>269</sup> GA7, 279

<sup>270</sup> Brogan W. A., *Heraclitus, Philosopher of the Sign*, in Jacobs D. C. (ed.), *The Presocratics after Heidegger*, p.266

concealed while spilling tears).<sup>271</sup> Accordingly, *lanthanō* does not mean to conceal, but to dwell, to remain in concealment. So that the famous Epicurean maxim: *lathe biōsas*, does not mean: live concealing yourself, but live in concealment. For Heidegger this counsel can only be grounded in an understanding of concealment that pervades the whole of Greek thought, and for which remaining concealed does not denote a determinate human behaviour, but the essential trait of presencing and absencing itself.<sup>272</sup> The philological ground of this extrapolation is certainly thin, but what is more significant for the Heideggerian thesis is that this essential trait eventually presents an impossibility with regard to ever-emerging *physis*. For what distinguishes men and gods altogether, is precisely the impossibility of remaining concealed in the clearing, insofar as their relation to the clearing is the clearing itself, as what collects and holds them together. In the clearing they are not only themselves illuminated, but mutually enlightened. Thus they bring in their own tropes the clearing to its completion and so protect it.<sup>273</sup>

It appears impossible to remain concealed from the *not* that is the clearing. Yet this *not* that we saw as a threefold with regard to *hen panta*, with its third fold relating to ex-istence, requires a final act. In the never setting sun one can never remain concealed, but a possibility remains: to exit. Whither? Anew into the dominion of the sun. Ex-istence oversteps the measure of the sun to discover measure and find a place in the sun. *To mē dynon pote* is the incessant *not*, the un- of the unthought that drives existence into the abyss of thought, where the origin reigns. The origin is *not/is* not the *not*. Ex-istence steps out of in-tensity to discover its law, to in-tend and in-tensify its never setting intention.

## 7. Logou synopsis

Thus the inception reaches an unprecedented and unrepeated clarity, a unique fullness of expression that amplifies the Anaximandrian origin and prepares the Parmenidean excess of Being. At the great noon of the inception the shadows grow ever

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<sup>271</sup> Homer, *Odyssey*, VIII, 93

<sup>272</sup> GA7, 273

<sup>273</sup> GA7, 285



deeper as we come to think with Heraclitus the essence of *logos* in lection, *in turn* the essence of lection as lesion.

In this lesion *logos* speaks not as word, but as the silent pro-logue of all language. *Logos* as *legere* lays out and forth and brings together in the sense of *sōzein*, salvaging *what-is* as *what-it-is*. In this ‘*as*’ the second sense of *logos* comes forth, the *reor* of *ratio*, holding something *as* something. In this two-fold of opening and showing *what-is* in the *as*, *logos* is *polemos*, the paternal index of the world that brings together the *antixoun*, what strives away from each other, gives it a place and places it. Such *polemos* unfolds the second fold of *logos*, the fold of the *as*, so that *what-is*, beings, appear as more than exclusively beings, in their tropic (social, political, religious, etc.) equi-essential excess. Thus *logos* col-lects difference and shelters strife, the Artemic *eris* col-lecting life and death, in a col-lection that doesn’t merely heap or se-lect but allows *what-is* in need of shelter to step into the *as*. This collection is tension and lies closest to the presence of *what-presences* in the pain attested in *alegō*; the pain of a lesion forming the tension that holds together.

Being cannot exhaust such lesion—foreign to every logic that disallows Nothing—for such lesion presents Being with the structure of concealment at the heart of unconcealment. This structure is best exemplified in the tropes of a fire that we have come to think not as element, but as the unshowing harmonization of *kosmos*. Fire as the structure of concealment constitutes precisely the Heraclitean *es* that *gibt*, what we have hitherto known as Nothing, while the *gibt* itself cor-responds to *aeizōon*, (the) ever-giving-forth-the-emerging. In this ‘*ever-*’ we come to understand ourselves not only as already falling and late, but as always already on fire.

Fire is the unshowing structure of the emerging, *physis*. It is a *physis* that doesn’t hide, but forms the opening of the most proximal of proximities. To remain open such *physis* needs to re-member the *chreōn* of concealment that preserves the trace of absence in its radiant emergence and counter-tends and en-joins its presence. This is the event of the world, the lesion whereby *kosmos* emerges from unconcealment and yet remains concealed in this emergence.

Of this *kosmos* it is *sophon* to say *hen panta*. *All one* is a *synapsis*, a nexus of disconnections where the one is *not/is* not. Only as such ‘*is*’ the one all, for it ‘*is*’ only a turning, a tropos. *Philo-sophia* accordingly consists in the love of the origin of the *not* that never sets, a love that says the *one* as tropos, as difference (*diapheron*) that leads outside (*diapheromenon*). This ex-cessive ex-istence never sets, but forms the incessant

*not*, from which one may *not* remain concealed, as it unconceals the thorough saturation of presence with absence. Saturation 'is' thus in-tension, the most concise translation of *hen panta*. Saying this tension is philosophic homology. *More and rather than* dialectics Heraclitus thinks homology, the cor-respondence of ex-istence and beings, that offers the responsibility of hearing. Hearing, homology discovers the *not* in *hen* and in *panta*, in their relation that constitutes the *kosmos* and in the relation of *kosmos* to ex-istence. The threefold of these in-tensions *gives* precisely as ever-turning fire.

The *phronimon pyr* then will maintain measure in accordance with *dikē*. For this measure it needs to consume the world in order to create it, *dikē* needs to transgress its own justice and punish presence for having ex-isted, whereby ex-istence discovers the *logos* of ex-cess, stepping out into the abyss of Nothing to claim in *nemesis* the *nomos* of itself. Nothing teaches in *dikē* the *nomos* of ex-cess which man hears in the homou.

We turn then to hear the first thinker of *dikē*, the thinker of the first *periechon*, the thinker of *apeiron*.

## V. Anaximander

### Introduction

We arrive at the beginning, in its inception we are about to begin. Here the doxographic tradition presents us with the singular heritage that is Anaximander's own sole utterance. This heritage is delivered enveloped in a quote of Theophrastus by Simplicius in his *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*; when isolated it reads:

*ex hōn de ē genesis estin tois ousi kai tēn pthoran eis tauta ginesthai kata to chreōn; didonai gar auta dikēn kai tisin allēlois tēs adikias kata tēn tou chronou taxin*

This radioactive rhizome is the first genuine fragment of *sophia* the West manages to salvage from time, even if its particles (most notably *genesis* and *pthora*, understood intentionally as *generation* and *corruption*) would often be disinherited as ridden with Peripatetic corruption. Since less than utter caution in our descent into the first utterance could prove catalytic, we dwell on the Greek sounds before any attempt at translation; indeed, to leap ahead into a translation would amount to no less than a leap into the abyss of the origin.

Yet next to the singular fragment appears *another*; hyper-elliptic, truncated down to another singularity, that of the word: the fragment of fragments, the single word *apeiron*. In this word doxography has shown the prudence of refraining from doubt; *apeiron* is as originally a word of Anaximander, as *chreōn*, *dikē* and *chronos*. Its exclusion as B2, in parallel to the one-word Heraclitean fragments<sup>1</sup> in Diels' classification, is the single greatest authoritative error in his definitive groundwork of archaic thought. This error was itself grounded and grounded in turn an understanding of the word as concept.<sup>2</sup> The field that *apeiron* opens up, is however most remote and

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<sup>1</sup> B68 *akea* and B122 *agchibasia*, for example. The rarity of these words makes their attribution to Heraclitus easy. *Apeiron* on the contrary was a word in much wider circulation. It was Anaximander however who set the economy of this circulation in motion.

<sup>2</sup> In Diels, an exclusive distinction of the actual word (B) and the commentary (A), left no room for what appeared to be neither: neither a word of another, another's description of a thought of Anaximander, nor according to strict philological criteria a word delivered as Anaximander's own, even if its authenticity lay beyond doubt. Precisely then, *apeiron* was moulded into a concept that was also a principle,

alien to the realm of the concept. *Apeiron* condenses Anaximander's thought to a point beyond the limits of language. It is the first philosophical distillation, a liquid thought of intensive fermentation. And this is the first meaning of *apeiron* with relation to its utterance, its unfettering activity, a sub-version of the concept, is equally its density and diction. More than the fragment itself, which Theophrastus immediately termed poetic, the seeming solitude of *apeiron* is the essence of its poeticity.

We set ourselves within these limits defined at their extremities *as* and *by* the *Saying* and the *Word* of Anaximander (and yet precisely the thought of Anaximander cannot be subsumed under either extremity, nor is it merely the aggregate of the two, but takes place equally in the tension of their *between*). This does not correspond to a prearranged eclecticism. Three reasons prescribe our cartography: first, the ramifications implicated in a claim for more land from Anaximander's lost Atlantis, far exceed our terrain; in fact, secondly, this claim essentially undoes pleonastic desires, as fruits are born counter-proportionally to the efforts that cultivated them, yielding ever-smaller accruals of meaning to the potent heart of Anaximander's thought; lastly, it is this trembling heart that allows our passage into the trope of Nothing; a necessary and sufficient ground.

### 1. Anaximander before Heidegger

Although Anaximander was occasionally suspected as uniquely philosophical among the Milesian philosophers, his thought awaited on the metaphysical margin, at the limits of silence, the penetrating intensity of Heidegger for a restitution to due emphasis, the unfolding of the third fold next to the Heraclitean and Parmenidean panes; the forest planes above the plain of early thought. Heidegger, in his recurrent lectures, only once evokes another contribution and this, self-justifiably, in the negative: "The only thinker of the occident, who has thoughtfully experienced the history of thought, is Hegel. Yet precisely he says nothing on the *Saying* of Anaximander."<sup>3</sup> A strong ambivalence permeates both clauses. We concentrate on the latter and try to

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Anaximander's genuine *archē*; a word that in turn one guesses he was the first to make a word of philosophy.

<sup>3</sup> *GA5*, 323

hearken to the lecturing Hegel himself and his general judgment: “[Anaximander’s] philosophical ideas are of little scope and don’t arrive at determination.”<sup>4</sup> One of these short-sighted ideas is *apeiron*. Hegel, as much as Nietzsche subsequently, thinks of Anaximander’s *apeiron*, through a first, hasty, transposing translation as the *infinite* (*Unendliche*) and accordingly by means of a second transposition, as the *indefinite*, precisely, the *minimally defined*. Hegel accepts at face value Plutarch’s reasoning for the introduction of *apeiron* as Anaximander’s own: “for it may not be short in matter in the progressing engendering.” Subscribing to the Aristotelian tradition, Hegel rests convinced that although Anaximander’s principle appears immaterial, materiality must undeniably constitute its hidden import. He follows Aristotle’s lead further: the infinitude of this material infinite rests not in magnitude but in number, so that, like number, is not discrete, but continuous.<sup>5</sup> This is an infinity of opposing parts, themselves changing within its unchanging indeterminacy; warmth and coldness are the opposites Hegel appears to intend, but they are left in turn unmentioned, undetermined. Again; although Anaximander didn’t say *such* was the infinitude of matter, we seem to know that this is the negativity of the finite that poses determinations and erases its division, a division of thickening and thinning, or of the warm and the cold.<sup>6</sup>

An offhand and irresponsibly rough rendition of Anaximander’s sole fragment seals Hegel’s wholesale treatment: “It is the principle of all becoming and vanishing; from it emerge infinite worlds (gods) and vanish again in the identical- this has a very oriental tone.”<sup>7</sup> If the word *becoming* is meant to translate *genesis*, and even if *principle* and *infinity* could stand for *archē* and *apeiron*, ‘world’ and ‘gods’ are expressively absent among the words doxography preserved as Anaximander’s own. One can only suspect this summary translation to come from careless memory, with a rhetoric purpose of diffusing while appearing to explain: the briefest closing remark, a remark leaving undetermined the heavy accusation of an oriental tone, which means for Hegel abstract determination,<sup>8</sup> is enough to discredit the first philosophic utterance of the occident.

One wonders whether a force other than historic schematism guides even such spassing attention to Anaximander in Hegel’s lectures. Interestingly, the law of this

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<sup>4</sup> Hegel G. W. F., *W18*, 210

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 210

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 211

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 210

<sup>8</sup> See for example, *ibid.*, 138-41

force is precisely Anaximander's crude idea of the infinite. For the first time, the principle discovers its potential for negativity, insofar as the Orient possessed negation but lacked the principle of a concept: "the absolute essence is no longer a simple, but a negative, generality, a negation of the finite."<sup>9</sup> And yet, this is far from enough; this conception of the concept is not brought to fruition as formal principle. So, insofar as the attempt at conceiving negativity failed to take roots in conceptuality, logic immediately reverts to material positivity. "In place of the indeterminate material of Anaximander, he [Anaximenes] placed again a determinate natural element (the absolute in a real form)."<sup>10</sup>

This is the gravest failure of the Ionians, recognized by Aristotle and confirmed by Hegel: the inability to account for the immaterial, providing merely the elements of the material. On grounds of matter, the impossibility of such critique becomes evident. The Ionians never entered the scheme of matter, engendered in its distinction to form: a curse of the metaphysical win of Aristotle in his *polemos* with the Platonic Idea. Even less were they guided by a thought of elements; a Platonic transcription of writing into Being inaugurating a *stoicheiology* to account for what was perceived as the atomist principle: *the element of Democritean matter was the element itself*. If so much was clear, retroactively each predecessor had to be attributed at least one element. In this attempt the critiques of the neglect of the immaterial and of the conflation of the general and the particular converge; *the Ionians who failed to think the immaterial, immaterialized matter, presenting the General in the particular Form of an element*. If the absurdity of this accusation, of a trial *in absentio*, is already evident, we are entitled to further suspicion on clustering together without proviso, Anaximander, Thales and Anaximenes.

Becoming, in the specific guise of change, marks the crux of their divergence. Again the Ionians are accused *in toto* for failing to account for the cause of change, insofar as they took their principle to be material. Thus, for example, nothing is to come forth from Thales' water unless something acts upon it, like a carpenter on wood, an idea on the world. So that if the reasons of motion are lacking, motion itself should be lacking.<sup>11</sup> However, all three Ionians are thinkers of change; change is not one of their thoughts, but its hidden originary essence. And yet, what sets Anaximander apart is the

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 211

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 214

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 216-7

attempt to think the *ground* of this essence, what one readily mistranslates into 'its reason'. In the ruined language of metaphysics one could equally say, that even if Thales and Anaximenes made their principal material, Anaximander's was clearly formal, a premature objection that constitutes Aristotle's specific unease with regard to Anaximander; an unease unfelt by Hegel.

The first thinkers of Ionia never endeavoured a thought of matter and a thought of the element. Neither out of lack, nor because these concepts were too intricate. The elemental and the material were projects of others; and deeper as we now clearly know, the inception is never conceptual.

Hegel's summary sentence on Anaximander: "infinity, description of motion, simple coming forth and returning into the simple general sides of the form, thickening and thinning,"<sup>12</sup> has now another, hollow ring.

The young Nietzsche is here still under the sway of Hegel; he thus defines the essence of *apeiron* as *mia physis aoristos*,<sup>13</sup> indefinite rather than infinite nature. In this both follow an essential tendency in Aristotle who thought Anaximander's *apeiron* in the ambiguity of infinite/indefinite matter, an ambiguity amplified by the incision of Theophrastus, to whom the words *mia physis aoristos* belong.<sup>14</sup> As already evident, the primary matter must be infinite (the trope of the infinite that Aristotle understands as formal quality) to vouchsafe the incessant provision of the ever-lasting process of birth. The redoubling of the infinite once as matter and again as form, was for both Aristotle and Hegel seen as Anaximander's crudeness. Yet this was but a measuring of metaphysics against a thought it has no concepts to conceive and hold captive. And Hegel may have revised and nuanced his reading in view of the tectonic difference between his and Aristotle's understanding of *apeiron*, if it wasn't for his guiding faith in Aristotle and his preconception of the indefiniteness of Anaximander's thought and words, foremostly his infinite/indefinite.

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<sup>12</sup> Hegel G. W. F., *WI8*, 218

<sup>13</sup> Nietzsche F., *KG, II4*, p.245

<sup>14</sup> The ambiguity is never resolved as Aristotle never re-names *apeiron*. For example: Aristotle, *Physics*, III, 4, 203b6ff. & 5, 204b22ff.; also I, 4, 187a12. Simplicius in his commentary of *Physics* remains, with regard to Aristotle, faithful to this singular employment of *apeiron* (see for example: 24, 13, from where B1 is extracted), but dares also the insertion of the Theophrastian interpretation (154, 14). Theophrastus only makes explicit the implicit *aporia* in the indecipherable *apeiron*. And yet the struggle is subsequently taken as a won battle, starting with Laertius ("*archēn kai stoicheion to apeiron, ou diorizōn aera ē hydōr, ē allo ti*") *Lives*, II, 1-2, 1)—by the time of Hegel thought does not need to think to render *apeiron aoriston*.

Theophrastus however already took issue with the uncharitable impasse of understanding *apeiron* as indeterminate infinity and makes an epistemological transition by employing the Aristotelian lesson of the *gnōrimon aplōs*: the infinite is indeterminate for us, but in its essence not indeterminate; as such of course it is no mere mixture of determinate elements.

Nietzsche is also unsatisfied with the Aristotelian logic. He believes to follow instead the hidden logic of Anaximander: every *gignomenon*, everything that is in becoming is bound to perish- in order for birth never to cease, its primordial essence must rise above it- this essence is thus not a being, it is not part of the becoming-not-being-a-thing, it is *indefinite*.<sup>15</sup> For Nietzsche “Everything endowed with qualities emerges and passes away: thus there must be a Being without qualities”—this is the teaching Nietzsche puts in Anaximander’s mouth. With Aristotle and Hegel, Nietzsche traces the deepest of Anaximander’s difficulties in change. A tracing unlike the Hegelian that remains faithful to the understanding of *apeiron* as the indefinite. The impossibility of change lies in the ontological abyss that separates being(-a-thing) and not-being(-a-thing); the first, full of qualities can never emerge from the latter, indefinite neutrality. Nietzsche takes Heraclitus as the first to have given the *one* the infinite qualities that are required in bringing forth the *kosmos* ripe with qualities and infinite injustices; Heraclitus was thus the first to give an answer to the silent anxiety of a cosmody, <sup>16</sup> the possibility and actuality of a singular *kosmos* fragmented in acts of injustice, which constitute its determination.

Nietzsche attempts a placing, a fixation of the absent theme of Becoming in Anaximander. Like Hegel, he turns to doxography and makes out of the two hypothetic principles of cold and warm a homology with Being and Becoming respectively. Nietzsche speaks thus of a dualism in Anaximander, illustrating thereby the futility of such ontological classifications with regard to the thinkers of the inception. For if Being (cold) and Becoming (warm) are two, then the *apeiron* emerges as a third. And yet *apeiron* is precisely the *one*. Nietzsche understands here for the first time *apeiron* as the trope that enjoins Being-Becoming. With the Pythagoreans and the metaphysic tradition, however, he sees this enjoining as *a* one, as presence, even if indefinite. *Mia physis aoristos*, the unity of the absolutely indefinite comes forth as the singularity of a

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<sup>15</sup> Nietzsche F., *KG*, II4, p.244

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p.271



presence. And yet *physis* withholds its elusiveness, *physis* is *the* Greek *tropos*, continually rendering presence asunder.

It is now evident that each time thought tried to think the deepest instance of Anaximander's inception, it was captivated by the web of his *Word*. For Aristotle, Hegel and Nietzsche Anaximander originates and culminates in the *apeiron*. We may still in passing sojourn in the contrary approach. Werner Jaeger, a contemporary of Heidegger was among the first to attempt an understanding of Anaximander through his *Saying*. The result for Jaeger is the portrait of the thinker who made "the discovery of the cosmos,"<sup>17</sup> a thought in pursuit of *a moral law of nature* and of the *creation of a cosmos*.

Yet what did Anaximander discover? How are we to understand *kosmos*, what diverse spectrum of connotations weaves the fabric of its sign? *Kosmeō* in Homer has the foremost meaning of arranging, *kosmos* most often referring to the ordered battle-array of an army. *Kosmeō* can thus refer to the *well-behaved*, the *tempered constitution* of an army, in the sense that Thucydides also commonly employs the word. The aesthetic meaning of the word, as jewel and ornament seems to be only attested in later texts, although the word already gives grounds for its coupling with and beyond the beautiful. The crux of this transformation that allows the nihilic significance of *kallistos kosmos* we have come to know with Heraclitus<sup>18</sup> is often traced to Pythagoras himself, the first to use the word in the sense previously located in *ouranos*<sup>19</sup>—the celestial order of the all. It is indeed to this previous usage Timaeus reverts to when he conflates *ouranos*, *kosmos* and *pan*.<sup>20</sup>

And yet even if this Pythagorean origin is true, the specific ground of this transformation, the ground that enabled the coupling of universal and human order recedes into the abyss of time; the origin thus gained needing to be attested and thought from the texts themselves. What however this plural origin uniformly points at, is that *kosmos* is not merely *any* arrangement, but a definite one: the arranged world has a *tropos*, a Zarathustrean *thus*. If we were then to turn to the texts, Kahn's observation could lead our way: *synistasthai*<sup>21</sup> is the most regular verb to accompany *kosmos*.

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<sup>17</sup> Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, 160

<sup>18</sup> Heraclitus, B124. See pp.128-9

<sup>19</sup> Sallis J. *Chorology*, p.53

<sup>20</sup> Plato, *Timaeus*, 28b

<sup>21</sup> Kahn C. H., *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*, p.223

*Synistasthai*: being constituted and standing together; *the 'thus' of the arrangement is the enjoining*: it enjoins in the '*thus*' of arrangement and it arranges in mutual jointure.

Jaeger has a profound intuition: certainly Anaximander did not discover *kosmos*—yet he discovered the essence of *kosmos*, an essence that is precisely not cosmological, and possibly neither an essence in the ontological sense at all.<sup>22</sup> Equally, the second claim of Jaeger with regard to moral law remains open. Indeed we can only gain access to its horizon, when we have first attended to a close hearing of Anaximander's saying.

## 2. The symbolic structure of the Saying—saying what-is

An understanding of the syn-tax, of the conjoining of the parts of the fragment, its *structure*, could help us clear the way to its understanding. Symbolic does not have here a meaning opposed to the real, nor does it imply the linguistic dimension of the structure. It means as we have come to think with Heraclitus the setting (*bolē*) together (*syn*) of its parts in a trope that guides one's way like a *sēma*,<sup>23</sup> a signpost.

The fragment is articulated in two clauses: the first, *ex hōn ... kata to chreōn*; the second, *didonai ... kata tin tou chronou taxin*. First then come precisely the questions around this articulation, how it happens, its specific import, what it allows to come to the fore, what it retains in the background. Heidegger would through all his revisits of the fragment<sup>24</sup> remain particularly sensitive to this articulation, structured by a necessity and enabling the necessity of the *Saying* to come to expression.

We start from the hinge of the whole *Saying*, around which it is free to revolve. The minimal word *gar* after *didonai*, the most common of ancient Greek structural words, provides the joining-grounding relation between the clauses,<sup>25</sup> so that they may in their difference speak of the *identical*. It is a bold claim, a claim in advance, the claim of the identical; before we can rely on it, we need to smith the relation of this difference

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<sup>22</sup> Precisely like “the essence of technology might be nothing technological, but it also is not at all, in a certain fashion, of an essence anymore.” Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, p.167.

<sup>23</sup> See p.76 for the Parmenidean symbol that informs symbolic thought throughout the essay.

<sup>24</sup> Inaugurated with the 1932 lectures on Anaximander and Parmenides (GA35), then returned to in the second part of the lectures of 1941 (GA51), finally fully explicated in the lectures of 1946 (GA78). The most succinct and famous articulation of this long engagement made public under the same title as that year's lectures: *Der Spruch des Anaximander* of 1946, collected in *Holzwege* (GA5).

<sup>25</sup> GA78, 29

to the identical in each of the strata of its manifestation. Before we can turn to and fully understand the *gar*, we need to turn to the members it unites; then we may return to what these members are saying a second time.

Kahn would make these members a mere repetition of a certain relationship of elements first in physical and then in legal terms; a hasty solution, as long as a secure access to the meaning of *physis* and law is want. Equally, the particular domain of which Kahn's elements are elements *of*, needs illumination before their relationship can come forth. And yet, a certain repetition seems to be at work, a first sign of the identical.

The repetition finds expression in the word *kata*, determining the trope of the saying of each clause. It is a trope of correspondence; *kata*: one *with regard to* another; an according, intensive correspondence. A latter writer offers a guiding example: Musonius Rufus assesses marriage as *kata physin* par excellence.<sup>26</sup> Man *with regard to woman* is in the trope of marriage most in *accordance to physis*; the *intention* of the *physis* of man and of *physis* for man is this particular *correspondence*. *Physis* has nothing to do with nature as the realm of *animalitas*, but is still understood in its Greek origin; *kata*, is its trope.

Tentatively we attempt thus with Heidegger to understand the first correspondence as a figuration towards the *archē*, the second towards time.

In the first clause appear the structural units: i. *ex hōn ... eis tauta*, ii. *ē genesis ... kai tēn pthoran*, iii. *tois ousi* and iv. *ginesthai kata to chreōn*. With regard to *genesis* and *pthora*, e-mergence and e-vasion (ec-lipse), we need be cautious against transforming them into natural processes, transposing them into an order of natural mechanics, into a scientific figuration. Within the first clause/trope/correspondence, a further correspondence of emergence and evasion is attested, so that we may equally read this unit: *ē genesis ... kata tēn pthoran*. The second unit that opens and envelops the first clause, *ex hōn ... eis tauta* (whence ... whither), invokes what we termed the identical (*tauton*). The identical is however at work in both poles of the field opened by this unit, in *ex hōn* as much as in *eis tauta*. And again we may read this polarity as a second correspondence within the first clause: *ex hōn ... kata tauta*. Both units and correspondences function for Heidegger on the ground of the identical: the identical

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<sup>26</sup> Musonius Rufus, *Reliquiae*, XIV, p.71

signified by emergence and evasion, by the whence and the whither. Heidegger thinks also the third unit, *tois ousi* (of beings), as the focus of the identical. We shall shortly return to *ousi*. Finally in the first clause, we read: *ginesthai kata to chreōn*. The trope of the *chreōn* arranges (*kosmeei*) the whole first clause. *To chreōn* arranges as beginning, inceptively: “The Saying on Being takes place in correspondences: The first sentence thinks Being as the *chreōn* in correspondence to inception as three-fold dis-posal.”<sup>27</sup> We are familiar with this threefold from *The Beginning of Truth*.<sup>28</sup> *Archē*: *the withdrawing, retaining, en-joining giving of a way*. And yet it is important to keep in mind that the first clause does not endeavour into the *archē tōn ontōn*, but thinks the *whence* and *whither* of them, for Heidegger of their *Being*;<sup>29</sup> for *us* of their *Nothing*.

The second clause is arranged around the units: i. *auta ... allēlois*, ii. *didonai ... dikēn kai tisin ... tēs adikias*, iii. *kata tēn tou chronou taxin* and lastly iv. *gar*, which grammatically belongs to the second sentence, but semantically joints the two clauses, belonging exclusively to neither. The second sentence is definitely not a justification of the first. It offers the experience of Being in word, an experience that uncovers the transition, the *ginesthai* of the *archē* of the first clause, as the pure, in itself collected going-forth.<sup>30</sup> *Auta ... allēlois* is in strict parallel to the two correspondences of the first clause, opening up the manifold of *tois ousi* into the trope of accordance: *auta (ta onta) ... kata allēlois (tois ousi)*. It is indeed evident that a second implicit repetition occurs in the fragment. *Ta onta*, beings, appear in both clauses. Singularly in the first, as mutual manifold in the second. The units of *dikē* (jointure) and *chronos* (time) require more preparation before we are able to attend them. In absolute suspension, we only take two general Heideggerian dictions in their conclusive unity: *dikē* and *tisis* are of a different order to a Roman and Christian interpretation of morality, ethics and justice, while the trope (*kata*) of the *chronou taxin* is neither cosmic nor judicial.<sup>31</sup> The trope of the second clause designates the pure order of *beings-in-mutuality*.

We have gained now the ground to return to *gar*: the twofoldness of the difference in the two clauses of the *Saying*. *Gar* is not simply a puzzling world, it is the essential word (Heidegger says the key word). In the *ground-result* (succession)

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<sup>27</sup> GA51, 103

<sup>28</sup> See p.24

<sup>29</sup> GA51, 110

<sup>30</sup> GA51, 122

<sup>31</sup> GA78, 160

relationship that the en-joining *gar* forces upon the clauses, reigns the *grounding relation* of Being to the succeeding beings. And so without saying the same, the two clauses speak out of the identical. *Gar* means not *thus*, is not a *tropos*; it rather means namely (*nämlich*), in accordance with the name, the name of the state-of-things (*Sache* as opposed to *Ding*). It is thus neither a mere cause-result, nor blunt repetition, nor proof of the first by the second clause. It speaks of the identical for the first time; it prefigures the *ergo/donc*, *between and beyond* the cogito and the animal, *between and beyond* reason and madness,<sup>32</sup> an identical *of* innumerable lesions, the name of lesion. The identity of the lesion of *gar* is war; the *polemos* Heraclitus will unfold. For the first time, the war in the *gar* brings the ‘namely’, the identical into language. And so Heidegger says: “The duality of the two ‘propositions’ does not originate from the in-between of the differentiation, but from the wealth of the selfhood of the identical.”<sup>33</sup> At his crossroad, paths part. It is precisely in the between of the clauses, between Being (for Heidegger) and Nothing (for *us*—even as such ‘*us*’ has been hitherto understood) on the one hand and the mutuality of beings on the other, in the abyss of the *gar*, that the two clauses, can be understood as two in their duality: the war, the *gar* is a *gap*.

To follow the Heideggerian understanding of the articulation of the Saying and hear of the Being of beings in the first clause and of beings in Being in the second, we must first attend to the way itself Heidegger hears Being in Anaximander. Despite the ultimate doubt we have come to experience in Parmenides, Heidegger, almost unto the end, will attempt to think the Greek *on* as presence, or ultimately as presencing. Reading the *ousi* of Anaximander, Heidegger says in 1941: “A being [what-is] is – thought in a Greek *tropos*– the presenting [what-presences].”<sup>34</sup> Five years later, in *Der Spruch des Anaximanders*, he adds the *e-* to *on* (precisely the Parmenidean lesson), yet still reads: *eon*: presence in unconcealment.<sup>35</sup> Heidegger makes the *Saying* speak only of *eonta*, reducing the significance of all the other constituents of the fragment to a mere gravitation in the orbit of the *eon*. The *eon* is not merely a being. Its sym-bol consists in the twofoldness that allows the first clause to evoke its being-ness, while the second its being a being.

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<sup>32</sup> The crossing problematic of Derrida’s *Cogito and The History of Madness* (Derrida J., *Writing and Difference*, pp.36-76) and his *Animal That Therefore I am*, lies beyond this essay’s bounds. Yet Derrida thinks in the *donc* in a rare inceptive proximity to the Anaximandrian *gar*.

<sup>33</sup> GA78, 270

<sup>34</sup> GA51, 104

<sup>35</sup> GA5, 370

Heidegger believes that *onta*, *on* and *einai* become in this saying the capital words of occidental thought.<sup>36</sup> This is far from exact. The contrary validates a deeper truth: it is precisely the *onta*, their beingness, which recedes in the words of Anaximander. They are named only once: *tois ousi*. In the second clause they are referred to, however unmistakably, simply as *auta*; indeed when in 1946 Heidegger keeps only the latter part of the fragment as the original core, *auta* are left without an explicit reference to *onta*—as *on* recedes into namelessness, Heidegger learns Nothing.

It is much more than an issue of explication. The general problematic of the saying concerns something that supersedes beings. It comes to the fore with the opening polarity: *ex hōn- eis tauta. Dikē* reigns over the fragment. We may try and focus on *onta*, but this is a false emphasis. At its limit the fragment thinks the Being of beings liminally. Ta *onta* are not the focus. *Einai* however is nowhere mentioned, a presence even more spectral than that of *tois ousi*. This absence is not merely the expression of a lack in the early Ionian vocabulary. What Heidegger calls the Being of beings, Anaximander tries to think in a much more radical, thus diversifying way. It is given no name, for it has no name. It is a *tropos*, a turning.

### 3. The identity of the whence-whither; e-mergence and e-vasion

A question haunts Heidegger, a question which he only dares confide in the form of a note but once, seemingly in the form of an answer but inceptively asking: *Is emergence and evasion a cycle in presence over against absence? What if emergence and evasion stand on the same side against which a third, a more radical absence reigns?*<sup>37</sup>

One of Heidegger's most unravelled and definite answers comes later, in 1932's lecture notes where the question arose; "Rather what-is is as emergence and evasion. And this reigns in Being (*apeiron*)."<sup>38</sup> Being is the identical (*das Selbe*); it is the presence (*Anwesen*) that constitutes the unity (*Einheit*) of *genesis* and *phthora*,<sup>39</sup> the

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<sup>36</sup> GA5, 335

<sup>37</sup> "Aufgehend und Entgehend um An-wesenheit kreisend – so oder so gegenüber Abwesenheit." GA35, 208

<sup>38</sup> GA35, 231

<sup>39</sup> GA78, 117

*whence* of the emergence and the *whither* of the evasion are but the identical.<sup>40</sup> Emergence and evasion can stand *in* unity because their *whence* and *whither* are *the* identical. It is a fine distinction. *Whence* and *whither* are not identical, even if the German expression allows this reading; yet this reading is misleading; we read rather: *the* identical. They are the tropos of Being, its being in flight according to *chreōn*. Thus, as much as they cannot be identical they may not be *in the* identical, in Being. The *whence* and *whither* are *in* ipseity (*Selbigkeit*). Their violent necessity is dictated by ipseity.<sup>41</sup> The *whence* and *whither* are *the* identical, because they *constitute* (the *synistashtai* of the *kosmos*) the identical *in* ipseity, in a belonging-together with regard to (in the tropos of) the identical.

The *whence* and *whither* are indeed *in apeiron* (*Selbigkeit*) but not *in* Being (*Selbe*). Heidegger is well aware of the ramifications of the nuance that defines the limit of metaphysics. He deliberately allows the free permutation between the two and forcefully claims their identity. *The identical* (Being) always claims ipseity for itself.

Let us for a moment turn to the words *genesis* and *phthora*. We saw earlier the doubt surrounding their originality. *Genesis* appears genuine, a common, guiding word among the thinkers of the inception. In *phthora* however one has always heard the resonance of a spurious Aristotelian. Instead, *thanatos* appears in Heraclitus, *olethros* in Parmenides, *apoleipsis* in Empedocles. Beneath us is thin ground. For this, we should best not attempt an alteration, but try to discover the road Anaximander pointed to, even if his sign (*sēma*) was defaced by Theophrastus.

We translate the words as emergence (*Entstehen*) and evasion (*Entgehen*). Emergence is what comes-forth (*e-*) to join and merge with what-is. Heidegger divides and reads *genesis* not with *ex hōn*, but with *estin tois ousi*: for him the force that guides *genesis* is not its origin but its destination. What sounds deeply anti-Heideggerian, is the step Heidegger takes in order to filiate emergence to presence. We read: “*das Entstehen anwest (zukommt) dem Anwesenden*”—e-mergence presences unto (accords with) what-presences.<sup>42</sup> And this is how soon afterwards e-mergence becomes a coming-forth that brings itself forth.<sup>43</sup> Presence engenders presence unto presence, the incestuous affair of metaphysics. Heidegger has the boldness and depth of the realisation: “Not the

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<sup>40</sup> GA78, 123

<sup>41</sup> GA35, 204

<sup>42</sup> GA78, 111

<sup>43</sup> GA78, 113

derivation (*Abstammung*) of things, but the descent (*Herkunft*)<sup>44</sup> of the e-mergence, not the causation of beings, but rather the whence of presence, is being thought.”<sup>45</sup> And yet he makes presence into this origin of presence, falling from the grace of Anaximandrian thought.

And *phthora*? Certainly not a mere cessation, decline or subtraction. Still, Heidegger reads it in the light of presence, in parallel to *genesis*, not with *eis tauta* but with *ginesthai*: *Hē phthora ginetai*—“*das Entgehen entsteht*”—the evading emerges.<sup>46</sup> If e-vasion is the walk (*vadere*) to join non-being, thinking evasion through emergence and accordingly presence, is to complete the filiation of non-being that was latent in emergence. When thus Heidegger designates presence as the transition of the coming-forth into the escaping,<sup>47</sup> he has already evacuated the possibilities of this transition into the singularity of presence.

And when he prompts us to an ec-static thought of emergence and evasion, even if we are still unprepared for the task, the divergence of *our* (and yet even here this remains a Heideggerian *in(-)tension*) understanding of it as a task of Nothing, a *medenic* task and Heidegger’s, a *parousiologic* endeavour, is as evident as it is crucial. We ask with Derrida: “Has not Heidegger, as he always does, skewed the asymmetry *in favour* of what he in effect interprets as the possibility of *favour* itself, of the accorded favour, namely, of the accord that gathers or collects while harmonizing (*Versammlung, Fug*), be it in the sameness of differentials or disagreements [*différends*], and before the synthesis of a sys-tem?”<sup>48</sup>

If *genesis* and *phthora* are *the* identical *in* the ipseity of Nothing, *ex hōn* and *eis tauta*, open the grid of difference of this ipseity. Translating them ‘*whence/wherefrom*’, and ‘*whither/whereto*’ is not merely a rhetorico-poetic solution. The beings spoken of do not arise out of and dissolve *into* other beings.<sup>49</sup> Neither as the tradition wanted *from* hypothesized *elements* like cold and warmth. Nor finally (*out*) of *apeiron*, if this is thought as element, matter or principle. The plural of *hōn/tauta*, points beyond a tidy

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<sup>44</sup> Descent and origin: the first translation, in 1932, of *genesis*; *phthora* is rendered Schwund (dwindling, diminution). Heidegger attempts this translation to avoid the word *Entstehung*, which also bears the meaning of creation and resounds an Aristotelian word-creation and a subsequent understanding of beings as matter.

<sup>45</sup> GA78, 122

<sup>46</sup> GA78, 116

<sup>47</sup> GA51, 119

<sup>48</sup> Derrida J. *Specters of Marx*, p.32

<sup>49</sup> GA78, 35



solution. If it points towards and according to (*kata*) the *chreōn*<sup>50</sup> and the *apeiron*, the effective plurality in the *whence/whither*, is of utter significance.

Before however we continue our way to the plurality of the *chreōn* and *apeiron*, we shall make an excursion into the singularity of *chronos*.

#### 4. Tactic time

In the second clause we find the correspondence: *kata tēn tou chronou taxis*, according to the ordering of time. What is then the order time orders and of the order of which time itself is, what is this double genitive?

*Taxis*, is not *para-taxis*, a next-to-one-another of time-moments, a one-after-another. It is rather allotment, a turning that turns to each and sets (*tassein* or *tattein*) it in its lot. It is this *taxis* that we try to think as the tropos of time. Like the Greek *topos*, *chronos* is not positivist time, a quantitative container, an empty para-meter. As *metron* and allotment *chronos* is never *that-time* but always *time-for*. “*Taxis*, the allotting (*zuweisende*) insetting (*Einweisung*- instruction and admission into Being), names the *tropos* (Weise), in which *chronos*, time, as the en-whiling enjoined into a while, in which what-is-for a-while rests as such, is as a being.”<sup>51</sup> Being a being for Heidegger means presencing, en-whiling; time as *time-for*, is *time-for-a-while*. What-is presences as what-is-for-a-while.<sup>52</sup> The essence of time then, the *Erweilnis*<sup>53</sup> is precisely the giving of the while, en-whiling, a futural gift receding into the past.<sup>54</sup> This giving is what sets (*tassein*) in time. The order of time is tactic.<sup>55</sup> Giving each its *while*, the *taxis* of time is thus not the Platonic order of *kosmos*,<sup>56</sup> not order as the placing of power (Nietzsche) or as the appointed moment in a series of succession (Diels); tactic time

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<sup>50</sup> GA51, 106

<sup>51</sup> GA78, 201

<sup>52</sup> GA78, 219

<sup>53</sup> GA78, 198

<sup>54</sup> See also Derrida J. *Specters of Marx*, p.28. The question where Heidegger becomes Hamlet reads: “How is it possible, that which is? Namely, how is it possible that the present, and therefore time be out of joint?”

<sup>55</sup> While the thetic, is what places in a grid of topoi, tactic is what sets in jointure. Time is thetic, yet moreover, tactic.

<sup>56</sup> For example, Plato, *Gorgias*, 508a.

offers 'appreciation'—the recognition of something in its capacity and presencing essence (*ousia*),<sup>57</sup> precisely, in its *while*. This is the notion of periodicity, in Anaximander, alluded to by Kahn, although in a different, scientific sense.<sup>58</sup> Period is what Heraclitus calls *tropē*, the turning of sea into earth for example,<sup>59</sup> the sub-version and revolution of a world revolving, the incessant turning of the while, into e-mergence and e-vasion.

This is the effect of time Heidegger wants to assimilate. He cites<sup>60</sup> the appearance of time in Sophocles:<sup>61</sup> *apanth' o makros kanarithmētos chronos / phyei t' adēla kai phanenta kryptetai*. Tactic time, time-for-a-while, is through and through enmeshed in all that appears, indeed, it is the very mesh of this appearing. What lay hidden tacticly comes-forth, while what was evident withdraws in favour of evidence itself, in favour of the clearing. Time both *phyei* and *kryptei*, it is the mutual *philia* of the two forces, a lesson Heraclitus would first bring to expression.<sup>62</sup> Time gives and lets *physis* withdraw. In *physis*, the domain of all that appears, all that is born, tactic time becomes what it is. Vernant insightfully observes of this time, that its "past [yet equally its present and future] is punctuated not by any chronology, but by genealogies. [This] time is included within the relations of filiation."<sup>63</sup> Time turns, en-whiling, giving birth and the orders of filiation. When relating to the past of this time, man finds himself not in a re-cording or memory, but in an ac-cording of remembrance (*Mnēmosynē*).

*Mnēmosynē* refers to a past as "integral part of the cosmos. To explore it is to discover what is hidden in the depths of being. History as sung by *Mnēmosynē* is a deciphering of the invisible, a geography of the supernatural."<sup>64</sup> *Mnēmosynē* is a stepping out, a Heraclitean tropos of ex-isting, one could even say with Vernant ex-isting 'beyond', was the word less fraught with transcendence. To be and have the privilege of *Mnēmosynē* means to ex-ist in the structure of tactic time and have access not to series of events but to past orders of filiation; genealogies of *dikē* and *alētheia*. *Mnēmosynē* is a rare privilege—not the democratic faculty of memory, but the distinction conferred upon a bard as the voice of tactic time. *Mnēmē* in the most ancient

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<sup>57</sup> GA78, 201

<sup>58</sup> Kahn Ch. H., *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*, p.115

<sup>59</sup> Heraclitus, B31

<sup>60</sup> GA54, 209 & GA35, 18, among other places

<sup>61</sup> Sophocles, *Aias*, 646/7

<sup>62</sup> Heraclitus, B123

<sup>63</sup> Vernant J.-P., *The Origins of Greek Thought*, p.120

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p.121

of traditions (as practised in the sanctuary of Helicon) is one of the three Muses next to *Meletē* and *Aoidē*, while in the Hesiodic lineage, *Mnēmosynē* is the mother of Muses.<sup>65</sup> The access to the goddess is reserved for the initiate. For this sacral privilege, one steps out of the human and into the divine *koinon* (the Heraclitean *xynon* however reminds us that in *polemos* the human/divine distinction is ex-istentially recast), from which stepping-out one reconstitutes a community, common memory and the past order.

And yet tactic time is more than *Mnēmosynē*, or more precisely, the *more* in *Mnēmosynē*. It keeps revolving, in a future where the seer belongs, the seer who doesn't witness temporal successions to come, but future orders of truth, its present open to the encounter of man and gods. This turning time, en-whiles all.

We see, against Hegel and Nietzsche a most radical thought of becoming, if the word retains any currency, a thought that will be Anaximander's subterranean heritage to all later metaphysics. This sense of period, as the while of emergence and evasion, illuminates also the essence of man as mortal (*thnētos*), as part of *physis* facing the immortal gods. Heidegger understands this essence as "the extremity of pre-sence (*Anwesen*), which we name death, at the same time the innermost of all presencing of the present."<sup>66</sup> Yet if we stay with Anaximander, we may see this essence differently; incessantly originating from time, for a while, the gift given by its tactic order. This gift is never presence, nor even the extremity of presence. It operates across a horizon beyond presence and absence, the horizon of an incessant turning, an unremitting *tropology*.

Tactic time, periodic time. When time has re-olved once, it sets anew. As en-whileing, time joins together all that appears in its grid. This grid is the jointure of the Horae, the seasons, later to become the astronomical hours. Sisters of Horae are unsurprisingly the Moirai, the allotments. Mother of both is Themis and their father Zeus, the son of Chronos. Their names are justice (*Dikē*), peace (*Eirēnē*) and fair distribution (*Eunomiē*).<sup>67</sup> *Chronos* turns, its revolving time bringing forth ever new

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<sup>65</sup> Detienne M., *The masters of truth in archaic Greece*, p.41

<sup>66</sup> *GA78*, 148

<sup>67</sup> Hesiod, *Theogony*, 901. The concerns regarding the mutual transitions from *mythos* to *logos*, from Hesiod to Anaximander, shouldn't be brushed aside into general, unrestricted concordances. Yet particularly with regard to the genealogic structure of tactic time, Vernant's conviction has at the very least to be fully explored: "Nonetheless, however important this difference between the natural philosopher and the theologian may be, the general structure of their thought remained the same. Both

figurations of the Horae; an incessant revolution. It is this insight, that constitutes the counterpoint Vedic understanding of the year as the turning (tropic) wheel of *rtá-*, the root of the harmonic *harmos* (jointure) and of the spectrum spanning from arm to art. If the doctrine of multiple worlds has any place in Anaximander's thought,<sup>68</sup> it is precisely here, in the revolving revolution of tactic time.

Before we turn to this meaning of harmony we may see its last dimension as tactic, as a time of *taxis*. We have just discovered the kinship of *chronos* and *dikē*, a kinship to become clearer through its guiding in what follows. For from Solon who defended himself 'before the bench of Time', to Rosa Luxembourg's final words,<sup>69</sup> it is a filiation that guides the wealth of history as it enters revolving time. History is the progeny of *chronos* and *dikē*.

## 5. Corresponding Use/Need

In order to prepare our approach to the jointure of *dikē*, we need to give thought to the other correspondence, which reigns over the first clause: *kata to chreōn*. We translate with Heidegger the tropic sign of the *chreōn* as *Brauch*: Need/Use. Neither useful need, nor needful use, *chreōn* is equally use and need as much as their correspondence: /. It is the enjoining trope of need/use that guides the first clause and opens the way to the second. The *chreōn* cor-responds then in three ways: i. within itself as the / of need and use, ii. as the guiding trope of beings in their *whence-whither*, iii. in

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posited at the beginning an inchoate state in which nothing had yet made its appearance (the Chaos of Hesiod; Nyx, Erebus, or Tartaros, in the theogonies attributed to Orpheus, Museus, and Epimenides; Apeiron; the Undefined of Anaximander)." Vernant J.-P., *The Origins of Greek Thought*, p.105 The significance of this should gradually clarify in the following.

<sup>68</sup> The lineage of commentary is too long. Indicatively, Zeller in his *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy* proposed a multiple successive worlds interpretation; Burnet in his *Early Greek Philosophy* preferred a multiple co-existent worlds reading; Cornford in his article *Innumerable Worlds in Presocratic Philosophy* criticized Burnet siding with Zeller. Kirk in *Some Problems in Anaximander* and Kahn in *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology* completely denied the hypothesis of multiplicity. More recently, Finkelberg criticized Kirk and Kahn in *Plural Worlds in Anaximander*, reverting to the dogma of Zeller, McKirahan in *Philosophy Before Socrates* argued for a particular version of the multiple co-existent worlds position, while Gregory in *Ancient Greek Cosmogony* criticized both versions of the multiple worlds reconstruction of Anaximander and defended anew the single world view. A most fascinating and controversial moment of the inception.

<sup>69</sup> "Order reigns in Berlin! You stupid henchmen! Your 'order' is built on sand. Tomorrow the revolution will already 'raise itself with a rattle' and announce with fanfare, to your terror: I was, I am, I shall be!"

accord with time, the second trope of the fragment. The unity of these three correspondences reads: Use/Need is the Jointure, which in enjoining presence, presents the present to our disposal (*Verfügung*). Presence is what dwells or essences in Being, this Being constituting for Heidegger the true subject of the first clause. For him, *to chreōn* is the oldest name in which the *eon*, the Being of beings comes to language.<sup>70</sup> We are however after a different thought, where *chreōn* is a tropos of the articulation of Nothing at the beginning of Hellenic thought.

The disposal of the present, manifest in *genesis* and *phthora* is for Heidegger the identity of their *ex hōn* and *eis tauta*.<sup>71</sup> We have taken our distance from this sense of identity to make room for a trope of ipseity, that never speaks out of Being and singularly in its name. For Heidegger *to chreōn* names “the ‘necessitating’ dis-posal of e-mergence and e-vasion i.e. of the vouchsafing and retaining in the ipseity (*Selbigkeit*) of presence.”<sup>72</sup> a forced here evocation of ipseity, insofar as the *identity* of presence is intended. And yet “the ‘necessitating’ dis-posal of e-mergence and e-vasion” is indeed the *tropos* of the *chreōn*, a tropos which cannot be subsumed under either presence or absence.

If there is a necessitating disposal, that is, a necessitating use, there is equally a necessitating need, which does not consist in violence but in a *ne-cedere*, an ineradicable non-ceding, a necessity,<sup>73</sup> a re-turning need in accord with nihilating Nothing. Heidegger intensifies the trope of need. In 1942/3 he adapts it to coercion (*Zwang*) and urging (*Bedrängnis*) under the destining, the sending of fate.<sup>74</sup> Still under the sway of Being and Time, in *Vom wesen der Wahrheit* we read: “*Dasein* is the turn to need.”<sup>75</sup> That is, still in 1930, the need for truth and stepping out of error. By the end of the war and the Anaximander lectures of '46 need has deepened. If *Dasein* is still in a tropos of need, then against Kahn *kata to chreōn* is the most *personal* Greek formula for fate<sup>76</sup> and equally most remote from *lex talionis*, as the first law of nature.<sup>77</sup> *Chreōn* is

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<sup>70</sup> GA5, 363

<sup>71</sup> GA78,134

<sup>72</sup> GA78, 132

<sup>73</sup> GA78, 132-133

<sup>74</sup> GA78, 128-9

<sup>75</sup> GA9, 198

<sup>76</sup> Kahn Ch. H., *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*, p.101 where *kata to chreōn* is precisely termed “the most impersonal Greek formula for fate.”

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p.183

the first thoughtful experience of the apportioning of *moira*<sup>78</sup> and at the same time, its collection, its *logos*.<sup>79</sup> In *chreōn* Heidegger discovers the mutual origin of the essential thoughts of both Heraclitus and Parmenides.

What is apportioning and what holds together in the use/need of *chreōn* is its manual origin. In *chraō*, *chraomai*, speaks the *cheir*, the hand. *Chraō* means to handle and at the same time to give to hand, to hand over and thus hand out, to let belong and let into a belonging.<sup>80</sup> For Heidegger, this hand brings eventually no implication of the 'must' of a coercion,<sup>81</sup> no sanctioning and ordering, but the preserving in the hands of the present in its presence. An etymological *excursus* is undertaken: tracing *brauchen* (needing/using) to *bruchen* and then further with a leap to the latin *frui*, to fruit. Accordingly the translation (and understanding) of fruition is grounded in enjoyment (*genießen*). Enjoying however is to have joy in something one needs and uses: "*Frui, bruchen, brauchen, Brauch* means: to hand out something in its own essence and to keep it as thus presencing in the preserving hand."<sup>82</sup>

*Chreōn* is the needing/using hand and yet a hand not grasping (*greiffend*). In 1973's Zähringen lectures *con-ceiving* (*begreifen*) is thought as "a way of comportment that takes possession of. The Greeks do not seize."<sup>83</sup> Of course taking-possession-of and arresting are not foreign to Greek thought, culminating indeed in the expression of the Platonic *katechon*<sup>84</sup> and the Aristotelian employment of *ousia*, possessing, appropriating the unshowing, inceptive order of truth. At the inception of thought, the hand of thought is more thoughtful, more generous. In the palm of the generous hand the essential question that started two decades earlier upon the ready-to-hand, now sounds: does Being need/use the essence of man?<sup>85</sup> The answer of Heidegger rests in discovering the essence of man in the thought of the truth of Being. Yet the *chreōn* is not Being. It is

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<sup>78</sup> Parmenides, B8, 37

<sup>79</sup> GA5, 369

<sup>80</sup> GA5, 366

<sup>81</sup> In 1946 is thus an explicit tension to 1942/3, with regard to coercion (*Zwang*). The way out for Heidegger would be fate, which never bestows *brute* coercion, but rather *proper* coercion, the force that unmistakably leads one to one's essence.

<sup>82</sup> GA5, 367

<sup>83</sup> GA15, 399

<sup>84</sup> Plato, *Timaeus*, 52b. "*Phamen anagkaion einai pou to on apan en tini topō kai katechon chōron.*" Being is what occupies, takes possession of place and yet also arrests, restrains place in this taking possession. The second, restraining fold of the *katechon*, crucially employed by Paul (*Thessalonians* 2:6-7) and revoked to the foreground of thought by the Schmittean discourse of political theology, is throughout current in Plato; see for example: *Phaedo*, 117d; *Laches*, 184a.

<sup>85</sup> GA5, 373

Nothing. Neither presence nor absence, *chreōn* is the incessant turn between need and use.<sup>86</sup> For we have by now come to know—*Being is not*, only beings are; there is nothing to need/use the essence of man, but the turning, the very *tropos*, of the need/use itself.

Thus *chreōn* corresponds to all parts of the fragment. What *chreōn* hands out as proper need and coercion, is the limit. Insofar as *chreōn* is a trope of the *apeiron* (the other being *chronos*), it is the hand that hands out what it has not. For Heidegger on the other hand, *apeiron* hands out presence into dis-jointure. It is the jointure of the dis-<sup>87</sup> that constitutes for Heidegger a danger, a constant threat posed by the *apeiron*, insofar as beings may resolve in favour of the *adikia* of presence. Yet this is far from the significance of the *a-*, of which for the moment it may only be said *contra* Heidegger that it constitutes precisely the *poverty* not *of* but *for* presence. The *apeiron* as *chreōn* hands out limits, always itself and the in-finite possibilities of de-finitions remaining out of limits. If *chreōn* is to hand out jointure to the needful, beings in *adikia*, it cannot already be assimilated by *dikē*, its law cannot be filiated by presence, for this instigate a new *adikia*, for which another hand would be required. *To chreōn* is not of the order of Being, it is not even a hand, but solely the handing of the limit and the remainder, of the ex-isting excess that does not belong to its poverty. It is one of the deepest moments of a deep thinker, when Heidegger confesses: “This remaining is absolutely not a leftover, but rather the source in presencing, the particularly (*eigentlich*) unusable and because of that the evermore bringing of the “Use” (*Bracht*).”<sup>88</sup>

## 6. Jointure, Vengeance, Dis-jointure

Before we proceed to *dikē* the need to familiarize with a word that appears to orbit in *dikē*'s field is crucial.

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<sup>86</sup> Michaux articulates the extreme superabundance of the in-junction of presence and non-presence in the name of ‘an emptiness that is as much expansion as subtraction, as much excess as loss’, as much use as it is need. Michaux H., *Miserable Miracle*, p.171-2

<sup>87</sup> GA5, 368

<sup>88</sup> GA78, 62

## A. Tisis

What is *tisis*? A word obscure, vanished as such from the Greek language, an ambiguous relic. Yet not without a trace.

In the verbal form of the word *tiō* we hear with Heidegger the valuation or estimation of correspondence; the measuring of a relation and correspondence as a relating countering (*Auseinander*); the en-countenancing encounter that sets one in relation and affirms the relation. And yet, despite the detailed attention paid to the ramifications of the word's translation, the first step of its rendition is little discussed: *tisis*, against the philological grain that thinks the word in variants of recompense and repay, is readily understood as reck (*Ruch*), which in German as much as English is found only in the negative: reckless (*ruchlos*). *Ruch* from the Middle-High German *ruoche*, means carefulness (*Sorgfalt*) and simply care (*Sorge*) and evokes a deigning (*geruhen*) of something, which preserves it in its essence.<sup>89</sup>

This care relates to the theme of time. When what-is-en-whiling is left in the recklessness of dis-jointure, in in-justice, tactic time gives reck, so that dis-jointure may be overcome. This overcoming (ex-istence) is for Heidegger the meaning of presence. And yet, reck is a mutuality of beings, never singular and detached.<sup>90</sup> Care is precisely a common trope, a *koinotropos*. When we look closer, we see beings ex-isting simultaneously in two tropoi: they emerge and evade *with regard*, and also as we shall see *towards*, the *archē* of *apeiron* and commit a *dikē/adikia towards* and *with regard to* other beings, the figurations of which we shall also undertake to explore. On which side of the / of *dikē/adikia* does *tisis* reside, which faction is it inclined to grace?

Although the polarity *dikē/adikia* is kept by Heidegger from the one-dimensionality of opposition, to the point of exiting its polarization, *tisis*, for Heidegger care, is certainly an accomplice of *dikē*, always an act acting in its name. Even philology sides here with Heidegger. In its capitalist interpretation of *tisis* in terms of repayment, it offers a view of *dikē* as a law of market, the law of debt.

Maybe however *tisis*, like the place it holds in the *Saying*, is more ambiguous, balancing on the razor of /. If we look at its place in ancient thought, we find it

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<sup>89</sup> GA78, 166 and GA35, 360

<sup>90</sup> GA5, 361



embedded in a fourfold succession that determines the relation of ex-istence to measure. First comes *hybris*, the verbal or physical act that disregards measure. The intervention of gods starts here. The gods give *atē*, not the deprivation of clarity and reason, but the active blurring and confounding, which intensifies the *hybris* committed and triggers the series of events that will culminate in retribution. This retribution is *nemesis*, divine avenge. Now, as last term, appears *tisis*. What is still left after *nemesis*, after the gods have acted against mortals? *Tisis* as last term in this succession is the manifestation of the divine act.

If *nemesis* is the will and undertaking of retribution, *tisis* is the fulfillment and the state of affairs it gives rise to. With regard to the presence of beings, their capital crime of having been, restitution is death and evasion. With regard to their absence, the marginal crime of never having ex-isted, restitution spells birth and emergence. Heidegger reads in *tisis Ruch*, but we, quasi re-opening the door to the philological tradition, read also *Rache*, avenge. Certainly, as Heidegger warns us, one shouldn't confuse the just (*Gerechte*) with the avenged (*Gerächte*)<sup>91</sup>—such caution however presupposes a particular understanding of the latter. Moreover Anaximander does not repeat the same word in the guises of *tisis* and *dikē*—the two should not be confused, but their communion must emerge in clarity. *Rache*, avenge has nothing to do with wreaking violence or the dispossession of property. We hear in *Rache* the whole spectrum of *Verfolgung*, *Vergeltung*, *Strafe*, as well as *Wiedergutmachen*. In vengeance similarly speaks the *vindicare*, the setting free and claiming of a being. *Rache* is retribution and restitution, re-attribution and re-institution, a new allotment of the proper, a new apportioning. It is because of such wealth that if we tried to think the story of Job in the Old Testament through *Rache*, it constitutes not the unbearable misery he is cast into and tried through, but precisely the last act of his restitution to life and *the common*. In *Odyssey*, *Rache* is the return of Ulysses. In the *New Testament*, Christly resurrection. *Tisis*, predominantly encountered in the cycle of divine wrath, takes its place insofar as it has been engendered by the stepping out of measure, *hybris*. Still, *tisis* retains the dormant meaning of reward and honour, of giving fair due to the fair.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> Derrida J. *Specters of Marx*, p.30

<sup>92</sup> It is out of such wealth that Sloterdijk may attempt a reconstitution of the West from the vantage point of *mēnis/thymos*, which he both translates as *Zorn*. See Sloterdijk P., *Zorn und Zeit*, (particularly) pp.9-49

Why dormant? The Greeks won't readily offer an answer to the early abandonment of the ac-claiming horizon of *tisis*, before the word disappeared altogether. This escapes the possibilities of Greek thought, insofar as as it requires thinking this thought in its totality as a thought of *metron*, measure. What Greek thought recognizes but deeply opposes is the ex-isting essence of man, man's tropos of stepping out of measure. This essential tropos of man leads him incessantly outside measure. Despite the symmetric appearance of the *Saying* of Anaximander, its accentuation is clearly on the side of measure. *Genesis* and *pthhora* are not equivalent, *dikē* reigns as guard of *metron*, continually bestowing *pthhora*, passing over the *genesis* awaiting at its disposal. Thus Greek language will preserve the trace of *tiō* in *timō* and *timē*. Unable to retain the tension within *tisis*, the word is led to its destructive limit, while language gives birth and chooses to preserve in the rewarding salvation of *timē*, the en-countenancing encounter as *honour*. Byzantium and Orthodoxy will eagerly appropriate the word into a history of untainted glorification, the inceptive *polemos* of its tension forever lost.

In the fragment are thus two forces at work. Doxography and philology would speak of a cosmic symmetry of *genesis* and *pthhora*, *ex hōn* and *tois ousi* and a moral asymmetry of *dikē* and *adikia*. We know however that the cosmic/moral demarcation can only function provisionally, misguiding a thought unprepared to abandon it. What *tisis* does, against the impetus of the *Saying* is to calibrate and reconstitute the equilibrium of the two forces, placing presence into limits while undoing the ultimacy of limits; to understand this, we will however have to wait for Anaximander's *Word*, *apeiron*, to reach us.

Heidegger implicitly accuses Nietzsche<sup>93</sup> of not having heard *Ruch* in *Rache*, *Sein & Zeit*'s project of care seizing the totality of metaphysics—a decisive confrontation. And yet Heidegger could be ramming an open door, as Nietzsche's attempt was never on the side of *Rache*; this battle in a distant land is of another war, the war of presence, unremittingly haunting Heidegger. We need finally make clear: if *Ruch* indeed lies hidden in *Rache*, *Ruch* equally always conjures *Rache*. For *Rache*, *tisis*, vengeance is a turning knife, in the service of no one; as such the equal, true honour of both e-mergence and e-vasion.

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<sup>93</sup> *GA8*, 92-100, for example

## B. *Dikē-adikia*

A long itinerary brings us finally to the crux of *dikē*.

We offhandedly translate: justice. Like *tisis* however, the primary meaning of *dikē* is not moral; it operates in a domain before description and prescription. Even to a scholar like Kahn *adikia* does not summarize an overt emphasis on morality or eschatology, but the certainty, inescapability and remorselessness of the punishment of the offender, when the hour is full.<sup>94</sup> Still, even if he hasn't been seized by the *rigor mortis* of classifications, for Kahn the question remains unsolvable: "How can an exchange of offence and penalty between the elements explain why compound things are dissolved back into the materials of which they were composed?"<sup>95</sup> The community of the order of just exchange and of the structural order appears in the purity of an enigma.

Kahn knows from Heraclitus that the other name of *Dikē* is *Eris* and so, even though he has eschewed moralist interpretations he turns to a judicial understanding of *aition*, against the current that would seek to encompass its understanding in the later source of Aristotle. For Kahn, *aition* is an abstraction from *aitios*, the guilty, the one to blame.<sup>96</sup> Yet precisely the dimensions of struggle and law do not suffice to explain the structuring activity of *dikē*. Kahn talks of elements and refers *adikia* to the two polarities of elements, the warm and the cold, the dry and the wet, which for him justify the plural *ex hōn/ eis tauta* and provide justification of the use of *gar*, grounding the unity of the fragment.<sup>97</sup> The introduction however of elements is here as anywhere else in inceptive thought deeply misleading, presupposing an understanding of *physis* as a reducible compound of aggregates.

Kahn is unable accordingly to see the necessary connection between the *agōn* and the cohesion of *physis*. He fails to see that both are tropes of jointure, the most faithful translation of *dikē*. Accordingly *didonai*, the verb that accompanies *dikē*, should not be thought as the exchange of blows, or the transaction of payments. It would be preferable in poetico-philological fashion to hear in it the very alliteration of *dikē*; and *didonai dikē* as giving jointure, en-joining the juncture. As such, *didonai* is the active

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<sup>94</sup> Kahn C. H., *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*, p.105

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, p.181

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, p.193

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, p.195

infinitive of the first person *didōmi*, with such fundamental meanings as to give, offer and place. If there is a place in inceptive thought for the Heideggerian *es gibt*, it is, before anywhere else, precisely here. Yet *didonai* is in *modus activus infinitivus*; not: *they give*, but: *giving dikē*. Philology is now in tune with the essential: the giving of *dikē* is always active, yet its focality lies in the un-finitude of *apeiron*, which we still need prepare to approach and, which consistently operates as the absent counter-point, the spectre that guides the whole of the fragment. Giving *dikē* means to be infinitely in the giving of *apeiron*, in the trope of *dikē*, jointure.

Heidegger will repeat that this en-joining is the letting-belong in the *chreōn*<sup>98</sup> that he translates as care, but which we saw in its restituting ambiguity. Thus, *didonai* is explicitly the letting-belong, implicitly the *es gibt*. Both for Heidegger have the meaning of presence, insofar as letting-belong in the jointure of care 'is' presence.<sup>99</sup> "Presence is [accordingly] the jointure of emergence 'and' eclipse," for care is the care over emergence and evasion, always the rule of presence over absence and over their originary community. Thus Heidegger wants us to recognize the Jointure in the 'and'.<sup>100</sup> *Dikē* however equally enables the stepping of emergence and evasion *out of their unity*.

If we adopt the etymological attempt of Heidegger to trace the grounding meaning of *dikē* in *deiknynai*, the pointing, then precisely we should not think of road signs that merely stand by the road, but of the road itself that leads one through its unfolding. And if we follow the pointing signs of German language and hear in *dikē* together with jointure (*Fug*) the right (*Recht*),<sup>101</sup> then *dikē* should rather than justice be translated for the moment as the right, with all its connotations of verticality. Standing within one's rights, within the disposal of these rights, within their enjoining, is the juncture of *dikē*; a standing always present and constituting presence. To give right, to retribute—to rectify, to make stand again.

Here the decisive Heideggerian figuration of the Being-*Dasein* encounter comes forth. It asks: is *dikē* an injunction of jointure, or is this letting-belong an essential human act, what actually constitutes the human? For Heidegger the answer introduces

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<sup>98</sup> GA78, 160/166

<sup>99</sup> GA78, 166

<sup>100</sup> GA78, 171

<sup>101</sup> *Mit Fug und Recht*, meaning 'rightly/justly so', is an expression that bears witness to the intertwining of the right with the proper/appropriate and thus with its proper apportioning, its right to enjoin.

Being, as that which gives Jointure; Dasein is *in* Being and Jointure. Letting-belong is an event of Being, as such superlative active. Indeed, *dikē*, is not merely a human affair. However its origin is not to be found in Being, but in *apeiron*, the first tropos of Nothing. In the plurality of the fragment becomes apparent that Being uses/needs beings more than the singularity of Being is ready to allow.

What is the role of beings and predominantly human in their jointure? In accordance with the partiality of *tisis*, their siding with punishment, the role of beings is principally assigned by *adikia*. Beings traverse the one-way street of Being, from their origin in *adikia* unto the destination of *dikē*. An eschatologic structure is at work both in Anaximander and Heidegger despite striving to enable and allow space for the counter-movement. The only difference to Judeo-Christianity is that this *eschaton* is neither temporal nor e- or sempi-ternal; it is *dikē*.

What is then the origin of the trajectory of beings, the origin of *adikia*? Certainly, the essence of *a-dikia* is to be sought neither in an economy of exchange, nor in a kind of criminality.<sup>102</sup> Jaeger among many scholars would be caught in such a conception of *adikia*, questioning how birth could be a crime deserving punishment.<sup>103</sup> We know that neither *dikē*, nor *tisis*, mean foremostly as such punishment. We also know however that birth and corruption are capital offenses against presence, presenting it with the vistas of the never-before and the nevermore, forcing it to re-member its origination “from a certain twofold absencing.”<sup>104</sup>

Thus Kahn<sup>105</sup> is quick to side with Jaeger against Diels and the forms of neo-Orphic interpretations that go back to Heinrich Ritter’s 1821 exegesis of Ionian philosophy and assume the crime to be a falling-off from *apeiron*. This approach of apostasy found its most intensive expression in Nietzsche’s *Philosophie im Tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen* and was followed among many others, by his early friend Erwin Rhode, later a philologist of prominent standing in the golden age of German philology.

What however both the Jaeger-Kahn and the Nietzsche-Diels factions presuppose is a reading of Being into *apeiron*. It is from the same reading that Vernant’s democratic principle ultimately proceeds: “The Milesians believe that cosmic order is based not on a sovereign deity, on his *basileia* or royal power, but on a law of

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<sup>102</sup> GA78, 8

<sup>103</sup> Kahn C. H., *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*, p.194

<sup>104</sup> De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.158

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, p.194

justice (*dikē*) inscribed in nature, a rule of division (*nomos*) that implies an egalitarian order for all the constitutive elements of the world, such that none can dominate or prevail over the others.”<sup>106</sup> Whether an apostasy from *apeiron*, or an endocosmic war over which *apeiron* presides as judge, or again a ‘cosmologic’ *isonomia* (as we shall in the reverse of *adikia* soon examine), the role of *apeiron* seems exhausted in maintaining the equilibrium of presence. It is in that sense that “help can come only from *dikē*. If *dikē* disappears, everything founders in chaos.”<sup>107</sup> And in accord to use/need, *apeiron* is on the side of *dikē*. Although, neither the meaning of *adikia* nor that of *apeiron* are yet fully clear, we must venture into the opposite hypothesis: the operation of *apeiron* uses/needs *adikia*. To try this hypothesis we need to see how *dikē* allows en-joins the flourish of all *from* chaos.

In 1932 Heidegger defines *adikia* in direct contrast to *dikē* (jointure) as dis-jointure. Beings insist and persist on their limits (*peras*, where the meaning of *a-peiron*, is thought to be found, as the un-limited). They insist on their de-finition/de-limitation against the lack of boundaries; *dikē* as jointure is then the *return* to the lack of boundaries (*Umrißlosigkeit*).<sup>108</sup> The limit, the boundary (*Umriß*) is however not a mere frame of things, but their collecting-enjoining force and inner weight. Appearing is the rising emergence into this limit, into its de-finition. But what persists on this limit, never letting go, thus fending-off *dikē*, is *adikia*. Emergence, as much as evasion, is a re-turn to limitlessness.<sup>109</sup> This insight remains central. *Apeiron* means for Heidegger the *return from and to the absence* of limit. It is an elective way, combining the Nietzschean

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<sup>106</sup> Vernant J.-P., *Myth and Thought*, p.403. This interpretation is in line with the totality of Vernant’s thought as we saw it in the preceeding and as we shall touch in passing again with regard to *apeiron*. We offer two illuminating observations. “The emphasis was no longer on a single person who dominated social life, but on a multiplicity of functions that opposed each other and thus called for reciprocal apportionment and delimitation.” Vernant J.-P., *The Origins of Greek Thought*, p.43. And: “There came a time when the city rejected the traditional modes of aristocratic behavior, which tended to exalt the prestige of individuals and of *gene*, reinforce their power, and raise them above the mass. Thus it condemned excess, as *hybris*—in the same category as martial frenzy and the pursuit of purely personal glory in combat—the display of wealth, costly garments, magnificent funerals, excessive displays of grief in mourning, behavior that was too flamboyant in women or too confident and bold in aristocratic youths.” *Ibid.*, p.64. Correct (even though informed from a particular democratic militancy still bearing a *ressentiment* against the *ancien regime*) as the socio-historical observations on the subsequent transformations of *basileia* into *isonomia* and later into *analogia* are, these transformations do not equally apply to all parts of inceptive thought. Each thinker and each moment of a thinker’s thought speaking anew is also always tied to a *Mnēmosynē*, that revokes a history of orders of truth, ex-ceeding the demands of present presence. Thus Anaximander thinks *from* ex-cess, even when thinking against a certain trope of excess. This tension we attempt to think.

<sup>107</sup> Vernant J.-P., *Myth and Thought*, p.49

<sup>108</sup> GA35, 24/219

<sup>109</sup> GA35, 24-5

insight of apostasy, with the desire to place *dikē* on the side of absence—the absence of limit. The tropos of Nothing takes at this moment at last hold of Heidegger’s thought; and yet *apeiron* must forever remain under the sign of Being.

The limit of each being is its collecting-enjoining force. *Dikē*, the guardian of measure and the guarantor of the return to an absence of limit, is not external to things, but constitutes them. Thus *adikia* can at last appear to be as much against other beings as against *apeiron* so that the old philological dilemma seems resolved.

Yet we ask again on the meaning of *adikia*, trying to unfold more of its inner fabric and bring simultaneously *dikē*’s guardianship of measure to light. A most characteristic form of *adikia* appears in the life of *polis*. Excessive political power is a wrong (*hamartēma*), which calls for chastising (*kolazein*) and punishing (*timōrein*).<sup>110</sup> *Dikē* in the form of law and the injunction of justice vouchsafes that this limit is never overstepped. Two generations after Anaximander, Alcmaeon of Croton will bring the *polemos* of *dikē/adikia* over measure into the realm of medicine. He defines health as equal distribution (*isonomia*) or proportionate blend (*krasis symmetros*) of opposite powers, the *excess* or ‘monarchy’ of which, is the cause of disease.<sup>111</sup> Similarly the equilibrium of the hot and the cold becomes a definite point of reference in the Hippocratic tradition. For Polybus, Hippocrates’ pupil and son-in-law, the elements are nourished by one another<sup>112</sup>; the hot feeds on the cold and reversely so that their balance remains intact. They inflict thus a mutual cannibalistic *adikia* in the service of the *dikē* of health; the presence of health is always the ground for *adikia* and the turning of one against another.

*Adikia* is then accordingly never a wrong committed *exclusively* among beings, but the wrong committed—among them—in view of *dikē*. Only because the *presence* of this third term *guarantees the presence of jointure* does dis-jointure have an essence. So that when beings give *dikē*—justice, right and jointure—they never give something of their own, but only render what rules over them and thus constitutes them in their enjoining limit. Accordingly, if we are tempted to ask: what is personal about *adikia*? The answer has to be: *Nothing*. Nothing is what-is-left: the residue of the constituting,

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<sup>110</sup> Kahn Ch. H., *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*, p.100

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, p.159

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, p.189

de-fining activity of *dikē* that has absorbed the whole essence of beings. Nothing is left; and yet only what is left, may be the truly personal. Nothing is the most personal.

If a last moment of the impersonality of *adikia* in Hellenic and Heideggerian thought could be of use, if we need such a moment in order to understand the stakes of *dikē*, we need turn to Hesiod.<sup>113</sup> The conflicts of Theogony present a cycle of retribution where the unwillingness of each generation to yield to its natural succession by the next, constitutes the overstepping of measure that guarantees the everlasting recurrence of *dikē*; even Zeus, like the Heraclitean sun, is bound like all else to this *adikia* handed out by the higher *dikē* of *Moirā* and nothing that has come to be may e-vade it.

There is always a higher authority. We just spoke of the *dikē* of *Moirā*, a somewhat imprecise allocation. With mythological rigour we must rather find the place *Dikē* contained within the worldly domain, while among gods the mother of *Dikē*, *Themis* presides. *Themis*, a Titaness, is however a remnant of the previous *order* that still receives its power from *Moirā*, over all future divine and human orders. It is as if a fissure in continuity has been necessary to guarantee the guaranteeing of jointure; as if presence needed this stepping-out, this residue in order to maintain itself.

It is here, at the always higher, what essentially ex-ceeds, that we may return at last to what is just in *dikē*, the justice of which we traced in the verticality of the right. Certainly if it is at all proper to re-appropriate the just, this should take place in De Beistegui's double indication (*deiknynai*) of ad-justment and the joust.<sup>114</sup> The essence of justice is en-joining strife. Yet it is too early to rest. For even though we now have a place for both the right and the just, Derrida's question remains open: "What is this justice beyond right? Does it come along simply to compensate a wrong, restitute something due, to do right or do justice? Does it come along to simply render justice or, on the contrary, to give *beyond* the due, the debt, the crime, or the fault? Does it come simply to repair injustice (*adikia*) or more precisely to rearticulate as must be the

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<sup>113</sup> *Dikē* aside from its mythic background, has a specific relation to *truth*, as part of religious rituals, allowing until the midclassical period a defining description of *dikē* as *telos echousa*, effectuating, in the specific socio-religious sense of Gernet and Detienne. See Gernet L., *Droit et société dans la Grèce ancienne*, pp.69ff. and Detienne M., *The Masters of Truth*, pp.66-7 & 73. Myth as much as thought refer thus continuously to *Mnēmosynē*, whence past orders of truth come to the fore, procuring further aletheic effects. *Dikē* as effectuating ritual truth, is still at work, both in the thought of Hesiod and Anaximander.

<sup>114</sup> De Beistegui M., *Truth and Genesis*, p.179



disjuncture of the present time?”<sup>115</sup> An easy and convenient solution would identify the two, as tacitly the hermeneutic tradition seems to have done. Yet the question is pressing as we know already since Plato that merely to give back the due does not equal the just<sup>116</sup> and as we also already know that justice and injustice are always in view of a third that is *not/is* not one: *apeiron*, the ex-cess.

Only from such ex-cess *beyond* presence and absence, may presence emerge *from* absence. Only by cutting with the knife of *tisis* the fabric of jointure may we arrive at “the necessary [*chreōn*] disjuncture, the de-totalizing condition of justice”, which “is indeed that of the present—and by the same token the very condition of the present and of the presence of the present.”<sup>117</sup> *Apeiron* is the de-totalizing condition of both justice and presence. *De-* and *dis-* are the syllables of the sought fissure from which *apeiron* allows us to understand *dikē* as right and then again as justice beyond the right, as gift beyond the law, as duty beyond, indeed without debt.

This is accordingly the only way of understanding “a *saying* which tells us that a duty ought to prescribe nothing [precisely in a change of tone, Nothing] in order to be or to do what it should be or do, namely, duty, its duty.”<sup>118</sup>

This fissure is indeed what is first, before *Dikē*, *Themis* and *Moirai*. At the inception, *Chaos*,<sup>119</sup> the gaping abyss, came to be.<sup>120</sup> *Chaos* is not. The fissure is not, even if it came to be first. *Chaos* is the turning that opens the world. *Tartarus*, the divine force that comes third after *Chaos* and *Gaia*, “the realm of night”, almost an immanent double of *chaos* that indeed “resembles, primeval *Chaos* and that, like it, contains within its breast the origins (*pēgai*) and limits (*peirata*) of all that exists.”<sup>121</sup> Yet what contains the origin and limit *is not*, *Chaos is not*, is neither Being nor non-Being. It is

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<sup>115</sup> Derrida J., *Specters of Marx*, p.29

<sup>116</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, 331cff. Returning arms to the madman does certainly not constitute justice, but the due needs to be calibrated from what ex-ceeds it, the appropriate as a third.

<sup>117</sup> Derrida J., *Specters of Marx*, p.33

<sup>118</sup> Derrida J., *On the name*, p.133

<sup>119</sup> *Ginunga*, the gap of twilight preceding the world of Nordic mythology, share with *chaos* a common etymological ancestry, pointing to the expanse of the origin.

<sup>120</sup> Hesiod, *Theogony*, 114

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, 609. See also *Ibid.*, 885 and Vernant J.-P., *The Origins of Greek Thought*, p.219: “This means that even after the generations of hostilities between the gods end and order is established, *Chaos* still constitutes a threat lurking in the background. Indeed, *Chaos* would submerge all that is stable and organized in the cosmos if Zeus, by virtue of his superior *kratos*, had not definitely fixed the place, privileges, and scope of each power.” It seems as though the puzzling figure of *Tartarus* is the foreground appearance of *Chaos*, the concession even Zeus’ *kratos* has to make to *Chaos* at this moment of revolving time; an older order is reinstated, transformed and transfigured into a later order of tactic time.

the Nothing of Origin. Seligman, for completely different, indeed evident reasons, calls chaos “personified nothingness.”<sup>122</sup> We know however that the Nothing of Chaos is not merely personified, but the most personal.

The constant residual fissure of Chaos enables Themis to cut across divine orders and in stepping-out attune the world of gods. If there is a sharing of mortals and gods in ancient thought or in the Heideggerian fourfold, it refers to the impossible necessity of humans to turn themselves human by stepping out into ex-istence, where the letting of jointure may take place. This stepping out of the measure and limit is not merely an overstepping of the limit, but what in committing this *adikia*, enables the world of *dikē* to come forth. The *a-* of *adikia* is the stepping out of limits that gives birth to *dikē*. As born, *dikē* is bound to die by its own hand. For it is not greed that *dikē* punishes. It is the denial of demise, which constitutes the essential temptation of having been born. Birth is the capital *adikia*, a crime against Being, which Nothing invites in the *a-*.

### C. *Dikē* and *chronos* in the correspondence of presence

Heidegger calls indeed attention to the fact that the *a-* of *adikia*, the out-of, is not the only *a-* where Being shines forth.<sup>123</sup> And yet precisely by admitting the pulsating significance of the *a-* in the thought of the inception, Heidegger vacates its tropologic in-tensity to make room for the shining forth of Being that is presence. We translate with Heidegger *dikē* into *chronos* to approach the event of presence.

In *chronos* understood as time, what presences is the en-whiling; presencing is *the while* of what-is-for-a-while.<sup>124</sup> What-is-for-a-while is thus set in the jointure of presence, where “presencing is neither mere standing nor mere going,”<sup>125</sup> but rather the *between* of arriving and departing. This *between* is the jointure of time. In jointure, *the tropos of presence* is precisely a *whiling* one. This *while* rests on the hinges of absence *on both*<sup>126</sup> *sides* of presence. When the present disregards its whiling tropos and *dis-joints* itself from absence, injustice is committed; *adikia* is the reign of this dis-jointure

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<sup>122</sup> Seligman, P., *The Apeiron of Anaximander*, p.94

<sup>123</sup> GA78, 182

<sup>124</sup> GA78, 173

<sup>125</sup> GA78, 175

<sup>126</sup> This presupposes a linear understanding of time, which most definitely *chronos* is not. We use the expression as provisional metaphor: *on all sides of presence* would be more accurate if presence could indeed be contained by sides and if the loss of relevance to the *between* could be avoided.

of time. What is only for a *while* petrifies and turns against the *while*. It insists on its *while* and desires to turn time itself into its own *while*.<sup>127</sup> *If the while is in dikē the act of presencing, in adikia this act becomes presence, tarrying-along itself.* How could presencing ever escape the yoke of presence except by the most radical of turns? What Heidegger is unwilling to cede is that this is the sending of Being and the destiny of metaphysics, in the face of which, the first moment of thought, Anaximander's *Saying*, balances on the ambivalence of offering both a ground for and a warning against.

At the same time beings do not passively await in the *adikia* of their while until the *dikē* of Being returns them to absence for the sake of the present presencing of jointure. Beings, that is, the most-present moment of presence, the culmination of the act of presencing, ex-ist in the tropos of coming-over without abating<sup>128</sup> the dis-jointure of presence. Their mutual tropos towards other beings, their *koinotropos*, is the dis-joining of the insistence on the while of other beings. In *setting free* other beings *for* absence and fulfilling the *dikē* of presence beings finally fulfil *the essence of their presencing: presence*. In giving *dikē*, jointure, beings give what essentially belongs to the other,<sup>129</sup> namely being free for absence in the name of presence. This setting free is precisely the coming-over of the dis-jointure effectuated by beings, a coming-over which belongs to the essence of each presencing as such.<sup>130</sup>

The exit of this vicious circuit of presence requires a small, yet decisive step, which constitutes the limit and essential play of Heidegger's thought. It requires the impossible dis-sociation of presencing and presence. This dis-sociation can only take place in the constant turning of the dis-, the *a-*. Instead of discovering how jointure needs the *a-* to arrive at the while of its *use*,<sup>131</sup> we should trace the *a-* that uses jointure to achieve the *need* of its turning. Not a mere re-versal, but an incessant sub-version of presence.

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<sup>127</sup> GA78, 176

<sup>128</sup> *Verwindung* not *Überwindung*- both words refer to a turning (*Wenden*)

<sup>129</sup> GA5, 357

<sup>130</sup> GA51, 120

<sup>131</sup> GA78, 182, where is said that *the jointure of the a-* is taken to belong to the *chreōn*, instead of *the a-* of jointure belonging to the *chreōn*

## 7. A-peiron

The rarely voiced question haunting Heidegger with regard to *apeiron* is ultimately the dis-junction: quantitative or qualitative?<sup>132</sup> His question is the unfinished endeavour to exit the dis-junction; to us is left the task of completing this exit and an exit of all disjunctions so that *a-peiron* may come-forth as the dis-junctive itself, its *a*-constituting the opening where presence and absence may hold sway.

### A. The ontological trope of apeiron

In the first part of the chapter we reenacted the attempt of modern thought to think *apeiron*. Aristotle was and remains the unwavering focal point of reference of every such attempt. We return now to rethink *apeiron* and reach a deeper stratum through him and the pleiad of scholarly voices.

#### i. apeiron as matter, element, spatiality

One of Paul Seligman's guiding philological intentions was to undo the Aristotelianism that obscured the Anaximandean and Milesian thought of the origin in favour of a thought of the element<sup>133</sup>. The constant Aristotelian displacement of questions of origin (*archē*) into the territory of matter (*hyle*) and constituent (*stoicheion* as element), is indeed crucial. What operates in Aristotle is actually a double osmosis and tension of *apeiron* as matter and element and as the infinite and the indefinite. What is consistently neglected is *apeiron* as origin, which like *chōra* fits uneasily into ready-made ontological distinctions.

With regard to matter we hear: "In the four-fold scheme of causes, it is plain that the infinite is a cause in the sense of matter..."<sup>134</sup> Thus *apeiron* is distinct from the four elements,<sup>135</sup> yet nonetheless it remains the material constituency of beings, in a sense, their singular *stoicheion*. In that respect, when Kahn, following Simplicius and Theophrastus in keeping apart the four interchanging elements from *apeiron*, still

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<sup>132</sup> GA35, 31

<sup>133</sup> Seligman, P., *The Apeiron of Anaximander*, p.58

<sup>134</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, 207b35

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, 204b22

believes the latter to have been intended as a ‘material substratum’,<sup>136</sup> he is merely phrasing the first of Aristotelian tensions.

We can then see Burnet in interpreting *apeiron* as spatially infinite, follow this material trajectory of Aristotelian exegesis. Burnet would take *apeiron* to refer to a crude notion of an infinite body, corresponding to the true Anaximandrian intention of *apeiron* as infinite space. Cornford would accordingly have little difficulty showing the impossibility of a notion of *infinite* space in the 5<sup>th</sup> century,<sup>137</sup> while both remained blind to the total irrelevance of the epistemic category of *spatiality* to Greek thought.

It is no accident then, that the doxographic tradition starting with Aristotle, speaks of two Anaximandrian elements, *other than* (in truth, *next to*) the *apeiron*, most commonly the hot and the cold. It is not really important to try with Gigon<sup>138</sup> to discover the origin of such a Peripatetic opposition in more primitive contradictions such as fire and air, or more likely, light and darkness. What is important is that the tension of matter/element, expressed in this doxographic attempt as a monistic/dualistic tension between the *apeiron* and a pair of opposites, has its origin in the impossibility of understanding *apeiron* with Aristotle as either matter or element. Oscillating between the two inapt poles merely exacerbates the general incongruity of the project.

We turn to the second, interweaved with the first, tension of *apeiron*. Although there is a clear sense of infinitude with regard to its materiality,<sup>139</sup> both Aristotle and Theophrastus are equally involved in problematizing its indeterminacy. In the words of Aristotle: “The infinite body cannot be one and simple, whether it is, as some hold, a thing besides the elements –from which they generate the elements– or it is not thus conceived”<sup>140</sup> and soon afterwards “...there is, as a matter of fact, no such sensible body, besides the so-called elements. All things are resolved into that of which they consist. Hence that body would be present in this world here, besides air and fire and earth and water: but nothing of the kind is observed.”<sup>141</sup> *Apeiron* may be infinite, but since it is neither one of the elements, nor anything else (for no such thing is observed!),

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<sup>136</sup> Kahn Ch. H., *Anaximander's Fragment: The Universe governed by law*, in Mourelatos A. P. D. (ed.), *The Pre-socratics*, p.99

<sup>137</sup> Seligman, P., *The Apeiron of Anaximander*, p.33

<sup>138</sup> Gigon O., *Der Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie von Hesiod bis Parmenides*, Ch.III

<sup>139</sup> If Aristotle could see the Platonic Idea at work in Anaximander, he might have taken the infinitude to operate even on the level of the formality of matter (*hylē noētē*).

<sup>140</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, 204b22

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, 294b32

it needs also be indefinite. Thus for example, the difference for Simplicius between Anaximander's *apeiron* and Anaximene's *aēr* (air) is the indeterminacy of the first against the determinacy of the second.<sup>142</sup> The remark offers an example of the chiasm of the two tensions, showing that, if of any import, the indeterminacy of *apeiron* may in no sense allow its function as a material/elemental cause. The infinity cannot have the structural place of the air if it has to be indefinite. As we saw in the reformulation of Nietzsche, Aristotle is led to the question of the possibility of a determinate and differentiated world emerging from the indeterminate. How could the indeterminate encompass (*periechein*) and determine (*horizein*)?<sup>143</sup>

A number of ancient commentators would accordingly side with Aristotle against the impossibility or at best unintelligibility of an indeterminate infinitude functioning as constituent matter. It is only arresting how a whole tradition, in which Aetius, pseudo-Plutarch and Stobaeus stand among its most prominent figures, would take the word of Aristotle on Anaximander's crudeness and remain consistently blind to the impossibility of the Aristotelian hermeneutic schematism itself, bound in a false *aporia* of its double tension.

## ii. *apeiron* as *krasis*

Already in Theophrastus and the later Peripatetic tradition, the suggestion of an interpretation of *apeiron* as composite intended to offer a solution to the essence of its indeterminacy. *Apeiron*, which was neither one of the elements, nor anything else and thus completely indeterminate had nonetheless to function as elemental matter. Thus

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<sup>142</sup> Anaximander, A5

<sup>143</sup> Vernant's bold and fascinating suggestion attempts to think the *apeiron* (as we thought the Parmenidean centre of the sphere of Being before) from the *meson*. *Apeiron* is thus the *xynon*—'something else', a third kind, beyond the elements, none of which may monopolize the *kratos* of the world; as a *koinon*, *apeiron* functions as the equator, prefiguring thus the Parmenidean ontological liminal equality. Vernant J.-P., *Myth and Thought*, pp.230-2. And yet in the Anaximandean cosmos the earth stands at the centre, while *apeiron* is the *periechon*, the surrounding. Earth at the same time is *hypo mēdenos kratoumenē* (A11, 3 the fragment delivered by Hippolytus), '*kratoumēnē*' by Nothing. Vernant knows the exclusive debate between translating 'held/supported', or 'dominated/ruled' by Nothing to be futile. *Ibid.*, p.223. And yet Nothing seems here precisely to have the place of *kratos* reserved for *apeiron* (the allusion to the *autokrates* Anaxagorean *apeiron* being more than a chance nexus), while at the same time the earth has taken place at the middle. *Apeiron* thus has to be Nothing and has to contain what is in the middle, while itself being a middle. It may be possible to reconcile and resolve the conflict, but such resolution exceeds our present resources. We may only remark (in Vernant's spirit) that if *apeiron* is to be a *meson*, this should be thought in the sense of *metron* and this in turn as the Nothing of limit, which we proceed to examine.

*apeiron* was taken as an *in-between* the elements facilitating their transformations.<sup>144</sup> Yet it was not intended as another in-between element itself but the very mixture of the elements.

One of Aristotle's general accusations of Milesian monism was its alleged inability to distinguish between generation (*genesis*) and alteration (*alloiōsis*) and account for their difference. Yet in A9 both concepts are thematized (even if they principally constitute an interpretation of Simplicius/Theophrastus). The fragment says that the elements are not generated from *apeiron* by its alteration but by separation through its everlasting motion. If this observation has any relevance to the inceptive thought of Anaximander, it consists in manifesting his distance from a theory of *ousia*, a distance that can look beyond the radical alteration that generation is, into an ever-turning tropos that encompasses both.

Yet insofar as an ousiologic understanding guides any approach to Anaximander a tension such as the one generated shortly afterwards in the fragment comes as no surprise. We read: "For the in-dwelling contrarities in the substratum (*hypokeimenō*), being an infinite body, are being exuded." This remark goes directly back (and thus repeated in Diels' fragmentology) to an almost identical phrasing by Aristotle.<sup>145</sup> The *apeiron* is in turns said to be a mixture (*krasis*) that lets its parts be separated (*apokrisis*) and then transformed into the container of contrarities that it eventually exudes (*ekkrisis*).

The issue has been of unceasing interest to ancient as much as modern interpreters. Vlastos,<sup>146</sup> for example makes *apeiron* a perfect *krasis*, a perfect blend of the opposites in a dynamic equilibrium (*isonomia*), invoking the Alcmeonic/Hippocratic tradition discussed earlier.<sup>147</sup> The essence of *apeiron* as equilibrium forms also Kahn's thesis, even though he won't enter the *krasis* debate: "Anaximander denies that any elemental body or portion of the world dominates another; for him it is equality and equilibrium which characterize the order of nature."<sup>148</sup> Cornford takes a further step in thinking *apeiron* as *krasis*. The mixture that *apeiron* constitutes is, unlike the

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<sup>144</sup> Anaximander, A9

<sup>145</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, 187a20

<sup>146</sup> Vlastos G., *Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmogonies*, p.171f.

<sup>147</sup> See p.168

<sup>148</sup> Kahn C. H., *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*, p.80

Empedoclean, not mechanical, but a complete fusion, the unity of water and wine rather than that of water and oil.<sup>149</sup>

The disjunctive dilemma of Heidegger seems to be answered here in favour of a qualitative *apeiron*. It is interesting then to note Gadamer's thesis which seems to assume a hybrid position violently cutting across a number of disjunctions. As if impervious to the Heideggerian struggle, Gadamer takes *apeiron* as *both* spatial and yet effectuating an equalization (*Ausgleich*) of opposites. This crude, unelaborated combination is further coupled by the endorsement of both the successive and simultaneous interpretations of the doctrine of multiple worlds doxography attributes to Anaximander. This question is clearly outside our scope, but its importance lies in the eclectically misleading final result Gadamer arrives at from these premises: his double interpretation of the doctrine of multiple worlds takes *apeiron* to be ensnared in the un-thought (crudely, the unintelligibility) of Nothing (for *apeiron* is through and through indeterminate) as well as in a thought of Being, reduced to hypothetical existence: the simultaneity of worlds reduces the Being of each to an *as-if* of Being itself; each world being and being thought *as-if* it was the world itself.<sup>150</sup> What is key is that the utter indeterminacy, which allows for the equilibrium of opposites and forces *apeiron* into un-thought is equated to a mere hypothesis, even if this hypothesis amounts to all we may have. If anything, Gadamer is here tainted by a most levelling transcendental hue and as far removed from Heidegger as ever. The world that 'is' only as a condition of experience of the world appears as all there is, while somehow thought (the thought of Anaximander) seems to possess beyond the knowledge of this a priori world an awareness of its true multiplicity. Anaximander becoming thus with Gadamer the pupil of Kant who has set his master's thought free of all its limitations, indeed free from its very critical structure.

What both attempts to understand *apeiron* as either constituent primordial matter or as mixture of constituents share in common, is an Aristotelian blindness to any other perspective on inceptive thought but that of *physikē epistēmē*. Yet *apeiron* can be as

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<sup>149</sup> Cornford F. M., *Principium Sapientiae*, p.178 *Krasis* is clearly not *mixis*, mixture, as for example later Plutarch attests in his *Marriage Precepts*, where the unity of the couple as a *di' holōn krasis*, resembles the formation of a new liquid whose two components can no longer be separated. See, Foucault M., *The care of the self*, p.208. Principally, *krasis* is a liquid metaphor.

<sup>150</sup> Gadamer H. G., *GW7*, 13



little pure or mixed as it may be material or conceptual. The un-thought of the Nothing of *apeiron* that Gadamer accuses Anaximander for, is in truth a confession on the effort we haven't yet undertaken, to approach the Nothing of *apeiron*. Before we do this we turn briefly to these attempts of a general conceptualization of *apeiron*.

### iii. *apeiron* as concept: principle and abstraction

If conceptualization consists in the arrest of something in a determinate singular or plural conceptual structure it also requires an initiatory conceiving that provides the adaptation of an event of language to a concept. Augustine offers a unique example. In translating *archē* into *principia*,<sup>151</sup> he is already taken up in the mode of conceiving Latin makes available. Accordingly *apeiron* as *principia* is made infinite: an infinitude of *principiae* each corresponding to an element. We are here at the counterpoint of the spectrum delimited by the monistic (yet ineluctably quasi-dualistic) interpretation of Aristotle. The Aristotelian tension of one *apeiron*/two elements (in-from/as *apeiron*) is here resolved into a direct commerce of a plural formal principal corresponding one-to-one to the manifold elemental world. A tradition of Neo-Platonism and the emerging Christianity has made thinkable this unhindered commerce of the Augustinian re-turn to Anaximander. Insofar as *apeiron* is not itself rendered into an infinitude of elements bordering on atomism, its multiplicity must remain formal. Cherniss seems among the few modern philologists to move in this direction.<sup>152</sup> What however this approach assumes to make better sense of, the plurality of the *ex hōn-eis tauta*, is actually very thin; the *whence* and *whither* turned into plural conceptual-formal structures.

A closely related but distinct approach emerges from another conceiving that conceptualizes *apeiron* as abstraction. A pseudo-apophatic rationality leads to this *apeiron*: neither here nor there, incessantly absent and everywhere present. What no sense can apprehend, for apprehension would bind it, set it in the limits it incessantly annuls. *Apeiron* is not of the order of elements.<sup>153</sup> Indeed, it is of no present order whatsoever. Accordingly Michel Serres among others understands this non-elemental, -topological, -numeric, -sensible *apeiron* as abstract. Yet does its abstraction follow from

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<sup>151</sup> Anaximander, A17

<sup>152</sup> Cherniss H., *Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, p.375ff.

<sup>153</sup> Serres M., *Anaximander: A Founding Name in History*, in Jacobs D. C. (ed.), *The Presocratics after Heidegger*, p.139

the non-, from the *a-*? What sort of negativity generates abstraction? We are not yet prepared for this question. Yet on the reverse Serres attempts an answer. What sort of abstraction is generated by negativity? Physico-mathematics; the attempt of an explanation of the world through the most formal of principles.<sup>154</sup> If now, even unanswered, our first question can offer some guidance, is that abstraction implies a very different negation, a negation that the *a-* least offers. We should argue that abstract physico-mathematics is as removed from the spirit of antiquity as conceivable. What is however more important is that the *a-* has not the meaning epistemology wants to discover in it. We have indeed already seen the lection of the *a-*, as trope of Nothing, being the most personal, that is, the least abstract, because the least conceptual. And if accordingly *apeiron* represents a generalization of conflicts, this generalization has only the meaning Heraclitus discovers in Anaximander: the unremitting intensification and concretization of any conflict with regard to its essence and tropicity.

In face of this attempt at conceptualization, Seligman is no more wrong in emphasising the Aristotelian adjectives of *apeiron*: *theion* (divine) *athanaton* (immortal) *anōlethron* (incorruptible)<sup>155</sup> and proceeding to make the Milesian *archē* divine and essentially alive, explicitly combating against the minimization of the role of the divine in Anaximander.<sup>156</sup>

If a living, divine *apeiron* however appears incongruous to and refuting an abstract *apeiron*, this is only insofar as its personal meaning has not been sufficiently thought: personal/concrete equals most definitely not individual/particular; Nothing can only be particular or abstract when its tropos is levelled to a concept.

## **B. The nihilating trope of *apeiron* (beginning the end)**

Unlike Hegel and Nietzsche, Heidegger reserves the horizon of *apeiron* as one of the last moments of Anaximandean thought to be approached. Indeed the *Word* of Anaximander (what Heidegger calls the 'other word')<sup>157</sup> is completely left out of the picture of *Der Spruch des Anaximander* (GA5), as its invisible source of lumination.

Next to the *Saying* however there is only one *Word*, *apeiron*, and if one was to

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<sup>154</sup> Ibid., p.139-40

<sup>155</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, 203b11 & Anaximander A15 & B3

<sup>156</sup> Seligman, P., *The Apeiron of Anaximander*, pp.22-23

<sup>157</sup> GA78, 217

speak of *another* that could only be its reflection, *archē*. *Inception* at last shows forth in the beginning of thought, as *the depth of its word*.

Doxography has attributed the first philosophical use of the word to Anaximander. Yet if *archē* is neither a concept nor an element, neither a formal principle, nor a material substratum, how is one to think *apeiron*? Heidegger is here more accurate than philology would ever concede, endeavouring to think *archē* as *physis*<sup>158</sup> according to the tropos of the *chreōn*. Use/Need (*chreōn*, *Brauch*) is the enjoining that bridges the meanings of *archē* as initiation and guiding force. For in the beginning we hear the German *ginnen* with the precise meaning of *brauchen* (using/need).<sup>159</sup> As such, *archē*, the beginning, is a ‘ginning’, a use and a need that clears the way and guides.

How should we however think *physis*? Certainly in the Heraclitean trope; *physis* is emergence, the actuality of the actual, an incessant turning into presencing: *in-tensity*. This intensity that gives presence, perpetual and infinite renewal, is not itself present, but precisely the turning. What the *naturalization* of *physis* effectuates, is the arrest of this turning, the permanent turn of *physis* into presence. Movement, against the Aristotelian accusations, did not wait for Heraclitus (or in a counter-trope—which already Hegel terms dialectic<sup>160</sup>—Parmenides) to come into thought, but *physis/emergence* in the *archē* of *apeiron* is movement par excellence. And it is in this sense to be understood that the *archē* of *apeiron* as using/need *physis* is not infinite potentiality but the actuality of “the em-powering power of appearing.”<sup>161</sup>

The meaning of this em-powering turning is to be sought in the *a-*. For Heidegger it denotes no lack, an Aristotelian *sterēsis*,<sup>162</sup> but a trope of satiety, the noble satiety and turning away out of an over-flow and over-power over every power-structure.<sup>163</sup> This turning away of the em-powering from the em-powered offers the opening, the gap or chaos, in which the field of power may arise. It is in this field that *dikē* operates. Not as a mere event among beings, but always attested by the over-power of *apeiron*<sup>164</sup> that constitutes them. And if this specific sense of negation of the turning

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<sup>158</sup> GA78, 223

<sup>159</sup> GA78, 224

<sup>160</sup> See p.43

<sup>161</sup> GA35, 28

<sup>162</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V, 22

<sup>163</sup> GA35, 29

<sup>164</sup> GA35, 30

away, expressed in the *a-* of *apeiron*, bears an ultimate meaning with regard to beings themselves and their struggle for *dikē* (right), it lies precisely in a-voidance, in the voiding, emptying of the injustice of the wrong that held sway over beings.

Clearly we are confronted with two components: the *a-* and the *-peiros/-peiron*. And although, or exactly because, the spectrum of their signification appears familiar, we need to attend closer to the metaphysical possibilities they ground if we are to approach the fullness of the first word of occidental thought; in *apeiron* the message the origin bestows upon us, has ridden the waves of centuries, carrying frequencies yet to be heard. What is key in this exploration however of the poles constituting the first word, is the reminder that the word is to be found in neither pole, nor in their summary, but precisely in the field of oscillation they open in their mutuality. This continuous return we shall try to trace.

We start with *-peiron*, what seems to refer to *peras*, *the end as limit* (and thus as the Platonic and Aristotelian determination of essence, as *horismos* and *telos*). This end as limit is the de-finition of the beginning; insofar as beginning and end are en-joined by *dikē*. In Heraclitus the other name for *dikē* is *logos*, and it is the implicit *logos* that in B103 allows for the coincidence of the beginning and end of a circle. For the circumference of the cycle in *logos* is not merely a fixed shape, but the circumambulation of the point, the movement that completes itself in itself, it is the *xynon* of the *archē* and *peras*, their community, their *unifying one*,<sup>165</sup> condensing into the point the Parmenidean culmination of the inception undertakes to arrest. *Peras*, the *end as limit* involves however something that eludes every arrest, every stop. The manifesto of *peras* reads: “We know no ends/we are only a going;”<sup>166</sup> our guiding words from the beginning of the journey of this text.

This is no flight of interpretation. Both in Homer and Hesiod we find *apeiros* and *apeiritos* as adjectives of the earth and the sea, although both are repeatedly said to have limits (arresting points). Neither is this mere inconsistency. According to Kahn, “Not only are the circles or rings described as *apeiros* or *apeirōn*, but the word is also used in garments or nets “in which one is entangled past escape.”<sup>167</sup> The most significant such circle and ring is *Ōkeanos*, the primordial ocean. *Ōkeanos*, the archaic

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<sup>165</sup> GA78, 236

<sup>166</sup> GA78, 272

<sup>167</sup> Kahn C. H., *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*, p.232

origin of all things, the river that originally bounds the earth, called a *telēis potamos*, a circling river<sup>168</sup> and *apsoroos*, a river flowing back into itself.<sup>169</sup> Ōkeanos is however *apeiros* as the very limit of all seas and as such, the true Aristotelian *periechon* (in A14 *apeiron* is termed the containing un-contained). This is the Anaximandrian *horizon*, the earth-heaven-sea limit of unity—what defines.<sup>170</sup> In Anaximander's map, as doxography hands it down to us, Ōkeanos still surrounds the earth, but it no longer occupies a fixed locality. The de-localization initiated by Thales in the ever-present water, finds its cosmologic culmination in Ōkeanos, which is now trans-posed in all—each being permeated through and through by Ōkeanos.

Kahn proposes thus a further step, a reversion to the root *per-* which as adverbial root refers to the front (exemplified in occidental adverbs and propositions such as *pro*, *per*, etc.) and which in verbal form suggests movement in a forward direction (*peraō*, *poros*, *porthmos*, etc.). So that *peirar*, for example will be the limit of a *passage*, a way in which we need to also understand *peras*. Thus for Kahn *apeiros* means the same as *aperantos*- what may not be transversed. Aristotle hence for example discusses *apeiron* in contrast to *dielthein* (coming through), *diiennai* (going through), *diexodos* (an exit through),<sup>171</sup> while Simplicius in contrast to *diexodeutos* (*what-has-an-exit-through*) and *diaporeutos* (*what-has-a-passage-through*). The transformation of this original meaning of the *unceasing* passage that a limit opens into a meaning of limitlessness as vastness and eventually mere limitlessness, is a series of transpositions that realize an essential passage themselves.

The original in-finite trope of the passage is not to be understood as human weakness in view of infinite vastness. For it is evident and indeed attested that since gods, like Hera, may transverse the earth, *nous* is equally capable of this. Then where does the in-finitude lie? In the very limit itself, in its tropos as a turning away from itself; the limit is always *given* as a fending-off of itself; the limit nihilates itself constantly upon man's persistence to exhaust it. The a-peiron, by fending-itself off, fends off the human endeavour of the passage. It is this this in-finite refutation that

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<sup>168</sup> Hesiod, *Theogony*, 242, 959

<sup>169</sup> Homer, *Iliad*, xviii. 399 & *Odyssey*, xx. 65

<sup>170</sup> This *horismos* (definition) that is also a *chōrismos* (a separation) finds its best mythological expression in the kindred Babylonian narrative of the Primal Flood, called *Tiamat*. *Tiamat* is split by *Marduk* into two- the celestial and terrestrial (part of which is earth) oceans; two oceans forever united in the horizon. Unsurprisingly, *Tiamat*, is precisely also perceived as chaos, as pure *chōrismos*, the gaping abyss itself.

<sup>171</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, 204a2-7

Permenides inherits under the sign of *ateleston/ouk ateleutēton*; a dangerous activity of limitation that defines the very limit of the inception.

In this activity *apeiron* becomes *aporon*, the impassable (*a-*) passage (*poros*) or passing (*poreia*). So that, accordingly, we need to understand the Socratic *aporia*, not as the mere loss in view of a blockade, of a terminal arrival, but as a loss in view of the infinitude of paths—precisely: “Isn’t the desert a paradoxical figure of the *aporia*? No marked out or assured passage, no route in any case...”<sup>172</sup>—no passage assured, insofar as every passage remains totally and equally open; this loss of passage, is a loss that the limit, as a turning away from itself, offers. In turn, this turning opens the *through* that enjoins the passage (*poros*) itself with its very end, its very limit (*peras*) that sustains the passage, for the one who decides to cross the desert.

Heidegger discovers the fending-off in the *a-*<sup>173</sup> that *attracts* the limit (*peras*) in *apeiron*. We have just attempted to understand this turning away *in the limit itself*. And yet there may be no limit unless it is constantly given by the *a-*, by the origin of limit and the opening of its field of operation.

One is tempted to ask on the relation of presence to the limit. By now it must be clear. Remaining, withstanding, takes place within the limits of presence, and what presences, becomes a permanence safeguarded by the limit. *Apeiron*, in fending off the limit of presence, rescues the essence of what presences.<sup>174</sup> Heidegger translates thus the Simplician equation of *physis apeiros* to the *archē tōn ontōn*:<sup>175</sup> “The Beginning of what-is-for-a-while in its while is (namely as the disposing [offering] of the Out-of-['Un'] as the jointure of the transition) the fending off of the limit (as the out-of-joint).”<sup>176</sup> The Beginning, the *ginning* use/need is here precisely the origin of the thought that will bear not the *peri-echon*, but the *katechon*, the constraining unconstrained. *Apeiron*, in giving the limit that itself fends off, principally the limit of presence, constantly rescues presence from itself. It keeps presence from permanence, from claiming the limit given to it for itself.

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<sup>172</sup> Derrida J., *On the name*, p.53-4

<sup>173</sup> *GA51*, 111

<sup>174</sup> *GA51*, 115

<sup>175</sup> Anaximander, A9

<sup>176</sup> *GA78*, 234

Heidegger understands absence as such, as this fending off. Thus for example he writes “The *a-* in *apeiron* names the ab-sence of limit.”<sup>177</sup> Absence is accordingly here a sub-version of the persisting limit of presence, so that *archē* (be-ginning) and *peras* (the un/limiting end) may en-join, so that their in-tensions pull them towards the same focality: a *tropos* of opening. According to this understanding of absence, Heidegger writes: “In the be-ginning of presencing absencing must reign.”<sup>178</sup>

*A-* then becomes an index. The *a-* in *a-dikia* and *a-peiron* shows forth as an indication of the Nothing dwelling in Being. Indeed this Nothing may not be seized by ontic logic and metaphysics (negative theology), which Being con-ceives in a trope of opposition.<sup>179</sup> Logic is trapped in a thought of exclusive affirmation and negation while negative theology testifies the inability of language to express positive Being in positivity thus for Heidegger remaining equally ontic.<sup>180</sup> Instead we need to try to think of this countering (*entgegen*) opposition as en-countering (*entgegenen*) opening. For Heidegger, the *counter* as en-counter becomes ontological difference, where Being is the countening/encountering and beings the ever-encountered.<sup>181</sup> But if indeed in the *Word* of Anaximander we en-counter Nothing, this is not an index of its assimilation to Being and can never be thought in the identity of Being. Nothing is much more what offers Being’s ipseity, its possibility to come forth as difference. The *a-* as absence never operates in the name of Being; it gives, but this giving is not guided by the identity of difference. The *a-* as index, points to Nothing as pure turning. *A-* is the giving of the limit in the *tropos* of fending off itself, while *-peras/-poros* is precisely the limit that incessantly guides the passage.

## 8. Apeiron synopsis

Having attended to the the manifold of Anaximander’s *Saying* and to the origin of his *Word* we hear one last time the earlier, in one of Heidegger’s final translations: “yet, from whence the emergence brings everything that is present for a while, thence

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<sup>177</sup> GA78, 238

<sup>178</sup> GA78, 229

<sup>179</sup> GA78, 244

<sup>180</sup> GA78, 245-7

<sup>181</sup> GA78, 254

(as in the identical) does also the evasion emerge in accordance (*füglich*) to use/need; for they (what-is-for-a-while) let-belong the jointure (of use/need) as well as care towards each other (from the overcoming) of dis-Jointure in accordance to the allotting/inducing of the enjoining en-whiling.”<sup>182</sup>

In the twofold of the *Saying-Word* “the unspoken ‘identity’ of all of Anaximander’s essential words” comes forth:<sup>183</sup> *archē* (be-ginning), *apeiron* (fending off the limit), *chreōn* (use/need), *chronos* (en-whiling), *taxis* (allotting), *adikia* (dis-jointure), *dikē* (jointure), *tisis* (care), *genesis* (e-mergence), *phthora* (e-vasion), are for Heidegger not mere linguistic variations of the same, but essential utterances of the identical; not a para-taxis, but an essential tactic belonging-together in time and Being. Thus, formulations like: “This identical, this dis-posing en-joining (*archē*), this identical, the *apeiron*, is the *chreōn*, the need, the necessitating,”<sup>184</sup> will recur, guiding and at the same time summarizing, the Heideggerian interpretation. For this interpretation the *Saying* says the identical, an identical still far removed from the Parmenidean appropriation. Being: in all its seeming complexity it says what in truth is the simplest, the most humane in human, for Heidegger precisely: Being.<sup>185</sup>

And yet with Heidegger again we start discovering another experience in the language of Anaximander; an experience of what-is in its Being coming forth, being neither nihilistic/pessimistic, nor optimistic, but remaining tragic.<sup>186</sup> If what remains tragic however is not beings in Being, but Being itself and if the *Saying* says Being, what it leaves unsaid to guide its utterance and our thought is Nothing. Nothing is the most humane in human, what constitutes human ex-istence and opens to Heraclitean *homou*, the stepping-out of the limit, which gives the limit and allows it to guide humans. Anaximander’s sequence of essential words does not speak of the identical, but consistently attempts to undo the hinges that hold the jointure of these words together. In his *Saying* the in-tension of measure appearing dominant is always in the shadow of the unsetting sun of *apeiron*. This shadow we know as *archē*. The be-ginning begins with measure. This measure still holds Heidegger’s thought in the limits of its sway. What Anaximander ultimately offers in his *Word* is precisely the opening for a sub-

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<sup>182</sup> GA78, 203

<sup>183</sup> GA78, 242

<sup>184</sup> GA51, 116

<sup>185</sup> GA78, 208-210

<sup>186</sup> GA5, 357



versive e-vasion from this measure of presence. A truth of *dikē* that with Heraclitus we came to witness as essential ex-cess, an index of Nothing. Yet it is Anaximander that teaches us first that while already late, already falling and already on fire, we are always also already in ex-cess, in the in-exhaustability of the limit that gives Being. Here begins the inception.

At its beginning our re-turn has run the course of a preparation of the *Saying of Nothing*. Set free for Nothing we may begin anew.

## Epilegomena

Trying to say *Nothing*; seeming as though we said *everything*, maybe *more*. Seeming like we said *nothing*, maybe *less*. And yet after all, the least and most we should hope for is a change of tone, a transtotation to instigate a series of transformations. Is there a future of new forms? Aren't we too late? We certainly knew our late-coming from the beginning. This is why our *logos* has always already been an epi-logue, a collection *after* originary difference, as the hunter is *after* the prey. In our epilogue we tried to speak *from* the beginning, speak *from* the silent pro-logue of all language, from the eloquence, that is, the *ex-locution*, of the lesion of Nothing.

Is there a way to assess such attempt, is there an assessment of the way? Certainly if such waying assessment is to be found, its rest should not depend on the exhaustion of *aporia*, a good way ends where *aporia* is no more. Indeed; “what would be a path without *aporia*? Would there be a way [*voie*] without what clears the way, there where the way is not opened, whether it is blocked or still buried in the nonway? I cannot think the notion of the way without the necessity of deciding there where the decision seems impossible. Nor can I think the decision and thus the responsibility there where the decision is already possible and programmable. And would one speak, could one only speak of this thing? Would there be a voice [*voix*] for that? A name?”<sup>1</sup> If the assessment of the way has a name it is precisely the inexhaustible *aporia* of *apeiron* whence the way begins—as such hardly a name, but rather Nothing, nothing at all.

*Aporia* is what gives a future, not the end, but the beginning of a way, what transforms the way. The *aporia* grants the way its waying by transforming the territories traversed into origins of futural tension. So that if finally we are to assess our way we need to ask: have we discovered an *aporia*? We have. We know that we are already too late; falling; on fire and that our condition won't be exhausted. We know with Malabou that a leap may not take us beyond, a harvest may not follow the sowing, a hatching the incubation.<sup>2</sup> Indeed we seem infested with *aporias*—new beginnings. To discover these *aporias*, to grant ourselves the possibility of a beginning, an *archaeology*, we undertook a return to the first beginning and saw it transform, saw the in-tension of the origin transform the very beginning. At the end of this return the truth that we could only profess has been gained: “At the end, the beginning no longer changes the same

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<sup>1</sup> Derrida J., *On the name*, p.83

<sup>2</sup> Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, p.116

way. And it is precisely from the end that we are going to start.”<sup>3</sup> In order to gain a beginning, we have to begin at the end for “the point of arrival does not preexist the leap.”<sup>4</sup> Yet since the leap may take us back, starting at the end in order to gain a beginning we found ourselves incepted by the first beginning. In this palintropic way we have been granted our aporias.

So the most *aporetic* of forms is granted to us. The cycle that from *Sein & Zeit*'s hermeneutics to the *Wesen der Wahrheit* and beyond has guided the thought of Heidegger opens for us to enter. This form we rediscover with Heidegger at the inception, for Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides are equally thinkers of the cycle. So that the in-sight that the essence of truth is the truth of essence now transforms anew into the certainty that *the essence of the inception is the inception of essence*. Nowhere is however this form formal. This is what our change of tone demands us to think—the Nothing of form salvaging it from formality. For certainly, when the course of the cycle is run, where we arrive—unlike the claim Parmenides seems to make from presence—is not where we began. And yet—precisely again with Parmenides—it is of no import in this cycle where we begin insofar as we are incepted, that is, taken into the beginning, as always, *from* the end.

At the same time, we come to understand that having gained a form, even the most de-forming of forms, having traversed even the widest of metaphors, we are still within metaphysics and the origin remains unreached, the giving *aporia* remains distant across the desert. No form amounts to the origin, but from the origin we come to gain a form that brings us to the *non-* of essence; and we gain the most *aporetic* of forms, the most *aporetic* of tropes, the cycle. In this cycle we regain Being, yet Being-transformed. In order to regain we have to lose. Thus Heidegger does away with Being. He transcribes and erases it. Certainly it is not enough. He assumes the excess of positivism simply to declare: there are only beings. As for Being? What is that? Nothing. At this point the cycle begins anew, Being begins to be regained, for at this point the Hunger of Being—always a double genitive—holds and permeates Being. And thus we understand our task and way: “Not for us men of the day, so that *sometime* we may be *full* – but rather for those of the future, that they may grow hungry for Being. Not for us – foremost properly not even for *humanity in general*,”<sup>5</sup> but for the simplicity

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<sup>3</sup> Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, p.124

<sup>4</sup> Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, p.117

<sup>5</sup> GA35, 258

of the responsibility of Being. What has been there all along, what we rarely came to notice, Being as Nothing, in which we temporarily-eternally dwell (*aufenthalten*) and it gently accompanies us, affording us difference, of this Being is still to be said.

We have not changed 'subject',<sup>6</sup> we have merely changed tone. As one moves from the 'they' to authenticity, Being moves into Nothing, its 'is' moves into the 'not'. Of this Being we have to speak anew and start again with its new aporias. One of these aporias, *the* aporia—still—of our time is technology. *As* aporia technology incessantly makes way, *the* way of modernity. And yet again, as aporia, it bans us from thinking its essence; for only *from the beginning* can this essence be thought. From the beginning technology shows us an order of beings where Being holds no longer sway, where beings find themselves metamorphosed into a porous metaphor, saturated with absence. As such technology stands uncannily close to Nothing. At the end of Being the beginning of Nothing is thus called again into question. This question can certainly not be raised here, a most demanding future of the beginning.

What we ask is rather the significance of our change of tone, a significance it now appears in the fullness of an aporia, this aporia that silently guided our leap to the beginning. From such aporia we came to recognize not only the first beginning as another beginning—a clarity long gained—but to discover the *other* of every beginning in the first beginning. Thus we saw the very event of the inception as the inception of the event, reiterating the aforementioned cycle of truth. Herein lies precisely the most scholarly of the text's claims. The inception is not a mere construction; as much as it is always another and as much as it always requires an end to inceive, *the inception took place*. Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides are its proper names.

The inception begins accordingly as ex-cess. Anaximander teaches us to think the limit and think justice beyond the right and the right beyond the merely just, *from the beginning*. In Heraclitus law beyond legality carries further the thought of justice and strife and the ex-cess of the limit comes to its most ripe, most open ex-pression. It is here that the inception teaches us to think the trans-formation of essence *from* existence, from the *incessant* ex-cess of man's stepping out into presence from absence. Eventually, Parmenides constitutes the moment of the very transformation of the inception, from an event of ex-propriation to the series of metaphors that constitutes

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<sup>6</sup> Malabou C., *The Heidegger Change*, p.228

metaphysics. The limit is thus with Parmenides transformed into the guardian of Being and *ex-cess* is bound to the maintenance of the now, yet not without a struggle, not without teaching us to think the tensions of the homology, to think *the struggle* of presence and absence itself.

Starting from this struggle we re-turn. To gain the aporia, to change tone. So that eventually we come to hear the words differently: *nihil ex nihilo*. Nothing *from* Nothing. Instead of the emptiest of utterances, the fullness of every actuality speaks in the purity of this *from*. *Nothing as essential tension emerges from Nothing*, it requires nothing to emerge and as such it is already there, already in-exhaustible, already burning, already giving the fall and the distance of de-lay. More than a self-duplication, such emergence opens the infinitude of lesions that ground lection, opens the event of saturation itself. In saturation Nothing grounds the irreducible duality of all Being, its tear into *essentia* and *existentia*. Heidegger localizes the ground of this tear in ontological difference,<sup>7</sup> a dif-ference we come to understand as a trope of saturation, as the emergence of absence in the heart of presence that withdraws Being from beings, and preserves the concealing forgetting in the heart of Being's *alētheia*. Yet this does not take us far enough into the aporetic *chōra*. In nihilic saturation we come to see essence, that is, the transformation and *alētheia* of essence permeated by ex-istence.

All existentialisms must here remain foreign. The in-valuable Nothing teaches us essence from the ex-cess of over-stepping to discover the limit. In order to give justice, *dikē* needs to overstep all that is just and punish presence for having presenced. Anaximander opens the inception precisely in the attestation that in order for justice to be, in order for presence to be allowed into presence (in order for Being to be), such presence needs to be already punished. It is not enough for presence to carry absence as a future. Absence 'is' equally its past and present. The presence of absence in the heart of presence 'is' saturation. Language creaks under the demands of this thought. A new language is as much due as it is impossible. *Dikē* will not allow it, for in every language Nothing has to withdraw and draw Being with it.

Finally we come to ask: is our having said too much and too little, is our impossible language a mere matter of names? Is it enough to replace the verticality of the *hen* (indeed the Greek *hen*) with the cycle of the Zero (the *late* gift of Arabia)? Would it suffice to replace in the Heideggerian corpus Being (Beyng, ~~Being~~, etc.) or

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<sup>7</sup> GA78, 213

even *Ereignis* with Nothing to fulfil the task at hand? Interesting and in-structive as such ex-ercise can be it soon proves itself insufficient. Heidegger indefatigably reminds us that a matter of names, the material of the name, is never 'mere'. Something of the order of *alētheia* speaks in the name, even if and when, or precisely if and when, *alētheia* withdraws and the name remains bare and unprotected, a forsaken sign, a trace of emptiness. And yet the name may not be a word, not even a whole sentence or a book, but the *Gesamtausgabe*, what Heidegger with regard to the inception often calls the *Saying*, or precisely even the *Word*—the very dif-ference of thought, unspeakable and impossible to summarize, a way foreign to all cartography.

Such name is Nothing, and yet *more* than another form in the series of transformations of idea, concept, will, etc. Nothing speaks precisely from *the more of the remainder*, when all names have been named. From the more of what remains, from the trace, we hope to gain the Hunger *of* Being, let Being speak anew. When Being speaks anew from Nothing, the name of Nothing is said, inception begins. We have tried to trace this inception, we have tried to utter this *from*, to speak *from* the *from*. At the end we are about to begin—again.

## Ergography

*Bibliographic Note:* All references to Heidegger have been referred back to the *Gesamtausgabe* [GA] and their translation like all German and Greek translations, unless otherwise stated, are mine. They appear in the abbreviated form: GA[number of volume], [number of page(s)] without mention of Heidegger's name, or the title of the specific volume or essay; at the same time the use of *ibidem* has been omitted in their case to provide a clearer picture of certain reference repetitions and formations. All references to ancient sources (Greek and Latin) are made with the standard numbering systems customary for each author and they do not appear in this *corpus* that consists solely in the texts used and cited in the essay. In particular with regard to Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides the standard Diels-Kranz [DK] classification is employed.

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