


Intercultural Broadcasting: The Approaches of DW-TV Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye When Targeting Arabic-speaking Audiences

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment for the PhD degree
Kingston University



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Abstract

This thesis introduces intercultural broadcasting as an alternative and more accurate term to that of the strongly associated term to propaganda: international broadcasting. It challenges theories of public diplomacy and public sphere by criticising public diplomacy as a term due to its abandonment of the core element of its process that is the power of ordinary citizens' unity, and provides the Arabs and Muslims as an example of a strong transnational public sphere due to the availability of the *elements of unity* amongst the roots of their shared values system which shapes their culture.

This thesis examines the approaches of DW-TV Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye in building bridges when targeting Arabic speaking audiences by analysing their dialogical programme content, as well as the overall programme genres. The uniqueness of this study comes from two points: it is the first research done by one of the targeted audience's members of the DW-TV Arabia and second, the TRT-Etturkiyye is relatively new and has changed its policies within the last year. This thesis argues that, before building bridges with the international world, countries are to build inner bridges with immigrants of the same nationalities as the international targeted groups. For instance, the Arabs and Muslims have lots of values in common that present them as a transnational public sphere; thus, Germany can seize the largest group of its immigrants – who are Muslims as well – to benefit from its public diplomacy efforts worldwide. Also, this thesis records the reactions of both DW-TV Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye towards the Arab Uprising of 2011, which forced both to create new programmes, invite new Arab guests and adopt new airing schedules.

This thesis was built upon original data collected from surveying ninety-one participants, general thematic analysis of four weeks of DW-TV Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye programmes, and detailed content analysis of the equivalent of twelve hours of episodes for each channel. The content analysis has been divided into two phases: the first was before the Arab Uprising of 2011 and the second afterwards. This thesis attempts to propose an innovative intercultural approach, considering the reality of this era's current international affairs. It outlines how an intercultural Arabic broadcaster targeting other cultural audiences should look.

Table of Contents

Abstract	2
Table of Contents	4
List of Tables and Figures	7
Acknowledgments	10
Thesis Output	12
About the Researcher	13
Introduction	15
Chapter 1. Intercultural Broadcasting as a Means of Public Diplomacy	20
1.1. <i>Aim of This Chapter</i>	20
1.2. <i>Introduction</i>	20
1.3. <i>The History of Public Diplomacy as a Definition</i>	21
1.3.1. Edmund Gullion (1965)	21
1.3.2. Public Diplomacy and Propaganda	22
1.3.3. Current Attempts to Define PD	23
1.3.4. The Missing Element of the Public Diplomacy Theory: The Power of Ordinary Citizens' Unity	24
1.4. <i>Public Diplomacy and the Public Sphere</i>	27
1.4.1. Theory of the Public Sphere	27
1.4.2. The Elements of Unity between Arab and Non-Arab Muslims.....	29
1.4.3. The Geopolitical Importance of Arabs and Muslims as a Transnational Public Sphere	33
1.4.5. The Importance of Media in Strengthening Both Public Diplomacy and the Public Sphere	39
1.4.5.1. The Satellite Channels	40
1.4.5.2. The Internet and Social Media.....	41
1.5. The Effects of the Arab Uprising of 2011	43
Chapter 2. The Importance of Defining Intercultural Broadcasting	48
2.1. <i>Defining Culture</i>	48
2.1.1. Eliot's (1948) Definition of Culture.....	48
2.1.2. Malik Bin Nabi's Definition of Culture	50
2.2. <i>International Broadcasting</i>	53
2.2.1. Definition of Broadcasting	53
2.2.2. International Broadcasters Targeting Arabic-speaking Publics	54
2.2.3. Is International Broadcasting Part of Media Diplomacy?.....	62
2.3. <i>Intercultural Broadcasting</i>	64
2.3.1. Intercultural Communication Literature Review	64
2.3.2. The Definition of Intercultural Communication and Intercultural Broadcasting	69
2.4. <i>Discussion</i>	71
Chapter 3. The DW & TRT Arabic Services Approaches	73
3.1. <i>Introduction</i>	73
3.1.1. Brief History	73
3.2. <i>Deutsche Welle</i>	75
3.2.1. Germany and the Arab and Muslim World 1919 – 1945	75
3.2.2. Brief History of Deutsche Welle	77

3.2.3. DW Board and Financial Issues	80
3.3. <i>Turkish Radio and Television</i>	89
3.3.1. Turkey and the Relation with the Arab and Muslim World	89
3.3.2. The Relationship between Arabs and Turks: Pre-World War I Nationalism and Current Affairs	90
3.3.3. Brief History of the TRT	93
3.3.4. Erdoğan's Speech at the Launching Day of the TRT	98
3.3.5. The Readiness of Arab Audiences to Accept the TRT.....	101
3.3.6. Davutoğlu and the Future of the Turkish International Role	103
3.3.7. The TRT's Approaches: Lessons Learned.....	104
3.3.7.1. First Approach: Drama.....	105
3.3.7.2. Second Approach: Share the Audiences' Celebrations.....	107
3.3.7.3. Third Approach: Simplicity and Repetition	109
3.3.7.4. Fourth Approach: Emphasis on Istanbul	110
3.3.7.5. Fifth Approach: Interests and Commonality	111
3.3.7.6. Sixth Approach: Family-oriented Programmes	112
3.4. Comparing the channels' goals and principles	113
Chapter 4. Immigration Effects on Both Germany and Turkey	116
4.1. <i>Introduction</i>	116
4.2. <i>Immigration History between Europe and the Ottoman Caliphate</i>	116
4.2.1. The Ottoman's Approach to Integrating and Tolerating Immigrants	116
4.3. <i>Immigration to Germany</i>	120
4.3.1. Die Gastarbeiter	121
4.3.2. The Integration Situation in Germany	123
4.3.3. The German Islam Conference (GIK) Initiative.....	133
Chapter 5. Methodology	136
5.1. <i>The Development of Methods Employed</i>	136
5.2. <i>Methodological Limitations and Obstacles that Affected the Research Process</i>	138
5.3. <i>Research Methods Employed Review</i>	139
5.3.1. Comparative Research Review	139
5.3.2. Content Analysis Review	142
5.3.3. Survey Review	146
5.3.4. The Survey Plan	148
5.3.4.1. The Changes in the Phases of the Survey.....	148
5.3.4.2. Reasons that Might Hinder the Process of Distributing the Survey	149
5.3.4.3. Using Social Media to Solve the Problem	150
5.3.4.4. Approached by the DW Research Department	150
5.3.4.5. The Changes in the Required Number of Surveyed Viewers	151
5.4. <i>Research Questions and Objectives</i>	152
5.4.1. Research Questions.....	152
5.4.2. Research Objectives	153
Chapter 6: Genre Content Analysis	154
6.1. <i>Thematic Genre of the Weekly Programmes' Content Analysis</i>	154
6.1.1. DW-TV Arabia Three Weeks	155
6.1.2. TRT-Etturkiyye Three Weeks	157
6.2. <i>Comparative content analysis between broadcasters</i>	158
6.2.1. The Analysed Week after the Arab Uprising of 2011.....	164
6.2.2. The Social Media Role	167
6.3. <i>Major Findings of the Genre Analysis of the Random Weeks</i>	169
Chapter 7: Dialogical Programmes' Content Analysis	171
7.1. <i>The DW Episodes Sample</i>	171
7.1.1. The First Phase Episodes.....	173

7.1.2. Second Phase	178
7.2. TRT Episodes Sample	184
7.2.1. First Phase Episodes.....	185
7.2.2. The Second Phase Episodes.....	186
7.3. Major Findings of the Dialogical Programmes Analysis.....	190
Chapter 8. Survey	194
8.1. In-depth Analysis of the Survey Findings:.....	194
8.1.1. Demography:.....	195
8.1.2. DW-TV Arabia:	199
8.1.2.1. Awareness of DW	199
8.1.2.2. Awareness of International Broadcasting.....	203
8.1.2.3. Personal Awareness.....	204
8.1.2.4. Awareness of Bridge-building Term.....	207
8.1.2.5. Awareness of Genre	207
8.1.3. TRT-Etturkiyye	209
8.1.3.1. Awareness of TRT-Etturkiyye	209
8.1.3.2. Awareness of International Broadcasting.....	211
8.1.3.3. Personal Awareness.....	212
8.1.3.4. Awareness of Bridge-building Term.....	213
8.1.3.5. Awareness of Genre	214
8.1.4. Intercultural Broadcasters.....	214
8.2. Discussion.....	218
8.2.1. Major Findings of the Conducted Survey.....	218
8.2.2. Insightful Participant.....	219
8.2.3. Concluding Remarks on the Findings.....	221
Chapter 9. Discussion and Conclusion	223
9.1. Conclusions.....	223
9.2. Future Outlook of an Intercultural Broadcasting Arabic Service	231
Appendices.....	237
I. Online Resources of the Programmes	237
II. DW-TV Arabia Episodes Sample:	238
DW-TV Arabia First Phase Episodes:.....	238
DW-TV Arabia Second Phase Episodes:	252
III. TRT-Etturkiyye Episodes Sample:	269
TRT-Etturkiyye First Phase Episodes:	269
TRT-Etturkiyye Second Phase Episodes:	271
IV. Copy of the Survey	281
V. Copy of the detailed results of the survey.....	291
Reference List	317
Arabic Reference List	337

List of Tables and Figures

TABLE 1 INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTERS TARGETING ARABIC-SPEAKING AUDIENCES	59
TABLE 2 INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTERS' LOGOS AS THEY APPEAR ON THEIR ARABIC SERVICES.....	61
TABLE 3 TIME GIVEN TO DIFFERENT GENRES BY TRT-ETTURKIYYE AND DW-TV ARABIA IN THE THREE CHOSEN WEEKS.....	159
TABLE 4 DEUTSCHE WELLE PARTNERSHIPS BEFORE AND AFTER THE ARAB UPRISING OF 2011.....	172
TABLE 5 "CHOOSE AS APPLICABLE" LIST OF WHAT MOTIVATES VIEWERS TO WATCH DW-TV ARABIA	205
TABLE 6 "CHOOSE AS APPLICABLE" LIST OF WHAT HINDERS VIEWERS FROM WATCHING DW-TV ARABIA.....	206
TABLE 7 "CHOOSE AS APPLICABLE" LIST OF WHAT MOTIVATES VIEWERS TO WATCH TRT-ETTURKIYYE	213
TABLE 8 "CHOOSE AS APPLICABLE" LIST OF WHAT HINDERS VIEWERS FROM WATCHING TRT-ETTURKIYYE	213
FIGURE 1 NATURALISATION OF FOREIGNERS (WITHOUT AUSSIEDLER) BY NATIONALITY IN GERMANY, SOURCE: STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, AUSLANDERBEAUFRACTE 2001 (CITED IN RAINER & ULRICH, 2003, FIGURE 2.1, 29).....	121
FIGURE 2 DW-TV ARABIA 3 WEEKS' GENRES' TIME DIVISION.....	155
FIGURE 3 TRT-ETTURKIYYE 3 WEEKS' GENRES' TIME DIVISION	157
FIGURE 4 DW-TV ARABIA'S GENRES DISTRIBUTION DURING THE WEEK OF APRIL 2012	164
FIGURE 5 TRT-ETTURKIYYE'S GENRES DISTRIBUTION DURING THE WEEK OF APRIL 2012	166
FIGURE 6 PERCENTAGE OF ARAB PARTICIPANTS BY AGE.....	195
FIGURE 7 SURVEY PARTICIPANTS DIVIDED ACCORDING TO THEIR WATCHING PREFERENCES	198
FIGURE 8 PERCENTAGE OF VIEWING DW-TV ARABIA AMONGST THE SURVEY PARTICIPANTS.....	205
FIGURE 9 THE PERCENTAGE OF TRT-ETTURKIYYE VIEWERS' GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE CHANNEL.....	210
FIGURE 10 THE PERCENTAGE OF SURVEY PARTICIPANTS VIEWING TRT-ETTURKIYYE	212
FIGURE 11 CHOICES OF THE ARABIC SERVICE INTERCULTURAL BROADCASTER'S LANGUAGES.....	215

إهداء إلى أُمِّي الحبيبة، شمسة بنت هزيم المهيري، التي علّمتني كيف أتلو:


« يَا أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ إِنَّا خَلَقْنَاكُمْ مِنْ ذَكَرٍ وَأُنْثَىٰ وَجَعَلْنَاكُمْ شُعُوبًا
وَقَبَائِلَ لِتَعَارَفُوا إِنَّ أَكْرَمَكُمْ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ أَتْقَاكُمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ عَلِيمٌ خَبِيرٌ »

سورة الحجرات - آية: ١٣

To my mother; Shamsa Bint Hazeem AlMuhairi, who taught me how to recite:

“O men! Behold, We have created you all out of a male and a female, and have made you into nations and tribes, so that you might come to know one another. Verily, the noblest of you in the sight of God is the one who is most deeply conscious of Him. Behold, God is all-knowing, all-aware.”

(The Holy Quran, 49:13)



My inspiration: Dr. Eissa Kh. AlSuwaidi

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Praise be to Allah, this thesis has witnessed its last stage. It all started ten years ago, when Malik Bin Nabi's books were passed to me as summer reading material. Since then, I have been digesting Bin Nabi's cultural and philosophical thoughts. In fact, this thesis is the result of Bin Nabi's argument over the problem of ideas in the Arab and Islamic world. He inspired my intellectuality to add further debate at the academic level.

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Thesis Output

There are three parts of this thesis which have been submitted to different conferences as follows:

1. Paper presentation: “Targeting Arab Audiences: The Approaches of DW-TV Arabia & TRT-Etturkiyye.” At the International Conference on the Trends of 21st Century Mass Communication: ICTMC – Qatar University. Doha: March 9th 2011.
2. Poster Presentation: “Sharek and Voice-to-Twitter: When Citizen Journalism Finds its Own Space in AlJazeera and Google”. At the International Association of Media and Communication Research Conference 2011. Istanbul: July 15th 2011. This was the starting point of the Arab Uprising of 2011 section of this thesis.
3. Up-coming paper presentation: “Talk-shows of DW-TV Arabia Before and After the Arab Uprising of 2011.” At the ECREA 2012 – 4th European Communication Conference. Istanbul: 24-27 October 2012.

About the Researcher

The researcher's interest in intercultural communication started while studying German as a third language at the Goethe Institute in Abu Dhabi. After being nominated by the German Embassy - Abu Dhabi in early 2007 to take part at the IFA; Institute für Auslandsbeziehungen (Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations), cross-cultural internship, the researcher witnessed an intercultural experience by spending two months in Hamburg. Questions started to arise in the mind of the researcher: Why are the Arabs, Muslims and others being sponsored by the German Foreign Office? Why are they spending massive amounts of money to send their messages to the world? What is this cross-cultural and intercultural communication they are promoting both on European and world levels? What are the reasons behind their well-organised network of institutions -both government and non-government organisations? How are they doing it? And what is so unique about their culture that they wish for us to know about it?

Driven by these questions, the researcher started to observe their lifestyle by interacting with Germans while still in Hamburg and via their official international broadcaster, the Deutsche Welle TV- Arabia. The two months period was very short to discover the answers the researcher sought, besides, the new academic year was about to start and the researcher had to move to the UK to finish her Postgraduate degree in Communication. Thus, the chosen topic of the MA dissertation was to study the intercultural communication and public diplomacy focusing on the German case. Noticing the effort to reach Arabs and Muslims, the researcher started to search for Arab or Muslim efforts to build bridges with the Germans or other nations through cultural means - the result was that almost none of the Arab or Muslim countries had a clear long-term plan for a cultural strategy, let alone an intercultural one. Therefore,

the researcher decided to expand the research on the German international broadcaster in her PhD thesis to cover this academic gap in the Arab world, believing that understanding one's culture and values and that it is human nature to be different will help any interculturalist to understand and respect others.

Inspired by this aim, the researcher took an intensive two weeks course on Public Diplomacy Training at the University of Southern California to expand her knowledge on the subject. Being the only individual joining for academic and research reasons, the researcher met experienced and professional individuals from diplomatic, military, political and journalistic backgrounds who were joining together to learn from high profiled professors in the field of Public Diplomacy. The two weeks reinforced the researcher's belief that a pure Arabic and Islamic point of view should stand at the academic level to present the uniqueness of its value system that drives its cultural life. This, as believed by the researcher, can be achieved by the individual effort of researchers to produce more non-Arabic research, the governmental efforts to reprioritise and reorganise their intercultural strategies, and the Arab and Muslim internet geeks to create virtual content of who they are and how their Arabic and Islamic cultural values have affected them.

Introduction

The previous century proved that the world of international relations and the balance of power can be affected widely by the mass media. The Cold War was the era in which propaganda became a well-established study field in itself. It started through the use of print media, for example, posters and leaflet distribution. However, the power of radio transmissions was far more effective. By then, all nation states had built their own international radio broadcasters to weaken the enemy's nation and strengthen their own image and policies. With the televised broadcasts, which cannot be easily formed with small-budget businesses, states owned all the first television channels and then broadcast these channels internationally for the same reason as the radio services. At the core of this issue lies the main topic of this thesis: targeting a foreign audience using their language via an international satellite channel to pass them specific messages of the state's interest.

This thesis specified the Arabic-speaking audiences as the target audiences group of the channels under study. It is important to mention here that the Arabic-speaking audiences do not contain only Arab ethnicities but also Muslims who speak Arabic or are interested in Arabic issues. There are strong connections between Islamic and Arabic values systems, thus, their political issues as well. Both used to be located under one Islamic Caliphate containing all ethnicities with a high geopolitical importance.

The international broadcasters under analysis in this thesis are DW-TV Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye. The reasons for choosing DW-TV Arabia instead of other international broadcasters like the BBC, AlHurra and AlJazeera are as follows: firstly, there is a massive amount of literature about these three channels in both Arabic and English. Secondly, the BBC is the former colonial empire in the major Arabic

countries, which means their language and culture was spread by force to Arabs, in comparison to the German language and culture which never reached Arabs by force. Thus, it was of interest to observe how Germans reach their audiences and the response from Arabic-speaking audiences to their efforts. Thirdly, AlHurra was launched as a direct result of 9/11; therefore, Arabic-speaking audiences expected a propagandist channel regardless of their viewing habits. Fourthly, AlJazeera was not included because it targeted Arabs by Arabs; as a result, it cannot be considered an intercultural broadcaster.

TRT Eeturkiyye, on the other hand, has been added to this research for two reasons. First, the recently launched channel reflects the emerging Turkish geopolitical power in the Arabic and Islamic world under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party. Second, the researcher previously recommended that the DW hire Arabs and Muslims in their Arabic service in order to have a better cultural understanding of their target audience; the Turks are the largest Muslim community in Germany. Thus, it would be of interest to compare how both Germans and the Turkish are targeting Arabic speaking audiences.

This thesis is divided into eight chapters, of which the first and fourth chapters provide a theoretical discussion; the fifth, sixth and seventh provide a methodological discussion; and the final chapter provides a general discussion and a future outline for an Arabic international broadcaster.

Since television broadcasting is at the heart of this thesis, chapter one inevitably discusses the emergence of broadcasting at the international level and how it became a form of public diplomacy. Notwithstanding, the definitions and discussions over major terminologies of importance to this thesis include public diplomacy, the public sphere, culture, broadcasting and intercultural broadcasting.

The first chapter draws its arguments around three points. Firstly, Gullion's public diplomacy theory is missing the element of ordinary citizens' unity. Secondly, it proved difficult to apply and implement Habermas's public sphere theory at the former pirogues European context (Fraser 1990, 58); however, applying this theory to the Arab and Muslim communities worldwide reflects the visibility of a transnational public sphere; this must be considered when relating to all international actors. Thirdly, international broadcasting as a term is inaccurate when studying the current phase of broadcasting; it is associated with propaganda, and the current attempts of nations is to build an understanding amongst them and, therefore, this thesis proposes the term intercultural broadcasting as an alternative.

The two international broadcasters chosen for this study are the German DW and the Turkish TRT; specifically, their Arabic services DW-TV Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye. The second chapter of this thesis provides overall information about international broadcasting targeting Arabic-speaking audiences and the motives behind such interest in Arabs, especially after 9/11. After that, the chapter devotes separate sections to DW-TV Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye for an in-depth review followed by explications of their approaches. The chapter concludes with an additional section about the Arab uprising of 2011 and its effects over the content of the channels under analysis.

The third chapter presents a major argument in this thesis, this being that the DW should build inner bridges with the Arab and Muslim communities living in its territories before seeking international relations. This is also relevant in the case of the theory of public diplomacy; as Germany contains Arabs and Muslims, it should focus its efforts on strengthening the relations amongst its citizens which, in the long run, would be reflected in its own political stability. Since the majority of Arabic-speaking

audiences are Muslims who share lots of values and history, and the majority of Muslims living in Germany are Turks, then studying the way Germany is communicating and dealing with this group of people is of importance to this thesis. Moreover, after the launch of TRT-Etturkiyye, it became far more interesting to compare how the two channels are approaching Arabic-speaking audiences. This chapter concentrates on the immigration effects on the relationship between Germany and Turkey from the Ottoman Caliphate to date. Then, the chapter concludes with the Muslim integration situation in Germany and the initiative of the German Islam Conference (GIK).

The second part of the thesis covers the methodology employed for the purposes of this thesis. The fourth chapter discusses the development of the methodological tools used in the past three years and their limitations. Next, the chapter provides the research questions and objectives in detail. The fifth chapter is the content analysis chapter, which starts with an explanation of the method used. Then, the chapter presents genre thematical analysis of three random weeks of both channels. After that, it provides a detailed content analysis of twelve hours of a dialogical programme; six hours for each channel. This content analysis is divided into two phases of dialogical programmes to compare the changes that occurred in their content before and after the Arab uprising of 2011.

The sixth chapter presents the survey conducted for this thesis. It explains the importance of the survey as a method, the original plan for the survey distribution and analysis, the obstacles faced in the process of surveying viewers and the solutions drawn by the researcher. After that, the chapter analysis details the findings of the survey's four parts.

The concluding chapter is the chapter in which the researcher provides her final arguments as well as recommendations for international broadcasting to cooperate with the needs of the current Arab youth; this is a further outline for an Arabic international broadcaster.

Chapter 1. Intercultural Broadcasting as a Means of Public Diplomacy

1.1. Aim of This Chapter

This chapter aims to answer five questions. Firstly, what is public diplomacy? Secondly, what is the relationship between public diplomacy, culture and broadcasters? Thirdly, what is the nature of the current international broadcasters that target Arab audiences and the ways and means they use to target them? Fourthly, how accurate is it to use the term *international broadcasting*? Is it propaganda or a cultural tool to provide understanding amongst nations? Fifthly, is it accurate to use the term *international broadcaster* to define the act of a broadcaster in building bridges amongst nations, or would it be more accurate to define broadcasters that aim for that as *intercultural broadcaster*?

1.2. Introduction

This chapter of the thesis deals firstly with the interpretation of the main definition of the term public diplomacy (PD) and its historical relationship to the political propaganda. Secondly, it places emphasis on targeting one's own people as an essential element of PD. Thirdly, it focuses on the use of the Muslim and Arab public sphere as an example of a transnational public sphere bound by common values. Fourthly, it discusses the definition of culture, elaborating on how cultural bridges benefit PD. Fifthly, it reviews the literature written on the subject of intercultural communication. Finally, this chapter suggests the use of the term intercultural broadcasting as a more accurate term than international broadcasting when describing broadcasting presenting a specific culture to international audiences. The practice of PD have been used since the existence of political knowledge. It has

been shown that a number of political theorists highlighted different aspects of PD and its importance in many ways; these included, Sun Tzu, Ibn Khaldoun and Niccolo Machiavelli. As a matter of fact, the Chinese civilization mastered it as an essential practice of building power relations. As Rawnsley (2009, 289) explains, "Clearly China has a long tradition of public diplomacy and has exercised its soft power for many centuries. ... China bestows upon its distinct approach to public diplomacy."

1.3. The History of Public Diplomacy as a Definition

1.3.1. Edmund Gullion (1965)

Terminologically speaking, the term *public diplomacy* is credited to Edmund Gullion, Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He explained it as the act which:

"deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents' and the process of intercultural communications."
(Gullion, 1965, cited in Cull, 2009, 19).

As can be seen in Gullion's (1965) definition, PD has to be an action taken in order to change the public's opinion and emotions towards international issues to legitimise the actor's policy. There are several actions that reflect public diplomacy: firstly, the exploitation of international public opinion which is based outside its borders, to support its international policies; secondly, the collaboration between a group of people in a country with another group in a different country that shares their interests; thirdly, the effect of foreign news journalists whose effects can be seen on international relations; and, fourthly, official diplomats who are nominated as

individuals to be the representatives and bear the responsibility when communicating across cultures. Finally, public diplomacy is the process in which intercultural communication occurs; however, the term has been less frequently used by the public.

1.3.2. Public Diplomacy and Propaganda

The majority of the recent scholarly articles added Gullion's definition in their introductory statements because he was the *first* to use the term PD (Paul, 2011, 34-35; Richmond, 2008, XIV; Cull, 2008, 19; Szondi, 2008, 2; Taylor, 2006, 6; Mori 2006, 62; Zwiebel, 2005, 2; & Wolf & Rosen, 2004, 3). However, the other scholars failed to give a real in-depth criticism of the definition. Seemingly, the above-cited definition created an intellectual boundary to their creativity. That is because they *attempted* to provide and develop the term within the exact same framework, which contains: a government, a foreign mass, a medium, a message or an action and a policy. This framework is very similar to Lasswell's statement: *Who says what in which channel to whom with what effect?* Mattelart and Mattelart (1998, 25-26) discussed Lasswell's literature and concluded: "Methods of dissemination appeared to be indispensable instruments for 'governmental management of opinion' on both the Allied and enemy sides. More generally, considerable strides were made in communication techniques, from the telegraph and the telephone to radio and cinema." The similarity between Lasswell and Gullion focuses on four of the elements mentioned above. Gullion's definition of PD avoids the directness of explaining the impact of propaganda, whereas in Lasswell's (1927, 627) theory of political propaganda, he defined propaganda as: "... the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols." There were a lot of other attempts to develop the term propaganda, including "Merrill and Lowestein's functional definition of propaganda is 'the effort or the activity by which an initiating

communicator intends to manage the attitudes and actions of others by playing on their preexisting biases with messages designed largely to appeal to their emotions and/or irrationality” (1971, 214, cited in Prosser, 1978, 55-56). As will be shown later, even recent theorists perceived the one-way communication as an important tool for PD, although originally, the clearest definition of propaganda was by Nelson and Izadi (2009, 338), who defined propaganda as “a systematic form of purpose through the controlled transmission of one-sided messages (which may or may not be factual) via mass and direct media channels”.

1.3.3. Current Attempts to Define PD

One of the main recent scholarly articles to define public diplomacy is Eytan Gilboa's *Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy* (2008). He discusses the development of the concept and its models stated by different scholars and theorists. He started with the weakness of Malone's (1985, 199, cited in Gilboa, 2008, 57) description of public diplomacy: "Direct communication with foreign people, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments." From his point of view, the definition lacks the 'who controls it' element and he reasoned that to be "probably due to the widely held notion in the 1980s that only governments use public diplomacy". He went on to highlight the definition's "two-step influence process: first, direct communication designed to create supportive public opinion in another state; and second, pressure by the informed public on its government to adopt friendly policies toward the country employing public diplomacy". (57) The richness of Gilboa's article lies in the variety of definitions he discussed and that it acts as a whole cumulative process towards finding the most accurate definition of public diplomacy. Later definitions identified actors and content. Tuch (1990, cited in Cowan & Arsenault, 2008, 57), for example, defined public diplomacy as “a

government's process of communication with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies". According to Cowan and Cull (2008, 7), "Public diplomacy provided a convenient framework for thinking about the impact of the 'communications revolution' on the practice of foreign policy." For the purpose of this thesis, definitions of public diplomacy related to media and communications are necessary in order to ease the understanding of the media's role in public diplomacy. Cowan's and Cull's article contains the following elements: public diplomacy as a separate subject for future reading, the effect of using media and communications as public diplomatic tools, the importance of messages sent to foreign public and the role of the policies of foreign affairs offices worldwide; however, PD is not limited to these elements. In fact, PD is a whole combination of the effort of individuals, organisations, NGOs and transnational companies towards a common goal of promoting a culture, faith or values in which a specific government is likely to support, develop, and in some cases, redirect. Manuel Castells (2008, 91) was able to provide the closest explanation of public diplomacy, arguing:

"The aim of the practice of public diplomacy is not to convince but to communicate, not to declare but to listen. Public diplomacy seeks to build a public sphere in which diverse voices can be heard in spite of their various origins, distinct values, and often contradictory interests."

As such, the aim is toward building a long-term understanding that results in a co-existence among citizens from different ethnicities.

1.3.4. The Missing Element of the Public Diplomacy Theory: The Power of Ordinary Citizens' Unity

Since 1965, the term PD has been inaccurately defined internationally due to the effects of the Cold War. At that time, the majority of the international diplomacy

targeting other publics was considered to be propaganda. However, as Carey (1975, 48-49, cited in Prosser, 1978, 141) argues:

"Through satellite communication there is a thrusting out of cultures into new regions of space. This movement is part of a system of national and regional rivalries, which find expression in United States and the Soviet Union as the two largest electronic powers can enlarge the region and particularity of their influence."

Moreover, Mori (2006) stressed the point that public diplomacy is very close to propaganda due to its strategic importance. However, as Gilboa (2006, 61-62) elaborates, " due to the media-saturated environment of international conflicts, the strategy space is compressed, and therefore public diplomacy must be given priority over [propaganda] tactics." Nonetheless, Mori's argument seems to see that both public diplomacy and propaganda come from the same source, but the difference is in the way they are applied. Thus, international broadcasting was being used by both propagandists and public diplomats. Using such tools might also be the reason for the intersection between propaganda and public diplomacy. The international broadcasting term "involves what was once with pride called 'propaganda'" (Martin, 1958, cited in Price, Haas & Margolin 2008, 153). To be specific, the commonality is that propaganda is always a one-way communication, whereas public diplomacy uses a combination of both one-way and two-way communication. As Cowan and Arsenault (2006, 16) explain, "One-way communication strategies are important at critical moments and for day-to-day explanations about policy." In fact, communicating with the masses was – and still is – crucial for governments and actors to pass them messages "involving essentially a one-way form of communication initiated by the media manipulators and providing messages to the

awaiting masses" (Prosser, 1978, 78). International broadcasting is strongly associated with propaganda and now scholars are trying to associate it with public diplomacy. Thus, building bridges through broadcasting will not reach its goals until it creates a clear flow of two-way communication.

Scholars argued that focusing on the one-direction flow of media was Lasswell's weakness (Mattelart & Mattelart, 1998, 34); however, such weakness came from the fact that, at that time, media owners were able to send messages in a one-way direction, but that is no longer the case as a result of the web 2.0 revolution. The two-way communication revolution has changed the way people think and act. Instead of being passive receivers, the used-to-be audiences, the masses are now participating through the Internet, which will be analysed in depth at a later stage. Thus, the direction of communication is not a major weak point of Gullion's definition. Rather, the weakest point is that he neglects a major element in public diplomacy's definition, that is the power of the citizen's unity; this was also ignored by all of the scholars who cited him or tried to create their own developed definition of public diplomacy. Moreover, if a public diplomacy's actor would like to target the Arab world, then targeting its own citizens should be on its priority list; in which they should prepare them to understand and respect the differences between their own values system and the Arabs', which is the base of a culture.

Since Arabic-speaking audiences are at the core of this thesis, it is essential to consider their language – Arabic – and their religion – Islam – as being at the heart of what unifies them. Therefore, global Arab and Muslim communities are to be included amongst the Arabic-speaking audiences, regardless of their official nationalities. In Germany, and when Deutsche Welle is targeting Arabic-speaking audiences, this includes targeting its own people that descend from Arabic and

Islamic roots in order to make the most of promoting the culture of dialogue both nationally and internationally. Several reasons led to the previous conclusion. Firstly, the probability of Arabs understanding how people of an Arabic background think, feel and act is much higher in comparison to a non-Arab anthropologist. Secondly, there is always a link between Arabs and pan-Arabs; thus, the public opinion of the Arab world might be affected by any action from that actor's government towards Arabs living within its boundaries. Thirdly, building inner bridges within the actor's own state would strengthen its reputation locally and globally. Furthermore, it would gain credibility and legitimacy, which would be reflected in the respect and trust of both its own people and foreigners.

The following chapters will discuss the German and Turkish cases, along with the methods employed when targeting Arabic-speaking audiences. The unique element of this targeted audience is that they are a mixture of Arab and Muslim communities that form an international public sphere with a shared culture and history and sometimes reach the level of sharing the language.

1.4. Public Diplomacy and the Public Sphere

1.4.1. Theory of the Public Sphere

The term public sphere was first mentioned by Jurgen Habermas in the mid-twentieth century to define the bourgeois classes in Europe who tried to affect the authority's decision by forming a legitimate public opinion. Thussu (2006, 55) explains Habermas' theory which "gave prominence to the role of information, as, at this time, a greater freedom of the press was fought for and achieved with parliamentary reform." To simplify, the public sphere is considered to be "the space between government and society in which private individuals exercise formal and informal control over the state: formal control through the election of governments

and informal control through the pressure of public opinion” (Curran, 1991, 29). The theoretical approach of Habermas seems to be limited due to the huge differences of each of the public and state policies globally.

In an attempt to theorise about Arab public sphere, Ayish (2008) argues that the richness of the Arab culture could be an addition to the contemporary political discourse, by emerging the *Arab-Islamic* values with global politics. He developed the term ‘*Islamocracy*’ that “suggests significant compatibilities between Arab-Islamic morality and democratic structures and practices, and hence would provide a fertile ground for the sustainability and enhancement of a public sphere in 21st century Arabian societies. Islam by default, promotes a public sphere-oriented congregational life-style” (Ayish 2008: 14). As the term reflects, Ayish’s attempt tried to combine the Islamic values with the western political practices focusing on the Arab public sphere; which is not the case for this thesis. This thesis is looking at the Arabic-speaking audiences who are forming a transnational public sphere that is shaped by the *elements of unity* discussed below. Besides, the current interpretation of democracy practices is not what an Arab and Muslim would aim for; therefore, this thesis attempts to find the uniqueness of this public sphere unity.

This chapter would add an additional element to Habermas’ public sphere theory. Taking Habermas’ concept of “public sphere” as the starting point, regardless of its weaknesses, there is a unique phenomenon created by a transnational public sphere. The missing part in Habermas’ theory is the explanation of what is considered to be common amongst the public. However, this thesis argues that when basic principles, religion, history, language and values system are shared amongst a population, then the result would be a common public sphere. The *elements of unity between Arabs and Muslims* is stressed to be the most important aspect of that which

forms their transnational public sphere because it is the core of their shared values system.

1.4.2. The Elements of Unity between Arab and Non-Arab Muslims

It is understandable that there are a minority of non-Muslim Arabs, a massive majority of non-Arab Muslims and non-practicing Muslims. Roberts (1979) pointed out that:

“as the Muslim religion includes more than Arabs, not all Arabs are Muslim. The Arab world, however, is connected by a shared culture that developed in the Islamic faith. Of course there is diversity within Islam, but it can be said that Islam is a “multidimensional system of beliefs that embraces the spiritual and the material, the divine and the earthly, the heavenly soul and mortal worldly deeds” (*Arab Human Development Report 2003*, 2003, p. 118).” (215)

This thesis argues that in order to reach appropriate conclusions about the different ethnicities that speak Arabic and form the Arabic-speaking public sphere, a researcher should understand the relationship between their cultures, which is shaped by the Islamic faith, and the subconscious system of values. The value, as defined by Kluckhohn (1951), is “a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action” (cited in Sitaram and Haapanen 1979: p.150).

It is evident in the communicative life of the Arabic-speaking public sphere that the Islamic values shaped its bases. In order to explain this Islamic base and how the Arabs and Muslims are forming a transnational public sphere, it is of importance to explain how their value systems are bonded. In his study about the northern Terramedia, Heggoy (1975) observes their strong values system and reasons that

strength to be “the side spread effects of Islam –the submission of mankind to God – which furnished a predetermined belief system and a set of approved behavior patterns” (cited in Roberts 1979 : p.226). His research was based on an observational approach to study the case; which led him to this conclusion. He linked between the values system and religion; in which some scholars might disagree with, believing that faith is the reason of backwardness that limits the human mind. However, Sitaram and Haapanen (1979) did a research on the values system and reached a similar conclusion, in which they emphasise on the approach of studying the values system of a culture by relating “cultural values to the religious beliefs and practices of the culture” (152).

The shared values system between Arabs and Muslims was originally shaped by Islamic acts. Historically speaking, Islam as a religion first started in the Arabic city of Mecca, the Holy Quran was revealed in their language; Arabic, and Arabs were the first to move and spread the message of Islam as a world-wide religion not limited to Arabs. Shortly after that, Islam’s message spread across all lands in a way that embraces different races and factions under the Caliphate. The religion of Islam managed to create a strong bond among a diversity of races that shaped their values system; thus, their culture. That is the Islamic Pillars: the Islamic creed, the five daily prayers, almsgiving, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and the pilgrimage to Mecca. These pillars outline the *elements of unity* among Arabs and Muslims in which a main value can be inferred from each of the previous pillars.

First, the creed of the Islamic faith; there is no god but Allah, and Muhammed is his Prophet, entail the desire of Allah’s reward and the fear of His punishment; *taquwa*. It can be argued that this forms the base of the value of freeing oneself from all sorts of slavery, as a result, the behaviours of the individual towards him/herself,

his/her family and society is being set. Second, the prayers, which increase not only the relationship between the individual and Allah, but also that between individual members of society because it is to be practiced in mosques; at five known times. In fact, this satisfies a crucial need in a human's life; which is to belong to a group. As a result, the chances for interpersonal communication increase, and thus, the value of belonging to one unity creates the bond of sharing the same concerns and joys and life. Third, the almsgiving of Zakah shapes the way in which a Muslim looks at his own money because he/she is responsible for it. In giving the Zakah, the rich and the poor interact and communicate directly, as a result, they spread the value of community cohesion. Fourth, fasting in the month of Ramadan is considered to be a secret worship in which a person can eat if he/she wishes, but they do not for Allah. Two values can be shaped by fasting, the value of mercy towards poor people and the value of commitment within the individual as well as the society, for during the month of Ramadan, Muslims break their fast and spend entire nights praying together – another bond to strengthen the cultural lifestyle of society. Finally, pilgrimage to Mecca; Hajj, the most widely attended and highly disciplined international conference as interpreted by the German converter to Islam, Prof. Dr. Murad Hofmann (1998). The Hajj is the best example of an intercultural communication in which no one differentiates him/herself from the other races so as not to spoil his Hajj. It shapes the most important value of equality between individuals of all nationalities and races.

From an interculturalist point of view, building bridges with another culture is best met through learning the other culture's language and the exchange programmes to have the chance to live there and understand the value system of that culture. That is what happened in the early stages of Islam; in which a Muslim who was passing the message of Islam to a non-Muslim was in fact interacting with him on a personal level

and speaking about the Islamic values system. In other words, he was living an intercultural process of his communicative act. The same goes for those recently converted to Islam when they try to absorb their faith. This serves almost the same as the intercultural bridge building phase of intercultural communications. In both cases, the individual tried to understand and put into practice the five Islamic Pillars, thus, the values system has been shaped and formed a bond between the individual and the Islamic world.

In comparison with other public spheres, the Arab and Muslim public sphere is expanding. It is a very important phenomenon that is considered to be an example to argue against Herman (1998, 133):

“The public sphere is shrinking globally under the impact of a triumphant market system, which is putting more and more public space to profitable use, as defined by the advertising community. ... This underlies the long trend towards entertainment and gradual marginalization of the public sphere. ... The main drift of the global market system and media therefore poses the serious threat that we are allowing democracy to be subverted and, in Neil Postman’s words, ‘entertaining ourselves to death’.”

Although the global public sphere is shrinking because of the reality that capitalism is promoting "individualism" and the uniqueness of the self-centric style for the sake of gaining more profit globally, the Muslim and Arab public sphere is a transnational one that is expanding, not shrinking, for two reasons. First, the non-democratic systems in the Muslim and Arab homelands that pushed them to create a transnational public sphere in more democratic states in which the media are more open in their political system. As Georgiou and Silverstone (2007, 38-39) argue, “The potential for decentralised, transnational [public] spheres emerges, therefore, as the nation-state begins to lose its monopoly of social, political and cultural exchanges and

as images, sounds and people are less bounded and grounded within singular political and cultural territories.” The situation of the Muslims’ and Arabs’ home of origin is that they are either living in non-democratic societies or in a society in its early stages of becoming more democratic. Thus, the educated masses knew well what was true and what was false. Trying to manipulate such a population would lead them to question the senders’ true intentions in targeting them.

The second reason for the expansion of the Muslim and Arab transnational public sphere is the actions of Muslim and Arab editorials in the media. Curran (1991, 30) clarifies the main role of the media “as assisting the equitable negotiation or arbitration of competing interests through democratic processes”. This role is what the Muslim and Arab media are trying to achieve; for all media are the mean to change their social and political life. The uniqueness of this case shows that “Arab media are distinct in terms of content and style, and exists of some sort of a coherent and unified media project that is inherently ‘Arab’” (Sabry, 2005, 41). Eickelman and Anderson (1999, 9) stressed the importance of unity by saying: “New media refigure audiences as communities, because senders and receivers have far more in common, not just in interests but also in cultural style and social position.”

1.4.3. The Geopolitical Importance of Arabs and Muslims as a Transnational Public Sphere

There are two theorists who emphasised the importance of the *elements of unity* but from different perspectives. The first scholar is Hans-Herbert Kögler (2007), who theorised that intercultural understanding is based on values – as discussed in 2.3.2. The second scholar is Ahmet Davutoğlu (2010), who stressed the importance of the geopolitical sphere of the Arabic and Islamic regions which form common values and principles. He studied the motives of the European, Russian and American colonial powers during the cold war and concluded that this importance is coming

from the vast area it is covering. Looking at its lands, the Arabic and Islamic regions located at the heart of the Afro-Euro-Asian continents that are rich with the essential raw materials with high percentage of youth populations. On the other hand, it is controlling the most important sea straits that play crucial roles in the economic and military spheres such as Strait of Gibraltar, the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Bosphorus.

Currently speaking, Davutoğlu referred to four variables that increase the geopolitical importance of the Arabic and Islamic regions (281-285). The first variable is the advancement of the Islamic identity in different regions, which affect the geocultural importance of the Islamic regions. The second variable is the spread of Islamic societies in the world due to voluntary migrations; as a result, the demographic of the host countries has been changed. The third variable is the advancement of civilization and cultural revival due to the search for alternative values instead of the Western values. The fourth variable is the reaction of Arabs and Muslims towards the psychological sphere of marginalising and neglecting Muslims and Arabs under the name of terrorism by Western powers.

The fruitfulness of the above-mentioned variables was evident during the Arab Uprising of 2011. Such variables can affect Europe more than any other region due to the nearness of the land and in some cases the shared borders. As a result, the European powers are to reconsider their situation according to the four variables discussed by Davutoğlu.

Although Davutoğlu did not use the term *public diplomacy*, he did point at its importance in terms of its cultural and historical aspects in which PD is becoming a major indicator of states' influences in different regions worldwide (Davutoğlu, 2010, 78 & 234).

The need of *the elements of unity* to support a unique transnational public sphere worldwide is available to Arabic-speaking audiences for several reasons. Firstly, Arabs' mother tongue is Arabic; which creates a common form of understanding life amongst different ethnicities and religious sects. Secondly, Arabs and Muslims share their principles and values due to their Islamic religion. Moreover, Muslims are encouraged by their religion to learn Arabic in order to understand their Holy Book, notwithstanding, their shared Islamic history for over 1000 years. Even Prosser (1978, 298) placed emphasis on similar points:

"Global communication that cause interaction, generally at the collective level, which later transcends national and cultural barriers. While such communication often is affected by problems of language, attitudes, values, and thought-patterning, there is generally some mutually uniting factor for such communication to take place effectively. An example is the unifying nature of Islamic thought for Moslems all over the world which allows them to communicate effectively with each other despite other barriers."

Prosser's argument relates to Arabs and Muslims within their home countries, along with Arab and Muslim inhabitants of Western societies, for example, those living in the United States and the United Kingdom. Davutoğlu (2010, 283) elaborated that "the effect of the 2nd and 3rd generations of Muslims' communities in the demographical and cultural spheres" of the hosted states are clear. Therefore, policies are to consider Arab and Muslim needs in both the hosted states and their country of origin.

The socio-cultural anthropologist Jon Anderson examines the phenomena of the Arab and Muslim public sphere in different research work as part of his specialisation in the anthropology of religion (Jon W. Anderson Website, 2007). Anderson, along with Eickelman (1999, 1), said in the first chapter of their book:

“A new sense of public is emerging throughout Muslim-majority states and Muslim communities elsewhere. It is shaped by increasingly open contests over the authoritative use of the symbolic language of Islam. New and increasingly accessible modes of communication have made these contests increasingly global. So that even local disputes take on transnational dimensions. These increasingly open and accessible forms of communication play a significant role in fragmenting and contesting political and religious authority. Muslims, of course, act not just as Muslims but according to class interests, out of a sense of nationalism, on behalf of tribal or family networks, and from all the diverse motives that characterize human endeavor. Increasingly, however, large numbers of Muslims explain their goals in terms of the normative language of Islam.”

Anderson and Eickelman were able to identify their subject of study by referring to Muslim publics as *Muslim-majority states* or *communities*. This accuracy is very important because the so-called Islamic states are not really Islamic as they do not apply Shari'a in their laws. Also, the word communities is much more accurate than the usage of the word Diaspora¹. For this reason, the word Diaspora will not be used throughout this work; instead, the word communities will be used. This shows that scholars are at a stage in which sticking to inaccurate terminology would result in reaching inaccurate conclusions. Thus, being specific is a must in order to analyse social phenomena. Davutoğlu (2010) used Muslim communities to refer to Muslims living in Europe regardless of their ethnicities. He linked his usage of this term to the changes that occurred in the geopolitics of the Middle East. Davutoğlu (2010, 279-280) argued, "The Islamic World shifted from the above mentioned definition to a description of communities of the recently established states." Anderson and Eickelman's statement is very powerful because it managed to envisage the future

¹ Diaspora is a term originally associated with the Jews living in different parts of the world outside Israel. (Cambridge Dictionary 2011).

outline scenario of Muslims. It reflects a sense of understanding the nature of Islam in influencing and unifying Muslims worldwide, especially after having the ability and accessibility to communicate openly without fear of being punished or censored. Although this analysis was stated in 1999, the Arab Uprising of 2011² proved its accuracy in highlighting the efficiency in exchanging and communicating ideas amongst these transnational communities. It also simplified the whole situation in the Muslim world in one sentence that did not have an adverse effect on reality. In fact, their prediction occurred twelve years later, having developed further, in part due to the inherent power of social media. A clear example of the accessible communications and its effects on governments is shown on a transnational dimension in the recent revolutions in Tunis, Egypt and the other Arab states. The use of social media changes the reality of Muslims' and Arabs' everyday life. A whole thesis could be written on the second part of their statement, because it is true that Muslims, like any other religious public, are expected to act according to their religious interests. They specified the most important values that follow the religion: nationalism, tribes and families, or to meet their personal values. By observing social media, as the most influential medium nowadays, the above-mentioned values are on the top of the trends in the Muslim and Arab world. Although the statement did not use the term citizen journalism, the last sentence reaches the same end; in which Muslim individuals are passing on their Islamic knowledge on a personal level using the available media, regardless of the fact that some governments are employing specific authorities to meet such goals. Anderson and Eickelman managed to reach this scenario; yet, states with an increasing number of Muslim communities are neglecting a powerful group living in their own geopolitical sphere.

² Year 2011 witnessed revolutionary protests all over the Arab world in which is still ongoing to date.

Pan-Arab and pan-Muslim communities in Europe are not ordinary refugees that emigrated from dictatorial governments; but rather, they are intellectuals seeking peaceful environments in order to prove themselves. In Anderson's (2003, 894) view,

"These students, together with émigré professionals, political exiles, and labor migrants, form part of the contemporary Muslim [communities]. It is a mobile population, not just of settlers but with ties and the material means to maintain links with homelands in a world shrunken by advances in transportation and communication available to ever more people."

The fact that they are productive communities who seized the mass-media to "highlight the[ir] concerns ... in their home cultures and in political and religious issues of their home societies, offer cultural profiles, political news and commentary and religious witness, and usually in advance of more official voices" (Anderson, 1997). The importance of integrated Arab and Muslim communities in Europe was highlighted in Davutoğlu's *Strategic Depth* (2010), Tariq Ramadan's books (1999, 2001 & 2004) and Tariq Modood (1997, 2009, 2012a, 2012b). However, the difference is that Davutoğlu viewed the issue from outside the European sphere, whereas Ramadan and Modood, whose arguments are discussed later in this thesis, presented the view of the second generation of Muslims living in Europe. As mentioned earlier, Davutoğlu (2010, 283) stressed on the importance of effective Muslim communities worldwide, especially second and third generations.

An in-depth reading of Ramadan's (1999, 234) thoughts and arguments reflects that there are three points which are of importance to this thesis: firstly, he argues that the efforts of the individual Muslims living in the West to know oneself will shape the future: "The degree of mutual misunderstanding remains alarming after decades of coexistence and centuries of dialogue." Secondly, he stresses that Islam does not conflict with the "engagement, social reform, to progress and well-

being" of the society (2001, 308). In contrast, Islam encourages the individual to give and get involved in their society. Thirdly, he predicted that "the future dialogue between civilisations will not take place at the geopolitical frontiers between 'the West' and 'Islam' but rather, paradoxically, within European and American societies" (2004, 226). Again, drawing on the last scenario, Ramadan is arguing about Western Muslims' efforts in the West to change the future of not only Muslims, but the whole dialogical concept worldwide.

The importance of culture in international policies these days is unavoidable, especially when the targeted public is from a totally different culture. To reach accurate conclusions for this thesis, three cultural theorists' perspectives are going to be discussed below: Eliot, Bin Nabi and Ramadan. As a result of the *elements of unity* amongst the Arab and Muslim public sphere, there has been a drift towards a common hope and a common future to strengthen them. In other words, as Sim (2006, 379) expounds, "This openness has been crucial in the formation of a genuine public sphere and in the shifting of the terrain of politics to include public opinion and identity issues." This is a result of two main breakthroughs in Arabic and global media. The first breakthrough is the usage of the Internet, which creates virtual communities and links between common interests of users. The second breakthrough is the new satellite channels and their main role in creating a transnational public sphere.

1.4.5. The Importance of Media in Strengthening Both Public Diplomacy and the Public Sphere

Different types of media are employed in order to emphasise on the sender's messages, to influence different public opinions and to reach their own goals. This section focuses on the usage of satellite broadcasting and the virtual media in reshaping current worldwide political affairs. As will be made evident, international

broadcasters are mainly used by governments' officials; meanwhile, social media and the other Internet methods are used by citizens in order to change their government's policies or to address issues that the major media are ignoring.

1.4.5.1. The Satellite Channels

The first important medium in shaping this public sphere is the satellite channels (Sim, 2006, 379). The most notable satellite channel, which is considered to be a global non-state actor, is AlJazeera, which was founded in 1996 (Sabry, 2005, 42). AlJazeera used to be an Arabic satellite channel, but then expanded to become a network that contains four sport channels, one children's channel, one documentary channel, one channel that broadcast live events 24/7, AlJazeera.net website, AlJazeera English channel and all social network media, including Facebook, Twitter and AlJazeera-Sharek³, in which viewers can share their own personal videos and photographs. Also, AlJazeera has launched its Bosnian channel. Recently, Pintak (2011, 47) coined the arrival of AlJazeera and other Arab satellite channels with McLuhan's *Global Village*. He argues that "[n]o longer did all the world view events through a Western lens. But neither could Arab governments any longer control the televised message". He specified AlJazeera to be the one which "reframed - and in many cases *created*" the debate. His book was published just before the Arab Uprising of 2011. He stated in his book that "electronic revolution had yet to be matched by even the beginnings of a political revolution" (Pintak, 2011, 47). By the time this thesis was written, the Arab Uprising of 2011 proved the beginning of his statement, yet refuted his concluding statement because AlJazeera and social media played a crucial role in shaping the new political sphere. By analysing AlJazeera's content and its availability worldwide, it became clear that the network mainly

³ During the Arab Uprising, AlJazeera

targeted pan-Muslims and pan-Arabs worldwide that have been either exiled or dispersed to other regions to find a respectful working environment. Those people are considered to be part of the Muslim and Arab transnational public sphere. In other words, this public sphere will, in the long run, play an important role in the political, economic and social life of their homelands.

1.4.5.2. The Internet and Social Media

No one can deny that the Internet was a changing point worldwide. Cowan and Arsenault (2008, 26) link the Internet, PD and collaboration: "Today, Web 2.0 applications ... have made it possible for those concerned with public diplomacy to move beyond online information portals and outreach campaigns to include much more broadly based forms of collaboration." They further their argument by predicting that the collaboration is a key issue in terms of the development of the virtual technological revolution, arguing that, "A number of amazing international collaborations are already taking place online. Software programmers collaborate without financial compensation or market incentives to make world-class software" (Cowan & Arsenault 2008, 26). They continue to put emphasis on the available collaboration chances between PD practitioners and divided it into three layers of PD: The Monologue, The Dialogue, and The Collaboration. They claimed that Collaboration is the most essential layer for PD, which is defined as "initiatives that feature cross-national participation in a joint venture or project with a clearly defined goal" (2008, 10). In terms of PD activities, Cowan and Arsenault (2008, 21) specified the definition to be:

"a form of public diplomacy [that] refers to initiatives in which participants from different nations participate in a project together. These projects can be short term with a clear endpoint, such as putting on a play or writing a piece of music; or larger in scale and long term

such as side-by-side participation in natural disaster reconstruction efforts."

Ten years before Cowan and Arsenault, Vittachi (1998, 231) argued that "traditional media are not conducive to democracy by their very nature". In her opinion, traditional media are "spaces for entertainment professionals" (Vittachi, 1998, 236), while the Internet "has provided us with an extraordinary leap towards empowerment and democracy. It is the first truly citizen-based mass media" (Vittachi, 1998, 238). In fact, she is the first scholar to give the sense of citizen journalism by visualising this process:

"For the first time, any one of us who is reasonably affluent and educated, by Northern standards, can – with a little bit of training – become a journalist or broadcaster in our own right, addressing a potential audience of many millions, saying what we want to say and how we want to say it. And we can do all this without leaving the comfort of our own mouse" (Vittachi, 1998, 238).

As an essential means for PD, the Internet witnessed lots of development. One recent example is the call by the State Department "to experiment with the use of social networking for citizen engagement and civic participation in the Middle East" (Morozov, 2010, 9). Again, the problem with the U.S. and other Western authorities is that they focus on their own tools while neglecting the mentalities and abilities of Muslims and Arabs as their target groups. In other words, they theorised very well, but failed to understand the *human* reality of the issue. Anderson (1995, 13, and 1997) explains the motive behind using the Internet widely amongst Muslims and Arabs, specifically outside their homelands:

"It embodies their values on speed, reach, openness, quick response and the emergence that they seek in the research they communicate. Responding to these needs, the Internet grew not just technologically

but sociologically as the forms and occasions of collaboration grew to include additional interests brought by its users.”

The Internet is becoming important in Muslim and Arab life, along with other means of new media in which “all focused on how to lead a Muslim life in a modern, increasingly middle-class world not denominated primarily in Muslim terms” (Anderson, 2003, 889).

1.5. The Effects of the Arab Uprising of 2011

Scholars might argue about the accuracy of different terminologies, given what happened in the Arab world late in 2010 / early 2011 and the event that marked its start. For instance, Western journalists and academics referred to it as the Arab Spring and the very first phase of it as the Jasmine Revolution, that is, the Tunisian revolutionary protests against the corrupted government of Bin Ali. The reason for calling the Tunisian Revolution the Jasmine Revolution is its high speed in overthrowing Bin Ali from the head of state and the amount of losses, which are considerably less than other historical revolutions. However, several Arab scholars and journalists in different conferences and papers have argued that the name does not represent the reality. Throughout this thesis, the Arab Uprising of 2011 will be used to refer to the first year of the ongoing uprising in the Arab world. This section will highlight the reasons behind the Arab Uprising of 2011, the role of citizen journalism and social media in accelerating the changes in their governmental structure and, finally, the axes of changes that occurred in both DW-TV Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye international broadcasters.

Although each individual Arab country has its own uniqueness, there were many common reasons behind the uprisings throughout the Arab world, including the high percentage of poverty, the high percentage of unemployment, the high percentage of illiteracy, corruption governments, the lack of citizen participation in

the political affairs, the lack of freedom of speech due to the interference of the State Security Services in the life of the citizens and, most importantly, the high number of youths who have been neglected for the previous decades. For the first time in the history of revolutions, there was no specific leadership for the Arab Uprising (Filiu, 2011). The commonality of the major factors has led the spirit of the revolution to spread all over the Arab country. This fosters the calls and protests of the youth before anybody else; the Arab youth, who were unemployed and spent the majority of their time surfing the Internet and mastering the usage of social media technologies. The Arab youth managed to use the available free spaces online to express their opinions and to post up-to-date visual and audio stories online. In other words, they became the competitor sources of information in front of their government media outlets.

In fact, Arab protests started six months before the incident of the Bouazizi in Yemen; however, there was not enough media coverage. Besides, the media and telecommunication infrastructures and literacy are not very strong. Nevertheless, when Bouazizi burned himself in front of the municipality of Sidi Bouzid after being slapped by a policewoman for selling vegetables without permission in the street, the Tunisian Revolution took a far more organized form and calls for political reforms spread all over the country. The violent response of Ben Ali's regime created an international struggle for Tunisians. In fact, within a month, he had fled from the country to Saudi Arabia without any requests from the people for him to leave, who, instead, asked for reforms. Ben Ali's government and its State Security Services were seen as the strongest in terms of its control over its own people. As a result of this action from Bin Ali, the hope and the will to get rid of the corrupt regimes spread amongst all Arabs, and the Egyptians dared to spread their revolutionary slogan: "The

people want to overthrow the regime!"

In Egypt, social media and citizen journalism was most visible and organised. It all started after the murder of Khaled Saeed, a young Egyptian who was tortured to death by the police after he uploaded a video on YouTube about the corrupt Egyptian police. A Facebook page was devoted to him to defend his case and regain the dignity spoiled by the then policemen. It became a reform movement for all Egyptians; regardless of their age, sex, religion or political views, they gathered and protested against corruption.⁴ The surprise was Tahrir Square, the largest and most important square in Cairo, being occupied by protesters and converted into a mini protesters' village. At that historical period of time, Arabs were glued in front of the TV and computer screens to see the latest Egyptian news from news agencies as well as from citizens' blogging and tweeting from Tahrir Square.

There were four major online spaces that were of direct influence in the acceleration of the Arab Uprising of 2011, especially in Egypt: firstly, Facebook, with its ability to build a massive amount of virtual networking and which was the platform in which the youth were organising themselves at the very first phase of their virtual protests. Secondly, Twitter, with its ability to communicate instantly via mobile phones to send images and locations of events to the whole world and in all languages. In fact, Facebook and Twitter provide the ability for the youth to reach major media agencies virtually in person. Thirdly, Google's services: Speak-To-Tweet, discussed below; and Blogspot⁵, in which bloggers were able to post their own stories, news and opinions, regardless of the official media news stories. Fourthly, AlJazeera's network services, especially AlJazeera Mubasher, the devoted satellite channel for live scenes 24/7, and AlJazeera Sharek, the free-of-charge space in which

⁴ See *We Are All Khaled Saeed* Facebook webpage

⁵ And other blogging services' providers

registered users can upload their video clips and photojournalism images under their own files. By providing these two means, AlJazeera was the first organisation to be able to support citizens against the corrupt Arab governments – keeping in mind that AlJazeera was originally the BBC Arabic channel which was formed by pan-Arab journalists. In other words, AlJazeera is not the representative of Qatar at the international level. The benefit of AlJazeera Sharek was not just uploading videos and images from the Arab streets and alleys, but the fact that good uploaded videos, in terms of the way the videos were taken and the clarity of the images, would be broadcast at AlJazeera Mubasher. In fact, the AlJazeera Mubasher screen was divided into a four-screen view in which Arab audiences were able to see different places of the Uprising broadcasted live. Later on, AlJazeera provided sub-channels of AlJazeera Mubasher, for example, AlJazeera Mubasher Egypt.

When the Mubarak regime shut down the Internet services and the mobile network coverage from Tahrir Square on 28th of January 2011 for two days, Google announced its new service Speak-To-Tweet to support the revolts. This service was supposed to be launched at a later stage; however, due to Wael Ghonim, the head of Google Middle East, being missing, it was necessary to launch it earlier. It was basically a voice-recording service in which you could call a specific number, choose a hash-tag⁶ and speak; and there is an official account in Twitter that is responsible for tweeting a link of the voice message to the world. This service did not implement a revolutionary idea that went against the common trend but it reflected the *element of unity* amongst the Arab public sphere discussed earlier in section 1.3.4. There were announcements of free-to-call numbers sent from Arabs and Muslims around the globe through Facebook and Twitter for those at Tahrir Square and other Arab towns

⁶ “The # symbol is used to mark keywords or topics in a Tweet ... as a way to categorize messages.” (Twitter Website 2012)

who could not afford the cost of calls. The uniqueness of the Arab Uprising of 2011 is that it broke the rooted fear and replaced it with the forgotten dignity of Arabs and Muslims. One of the first, if not the first, published books on this matter was by Filiu (2011), which listed ten main lessons from the first phase of the Uprising, of which the fifth was: "Leaderless movements can win."

The importance of providing a brief about the beginning of the Arab Uprising of 2011 is to give an overall view of the radical change of the political situation in the Arab countries and its circumstances over international actors who observed the situation and changed their strategies accordingly. As Hanau Santini (2011, 287) states: "The uprisings have signaled the end of Western-led, top-down models of reform in the Arab world." For the purpose of this thesis, the reaction of DW-TV Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye as the international broadcasters will be explained. As mentioned in 6.2.1, there were a number of changes in the content of both channels.

Chapter 2. The Importance of Defining Intercultural Broadcasting

2.1. Defining Culture

In the previous sections, two terminologies have been discussed: public diplomacy and public sphere. The weakness of the public diplomacy definition was the original limitations of the public ethnicity to the inclusive European publics, thus, it could not be applied due to the variety of languages and ethnicities in the European continent. However, applying his theory to Arab and Muslim communities worldwide, Habermas' theory of the public sphere seems to be more applicable. For the main purpose of this thesis, that is, to compare two international broadcasters and to propose an intercultural broadcaster, it is crucial to discuss culture as a definition from both Western and Eastern perspectives. The following will discuss Eliot and Bin Nabi's points of view on culture.

2.1.1. *Eliot's (1948) Definition of Culture*

A shared culture is an important element that shapes the public sphere and an effective means in public diplomacy; however, international relations scholars and social scientists never agreed upon a single definition of culture; this can be considered a healthy sign in the intellectual sphere. One of the major inputs in defining culture is T. S. Eliot's (1948) statement: "A whole way of life." In his book *Towards a Definition of Culture*, Eliot (1962, 31) combines culture and religion: "Yet there is an aspect in which we can see a religion as the whole way of life of people, from birth to the grave, from morning to night and even at sleep. And that way of life is also its culture." In his opinion, the whole way of life is being shaped by religion, which affected him personally. As a result, he concluded that culture was a result of

religion. Linking culture with religion encouraged some scholars to stand against Eliot. For instance, Raymond Williams disagreed with Eliot, yet devoted a whole chapter in one of his books to reviewing Eliot's writings (1959, 227-243). Williams (1992, 41) explained culture from the social perspective as:

“a description of a particular way of life, which expresses certain meanings and values not only in art and learning but also in institutions and ordinary behaviour. The analysis of culture, from such a definition, is the clarification of the meanings and values implicit and explicit in a particular way of life, a particular culture.”

His main concern in studying culture was to remove the class boundaries from the British society system by enabling people to believe in culture's explanation as “a whole way of life”; by doing so, potentially resulting in a drift from class loyalty to national loyalty.

Prosser (1978, 296) emphasised three different possible definitions of culture:

"The notion that it is through culture that traditions, norms, behaviours, perceptions and thought-patterning are passed from generation to generation; the concept that culture, like communication, is a constantly developing process; and the concept that humans act upon their cultural environment instead of simply being passively acted upon by it. In this sense culture is synonymous with control."

The first definition is value-oriented, the second is communication-oriented and the last one is power-oriented. The three orientations of Prosser's definition reflect a communication and a social mentality in which values of publics, media use and the owner of the media outlets were under his focus.

Globalisation melted the frontiers of cultures; as a result, people might start to distinguish themselves from others by holding tight onto their own traditions. Moreover, in order to do that, religion might be one of the major elements that help one's own identity to remain intact. An excellent example would be Muslims who

adopt a modern lifestyle whilst practicing their belief and creating a unique public sphere. As previously mentioned, Prosser (1978) gave the example of Muslims without explaining that it is all due to their religion. It is important to put emphasis on religion as a predominant factor in the shaping of a culture and in building a strong, sustainable identity. This is in agreement with Eliot's (1962, 15) statement that "[t]he first important assertion is that no culture has appeared or developed except together with a religion: according to the point of view of the observer, the culture will appear to be the product of the religion, or the religion the product of the culture". Considering the meaning of culture from an Eastern Muslim point of view, a scholarly definition of culture will presently be discussed by Malik bin Nabi⁷.

2.1.2. Malik Bin Nabi's Definition of Culture

There are several Muslim scholars who provided different definitions of culture; however, Malik Bin Nabi provides an in-depth study of Arab and Muslim culture during the colonial era and the Western influence on the Arabic and Islamic culture. His analysis, observation, description and definitions are stated in his series of books entitled "Problems of Civilization". He devoted a whole book to the discussion of culture, entitled *The Problem of Culture*, in which he redefines the concept from an Arabic and Islamic perspective; he then went on to explain specific cultural problems in the Islamic world. Also, he reasoned that Ibn Khaldoon did not mention culture in his *Prolegomenon* because of a linguistic issue in the Arabic language; that is, Arabic language does not use generalised terminology (Bin Nabi, 2000, 20). He insisted "we must look for a practical definition of culture not only from a theoretical definition"

⁷ Note that the spelling of his name may differ from one reference to another due to the differences in translation (e.g. Malek bin Nabi, Malik Bennabi, Malik Binnabi ... etc.).

(Bin Nabi 2000, 40). Sociologically speaking, Bin Nabi (2000, 74) cited in Attayeb (1993, 89 & 155) sees culture as “the sum of moral manners and social values that an individual gets since his birth - Culture is the orbit that surrounded this individual and shaped his personality”. In his own words, Bin Nabi (2000, 43-50) explains culture as “what specifies the relation between the social behaviour of the individual and the way of life in the society ... culture is life of the society, if it disappears the whole society would die”. He concluded his book with the following definition of culture:

“And this general concept of culture is what specifies its definition. It is the surrounding that reflects a particular civilization and moves within it the modern human. In sum, we can see that this definition contains within it the philosophy of the human as well as the philosophy of the group. In other words, it contains the human vitals and the society vitals, keeping in mind the necessity of having a harmonical relation between them which is the result of the combination process of the spiritual source.” (2000, 74)

Looking through Bin Nabi’s (2007, 74) concluding definition, the main elements of the Islamic roots are there. Three main points reflect that: firstly, the importance of manners in one’s life; secondly, the emphasis on both the individual as well as society as a whole; and, thirdly, the spiritual source as the main cause of a strong relationship between the individual and society. These three points reflect how Bin Nabi’s interpretation of culture is a behaviour-social-oriented approach. He expanded his definition to argue that “the making of politics means in the final analysis, the making of culture ... there is consolidation and integration between culture and politics and not prioritization and precedence of one over the other” (Bin Nabi cited in Barghouth, 2005, 173). This argument is driven by the belief that culture is the main driving force shaping society’s value system as well as the behaviours of its citizens. As Berghouth (2005, 173) explains, Bin Nabi “is of the view that any

political system that is duty oriented and ethically based calls for the existence of a dynamic cultural system". The interpretation of a behaviour-social-oriented approach in looking at culture is the core difference in comparison to the Western approach of shaping a society and branding the state or a city as part of the public diplomacy efforts is achieved by promoting its unique cultural identity as a product more than an influential behaviour. In fact, this can also be seen in the way the Western international broadcasters are functioning; culture is being dealt with as a product on their media, as will be discussed in section 2.4 of this thesis.

However, Bin Nabi's ideas will be either neglected or criticised in a Western capitalist society for two major reasons. Firstly, such ideas can affect the person's value system; consequently, his/her priority hierarchy would also be affected. As a result, the individual would have more control over his/her daily habits as part of his/her responsibilities toward him/herself, his/her family and society. This is a voluntary process towards the surrounding environment; this would thus impact on their spending habits and, therefore, the overall money of the capitalists would be affected. Secondly, since these elements arise from a Muslim scholar who is emphasising the role of religion in shaping the overall lifestyle of the people, his argument would be rejected under the claim that religious thoughts would drag Europe back to the dark ages. Nowadays, arguments are starting to emerge over the importance of belonging to a faith in order to create and maintain a stable society. Amongst these scholars is Tariq Modood, whose arguments are discussed in the later chapters of this thesis. These religion-based ideas shaped the lives of more than a thousand million Muslims. Fundamentally, the Muslims' way of life is based on Islam, which allows cultural differences. For example, Far Eastern Muslim women

wear a different style of *Hijab*⁸ in comparison to Saudi women. Matthew Arnold (cited in Johnson, 1979, 31) stressed that “culture goes beyond religion”; his argument is invalid when presenting the Islamic culture as evidence that has existed for more than 1400 years as a well-established culture based on religion.

2.2. International Broadcasting

International broadcasting is at the heart of this thesis because it analyses the content of broadcasters that target a wide range of Arabic-speaking masses on an international level. The following section defines international broadcasting and discusses major international broadcasters that provide Arabic services as a public diplomacy tool, focusing on DW and TRT satellite channels. By the end of the chapter, the term intercultural broadcasting will be introduced and used throughout the thesis.

2.2.1. Definition of Broadcasting

Broadcasting by itself can be defined as “a long term business, so the mission must be based on things which are essential always ... The only appropriate enduring mission for public service broadcasting, domestic, or international, is that it is, simply, a public good” (Rendell, 1991, 27). Furthermore, international broadcasting can refer to:

“a complex combination of state-sponsored news, information, and entertainment directed at a population outside the sponsoring state’s boundaries. It has largely meant the use of electronic media by one

⁸ *Hijab* is part of the women’s Islamic cloth which can be define as the headscarve, however, Muslim women were different types of Islamic cloth such as the *Niqab* ; the face veil and the *Jilbab* the full-length gown. For an expanded study on the current case of Muslim women in Europe check Tarlo, M (2010) *Visibly Musilm: Fashion, Politics, Faith*.

society to shape the opinion of the people and leaders of another" (Price and Margolin, 2008, 152-153).

2.2.2. International Broadcasters Targeting Arabic-speaking Publics

The above discusses how television broadcasting is being used as a public diplomacy tool on an international level. This section will focus on the overall announced missions and goals of international broadcasters that are targeting Arabic-speaking audiences. As mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, the majority, if not all, international broadcasters turned towards Arabic-speaking audiences following the events of 9/11. However, the importance of televised international broadcasting was first noticed through the "CNN Effect". International communication scholars have interpreted this term differently; for instance, it was defined by Steven Livingston as

"the impact of new global real-time media on diplomacy and foreign policy. Piers Robinson describes it as the responses from domestic audiences and political elites to global events that are transmitted by real-time communications technology. Joseph S. Nye Jr. characterises it as the impact of the increased free flow of broadcast information shortened news cycles on public opinion in free societies" (Bahador, 2007, 117).

Additionally, Hoskins and O'Longhlin (2007, 55) explain that it "was understood as a theory about a relationship between television news and policy, particularly foreign policy". They went on to conclude that such an effect has been over-exaggerated, yet scholars cannot neglect the fact that during its live coverage of the Gulf War in 1991, Arabic governments reconsidered and evaluated the real weight of televised satellite channels. For example, the Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC) was launched in 1991 "towards marrying entertainment and education"

(Lahlali, 2007, 35). This was followed by BBC Arabic Television in 1994, yet “the BBC’s alleged failure to observe ‘cultural sensitivities’ – Saudi code for anything not to the royal family’s liking” (Richardson, 2003) resulted in the Saudi Orbit Communications Corporation blocking the signal of the BBC Arabic Television in 1996, resulting in its demise.

After only six months, the financial support of the Qatari royal family and the work of the former crew of BBC Arabic Television, AlJazeera was aired (Richardson, 2003). It became a phenomenon that not only covered issues occurring in the Arab countries but also included all pan-Arab communities worldwide. Due to the fact that the majority of pan-Arab communities are mainly in the U.S. and Europe, AlJazeera messages affected major international actors’ policies. It can be argued here that AlJazeera’s influence was a major factor in the appearance of 24/7 news broadcasters in the Arab world, whilst 9/11 was a wake-up call to all international actors to reconsider the situation of their international broadcasters, as will be discussed later in this section.

Although all international broadcasters started their channels to strengthen their government’s foreign affairs policies, it developed to focusing on promoting their unique cultural identity and the country as a brand globally. Zayani (2012, 188) explains,

"The development of Arab news media unsettled the traditional reliance on Western news agencies ... These developments are not only altering the direction of the flow of information, traditionally emitted from the north to the south, but also affecting the sanctity of a long-standing center."

Launched on Valentine’s Day of 2007 (Baylouny, 2006, 15), the U.S. AlHurra targeted Arabic-speaking youth to win their “Hearts and Minds” during Bush’s declared War on Terror. The chosen launching date suggests that they are targeting

youth with love; however, it reflects that Americans are still targeting Arabs from an American's perspective, neglecting the fact that the majority of Arabs are Muslims.⁹ Baylouny (2006) reasoned the launching to: "The U.S. response to al-Manar has been to ban it entirely from the U.S. and to promote its own channel, AlHurra, to compete for Arab audiences. The station was intended to move "the people of the region away from extremism and violence and toward democracy and freedom" (Baylouny 2006, 14). This might be the case in Lebanon because for Lebanese Christians like AlHurra "it is more reflective of their interests in the way that AlJazeera is for Muslims" (Baylouny 2006, 19). He went on to provide a conclusion from random interviews conducted in Jordan and Lebanon that indicate that the main reason for them to watch AlHurra news is to see how events are represented through the American perspective and compare it with their Arabic news channels (Baylouny 2006, 19-20). Lahlali (2011, 5) stated that the "US government's frustration with Al-Jazeera's practice has also led to the launch of Al-Hurra, which is intended to promote freedom and democracy in the Middle East". Whether it was AlManar or AlJazeera, it is evident that the appearance of AlHurra and other international broadcasters targeting Arabic-speaking audiences is a reaction to the Arabic media's steps towards presenting their own issues and messages from their own perspective.

Another Western channel that shifts towards targeting Arabic-speaking audiences is France 24. The channel was originally launched as a result of the unheard voice of the French government when it refused the invasion of Iraq in 2003. As a result, according to Kuhn (2010, 267), "French political elites across the party spectrum argued that France's voice in international matters, notably its opposition to the invasion, was at best being marginalized and at worst vilified in the news

⁹ Recently, all shopping centres, hotels, and restaurants in the Arab world are celebrating Valentine's Day in order to sell their products and services.

reporting of channels such as CNN and Fox News." However, in 2008, it was announced that France 24 would broadcast only in French, which could potentially destroy the mission of France 24 in targeting international audiences. After a while, this decision "was quietly dropped in the subsequent governmental reorganization of France's external broadcasting services" (Kuhn, 2010, 270). The process of getting France 24 to broadcast in a foreign language was slow. This can reflect the inflexibility of the French traditional governmental policy process and how the broadcasting and media policies are closely bonded with it. Moreover, France 24 is now broadcasting in English and Arabic and its content is following its announced mission statement. Chalaby (2009, 185) presented its content in five main points:

"First, and most obviously, events in France are given higher priority by France 24 than by other translational news providers. ... Second, events in Africa, especially in Francophone sub-Saharan African states ...receive more coverage than on other transnational news services. ... Third, a French perspective influences the framing of coverage of European and global events. ... Fourth, France 24 gives a substantial space to the arts, literature, and culture-notably French and Francophone culture-in its schedules. ... Finally, French-style debate and discussion programs are an integral part of the schedules, giving the service ... a 'more discursive' character than several of its competitors" (cited in Kuhn 2010, 273).

Many countries left some time before announcing their Arabic service: France 24 is one example and the other is the Chinese Arabic service. In fact, 9/11 was an indirect reason for the launch of CCTV Arabic, because the Chinese were embarrassed due to the criticism they faced regarding their "late and sparse coverage" of the event (Jirik, 2010, 285). However, that also took almost ten years to launch.

The importance of targeting Arab and Muslim publics varies from one broadcaster to another according to their interests and goals. This part of the thesis

will focus on analysing these reasons as well as the methods used by international broadcasters to reach their audiences; this is then followed by a discussion of the current situation.

In his well-known audience survey of international radio broadcasting in the Arab world, Boyd (1986) identified factors that led broadcasters to transmit internationally. Broadcasters are there "(1) to enhance national prestige; (2) to promote national interests; (3) to attempt religious or political indoctrination; and (4) to foster cultural ties" (cited in Boyd 1999, p.290). Boyd's four reasons can be generalised to any international broadcaster targeting foreign audiences. However, the Arab and Muslim world is unique as a result of its geopolitical position and the richness of its own land with raw resources. Davutoğlu (2010) devoted large amounts of his book to the geopolitical importance of the Arab and Muslim lands. To begin with, he defines "region" as "the areas that has an inner strategic integration of its main geopolitical, geocultural and geoeconomical lines" (Davutoğlu, 2010, 40). If Davutoğlu's explanation of the Middle East as a region is taken into account, then what had been said at the beginning of the twentieth century by Haushofer (1928, 1938) and Mackinder (1904, 1943), as cited in Davutoğlu (2010, 128-129), of the importance of colonising the Middle East in order to control the world, is logically true because of the intersections of strategic lines mentioned above over the Middle East region.

Unlike during the old ages, when regions were invaded physically, nowadays, politicians are forced to consider reaching the Arabic-speaking audiences in a more diplomatic manner. As discussed earlier, international broadcasters worked as a public diplomacy tool in order to meet political interests. Currently, there are nine international broadcasting satellite channels that target Arabic-speaking audiences,

three of which are Eastern and six are Western. DW-TV Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye are the main concern of this thesis. Arabic-speaking publics were not targeted via satellite channels in their own language until the twenty-first century. Nowadays, there are nine international satellite channels that target Arabic publics. This section provides a brief introduction about these channels' motives and the importance of Arabic publics at the international level. Table 1 below shows all of the international satellite channels that target Arabic-speaking audiences and were launched as a result of the events of September 11th, 2001:

Inter. Broadcaster	Launched on	Satellites	Arabic Hours	Other media used	Extra Activities
AlAlam	2/ 23/ 2003	Hotbird 8, Atlanticbird 2, ArabSat BADR 5, AsiaSat 5, TelStar 12 & Galaxy 19.	24 hours	Website & Livestream Social Media: Twitter, Facebook, YouTube	-
AlHurra TV	2/ 14/ 2004	ArabSat BADR 4, EuTelSat Hotbird 8 & NileSat Digital	24 hours	Website & Livestream Social Media: Twitter, Facebook, YouTube	-
DW-TV Arabia	3/ 1/ 2005	ArabSat BADR 4 NileSat 102	12 hours	Website & Livestream Mobile Services, Social Media: Twitter, Facebook, Blog, Podcast YouTube	DW-Akademie Conferences Awards
France24	4/ 2/ 2007	ArabSat BADR 4 NileSat 7	24 hours	Website & Livestream Mobile Services, iPad App, Social Media: Twitter, Facebook, Blog, Podcast YouTube	Awards
RT Rusiya AlYaum	5/ 4/ 2007	ArabSat BADR 4, HotBird-6 NileSat 103	24 hours	Website & Livestream Social Media: Twitter, Facebook, Forum, Podcast YouTube	Upload your news service
BBC Arabic	3/ 11/ 2008	ArabSat BADR 4, EuTelSat Hotbird 8, & NileSat 102	24 hours	Website & Livestream Mobile Services, iPad App, Social Media: Twitter, Facebook, Blog, Podcast YouTube	BBC-Academy, Awards
CCTV Alarabiya	7/ 25/ 2009	Arabsat BADR-6, Nilesat 103, Eurobird 9, ChinaSat 6B	24 hours	Website & Livestream	-
TRT Etturkiyye	4/ 4/ 2010	NileSat AtlanticBird, Arabsat BADR, TurkSat	24 hours	Website & Livestream Social Media: Facebook.	-
Sky News Arabiya	5/ 6/ 2012	ArabSat, NileSat 201 and Astra	24 hours	Website & Livestream Mobile Services & Social Media: Twitter, Facebook, Podcast, YouTube	-

Table 1 International Broadcasters Targeting Arabic-speaking Audiences

There are seven major findings that can be noticed from Table 1 above.

Firstly, Iran's AlAlam was the first state to target the Arabic-speaking public, followed by the U.S. AlHurra TV. The most likely reason was not September 11th but the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the need of an international voice for Shia'a. In fact, at almost the same time, several Arabic-speaking Shia'a channels were launched and all

were aired from Iraq. Secondly, AlAlam is the only Arabic service by a non-Arabic international channel that broadcasts via six satellites. Thirdly, DW-TV is the only channel that targets English-speaking audiences via its Arabic service with a total of twelve hours in English and twelve in Arabic. Fourthly, in terms of marketing the channel through social media, two points can be noticed: A) all are using Facebook, except for China's CCTV AlArabiya, which is a result of the Chinese government restrictions on social media; and B) putting CCTV AlArabiya aside, TRT-Etturkiyye is the only channel that is very weak in using social media in comparison to the other channels, which are using such tools efficiently and effectively. A viewer can find out more about any of the international broadcasters online through Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and the iPad App or podcasts on the iTunes Store. The importance of social media cannot be neglected, as discussed in 1.4.4.1. It is important to mention here that the original Turkish TRT channel uses social media just like the other international broadcasters. However, "the TRT Etturkiyye is in the process of using Social Media soon" (Personal communication, Mohamed Zahid Gol, the acting director of TRT-Etturkiyye, July 8th, 2011). Furthermore, the German's DW-TV and Britain's BBC are the only broadcasters that provide training for international journalists, especially from the developing countries, in addition to organising international awards. This might be a result of the intellectual understanding of the importance of exchanging programmes and person-to-person intercultural communication as part of their public diplomacy. In addition, the only non-governmental international satellite broadcaster is Murdoch's Sky News Arabiya; launched in May 2012, this reflects a strong capitalist movement towards commercialisation and privatisation of the United Arab Emirates. Finally, the Arabic name of each international service differs in a way that reflects some degree of the understanding of the Arabs' culture or the broadcasters'

culture. In order to explain this point, each channel's Arabic logo will be compared with its original name.










Inter. Broadcaster Original Name	Arabic Service Name	Current Arabic Service Logo	Old Arabic Service Logo
AlAalam	AlAalam		N/A
AlHurra TV	AlHurra		
BBC	BCC Arabi		N/A
CCTV	CCTV alArabeya		N/A
DW-TV	DW-TV Arabia		
France24	France24 Arabi		N/A
Russia Today	Ruseya alyaum		N/A
Sky News	Sky News Arabiya		N/A
TRT	TRT-Etturkiyye		

Table 2 International Broadcasters' Logos as they appear on their Arabic Services

Table 2 shows the way each channel's logo appears in the Arabic services. There is a critical point in applying Arabic letters to the logo. AlAalam, AlHurra, CCTV-Alarabiya, Rusiya AlYaum and TRT-Etturkiyye use Arabic letters in their logo, whereas the BBC, DW-TV and France24 stick with their original logo with the Latin letters. However, only TRT-Etturkiyye used the Arabic as a classical art by applying the Diwani calligraphy when writing Etturkiyye in Arabic, which added a

beautiful aspect of the shared artistic culture. Unfortunately, Etturkiyye has changed its logo recently to an Orange computerised logo that eradicates the emotional sense of the former logo. Critically speaking, using Arabic letters reflects each channel's vision in trying to approach their target audience using the audience's language. On the other hand, the channels using the Latin letters reflect the marketing trend of branding one name and avoiding the sub-brand costs. In other words, they are thinking from a purely capitalist perspective. Alternative logos can be considered here according to the Arabic vocals used amongst Arabs when referring to the specified international channel. They can either add "Al" as in al-atta'areif¹⁰, which is used in Arabic when a name is well-known, i.e. al-BBC, or to use the Arabic word itself for each nationality of the channel, i.e. as-Seiniyya, the Chinese channel; al-Almaniyya, the German channel; and al-Faransiyya, the French channel.

Zayani (2010, 188) concluded that not "all these channels have an impact, though, or can be considered as important media players capable of attracting a sizeable audience, setting the agenda, influencing events, or shaping public opinion". However, a huge amount of governmental money is devoted to each of the above-mentioned international broadcasters in order "to extend their hegemony beyond their national borders ... to promote their policies and points of views, or new websites containing new material in Arabic" (Lahlali, 2011, 54). In short, it became evident that this literally did not focus on their relationship to their audiences, but rather to other aspects of the channels.

2.2.3. Is International Broadcasting Part of Media Diplomacy?

This thesis is concerned with the role played by international broadcasting in international communication. The final chapter discusses in detail a new approach for

¹⁰ *Al*: is the article in the Arabic language that makes nouns definite.

broadcasters to adopt when targeting international audiences. The following section explains the difference between intercultural broadcasting and international broadcasting by highlighting the importance of a two-way dialogue with an understanding of the cultural value differences, and also provides a definition of the term intercultural broadcasting. This work focuses on international broadcasting as a crucial public diplomacy media. The term "broadcasting diplomacy" has not been used; however, Ramaprasad (1983, 75) has used the term "media diplomacy" in an attempt to provide a joint term between media and diplomacy: "Media diplomacy ... also describes manipulation by government officials of the media for diplomatic reasons without an awareness on the media's part of this manipulation." He criticized literature written on PD at that time because they focused on two areas only: "1) the emergence of public diplomacy and 2) the nature of government-media relations - should they be of an advocacy or adversary type?" (Ramaprasad, 1983, 71). He went on to raise an important question in terms of the relationship between the media and PD. "Is public diplomacy seen as a function of the media? That is, how the media conferred a major role in the emergence of public diplomacy?" (Ramaprasad, 1983, 71) Ramaprasad was able to envisage the future with his question because today's world is situated in an era dominated by the media and communications as mentioned earlier by Cowan and Cull (2008), as well as by Giddens (2006, as cited in Mellor, 2008, 191): "No one doubts the importance of the media in the contemporary world, but they are only one part of a much complex set of social institutions that is the object of sociology to study." It is strongly believed that, in addition to citizen journalism and social media, the media are playing a major role in terms of the emergence of public diplomacy because of the ability to pass diplomatic values of a specific government, or an individual to the targeted people.

2.3. Intercultural Broadcasting

The main argument of this thesis pertains to the need for a new broadcasting system that is orbited around the intercultural communications approaches away from the current propagandist approach of international broadcasting. With the web revolution and the ability for Internet users to produce content, the idea of an intercultural broadcaster is achievable, as will be discussed in chapter seven of this thesis. This section provides academic explanation of the definition of intercultural broadcasting by breaking it into its original form; that is, intercultural communication plus international broadcasting. Therefore, both terminologies will be discussed.

2.3.1. Intercultural Communication Literature Review

As previously mentioned in section 1.3.2., complaints occurred because broadcasters are considered to be a one-way communication. People start to seek a multi-way communication in order to build a proper dialogue that:

"refers to myriad situations in which ideas and information are exchanged and communication is reciprocal and multidirectional. There are multiple forms and multiple levels of dialogue. Ideas and information can be exchanged in formal summits attended by elites; in academic or professional conferences; in call-in talk shows; on interactive Web sites; and through citizen participation in cross-cultural sports, cinema, and arts projects" (Cowan & Cull, 2008, 18).

Such participation should also include other forms of dialogue, for example, individual interactions in their ordinary day-to-day activities, which is the core element for coexistence. As Weigand (1994, 70) explains, "Some approaches emphasize the difference between a concept of dialogue considered as a pattern of action possibilities and a concept of dialogue considered as a dynamic process. The notion of process stresses the feature of continual change." Nevertheless, a

communication is a must. Finally, scholars created the term intercultural communication in order to explain such an equation.

Intercultural communication, as interpreted by Stewart (1974), "rests its claim for identity" over the issue of "differences, either naturally or by acquisition". He elaborates on his hypothesis further by stating that "[b]y focusing on the actual or perceived cultural contrasts and on the communicative contrasts between members of different cultures, Stewart suggests that intercultural communication becomes a most urgent extension of human communication itself" (cited in Prosser, 1978, 11). Porter and Samovar (1973) interpret it from a behavioural perspective: "Intercultural communication occurs whenever meaning is attributed to behavior coming from another culture" (p.7: cited Tyler, Hall, and Taylor p.231: 1979). On the other hand, Asante, Newmark, and Blake define it as "attempts to shed the trappings of ethnocentrism and explain the communicative act in its own ethnocentrism and explain the communicative act in its own terms. What is needed at this juncture is more description of the intercultural communication process, i.e., our scientists need to observe before they theorize." (12) To simplify, intercultural communication is a combination of three terms: international, which refers to the level activities are occurring at; cultural, which reflects the values and principles that affect the identity of the acting person in his everyday life; and communication, which reflects the type of activity used to pass a message. The main focuses of intercultural communication are first and foremost the self-identity and then the cultural identity of the individual. It can be more visible amongst individuals living in a multicultural society or who communicate on an ongoing basis with members of other cultures, whether in person or via a communication means; in other words, an old or new media.

It cannot be denied that intercultural communication is more important now than ever before, mainly due to the increasing number of travellers around the world and the availability of the Internet, which virtually removed time and space borders. It is of importance here to distinguish between international communication and intercultural communication; they are not synonymous, according to Prosser (1978, 80-81): “International communication ... more properly characterizes the interaction which takes place across national political boundaries.”

A leading scholar in the field of intercultural communication is Hall (1959), who concentrated on the research process and its approaches’ appropriateness. He criticises the intercultural communication research because it went away from its central point: *culture*. The study of culture requires far more than just theoretical work. One of the contemporary scholars, Shuter (2007), calls to redirect the study of intercultural communication towards where it started originally with Hall. He argues that intercultural communication research should be orbited around culture, however, the majority of the research “is conducted to refine existing communication theories: culture serves principally as a research laboratory for testing the validity of communication paradigms.” (37)

In fact, the roots of intercultural communication as an academic field were developed by the efforts of Edward Hall, William B. Gudykunst, Fred E. Jandt, and Molefi Asante. The Speech Communication Association started a full series on International and Intercultural Communication in the 1970s followed by the publication of *The Handbook of Intercultural Communication* (Asante & Gudykunst 1989). A historical timeline of the development of intercultural communication study was provided by Shuter (2007) in which he divided it into the 80s and 90s era suggesting that the post 90s research agenda should focus on “generating cultural data

that not only increases understanding of a society, but also serves as a springboard for developing intercultural communication theory” (40).

Unfortunately the available research covers theoretical approaches of intercultural communications with cases of specific groups living in another cultural sphere or individuals living in intercultural-interpersonal experiences such as international students. This thesis was conducted to find an effective method to communicate between two or more cultures at a distanced mass scale. However, the available literature is not covering this aspect with the exception of the literature related to the cultural value differences in intercultural communication that benefit this thesis the most.

According to Asante, Newmark and Blake (1979), there are two schools of intercultural communication in relation to values: “the *cultural dialogue* group and the *cultural criticism* group. ... For them [cultural dialogue group], intercultural communication is one more attempt to organize human society along mutually satisfying lines. ... Cultural dialogue, then, is a trend toward world communication.” (12-13) In studying how values are formed in one’s cultural sphere, Sitaram and Haapanen (1979) suggest that a “concept becomes a value to a people when they consider it as extremely desirable or undesirable. Values are thus positive or negative on the same continuum: while one people might consider a concept as most desirable, another might say it is most undesirable, and a third might not have a reaction” (149). Accordingly, people make their decisions to meet this values system.

Theory of *Interkulturelle Verständigung* created by the theorist Hans-Herbert Kögler (2007), mentioned earlier, provided a unique interpretation of the intercultural concept in terms of focusing on understanding the differences of the values system in each culture. Also, he emphasises the necessity of the self-understanding of the other,

arguing, that "the task is to show how an interpreter situated or grounded in a particular culture is capable of bridging the difference between her own self-understanding about something so as to gain access to the meaning and self-understanding of another" (353). He went on to highlight the importance of the communications element in his theory: "And since such a process will necessarily involve communicating with the other about something, we have to show how communication has to be structured such that an understanding of the other's meaning is possible" (353). After that, he relates his theory to the three value-oriented elements: "Self-realization, successful participation in social and cultural interaction and a general understanding of world and self" (362). He concluded the need to:

"always keep in mind that the ethos of hermeneutic dialogue conceives of the roots of recognition as operating similarly between the self and the other. Universal respect for the other as reflexive self, hermeneutic sensitivity toward the other's cultural background, and a critical reflexivity regarding the power constraints imposed on situated selves, are considered interpretive ideals which should guide both sides. First and foremost, it should enable any interpreter, whether theorist or agent, to see herself from the perspective of the other." (370)

Respect is the key value to the success of any sort of international communication. The claim of building cultural bridges firstly requires the willingness to listen and to respond respectfully, in which sides involved in the discussion listen to each other and respond while showing full awareness of and respect towards the differences. Dialogue is usually associated with solving conflicts; however, dialogue is more important during peace time. John Stuart Mill (1992) stresses that the truth might be there in all versions of a story, therefore, he advocates tolerating different opinions: "diversity of views promotes truth, because each of these views (though they may be false) can contain 'a portion of truth'; moreover, instead of holding our

own opinions as simple prejudices, views that differ from our own views will compel us to defend what we think is true, thus providing us with a better grasp of it" (cited in Krzysktof Abriszewski, 2007, 336).

2.3.2. The Definition of Intercultural Communication and Intercultural Broadcasting

This chapter is an attempt to provide a new term to be used in the future research of international relations, communication and cultural studies. Intercultural broadcasting is a development of international broadcasting in the framework of cultural public diplomacy. The relationship between international, culture and broadcaster is strongly integrated, but in a very simple way. Firstly, every group of people interacts with each other in order to pass their messages to the other; it is natural for humans to communicate. Secondly, in the same group, ideas are communicated, discussed, developed and adopted in their everyday life; as a result, their culture is shaped. "As Clifford Geertz suggests, without culture, no humans, but without humans, no culture" (cited in Prosser, 1978, 296). Thirdly, a conflict between each unique cultural group living in the globe due to the misunderstanding of each other's values and religious differences. Thus, an international communication is very important in order to create an overall understanding atmosphere worldwide, especially among international state and non-state actors. Lastly, there is a need for a medium to communicate one's message and, therefore, broadcasters became one of the most important means for groups to pass their messages to other masses.

Intercultural communication, as interpreted by Stewart (1974), "rests its claim for identity" over the issue of "differences, either naturally or by acquisition". He elaborates on his hypothesis further by stating that "[b]y focusing on the actual or perceived cultural contrasts and on the communicative contrasts between members of different cultures, Stewart suggests that intercultural communication becomes a most

urgent extension of human communication itself" (cited in Prosser, 1978, 11). It cannot be denied that intercultural communication is more important now than ever before, mainly due to the increasing number of travellers around the world and the availability of the Internet, which virtually removed all borders. However, Prosser (1978, 28) argues, "There is a constant interplay between the drives and the values of the technological society." It is of importance here to distinguish between international communication and intercultural communication. They are not synonymous, according to Prosser (1978, 80-81): "International communication ... more properly characterizes the interaction which takes place across national political boundaries." In short, intercultural communication focuses first and foremost on the self-identity and then on the cultural identity of the individual. It can be more visible amongst individuals living in a multicultural society or who communicate on an ongoing basis with members of other cultures, whether in person or via a communication means; in other words, an old or new media.

Intercultural broadcasting should be taken away from the context of the categorisations of West-East, North-South, Black-White, Muslims-Jews, or us-them, for a very simple reason: the moment a human mind starts to categorise in very wide and general stereotypical terms, the value of respect would be shaken. In fact, the mass media was a major cause of spoiling human communication by imposing false stereotypes. It is time for the mass media to correct and reshape such historical mistakes.

2.4. Discussion

Habermas's public sphere theory is necessary when analysing public living in a democratic political system. This can be applied to some countries; however, this may not be possible at the global level; and as such, Habermas produced a theory that is based on the "bourgeois publics spheres" (Fraser 1990, 58) and not on the current global public sphere theory. As argued above, the global public sphere is hard to achieve due to the huge amount of ethnicities. As a result, it is hard to find the *element of unity* amongst them. Nonetheless, this thesis provided the Arab and Muslim public sphere as a model of a unified public due to their shared basic principles, values, religion, history, land and language. Although this public sphere shared these factors, they are not only based in their homelands, but also in a number of other countries worldwide. Therefore, this represents a transnational public sphere, or in other words, it provides a close example of a global public sphere. In contrast to the global media that seek their profits when targeting global audiences, the Arab and Muslim media play an important role in creating and influencing this public sphere.

If the *element of unity* that gives ordinary citizens a unique source of power is understood and implemented by PD-makers, then Prosser (1978, 68) drew a very accurate conclusion: "All intercultural communication is interpersonal as well." It is a very logical fact that, without the process of communicating at the personal level with a person from another culture, there will be no intercultural communication. He clarifies this by saying that: "[w]hile all interpersonal communication has cultural dimensions, differences in linguistic, nonverbal, attitudinal, value, and thought-patterning orientations are not so great among those who share the same culture as among those who are members of contrast cultures" (Prosser 1978, 67). Such

differences are at the soul of humanity's nature: without them, life would be missing a huge part of its joy. Peter Adler (1974), as cited in Prosser (1978, 70), provided criteria to describe a person who is able to interact globally as an international, transcultural or intercultural person "whose horizons extend significantly beyond his or her own culture. Such persons are intellectually and emotionally committed to the fundamental unity of all human beings. At the same time they recognize, legitimize, accept, and appreciate the fundamental differences that lie between people of different cultures". Adler missed the difference between international, transnational and intercultural terms. On the one hand, international is used to describe the global level of an action. On the other hand, transnational is used to describe the physical movement across borders. While intercultural is the description of the global level of the variety of cultures, the term intercultural appears much richer in terms of describing a person who has a massive knowledge of the diversity of culture; with this knowledge an interculturalist can communicate with people from other cultures respectfully. Thus, if a person who has Adler's criteria is to be an interculturalist, then, similarly, an international broadcaster which aims to build cultural bridges with other cultures through multi-directional-way dialogue must be referred to as an intercultural broadcaster. The current international broadcasters are all financed and supported by governments. As a result, those broadcasters cannot allow a multi-way dialogue to avoid any misinterpretation via incoming live calls to talk shows that can affect their relations with other international actors. In fact, these are the cases of both DW-TV Arabia as well as TRT-Etturkiye. As will be shown in the following chapters, both channels do not have live political programmes in which live-telephone participations are allowed. In other words, there are no intercultural broadcasters that really promote an effective multi-way dialogue.

Chapter 3. The DW & TRT Arabic Services Approaches

3.1. Introduction

The majority of Arabs and Muslims are based in the land that joins Asia, Africa, and Europe, which is considered to be the heart of the old civilization. Politically speaking, winning the hearts and minds of the citizens of this world means winning a very active geopolitical sphere. The events of 9/11 forced both the academic and political spheres to review their methods in communicating with Muslims and Arabs. Academic exchange programmes, cultural activities and fairs can be counted among the public diplomacy's methods; nonetheless, new public diplomacy approaches are needed in order to communicate their messages to international audiences. Mass media is still the main strategic method to communicate one's message; to be effective it has to be honest and credible. Mass media includes TV and radio broadcasts, the Internet and social media, and advertisements. Thus, lots of international broadcasters launched their Arabic services or increased its designated budget.

As mentioned earlier, this thesis is concerned with how the two international broadcasters are approaching Arabic-speaking audiences. The first is a Western international broadcaster, DW-TV Arabia, and the second is an Eastern international broadcaster, TRT-Etturkiyye. Five years after the launch of DW-TV-Arabia in 2005, the TRT launched its Arabic service, Etturkiyye. This chapter covers each of the mentioned channels' history, their relationship with Arab and Muslim publics, and the approaches applied to build bridges with them.

3.1.1. Brief History

The DW website (2010a) shows that the DW network targets international audiences through television services in German, English, Spanish and Arabic,

together with different radio services in thirty languages, in addition to an online website for all thirty languages. Notwithstanding, DW-World.de is very active virtually in terms of its usage of the online technologies, such as podcasts, social media websites and mobile apps. In addition, the DW network has a training centre that is highly-regarded, the DW-Akademie. In comparison, the TRT targets both international and domestic audiences through nine radio channels and six TV channels that target regional audiences, in addition to four TV channels targeting Turks abroad and twenty-nine radio channels, one of which is an international TV broadcaster targeting international audiences. It is important to note that the information provided by the TRT official website is outdated because the children's channel was mentioned as part of the future plans rather than as a current channel, and the Arabic channel was not counted as part of their broadcasted channels. However, the newly developed Arabic website, which has a different domain name from the original Turkish TRT website, is updated regularly, and their social media and YouTube channel is going to be available soon.

Both Germany and Turkey started their shortwave radio broadcasts in the middle of the twentieth century. In fact, Germany has two phases in targeting Arabic speaking listeners: firstly, during Nazi Germany between 1939 and 1942 and, secondly, after the establishment of DW shortwave radio in 1953; this was followed by the Arabic service in 1959. On the other hand, Turkey founded its first shortwave radio in 1927 and its first Arabic broadcast in 1937 in order to "resolve The Hatay Problem" (TRT Official Website 2011c). However, the Arabic services of both the DW and TRT television channels are considered to be very recent.

As for its television station, DW started as the RIAS-TV in 1988 and changed to DW-TV in 1992. As mentioned above, DW-TV Arabia was launched after 9/11. It

was considered to be “the key sources of pressure pushing German international broadcaster Deutsche Welle to reform [its] programming” (Hafez, 2007, 119). Moreover, lots of changes occurred in international relations, and a new type of diplomacy was advocated (Hafez, 2007 & Gilboa, 2008). Mark Sedgwick (2003), as cited in Emad El-Din (2005, 196), argues that it is necessary to employ such diplomacy when targeting the Arab and Muslim publics as, in his opinion, the 9/11 attacks “were the consequences of Arabic public opinion, not of Arab weapons programmes or the activities of any Arab state”. Thus, international broadcasters became a crucial tool in international relations as part of their public diplomacy, and the German Foreign Office was amongst those trying to use it together with the youth exchange programmes (Hegasy n.d., 24). The TRT, on the other hand, established its television broadcast in 1964; yet, Turkey did not target Arabs after 9/11 because it was in the same position as other Muslim countries in the eyes of Europe and the U.S. However, it seems that the policies of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government aim to strengthen relations with the Arab and Islamic world; and this is based on Davutolgu’s *Strategic Depth* (2010) and the geopolitical importance of the region.

The following section presents each channel separately, covering the relations between the TV content and the Arabic speaking world. Additionally, it will cover the history of the channel.

3.2. Deutsche Welle

3.2.1. Germany and the Arab and Muslim World 1919 – 1945

Historically speaking, the relationship between Arab and European countries during the twentieth century was tense due to the European colonisation of Arab lands. This was not only due to the advancement of the European countries: England, France, Italy and Spain, but also due to “the susceptibility of Arabs to be colonised”,

as argued by BinNabi. Fortunately, Germany, the German Reich at that time, never colonised an Arab or Muslim country due to the considerably late movement towards colonising other lands. After reading several historical documents, there was evidence that reflects a strategic step towards forming an international German territory by being visible at the Ottoman Caliphate lands. Since the North African, Holy region, Yemeni, Somalian and Indian lands were already considered territories of other European powers, Germany took a very clever step by proposing a rail project to the Ottomans. This was the Baghdad-Istanbul-Berlin end of the nineteenth century/early twentieth century. This approach was the exact same approach used as the very first step towards colonising Africa in 1884. According to Lewin (1914), two German thinkers, Friedrich List and Ernst Fiedel, convinced the German Emperor to take official steps towards expanding its territory outside Europe. It was peacefully done by sending German travellers to propose rail projects connecting villages to African tribes' leaders. As a result, the German Empire claimed its first colony in Africa; today, Togo, Cameroons, and German Southwest Africa.

Since the same proposal was presented to the Ottoman Caliphate, there is a very high probability that the German Empire noticed the weaknesses of the Caliphate and wanted to ensure a spot over the Sick Man of Europe's land. However, the outbreak of World War I stopped the deal and the Germans lost the war, which postponed the progress of the railway project. Noticing its importance and seizing both the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate and the German Reich Empire, "the railway fell into England's possession in 1919. English financiers scrambled to fill the administrative positions left vacant by the departing Germans forced to comply with the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles" (McMurray, 2001, 138).

However, never neglecting the geopolitical importance of Arab lands, Nazi Germany took another step to weaken the English and French existence amongst Arabs. That was achieved by launching the Arabic service of Berlin's Station.

".. Nazi Germany started transmitting in [A]rabic for the first time in April 1939 (Bergmeier & Lotz, 1997), just as the Pact came into force. Germany thus became an Italian radio surrogate, providing a new programming dimension by the addition of anti-Jewish and anti-British themes broadcast by several prominent Arab exiles, including Rashid Ali El-Ghailni, an ex-prime minister of Iraq, and Hajji Amin Al-Husayni, the spiritual leader of the Palestinian Arabs and Grand Mufti of Jerusalem" (Boyd, 1999, 293).

Broadcasted between 1939 and 1945, the Berlin Station used both nationalistic and Islamic methods in order to attract Arabs. Moreover, the station looked to hire highly qualified Arabs in exile for broadcasting. Amongst these was a German officer with the rank of captain (Bahri, 2002) who was originally "an Iraqi by the name of Yunus al-Bahri, who may have been the most gifted Arabic-language broadcaster ever to speak from Europe" (Boyd, 1999, 294). Although Germany and the Ottoman Caliphate fought together during World War II, at the same time witnessing the rise of Arabs' nationalism, this did not create any sense of fraction towards Germany amongst Arabs. After the fall of Nazi Germany and its division into West and East Germany, there were no major steps taken towards Arab and Muslim countries until the official treaties between Turkey and other North African Arab countries in the '60s and '70s regarding the Gastarbeiter¹¹.

3.2.2. Brief History of Deutsche Welle

According to Aster and Olechowska (1998), Deutsche Welle (DW) was established in 1953 and is renowned as one of the five largest international

¹¹ Discussed in 3.3.1.

broadcasters along with the BBC, VOA, VOR and Radio Beijing. Nowadays, DW is the second largest satellite network after CNN in terms of its coverage map. After the unification of the German sides, DW became more important than ever, especially when it came to presenting united German political views to other nations (Aster & Olechowska, 1998, 284-286).

As mentioned earlier, DW Radio is broadcast in thirty languages, including Arabic. The television services followed in 1963 and were broadcast in German, English and Spanish, and then Arabic, and “DW began producing television programmes on its own in 1983” (DW-World.de 2011a). By broadcasting its own programmes, “hundreds of hours of programming continue to go out to the world every year in many languages. Programs are adapted in and dispatched from Berlin” (DW-World.de 2011a). It is also evident that DW’s development process is increasing, not only in adopting new technologies according to its target audiences’ needs, but also in organising events to promote its messages.

In terms of adopting new technologies, DW is increasingly active in using social media tools, e.g. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.

Observing the Arab followers of DW-Arabia on Twitter after the Uprising of 2011, it was clear that the majority of its followers were Arab-revolts who wished to pass their political voices internationally. Yet, some are followers who are following to learn German. This raises the point of the reality of the Arab audiences and their relation to international broadcasters: are they following to express their thoughts and views, to learn about the German language and culture, or to understand Germany as an international actor to cooperate with? In fact, this reflects a major aspect of the German Foreign Affairs Office strategy that is working as a whole integrated system towards promoting Germany and its culture. As stated on their website, “DW

developed this wide range of services with the help of partners like the Goethe-Institute (GI) and the German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHK). This platform has been created with content for both German students and for teachers” (dw-world.de 2010). By doing so, DW is able to achieve its cultural goals along with other means such as “the DW-AKADEMIE, where radio professionals from developing and transition countries receive further training. ... [it also] offers ‘Intercultural Media Training’ for German executives and institutions looking to go abroad” (dw-world.de 2011c).

In terms of events and awards, “Deutsche Welle created The BOBs blog award in 2004, giving a unique overview of the international weblog scene in 11 languages” (dw-world.de 2011d). This award helped DW to achieve its goals of spreading democratic concepts and to promote citizen journalism world-wide. Although this is an online competition, the award ceremony is combined with the Deutsche Welle Global Media Forum in Bonn; the forum is “a congress with international reach. It draws media representatives from around the world and people from the fields of politics, culture, business, development and science” (Deutsche Welle Global Media Forum, 2011, 4).

A major strategy in developing itself, DW creates regional programmes with the cooperation of other international broadcasters. For instance, DW signed contracts with Abu Dhabi TV, Cairo TV, Algeria TV and Al-Maghribiya TV. Although this might be of benefit to the DW, it does not help its long-term goals because the majority of Arab governments’ regimes are not democratic, as this was proven after the Arab Uprising of 2011. It is time for DW and the German Foreign Office to review their methods in communicating with Arab and Muslim audiences. In other words, how can DW promote freedom of speech while citizens cannot make their

thoughts public?

3.2.3. DW Board and Financial Issues

The Broadcast Council makes up the managing board of DW, and also supervises the channel while being the major decision-maker. According to Abshire (1973, 24):

“Under a law passed in 1960, Deutsche Welle is supervised by the Broadcast Council, composed of two members chosen by the Bundestag, two by the Bundesrat, four by the Federal Government, and three members, each chosen by one of the three major religious faiths – Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish. The council lays down guidelines on program policy and elects the general manager on the recommendation of an administrative council. This body, selected by the Broadcast Council, supervises the general manager’s operations.”

If the last three members of the main religions are to be considered now, then after 40 years, the Muslim population is far larger than the Jewish population. According to Religious Studies Media and Information in Germany – REMID (2009) – Muslims are the largest minority group in Germany by around 3.5 million in comparison to 107,000 Jewish people. As a matter of fact, the above-mentioned law was changed in 1997 to the "Deutsche Welle Law" (DW website, 2003). This document contains the following statement:

“The Broadcasting Board shall represent the interests of the general public, advise the Director General in general programming matters and supervise compliance with the basic principles of programs. The seventeen members are elected, respectively appointed by the federal parliament, the Bundestag, by the Bundesrat and the federal government and by different social groups and organisations (churches, employer associations, leading union organisations).”

After comparing the two statements, the major amendment is "the three major

religious faiths – Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish" to "different social groups organisations (churches, employer associations, leading union organisations)". It can be argued here that the main reason for changing this part is the fact that Islam is becoming one of the three major religions in Germany. If this is to be neglected, two major problems might occur: firstly, the socio-political problems of neglecting the Muslim citizens of Germany; and, secondly, different social group organisations might create problems in the long term because a social group can be *any* social group. In other words, the Act should clarify and specify the criteria in which social groups are chosen accordingly. It can be added here that perhaps the best institution to nominate a Muslim board member is the German Islam Conference (GIK).

There is not a single advertisement slot during its 24/7 broadcasting hours (Abshire, 1973, 24). Mr. Peter Senger, Chairman of the Digital Radio Mondiale Consortium and Director DRM at DW, has attributed that to DW's unwillingness to put itself under the pressure of international trademarks such as Mercedes and Volkswagen (cited in Aster & Olechowska, 1998, 37). However, there are indirect promotions for such car brands in a weekly programme of sports and cars called *Drive it!* Germany is promoting its brands by giving it free airing time to support its own economy; however, there is a very high probability that there is some sort of deal in which these brands are supporting the individual video productions.

One of the main findings that DW highlighted was its financial situation. In 1998, DW's annual budget was DM¹² 255,000,000, which dropped to DM 244,000,000 after two years (Robillard-Frayne, 2002, 47). Mr. Senger commented on an almost similar situation DW Radio's budget also declined by saying:

“We have cuts but of course we had a big gain after the unification because we gained the television. I think an international service

¹² Deutsche Mark equals to 1.95 Euro.

relying only on radio might miss the great opportunity which comes up now with digital television which is less expensive in distribution as well as with digital audio broadcasting which is the doorstep, with internet, with rebroadcasting, with all means to reach as many listeners or viewers as possible" (cited in Aster & Olechowska, 1998, 24).

Although Mr. Senger admitted that they had cut the budget, still, his vision reflected long-term visionary wisdom. He understood very well the importance of adopting new technology in passing one's message to expand the number of viewer and listener audiences.

As a result of DW's mission in promoting the development of democratic values against corruption and poverty, the management report for the financial year 2009, *Deutsche Welle Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts Bonn* (2009, 8), stated that DW should seek an alternative source of funding and nominated the "Official Development Assistance to support the development cooperation". The report explained that the ODA countries are "the countries around Russia, almost the entire Arabian region, almost the whole of Africa, Central Asia including Afghanistan and Pakistan, Indochina, the Tiger states, with the exception of Singapore, China and the whole of Latin America". The majority, if not all, of the ODA countries are targeted by DW as well. In the meantime, DW receives funding from the Interior Ministry only, as stated in the same report, with an

"over-indebted ... of approx. € 18.2 million. Due to the non-existing insolvency capability as an institution of public law as well as the financing guarantee of the German Federal Government stipulated in the DWG, the continuation of the broadcasting corporation as a going concern has been assumed, and the balance sheet has been prepared under going concern premises" (*Deutsche Welle Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts* 2009, 2).

In fact, the objective of promoting democracy to all the above-mentioned

countries of the ODA is just unrealistic unless DW is able to obtain funding from NGOs or the UN itself. Consequently, DW finished the “year 2009 with net loss for the year amounting to € 3.8 million” (Deutsche Welle Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts 2009, 7). The aftermath of this was the reduction of DW grants by the federal allowances “by € 2.0 million to € 273.1 million under a parliamentary procedure” (Deutsche Welle Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts 2009, 2). Other international broadcasters might get their funds from advertising revenues. However, DW does not have a single advertisement slot during its 24/7 broadcasting hours (Abshire, 1973, 24). As previously mentioned, in Senger’s opinion, DW’s unwillingness to submit to pressure of international standards, contradicts the fact that DW promotes German brands indirectly by exposing each brand in its programmes. The report went on to recommend additional funds:

“[F]or 2013 amount to up to € 16.4 million p.a., which will be solely due to cost increases, underlying, among other things, average inflation rates and, in particular, the lack of funds for staff recruitment. Primarily due to the rationalization measures that have already been implemented with success in the personnel, program and transmission sectors, further savings in these sectors will only be possible to a very limited extent in the following years. Should the budget, however, remain the same, Deutsche Welle will be required to reduce its programs offered both in terms of contents as well as distribution in order to compensate for the above amount” (Deutsche Welle Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts 2009, 9).

According to Manfred Kops, the most recent budget of DW is € 271,000,000 (cited in Richter, 2008). However, there is another sign of a shift in DW’s strategy when its decision-makers dropped ten languages over five years: 1995 to 2000. In comparison, one language was added, which was Ukrainian (Robillard-Frayne, 2002, 55-56). Seemingly, the decision of adding this language is based on research that has

been conducted on the Ukrainian audience of DW (Zlobina, 2004). In other words, the total amount of broadcasting languages of DW Radio dropped from forty to thirty-one in Oct 2000 (Robillard-Frayne, 2002, 48). Such a decision might be bonded by two axes; the cultural and integration policies of the European Union. It is interesting to note that excluding Japanese, the rest of the dropped languages are European. This might be a result of the EU policy to strengthen its integration.

Lefrance (1972, 5) explains the European use of the media, which “have very quickly proved capable of strengthening the bonds between the various peoples constituting the same nation and of genuinely cementing national unity”. He argues that there is a “strong temptation to use the cultures and languages of majority groups to establish a common denominator. However, Europe can be confidently expected to parry any attempt to use a satellite as a means of establishing cultural imperialism” (Lefrance, 1972, 7). On the other hand, the financial situation of DW might be a reason.

The recent report of *Deutsche Welle Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts Bonn* in 2009 is very detailed and contains five issues of importance related to this thesis. The first point is related to programme distribution throughout the time zones worldwide. The second discusses the target audiences of the channel. The third links between the budget issues and the stated objective of the channel. The fourth point discusses the budget loss and the advertising issue with the channel. The last point provides the recommendations contained in the report.

DW understands very well the difference between the time zones of its headquarters time and the targeted audiences’ time zone. Therefore, the transmission shifted to the receiver time zone starting from 2008 (*Deutsche Welle Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts* 2009, 3). This change towards the target audiences is restricted to

“DW TV America, DW TV Arabia as well as the third satellite facility, DW TV World, due to limited financial means” (Deutsche Welle Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts 2009, 3). Although it is considered to be very late, the adaptation of the receiver’s time and building the programme timetable accordingly is considered to be a point forward in reaching its different target audiences. Although the report continues to differentiate between its target audiences by stating:

“DW TV World shall primarily address all non-German speaking viewers in Europe, Africa and, in particular, Asia. ... This will make it possible that German-speaking viewers are provided with a mainly German-language channel and for non-German-speaking viewers a language channel is available that normally offers English programs with windows in the local languages” (Deutsche Welle Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts 2009, 3).

By having almost the same programmes with subtitles in the language of the targeted people in all the different sub-channels, DW managed to save money. It can be argued, however, that between the years 2008 and 2010, DW focused on presenting its German culture instead of focusing on what really concerns its target audience. As mentioned above, after the Arab Uprising of 2011, the DW changed its approaches.

Another aspect worth mentioning is the reaction of DW towards several researches. For example, Lucassen’s and Zöllner’s (2004, 93) research on Arab audiences concluded that “Algeria was host to the most devoted letter writers”. This research was published in 2004, and, interestingly, DW-Arabia aired a new programme called *Zwischen Nord und Süd; Between North and South*, in March 2008. It is a monthly programme broadcasted once from Berlin and the following month from Algeria, and its main goal is to encourage dialogue between Germany and the Arabs. Such response gives some hints as to what the strategic minds of DW

are contemplating. It is believed that “a cross-cultural communication does not take place when there isn’t dialogue and two-way communication” (Bystrom, cited in Contreras et al., 1976, 10). Since DW “conveys information and culture, demonstrates interaction and dialogue with other peoples and therefore builds bridges of understanding between nations. Communication – that is its main business” (Aster & Olechowska, 1998, 284). To be more specific, it is not any sort of communication that concerns DW but a cross-cultural plan as described by Zöllner (2002a, 152): “[DW’s] main focus is to inform decision makers and opinion formers worldwide about Germany and Europe, or rather about Germany in a European context – quite a daring cross-cultural proposition.”

By neglecting the increasing number of Muslim population in Germany during the amendment phase of the Deutsche Welle Act, DW decision-makers will create a false reality that might result in an unjust and unfair atmosphere around the country, from its government to its ordinary citizens. Davutoğlu (2010, 49) discussed this point as a long-term weakness of the German mentality if neglecting the fact of the existence of German Muslims:

“Germany was never and will never lack high intellectuality among its people; the Frankfurt School will continue to produce more thinkers, however, the moment Germans might look at others' intellectuality a second or a lower ranked thinkers and will start neglecting others opinions and facts in order to avoid reality then the German thinking school will become a heritage. The increasing number of the Muslims' population in Europe in general and Germany in specific is inevitable. Although there are offensive actions against Muslims from Eastern roots, the total population of Muslims is not exclusive to them, there are Anglo-Saxon Germans who converted to Islam and the same converters are starting to have their own family. Thus, a new generation from German origins Muslims are to play an important role

in the near future.”

There are high hopes on the German intellectuals as well as the DW decision-makers because of actions taken towards research and current affairs. As mentioned earlier, DW reacted towards conducted research focused on its target audiences; this reflects a positive attitude towards research. Notwithstanding, announcing the DW Arabic service after 9/11 and the very first adaptation of new programmes and the rescheduling of the Arabic and English slots after the Arab Uprising of 2011 are excellent indicators to arouse hopes that DW would adopt innovative approaches. Moreover, as will be discussed in section 3.5., DW-TV Arabia reflected the German Foreign Office’s new policies towards the Arab world by adopting brand new programmes to cover recent events and current affairs of the Arab world, reflecting an awareness of the Arabic-speaking public’s needs.

In following the main aim of DW, that is, to build bridges with other nations, the main target audiences would be foreigners from other nations. However, each of the specialised scholars on DW defined them differently. For example, Zöllner (2002a, 152) stated that DW’s aim is “to inform decision makers and opinion formers worldwide about Germany and Europe, or rather about Germany in a European context,” as its slogan shows ‘Aus der Mitte Europas’, ‘At the heart of Europe’ or ‘Desde el corazon de Europa’”. On the other hand, Schurhoff (2002b, 143) pointed out that DW’s targeted group are those “non-Germans living abroad who are basically interested in German and European views and perspectives on current affairs, and their particular assessment of the image of Germany and their personal sympathy towards that country”. However, there is another non-core category of DW’s audiences: the German travellers or expatriates (Schuerhoff, 2002a, 129). Zöllner (2002a, 152) stresses that “DW-TV doesn’t see itself so much as a channel providing the cosy ‘link with home’ for German ex-pats or travellers around the globe.”

However, a recent update (December 10th, 2010) of the FAQ webpage of DW's official website states the following: "And finally: Germans, living either temporarily or permanently abroad, use DW as a 'bridge to home'. However, in today's day and age, these individuals have a wide range of information available to them in German – like with online sources and media" (DW-World.de 2011b). In other words, Germans abroad have the option to watch it; yet, DW will not compete to win them. This argument between whether to consider the German travellers as part of the main target audience might not be an influential issue on DW's strategists' heads; instead, what they may be worried by is the foreigners living in Germany. Although there does not appear to be a study covering this issue, the main content of DW's news bulletins highlight issues of such a group's interest from time to time. Moreover, the Muslim population in Germany, both immigrants and Germans converting to Islam in Germany, is increasing dramatically. According to Herding (2008), the Muslim population is the fastest growing population in Europe. For the long term, DW's strategists may benefit if they build inner bridges with German Muslims; then there might be a probability of smoothing the communication with the Islamic West, as this thesis argues in section 3.2.1.

As part of its main aim in building bridges with other nations, DW is presenting its own culture to the world. As discussed above, this might cause various question marks in terms of considering such strategies as propaganda; however, the American anthropologist Hall (1959, 54) said, "One of the most effective ways to learn about oneself is by taking seriously the cultures of others. It forces you to pay attention to those details of life which differentiate them from you." Such hypothesis raises an important aspect of the history of DW as it provokes the passions and motives of the strategic minds behind DW. Abshire (1973, 76-77) divided the foreign

relations of the democratic countries into two channels. The first channel is “the formal intercourse between governments, ... The other channel of relationships between nations is ‘people-to-people diplomacy’”. He then presented broadcasting as a diplomatic tool, giving VOA, BBC and DW as examples (Abshire, 1973, 81). After World War II, Germany was forced to leave its military power; however, it subsequently became a “civilian power” (Harnisch, 2001, 35) in which it “sought to pursue its foreign and domestic objectives primarily through political and economic means, and which was committed to multilateral co-operation and strengthening international law” (Hans Maull, cited in Hyde-Price, 2001, 31). The German situation is very sensitive; therefore, they are concentrating on strengthening their public diplomacy and intercultural communication means.

In aiming to build bridges with other cultures, DW sought to target foreigners, but aimed to also represent its own culture to the world. It aims to use a cross-cultural method to reach these audiences; whereas some argued that these targeted audiences should be the decision-makers, others felt the need to address the non-German inhabitants who were interested in German cultural life.

3.3. Turkish Radio and Television

This thesis focuses on two important points: firstly, it focuses on the idea that it was the last official Caliphate to hold the Islamic nation together and, secondly, on the idea that the cultural, traditional and moral Islamic values and principles were shared between the Arabs and Muslims.

3.3.1. Turkey and the Relation with the Arab and Muslim World

Between 1517 and 1924, all Arabic-speaking countries and Muslim lands were under the rule of the Ottoman Caliphate. However, there were internal and external

factors that weakened the Caliphate. On one hand the main internal factor was the call of nationalism among Arab and Turk tribes against the Caliphate. On the other hand, the main external factor was the British Empire interests in expanding itself over the Caliphate land, its support of the nationalists and its contribution in distributing the land amongst the other European powers.

The year 1923 witnessed the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne between England and Atatürk's secular government in Ankara. The treaty states that in order for the United Kingdom to recognise the independence of Turkey, Turkey should do the following: (1) cancel the Caliphate system; (2) deportation of the Caliphate into exile; (3) confiscation of the Caliphate's funds; and (4) announce the secular system officially in Turkey. In other words, that was the official fall of the Ottoman Caliphate (Yaghi, 1998, 231).

3.3.2. The Relationship between Arabs and Turks: Pre-World War I Nationalism and Current Affairs

Unlike the German, American, British, Russian or French broadcasters, Turkish broadcasters have historical, religious and traditional bonds with their targeted Arab audience.

Islam was the main bond between Arabs and Turks. No one can deny that the Ottoman Caliphate ruled the Arab and Islamic world for more than 400 years. However, during the last years of the Caliphate, the concept of nationalism was promoted amongst both Arabs and Turks in a racist way that affected their historical bonds. There were several leaders who started the calls of nationalism against the Ottoman Caliphate; these included "King Hussein of *Hijaz*, King Fuad of Egypt as well as the Republican People's Party in Turkey, which was led by Kemal Ataturk"

(Ardic, 2012, 5). Thus, there are those who claim that the Ottomans were merely invaders, neglecting the historical facts about its existence as an Islamic Caliphate.

It can be argued that nationalism is the ignorance of the twentieth century because the advocacy of nationalism within a state reflects an inner corruption of that state's system or an effort to redirect the citizen from a nation belonging to a particular nationality or ethnicity.

During Atatürk's era, almost all signs of connection to the Arab and Muslim world have been either banned or replaced. Notwithstanding, Arabic letters, Arabic Adhan, that is, prayer calls, and other daily lifestyles were banned, including wearing the Hijab – the ladies' veil – which is widely known to be a symbol of Islam. This strategy aims to move the society from its Islamic reality sphere to a secular imaginary sphere. However, after World War II, Turkey started to change fundamentally. As Jenkins (2007, 117) acknowledges,

"The first DP government was formally established on 2 June 1950... Menderes¹³ announce that its first act would be to abolish Ataturk's 1932 ban on the recitation of the adhan in Arabic ... the impact of the lifting of the ban on the Arabic adhan was immediate and pervasive; ensuring that the DP's commitment to the protection of religious values physically resonated with anyone within earshot of a mosque."

A month after the establishment of the first DP government, serious action against banning religious symbols was taken. They have "lifted the ban on religious programming on the state-run radio, allowing studios in Istanbul and Ankara to begin broadcasting short reading from the Quran in Arabic" (Jenkins, 2007, 117).

Since then, there seems to be an effort amongst Turks to stick with the principles of an Islamic lifestyle as well as to adopt a new institutionalised Islamic lifestyle. This became evident in the appearance of the Rafah Party in 1983 and the

¹³ Adnan Menderes, the Turkish Prime Minister from 1950 to 1960.

appointment of their leader, Erbakan, in June 1996 as the first Islamist Prime Minister (Karakas, 2011, 10), as well as the incident of dismissing PM Merve Kavakci from the Turkish Parliament in 1999 for wearing her Hijab, which was followed by banning her party, the Virue Party, in 2001. As a result of such a cumulative process, 2009 witnessed an event that changed the reputation of Turkey amongst Arab audiences from a secular-weak state to an Islamic-strong state, when Prime Minister Erdoğan:

"walked out of a televised debate [during 'Gaza: The Case for Middle East Peace' session of the World Economic Forum in Davos] on Thursday with Shimon Peres, the Israeli president, [Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations and Amre Moussa, Secretary-General of the League of Arab State] after the moderator refused to allow him to rebut Peres' justification about the war" (AlJazeera.net, 2009).

Part of his statement was:

"I condemn those of you who applaud this persecution. Because applauding these killers who murdered those children, who massacred those people is, I believe, also another crime committed against humanity. ... Avi Shlaim, Professor of Oxford who performed his military duty in Israeli army, says in the Guardian the following: Israel became a gangster state."

By standing with the Palestinian issue, Erdoğan managed to win the hearts and minds of not only Arabs and Turks but also Muslims all around the world; therefore, a full discussion of Erdoğan's charisma and how he has been the icon of the TRT will be provided later in this chapter. In fact, Erdoğan's action during the Davos Forum reminds the Arabic and Islamic public of the last Ottoman Caliphate, Abdulhameed the Second, and his well-known statement regarding the land of Palestine. In his letter to Theodor Hertzfel, who proposed the Jewish immigration to Palestine in return for

paying the foreign debt of the Ottoman Caliphate, Abdul Hamid the Second (Islamic City website 2008) said:

"Please advise Dr Hertzl not to make any serious move in this matter. I cannot give up even one small patch of land in Palestine. It is not something that I own as a part of my personal estate. "Palestine in fact belongs to the Muslim Nation as a whole. My people have fought with their blood and sweat to protect this land, let the Jews keep their millions and once the Caliphate is torn apart one day, then they can take Palestine without a price, to have the scalpel cut my body is less painful than to witness Palestine being detached from the Caliphate state and this is not going to happen." (Sultan Abdul Hamid)

Although he could not protect Palestine, and the last day of the Ottoman Caliphate was during his era, both Sultan Abdulhameed the Second and Prime Minister Erdoğan became heroic personalities amongst Muslims. In fact, that was not deemed a point for Erdoğan, but also, for the Turkish government's foreign affairs. There were cumulative events that promoted Turkey as a leading state amongst the Islamic states.

3.3.3. Brief History of the TRT

The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey was announced in 1924. However, this constitution was referendum three times: in 1961, 1982 and 2010. The first referendum was of importance to this thesis because the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) was established after the effect of Article 359 of the constitution of 1961, which states that the TRT is the official state radio channel. In 1968, the TRT television channel started to run (TRT Official Website 2011a). There have been fifteen appointed general directors (GD) for the TRT since its establishment in 1964, two of whom were reappointed: the first, GD Adnan Öztrak, from April 29th 1964 to

June 2nd 1971; followed later by, Yücel Yener, from July 18th 1997 to March 24th, 2003.

Since then, the TRT radio and television channels target the multi-ethnicity Turkey, and have succeeded in, "Reaching a large mass of viewers of different education, age and socio-economic levels ... with seven television channels; four national, two international and one regional" (TRT Official Website 2011b). Clearly, the TRT covers all type of audiences; however, it was a reflection of the monopoly of the state over the media. Jenkins (2007, 152) explained that the event that stopped the TRT monopolising the broadcasting industry took place in 1990 when the satellite channel Magic Box, which "soon changed its name to Star, became the first independent television channel in Turkey". He went on to specify that this was partly an action by Özal¹⁴ "to ease other restrictions on freedom of expression in order to create what he frequently referred to as a 'talking Turkey'" (Jenkins, 2007, 152). Jenkins (2007, 155) went on to link the freedom of press and the long-term political change of Turkey:

"The easing of the state monopoly on broadcasting during the early 1990s also led to the appearance of Islamist television channels and radio stations, although again the emphasis was on values and lifestyles rather than explicit calls for political change. ... The Islamist media also reinforced a sense of membership of a supranational community of Muslims, which was often underpinned by a strong sense of Ottoman nostalgia. Conservative Turks tended not to only see themselves as members of a transnational community but to regard themselves as its past - and frequently also future - leaders."

It is possible to argue for or against Jenkins's statement according to the arguer's position. However, if the statement is to be analysed deeply, six points can be

¹⁴ Turgut Ozal, President of Turkey between 1989 and 1993.

found. Firstly, Islam is deeply rooted within the ordinary Turkish man, regardless of the efforts of the secular state to separate Islam from daily life. Secondly, the spread of freedom of expression as an acceptable value in the secular system of Turkey was a major factor in establishing a well-based sphere for all to speak their own minds. This is a global trend, because the international affair affects the national affairs directly or indirectly and *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights* is recognised by the United Nations and, thus, to all states' members. Freedom of expression and the right to be informed are fundamentals and the state that rejects such principles and values could lead its own sovereignty to an international intervention or international sanction. Thirdly, the use of media by Muslims to spread their message is to be taken as a fact, because any human being has the potential to use all tools available in order to pass his/her goals. In this case, Muslims in Turkey used the media as a tool to pass their messages. Although it requires a whole study of content analysis of media to answer the question of what their goals and messages are, the fourth, fifth and sixth points raised by Jenkins explain the major messages of those Muslims; the fourth point is reshaping the value and practice of citizens before any political reform. According to the Holy Quran: *Verily, God does not change men's condition unless they change their inner selves* (Surah 13: Verse 11). Thus, it should be believed by all Muslims that in order to change society, one must change himself from within. By believing in this verse of the Holy Quran, Muslims in Turkey focused on the adoption of manners and values as encouraged in both the Quran and Prophet Mohammad's practices, which is becoming a trend even in the Arabic television stations.¹⁵

¹⁵ In fact, this is a trend that started after 2003 when channels that considered themselves Islamic moved forwards. Their main programme content was focused on values and manners.

Next, the originality of belonging to one nation which has been spoiled by the concept of nationalism thus created borders between Muslims and Arabs. As discussed earlier, a major reason that led to the collapse of the Islamic Caliphate was the spread of nationalism by the Young Turk Society and the Young Arab Society, which was supported by Europe and had offices in Paris and London. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk led the nationalism calls in the Turkish land of the Ottoman Caliphate, whilst other Arabs called for nationalism in the current Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Hijaz. Lastly, the Turkish mentality of believing that they are the past and future leaders encouraged them to play an active role at all levels in all regions. Whether it is their right to lead or not is not the interest of this thesis. Instead, the point of feeling responsibility towards their rooted origins made the Turks active citizens. Thus, it may be one of the TRT's motives to target Arabs.

The above statement by Jenkins summarises the current situation in Turkey. Briefly speaking, Turkey faced a huge amount of changes, especially in the circumstances that followed applying for European Union membership. As Yavus (2009, 203) elaborates, "The policymakers of the AKP consider Turkey to be not a 'bridge,' but rather a 'pivotal' state in the region. ... There is thus a deep duality at play between 'eastern identity' and 'the Western values' that the government seeks to implement."

In fact, that was a major reason to foster the democratisation of the Turkish system. It is well known that the secular system and the military in Turkey did not allow a party with Islamic roots to reach the presidency or hold any sort of power; however, the recent voting process reflects the opposite. According to Yavus (2009, 243),

"The military, along with the secular judiciary and the university administrations, resisted Gül; [the current president of Turkey and a

former who held the position of Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs previously] as the president for a number of reasons. The president in the Turkish system has considerable power in blocking laws and appointing high officials. S/he has the authority to appoint ... the general director of the Turkish Radio and Television."

Although Fuller (2008, 23) thought that a pan-Islamic ideology "will never be adopted as a basis for foreign policy in contemporary [secular] Turkey", he predicted that, at the very least, "Turks and Arabs may soon come to revisit their centuries-long experience of fruitful cultural and political interaction that ended with World War I". This is evident nowadays due to the new foreign tourism, economic and cultural Turkish policies towards the Arab countries. A very recent example of such policies and treaties is the Turkish-Emirates ties crowned by the visit of President Abdullah Gül to the UAE (GulfNews.com 2012). As part of its public diplomacy effort, Turkey announced its Arabic service of its official satellite broadcaster, the TRT.

Nowadays, Turkey, under the leadership of Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), which translates as the Justice and Development Party, created change that was once referred to by Jenkins (2007, 177) as "ideologically motivated". He provided an example of the appointed head of the TRT, Şenol Demiröz, who was the former head of cultural affairs for the Mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Although he was the GD for less than two years from January 12th 2004 to August 1st 2005, "religious programming on TRT's main television channel tripled, albeit from only two regular programmes a week to six" (Jenkins, 2007, 177). Currently, the general director of the TRT is İbrahim ŞAHİN.

In 2010, the TRT launched its Arabic service: TRT-Etturkiyye. The first director of the TRT Arabic service, Etturkiyye, was Sefar Turan, 2009-2010, who led a dialogical programme called *Dhayf Etturkiyye*; Guests of Etturkiyye, which discussed international current affairs issues with high officials from around the

region. The second director of the TRT's Arabic service is Şakir Özbek, 2011 to date. During the opening ceremony, Prime Minister Erdoğan's speech contained the goals, vision and mission of TRT-Etturkiyye, which run parallel with the foreign affairs strategies structured by Davutoğlu, as discussed in sections 1.4.2. and 3.3.6. Thus, it is essential to provide a detailed analysis of his speech.

3.3.4. Erdoğan's Speech at the Launching Day of the TRT

Although the speech was in Turkish, Erdoğan spoke in Arabic several times. In the first statement, which was met with warm applause, he said, "Ladies and Gentlemen, peace be upon you and God's mercy and blessings, we welcome you all in Istanbul." Using Arabic greetings as an opening statement by a top official of a non-Arabic country reflects the willingness to create closer relations with Arabic audiences.

He described the opening ceremony day as a historical day. The speech addressed the audiences' hearts, emotions and feelings. For example, he repeatedly stressed that TRT-Etturkiyye would be a bridge between the hearts of Turks and Arabs as brothers. Erdoğan repeatedly highlighted the common culture and history and the fact that both Turks and Arabs belong to the same civilization, and also that both their minds and hearts were fed from a shared source and grew up accordingly.

Also, the usage of literature and music as public diplomacy tools were evident during the speech. He mentioned several well-known Arabic poets and singers: Mahmoud Darweish, Nezar Qabbani, Majeda alRumi, and Um Kalthum. It is common amongst Arabs to address emotions during public speeches because it has a huge effect on Arab publics. This was one of Erdoğan's most notable criteria used in his speech. He used famous literature examples in order to simplify the relationship between Turks and Arabs and the commonality between them. He developed further

links when he stated: "Istanbul rejoice for your joy, and grieve for your pain and our destiny is your destiny!" By naming several Arabic cities for each part of the statements with several Turkish cities, keeping Istanbul in all examples, Erdoğan emphasised Istanbul's role as the heart of the nation. He then referred to the historical facts by tactically saying:

"Perhaps borders were drawn between us in the near history, perhaps mines were planted between us, and perhaps invisible dams and walls were built between us, however, we still have the power and determination to go over them all! There will be not a single power to apart the brothers sow sedition among us!"

At another level, Erdoğan highlighted Turkey's involvement with the European Union by saying: "Although our face might be heading toward the West, we have never give our backs to the East." He then continued to emphasise the relation between Arabs and Turks: "We never abandoned the geography that we share our history and culture with. We moved from the shared cultural factors in order to reach political, cultural and economical relations with you." This statement allowed all Arabs to see Turkey as an Eastern partner that reflects Davutoğlu's strategic depth of international policies.

After that, Erdoğan placed emphasis on common cultural grounds. "I stress on the following: we say in our Anatolian culture: *Don't buy a house, buy a neighbour* and Arabs say: *The neighbour before the House*. Also, we have in our common culture a principal that '*A man should never sleep full while his neighbourstarves.*'" Then, he joined it with his strategic foreign policies: "From this perspective, Turkey will seek for peace, solidarity, welfare, and cooperation with all countries starting from our region." His second point stressed that there are common political priorities: "We are very pleased and appreciated the vision of Arabs' leaders who share the same principle with us"; by saying so, he might be showing Arab political leaders that he is

cooperating, rather than competing, with them. After that, he directed his speech to cover humanitarian issues of importance to all international actors in the region and clearly stated his mission:

“We feel the pain of hunger, we will answer any individual who needs us. We can't abandon killing the innocents in any spot of the globe. Haiti, Chile and Gaza! When Gaza is burning or the black clouds surround AlQuds –our civilization’s heart ... Our mission is to spread peace world-wide, starting from our region. All of our efforts are directed toward this aim.”

Erdoğan’s concluding remark concentrated on the role of the TRT in building an understanding with the Arab world. Although he did not use the term intercultural broadcasting, the sequence of words he used to express commonality between cultures reflects the goals of an intercultural broadcasters, as discussed in section 2.3.2., with music, literature and cuisine as its elements of understanding:

“With the launching of our shared language and screen; TRT-Etturkiyye, our shared feelings are expressed. We might be speaking different languages, still we can communicate very well, and language will not be a barrier in front of us. However, we -Arabs and Turks- said: "Salam Alaikom, Marhaba, Sabah AlKhair, Qalb!" we share lots of words, tones, cuisine, and feelings! When Um Kalthum sings, we feel she is singing in Turkish and when a Turkish person reads the Holy Quran, we feel s/he is reciting in Arabic! When we read Mahmoud Darwiesh arabic poetry, our Turkish touched are touched. Same goes with Nacip Fazel poetry in Turkish, Arabs’ feelings are touched. They both reflected our shared emotions. ... TRT-Etturkiyye is our channel more than being just a Turkish channel. It is the new unify our hearts. I feel great enthusiasm to address you through the channel, in order to deepen and consolidate our friendship, brotherhood, unity, and support.”

In the worldview part of the 2010 Zagby Arab Public Opinion Poll, there were two indicators of the rising role of Turkey in the Arab world. The first indicator is that

Turkey ranked second after France as an actor that plays a constructive role with a total of 21% amongst a list that included: France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Syria, Lebanon, Germany and the United States. The second indicator is that Erdoğan ranked first amongst the top most admired leaders with a total of 20%. It is worth noting that, in 2009, he had only 4% and, in 2008, he was not listed. This list includes ten other leaders: Hugo Chaves, Ahmadinajad, Hassan Nasrallah, Bashar al-Assad, Nicolas Sarkozy, Osama bin Laden, Jacques Chirac, Sheikh M. bin Zayed, Hosni Mubarak, Sheikh M. bin Rashed and Saddam Hussein. In fact, the Zogby International Analysis conducted another poll comparing Obama's to Erdoğan's popularity amongst Arabs, which is reflected in the following table:

Percentage of the attitudes towards the policies of Erdoğan in comparison to Obama						
	Morocco	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	KSA	UAE
Erdoğan	78/18	62/11	87/7	35/36	78/7	84/2

Table 3. Attitude Question 2011 of Zogby

The charisma of Erdoğan, along with Davutoglu's foreign policies are crucial in understanding how the TRT, in the short term, managed to gain a wider Arabic audience and how historical events affect the current international relations between contemporary Turkey and the Arab world. Until recently, the Arab world struggled with many problems, including unemployment, poverty, illiteracy and government corruption.

3.3.5. The Readiness of Arab Audiences to Accept the TRT

There are several reasons that Turkey was isolated from the Islamic world: firstly, its support to the Israeli strategies in the region; secondly, its negative position towards the Suez Canal; and, thirdly, its assistance in establishing the Baghdad Pact.

In other words, Arabs looked at Turkey as the strategic alliance for the colonial power. Fuller (2008, 23) argued that the:

“reality is that today's Muslim world is still in search of a leader. In view of its present leadership deficit--there is hardly a single leader who commands broad respect across the region--Turkey is being listened to more carefully as an increasingly respected, independent, and successful Muslim voice.”

Thus, his prediction of Turkey's voice becoming dominant and leading Arabs and Muslims was proven accurate, and was clearly evident during the Arab Uprising of 2011.

As previously mentioned, the majority of Arab and Muslim countries are suffering from unemployment, poverty, illiteracy and government corruption. In fact, these were the factors of the recent Arab Uprising. As a result, the Arab world witnessed the fall of three major corrupt regimes in Tunis, Egypt and Libya and the struggle continues in Syria and Yemen. During the protests of the afore-mentioned countries, there was only one common flag waving: the Turkish flag. Waving the Turkish flags during the recent revolutions in Tunis, Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Syria is a sign of their appreciation of the Turkish policies in the Arab world and the region. Both the public's opinion and the official government's opinion of Turkey supported the Arab citizens against the corrupt regimes and their use of violence against protestors.

The implementation of Davutoğlu's strategic depth and zero problem theories¹⁶ by the Turkish Foreign Affairs Office and its reflection on Erdoğan's speeches and actions gave Arab publics, for the first time, a sense of credible and honest politicians.

¹⁶ Explained below.

3.3.6. Davutoğlu and the Future of the Turkish International Role

Academically speaking, foreign policy refers to “external affairs, particularly to decisions and actions taken by states in their dealings with other states or such ‘external’ actors as international organizations, multinational corporations, and other transnational or non-state actors” (Viotti & Kauppi, 1998, 478).

As Baylis and Smith (2005, 389) explain, “Diplomacy in foreign policy refers to the use of diplomacy as a policy instrument possibly in association with other instruments such as economic or military force to enable an international actor to achieve its policy objectives.” However, Davutoğlu (2010, 36) sheds light on a different aspect of the definition: "... the question of what is foreign to who may not necessarily be, primarily, a matter of nationality - it can be a matter of ethnicity, class, region, gender or generation."

During the interview with Mohammed Zahid Gol, the acting director of TRT-Etturkiyye, he stressed the importance of forming an editorial board that goes parallel with the policies and diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In other words, TRT-Etturkiyye mirrored the policies and diplomacy of Turkey. In fact, this is a part of the integrated system that started with Davutoğlu's theories of strategic depth, zero problems and the proactive peace and ended with Erdoğan's implementation of these theories by his current government. Davutoğlu (2005), as cited in Karakas (2011, 16-17), explains, “The AKP government’s foreign policy doctrine (‘Strategic Depth’) proposes an active foreign policy with the aim of ‘zero problems’ with neighbouring states. Turkey is to grow into the role of a regional peacekeeping power and honest broker.” Davutoğlu’s openness to all shaped Turkey’s foreign policies and built it as a regional player. As Fuller (2008, 79) argues, "Davutoğlu suggested a new term to guide Turkish foreign policy –‘proactive peace’– meaning that Ankara should keep its channels open to all political players in the region if it is to possess the needed

legitimacy to work among all parties." In order to strength the relationship with Arab states, Davutoğlu (2010, 450) drew scenarios emphasising on understanding the uniqueness of each individual Arabic state separately in order to regain the trust between Turkey and the Arab world by:

"developing an understanding of the Arab world rhythm of social, cultural and political change that Arab societies are witnessing ... stay away from generalisation approaches that reduced the Arab societies in a one classified category."

Davutoğlu (2010, 42) justified Turkey's intervention in Balkan by referring to the responsibilities of the Caliphate inheritance thrown over Turkey's shoulders:

"Since Turkey is a nation built on the Ottoman legacy, yet with new features, at the beginning of the last century, finds itself once again compelled to face the geopolitical and geocultural responsibilities towards this inheritance by the end of the same century."

The same justification applied to the whole region, including the Arab and Muslim world. It is worthwhile noting here that Davutuglo (2010, 40) defines region as "the concept which reflects areas that have inner strategic integration between geopolitical, geocultural, and geoeconomical factors".

3.3.7. The TRT's Approaches: Lessons Learned

As a result of the lack of democracies in almost all of the Arab and Muslim states, Turkey is finding its own space amongst Arab and Muslim publics. Adopting Gillingham's (2006, 193) words: "Turkey is a strong ... - a bridge builders between blocs and interests with a special role to play in the difficult process of nation building in a region without strong democratic traditions."

As Zogby's earlier findings indicate, Erdoğan's charisma filled the gap and captured the minds and hearts of Arab and Muslim publics. TRT-Etturkiyye found an

eager audience ready to hear the Turkish perspective on current affairs. Besides, the widespread Turkish dramas amongst Arab audiences helped in promoting Turkey in the Arab world. Thus, it will play a major role in shaping public opinion of the Arabs and Muslims if, and only if, it worked as a reflection of the Turkish government's policies.

During the first year of its launch, it can be noted that TRT-Etturkiyye had several approaches to hold its own audiences' interest:

3.3.7.1. First Approach: Drama

The first approach is that TRT-Etturkiyye is using drama as an icebreaker between cultures and as an advocacy tool to promote Turkey. This approach is a missing element in almost all international broadcasts that target Arabic-speaking audiences. This is said to reflect the awareness of a major interest of their Arabic-speaking target audiences. The usage of dramas by the TRT reflects two aims. Firstly, by presenting its own Turkish drama, the TRT is promoting the Turkish way of life to Arabic audiences. According to Buccianti (2010) the majority of "Arab audiences have always shown great interest in foreign productions" including the Turkish soap operas. Secondly, amongst all the Arabic dialect, the TRT have chosen to dub its drama with Syrian dialect.¹⁷ Such a choice reflects that the Turks are trying to create a link with the Syrian population, who they have been in conflict with during the last years of the Ottoman Caliphate due to the calls of Arab nationalism. In the long-term relationship, however, such usage of the Syrian dialect might create a subconscious image in the Syrians' minds that Turks are speaking their language and have a very close relationship to them. As Buccianti (2010) elaborates,

"In Arab media, translations are mostly done through subtitling. As for

¹⁷ There are several media production companies which dub the Turkish dramas with the Iraqi dialect.

dubbing, Robert Stam explains that accents and intonations are also essential as they convey cultural and linguistic differences. When it comes to Arabic, the diglossia of the language is an essential characteristic to consider.”

In fact, drama found its space amongst Arabs long before the launch of TRT-Etturkiyye. The most notable hit of the Turkish dramas amongst Arabic-speaking audiences was aired on MBC on August 30, 2008, when:

“85 million Arab viewers were glued to their TV sets for the finale of the Syrian-dubbed Turkish soap opera, *Gümüş*1 ... a Kanal D production that received little attention in its homeland in 2005. ... By ‘winning hearts and minds’, *Noor* triggered a sudden reawakening and consideration of these *Sanawat al Dayaa*’ (‘lost years’) as well as several other dilemmas” (Buccianti, 2010).

Moreover, such drama shows the commonality between the cultures; in other words, if the diplomatic means did not manage to build the Turkish image, then the drama will certainly help to achieve this. Saker (2007) discussed the effects of the Turkish drama in Turkish tourism itself:

“Figures from the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism reveal a steady increase in tourism from Arab countries, with the most significant increases from Gulf countries ... The palace where *Noor* was filmed on the Bosphorus was rented and transformed by tour operators into a sort of lovers’ museum destined for Arab tourists. Other more ambitious fans chose to learn Turkish.”

This is a unique approach in comparison to the Arabic series which are filmed at the studios. Buccianti (2010) claims that the “Turkish series can be seen by some as a soft power instrument to win over Arab public opinion”. Mohammed Zahid Gol stressed that “what [the] drama series achieved cannot be accomplished with the biggest branding agencies”, yet he said that Turkish drama does not represent the “real

Turkey". He went on to explain that the near-future plan is to reduce the amount of drama series on TRT-Etturkiyye as well as to produce its own drama that represents the "real Turkey" because of the new channel's policies (Personal communication, July 8th, 2011).

3.3.7.2. Second Approach: Share the Audiences' Celebrations

The second approach is participating in the audiences' celebrations. A significant finding was that forty-four hours and twenty-five minutes per week were devoted to Islamic programmes, which include eight specialised programmes on Ramadan. They vary from talk-shows, lifestyle, documentaries, dramas and musicals, to children's programmes. In fact, there are three approaches that the TRT followed during Ramadan. The first of these are the dialogical programmes in which *Musahharati* and *May your Fast be Accepted* ranked third and fourth in the total airing time during the week: *Musahharati* with a total of nine hours and thirty-five minutes and *May your Fast be Accepted* with a total of seven hours and thirty minutes. Both programmes cover the beginning and end of a Ramadan's day. In order to explain the programmes' content, it is essential to check the roots of both words. Musaharati is the person who calls people and awakens them between midnight and dawn to have their Suhuor. The Arabic noun Musaharati came from the Arabic word Sahar, which refers to the time between midnight and dawn (Ibn Mandhor, 2005); also, TRT air this programme live during Sahuor time¹⁸. The Musaharati became a very strong tradition in the Arab and Islamic world and is connected with the holy month of Ramadan.

¹⁸ This particular time has its special spiritual value to all Muslims because they were encouraged by Prophet Muhammad - peace be upon him - to have their the Sahuor¹⁸ during this specified time.

The second Ramadan dialogical programme was *May your Fast be Accepted*. Again, this prayer can be heard all over the Arab and Islamic world during Ramadan, which is usually being said after breaking the fast. Without memorising the schedule of the channel, any ordinary Muslim can assume the time of Musaharati to be between midnight and dawn and *May your Fast be Accepted* to be after sunset – the first was between 02:30 am and 04:25 am and the second between 18:25 pm and 19:55 pm. Both programmes remind Arabs and Muslims of the long-established Islamic bonds, which go far back to the establishment of the Ottoman Caliphate.

Ramadan was not the only event that the TRT shared and celebrated with the Arab and Muslim audiences. For instance, the TRT devoted special air time to celebrate Eid AlFetir and Eid AlAdha. Additionally, the TRT aired a programme about the Prophet Muhammad: *The Prophet in our Hearts*. It is a very modern way of representing the life of Prophet Muhammad PBUH. In each episode a concept was chosen and the Turkish public was questioned on how to achieve such a concept; after that, a scholar or an academic would give his opinion on how Prophet Muhammad PBUH was able to apply such a concept in both his personality as an individual and his society as a whole. The idea of this programme was original in terms of interviewing both the Turkish public and academics and presenting it to the Arab and Muslim audiences. By doing so, the director of the programme managed to achieve religious, cultural and political goals. First of all, they have addressed an ironic leader to all Muslims: Prophet Muhammed PBUH. Then, by showing how the ordinary Turkish and Arab people are feeling toward a certain concept, such as leadership, they've managed to display the common way of thinking in the Turkish and Arabic cultures. After that, they've presented professors from well-respected Turkish

universities who specialised on the Prophet Muhammad PBUH's biography in order to show the level of education and knowledge in Turkey.

Another important aspect of the TRT Ramadan programmes is the airing of an hour of the Holy Quran reciting, which is common and respected amongst Muslims during Ramadan, the month of elevation. The title of this reciting hour is *Hints of the Holy Quran*.

3.3.7.3. Third Approach: Simplicity and Repetition

The third approach used by the TRT is the simplicity and repetition approach; this means airing short five-minute clips throughout the day. For instance, amongst the other Ramadan and Islamic programmes of the TRT-Turkeyah, five ran for only five minutes and had very clear, focused and short messages: *Ramadan and what it Contains*, *Flame from the Sky*, *Ramadan Diary*, *Sentimental Spirituality*, *Miniatures when they Speak*. All of the five programmes were shown repeatedly throughout the week. Such an approach will ensure that the message reaches Arabic audiences throughout different time zones. Moreover, the audience will never get bored of short clips; instead, such clips might increase the curiosity of the audience to go and search for much deeper information; in other words, it highlights major points and leaves the viewer to think of the content. The repetition of short clips during the day is very informative. For instance, the short programme *Today in History* was shown eighteen times weekly; with an average of three times a day and a total of one hour and thirty minutes per week. It is interesting to note the specific timing of the airing – during the children's slot – and *A City and a Mosque* was shown sixteen times a week, three times a day, a total of two hours and forty minutes; and although it is a short documentary, it contains some geopolitical, cultural, historical and religious aspects. For example, it introduces different towns in Turkey to its Arab and Muslim

audiences and how the religion is spread across Turkey by showing a town and its main *Chamme* (Mosque). The link between the Turkish culture and the richness of its Islamic history can clearly be seen here. Besides, such linkage would draw the Arab audiences to think of their own relationship with Turkey. This was one of the most important programmes in sending the main message of TRT-Etturkiyye to the Arab and Islamic world.

3.3.7.4. Fourth Approach: Emphasis on Istanbul

The fourth approach highlights the importance of the former capital of the Ottoman Caliphate in which three programmes' titles contained the city name: *Good Morning from Istanbul*, *A Tour in Istanbul* and *From Istanbul*. When asking ordinary Arab citizens to name the capital of Turkey, there is a very high probability that they will incorrectly state "Istanbul". This is the result of the strong association between the history of Turkey and their own history when Istanbul was the original capital of the Ottoman Caliphate. Such usage of Istanbul by the TRT instead of the capital Ankara might reflect three things: firstly, Istanbul is the capital of the Ottoman Caliphate, which, if we are to be optimistic, might remind Arabs of belonging to one Islamic nation; secondly, Istanbul has been and still is being promoted as the cultural city of Turkey and the European Union have chosen it to be the EU cultural city of 2010 (www.telegraph.co.uk website 2010); and, thirdly, as mentioned above, TRT-Etturkiyye is working closely with the Turkish government's 2023 strategies in which a century before, 1923 saw the fall of the Caliphate and the substitution of Ankara with Istanbul as the capital. It can be predicted here that 2023 might witness the return of Istanbul as the capital of Turkey – or at least more stress will be placed on the goal of gaining back its historical position amongst Arabic and Islamic civilization.

3.3.7.5. *Fifth Approach: Interests and Commonality*

The fifth approach relates to the cultural and economic common interests between Arabs and Turks. As previously mentioned, celebrating Islamic events reflects the common ground between the two cultures; however, there are other common interests. The TRT was able to shed light on the most common yet unique aspect of the Turkish lifestyle with the Arabic one. There are four aspects that the TRT focused on: cultural and economic interests and the usage of music and cookery programmes in emphasising the cultural commonality between Turks and Arabs introduced the audience to new aspects of what they are experts on. As a result of comparing the very common culture, the richness and uniqueness of the Turkish lifestyle will glow. Fuller (2008, 91) mentioned the new trend in the region of having a "Turkish Arabesque-style music represents a modern heavy fusion of both Turkish and Arab tradition". The music programmes are the following: *The Conscience Melody*, *A Thousand and One Night* and *Sentimental Spirituality*. Besides using the Turkish music culture, the Turkish cuisine culture is a crucial element of commonality. The cookery programmes are *Before Breaking your Fast with Yasmin*, *Kitchen Palace* and *Call for Dinner*. The first programme is a live cookery show. As a matter of fact, during Ramadan almost all the Arabic and Islamic channels would include a cookery show. The second programme is a cooking competition in which several participants registered and there is a group of audience members to taste their food to finalise the results. This has been the tradition since the establishment of the majority of local broadcasters as an indicator of Ramadan. It is of importance here to note that engaging audiences directly in these dialogical musical and cookery programmes through either live phone calls or attending the live shows at the studio can increase the popularity of the channel amongst audiences. This approach is very rich in terms of the cultural information passed to the audiences. As a result of airing

such programmes live, TRT managed to show the commonality between its culture, as shown in the Turkish cuisine and the preparation for the Iftar meal, and the Arab and Muslim culture. Emphasis on such similarities in both ways of life is one of TRT-Etturkiyye's messages which is considered to be a successful way of bridging nations. The only economy-oriented programme is *Economies*, which targets audiences interested in establishing a strong knowledge base of chances and business available in Turkey and aims to strengthen economic relations between Turkish and Arab elites.

3.3.7.6. Sixth Approach: Family-oriented Programmes

The sixth approach is targeting the whole family, including children. Almost all international broadcasters will not do this, because official international broadcasters are usually associated with the Foreign Affairs Ministry that targets decision-makers and elites. Notwithstanding that, the more focused on a specific audience's age, the more likely it would be that a broadcaster would manage to pass its message; however, the TRT-Turkiyye is using one of the oldest methods in the Arab world when dividing its programmes. This is the method of the Arabic classical broadcasting style, that is, to divide the airing schedule into an opening programme, early morning programmes, children's programmes, afternoon programmes, sunset programmes, news, dialogical programmes, after-midnight programmes, and ending with an hour of reciting from the Holy Quran.

Although the children's programmes cover only an hour of the total airing time per day, TRT-Etturkiyye used it efficiently to pass the same messages to the children as well, that is, seeing commonality with Turkey. There are four programmes devoted to children. The first is *Nam Nam*, a similar show to *Tellytubbies* and *Sesame Street* but with a Turkish identity where it explains a specific manner and a concept in

each episode within ten minutes. By the end of each episode *Nam Nam* will remind the children to go online and enjoy more of Nam Nam's virtual world. Second is *Come, Follow Me!*, a documentary of a Turkish child. The whole lifestyle of that child would be recorded and the child himself would invite Arabs and Muslims to visit his world one day. Again, TRT is managing to show its culture to its audience within twenty minutes for the whole family. Third is *Moments with Juha*; the time given to this programme is five minutes per day. It can be argued that the reason for giving it such a small amount of airing is that *Juha* is a well-known comedian character in the Arab and Islamic world, thus, the goal of showing him is not to inform its audiences about the existence of Juha in the literary world but to emphasise the shared literature amongst Turks, Arabs, Persians, etc. In comparison, the fourth programme is *Qarqooz wa 'Eewadh*, which is an Ottoman tale of two men who were sentenced to death because they hindered the development of a mosque because of their chatting habits; when a friend missed them he created a small light-theatre to remember them and the tradition went on to date. *Qarqooz wa 'Eewadh* is ten minutes per episode and is repeated three times per day. The reason for this intense repetition might be to introduce a pure Turkish literature to the Arab and Islamic world.

3.4. Comparing the channels' goals and principles

Douglas Boyde (1986, 290) summarised the main goals that broadcasters should invest in when approaching international audiences: "(1) .. enhance national prestige; (2) .. promote national interests; (3) .. attempt religious or political indoctrination; and (4) .. foster cultural ties. .. every broadcaster has at least one of the above as a major reason for transmitting."

Although most of the major international broadcasters have a common goal in projecting their country to the world, DW and the TRT have clear goals and

principles. These goals are specified in eight points, which are announced on their websites. It is important to know that there are six very similar goals between DW and the TRT, from communicating their governments' foreign affairs offices to global issues worldwide, presenting their own culture and heritage, targeting global audiences through their multilingual media, seeking credibility from their country's pluralistic environment, building cultural bridges via international dialogue and passing their professional knowledge to global partners. Interestingly, the only two different approaches are seen through the approaches that reflect the Western values of DW and the Eastern values of the TRT.

Starting with DW, democracy, human rights and freedom of speech values are stated clearly on two of the three remaining principles: "We communicate the values of democracy and support human rights. We provide comprehensive and uncensored information to countries that lack free media, particularly crisis regions and war zones." The last principle reflects a capitalist way of thinking in terms of branding something; in this case, branding their nation by using the idea that Germans are well known for their manufacturing accuracy and quality, as well as their advanced use of technology: "We use our credibility to promote Germany's reputation worldwide." This reflects how the DW-TV Arabia is dealing with culture as a product of knowledge by promoting their culture to others because that's how their scholars view culture. When it comes to Arab audiences, the above-mentioned Western values are considered to be amongst the top-ranked dreams of the majority of Arabic-speaking publics, especially the youth, due to media and intellectual repression led by their authoritarian governments as well as the high degree of unemployment amongst degree-holder graduates. In other words, DW emphasises the youths' dreams, yet it never represents *how* to achieve those dreams.

On the other hand, the TRT's remaining three goals contain two major different points from the DW. Firstly, it targets Arabs living in Turkey and uses the emotions of its target audience. The main highlighted terminologies in the remaining goals are cultural identity, brother's bonds and knowledge interaction.

"Deepening the ties of brotherhood and reconciliation between Turkey and the Arab world. Benefiting the Arab audience living in Turkey by providing them with a set of unique programmes aimed to formulate and shape the cultural identity of the individual and the society. Communicating knowledge; the TRT's studios around the Arab countries by cross-interaction exchanges of artists, musicians, singers and celebrities" (Arabic TRT TV Website, 2010).

The use of these principles is deeply rooted in the collective oriental societies, in which the TRT is pulling the emotional aspect of its Arab audience. This might and might not work with the Arabic-speaking audiences. If it works, then that is due to the fact that it is speaking using the same language and style as the Arabs. However, if it did not work, then that is because the current generation and the current political affairs are no longer the same.

As mentioned above, there are four similar announced goals between DW and the TRT, yet, their differences are apparent in the way in which they highlight their audience's needs. This thesis discusses the different approaches of DW and the TRT in winning wider Arabic-speaking audiences.

Chapter 4. Immigration Effects on Both Germany and Turkey

4.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to study the correlation between immigration movements and the understanding of the *other* in intercultural relations. For the main purpose of this thesis, immigrations that occurred during the last phases of the Ottoman Caliphate and the aftermath of World War II in Germany will be discussed. The first section of this chapter covers the Ottoman's policies towards immigration movements over its territories. The second section covers the immigration to Germany, focusing on the *Gastarbeiter*¹⁹ and the German policies enforced afterwards. The third section covers the current situation of the integration debate in Germany, concentrating on Muslim immigrants and citizens. The last section covers the initiative of GIK.

4.2. Immigration History between Europe and the Ottoman Caliphate

Immigration occurred due to the search for human needs. Historically speaking, the Ottoman had lots of diplomatic relations with Europe for social, economic and cultural reasons. On the other hand, lots of conflict occurred between Christian Europe and the Islamic Caliphate. Both sides were in such conflict to either defend or expand their lands. This chapter is concerned with the immigration movement and integration policies in the Ottoman Caliphate as well as the policies of Germany and its effects during the twentieth century to date.

4.2.1. *The Ottoman's Approach to Integrating and Tolerating Immigrants*

Islam unified all Arabs, Persians, Turks, Indians, Africans, etc. The Ottoman Caliphate led Muslims from 1518 to 1924. The ultimate goal was to spread the message of Islam. However, covering such a large area would require excellent

¹⁹ Guest Workers

management skills to lead plenty of different ethnicities. There were three Ottoman sultans who took significant action in managing the variety of ethnicities living in the Ottoman Caliphate. The first was Sultan Mehamed²⁰ AlFatih, who, according to Braude and Bernard (1982, 12), after the conquest of Constantinople,

“was reputed to have granted Patriarch Gennadios and the Orthodox Church [number of privileges which allowed fiscal and legal autonomy to the community. The Patriarch was responsible for his community's taxes and in return the state supported the authority of the patriarch. Comparable arrangements were said to have been made with the Armenians and the Jews.”

The second was Sultan Abdul-Majeed I (1861-1823), who managed the first large-scale and most violent internal sectarian conflict in what is now known as Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. They were “the Druze-Maronite civil war in Lebanon between 1840 and 1860, the 1840 Damascus ‘blood libel’ by Christians against Jews, and the Muslim riots against the Christians of Aleppo and Damascus in 1850 and 1860 respectively” (Ma’oz, 1982, 92). The third was Sultan Abdul Hameed II, the last Ottoman Caliphate, who witnessed great pressure both on national and international levels. It is believed that, in 1882, Sultan Abdul Hameed II’s “effort to assimilate them into the Ottoman social body actually amounted to a socioethnic restructuring and caused society to update its old identity, in accordance with the new circumstances” (Karpas, 2001, 184).

His efforts include most aspects of the social, economic and diplomatic spheres. Karpas (2001, 185) explores this point in depth, stating that:

“The government tried to overcome the ethnic diversity by creating a political culture based on common characteristics and expectations of its dominant Muslim sector. The rapid expansion of the modern school

²⁰ Spelling of his name may vary from source to source, e.g. Muhammad, Mohammed, Mohamed, Mehamit, Mehammed, or Mehamed.

system after 1880 and the use of textbooks glorifying the Ottoman-Muslim past aimed at consolidating internal unity and the sense of a common past. That all this inadvertently appealed more to the Anatolian and Rumilian Muslims than to Arabs helped to shape their identity as a distinct ethnocultural entity. In 1893 the sultan announced a new immigration policy that favoured Muslims, mostly those from the Balkans."

His strategy reflects an awareness of the strength of a unified nation of different ethnicities under one umbrella, indicating that this would bring back Islamic glory. The scholar indicates that, to some extent, the non-Arab Muslims reacted positively towards the Sultan's methods of changing the educational curriculum, but the Arabs did not. However, no evidence was provided throughout his book. Also, Karpas went on to discuss the new immigration policy which he referred to as an "Islamist immigration policy" (186) because it prioritises Muslim immigrants over all others and gave them privileges in order for them to have the best welfare conditions. It can be argued that this policy occurred for a number of reasons: as a policy to avoid the conflict amongst the ethnicities of Eastern Europe, as a reaction towards the Jews' immigration to Palestine, as a motive to rebalance the population of the Ottoman Caliphate, as a means to gain more supporters and loyalty toward the Caliphate and as a reminder to all Muslims that they are being served under one nation.

Given the fact that the Ottoman Caliphate was very weak at that time and international powers were eager to take advantage of such weakness, such an approach was analysed negatively according to each international actor's interest. Karpas (2001, 185) provides two major European actions, one of which was a major reason for this policy to occur and the other reflects the long-term interest in expanding their territories, the first of which was "the Austrians [efforts in 1894] to stop the emigration of the Bosnians and even to recall those already settled in Turkey,

...[by] induced the mufti of Tuzla, ... to write a religious comment designed to discourage the emigration". The second was in 1898 when the German Settlement Society of Hannover debated the idea of settling one million Germans along the Anatolian railway and of securing for them a special administrative status in order to create a "new German homeland" (Karpas, 2001, 186). Karpas's (2001, 188) discussion of this policy led him to conclude that Abdul Hameed's new approach in using Islam was an innovative approach "to build a Muslim nation in the modern sense of the word, retaining and reviving Islamic traditions, loyalties, and symbols at the very time he was changing and creating a new 'whole,' still as part of the 'true Islam'". However, he concentrated on this specific policy of immigration, neglecting another fundamental policy, which is a well-known Islamic principle applied as a national "framework within which the Christian and Jewish communal authorities functioned under Ottoman rule" (Braude & Bernard, 1982, 12), which is otherwise known as the *Millet* System. The word "*millet* means a religiously-defined people" (Braude & Bernard, 1982, 69). Scholar Hellyer (2009, 186) explained it as:

"An Ottoman scheme by which a multi-religious society was governed with a degree of tolerance and acceptance. Religious autonomy was cherished in the Ottoman Caliphate and in various Muslim governments across the world, with these societies accepting a mixture of communal autonomy based on religious identity and unified purposes. This scheme worked well for its time, and some communities today still seek similar official recognition by the state, whether on the basis of ethnicity or of spiritual bonds."

Both policies helped to reconstruct the Islamic Ummah, yet, in a modern way. During that historical era, results were mainly negative and Sultan Abdul Hameed lost his position for this and many other reasons. Today's world is witnessing an interesting shift amongst Muslims worldwide, who can now feel a sense of belonging

to one nation; it can be argued that this is part of the long-term effects of such policies. According to Nielsen (1995, 151), "The very success of the concept of nation involved creating an ideological identity which, whatever its variety of cultural sources, presented a common culture as an essential distinguishing characteristic of the nation." It can be argued here that this ideological identity is shaping Muslim communities worldwide. Thus, it would be wise to show an understanding of their own culture, which is strongly shaped by their religion, when communicating with them on an intercultural level.

4.3. Immigration to Germany

The existence of Islam in Europe cannot be neglected for it is "the fastest growing religion in Europe" (BBC Website, 2005). As many other ethnic and religious migrants did, Muslims emigrated from their homeland seeking to secure their dignity in life with better employment and educational chances. The case of Germany does not differ from other European countries, with the distinction of its own step towards seeking labourers after the massive loss of men during World War I and World War II, of which the majority of the labourers were Muslims. As for this thesis, Germany is targeting predominantly Muslim Arabic-speaking audiences via its broadcasts in order to build bridges with the Arab and Muslim world. As a result, this chapter aims to study the case of the Muslims' situation in Germany in relation to the German government in order to understand whether Germany's national policies are drawing parallel with its international policies.

As previously mentioned, immigration is a normal aspect in human nature. In this section of the thesis, the main focus will be on the Turkish Muslim immigration to Germany for three main reasons: firstly, Turks are not only the largest Muslim community in Germany, but also the largest immigrant community and naturalised foreigners (Rainer & Ulrich, 2003, 29, 35). Secondly, Turks are the first group of

Muslims' *Gastarbeiter* to reach Germany through an official treaty between Germany and Turkey. Thirdly, following the recommendations of AlSuwaidi's (2008) MA dissertation mentioned in section 5.1., it would be of interest to observe how the Germans are building bridges both internally and externally.




Figure 1 Naturalisation of foreigners (without Aussiedler) by nationality in Germany, Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Auslanderbeauftragte 2001 (cited in Rainer & Ulrich, 2003, figure 2.1, 29).

4.3.1. Die Gastarbeiter

It all started in the 1950s when private agencies started to hire Turkish labour. April 1957 witnessed an "agreement between the Ministry of Labour of Schleswig-Holstein and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs led to the arrival of a dozen Turkish craftsmen in Kiel in April 1957" (Nielsen, 1995, 23). In 1961, the Treaty of the First Employment Agreement with Turkey took place, with a major condition of substituting the *Gastarbeiter* every four years in order to maintain the status of temporary guest-workers, not permanent immigrants. However, it was far more costly to train the newcomers instead of keeping the already trained *Gastarbeiter* groups (Karankasoglu & Nonneman, 1997, 241).

The German government assigned the Protestant and Catholic churches to be in charge of the social welfare of the *Gastarbeiter*; however, the uniqueness of the Turks *Gastarbeiter* was their religion, Islam. Thus, “the *Arbeiterwohlfahrt*, the social welfare arm of the Social Democratic Party and the labour movement” was assigned to take care of them (Nielsen, 1995, 24). Also, the German government established cultural associations, funded regular broadcasting in their mother tongue, encouraged Turkish consults, required employers to accommodate workers with proper housing, and forced an integration policy in 1973 to help new arrivals to get an education and achieve integration (Nielsen, 1995, 24-25). These governmental actions encouraged the Turkish workers to settle in Germany. According to Hailbronner and Motomura (1998, vi), the number of *Gastarbeiter* kept on increasing to reach “2.3 million from 1988 to 1993, a historically unprecedented flow of immigrants”. They attributed this to external factors:

“Migrant workers originally recruited for temporary employment ended up staying on as immigrants. Reunification of these workers with their family members, who came to join them in Germany, added to the noncitizen population. A growing number of asylum seekers also swelled the numbers, as did a substantial influx of “ethnic Germans” from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Taken together, these factors have made for a sizable de facto immigrant influx into Germany” (Hailbronner and Motomura, 1998, vii).

In addition to the above-mentioned external factors, the situation of the secular state of Turkey cannot be neglected. There is a high probability that after finding employment, those Muslim Turks found a chance to settle in Germany and practice their religion away from the Turkish secular state. However, the German government faced an economic crisis in 1973; as a result, “Germany put in place severe restrictions on the recruitment of industrial workers, leaving the gates open only for

the family reunion and for particular specified professionals and crafts" (Nielsen, 1995, 25). Without the oil crisis that affected the German economy, there was a far higher probability of a huge increase in the number of emigrants. In fact, the following years witnessed massive efforts led by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to control the situation of those workers in Germany. Chancellor Schmidt worked on three levels: firstly, reintegrate those who are living in Germany legally; secondly, enforce the ban on recruiting new workers of 1973; and, thirdly, apply the new law of *Rückkehrförderungsgesetz*, in which "every guest worker who left Germany voluntarily received an incentive of 10,500 Deutschmark (E5,250), but only about 250,000 migrants, mainly those of Turkish origin, responded to this opportunity" (Santel & Weber, 2000, cited in Faas, 2010, 63). The small numbers of respondents to the last offer reflects the need of those guest workers to live in a more respectable place where they can practice their religion away from the former extreme secular state of Turkey. A lack of social studies on this group might be a reason for the failure of the previous governmental efforts in controlling the situation. Rainer and Ulrich (2003) divided the research on immigration into two phases. The first phase took place between 1980 and 1988 and focused on the historical background of the immigrants, while the second phase started from 1989 and concentrated more on the social integration of the immigrants. They have attributed that to the late awareness of the second-generation effects and "Germany's ageing and shrinking native population" (Rainer & Ulrich, 2003, 20).

4.3.2. The Integration Situation in Germany

Throughout the reviewed literature on integration issues in Europe generally and Germany specifically, it was evident that there are both individual and institutional efforts from both the Muslim side as well as German officials, regardless

of the negative assumptions and attempt to reject the whole approach of integration. In fact, multiculturalism as an approach was the most excluded as a term and a policy. Meer and Modood (2012, 30,) attribute the appearance of anti-multiculturalism in Europe to different reasons, including “the view that multiculturalism has facilitated social fragmentation and entrenched divisions; for others it has displaced attention from socio-economic disparities’ or encouraged a moral hesitancy amongst ‘native’ populations. Some even blame it for international terrorism”.

As mentioned earlier, the existence of immigrants and their integration issues in Germany did not gain the attention of researchers up until the late '80s. The case of integration is complicated for two reasons. On the one hand, the terminological perspective can contain many meanings within, which have been discussed in depth in section 4.3.2. On the other hand, the process perspective can be seen from two main angles. Firstly, the process of an individual integrating into a new cultural atmosphere would be totally different from that of another individual due to the complicity of his psychological, emotional and intellectual perspective. Secondly, the process of collective group integration in a new cultural atmosphere cannot be overlooked because they are sharing the same memories, values, cultural principles, traditions, language and religion, which reflects on the way in which they adopt or deal with the new culture. In the integration of Turks in Germany, it is vital to generalise the situation of an individual over the collective group and vis-à-vis, because this group of people is active in a large scale throughout the German state. This section will discuss the definition of integration, policies of integration in Germany, the willingness of Muslims to integrate, the current debate of the accuracy of integration and the GIK.

This thesis explores integration from the two-way communication perspective as defined by Modood (2012b, 43):

“Integration is where processes of social interaction are seen as two-way, and where members of the majority community as well as immigrants and ethnic minorities are required to do something’ so the latter cannot alone be blamed for ‘failing to or not trying to integrate’. The established society is the site of institutions - including employers, civil society and the government - in which integration has to take place, and they accordingly must take the lead.”

Modood managed to cover three major aspects of the concept: a social two-way process, a shared issue to be solved and the importance of the institutionalised society in the equation. Building a socially constructed solution based on the two-way process is proposed in the final chapter of this thesis. However, there are several aspects of the integration issues that should be clarified. Taking into consideration Vasta’s (2009, 19) definition of integration “as a concept and process defined by the dominant group. Many social scientists prefer to use the term ‘immigrant participation’ which provides the idea of immigrant agency in the process of settlement”. Kjeldstadli (2009, 73) studied the Norwegian integration case, raising two main points that must be taken into account by integration scholars; the first point is what he called “cultural membership [in which] ... the influence moves from the majority to the minority, that the society at large has greater power and sends out a number of signals and demands”. The second point is that if the minority communities are to be acknowledged, then their values and ways of thinking are to become part of society. Thus, the value system of the society is going to have a two-way value exchange; in this case, one from the original majority citizen and the other from the immigrant minority citizen (Kjeldstadli, 2009, 73). Keeping in mind that an immigrant is a human, full of emotions, memories and beliefs that shape his/herself,

as a result, asking him/her to integrate and adopt a pure German lifestyle while neglecting this basic fact will keep on creating an illusionary vision of a bright German future. Although Kjeldstadli's argument is very logical, he concluded it with a fear; not a fear of the circumstances of this two-way value exchange, but a fear of, perhaps, the scholars, politicians, or readers of his articles, as if he was not supposed to highlight the issue:

"Do not misunderstand. I do not mean that because a minority has a certain understanding, that other people owe it to them to take it on, or even that they owe it to them to like or accept it. Yet, because minorities are members of society, on the same level as others, then one must be prepared for what is Norwegian to change and that the perception of Norwegianness, what it means to be Norwegian, must change" (Kjeldstadli, 2009, 73).

By concluding his argument with this statement, Kjeldstadli shed light on the fear of facing the reality as if it is a taboo.

McGarry, O'Leary and Simeon (2008, 42) added another dimension into the debate of integration:

"Integration, while respecting differences in the private domain, involves the elimination of differences in the public sphere. It aims at public homogenisation through common citizenship. ... [Accommodation] allows for the public and institutional expression of differences in the public sphere. While integration responds to diversity through institutions that transcend, crosscut, and minimise differences, accommodationist strategies seek to ensure that each group has the public space necessary for it to express its identity, to protect itself against tyranny by the majority, and to make its own decisions in domains of critical importance."

By proposing accommodation policies as an alternative to the integration policies, they interpreted integration as "the politics of the historically weak or the

newly arrived, whereas accommodation shapes the politics of those powerful enough to resist assimilation but not strong or united enough to achieve secession" (McGarry, O'Leary and Simeon, 2008, 88). There are a large number of claims that Muslims are integrated poorly in Germany: "Discourse that sees Muslims as a problem or a threat is not confined to an extreme fringe, nor to popular prejudice, but is prominent in certain elite discourses" (Modood, 1997, 3). However, if McGarry's, O'Leary's and Simeon's (2008) hypothesis of the newly arrived weak vs. the settled powerful immigrants has some accuracy, then the reason for the *poorly* integrated Muslims is their strength in holding tight to their own principles and values. In agreement with Ramadan (2010, 6), this is the phase in which the situation is to be considered the "post-integration generation discourse".

Changing European policies of integration affected Muslim communities and led them "towards self-isolation and exclusion, and enabling them to shape an Islamic European identity, although this process is yet to be fully realized" (Malek, 2004, 1). This isolation and late political movement led the second and third European Muslim generations to study their own situation and theorise for themselves; therefore, European countries have to reconsider their policies towards Muslim communities. In explaining why states are to consider policies towards a religion, Modood (2012a) presents five reasons, including religion as an identity. He encourages policy-makers to break down the identity into three levels when dealing with religions: firstly, the individual identity; secondly, the public or civic identity and, thirdly, the minority identity.

It is necessary to deal with Muslim communities from a religious perspective as they are "the largest non-Christian religious community in Europe, 11-12 million in the 'old' European Union [EU]) alone" (Hellyer, 2009, 2). Excluding Islam as a

religion will cause a massive amount of misunderstanding and, thus, mislead decisions from both sides. As cited in Schiffauer (1997, 150), “Gebauer finds the French solution, excluding religion from the state domain in the name of laicism, highly problematic. Since religion quite obviously fulfills a basic need, he argues, ignoring it only leads to the abandonment of an open field to Islamist groups.” One of the ways to put Muslims in action is by expanding and empowering their political participation at the governmental level, adopting Yalcin-Heckmann’s (1997, 102) statement: “the process of political *visibilisation*.” In the German case, there is a trend of creating “a civil society within civil society” by different ethnic groups “demonstrating not only their willingness but also their ability to integrate, despite German resistance” (Mushaben, 2008, 223). In terms of Muslim communities living in Germany, the second generation led the political activism there (Nonneman, 1997, 5). Doornik (2009, 19) drew a wider map of the political participation of Muslims in different German parties:

“Nearly all the parties now have a Turkish or Muslim section that seeks to recruit citizens of immigrant origin to their respective causes: the Arab Social Democrats (Arabische Sozialdemokraten, A-SPD) in Berlin; the Greens have Immigrün; the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has the German-Turkish Forum (Deutsch-türkisches Forum), which counts 400 members; and, finally, the FDP set up a Liberal German-Turkish group (Liberale Deutsch-Türkische Vereinigung). ... The current Bundestag includes five members of Turkish origin and one of Iranian origin. ... In addition, several young Turkish Germans hold national-level party positions and are visible participants in national political debates, such as Bülent Arslan (CDU), who is leader of his party’s German- Turkish Forum (DTF); Giyasettin Sayan, a spokes- woman for the Left Party; Emine Demirbüken-Wegner (CDU), who was a longtime local foreigners’ commissioner in Berlin; and Mehmet Daimagüler (FDP), a former member of his party’s executive

board. These individuals who participate in national debate are complemented by a handful of local officials in land level parliaments.”

These efforts, which would have long-term effects on Muslim communities, are expanding, and there is no way of ignoring their existence. Modood (2012a, 75) accepted Oliver Roy’s argument that:

“younger Muslims and those in the West, are much less likely than their parents or previous generations to do or believe things just because it is the done thing in their faith community. They are less likely to be customary or conventional or obedient Muslims and more likely to think about and question what it means to be Muslim.”

However, he argues that it is not to be seen as an individualisation of an identity, but rather, these identities are becoming public due to the very personal questions they ask at the public level. This would eventually lead to accommodating them “within a civic multiculturalism and existing secularist institutional accommodation of religion” (Modood, 2012a, 75-76). In fact, the matter of accommodating them is not really an action from the hosted country for the immigrants but a reaction of the reality of the immigrants’ existence in that country. Therefore, there are several initiatives and efforts towards multiculturalism policies. Although, policy-makers in Western democratic and capitalist societies are those who have been elected MPs to take major policy decisions on behalf of the citizens, their efforts towards creating a stronger public diplomacy at the national level is weaker in comparison to their regional and international levels. Winning or redirecting international public opinion might be of use for the image of a state; however, directing one’s own people at the cultural level is sensational. Leaving it as a popular culture that is shaped by the consumerism of the West for the sake of creating a flow in the capitalists market is of no use. In fact, it can be argued here that Bin Nabi’s

cultural redirection of the society is essential for a state as part of its both national and international cultural diplomacy. He argues that “the reconciliation and integration between culture and politics is achievable through the individual because he is the conscious being and factor who orient the social energies” (Bin Nabi, cited in Berghouth, 2005, 174). His argument put more emphasis on the power of the *element of unity* that is shaped by the shared culture of the public. Regarding the German Muslim youths, Hellyer (2009, 18) notes that their “goal became not to assimilate themselves into the secular values of the West but, instead, to adopt a true Islamic identity while living in the West.”

Another interpretation of the situation is addressed by Schiffauer (1997, 151), who presented the problem as the “problem of solidarity” and proposed a typical German solution for this issue, which:

“can be reduced to Schiller's formula of the individual and the general. Unprompted solidarity is possible, in Schiller's view, when the individual and the particular are fully realised in the general, and vice versa' that is, when the general and the individual are not related mechanically to one another, but dialectically.”

In fact, observers of the youth generation of Muslims in Germany are managing by functioning “effectively in both cultures, and to fulfill the role of go-betweens between Germans and Turks” (Karankasoglu & Nonneman, 1997, 247), as well as seeking “a fusion of religious law with secular law. It wants its concerns to be understood as a universal interest, something for the common good that transcends national borders” (Jonker, G. & Amiraus, 2006, 139). Muslim German youth are expected to have many successful chances to present their own identity, considering that they belong to “the most strongly organised of any of Germany's (255) ethnic and religious minorities it boasts more than 2,000 regional organisations, with 50,000-

100,000 members, and over 500,000 practicing Muslims who regularly use their services” (Karankasoglu & Nonneman, 1997, 254).

However, after 9/11, the Germans started to debate the integration situation and search for solutions for the social problems that occur amongst the Muslim immigrants’ spheres. This debate was at its peak in October 2010 when:

“President Christian Wulff used the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of German unification on October 3, 2010, to affirm once more that Islam is part of Germany, ... Several of his fellow Christian Democrats have challenged his view and insisted that Germany was based on a ‘Judeo-Christian heritage,’ which should also be considered as its ‘Leitkultur’ or guiding culture, a politically charged term that had already sparked a raging debate in the past.” (Aslan 2011, 1)

In the same month, Chancellor Angela Merkel declared the death of multiculturalism in Germany, saying that it had "failed utterly" (guardian.co.uk website October 17, 2010). Meer and Modood (2012, 30) argued that:

“reasons for this anti-multicultural turn are various, but include the view that multiculturalism has facilitated social fragmentation and entrenched division; for others it has displaced attention from socio-economic disparities’ or encouraged a moral hesitancy amongst ‘native’ populations. Some even blame it for international terrorism.”

One of the reasons why this failed is “that some immigrant groups have become too dependent on welfare and comes to the conclusion that 'strong multiculturalism' combined with a 'strong welfare state' has contributed to the failure of immigrant integration” (Koopmans, 2003; Koopmans, 2006, cited in Vasta, 2009, 26).

Although this process of exchanging and defending viewpoints might reflect a healthy society, it definitely affects the daily life of the Muslim immigrants, their image amongst other fellow citizens and the media representation of the debate.

Mehmet Yeneroglu, a Muslim German from a Turkish background, reflects on the integration situation:

“If one begins to take this seriously—integration, to become integrated—then we want to be taken seriously as partners as well. We represent the largest Islamic community in this country. If we want to succeed, we have to find new interpretations for shari’a regulations, not only for those that make Islamic life possible but also for the hard spots [hudud punishments for fitna, theft, and adultery]. We want to become accepted with our rough edges and likewise build up solidarity with the whole umma. We want to become a partner of the state” (interviewed by Jonker & Amiraus in April 16 2004 and cited in Jonker & Amiraus, 2006, 135-136).

Malek (2004, 15) encourages Muslims to integrate “Islamically” by “creating positive self-images for the Arabic/Turkish/Urdo speaking community”. “Islamically”, to Malek (2004), is not clarified. However, Malek’s (2004, 234) position is understandable if he refers to the point that Islam does “allow and encourage Muslims to engage in their society fully in respect of its legal framework”. However, he neglected the fact that, like other religions, not all Muslims are practicing Islam. Moreover, many Islamic societies and organisations are dividing their positions in front of the German government. It would be more efficient if he should provide an overall plan of how to integrate “Islamically”. Another solution for Muslims to integrate in Germany was a demand call for partnership integration, in which the “notion of ‘partners’ implies a claim to the legal status of a ‘Church,’ the so-called corporation of public law, which in Germany only the churches and the Jewish community possess—none of the Islamic organization possess this status” (Jonker and Amiraus 2006, 136). This demand is reasonable; however, it is difficult to apply this due to the previously mentioned situation of the strong “Leitkultur” belief that the government is to follow a “Judeo-Christian heritage”. In fact, this makes the

situation worse, because the so-called *minority* Muslim population is now far larger than the Jewish population in Germany. This is very similar to the case of the DW Act mentioned in section 3.2.6.

Almost all public discussion of Muslims' integration into Germany neglects the fact that there are native Muslim Germans standing up for their rights. According to Nielsen (1995, 32):

“German Muslims have played a crucial role in the establishment of Islam. For many years Turks who sought to live according to Islam found that they had to turn to German Muslims for help. The laicist history of the Turkish republic meant that the educated Turks who came to Germany were unwilling to identify themselves with Islam. They were therefore not available as a leadership resource which could mediate with German society. This role was taken by countless German Muslims, and it is a role which continues even as the Turkish Muslim groups are beginning to build up their own competent leaderships. Due to the efforts of a few individuals, again German Muslims, the country has one of the most active branches of the Muslim World Congress in the world. The German branch has during the 1980s been particularly concerned to establish constructive relations with German institutions, especially the churches.”

Amongst the notable examples of native German Muslims is Dr. Murad Wilfried Hoffman, the former director of information for NATO and the former German ambassador in Algeria and Morocco. He was awarded the title of Islamic Personality of the Year by Dubai International Holy Quran Award of 2009 in recognition of his active role in the Islamic life of Muslims (AlNajami, 2009).

4.3.3. The German Islam Conference (GIK) Initiative

Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, the German Minister of the Interior, announced the opening of the GIK by stating that “Islam is part of Germany...it is part of our present and part of our future. Muslims are welcome in Germany” (Aslan 2011). Silvestri

(2010, 52) shed light on the unique point about the GIK along with the weakest point. He sees that “including ordinary individuals of Muslim faith ... not affiliated with any mosque or Islamic organisation” was innovative, while, on the other hand, the exact same idea was interpreted negatively by Muslims because the organisers did not include “religious scholars when theological matters are discussed, and feel that the German government is manipulating the divisions that exist within Germany's Muslim communities”.

Nevertheless, the step of organising the GIK by itself is an achievement, and all Muslims representative of Islamic organisations and individual Islamic activists should participate in order to create a common ground amongst Muslim and German officials. In fact, the timing of the GIK is crucial and every responsible Muslim is to promote and participate actively in it because, as indicated by Karankasoglu and Nonneman (1997, 264), there were:

“indications that the various Islamic organisations are moving closer together over a 'lowest common denominator' consensus. ... Secondly, ... the organisations have become increasingly adept at dealing with the German authorities. This can also be regarded as a learning process in the form of democratic cooperation.”

Within less than ten years the result was GIK. In other words, there are bright hopes for active Muslims to introduce themselves in a better way through this initiative.

Being a leading state member of the EU forced Germany to adopt lots of things for its own foreign policies, including integration as a case. According to Hubel and Heise (2005, 11), “the effects of transatlantic and European integration have increasingly shaped Germany's international role”. It was after the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue of 2008 that Germany had no other option but to apply the concept and promote it within its own territories. Silvestri (2010, 47) relates:

"Intercultural dialogue entails a broader efforts, implying a change in mentality directed towards a more 'human' or ethical dimension of politics (beyond concerns with power, economic interest and security); it means adopting an intercultural mindset in whatever individuals and institutions do. We could argue that intercultural dialogue successes in refocusing on both individual human rights and collective responsibility".

Prof. Ramadan (2009, 267) addressed a strong message to sociologists in order to provide Europe with new solutions for the European identity crisis:

"At the heart of Western societies, which are going through true identity crises (because they must face the presence of new religions and cultures and massive, continued immigration that is nonetheless necessary for them to survive), sociologists are compelled to assess achievements and reaffirm founding principles, if not completely rethink religious and cultural pluralism."

The GIK is an intercultural means for both Germans and Muslim Germans to start building a brighter future for Germany. However, Muslims of Germany should show more wisdom in dealing with this initiative and work as one entity to serve the future of the next generations of Muslims living in Germany instead of thinking about their own sects' benefits. Likewise, German authorities should demonstrate more understanding of Islam as a faith that shapes the lifestyles of the more than four million Muslims based in Germany.

Chapter 5. Methodology

5.1. The Development of Methods Employed

When the research for this thesis started in 2008, the plan was to focus on Deutsche Welle (DW) TV Arabia and to use the following qualitative and quantitative methods as the main methods for this thesis: 1) conducting interviews with the main decision-makers and strategic decision-makers of DW; 2) analysing the thematic content of DW-TV Arabia's dialogical programmes; and 3) combining surveys and focus groups as tools to study the audience feedback on the channel. However, it was a difficult task due to the lack of direct references on the topic. In April 2010, a news report was shown on the AlJazeera Arabic channel of the launching ceremony of the Turkish-Arabic channel Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) Ettiyye by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Since the main hypothesis of this thesis was that, for DW to build strong international relations through intercultural communication and public diplomacy, DW should consider building its inner bridges with Arabs and Muslims in Germany first, and considering that the Turkish Muslims are the majority of the Muslims population in Germany, the launching of the TRT added a comparison method to this thesis. In other words, this thesis was developed to be a comparative study between the two channels' content as a public diplomacy tool when targeting Arab and Muslim audiences.

Methodologically speaking, this method will bring more accurate measurements of the quantity of using keywords and give more time for people to express their thoughts during the dialogical programs. Also, it can give the impression of the overall direction of the channel and its aims. As a result, this comparison study

would help other researchers to build on its findings by providing an in-depth content analysis of its dialogical programmes. The comparison would cover five areas. The first area is comparing and analysing the channels' announced goals and principles. The second is a comparison between the financial status and policies of the channels. The third is a comparison between their general programmes' genres. The last two areas have been revised twice due to the changes that occurred in the Arab world after the Arab Uprising of 2011. As a result, the fourth area provides the changes that occurred to both channels through analysis of a week from 2012 and then compares it with the previous weeks. The final area is an in-depth content analysis of four episodes of six dialogical programmes by the DW, three of which were aired before the Arab Uprising of 2011 and the other three which were aired afterwards, in order to examine the changes of DW's and the TRT's approaches in reaching Arabic-speaking publics. The first group of programmes contains: DW's *Between the North and South*, *The Cultural Saloon* and *Youth without Borders* as well as the TRT's *East and West*, *A Thousand and One Nights* and *Good Morning from Istanbul*. The second group of programmes includes: DW's *With the Event*, *Youth Talk* and the *New Arab Debates* as well as the TRT's *Without Restriction*, *Morning Etturkiyye* and *In the Shade of Events*.

The second method that has been applied in this thesis is conducting a survey followed by organising focus groups of the survey's participants. The participants of the survey are mainly considered to be a selected sample of DW-TV Arabia audience in order to measure if their intercultural knowledge has been changed due to their viewing habits of the German international broadcasts. The viewers of the recent TRT-Etturkiyye channel are considered a second priority of the current study scale.

The decision of comparing DW with the TRT gave a new spirit to the thesis and required a revision of its objectives and methods. The researcher believed in the importance of developing the two previous recommendations given by AlSuwaidi (2008, 48) in her MA dissertation submitted to University of Westminster: *The German Foreign Affairs usage of media in building strong international relations with the Islamic World; Deutsche Welle TV Arabia*. The recommendations were as follows:

“1. There has to be efforts from the Arab and Muslims’ side because the German efforts is a one sided work while it has to be shared responsibilities. For example, an Islamic Culture channel in different languages, that represents the variety of different traditions with Islamic roots to build not a right or wrong image but to give a closer approach to understand Islam, is strongly recommended for building stronger awareness.

2. Building bridges is very important, yet, the German federal government has to keep in mind building inner bridges as well with the increasing number of Muslims in Germany.”

In addition to the above-mentioned points, the researcher found that there was a huge drift towards Americanisation of PD as a term and a study field. Thus, the research was directed to change the view of their theories and interpretations in order to dissociate between the need of PD and capitalists’ stream of thinking.

5.2. Methodological Limitations and Obstacles that Affected the Research Process

There were limitations and an obstacle for this thesis. The limitation was the fact that DW-TV has been targeting Arabic-speaking audiences for more than six years now, while the TRT started to do so recently; however, the main goal of this comparison is to observe, analyse and evaluate the approaches, regardless of the

implementation of time. Besides, this thesis is a search for a new and different theory of intercultural communication, which requires observing any single effort used to approach Arab and Muslim audiences. The obstacle was the difficulties of reaching the high officials of the DW. In fact, the researcher managed to reach Dr. Johannes Beermann; Minister of State – Chief of the State Chancellery, in person, exchanged business cards, promised to forward all questions directly to Erik Bettermann; General Director of Deutsche Welle, and emailed him a list of all the required questions; however, he never replied. The same email has been forwarded to Bettermann, who also failed to respond. As a result, the researcher decided to focus on the comparative content analysis as a main method for this thesis.

5.3. Research Methods Employed Review

5.3.1. Comparative Research Review

In the early stages of this thesis, DW-TV Arabia was a single case international broadcaster to be researched. The analytical unit of the content analysis at that time was episodes of several dialogical programmes. However, the main research questions of the thesis could not be answered because the uniqueness of DW-TV Arabia could not be noticed without having a base model or another international broadcaster to compare it with.

As described earlier, the launching of TRT-Etturkiyye added a new spirit to the research. This was the power of the comparative approach to study social and political sciences to discover "cross-societal differences and similarities", as stressed by Easthope (1974 cited in Ragin 1989; p.1).

Finding the differences and similarities lies at the heart of the comparative research. In fact, it helped in discovering the uniqueness of each case. As Smelser (2003) puts it:

"Comparative analysis has come to mean the description and explanation of similarities and differences (mainly differences) of *conditions* or *outcomes* among large-scale social units, usually regions, nations, societies and cultures. ... It reflects the understanding we have of traditions that have evolved in the disciplines of anthropology (cross-cultural analysis), sociology

(cross-societal), political science (cross-national), history (comparative history) and psychology (comparative psychology)." (645)

Although Smelser (2003) did not include the communication science in his definition, the comparative research method is at the heart of all intercultural communication research. In the case of this thesis, two points were served when the comparison approach was added. First, the researcher was able to measure the closeness of the broadcasters in achieving their announced goal of building intercultural bridges with the Arabic-speaking world. Second, the researcher understood how the cultural background of each broadcaster can affect its content while targeting other cultural audiences. In fact, meeting the minimum requirement of a comparative research -that is at least two different broadcasters that represent two different cultures- "emphasizes the fact that the data of comparative social science are cross-societal" (Ragin 1989 p.4). In other words, the comparison research reflects how the cultural values and political priorities of the German and the Turkish international broadcasters in targeting Arabic-speaking audiences differ.

The comparison approach, as interpreted by Pennings, Keman and Kleinnijenhuis (2006), is considered an art because it is essential in building ones knowledge. Their argument that a comparative approach is closely related to the research questions and design is very accurate. For example, this thesis witnessed several developments in terms of its research questions and design after adding the comparison approach. In other words, the two broadcasters became the main two cases for the comparative approach and their dialogical programmes' episodes are the units of comparison. The comparison units were analysed at a few time intervals over three weeks during 2010; September 4th, November 14th and December 5th. As a result of the occurrence of the Arab-Uprising of 2011, the researcher decided to include one more dimension to the comparative approach by adding the uprising as a time element to observe how both broadcasters reacted towards their targeted audiences' phenomenal uprising. Thus, a week from April 2012 was added.

According to Pennings, Keman and Kleinnijenhuis (2006), comparative research has two validities; internal and external, in which the first focuses on the appropriateness of the researches theoretical measurements and the second focuses on the usefulness of concepts discussed in the research in relation to the thesis' argument (p.6-7). They place emphasis over the role of comparative research in "determin[ing] the differences or similarities among polities, institutions or agents - once again

emphasizing the fact that comparative research need not be cross-national research. Determining these differences or similarities requires conceptualization. A concept must be clearly defined and strong enough to survive its use across nations and cultures" (Pennings, Keman and Kleinnijenhuis 2006; p.147). The main concepts discussed in this thesis were Public Sphere, Public Diplomacy and Intercultural Broadcasting.

Considering their internal and external research validities, it can be argued here that a researcher might not be aware of his/her theoretical measurement and concept appropriateness. Thus, the researcher would be in need of another researcher to evaluate his/her work. Mills, Gerhard G. van de Bunt Vrije, and Jeanne de Bruijn Vrije (2006) specified four main problems that might face the comparative research: "(1) case selection, unit, level and scale of analysis; (2) construct equivalence; (3) variable or case orientation; and finally, (4) issues of causality." (621). The first three points can be considered part of the early stages of the research design in which the researcher should make the right choice of which cases to study, whether they are comparable, and what are the required number of cases and variables to reach ones conclusion. While the final point is more towards the researcher's ability to analyse and draw correlation between the data.

On the other hand, Mills, Gerhard G. van de Bunt Vrije, and Jeanne de Bruijn Vrije (2006) emphasise the advantages of this approach in terms of its usefulness in cross-national or cross-cultural research by allowing the researcher to specify concepts for each cultural background and thus discover each cultural uniqueness (621). This was also stated by Dogan, Mattei, and Pelassy, and Dominique (1990), "the comprehension of a single case is linked to the understanding of many cases, because we perceive the particular better in the light of generalities, international comparison increases tenfold the possibility of explaining political phenomena. ... The discovery of the extraordinary urges the observer to explain why the rule that exists here is absent there, and vice versa" (p.8-9). In an in-depth study on the comparative research method, Pennings, Keman and Kleinnijenhuis (2006) stressed that "the first step in deciding what to compare and how, is to know the units of variation" (33). After that comes the accuracy on choosing the cases to be compared by first making "assumptions about how similar or different the cases or political systems under review are with respect to their context." In the case of this thesis, both international broadcasters under study have a common announced goal targeting Arabic-speaking

audiences and they are both sponsored by their governments; however, the main differences between the two cases are the cultural backgrounds of the broadcaster's team.

As explained earlier in 5.1, this thesis went through several different phases starting from studying DW-TV Arabia as an individual case, adding TRT-Etturikiyye as a comparison case then extending the comparison time to cover the reaction of both international broadcasters towards the Arab Uprising of 2011. These phases were not planned, the researcher decided to add them in order to strengthen the value of the thesis. It is common while doing a comparative research to face problems, especially when there are cultural and linguistic differences from the researcher's origins. Several of the problems that faced the researcher while writing this thesis were discussed by O'Neill (1997); *Border Crossing: Opportunities and Challenges in Comparative Research*. He experienced the disadvantages and advantages of doing a comparative research. On one hand, he faced difficulties in accessing official documents from the other country in research and finding material in English; language was a major barrier for this thesis as well. One of the main advantages he stressed on was that a comparative research approach expands one's knowledge and broadens the researcher's specialties that are needed in academia. Moreover, the "comparative or cross-national focus enables us to escape the confines of a single culture or case" (O'Neill 1997, 142).

In fact, comparative research helps to widen the horizon of social and political sciences, as argued by Dogan, Mattei, and Pelassy (1990), Western researchers comparing two cultures or cases "rapidly discovered with bitterness the inefficiency of their "universal" concepts" (13), thus, new non-western concepts have been discovered. In fact, introducing new concepts such as Intercultural Broadcasting as an alternative term to international broadcasting as well as finding new theories to explain the social phenomena such as the Elements of Unity between Arabs and Muslims were among the goals of this thesis. It should be stressed here that the comparative approach was the right method to outline the Intercultural Broadcasting Arabic Service discussed later in 8.2.

5.3.2. Content Analysis Review

Content analysis is the main method used in this thesis. Krippendorff (1980, 2) defines it as "a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from

data to their context". He went on to explain "its purpose is to provide knowledge, new insights, a representation of 'facts,' and a practical guide to action" (Krippendorff, 1980, 21). Robson (2002, 350) stressed that Krippendorff's definition of content analysis "does have the virtue of stressing the relationship between content and context. This context includes the *purpose* of the document as well as institutional, social and cultural aspects. It also emphasises that reliability and validity are central concerns in content analysis."

Altheide (1996, 2) refers to content analysis as document analysis in which documents mean "any symbolic representation that can be recorded or retrieved for analysis". He went on to present his explanation about document analysis to "an integrated and conceptually informed method, procedure, and technique for locating, identifying, retrieving, and analysing documents for their relevance, significance, and meaning" (Altheide, 1996, 2). He divided documents into primary and secondary documents which are the main objects of study (Altheide, 1996, 3). Units of study have been categorised differently from one scholar to another. Holsti (cited in Robson, 2002, 354-355) listed several types that include: "Subject matter, ... Direction, ...Values, ...Goals, ... Methods, ...Traits, ... Actors, ...Authority, ...Location, ...Conflict, ... [and] Endings". Thus, sorting the main units of study is the most important aspect of the method of content analysis (Robson, 2002, 355). As a result of such importance, "a content analysis can be no better than its system of categories" (Berelson, 1952, cited in Robson, 2002, 355).

This thesis has the dialogical episodes of both international broadcasters as the documents of study, in which each episode has several units of study: title of the episode, topic discussed, guests of the episode, reports shown during the episode, and social media used during the episode.

The positive sides of using document content analysis as a qualitative research method are that it:

"Documents, then, enable us to (a) place symbolic meaning in context, (b) track the process of its creation and influence on social definitions, (c) let our understanding emerge through detailed investigation, and (d) if we desire, use our understanding from the study of documents to change some social activities, including the production of certain documents!" (Altheide, 1996, 12)

Other advantages to be added for the document content analysis are the easiness to access the data and the fact that it is more cost-effective (Denscombe, 2007, 244-245). Robson (2002, 358) added:

"When based on existing documents, it is *unobtrusive*. You can 'observe' without being observed. The data are in permanent form and hence can be subject to re-analysis, allowing reliability checks and replication studies. It may provide a low cost form of longitudinal analysis when a run or series of documents of a particular type is available."

Similarly to Robson's point regarding the unobtrusiveness of content analysis, Denscombe (2007, 237) referred to Gerbner et al. (1969) and Krippendorff (2004) and stated that:

"Content analysis has the potential to disclose many 'hidden' aspects of what is being communicated through the written text. The idea is that, quite independent of what the writer had consciously intended, the text carries some clues about a deeper rooted and possibly unintentional message that is actually being communicated. You do not have to base the analysis on what the author *thought* they were saying when the text contains more tangible evidence about its message."

Brissett and Edgley (1990) and Burke (1962), as cited in Altheide (1996, 24), highlighted a crucial point that is not easily reached via other methods: "Implicit in this approach is to combine 'how' with 'what,' as in 'what was said and shown?'"

more specifically, include categories to document the act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose reflected in the document.”

In addition to the above-mentioned positive points of content analysis as a method, it appears most effective when combined with other methods. For instance, content analysis helps to unveil data and, thus, facts can help in forming new questions which the researcher can benefit from when surveying and/or interviewing people to test his/her hypothesis.

Although content analysis as a method contains lots of advantages, it has a disadvantage that Robson (2002, 358) summarised in the following points:

“The documents available may be limited or partial. The documents have been written for some purpose other than for the research, and it is difficult or impossible to allow for the biases or distortions that this introduces (note need for triangulation with other accounts/data sources to address this problem). It is very difficult to assess causal relationships. Are the documents causes of the social phenomena you are interested in, or reflections of them (e.g. in relation to pornography and/or violence in the mass media)?”

Another disadvantage might be the researcher’s lack of observational skills; even if s/he organised the document’s units of study, there are always far more in-depth meanings that can be revealed from the document itself. One of the reasons for choosing content analysis as the primary method of this thesis was the difficulties faced by the researcher in organising focus groups and reaching the main directors of DW for interviews.

For the purpose of this thesis, content analysis was of use for several reasons. Firstly, spending more hours observing the channels and listening to its programmes directly helped in drawing a much clearer image about them and helped create much stronger correlations between the content and their announced goals. Secondly,

content analysis fostered the researcher's ideas to innovate the intercultural broadcaster idea in relation to the missing parts in their current programmes. Thirdly, comparing the two channels' content added a depth to the thesis in terms of its main argument that DW should build inner bridges first, as well as learning more about the integration and multiculturalism situation in Germany.

5.3.3. Survey Review

Surveying the audiences of both DW-TV Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye is a major aspect of this thesis that aims to help understand their needs and interests when watching international broadcasts. Therefore, the qualitative method employed here was the questionnaire. As Fink and Kosekoff (1985, 15) elaborate, "The data they provide are descriptions of attitudes, values, habits, and background characteristics such as age, education, and income." It simply "*describes a population*" (Sapsford, 2007, 3). This method had a major weakness, according to Payne (1980), who highlights the negative linguistic aspect of the questionnaire that is usually an issue of the designer and writer as well as an issue of the respondent's interpretation. His argument is understandable, as choosing specific words and placing them in a specific order might affect the results. As a solution, Payne (1980) encouraged researchers to include all types of questions in their questionnaire design, putting into consideration a reasonable length of time for answering.

Fink and Kosekoff (1985) counted the different type of questionnaire questions to be multiple-choice, forced-choice and open-ended questions. Mixing different types of questions in one questionnaire helped in building correlations between answers. The validity of a survey usually revolves around three main aspects, as explained by Spasford (2007, 11):

“1 *validity of measurement* – the extent to which the data constitute accurate measurements of what is supposed to be being measured; 2 *population validity* – the extent to which the sample gives an accurate representation of the population which it is supposed to represent; 3 *validity of design* – the extent to which the comparisons being made are appropriate to establish the arguments which rest on them.”

The first and third points relate to the researcher’s intellectual and research skills. However, the second point was an issue for this survey due to the very specific topic in question. As a result, the researcher decided to choose a specific group of respondents; these respondents were interested in German language and culture. This step was taken to avoid unnecessary invalid answers from non-viewers of the channels. As Payne (1980, 16) argues,

“Respondents may never before have heard of the subject. They may confuse it with something else. They may have only vague ideas about it and no means for forming judgments. Even if they know the subject, they may misunderstand the question or answer it in some unexpected sense.”

Another step that was taken to avoid misinterpretation from the respondents’ side was to follow the tip of May (2001) and Fink and Kosecoff (1985) in explaining terminologies used in the survey when needed.

As will be noticed, the process in which this questionnaire was conducted is worth analysing. In fact, this experience led the researcher to reach conclusions that would never have been reached without it. Seal (1999, 160) stresses the importance of sharing this experience because it “can at times develop into an excruciating degree of self-consciousness, so that the research itself becomes well-nigh impossible”. He went on to emphasise the same point, adding that it “can serve many purposes, not all of which assist judgments about the credibility of findings or the quality of a study”

(Seale, 1999, 177). Believing in this argument, the researcher will provide full details of the process which the questionnaire went through.

5.3.4. The Survey Plan

The survey was the main second methodology employed to reach conclusions for this thesis. However, throughout the surveying phases, several issues occurred which required some modification and adjustment. The plan was to engage viewers of DW-TV Arabia and/or those who are targeted by the German Foreign Office to determine whether their intercultural knowledge had been changed due to watching the German international broadcaster as well as the worthiness of the German programmes and activities in the so-called cross-cultural and bridging efforts. Viewers of TRT-Etturkiyye channels were a second priority because TRT-Etturkiyye is a recently launched channel to provide alternative approaches when targeting Arabic-speaking audiences. As discussed in 5.2.1., first, the researcher (2008) called Germany to build inner bridges in order to target Arabs and Muslims efficiently; however, today, the Turks, who are the majority of the Muslim communities in Germany, are targeting Arabic-speaking audiences. The step taken by the researcher was to cooperate with Goethe Institute (GI) Gulf region in Abu Dhabi, U.A.E., in order to distribute a survey of two hundred and fifty to three hundred and fifty participants via the institution's three branches in the Gulf. The analytical phase of the survey was mainly to form the focus groups and create specific questions for the directors of both channels.

5.3.4.1. The Changes in the Phases of the Survey

The first meeting took place at GI on May 4th, 2011, with Susanne Sporrer, the director of GI. It went very well, and the researcher handed the institute 100 hard copies of the survey and informed the director of the e-survey to be emailed to them.

However, it turned out that, for unspecified reasons, GI delayed the process of distributing the survey. The researcher received an email from the director, explaining that there were some points on the survey that required clarification, thus, another meeting was set up on Monday May 9th, 2011, by Maya Röder, the cultural programme coordinator. The plan was to finish surveying people in a month. Both hard copies and e-survey were sent to the institute to be distributed in May, 2011. Unfortunately, nothing was done until May 24th. However, this was managed by creating a Twitter account for the research immediately. Because of the impression of bad cooperation, it was decided to focus on the online survey than to go over it with the institute. The result was thirty-seven online entries out of the total ninety-one came from the Twitter account, which is almost equivalent to the entries coming from GI.

5.3.4.2. Reasons that Might Hinder the Process of Distributing the Survey

During the second meeting, the director was there with other GI representatives; amongst them was the head of the German language teaching department, who refused the whole idea of surveying "his students" due to the following reasons:

- “1. My students do not have time.
2. We will be having examinations and they need to concentrate on that.
3. They do not have the time to do it.
4. "The language of the survey is very hard for them; they are not at a level to be able to read and write, so they cannot answer the questions! So, do not expect more than two or three responses!"

The above points of the head of the German language teaching department seem unreasonable because there were both hard copies and the e-survey link to be sent via email. As a matter of fact, the researcher handed over the 100 copies and

passed the e-survey link through email. The survey is in both Arabic and English, not in German. In other words, the language would never have been an obstacle. It is very understandable that such an action cannot be taken as an official refusal of the whole study but a misinterpretation of an individual who influenced the director's decision.

5.3.4.3. Using Social Media to Solve the Problem

While having several correspondences and meetings to clarify things with GI, the researcher uploaded the survey online and created a Twitter account to reach people following the Deutsche Welle Arabic account. This action had both positive and negative points. The positive points were, firstly, widening the scope of the surveyed participants by using social media. Secondly, following Tweeps²¹ who followed DW-Arabia enriched the knowledge of the researcher regarding the reasons an Arab would follow an international channel. Thirdly, the DW research and development department approached the researcher through Twitter.

5.3.4.4. Approached by the DW Research Department

In fact, the research and development department of DW approached the researcher through Twitter using the account that the e-survey was distributed through. Several emails were exchanged with Rosina Bliznakova, a research analyst at the research department of Deutsche Welle. In one of her emails, she mentioned three points that concerned them in the survey: her first comment was a concern about the selectivity of the participants. She stated "I noticed, that you ask the respondents if they learned about the survey through the Goethe Institut or the German Club - this means, it is very possible for you to reach too many German-interested respondents, which could affect your results. You should be aware of that". Her second comment mentioned that the *Between the North and South* programme mentioned in the

²¹ Twitter users.

favourite shows list is no longer on air. Her third comment was regarding question ten, section two of the DW part of the survey. She said: "Reasons for not watching DW-TV: among the other reasons you listed 'promotes homosexuality' - do you mean that it is generally a hindrance for the Arab audience for watching a foreign/Western channel (or is it a specific DW characteristic²² in your opinion)?" (Personal Communication Rosina Bliznakova; research analyst at the Research Department of Deutsche Welle, May 30th, 2011). The researcher replied as follows: "Reasons for not watching DW-TV: there is a possibility that it might hinder audience-watching habits even if it was an Arabic channel. However, there might be people who watch the channel for that reason" (Personal Communication, Rosina Bliznakova; research analyst at the Research Department of Deutsche Welle, May 31st, 2011). This optional answer was listed because there were several reports on *Euromaxx* that cover arts, music and dance performances with several side scenes of homosexuals. Besides, several of DW's website news-stories presented Guido Westerwelle as the first homosexual German foreign minister and the highest official supporter of gay rights (Harter-Mojdehi 2012 and Borrud 2010). It was understood from this email that mentioning question number ten in section two, which states, amongst a long list of other reasons, that promoting homosexuality is a reason that would hinder your interest in watching DW, was of issue to both DW's research and marketing department and the Goethe Institute, perhaps due to the fear that stating this clearly might affect their reputation amongst the Arabic-speaking conservative societies.

5.3.4.5. The Changes in the Required Number of Surveyed Viewers

Since the targeted participants are a selective group of viewers of the DW, the researcher approached them through GI. As previously mentioned, due to the delay in

²² Spelled in the email: charakterestic.

distributing the survey by GI, the researcher changed the method to reach the DW-Arabia viewers and used social media instead. As a result, the total number of participants dropped from a range of two hundred and fifty – three hundred and fifty to sixty-five or seventy-five participants. After conducting the survey, the total number of returned surveys was ninety-one, and, moreover, six were omitted due to false or inaccurate answers. One participant spoke about "Arab nationalism" in almost every question, which was unrelated, thus, it was crossed out. Therefore, the total number of fully submitted surveys was ninety-one.

5.4. Research Questions and Objectives

5.4.1. Research Questions

The main research questions of this thesis are:

1. What are the criteria of DW and TRT programmes and how are they unique in applying their cultural diplomacy strategies?
2. How do they aim to build bridges with the Arabic-speaking public through their programming and the chosen genres of these programmes?
3. How useful is to understand *the elements of unity* between the Arab and Muslim public spheres to the content provision of each broadcaster?
4. Why is it important to create an Arabic intercultural broadcaster and how is it different from the current Arabic international broadcasters?

An additional question came up due to the Arab Uprising of 2011:

5. How did both DW-TV Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye react to the current affairs happening in the Arab world?

5.4.2. Research Objectives

1. To provide a terminological comparison between International Broadcasting and Intercultural Broadcasting.
2. To measure the usefulness of the Arab and Muslim public spheres and their values system to the public diplomacy strategies.
3. To compare how both international broadcasters are building bridges with Arab audiences in terms of their announced goals and the chosen genres of their programmes.
4. To search for indicators to find if their approaches are strengthening relations with Arabs or revising the classical thought that international broadcasters are propaganda tools for their governments.

In an attempt to address the questions and achieve the thesis's goals, the following chapters are devoted to explain the methodological tools of the thesis: the thematic content analysis of the weekly programmes, the dialogical programmes content analysis and the survey. Each chapter is concluded with the final discussion section of the major findings.

Chapter 6: Genre Content Analysis

As previously mentioned, the content analysis originally focused on the thematic analysis of the dialogical programmes of DW-Arabia; however, due to several limitations and new development, and the political level of the Arab world, the method employed changed to focus on a comparison analysis of the content of DW-Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye. As a result, the content analysis became the main method of the thesis, followed by the survey. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first covers a comparison between the thematic genre analysis of three different weeks of the DW-Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye DW programmes aired in 2010. The second is divided into two sub-sections before and after the Arab Uprising of 2011, of which each contains a detailed content analysis of a total of twelve hours of different programmes from DW and TRT-Etturkiyye. This part will start with a brief description of the programme, followed by visual analysis of the episodes' openings, as well as the reportage used within episodes, word usage analysis within the discussion and the form of the questions asked.

6.1. Thematic Genre of the Weekly Programmes' Content Analysis

A three-week period in 2010 was picked randomly as an observation period to analyse the genres for both DW-TV Arabia's and TRT-Etturkiyye's programmes. The first week ran from September 4th to 10th; the second week from November 14th to 20th; and the last week from December 5th to 11th. In order to draw accurate conclusions, the analysis was divided into analysing the programmes' genre and the time devoted to each category. It is of importance to note that there are two issues of concern: firstly, some of the genres can contain sub-genres; for instance, the cultural genre contains music, arts, performances, or food sub-genres. Another example is that the EU genre covers all European Union-related political, economic and cultural

issues. A specific example of the genre's diversity is *Nagham AlWejdan* on TRT-Etturkiyye, a show in which the host invites an Arab or Turk singer and discusses different cultural topics with him/her and, therefore, it has been categorised under music and dialogical genres. Another example is *Tomorrow Today* on DW-TV Arabia, a science and technology programme that covers the economic aspect of a specific technology and, thus, it has been categorised under the economics and science genres. The second issue that has to be explained is that, as a genre, Ramadan covers all programmes that were shown as part of the Holy Month of Ramadan. However, this does not include only religious programmes but also cookery shows. The importance of the programmes' genre's timing is to count the exact amount of the broadcast aired in order to compare it with the announced goals of the channel.

6.1.1. DW-TV Arabia Three Weeks

The following is a detailed thematic analysis of the channels' programmes during the mentioned three weeks, starting by comparing the weeks of DW, followed by a separate section of the weeks of the TRT. After that, a final overall comparison between the two channels' weeks would be provided.




Figure 2 DW-TV Arabia 3 weeks' genres' time division

As observed from Figure 2, the indicators of the chosen weeks are almost identical due to the stability in their type of programmes. The top three ranked genres during the two weeks of December and September are the political genre with 112:30, 122:30 and 113:00 hours; following this is the cultural genre with 68:00, 69:00 and 66:00 hours; and then the economics genre with 40:00, 41:00 and 39:30 hours during each week. Although DW is claiming to build bridges with Arabs by opening dialogue with them, the devoted hours for the dialogical genre is very small: 07:00, 09:30 and 07:00 hours per week. Also, there are no competition shows, drama, children's or Ramadan programmes; the latter is especially of concern to the majority of Arabic-speaking audiences. Note that DW uses the magazine system in presenting its programmes: to illustrate, there is the science magazine *Tomorrow Today*; the magazine from Brussels *European Journal*; the German film magazine *Kino*; the German music magazine *PopXport*; the political magazine *People and Politics*; the football magazine *Kick Off*; the motor magazine *Drive It*; the business magazine *Made in Germany*; and the cultural magazine *Art21*. These types of programmes are broadcast four to eight times a week depending on the programme, and they are directed towards promoting German culture not only to Arabic-speaking audiences but also to English-, German- and Spanish-speaking audiences. It can be reasoned that the main benefit of such a system is to divide its time equally and to stay focused on its genres. It is of importance to mention here that, as a reaction to the Arab Uprising of 2011, DW-TV Arabia adopted a brand new division of genres and developed new dialogical programmes. As previously mentioned, an additional section has been added to this thesis in order to study such changes and its effects on DW's decisions.

6.1.2. TRT-Etturkiyye Three Weeks




Figure 3 TRT-Etturkiyye 3 weeks' genres' time division

The variety of programmes in Figure 3 indicates the flexibility of TRT-Etturkiyye in adopting the current issues in the Arab world. Thus, each week would be taken separately. Also, it shows that, during September, the top-ranked genre was the cultural genre with 53:20 hours. Then, there was a huge amount of air time devoted to Ramadan and religious genres. It should be noted that this week encountered the month of Ramadan in the lunar Islamic calendar. However, the importance of this month to the targeted groups of Arabs and Muslims did not change anything in terms of the major content of DW-TV Arabia. Moreover, it was clear that TRT-Etturkiyye changed everything from its overall theme to the content of each programme in order to meet the audience's needs during Ramadan. The cultural and dialogical genres were given 40:45 and 37:10 hours.

In the week of November, the top three genres were the cultural genre with 70:35 hours, followed by the dialogical genres with 50:30 hours and the political

genres with 48:39 hours. It can be argued here that the political genre increases by around 10 hours as a result of the U.S. announcement on November 14th 2010 that Israel was to freeze its settlement-building projects in the West Bank for three months. It is important to note here that the following days of the week in November witnessed Eid AlAdhha, a major annual festivity for Muslims to celebrate the days of the Islamic Pilgrimage of Hajj. It can be concluded that TRT-Etturkiyye combines religious events and the cultural aspects of the Turkish lifestyle; thus, the cultural genre of its programmes witnessed a sharp jump in comparison to the rest of the weeks due to following its foreign affairs in focusing on the issues that bond them with Arabs and Muslims, as previously discussed. In the week of December, the top three genres were dialogical, cultural and music genres, with 48:00, 37:10 and 32:15 hours respectively. It is worth pointing out that the religious genre's airing time witnessed a drop from 40:20 hours in September to 02:30 hours in December, which might be due to the end of the Holy Month of Ramadan and the secular system of Turkey. It is evident that, in comparison to September's week, the dialogical, documentary and music genres took over the airing time of Ramadan programme hours in December as follows: 37:10 vs. 47:55 hours, 05:00 vs. 23:00 hours and 14:10 vs. 32:15 hours respectively. The following paragraphs are a comparison between the two channels' genres in detail.

6.2. Comparative content analysis between broadcasters

When comparing TRT-Etturkiyye and DW-TV Arabia, six differences can be noticed. Below, Table 4 shows the division of each genre's time during the three weeks. Firstly, the hours devoted to political topics show huge differences which have been affected by three factors: the source of funding, the goals of the channel and the understanding of the Arab satellite TV market. On the one hand, DW-TV Arabia

gives more than half of the week to the political genre, that is, a total of 112:30, 122:30 and 113:00 hours for each week. On the other hand, TRT-Etturkiyye gives a little more than a day per week for the political genre, that is, a total of 29:52, 48:39 and 24:49 hours.

	September 2010		November 2010		December 2010	
	TRT	DW	TRT	DW	TRT	DW
Cultural	53:20	66:00	70:35	69:00	40:45	68:00
Political	29:52	113:00	48:39	122:30	24:49	112:30
Sports	3:10	9:30	5:20	9:00	3:00	9:30
Health	11:10	4:00	22:00	5:00	20:00	4:00
Economics	14:00	39:30	13:20	41:00	18:30	40:00
E.U.	0:00	35:00	0:00	37:00	0:00	36:00
Music	14:10	0:30	36:25	6:00	32:15	4:00
Tourism	13:20	10:30	8:45	8:30	19:20	9:30
Religious	40:20	3:30	15:00	0:00	2:30	4:00
Science	6:00	4:00	8:00	8:00	11:00	4:30
Dialogical	37:10	7:00	50:30	9:30	47:55	7:00
Documentary	5:00	26:00	27:45	23:30	23:00	25:00
Drama	27:40	0:00	29:40	0:00	22:05	0:00
Competition	5:10	0:00	5:10	0:00	9:45	0:00
Historical	19:35	0:00	24:05	0:00	10:25	4:00
Children	6:20	0:00	6:40	0:00	7:25	0:00
Ramadan	25:30	0:00	0:00	0:00	0:00	0:00

Table 3 Time given to different genres by TRT-Etturkiyye and DW-TV Arabia in the three chosen weeks

Moreover, TRT-Etturkiyye places emphasis on music and history programmes. It is obvious that the music genre is highly regarded on TRT-Etturkiyye channels, with a sharp increase after Ramadan from 14:10 to 36:25 and 32:15 hours. However, DW-TV Arabia allots a small amount of time to music programmes, a total of 10:30 hours in the three weeks. Moreover, music is considered to be a major part of not only culture, but public diplomacy tools, especially when targeting youth, as

found by Bound et al. (2007, 79) at the British Council: “Culture, particularly music and film, is a great way of reaching this group.” This contradicts the overall German policy on using music; Mozart has been used as a major promotion for the German flag all over the globe. Thus, emphasis on music is a must for intercultural broadcasters. In the historical genre, the time given in DW-TV Arabia is far less than in TRT-Etturkiyye with a total of 04:00 hours vs 30:05 hours during the survey of three weeks. This indicates that DW-TV Arabia is avoiding presenting the German history concerning the Nazi’s history of the previous political system, which probably conflicts with its current need of political affairs. On the other hand, TRT-Etturkiyye might be focusing on the positive Islamic Ottoman era of Turkey in order to win the hearts and minds of its audience. The effect of the historic relations between Germany and Turkey and Arab and Muslim countries has been discussed in depth in section 3.2.1, 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.

Next, it is necessary to draw attention to DW-Arabia’s emphasis on economics and EU genres. The Arab world is known for its richness in both natural and human resources, which makes it an excellent area to invest in nationally and internationally. As a major base of capitalism, the economic genre covers 40:00, 41:00 and 39:00 hours of the DW-TV Arabia’s weekly time in comparison to less than half of that given to the economy by TRT-Etturkiyye: 18:30, 13:20 and 14:00 hours. As mentioned above, the capitalist’s Western values are playing a key role in the content of DW-TV Arabia. Another genre that distinguishes DW-TV Arabia from TRT-Etturkiyye is presenting the EU as a separate genre, with a total of 35:00, 37:00 and 36:00 hours vs. 00:00, 00:00 and 00:00 hours. This might be due to Germany’s cultural policy in enhancing loyalty towards the EU nation and Turkey’s focus on its Arab audiences, in which the EU might be either a part of a news-story or a topic in

one of its dialogical programmes. Moreover, it reflects the regional and geopolitical priorities of both broadcasters.

Referring back to Table 4, DW-TV Arabia has 00:00 in the following genres: Ramadan, drama, children's programmes and competition, which leads to a further fourth, fifth and final points that neglect the Arab audience's interests. The fourth point relates to the adaptation of the current events. The Ramadan genre on TRT-Etturkiyye shows how it adjusts its overall themes and programme content to meet the needs of its target audience during Ramadan. The channel participated with twelve programmes, which vary from very short programmes to very long talk-shows. TRT-Etturkiyye seized the Holy Month to strengthen the bonds with Arabs and Muslims by using the religious, historic and tradition commonalities. Amongst TRT-Etturkiyye's Ramadan programmes are *Ramadan the Most Beautiful Month, Before Breaking Fast with Jasmin* and *Ramadan Daily*. In fact, almost all Arabic and Islamic channels increase their Ramadan programmes to fulfill the public sphere's demand. In order to attract wider audiences, any media outlet that targets Arabs and Muslims should focus on this genre for one month.

The fifth point that each channel should pay attention to is to understand the interests of the target audience. The Arabic society is considered to be a collective, family-based society. DW-TV Arabia missed that point and neglected the drama, children's and competition genres, which are usually a reason for the family to gather in front of the TV. Drama is a well-known genre in the Arab world, which is missing in almost all international broadcasters that target Arabic-speaking audiences. As a result of such an unawareness of a major interest of their target audience, there is a very high probability that these channels are not hugely popular. TRT-Etturkiyye did well by using this genre because they are managing to achieve two of their main aims:

firstly, by presenting its own Turkish drama, the TRT is promoting the Turkish way of life to the Arabic audiences and placing emphasis on commonalities between the cultures. As mentioned earlier in 3.3.7.5., the most positive result of stressing common cultural lifestyles is giving the audience a feeling of a shared past, present and, thus, future.

Secondly, amongst all the Arabic dialects, TRT have chosen to dub its drama with the Syrian dialect. Such a choice shows that the Turks are trying to rebuild the connection with the Syrian population, who they have been in conflict with since the last years of the Ottoman Caliphate due to the calls of Arab nationalism. Regarding long-term relations, such usage of the Syrian dialect might create a subconscious image in the Syrians' minds that the Turks are speaking their language and have a very close relationship to them. In fact, Davutoğlu is directing the Turkish foreign policy towards strengthening its relations with Syria²³.

The children's genre is also a missing genre in the majority of international broadcasts. It is a family-based genre, in which parents might be happy about the way TRT-Etturkiyye is presenting folkloric stories based on valuable manners to their children. The only negative aspect of using the children's genre is its length: around seven hours per week. It is understandable that children are not TRT-Etturkiyye's main target group. However, they are the only international broadcaster to target Arab children during its airing time. TRT-Etturkiyye might be testing its audiences' needs by devoting more time to Arab children. In fact, by doing so, TRT-Etturkiyye is gaining further probability and widening its audience scale in the long run. An example of a country that made the most out of targeting children is Japan. Through

²³ Refer to chapter 2.3.6 for further details on Davutoğlu's *Strategic Depth* policies.

their anime and video games, their popularity increased. Another example of using children's media as a PD tool is the well-known children's programme *Sesame Street*.

Finally, Arabs prefer channels that engage them through live shows, call-in shows and debating programmes because they want to be heard. According to Wood (1979, 290), there are six specific identified reasons for Arabic-speaking audiences to choose international broadcasters' programmes; including 1) a preference of oral culture; 2) to overcome both physical and political barriers and the obstacle of illiteracy; and 3) following foreign broadcasters became part of their *modern* lifestyle habits. Additionally, he identified other factors that encouraged Arabs to turn towards international broadcasting that includes political reasons and their credibility (Wood 1979, 117-118 cited in Boyd 1999, 290).

Although DW and TRT-Etturkiye organised their programme timetables, the given time for dialogical programmes through the channels does not reflect the aim of both channels, which is to build dialogical bridges with Arabs. TRT-Etturkiye devotes almost a quarter of a week to dialogical programmes, that is, 47:55, 50:30 and 37:10 hours in the observed week. In comparison, DW-TV Arabia is devoting far less than a tenth of a week, that is, 07:00, 09:30 and 07:00 hours in each week. Most probably, the reason which hinders DW-TV Arabia from allowing call-in live participation is the fear that the caller might offend or comment negatively towards the German government. It is understandable because of the political situation that their comments or questions might lead to. However, this pre-censorship of the unpredictable participations might lead to a gradual loss of the credibility of the channel and, thus, a decrease in audience numbers, especially when their slogans are calling for building bridges with the Arabic and Islamic world and their goals are touching the dreams of Arab youth freedom. More time should be devoted to

dialogical programmes and more focused approaches should be applied to pass the message along with part, if not all, of their audiences' needs. As a starting point for TRT-Etturkiyye, that might be fair; however, DW-TV Arabia is at a critical point and must increase the hours of its dialogical programmes. It is crucial to point out the radical change of DW-Arabia after the Arab Uprising of 2011, which has been discussed in depth in section 1.5., as well as the content analysis of its programmes in the following section 6.2.1.

6.2.1. The Analysed Week after the Arab Uprising of 2011

There are four changing themes after the Arab Uprising of 2011. The first theme is the overall structure of the time division of the weekly schedule of the channels' programmes, which is reflected in the radical increase of the political genre instead of the entertainment cultural genre. The second theme is the increase in the use of social media. The third theme is the emphasis on youth dialogical programmes by inviting youth activists who had participated in the revolution and were not representative of a government or an institution. The fourth theme is the invited guests and the chosen satellite channel to cooperate with.




Figure 4 DW-TV Arabia's genres distribution during the week of April 2012

In comparison to the previous table, Figure 4 above shows changes in the amount of airing time for DW-TV Arabia's genres. The amount of time devoted to three genres increased: health, tourism and science²⁴. On the other hand, it reduced the time given to the following genres: culture, politics, EU and documentary. In fact, this reduction of time seems to be a result of the reduction of the repetition of programmes in order to spare it for other programmes. For instance, the dialogical programmes are aired on a weekly basis and each episode is thirty minutes long and is repeated during the week. There is a whole chain of dialogical programmes devoted to following the current affairs of the Arab uprisings: *The Era of Change*, which includes *Youth Talk* and *With the Event*. Another aspect of the content of the channel is the changes in the language division through its daily schedule. DW-TV Arabia used to air an hour of Arabic language programmes followed by two hours of English language programmes; however, it currently airs six hours of English followed by four hours of Arabic language programmes. This change made it easier for Arabic-speaking audiences to follow the channel's content.

²⁴ That included a special program on the science and technology of virtual life.




Figure 5 TRT-Etturkiyye's genres distribution during the week of April 2012

In the case of TRT-Etturkiyye, Figure 5 shows that there are three genres which increased in time allotted: health, economics and dialogical genres. The following genres decreased dramatically: music, science, drama, competition, historical and children's programmes. In fact, the differences are very huge between TRT-Etturkiyye's three weeks of 2010 and April week of 2012: the science and competition genres had zero airing time, while music and children's programmes dropped around 06:00 hours to become 17:40 hours and 01:05 hours. The drama genre dropped sharply from more than 30:00 hours per week to only 07:00 hours. This might be due to the new policies mentioned by Mohammed Zahid Gol that TRT-Etturkiyye would move from a family-entertainment-oriented channel towards a more politically-oriented channel that represented the Turkish Foreign Ministry (Personal communication, Mohamed Zahid Gol, the acting director of TRT-Etturkiyye, July 8th, 2011). It is of importance to mention that amongst the dialogical programmes

launched after the Arab Uprising of 2011 were *Without Restriction*, a programme that gathered Arab youth to discuss their political affairs, and *Thinkers' Forum*, a programme that provided a live discussion of current affairs issues amongst scholars, journalists and politicians, with the attendance of postgraduate Arab students.

6.2.2. The Social Media Role

There was a notable increase in the social media activities of DW-TV Arabia in terms of providing a sub-YouTube to its DW YouTube online channel for its Arabic service as well as increasing its posts in both Twitter and Facebook. This was due to the increase in the number of Arabs signing up to these services after the Arab Uprising of 2011. For example, “Facebook users jumped by 30 per cent to 27.7m, compared with 18 per cent growth during the same period in 2010. In the past year, the number of users has nearly doubled from 14.8m” (Huang 2011).

In fact, the increase in the number of Arab users was the reason for the researcher to distribute the survey via Twitter and Facebook. As a result, it should be mentioned here that this led the researcher to observe and conclude that Arab users sent tweets and comments to DW-TV Arabia online not only to receive news from a foreign international broadcaster, but also to send the DW their own stories of the uprisings. In other words, they tried to approach the channel in person virtually. On the other hand, TRT-Etturkiyye is still weak in using social media. For instance, their official YouTube channel is to be launched soon and their official Twitter account is not yet launched. In comparison to DW-TV Arabia, TRT-Etturkiyya does not provide all their programmes archived in their official website.

Although targeting youth through its programmes was one of DW-TV Arabia's main approaches, it can now be seen that youth programmes move towards a much more serious discussion about more political topics. Similarly, TRT-Etturkiyye

launched its youth programme *Youth Voice*²⁵ as well as *Thinkers' Forum*, which invites postgraduate Arab students to attend the live broadcast to discuss current affairs. There was an argument by Amin (2004 cited in Lahlai 2011, 31) that "Millions of Arab viewers would watch the same broadcast, and this has created a unified strong Arab public opinion, manifested in the repeated demonstrations in the streets." However, watching the same broadcast does not necessarily mean agreeing over its content; instead, there is massive diversity in the political opinions amongst Arab youth. Thus, the claim of creating a unified *strong* Arab public opinion by watching one broadcaster is false here. Hanau Santini (2011, 287) concluded that the "uprisings have not only increased the visibility of Arab populations, transforming their image from passive and subjugated peoples to legitimate and powerful political actors"; it should be added here, especially the Arab youths' future.

In looking at the European political standpoint after the Arab Uprising of 2011, Hanau Santini (2011, 287) recommended the European governments engage "with civil society actors in a much broader and more consistent way--actors from across the political spectrum and not just the 'usual suspects' (traditionally pro-Western, secular elites, often out of touch with and scarcely representative of the broader public opinion)." As mentioned earlier in the public diplomacy chapter, her reason was that the uprisings prove that the "power that public opinion will have to influence political decisions, even foreign policy ones, is altering calculations everywhere--Europe included" (Hanau Santini, 2011, 287). In fact, the concentration on Arab publics of all ages, classes and professionals are evident in the fact that both DW-TV Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye invite human rights and political activists and academic scholars, as well as the governments' official guests. Additionally, DW-TV

²⁵ This programme was not included in the content analysis because it was not available online.

Arabia is cooperating with private satellite channels instead of government satellite channels, which is the case in Egypt. Previously, DW-TV Arabia used to air *Youth Without Borders* from Cairo in cooperation with the Egypt One satellite channel. Currently, DW-TV Arabia is airing *Youth Talk* from Egypt with the cooperation of the privately owned channel AlHayah. This places more emphasis on the importance of public diplomacy that targets individual persons more than the governmental elite nominees; for in recent times, public diplomacy has dealt directly with the public of the other country.

6.3. Major Findings of the Genre Analysis of the Random Weeks

As discussed earlier in chapter 6, the analysis looked at the genre of the two channels' programmes and focused on the dialogical programmes targeting Arabic-speaking audiences. In terms of the genre analysis of the three weeks of DW-TV Arabia conducted before the Arab Uprising of 2011, it has been shown that the channel is systematic in terms of its schedule division and the overall organisation of the programmes by defining them into magazines. The type of genre dominating the channel was the political genre, with more focus on the EU political, cultural and economic lifestyle. In comparison, DW-TV Arabia showed major changes in its genre and programme content in the analysed week of 2012. The channel added weekly dialogical programmes exclusive to the Arabic service under the theme of The Era of Change in order to focus on the current affairs of the Arab Uprising of 2011. Moreover, and for the first time, DW-TV Arabia aired a non-government-sponsored programme that is moderated by a non-Arabic non-German moderator.

In terms of TRT-Etturkiyye, the changes over its three-week programme schedule were massive. The genre analysis of the three weeks of TRT-Etturkiyye

conducted in 2009 and 2010 highlights that the channel aired a variety of genres that target different audience age groups with different interests centred on a cultural-entertainment genre. Besides, religious occasions and major Arab and Muslim festivals were celebrated and discussed as a participatory approach between the channel and its audiences. On the other hand, TRT-Etturkiyye changed its programme content after the Arab Uprising of 2011 by reducing the former entertainment approach to minimum air time, especially the drama genre and the music and live shows, and focused on dialogical programmes that concentrated on political, economic and social relations with the Arabs.

In order to build stronger conclusions, the next chapter analyses the content of the dialogical programmes of both the DW-TV Arabia and the TRT-Etturkiyye.

Chapter 7: Dialogical Programmes' Content Analysis

This chapter is divided into three sections: the content analysis of DW programmes, the content analysis of TRT programmes, followed by a comparative discussion between the two channels' programmes. The selected programmes were chosen according to two phases before and after the Arab Uprising of 2011. In terms of the DW-TV Arabia, the first phase programmes include two episodes of *Youth Without Borders*, *Between the North and the South*, and the *Cultural Salon*. While the second phase includes *Youth Talk* and *With the Event*, as well as airing a programme that is moderated by Tim Sebastian and produced privately, the *New Arab Debates*. The TRT-Etturkiyye's unit of analysis took more than sixty minutes, therefore, the researcher decided to have one episode per programme in the case of long programmes. The first phase includes *Good Morning from Istanbul* and *East and West*. The second phase, on the other hand, includes *In the Shade of Events*, *A Thousand and One Night*, *Without Restriction* and *Etturkiyye Morning*. This chapter will analyse the invited guests, the topics discussed, the content of the prepared reportage aired during each episode and the types of questions asked. Refer to appendix I and II that contains the description of all analysed episodes.

7.1. The DW Episodes Sample

The DW has its 24/7 systematic schedule based on thirty-minute programmes which are defined by DW either as a "Journal" for the news-slots or as a "Magazine" for all other programme categories in all of its four international satellite channels. However, DW has been using a special approach with its Arabic service, that is, to organise a monthly programme with one of the Arabic satellite channels. The following chart shows the Arabic channels that had a joint programme with DW.

Deutsche Welle Programmes' Partnership Before the Arab Uprising of 2011		
Name of the Channel	Name of the Programme	Year
Abu Dhabi Channel	Europe Meeting	2007
Moroccan Channel 1	The Cultural Salon	2008
Algeria Channel	Between the North and the South	2008-2009
Egyptian Channel 1	Youth Without Borders	2009-2010
Deutsche Welle Programmes' Partnership After the Arab Uprising of 2011		
AlHayah – Egypt	Youth Talk	2011 to date
The U.K. Arab Partnership Programme Fund and the Swedish International Development Agency International Talk Network Ltd.	The New Arabs Debates	2011 to date

Table 4 Deutsche Welle Partnerships Before and After the Arab Uprising of 2011

It is clearly evident from the table above that the DW shifted its approach in reaching Arabic-speaking audiences after the Arab Uprising of 2011 from dealing respectfully with government-owned television stations, as in *Europe Meeting*, a programme to discuss the European-Arabs relations; *Cultural Salon*, a programme to discuss music, arts and literature from the German and Arab world; *Between the North and the South*, a programme to discuss the political and economic issues between Mediterranean countries; *Youth Without Borders*, a programme to discuss youth cultural issues amongst groups of German and Egyptian youth; to cooperating with private television stations and non-government-sponsored programmes such as *Youth Talk* and the *New Arab Debates*. This might be considered an indicator of the German Foreign Office's changes towards supporting ordinary citizens as representatives of the Arab publics instead of the Arab regimes controlling the governments.

7.1.1. The First Phase Episodes

The first phase of DW-TV Arabia analysed programmes' episodes had a variety of topics. Focusing on the Egyptian and German youth, the *Youth Without Borders* episodes discuss the youth perspective on a wide range of daily life issues. This is an exchange programme in which some of the participants travel between Cairo and Berlin to have the experience of living in another culture. The programme is a clear example of the German efforts in intercultural communication; however, picking Egyptian youth among all the other Arabs can be attributed to the wide number of German-speaking Egyptians due to the German University in Cairo as well as the efforts of the Goethe Institute there. This exchange programme requires participants to produce solo or group videos on what interests them about a specific topic in the other culture while they are in the host city. After that, the participants discuss their experiences with each other and sometimes ask questions about issues that were not clarified to them whilst living there. The theme of the episodes covered different ranges of cultural lifestyle topics. For example, the first episode covers health, diet and sex issues as part of how to have a healthy lifestyle and outlook that influences your self-confidence and relationships, while the second episode covers the forms of protesting activities that includes volunteering for women's rights organisations, questioning one's traditions and beliefs, engaging in online activism, organising awareness campaigns, expressing oneself through comics and discovering the self through travel. Also, this episode shed light on issues such as privacy, student activities, public rights and the Anti-Conflict Police. In the second episode, each of the youth groups were protesting and this reflects how both cultures are different in terms of their political systems and their rights and needs. For example, the German youth reports focused on the privacy rights, students' rights, public rights, and individual rights to choose their way of life. Its report shows how such protests were

taken in terms of directly contacting the authorities or expressing themselves. On the other hand, the Egyptian youth reports shed light on women's rights, questioning traditional ideas and taboos, virtual protests, students' rights, choosing their marriage partners and heritage places rights. In analyzing its reports, it can be concluded that none of the mentioned Egyptian youth reports and comments stated the role of the authority or reflected on how the authority has accessible communication means with its own citizens in comparison to the German youth reports. Egyptian youth were looking for virtual methods to express themselves while German youth were communicating with authority easily.

In the conducted public polls, random German and Egyptian youth's answers reflect the cultural differences between the two groups. For instance, the German youth reflects the relations between the German Nazi history and the post-war German culture, in which the first three interviewees said they protest against war, social injustice and neo-Nazism. This is also evident in the last youth's comment in which he stated that he protests *peacefully*. The other group of answers did not have a specific concentration in which it reflected their understanding of the importance of protesting as part of their responsibilities towards the society when change is needed without stating what exactly was to be changed. On the other hand, the Egyptian youths' answers show a much more practical and mature perspective of why to protest. In fact, four out of the six answers were clear indicators of the Arab Uprising of 2011 that nobody took them seriously at that time. The other two answers reflected the type of society's culture in which the individual is to consider the people around him/her and how they dress or act. In comparison to the Egyptian youths' radical way of interpreting protests due to their situation, the German youths' answers can indicate how the Western democracies political systems consolidated in their subconscious

that it is *their* responsibility to protest and express themselves towards any issues. However, policy-makers are the only group of people who can really take any of the necessary decisions in order to create change.

The second analyzed unit was the *Cultural Salon* episodes which discussed wider issues that can be applied not only to the specific case of Morocco but can also be expanded to other Arab and Muslim countries. As can be understood from the title of the programme, it is a discussion around a cultural issue between two guests: a German and a Moroccan. It is usually a highly intellectual discussion between professors, authors and artists. The positive point is that the programme introduced the intellectuals to each other, which increases the probability of building a long-term relationship because the tone of the dialogue is soft and respectable. From the tourism perspective, the programme promoted the cities of the invited guests, that is, a German city and a Moroccan city in each episode. This is achieved by including the main highlights of the city and how it influenced and inspired him/her. The first episode discusses the definition of modernity, identity crisis, political Islam, the Brain-Drain issue, coexistence amongst cultures, religious values, the media as a tool for modernity and factors that hinder reform and development in the Arab and Muslim countries. It was evident from the episodes that the channel was biased towards Arab governments to maintain its political and economic relations. For example, there was a scene of the Mubarak regime's efforts in organising elections in Egypt as an attempt from the channel to expose it as a positive effort by an Arab government. The same report negatively addressed the fact that Germany has never occupied an Arab country. For Germany's advantage, the channel can criticise the French and British policies towards Arab countries; however, the German policies have never reached the required amount of a general acceptance amongst Arab

publics due to its diplomatic approach of being neutral towards Israeli policies in the region.

The invited scholars of this episode presented a German's point of view that defended the modernity process of the Arab and Muslim societies. The Arab's point of view was a more liberal perspective that accepts modernity as fate, even if it was shaped by a Western style. In fact, all the scenes of the report that introduced Prof. Krämer reflect her deep knowledge of Arabic language and history; she was shown reading Arabic books, writing notes in Arabic and speaking while the background shows her library full of Arabic books, including the volumes of *In the Shades of the Qur'an* by the Muslim Brotherhood member Sayyid Qutb. This reflects how DW is addressing the subconscious of the Arab viewers to create an image that Germany has scholars who understand the Arab and Muslim situation; however, this did not influence the reality of German policies towards Arabs and Muslims living in Germany.

However, the *Cultural Salon's* second episode covered the artist's industry and talent shows and expanded the discussion to reasons for promoting these sorts of shows and how these shows are playing with the German youths' dreams to become a celebrity and Arab youths' dreams to be heard and practice voting as a form of democracy. In fact, the episode started by discussing the talent shows trending worldwide, then it focuses on a German argument of the case and the very specific case of an Amazighi, a singer from Morocco. This case can be considered a major issue of conflict in not only Morocco, but also the Arab Maghreb. There are movements that call for their political liberation and separation from the Arab countries. Highlighting this issue at the end of a cultural episode that discusses music and arts can be interpreted as a way to support a human rights issue from the DW perspective.

However, it might also be interpreted as a channel that promotes sectarianism in the region.

The last programme analysed in the first phase of DW-TV Arabia was *Between the North and South*. As the title suggests, the focus is on the Mediterranean Sea, in which the North is the European countries and the South is the North African countries. The programme coincided with Sarkozy's call for union for the Mediterranean. It is important to mention here that the guests are usually high ranked politicians from different ministries and researchers from different universities and research institutions. The first episode covered several topics, including cultural collaboration, cultural diversity, cultural festivals, dialogue and building bridges, soft power and the EU financial support. Although the episode's report did not define culture and the opening scene featured a tanker sailing, followed by the heads of the Mediterranean governments, Ghaddafi, Mubarak, Sarkozy and Merkel, while the narrator is stating how the economic and political relations have lasting historical strength. The in-studio questions were focusing on the form of collaboration between Europe and the Maghreb rather than the cultural aspect of the relations. Culture seems to be presented as a public diplomacy tool and a soft form of power allowing the strong nations to expose other nations to its own way of life, thus, its own point of view towards the surrounding issues, as well as gain its own economic and political interests. The second episode covered several topics, including the importance of public opinion, the influence of international interests, the role of technology in the visibility of public opinion, the connectivity of global public opinion, and the role of lobbyist groups in changing international agendas. The first statement of the report reflects DW-TV Arabia's caution and sensitivity towards reporting Arab political issues, especially in discussing the issue of freedom of expression. Another sign of

this cautious approach is the overall structure of this report, in which it is stated that global public opinion was able to change policies concerning natural disasters with the power of connectivity provided by technology. Yet, it was followed by the statement that global public opinion cannot stand against major state interests, as if DW-TV Arabia is providing a safe cover for itself that it did not *call* for the global public opinion to struggle against the interest of these international actors.

During the first phase of DW-TV Arabia content analysis, topics discussed tended to be more political without criticising an Arab government. For example, the chosen scenes of *Between the North and South* usually showed the harmonious moments between the German and Arabic government without naming a specified government. The invited guests were well-known names; however, *Youth Without Borders* participants were not presented in terms of their positions, but as general youth. After watching several episodes, it was evident that many of the participants were attending the programme regularly. For example, the outspoken Egyptian lady, Ola, appeared in several episodes. Moreover, Egyptian participants have a good amount of German language speaking skills, which reflects the selectivity process of the participants.

7.1.2. Second Phase

The second phase of DW-TV Arabia's programme analysis showed a dramatic change in the way the channel addresses Arabic-speaking issues in terms of the language used and the openness when discussing topics. Unlike the usual slow process of the DW in adding or changing their programmes, the following programmes are the direct result of the Arab Uprising of 2011. The new programmes started to air exclusively from Germany on a weekly basis for thirty minutes only to follow-up the current affairs from both the high political level as well as the youth

level, who can be considered the movers and shakers of the Arab Uprising of 2011. The opening of each new programme had the same theme with different usage of visuals and colours depending on the type of targeted participants. Moreover, the *New Arab Debates* is led by Tim Spastian, a well-known BBC moderator of *Hard Talk* and *Doha Debates*.

Firstly, *Youth Talk* is a programme focusing on the Arab youth role in the Arab Uprising of 2011. Unlike *Youth Without Borders*, all invited guests were well-known online activists of the Arab revolutions. The level of discussion is far more daring and focuses to a greater extent on current issues. It is an initiative to promote youth solutions and views. Its goal is to form a hub for Arab youth virtual activists to meet and discuss current affairs relating to the Arab uprising issues on a weekly basis. Part of the opening statement of all episodes was: "... We welcome your comments and opinions regardless of its differences," in an attempt to gain more participants via social media. This is said repeatedly in all the episodes, at the introductory as well as the concluding statements, which is considered to be a new approach for DW-TV Arabia. The analysed episodes covered issues of interest to all Arab youth. The decentralisation of topics in the programme resulted in wider audiences. Issues addressed in the topics were covered as follows: the first episode covers youth and their revolutions, the Egyptian case and Mubarak's regime, democracy and social media activism, Arab uprisings and the role of Islamist parties and, finally, the Emergency Laws threat. The main question discussed in the first episode was: "Will the youth lose their revolution?" As it suggests, DW-TV Arabia admitted that the Arab Uprising of 2011 is a revolution belonging to the youth. This is a clear indicator of the position of not only the channel but also the German Foreign Office. However, it also suggests that the invited guests represent the Arab youth opinion in which – for

the first time – DW-TV Arabia present youth with their activism titles and discuss Arab political systems openly. As part of the episode debate, the Israeli case was in the very first episode. The programme gave a direct impression that Arab youth are ready to discuss any topic, regardless of its sensitivity, by debating over Israeli's position towards the uprisings. This is a radical shift in the DW-TV Arabia's approaches in addressing the political issues in the Arab world. Another change was in the language used and the topics discussed. For instance, instead of addressing public opinion and protest topics, this episode discusses the civil disobedience of the Arab Uprising. The second episode covers human rights activists' role in the revolutions, German recognition of the main activists of the Arab revolutions: in Egypt, Khaled Saeed, as well as the case of Al-Buazizi in Tunisia. Moreover, the role of women was discussed by a former woman prisoner for her role as a social media activist in the Arab Uprising of 2011. The Syrian situation was highlighted by a Facebook page entitled "Freedom Print", which aimed to search for missing youth in Syria; however, the episode's language was emotional. That was evident when discussing the cost of freedom in terms of the families' reactions and feelings towards losing their sons or daughters as a cost for freedom. Moreover, choosing Ghayda as a guest for this episode of "the Price of Freedom" was excellent because she is a woman who stood up against not only a dictatorial regime, but also against the false stereotype that Arab women are to *obey*, not only to be part of the action in such a traditional and closed society as the Libyan societies. In fact, the programme repeatedly linked between the post-Arab Uprising of 2011 and the Berlin Wall revolution, which can be considered a new approach by DW-TV Arabia to create a subconscious historical bond with the Arab youth. Such an approach might be fruitful and influential in the near future.

The third episode covers the role of citizen journalism in shaping the overall political situation of the Arab Uprising of 2011. Among the topics discussed were traditional journalism vs. citizen journalism, the type of Arab youth activities online since January 2011, Arab virtual regimes' activities, the credibility issue of citizen journalism stories and the online copyright issues.

Almost the same questions were asked to the previous episode's guests. Addressing the emotional part of the issue is what the majority of Arab publics understand. In fact, by presenting a woman who is an oppositionist to the corrupted regime, like Sundus in this episode and Ghayda in the previous one, the episode thus contains a direct message to all Arab women to struggle because they are not alone and other women are struggling too. As mentioned earlier, the approach of using social media can strengthen its presence in the Arab media market. The fourth episode was the first episode to focus on an individual case and with the cooperation of a privately owned channel, the Egyptian AlHayat. The discussion covered the Egyptian parliament elections, the German parliament elections, tips on dealing with the former regime from the German method in dealing with STASI and the importance of the documents of the former Egyptian police and security offices. It was evident that throughout the episodes the German guest was there to pass his party's experience and his advice to the Egyptian guests instead of discussing issues with them. The overall evaluation of the episode was weak in comparison to the previous episodes in terms of how the moderator was managing the discussion and the overall level of discussion. Besides, the episode presented a report getting the old style of DW instead of focusing on social media videos. The episodes' reports enhance the image that the programme was prepared previously, which loses its main goal of gaining the trust of their target audience.

Secondly, *With the Event* focuses on one specific case from a specific Arab country and invites a member of the German Parliament with two others to represent the other country's official point of view. Its goal seems to be having an overall view of what is happening directly from Arabs involved in the situation discussed, whilst German guests asked direct questions instead of the moderator on some occasions. The first episode focused on the Libyan case, including weapons leakage, oil wealth distribution, new constitution and legislative elections, the role of Islamists, NATO intervention and issues relating to the role of German private companies. The second episode discussed the Syrian case by addressing the internal repression and the external interference. The Russian, Turkish and NATO positions towards the case were at the heart of the discussion, along with the chances of dialogue between the regime and those taking part in the revolts. The episode presents the Syrian case as a hopeless case.

The third episode focuses on former regimes' presidents and their trials and how to deal with the remainder of the regimes by providing the German case as a model in dealing with STASI. Again, DW-TV Arabia is trying to create a historical bond in terms of how Arab activists should deal with the security and state police documentation by providing the example of how to deal with STASI after the fall of the Berlin Wall. DW-TV Arabia is still insisting on presenting Germany as a role model for Arabs revolts in how to deal with the current situation, neglecting the fact that there are huge differences between the two.

The fourth episode covers the Yemani case, especially the part of the "unexpected" return of Saleh, his refusal to sign the GCC solution, the fear of a tribes' civil war and the appearance of Al-Qaeda. This is the first episode in which the programme invited an official representative from a corrupt Arab regime, which is

legitimising Ali Saleh's regime from the German position. The episode showed some cautiousness from DW-TV Arabia's side in terms of how the montage was prepared and how the questions were asked. This can be attributed to the doubts over the representatives of the Yemeni revolts and the continuity of Saleh's regime in the power. This is an indicator that DW-TV Arabia is still limited in the way it discusses Arab issues according to its editorial board's priorities and interests.

The invited guests reflect two of DW-TV Arabia's new approaches: firstly, building networks with the upper high officials and, secondly, understanding how the new leaders of the Arab world are thinking by engaging them in a direct broadcasted debate show. Here, DW-TV Arabia is operating as a strategic diplomatic tool for the German Foreign Affairs Office. It is critical to ask the Arab guests to address what is needed from the Germans because it might be interpreted that Germany, represented by DW-TV Arabia, is still looking at Arabs as *the North giving the South*. Such an interpretation might affect the relations; in fact, even if it is to be interpreted as good will to support them, all the questions that followed reflect the economic interest of Germany rather than the humanitarian support for the people – more evidence of the capitalist motives of DW-TV Arabia. Besides, it was clear that the role of the German MP guests was usually to give advice or to ask questions in order to form an overall image of the current situation by hearing directly from people in a high position from the other country.

Thirdly, the *New Arab Debates* is the only programme that is not a German production. This programme is moderated by Tim Sebastian. In fact, DW has nothing to do with sponsoring or producing this programme. Instead, DW helps to translate the programme and air it for free on their channel. "The programme copyright is owned by International Talk Network Ltd, a non-profit company which is

commissioned to produce the debate. The debates are provided to DW for free, but DW provide some effort in kind such as editing and translation into [A]rabic subtitles” (Personal Communication The New Arab Debates Team). DW-TV Arabia has broken its systematic way of presenting its programmes as well as its usual content rhythm. The *New Arab Debates* added a new spirit to DW-TV Arabia programmes for four reasons. Firstly, it is widely attended by more than seventy in-studio audiences per episode. Secondly, it is the only programme aired on the channel with a moderator who accelerates the discussions in order to heat-up the debate. Thirdly, it is the only non-German programme produced by a non-governmental organisation from outside Germany to be aired on the channel. Fourthly, it is the first of its kind among DW programmes to melt down the political custody of the other programmes like *Quadriga*. The two analysed episodes reflect that the programme is being aired from the city of the topic discussed and guests are from the leading actors of the current situation. As a result, the number of in-studio audience exceeds the seventy members per episode.

If DW-TV Arabia maintains airing and promoting this sort of programme, there will be a very high probability that more audiences would be encouraged to watch the channel.

7.2. TRT Episodes Sample

As discussed in the previous chapter, the TRT-Etturkiyye has a more traditional daily schedule of its programmes that targets the Arabic-speaking families as a whole. As a result, the selected unit of analysis was the dialogical and interactive programmes that discuss cultural and political topics as well as its availability on the official website of the TRT-Etturkiyye channel.

7.2.1. First Phase Episodes

The overall trend of TRT-Etturkiyye programmes before the Arab Uprising of 2011 focused on cultural-entertainment programmes. As a result of the changes in the channel's policies, the focus of the analysis was mainly over the announced new programmes. However, the following two programmes are examples of TRT-Etturkiyye pre-Arab uprising programmes. The first programme was *Good Morning from Istanbul*; a family-oriented programme covering different non-political lifestyle issues. It is aired from three different cities; Istanbul, Cairo and Beirut. The episode started and ended with a Turkish song because music is a major tool in public diplomacy. Although there were slots of stories from Cairo and Beirut that did not take thirty minutes in total, this entertainment programme serves to promote Turkey's cultural aspects through entertainment.

This programme was the top-aired programme in terms of the channel's airing time, which was, essentially, a two-hour light entertainment morning programme that invites guests to perform their music or songs and discusses the importance of the beautifulness of the shared culture with Arabs. The second programme was *East and West*, a politically-oriented dialogical programme that discusses current affairs issues. Guests of the episodes were three well-known Arab journalists or political analysts and a Turkish political analyst, the audience are all postgraduate Arab students and the topics discussed cover the following subjects: Turkish constitutional amendments, Erdoğan's government, Turkish international policies, the Arab-Turk relations and the usefulness of the Turkish political model for the Arab countries. Unlike the previous programme, this was a rich intellectual discussion that engaged Arab postgraduate students reading social sciences in Turkish universities. Notwithstanding, this programme is part of the pre-Arab Uprising of 2011 programmes or, in other words, TRT-Etturkiyye placed a special attention to Arab youth before the uprising. In fact,

having the students' direct involvement in the programme is an excellent way to promote Turkish universities in the Arab world; also, it is an excellent motivation for students to give them the chance to directly ask their questions to high intellectual scholars, journalists and activists. This approach is totally different from DW-TV Arabia, which was promoting studying in Germany by advertisement slots between its programmes. TRT-Etturkiyye is building inner bridges with Arabs in Turkey by inviting them to its programmes and giving them the chance to speak about their issues live. This is considered to be one of the best public diplomacy methods for gaining the trust of Arabs all over the world; building inner bridges is the best way to build strong outer bridges.

7.2.2. The Second Phase Episodes

The chosen programme for TRT-Etturkiyye second phase were *In the Shade of Events*, *A Thousand and One Nights*, *Without Restriction* and *Morning Etturkiyye*. Although the channel is moving toward more politically intense content, entertainment programmes and talk shows are still aired on the channel.

The episode of *In the Shade of Events* covers the academic political forum discussing the Arab Uprising of 2011. All invited guests are professors participating on the forum. Turkey became the hub for all forums and workshops discussing the circumstances of the Arab Uprising of 2011. This episode was aired from Gaziantep city in the southern part of Turkey close to the Syrian borders. This reflects a geopolitical message from the Turkish government. In fact, this can be considered good public diplomacy coordination among the official bodies of the Turkish government for several reasons. First, inviting academic Arabs to present their reflections about what is happening in the Arab world creates a long-term bond among think tanks in Turkey and the Arab world. Second, it is a political message to the Syrian regime that

Turkey is supporting the Arabs revolts. Third, the location was chosen for Arabs to witness the Turkish efforts at the borders with Syria to pass its support to the Syrian revolts. Although airing a live programme is considered to have a high risk, especially for broadcasters that represent foreign affair offices of governments, TRT-Etturkiyye is practicing it. As a result, this would give the channel more acceptance amongst Arabic-speaking audiences because they trust those who *listen* to them and discuss their issues openly.

Although the opening statement of the episode mentioned three core questions that focus on Turkey to be addressed in this episode, the scholars redirected the discussion and debates over issues directly related to Arab revolutions; which is either a weakness of the episode moderator to moderate live discussions or the willingness to give guests the priority to speak about issues of importance. This episode reflects how TRT-Etturkiyye is supported by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs by organising this widely attended forum discussing the relations with Arabs and their political revolutions.

The second programme is the entertainment programme *A Thousand and One Nights* which continues from the pre-Arabs uprising programmes' list on the channel. As the name suggests, it is an entertainment show that emphasises the shared Arabic and Turkish entertainment culture. This episode is evidence of the position of the Turkish government towards the Syrian situation focused on the Syrian traditional songs and the opening song as solidarity with the Syrians, who were, at the beginning of the Syrians' struggle, against Assad's regime. Moreover, the programme is an attempt to promote TRT-Etturkiyye amongst Arabs living in Turkey; two Turkish guests, a singer and an actress performed traditional Turkish songs; however, Abeer, a Lebanese singer, performed songs on each episode in order to attract more audiences.

The third programme is *Bila Quyood*; launched after the Arab Uprising of 2011, of which two episodes were analysed. The invited guests are a Turkish political analyst and three Arab officials directly involved in the issue under discussion. Its opening theme contains several visual images of the recent Arab Uprising of 2011, with the exception of the famous photograph of Erdoğan during the Davos summit while Perez is beside him and Freedom Flotilla. This can be interpreted in two ways: either the struggle for Arabs rights started by Erdoğan's action during the Davos summit, giving Arab publics the hope for new regional policies, or the issue of Palestine must be a core issue in the minds and hearts of Arab revolts. The first episode's topic was the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Gaza. The discussion covered the following aspects: the Israeli acceleration against Gaza, the Palestinian's resistance responses, Hamas' position from both sides and how this case is related to the Arab Uprising of 2011. By inviting the major actors in the issue; that is, a representative from Hamas and Islamic Jihad as well as an Israeli representative from an Arab background, TRT-Ettukriyye is continuing the role of the Turkish Foreign Ministry in being the bridge-builder and the regional moderator of dialogue between Arabs and Israelis. The episode's report covered seven political aspects of the situation; however, four of the report's points seem to be presenting Hamas' point of view. This is another reflection that the channel is representing its foreign ministry by standing at the side of Hamas.

The second episode's topic concentrated on the Egyptian case, its current constitutional crisis as well as the candidacy of the presidential position. The main focus of this episode was the position of both Muslim Brotherhood and the SCAF at the Egyptian's political scene. Although the topic revolved around a widespread Egyptian issue, TRT-Etturkiyye invited representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood

and a guest who withdrew from the presidency elections to increase the chances of Muslim Brotherhood representatives. In other words, the episode's topic was Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian situation. Again, the full report covered the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and did not include other parties or individual candidates. The Turkish perspective of the issues under discussion related to the Arab Uprising of 2011 and can be seen clearly in the Turkish political analyst's statements. This adds more weight to the image of the Turkish government amongst Arabic-speaking publics; additionally, the episode emphasises issues directly related to the Arab public and allows the Arab public opinion leaders to present their views.

In fact, both episodes of *Without Restriction* presented Islamists' views of the discussed topics; therefore, would that be considered as a biased position of the channel, a mirrored position of the current Turkish government, or an Islamist channel speaking under the umbrella of Erdoğan's government? If the channel was standing beside Arab Islamists whose governments are considered the opposition and threat groups, then this would mean TRT-Etturkiyye lost the liberals and seculars amongst others of the Arab publics. If it was the position of the government, then it reflects a deep vision of the current political situation because two of the recently elected presidents were Islamists. In other words, Turkey stood beside the new political power in the region. However, if the channel is considered a free platform for those who do not have the chance to speak in their own countries, then this is a direct message from the Turkish government to all Arabs, both the public and governments, that the secular Turkey is supporting those who want to change the current Arab situation by any means. This would serve strategic long-term goals that serve Turkey and not only the Arab world but the Islamic world as well.

The fourth program is *Morning Etturkiyye*, which took over the airing time of the former *Good Morning from Istanbul*. The difference is that the former used to be a cultural entertainment and family-oriented programme, whereas this is a news-based, politically-oriented programme that lasts for seventy minutes. In fact, the programme is the substitution of *Afaq assahafa*; a daily sixty-minute programme that discussed the main headlines of the major Turkish and Arabic newspapers. The new ninety-minute programme added two more parts: major international newspapers headlines, including the Israeli's newspaper; and exclusive news from the Turkish government in Ankara. The two episodes analysed reflect a concentration towards the Syrian- and Iranian-related stories along with other regional and international actors' positions towards the cases. The Turkish position towards national and international issues was highlighted as well. This programme is the best reflection of TRT-Etturkiyye's position towards its new content. As a result of its geopolitical importance, the four parts of the episode covered the Syrian situation as a prominent core story in all national, international and regional newspapers, including the section on Turkish government news from Ankara. This is because the longest Turkish land border is shared with Syria. In other words, Syria's stability is Turkey's stability. Another reason might be part of Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs policies toward Assad's regime, that is, to create a platform for the opposition to air their news because the military solution proposed by Turkey has been rejected by the UN, which can be interpreted to be an international propaganda tool to move the Arab public sphere towards struggling against Assad's regime.

7.3. Major Findings of the Dialogical Programmes Analysis

There are two major points that must be mentioned when looking at the chosen sample episodes of DW-TV Arabia before the Arab Uprising of 2011. Firstly,

the youth programmes concentrated more on health, culture and lifestyle topics. Besides, the other dialogical programmes produced with the cooperation of other Arab governments focused on the individual cases of the cooperating country only by inviting guests from that particular country only. For example, the *Cultural Salon* was organised with the Moroccan official channel and guests were German and Moroccan artists, authors and performers. However, after the Arab Uprising of 2011, there were massive changes in the content and language tone of the channel. *The Era of Change* dialogical programmes were first produced by DW only, which freed the channel from the former government's censorship of the invited guests. Now, DW invites all types of guests, including human rights activists, high officials and representatives of the political oppositions and high intellectuals that used to be banned in their countries, to meet with the high official German PM. Although *The Era of Change* programmes always concluded with the German guests giving advice or a cooperation suggestion to Arab guests, and the discussions became more focused on the Arab publics' concerns and hopes, regardless of their governments' political position. Another aspect evident in *Youth Talk*, is being highlighted and focusing on the usage of social media not as a means to promote their programmes but as a two-way communication means with their audience. Moreover, the programme presented a shared topic of concern to all Arab youth and invited youth from different Arab countries whilst, previously, DW used to focus on the Egyptian youth and invite similar youth who had a direct connection with the German University in Cairo or the Goethe Institute. Besides, Arab youth are being taken as serious respectable guests to discuss the future of the region, rather than to discuss general lifestyle topics.

From another perspective, there were three major observational points that resulted from the Arab Uprising of 2011 towards the overall political situation in the

Arab countries. Firstly, both channels are discussing more Islamist and Democratic topics by inviting Arabs to express their critical opinions and analyse current issues, which are becoming the issues discussed publicly amongst the general Arabic public. Secondly, DW-TV Arabia's programmes invited a variety of guests to discuss politically-oriented topics, of which lots of the newly formed political parties, as well as human rights organisations, appointed a female spokesperson, which can reflect the women's empowerment policies taking place in Arabic countries, as well as the trend towards involving women in changing the stereotype of the woman's role in the Arab and Muslim world and to be accepted internationally. Thirdly, the *With the Event* programme kept on inviting one of the German MPs as a German guest for each episode. This can reflect how DW-TV Arabia is serving as a political-diplomatic bridge broadcaster rather than a cultural bridge broadcaster.

TRT-Etturkiyye's sample episodes, on the other hand, reflect the dialogical- and politically- oriented approach of the channel. This is obvious from changing the entertainment morning show *Good Morning from Istanbul* to the national and international information press morning show *Etturikiyye Morning*. This new programme includes an important part that informs the audience about the daily activities of President Gül, Prime Minister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister *Davutoğlu*. In fact, the Justice and Development Party dominates the channel and the new policies of the channel reflect that. All guests are either high intellectuals, academics, researchers, journalists or Islamists²⁶ from both the Arab and pan-Arab communities. However, TRT-Etturkiyye's content started to involve more Islamist content rather than the former secular content. This is evident in the type of guests invited, the topics discussed and the genres aired. In fact, comparing the pre-Arab Uprising of 2011 and

²⁶ The term Islamist here refers to all political and non-political Islamic movement members, including Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists and independent individuals.

post-Arab Uprising of 2011 phases, the secular society of Turkey presented in the widespread drama on other Arab channels is not evident on the Turkish channel. Besides, TRT-Etturkiyye tends to stand by the side of Islamist activists more than any other activist groups and gives them space to present their opinions when their own countries would refuse to do so. As mentioned earlier, this Islamist position of TRT-Etturkiyye is the result of the AKP government policies to support strategic change in the Arab world by supporting the strongest opposition groups, of which the majority are from Islamist backgrounds.

Changing from an entertainment channel to a politically-oriented channel requires high official approval that usually takes a long time to obtain; however, in the case of TRT-Etturkiyye, this was different as the content has been radically changed in a short period of time. Unlike the rest of the TRT's channels, TRT-Etturkiyye has close ties with the Turkish Foreign Ministry. It is becoming the official representative of the Turkish government in addressing their messages in the Arabic media sphere. The TRT no longer competes to win audiences through its drama, but instead through its political actions and support of the Arabic public after the Arab Uprising of 2011. The channel is currently in the process of shaping its identity on an international level.

It is of importance to point out here that the researcher did not include an important programme in the analysis due to the lack of availability of the episodes: *Voice Youth*, a weekly programme that discusses current affairs issues from the Arab youth perspective and is aired live from different locations in Turkey and Arab countries. If the programme was considered, then it would be a much better comparison with DW-TV Arabia's programme *Youth Talk*.

Chapter 8. Survey

8.1. In-depth Analysis of the Survey Findings:

This chapter provides the findings of the survey along with the results. It aims to critically analyse the participants' answers and build general correlations from the findings. This chapter is divided according to the original survey outline²⁷. The first part of the survey was covering demographic questions to give a sense of familiarity with the surveyed participants. The major discussion of the survey's findings was outlined according to the first part's results in which the participants were divided into Arab and non-Arab participants, followed by sub-division according to their age into Arabs under the age of thirty and Arabs above the age of thirty. The decision to divide the participants was taken to make it easier to find co-relations in the results.

The second and third part, which covered DW-TV Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye as international broadcasters, were almost identical, each consisting of twenty questions covering five aspects of audience awareness: firstly, the awareness of availability of DW-TV Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye as television channels; secondly, awareness of the international broadcasting system; thirdly, awareness of the self; fourthly, awareness of the term bridge-building between civilisations; and, lastly, awareness of the different types of genres. The questions of the survey were a combination of multiple choice, tick as applies and short answers. The opening question of the DW-TV Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye parts was a very direct yes/no question: "Have you ever watched ...?" According to their answers, participants were able to continue to the next question or skip to the next section. From the selective sample of people interested in German language and culture, 65% do watch DW-TV

²⁷ Check appendix 1 for the survey copy and appendix 2 for the full detailed answers sheet copy.

Arabia, whereas only 18% watch TRT-Etturkiyye. The rest do not watch any of the given channels. As a result, the comparison between the channels throughout this survey will not give very accurate representation; thus, each part will be discussed in a separate percentage total with the same outline of the discussion.

The fourth part tested their support of funding a new intercultural broadcaster Arabic service. The section provides both multiple choices questions as well as short answers to understand their point of view. Some of the questions stated in the former sections were linked to the part to test if there was any correlation, as will be discussed later.

8.1.1. Demography:




Figure 6 Percentage of Arab participants by age

The participants were diverse in terms of their gender, age and nationality. In terms of gender, there were 56% males to 44% females. It is interesting to note that 54% of the total participants were Arab youth below the age of thirty and 32% of the total participants were Arabs above thirty years old. The overall age range was between twenty-one and thirty-five years old from a total of 58%. The study sample was a selective target of people who expressed an interest in German language and

culture; as a result, the researcher approached GI for cooperation. There were twenty-two nationalities, including those from Bahrain, China, Egypt, Eritrea, India, Iraq, Jordan, K.S.A., Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Oman, Palestine, Philippines, Qatar, Sudan, Syria, Tunis, Turkey, U.A.E., and the U.S.; the majority of which were Arabs with 84%. The same percentage applies to those with Arabic as their mother language. All of the thirteen non-Arabs that participated in this survey were approached by the Goethe Insititute, Abu Dhabi. This indicates that they either watch it at Deutsche Welle Punkt²⁸ of GI or they watch it individually to learn the language, to gain material to teach German language or to listen to German news on the Middle East region.

In the same part, the last three questions test the relation between their travelling and viewing habits as well as the category they see themselves in as viewers. Amongst the surveyed participants, 54% have been to Germany, 41% have been to Turkey and 31% have never been to either of the mentioned countries. When asked about the frequency of watching TV, 48% said they watch it occasionally, 41% always, 9% rarely, 1% addicted and 1% never watched TV. Almost all participants do watch TV and one of their choices was DW-TV Arabia, of which more than 59% of those who travelled to Germany do watch. Although only eighteen out of ninety-one of the total survey participants said they do watch the TRT-Etturkiyye, 94% of them said they did travel to Turkey. Another reason that encouraged them to visit Turkey is the Turkish dramas aired on other Arabic television stations, such as the MBC, Abu Dhabi channel and Dubai channel even before the launch of TRT-Etturkiyye.

²⁸ Deutsche Welle Point: this is a station distributed by the channel over several places where people interested in German culture, language and news might be located.

The final question in the first part asked participants about the source that passed them this survey. This question was formed in order to find out the amount of people who can be reached via German official bodies in comparison to social media; Twitter, in this case. For this matter, it is of importance to note that Turkish official bodies could not be located in the U.A.E. The distribution and circulation of the survey went on for a month. During this period of time, 48% of the participants knew about the survey via GI, then 41% through a tweet in Twitter, 8% other-unspecified, 5% German Club and 2% from a friend. Notwithstanding, according to the short answers and comments left by the participants, it can be concluded that participants from GI were more knowledgeable about DW-TV Arabia's negative and positive sides and were able to add their personal recommendations and suggestions for improvements. On the other hand, followers of the Twitter account of DW-TV Arabia were less knowledgeable about the TV channel or the radio station; instead, they were followers because they either liked the Facebook page of DW-TV Arabia or they were amongst the Arab youth who wanted to reach international media outlets in order to pass the news of the Arabs uprisings or want to see how foreign media are reflecting on them. In other words, the real motive of DW-TV Arabia's Twitter account followers was to find a space to pass their messages to foreign media rather than their own.




Figure 7 Survey Participants divided according to their Watching preferences

The above Figure 7 shows the percentage of participants viewing either DW-TV Arabia, TRT-Etturkiyye, neither or watching both. The following analysis concentrated on the answers of the 15.3% of those who watch both channels. The first finding was that all of them were Arabs who speak at least two languages: Arabic and English. Half of the 15.3% of each channel's viewers saw evidence of building bridges with the Arabic and Islamic worlds. In terms of DW-TV Arabia's viewers' answers, three stated: "Enhance communication and knowledge between Arabs and Germans", "Trying; by organising talkshow - yet not live", and "Like *Youth Without Borders* programme". Meanwhile, TRT-Etturkiyye viewers stated their answers as follows: "More communications", "Lots of live calls in the live shows PLUS lots of celebrities Arabs & Muslims in their shows", and "Arabic language used, cultural programmes and detailed news coverage of Arab world issues".

It was important to trace those who used the term intercultural broadcaster for either DW-TV Arabia or TRT-Etturkiyye to see the relations with understanding the term, the building bridges efforts and their readiness to accept the availability of an Arabic service intercultural broadcaster. There were twelve who referred to DW-TV

Arabia as an intercultural broadcaster, of which seven saw its efforts in building bridges with the Arab and Islamic world and two stated why they refused the idea of having an Arabic intercultural broadcaster: "Arabism is the same as Islamism. Both are racist and the reason for our oppression and suffering", and "The existing ones lack grabbing attention of the typical citizens. Only those interested in learning more of a culture or language will typically watch it." These two comments indicated how hopeless they felt regarding the Arab media situation. In fact, the first comment shed light on one of the main reasons for the slow progress of Arab intercultural initiatives: if nationalism and Islamism ruled the mind of the policy-makers, then any funded international broadcaster would be serving either one of the streams. In other words, any initiatives would be a propaganda tool working as the mouthpiece to serve either stream, not as an intercultural broadcaster but to create a broader understanding in the world. On the other hand, all seventeen who answered that they have seen TRT-Etturkiyye's efforts in building bridges with the Arabic and Islamic world answered positively for having an Arabic intercultural broadcaster service. All those who referred to TRT-Etturkiyye as an intercultural broadcaster were Arabs, and all were below thirty years old, with the exception of one over fifty years old who also referred to DW-TV Arabia as an intercultural broadcaster. The same group of participants supported the idea of having an Arabic intercultural broadcaster.

8.1.2. DW-TV Arabia:

8.1.2.1. Awareness of DW

Ten questions were devoted to finding out how knowledgeable the participants were about the channel in question. The following relates to DW-TV Arabia.

Firstly, the means by which the participant learnt about the channel was of importance to understand if the channel succeeded in promoting itself to a wider

audience. Answers were categorised into two main categories: the individual him/herself and the official German bodies. In the first category: 39% of the participants learnt about the channel via the satellite channels' list, 15% heard about it from a friend, 4% said via the Internet, 4% said by myself without specifying "how", 2% said via Twitter, one said by chance and one said I can't remember. On the other hand, 21% mentioned several official German bodies: 10% via GI, two via official German websites, 4% said in Germany without specifying the means, 2% directly from the founder and 2% from a German magazine. Marketing the channel via word of mouth is more effective in the Arab world than through official bodies; therefore, DW-TV Arabia should try to build relations with individuals in order to have a wider marketing network through individuals.

Secondly, the aim of asking participants to pick their favourite shows was to measure their knowledge of the channel as well as to show the most popular genre amongst them. The three top ranked programmes were: *EuroMaxx* with 49%, *Made in Germany* with 30% and *Discover Germany* with 29%.

Thirdly, three questions were directed to the visual memory of the viewer in order to measure whether the channel did well in designing their logo, presenting their slogan and the choice of the channel's colour theme, in which 44% knew the right colour theme of the channel and 92% the right logo.

Fourthly, the next group of questions focused on the viewers' satisfaction with the channel and to see if such satisfaction led them to communicate directly with the channel or not. This group of questions started by asking if the participant had encouraged another person to watch the DW-TV Arabia; 32% answered positively. The second question asked participants to assess the overall quality of the channel through a scale of excellent, very good, satisfactory, not good and other with a space

to specify their answers. 13% of participants said DW-TV Arabia is excellent, followed by 20% who referred to its quality as very good, whilst 27% said it is satisfactory. There were no “not good” responses; however, 40% picked “other”, of which only 8% stated that they don't watch it enough to make a judgment. Another question that related to the quality of the channel and the interest in the development of the channel asked specifically if the content needs improvement, and participants were given five options to choose from. The results turned out as follows: 74% said yes, it needs improvement, 4% said no, 13% said I don't know, 3% chose doesn't matter and 5% refused to answer.

Suggestions for improvement varied from requesting the reduction of specific genres, increasing other genres, applying new ideas, understanding the targeted market needs and doing more in-depth marketing studies. Firstly, the participants requested the reduction of news and EU genre slots and, instead, suggested the use of this time be allocated to introducing Arabs to the German federal political system, the basics of its democracy and how it is managing its multicultural environment. Secondly, they asked for more focus in presenting Germany's success stories and the "how to achieve" in creating music, manufacturing cars and constructing companies as well as large firms. Thirdly, participants were more interested in learning German language through television, thus, they have requested to substitute the amount of English airing time to German airing time, to air television shows that teach German, and to specify time slots for Arab children to learn the ABC of the language. Fourthly, participants asked to have programmes oriented towards the needs and interests of the target audience, in this case, Arabs, and suggested that DW-TV Arabia should develop family-oriented programmes that target children and women, for example, children's programmes, German drama and a morning live talk show. Then, another

group of participants demanded that the channel present different opinions by sending their own correspondents to reflect not only on the Arab governments, but also, the Arab publics' opinion. In other words, they asked for more in-depth investigative journalism sponsored by Deutsche Welle in the Arab and Islamic world. Next, others went further to ask for more credibility and honesty when presenting stories of Arab and Muslim communities living in and outside of Germany, and to review its editorial policies in order to avoid conflicts between its German journal news and Arabic journal news. A participant presented this issue by saying that DW-TV Arabia "were reporting about Somalia. In the Arabic edition they described the Somali fighters as Mujahedin and in the German one as terrorists!" This comment reflects awareness from the viewers' side. In fact, it reflects how Arabic audiences are choosing their sources of information, thinking of its credibility, comparing different news reports and forming their own points of view. Lastly, a group of participants requested more marketing studies and surveys to be conducted because they believed in the importance of DW-TV Arabia in the Arab world, yet, improvement is a must and the only way of doing it is by doing market research for their own needs.

The last two questions tested participants' interaction with the channel. The number of participants who gave feedback were three via email, one via social media, one via letter and one via another unspecified means; it is important to mention that this question was a "tick as it applies" question. On the other hand, a "yes/no question" reflects that 10% said yes, they did contact DW, 15% said no and the rest decided not to answer. After conducting the survey and reviewing the answers, it has been discovered that other questions were needed for this part, for example, "What hinders/encourages you to contact the DW?" and "Have you maintained this communication? If yes, why?"

8.1.2.2. Awareness of International Broadcasting

Although the questions were addressed under specific channels, several were meant to check participants' knowledge of international broadcasting. The first question asked was to identify DW-TV Arabia by choosing one option from five. The results were as follows: 37% chose DW as "An international broadcaster", 28% chose DW as "An intercultural broadcasting", 20% chose DW as "A news channel", 45% chose DW as "A promotional channel for Germany" and 7% chose DW as "Other".

The second question asked participants to specify what makes DW-TV Arabia a German international channel. The participants were allowed to choose from seven options. The results show that 37% identified the DW to be a global international broadcaster because it "discuss global issues", 35% because it "speaks a foreign language," 32% because it "promotes Germany", 11% because it "presents the German government's point of view", 29% because it "targets foreign audiences", and 29% have chosen all the above. The results reflect that, although the questions specify what makes DW-TV Arabia a German international channel, the answers that reflect the German government's point of view ranked last with only 11%.

The last question regarding the awareness of international broadcasting was, in fact, a joint question with the awareness of the personal awareness part. It is a short-answer question in which participants were asked about the difference between the channel's and their countries' traditions. Participants answered this question in two different ways: the first group answered it in one descriptive sentence; the second group answered it by comparing their traditions to DW. The first group specified four differences: the value priority scale of each society, the genre types, topics covered and the description of the channel. The value system of DW-TV Arabia is different in comparison to the Arabic system in terms of prioritizing its religious and traditional principles; besides, family comes before the individual, which is a reflection of the

differences between individualist and collectivist societies. Apart from the news slot, DW-TV Arabia's programmes cover cultural aspects, on which the Arabic channel does not place as much focus.

Also, DW-TV Arabia covers topics that have a major conflict with the Arabic traditions, for example, German interests, homosexuality, alcohol consumption and nudity. In terms of the descriptive sentence, a participant described DW-TV Arabia as a “more humanitarian-oriented channel” without specifying how. In the comparison answers, participants compared the trustworthiness of the channels as a source of information, in which Arabic channels present the government's point of view only, whilst DW-TV Arabia presents different parties' opinions. The targeted audiences of Arabic channels are always Arabs, whereas DW-TV Arabia targets international audiences. Furthermore, Arabic channels use either Arabic or English languages when targeting Arabs, whilst DW-TV Arabia uses multi languages to reach its international audiences, which include Arabs. Other participants preferred a privately owned channel.

8.1.2.3. Personal Awareness

As the previous question indicates, participants are aware of the differences between German culture and their own. The survey went on to observe that the awareness of the self is clear at the individual level as well. This subgroup contains three questions. In order to measure if the participant is aware of his/her own viewing habits, participants were asked to categorise themselves according to their frequency of viewing time for the specified channel. Figure 5 below shows the percentage of viewing DW-TV Arabia figures amongst the participants of the survey.




Figure 8 Percentage of viewing DW-TV Arabia amongst the survey participants

It is interesting to find that Figure 8 indicates that only 1% is watching regularly for a specific programme and more than half of the surveyed participants are not regular viewers, regardless of the massive budget devoted to the channel. In the other two questions, participants were given the choice to pick as many as applies in order to explain why they would view DW-TV Arabia or avoid it. Also, the choices contain "other" so that they can specify their own reasons. The reasons that made them watch the channel ranked as follows:

Why Do You Watch DW-TV Arabia?		
Because it provides me with useful information about the German way of life;	30	53%
Because it is fun to watch;	9	16%
Because it teaches me German language;	20	35%
Because it provide news about Germany & Europe;	28	49%
Because I'm seeking a foreign news source;	19	33%
Because another family member watches it;	1	2%
Because it provides economic reports;	4	7%
Because it provides cultural reports;	24	42%
Because it is a free channel;	7	12%
Other;	7	12%

Table 5 "Choose as applicable" list of what motivates viewers to watch DW-TV Arabia

As can be noticed from the table above, the top four reasons for Arabic-speaking viewers to tune into DW-TV Arabia channel revolved around the fact that it is a German channel; the results were as follows: 53% tuned in to it in order to see the

German way of life, 49% to see news about Germany and the European Union, 42% to watch its cultural reports and 35% to learn the German language.

What Would Hinder You From Watching the DW-TV Arabia?		
No live shows;	12	13%
Doesn't provide in-depth information on Arabs and Muslims communities in Germany;	31	34%
Advertising for living and studying in Germany;	7	8%
30 minutes of news every hour;	13	14%
Using English and Arabic languages instead of the German language;	14	15%
No live interactions and calls from audience;	10	11%
Over emphasis on European Union;	12	13%
Promotes homosexuality;	9	10%
Other;	32	35%

Table 6 "Choose as applicable" list of what hinders viewers from watching DW-TV Arabia

On the other hand, the ranking of the reasons that hinder them from watching the channel were as follows: of the 35% who chose other, only 59% of them filled in their personal reasons, of which 6% said nothing, 6% said no time, 3% said nothing concerns the channel, and 9% said I watch other channels. The rest stated different points that vary from cultural reasons to personal taste. The two most important answers were stated by two Arabs who visited Germany, learned German, and received the online survey through the GI email list; the first stated that, "[DW-TV Arabia] isn't as rich and diverse as other channels such as France 24. And during this specific time [Arabs uprising,] I'd rather watch more in-depth news programmes such on Al Arabia, BBC, ONTV Egypt." This statement reflects that this individual is well aware of different international broadcasters and of the current needs in the Arab world due to the revolutionary uprising that is changing the whole political, economic and social systems and will also lead to a change throughout the Islamic world. The other person wrote in Arabic that "[DW-TV Arabia] provides a false picture on the German society internationally. Germans are successful in their own country; they work as machines without feelings or human emotions. They are suffering from many psychological illnesses and they don't have strong social relations within their own society. In fact, Germans are suffering from 'Außländerhass' [xenophobia] DW-TV

Arabia never mentioned this aspect of the life of German society." This is an answer that reflects an individual's opinion.

The second top reason reflects that Arabic-speaking audiences pay attention to the Arab and Muslim communities' issues, with a total of 34% of participants who answered that what hinders them from watching DW-TV Arabia is the lack of in-depth information on Arab and Muslim communities living in Germany. The other top two reasons were the usage of English and Arabic languages instead of German and the "every 30 minute news slot every hour" which reflects that 1) the language itself is a big reason to watch it; and 2) Arabs and Muslims have their own news information resources.

8.1.2.4. Awareness of Bridge-building Term

Of the participants, 62% see that DW-TV Arabia is putting effort into building bridges with the world. The perspective of the methods they are using to achieve this goal varies from one participant to another. The question was a fill-in question: "If yes, how?" Answers covered areas of efforts in terms of having the channel itself with a full budget devoted to reach Arabs in their home countries, speaking different languages to ease communication, providing a free channel that exposes Arabs and Muslims to a wide range of intercultural topics, broadcasting news stories about Arabs and Muslims, and presenting rooted knowledge on German culture because knowing the other means achieving a better understanding. In other words, 62% are well aware that DW-TV Arabia is considered a bridge-builder.

8.1.2.5. Awareness of Genre

Two questions listed seventeen genres, and participants were asked to pick an appropriate number of genres that the channel should place emphasis on, as well as genres that the channel should decrease the amount of airing time for. The list has been formed according to the programme's genre analysis of the three weeks given to

both channels (check section 6.2. for more details). It contains the following genres: culture, dialogue, tourism, music, history, competitions, sports, health, political, economics, EU, documentary, science, religious, children's, drama and Ramadan programmes.

It is interesting to note that the top ranked genre which DW-TV Arabia should place more emphasis on was the culture genre with 61%, followed by the documentary genre with 58%, and dialogue and history, ranked third with 44% each. On the other hand, the genres that the participants wanted a decrease in air time were: religious and none of the above with 23%, EU and music genres with 19% and the political genre with 17%. This ranking shows that participants are demanding that DW-TV Arabia focus more on their culture programmes instead of the political programmes. In fact, as the three-week genre analysis shows in 6.4.1., the political genre airing time was very high in comparison to the culture genre by an average of 116 to 68 hours per week. This can be attributed to the news slot airing every thirty minutes.

Notwithstanding, having none of the above genres as the top ranked genre, besides the religious one, can be an indicator that, firstly, they do not have an opinion about it and, secondly, the religious programme has a specific stereotype in their minds or could also be due to the wide availability of this genre on other Arabic channels. Therefore, participants asked for fewer religious programmes. However, one reason for this result might be a possible misunderstanding of the question itself by mixing between "religious" and "Islam", in which participants were not aware of the fact that the *Faith Matters* programme is covering the Christians religious issues in Germany.

8.1.3. TRT-Etturkiye

8.1.3.1. Awareness of TRT-Etturkiye

This part has 18% participants of the overall total of the survey participants, which is understandable because the TRT was launched around a year before the survey was conducted. The fact that the number of participants in this section is very small did not affect the result of the participants' answers, especially when they were asked, "How did you hear about it?" Six participants heard about the channel through TV, three through the Internet, two through news stories and two stated that they found it by chance without specifying the means. There are two major points to be considered here. On the one hand, "through TV", the top ranked common answer between DW-TV Arabia's and TRT-Etturkiye's audiences, is the result of the choice of the channel to be aired on either the Nile Sat, Arab Sat or Hotbird. This defers from the awareness of its existence. On the other hand, DW-TV Arabia were much more advanced in using official means to promote the channel, whilst TRT-Etturkiye does not seem to have an official cultural attaché like the Goethe Institute to promote it.

The following questions covered the TRT's programmes, which are almost double the amount of DW-TV Arabia's programmes: there are more than forty shows and programmes at TRT-Etturkiye's channel in comparison to around twenty shows and programmes at DW-TV Arabia. This amount of shows and programmes made it difficult to ask participants to pick their favourite shows, because even if they have a good amount of knowledge about the channel, the distribution of the 18% of participants' choices would be distributed in a small fraction for each programme. Yet, the programmes that were listed for participants to pick from, showed the three top ranked programmes as follows: *Good Morning from Istanbul* with 35%, *News Slot* with 30% and *Good Morning from Istanbul* with 25%. It is important to note here that, during the distribution of the survey, DW-TV Arabia had its news slots every

thirty minutes, whilst TRT-Etturkiyye had one slot of its news for fifty minutes only. However, after the Arab Uprising of 2011, the news slot of DW changed to three types of news: a brief news slot that is aired nine times a day, a fifteen-minute news slot aired eight times daily, a thirty-minute news slot specialising on the EU news only that is aired twice a week and the main news of thirty minutes repeated four times a day. On the other hand, TRT-Etturkiyye moved to air the news four times per day with a total of three hours.

In terms of the visual aspects of the channel, 0% knew the slogan of the channel, 8% knew its logo and 10% of the participants were able to pick the right theme colour of the channel.

The last group of questions focused on the viewers' satisfaction with the channel and to see if such satisfaction led them to communicate directly with the channel or not. Amongst the viewers of TRT-Etturkiyye who participated in the survey's part of TRT-Etturkiyye, 50% said yes, they did encourage someone to watch the channel. Figure 6 below shows the evaluation of the TRT-Etturkiyye from the survey conducted on eighteen participants of the TRT-Etturkiyye part.




Figure 9 The percentage of TRT-Etturkiyye viewers' general evaluation of the channel

When asked to assess the overall quality of the channel, the majority evaluated TRT-Etturkiye as being a very good to excellent broadcaster. The next part focused on the quality of the channel and the interest of the viewer in the development of the channel question. Answers centred around three points: the need to focus on the shared history and culture with the Arabs, focusing on the Arab youths' needs and promoting the Turkish language and lifestyle.

8.1.3.2. Awareness of International Broadcasting

As in the DW-TV Arabia part, this section comprised the same three questions. Viewers of TRT-Etturkiye identify it as follows: 36% for "an international broadcaster", 36% for "an intercultural broadcaster", 14% for "a news channel", 50% for "a promotional channel for Turkey" and 9% for "other". The participants identified TRT-Etturkiye as a Turkish international channel for the following reasons: 63%: discuss global issues; 21%: speaks a foreign language; 42%: promotes Turkey; 37%: presents the Turkish government's point of view; and 6% said: "I don't consider it an international channel" and 3% added, "It is more of a regional channel."

In terms of the differences between the channel and their countries' traditions, 33% of the participants said there are differences, 44% said very similar, 22% said I don't know and 3% said no answer. The following are their stated answers: "Nationalism!!", "The same conservativeness which hinders our progress, freedom and modernity", "It's same mentality, very weak, and although it's a new channel it's not implacable to be as international channel focus on songs and humourous issues is not important focus on drama is not the main thing to interact with the viewer", and the "legends of the Turkish culture".

8.1.3.3. Personal Awareness

The exact same questions from the DW-TV Arabia part were asked in the TRT-Etturkiye part. In the personal awareness subgroup, the three questions were answered as follows: the participant is to categorise him/herself according to their time and frequency of watching TRT-Etturkiye as shown in Figure 7. The findings showed that there is no regular viewer to the channel.




Figure 10 The percentage of survey participants viewing TRT-Etturkiye

The other two questions given to participants were the choice to pick as many as apply in order to state reasons that either made them view or avoid TRT-Etturkiye. Also, the choices contain "other" so that they can specify their own reasons. The reasons that made them watch the channel ranked as follows:

Why Do You Watch TRT-Etturkiye?		
Because it provides me with useful information about the Turkish way of life;	11	58%
Because it is fun to watch;	3	16%
Because it teaches me Turkish language;	1	5%
Because it provide news about Turkey & the Islamic world;	9	47%
Because I'm seeking a foreign news source;	4	21%
Because another family member watches it;	1	5%
Because it provides economic reports;	0	0%
Because it provides cultural reports;	6	32%
Because it is a free channel;	3	16%
Other;	5	26%

Table 7 "Choose as applicable" list of what motivates viewers to watch TRT-Etturkiye

On the other hand, the ranking of the reasons that hinder them from watching the channel were as follows:

What Would Hinder You from Watching TRT-Etturkiye?		
Because some of the programmes are very short;	2	12%
Because it doesn't provide in-depth information on Arab communities in Turkey;	7	41%
Because it is a mirrored channel of Arabs' channel - I want something different;	3	18%
Because it devoted too much time for Turkish Drama;	4	24%
Because it uses Arabic language instead of Turkish language;	1	6%
Because it concentrates on the Eastern lifestyle of Turkey & neglects the Western lifestyle;	2	12%
Because it overemphasises positive relations with the Arab world;	0	0%
Because it promotes liberalism;	0	0%
Because it promotes Turkey as the leader of Middle East to regain its Ottoman glory;	0	0%
Other;	5	29%

Table 8 "Choose as applicable" list of what hinders viewers from watching TRT-Etturkiye

Only one participant stated his/her opinion in the category of "other" as being "because of pro-Islam and pro-Islamism and the lack on emphasis on modernity".

8.1.3.4. Awareness of Bridge-building Term

Of the participants, 12% saw the efforts of TRT-Etturkiye in building bridges with the Arab and Islamic world. The follow-up question of "If yes, how?" was answered by five participants as follows: "Lots of live calls in the live shows PLUS lots of celebrities Arabs and Muslims in their shows", which reflects how it is working as a medium to show their views; "showing similarities between Turkish and

Arabic cultures", which reflects the importance of the feeling of belonging; "Arabic language used, cultural programmes and detailed news coverage of Arab world issues", which reflects the respect of the Arabic language, culture, and issues; another stated "more communication", which was not clarified; and "Arabic Islamic programmes", which places emphasis on the awareness of the shared Islamic roots.

8.1.3.5. Awareness of Genre

In the genres' two questions, the genres that TRT-Etturkiyye should put more emphasis on: culture and history with 55%, political with 45%, documentary with 40%, tourism with 35%, music with 30%, economics, science and none with 25%, dialogue with 20%, sports with 15%, competitions, EU, Ramadan programmes with 10%, religious and children's programmes with 1%, and health, drama and other by 0%.

On the other hand, the genre that TRT-Etturkiyye should decrease the amount of its airing time: non ranked at the top of the scale with 35%, competitions with 24%, music and religious with 18%, history, sports, political, EU, drama and Ramadan programmes with 12%, economics with 6%, and the rest were given 0%.

8.1.4. Intercultural Broadcasters

At the beginning of this part in the survey, an intercultural broadcaster has been identified to the participants as "... an international satellite channel that focuses on culture and sends its messages across borders globally via television, radio and social network media to its international targeted audiences".

The opening question was to determine their support of the idea of establishing an Arabic service intercultural broadcaster; 89% supported the idea for the following given reasons: 74%: "To spread awareness of Islamic civilization's role in spreading knowledge and sciences"; 74%: "To change the global stereotype that

Arabs are terrorists”; 73%: “To promote Arabic culture”; 73%: “To build bridges with the world”; 65%: “To promote Arabic language”; 60%: “To explain the relationship between Arabs and Islam”; 51%: “To compete with the global trend of international broadcasting”; 44%: “To promote tourism in the Arab world”; and 4%: “Other”.

Figure 11 below shows the participants’ choices of language used in the proposed Arabic intercultural broadcasts. The top ranked choice was to have it in three languages with a total of 32%; however, the 24% who filled the “Other” sections were asking for more than three languages, with the exception of one lady who asked to have it in Hebrew, believing in the misleading Israeli media.




Figure 11 Choices of the Arabic Service Intercultural Broadcaster's languages

There were questions asked about how to fund the channel and where it should be based. In terms of the source of funding for the channel, 36% chose: “It should be an independent channel”, 18% stated that it does not matter, of which one stated clearly that it “should be an ‘open’ country to be not perceived as propaganda”; following that, 13% have chosen a non-government organisation to fund it, 12% chose Gulf Corporation Council and 10% chose “joint governments” and the “Organisation of Islamic Conference”. Interestingly, only one participant picked “a specific government”, which is less than 1% of the total participants. In terms of the

location, participants were able to pick more than one from a list of thirteen options that includes: Cairo, Tunisia, Beirut, Doha, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Muscat, Kuala Lumpur, Riyadh, AlQuds, Jakarta, Istanbul and Other. The top five cities chosen were: Cairo 35%, Dubai 32%, Abu Dhabi 29%, Istanbul 17% and Beirut 15%.

In terms of the language, the survey did not specify a language apart from Arabic; instead, the question was stated as follows: "How many foreign languages should the channel air?" Each participant was able to pick one answer only: 32% picked "3 languages", 24% picked "Other", 21% picked "Only Arabic with different subtitles", 20% picked "2 languages", 3% picked "1 language" and 0% picked "Only Arabic".

The following part was important in enabling understanding of an intercultural broadcaster as a term from the participants' perspective. The question asked them the following: "If you are to choose from the following targeted-audiences, which would be the most important for the Arab intercultural broadcaster to focus on (tick as appropriate)?" The five top ranked audiences were: 75% Europeans, 67% Americans, 44% Pan-Arabs, 38% Turkish and 32% for both Chinese and Japanese.

The final two questions of part 4 of the survey were "fill in the question" type of questions. Answers reflect the personal viewpoints of the participants about media-related issues. The first question was: "In your opinion, why wouldn't you like to see an Arab intercultural broadcaster?" It is addressed to those who answered no to the first question in this part. Answers were as follows: "It's a sign of civilization and it's our job to convey a good correct message about who we really are at the moment because our situation in most of the field, maybe all of it, does not feel me proud like EU"; "To correct the misconception of the Arab and Muslim culture and people"; "Only if they broadcast silly program with no added value"; "Acculturation is needed

to understand others”; “Because there is so much misinformation, particularly among American TV consumers”; “I would like to see an Arab intercultural broadcaster”; “I have no objection on this, but proper content and attire are important to capture audience retention”; “Lack of understanding”; “Too much religion ... there's a difference between an Islamic and Arabic channel”; “Quality”; “If it is targeting Arab audience they should have an Arab intercultural broadcast, Arabic is a strong language”; “I don’t want governments to interfere in the media and force what they want or don’t want. I want the channel to be independent”; “The existing ones lack grabbing attention of the typical citizens. Only those interested in learning more of a culture or language will typically watch it”; and “Arabism is the same as Islamism. Both are racist and the reason for our oppression and suffering.”

Finally, participants were asked if they had any comments; six participants stated clear comments:

1. “Any Arabic channel should accept the other the same way the other accepts the Arabs.”
2. "A quality TV channel should first and foremost address the Israeli population. The biased and uninformed Israeli public prevents a Middle East settlement. But what do they know about Arabs? How can they find out that they are being fed lies and half-truths by their own media and the propaganda of their government?"
3. “In Europe and America people have enough channels to watch all the time, and you will find few people who would like to watch a documentary about Islamic history, so the channel might be on air for a long time before people give it attention.”
4. "Arab intercultural broadcaster: it will be a success only with a huge budget

and high professional staff. I suggest [to] the follow the example of euro-news, multilingual channel available in ten languages.”

5. “Yes. First in terms of who should fund the channel, I think it should be a privately owned firm. Because almost all media outlets in the Arab world are government funded. It would be nice to see TV content that isn't part of an Arab government's agenda, another perspective. As a media student, I know there is no such thing as 100% objectivity, but this news channel should strive to be. It's about time we had an inter-cultural Arab broadcaster!”
6. “I ask for a channel to be opened specialising in human rights and transmit the actions and events live from where they occur.”

Participants' comments vary according to the individual's concerns, for example, accepting the other's opinion, prioritizing the target audience, the market competition, financial issues of the channel, independence from Arab governments, and its content.

8.2. Discussion

8.2.1. Major Findings of the Conducted Survey

Although there was some delay on the survey's original plan and the focus group sessions were canceled due to lack of cooperation with GI and the obstacles facing individual researchers in organising gatherings, the researcher found positive points in terms of experiencing the way online surveys are conducted as well as the power of social media in the Arab world. The major findings of the survey were that viewers of DW seek improvement to its content by requesting more teaching of practical-steps programmes, for instance, how to apply the democratic political system, how to play music and how to master the German language. Some of the survey participants requested family-oriented programmes, which means including programmes that target mothers and children. Also, there was emphasis on the interest

to know more about Arab and Muslim communities in Germany, which is the result of the *element of unity* amongst Arabs and Muslims. As a result of one of the answers, it has been noticed that there was an overlapping understanding of the following terms: Islam, religious, and faith, amongst the Arabic-speaking audiences. Although the number of participants on the TRT-Etturkiyye section was only eighteen out of the total ninety-one participants, their depth in answering the questions was of use to enrich the discussion of this thesis.

The answers of the intercultural broadcasting part reflects the *element of unity*, because the main reason for supporting the idea of creating an Arabic intercultural broadcast was to spread awareness of the Islamic civilisation's role, to change the global stereotype that Arabs and Muslims are terrorists, to promote Arabic culture and to build bridges with other nations. Participants requested that the proposed intercultural broadcaster be in three languages or more to cover as large an audience as possible with zero for only Arabic. It is clearly evident that participants, who were all Arabs, are fully aware of the importance of using other languages to communicate one's message. In terms of the target audiences, it is interesting to note that participants want to target Europeans more than Americans, which can be an indicator of their understanding of the decreased international role as well as the spoiled reputation of the United States amongst Arabs and Muslims due to its War on Terrorism.

8.2.2. Insightful Participant

The most valuable comments were stated by a German/British lady who answered all the questions and had written valuable comments in all available spaces in evaluating DW-TV Arabia as well as addressing the need for an Arab intercultural broadcaster. She speaks German, English, Arabic and French. She evaluated DW-TV

Arabia's work as satisfactory and thought the areas to be developed were the documentaries in terms of promoting a democratic system by providing the German federal system as an example. She stated: "Explain in much more detail with documentaries etc. how exactly 'democracy' actually works. For instance what a political party is, how it works, why it is different from a pressure group, which focuses on a single issue. What are the advantages of having a federal system. Does it mean that the German person in the street has more say in what happens to public issues than the person in the street of a more centr[a]lised system such as in France or Great Britain. The reason that makes her watch the channel is to see how the news is interpreted on DW-TV Arabia and what hindered her from watching is the lack of time. The German federal system may be an interesting example of how to accom[m]odate regional differences." She understood very well the Arabic audiences' daily lifestyle by picking the children's genre amongst other genres to be added and emphasise on the channel. She answered that the efforts of DW-TV Arabia can be seen by "the fact that it is there and that a lot of thought goes into the productions". Unlike the other participants, this lady's comments were critical towards DW-TV Arabia. As can be noticed, speaking several languages added to her intercultural experienced comments; besides, she is knowledgeable enough to address the needs of the Arabs and the weak points of the channel. Her final comments on section four of the survey were enriching as she was the only participant who addressed the importance of targeting Jews. She did not pick any of the suggested languages and instead added Hebrew. In the additional comments she stated the following: "A quality TV [channel] should first and foremost address the Israeli population. The biased and uninformed Israeli public prevents a Middle East settlement. But what do

they know about Arabs??? How can they find out that they are being fed lies and half-truths by their own media and the propaganda of their [government]?”

8.2.3. Concluding Remarks on the Findings

Considering the results of the survey, *element of unity* was visible in the participants' answers, especially in questions of what motivates or hinders them from watching DW-TV Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye as well as in the intercultural broadcaster part. In the latter, almost three quarters of the participants have chosen reasons to establish an Arabic intercultural broadcaster to be: spreading awareness of Islamic civilization's role in knowledge and sciences, changing the global stereotype that Arabs are terrorists, promoting Arabic culture and building bridges with the world. In comparison to DW-TV Arabia, TRT-Etturkiyye has been using element of unity to win its audiences. DW-TV Arabia has been neglecting it, either due to lack of awareness or the fear of strengthening relations amongst Arabs and Muslims. Either reason will not intercede if DW-TV Arabia continues to neglect it. In fact, the German channel has two advantages over other European broadcasters; firstly, they have never been considered as a colonial power and, secondly, they have high intellectual Muslims who can support any German-Islamic initiatives.

In terms of the usage of *element of unity*, TRT-Etturkiyye did well in emphasising the shared cultural and historical elements with Arabs due to the Islamic civilisation covering the Ottoman Caliphate era. However, the channel is neglecting the fact that, in terms of the individual identities, the diverse Arab and Turk worlds cannot be limited by the general cultural atmosphere of society, for example, there are liberals and seculars living in both Turkey and the Arab world, whom have been almost excluded from the main content of the channel. The usage of *element of unity* should be an inclusive method of all types of individual positions by at least

addressing their major concerns. Although this can be interpreted as a biased representation of opinions towards Islamists, the Justice and Development Party's Islamic influence over its national and international policies are starting to show fruitfulness amongst the Arab publics. This indicates the influential power of Islamists in the Arab world.

Another point is the programmes' scheduled air time in which TRT-Etturkiyye has been changing its aired programmes according to the current affairs issues as well as the availability of programmes, whilst DW-TV Arabia has been viewing its magazines in a systematic way.

DW-TV Arabia needs to engage the Arabic-speaking audiences living in Germany to contribute to the programs, content and improve the channels' services. Engaging Arabic speaking audiences will allow the channel to enhance its approaches when targeting their audience as this specific audience group knows well what approach is suitable to them.

Chapter 9. Discussion and Conclusion

9.1. Conclusions

The massive amount of information delivered via all types of mass media and the Internet has changed the whole equation of the usage of media by different actors. Nowadays, the receiver is no longer a passive actor; s/he would have the ability to search for the news' accuracy through different means. Therefore, international broadcasters cannot play the old propagandist role. Instead, they have no options but to find innovative approaches to present the reality from their perspective without underestimating the receivers or trying to mislead them.

The importance of targeting Arabic-speaking audiences is associated by the geopolitical importance of their lands. Being located at the heart of the old contents; Africa, Europe and Asia, which is unarguably rich in terms of its raw natural resources and cultural history, increases its importance. Moreover, their lands control major air, sea and land trade paths which are of importance to world trade and transportation. It is essential to build an understanding with Arabic-speaking audiences in order to spread peace and smooth the relations on an international level. This can be achieved by spreading awareness of respecting the intercultural differences worldwide; and intercultural broadcasting is one means of doing that.

As this thesis has presented, public diplomacy, as a term put into practice by politicians and media experts, neglects the reality of the power of ordinary citizens, which results in massive losses in the balance of the power of reputation. Moreover, the *elements of unity* of Arab and Muslim communities resulted from their shared values system, history, and religion that made them a transnational public sphere power which cannot be neglected. Therefore, the main media outlets targeting Arabic-speaking audiences need to consider their needs and their visibilities worldwide.

This thesis doubted the accuracy of the usage of international broadcasting as a term and challenged it by providing intercultural broadcasting as an alternative term that presents a specific culture to a different cultural audience in order to create a much deeper understanding of the world of differences.

In comparing both findings, the second phases of both channels' programmes discuss directly related topics to the fate of Arabic-speaking audiences, which means that both channels are heading in the right direction by raising their audiences' issues. However, TRT-Etturkiyye shows more understanding of the Arabic-speaking audiences in terms of devoting more air time to address issues that reflect the *elements of unity* amongst the Arab and Muslim public sphere. On the other hand, DW-TV Arabia does not seem to have an understanding of the *elements of unity*; in fact, the channel is still devoting more time to its European programme *Euromaxx* and a specified news journal for European issues. A very recent example of neglecting the interest of their targeted Arabic-speaking audiences was on June 24th, 2012; when the Egyptian elected president's name was about to be announced officially, the channel was airing a show about a golf resort, and the following news slot *Journal* did not mention anything about Egypt until the end when the anchor closed the news slot with a remark that the elected new president of Egypt is about to be announced and more information was to follow. That was a clear reflection that the channel does not consider the huge amount of viewers at those specific hours who tuned to other channels to watch the event live, including TRT-Etturkiyye.

Another aspect in both channels was the discussed topics. Both channels were promoting political reforms and freedom of speech by inviting all within the political spectrum; however, each channel ended up specifying its political models and solutions to be adopted by the Arabs after the Arab Uprising of 2011. For

example, TRT-Etturkiyye continued to discuss the model of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its applicability to Arab countries. Another example is DW-TV Arabia's suggestion to learn more by using the archiving of STASI documents as an example to deal with the state security's and police services' documentations in both Tunisia and Egypt. Again, both DW-TV Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye are following the Western model in seizing the chance to promote themselves in this current situation.

The changes that occurred are indicators that both channels are trying to promote understanding amongst Arabic-speaking publics using their own approaches; nevertheless, both channels are focusing on political issues rather than cultural ones. As a result, if the political situation changed in a way that presents new positions of Germany or Turkey towards Arabic countries, then there is a high probability that its international broadcaster would be affected. In other words, concentrating on the current political affairs to win more Arabic-speaking audiences or to promote freedom of speech and democratic values is a temporary issue that might be spoiled.

It was evident that each channel had its own approaches when sending messages to its Arabic-speaking audiences. However, both broadcasters failed to create a brand new approach to disassociate their international satellite channels from being propagandist tools. They are still adopting the Western style in branding their country's image and representing their government's position. Focusing on the individual cases, the systematic way in which DW-TV Arabia schedule their programmes creates a clearer Western identity for the channel, whilst the variety of TRT-Etturkiyye's programme lengths and genres reflect an Eastern identity to the channel. As a result of the occurrence of the Arab Uprising of 2011, both channels reflected very fast responses towards adapting new dialogical programmes and new

programme scheduling strategies. In fact, such responses reflected the depth of understanding, not only in relation to the current affairs but also to their target Arabic-speaking audiences' needs. However, the Arabic media market is already full of high competitors discussing international and current political affairs issues. As such, an intercultural broadcaster that aims to influence its audiences' behaviour and redirect culture rather than branding its own government culture as a present culture only should look again to culture as addressed by Bin Nabi's behavior-oriented approach, and be an intercultural broadcaster that addresses the behavior, instead of remaining an international broadcaster that promotes the government.

Although the last century witnessed the creation of a massive amount of separation policies towards any Arabic- or Islamic-related subject to create a proper secular modern government that follows Europe, the shared bonds between Turks, Arabs and Muslims are massive at the historical, religious and geopolitical levels but also at the ethnicity and cultural levels. As a result, TRT-Etturkiyye was able to find its way towards Arabic-speaking audiences by using these shared bonds as well as highlighting public needs and issues. However, this raises the question of whether TRT-Etturkiyye is following an inclusion policy towards addressing all ethnicities living in the Arab and Muslim world or not. For example, the Kurds might be one of the ethnicities that the TRT-Etturkiyye would avoid due to the political sensitivity of the issue both nationally and internationally; besides, Arabs have other issues to take care of. As a result, the Arabic-speaking audiences might not notice the absence of Kurds' issues in TRT-Etturkiyye. Another example is the Amazigh; an ethnicity living in the northern part of the Maghreb Africa, whom DW-TV Arabia have mentioned and had a singer from the area as a guest on one of its programmes; whilst TRT-Etturkiyye, as far as the researcher observed, did not mention them. On the other

hand, the Christian Corps of Egypt were mentioned and the Christian Lebanese singer Abeer appeared in all episodes of *A Thousand and One Nights*. It can be concluded that TRT-Etturkiyye has no problem addressing different cultural and religious ethnicities; however, if an ethnicity was considered a political issue, they will not be exposed on the channel. On the other hand, the question of inclusion or exclusion of the audiences cannot be addressed on DW-TV Arabia because it is not only excluding but also neglecting the existence of Arabs and Muslims in Germany, looking into stories of tourists or students living temporarily in Germany; an example was a short documentary about a woman from the Gulf living and studying in Germany, or showing the worse-off individual Muslims, for example, a youth whom the channel addressed as heading towards terrorism. A successful intercultural broadcaster should have the ability to include all sorts of diverse audiences because inclusion has a high level of honesty. Thus, they will be more credible in addressing issues of their audiences' interests.

This thesis looked at the historical relations between Germans and Turks and how it affected the current situation of immigrants' integration in Germany. It has been argued that Germany should build inner bridges first with Arab and Muslim communities in order to create a strong international relation. This argument is based on the belief that the reputation of the government amongst those communities would be directly reflected to their relatives in the countries of origin; of which both Turks and Arabs are of geopolitical importance to Germany. In other words, they cannot be neglected.

The findings of the methodology tools employed in this thesis concluded the following five points. The first two points cover theoretical study issues, the third

highlights the Muslim situation in Germany, the fourth addresses the DW-TV Arabia, and the last addresses TRT-Etturkiyye as follows:

In terms of theory-building, it is not acceptable to generalise in social sciences studies, especially the field covering anthropology and cultural studies, because a society is made up of diverse individuals who are inclusive regardless of their differences. Therefore, theorists are to look into specified targeted people and understand that there are public and personal specifications. In other words, for each person there are specifications that distinguish him/her from the whole group, because each individual person is the sum of emotions, feelings, beliefs and ideas that encourage him/her to act accordingly, and this sum drew the relationship towards his/her own culture, whether it is accepting, refusing or dignifying this born-in culture. After that, the development of the person results in the formation of new relationships with others' cultures. This is being shaped in the unconscious of the person, in which the mind starts to compare and analyse any unusual input coming from another culture with the already formed culture of the person. This process is the intercultural process in which the best possible results would be achieved if the following base was available, as in the following scenario: two different people representing two different cultures must understand that they should not be surprised by their differences; instead, they should mediate it in a way to apprehend the other side's point of view and win their acceptance. This scenario might work well in a person-to-person situation; however, the situation of broadcasting might be a bit difficult. As a result of the originality of the television as a one-way communication medium, there has to be a solution to expand it into a multi-way communication medium. The problem arose from the credibility issue of these solutions because, on the one hand, if the programme is being edited there are high doubts regarding what

had been excluded from the discussions. On the other hand, it is very critical for a channel that represents its country's foreign affairs office to be a free platform in which everyone can speak their mind, whether this was through live telephone calls or in-studio audience live discussions. This thesis offers an alternative solution to this problem by encouraging these channels to support and promote the idea of establishing online intercultural channels that focus on spreading intercultural awareness amongst virtual users. This idea can also be promoted through person-to-person communication that can be easily reached via new social media outlets; this will be the core discussion of the following section.

The weakness of both theories of public diplomacy and public sphere disregard the element of what unites a group of people. For instance, the theory of public diplomacy focuses on the state actor's power and how to deal with foreign elites to win their future international support, which reflects the unethical way of prioritising interests over any other value. In fact, public diplomacy is the new modernised edition of propaganda. This way of thinking would never reach practical conclusions to move forward bridge-building amongst nations because it is based on interests. Therefore, scholars and theorists should understand it and find alternatives to stay at a distance from this school of thinking. Complex problems are created instead of solved when one individual or another is looked down on or neglected due to the society class system or ethnicity differences.

After reading about the situation of Muslims in Germany, positive indicators were found from both the government's and Muslims' sides. In fact, if an attempt is being given to participate in developing the status of Muslims' positive participation in German society, then all Muslims are to participate effectively and efficiently with the GIK initiative.

Both DW-TV Arabia and TRT-Etturkiyye used *north* and *south* in their dialogical programme titles, focusing on the relationships between Arabs and Europeans. In fact, this old-fashioned way of naming programmes served the opposite goal of the programmes. Indeed, associating the relationship according to their geographical position places emphasis on the historical dark relation of the colonial era. Therefore, avoiding using such terminologies will help in creating a dialogue to focus more on networking in all directions both internationally and nationally.

Looking at the case of DW specifically, their efforts towards understanding the Arab and Muslim culture must be acknowledged. In fact, their reaction towards the Arab Uprising of 2011 reflects their quick understanding of the status quo. However, it would be more efficient to expand their cooperation with the GIK by requesting a list of nominees to represent the GIK at the DW Board in order to represent their points of view, not as Muslims, but as a group of Germans who have strong bonds with the geopolitically important Arab and Muslim world. In fact, the adaptation of a new programme time division between the Arabic and English language slots was a good sign of understanding the Arabic-speaking audiences' needs. In terms of their content, it is important to emphasise that DW should build stronger relations with the GIK by cooperating and producing weekly programmes to cover the Arabs and Muslims living in Germany. This programme would have a positive result in the long run because such a programme would present the situation of the Arab and Muslim lifestyle in Germany that is of interest to their target audiences. In fact, with a degree of honesty in presenting their stories, even if they were reflecting negative aspects of the German's policies, it will increase the credibility of DW-TV Arabia amongst its audiences. Moreover, this sort of programme would create a separation between the German government and DW as a

body that broadcasts its own content to reach its ultimate goal of building bridges with other cultures; in other words, being a leading example of an intercultural broadcaster.

In terms of TRT-Etturkiyye, it is to be admitted that this thesis did not give the channel enough time to draw concrete conclusions because the channel was recently launched and its policies have been changed dramatically throughout the past two years. However, it was evident that, although TRT-Etturkiyye reacted towards the Arab Uprising of 2011 positively, it did not make the most of the new social media available online. In fact, TRT-Etturkiyye had no option but to foster its online activities on Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. Besides, the official Arabic website needs constant updates of its content and available political, dialogical and cultural videos in order for users to be able to reach its content whenever they are need to. In fact, the availability of the official accounts of President Abdullah Gül, Prime Minister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu on Twitter and Facebook are of help to the TRT-Etturkiyye to promote its own website. Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should support TRT-Etturkiyye in the Arabic and Islamic countries by creating a clear cultural plan for the embassies to apply as part of their public diplomacy to gain the trust of Arab publics.

9.2. Future Outlook of an Intercultural Broadcasting Arabic Service

The objective of using the term intercultural broadcasting is to promote the need to have a focused channel on cultures, regardless of the commercial and political agendas. This thesis strongly believes in the need for an independent official body to represent the Arabic and Islamic culture to the world. According to Schiffauer (1997, 157):

"Truth, according to Kierkegaard, cannot be taught by another, but has to be developed and discovered by each individual him/herself. The recipient thus plays an active role which implies that the boundaries between text and interpretation are blurred."

It is true that the individual plays an important role in forming a better understanding of the cases around, especially in an age in which there is an increasing amount of availability of information resources and the ability to reach resources online for free; however, audiences are not to be blamed for not having a positive image of Muslims and Arabs. Such a stereotype is a result of long-organised misleading plans by the media, politicians and lobbying groups of interests. Thus, the self-realisation of truth cannot be easily reached.

On the other hand, Arabs and Muslims are to take serious actions towards correcting and showing the truth about who they are. A simple step to take is by creating an intercultural broadcaster through the available means online. As stressed in section 1.3.4., the power of ordinary citizens can make a difference by taking small steps until everyone drifts towards a common united goal.

The author suggests that it is necessary to set up on an online international broadcaster that is managed by Arab and Muslim youth individuals who want to promote Arabic and Islamic culture worldwide in order to fill the gaps of the current international broadcasters. There are several initiatives to promote the Arabic language; for example, *Taghreedat* is a volunteer group of enthusiasts whose main goal is to translate technological terminologies into Arabic. Their initiatives reached a level to which semi-governmental organisations supported them, such as TwoFour54²⁹. The channel will be a non-profit volunteer-based organisation that will be based on building a strong social network base. Collaborations with other

²⁹ Abu Dhabi's Media Free Zone – U.A.E.

organisations that fit with the vision and mission of the channel are welcome. All content of the channel will be available online for those who want to add their own language subtitles, but they will have to inform the channel to check for accuracy of translation. As a starting point, the channel content will be aired online. The programme timetable will be divided into five divisions based on five time zones: Chinese, Indian, European, Brazilian and American time zones. The main approach of the channel will be the repetition approach, in which programmes will be aired in Arabic with the target audiences' language subtitles as follows: Chinese subtitles, Indian subtitles, German subtitles, English subtitles and Spanish subtitles, and will be used to repeat programmes according to the different time zones of the target audience. On that basis, all programmes will have subtitles suitable for the target time zone and will be designated a four hour duration according to the time zone in place. Reasons to choose the previous languages include: they are the most widely spoken languages worldwide, major international actors understand at least one of the chosen languages, the European and American languages were chosen because they are the languages of major media producers that affected the image of Arabs and Muslims, and Chinese, Indian and Spanish are the languages of the newly emerging international powers: China, India and Brazil.

The vision of the channel is to be a lively informal virtual café to enrich the understanding and respect of the Arab and Muslim culture. Moreover, its mission is to provide online content that is available 24/7 to all youth and seekers of cultural understanding through valuable cultural, historical and dialogical programmes. Also, the channel should aim for the following:

1. To spread awareness of the Islamic civilization's role in spreading knowledge worldwide

2. To promote Arabic language and culture
3. To change the global stereotype that Arabs and Muslims are terrorists
4. To explain the relationship between Arabs and Islam
5. To promote the importance of travel by building an understanding of the other through coexisting
6. To build an informal relationship with the audience because informality creates a more easy-going dialogue
7. To provide visibility to the pan-Arab and pan-Muslim communities worldwide

Moreover, its programmes should include short documentaries lasting twenty-five minutes about both Arabs and Muslims living worldwide in order to discuss what unites them. Successful individual cases will be presented, along with the intercultural aspects of their lifestyle in terms of the languages they speak, international friends they have and intercultural experiences they had gone through. Another type of extremely short documentary of forty-five-second informative clips about towns in the Arab and Muslim countries, focusing on its cultural or historical advantages, will be produced. This channel is not to promote major cities; instead, it is an informative channel to introduce both Arab and non-Arab public audiences to small towns in Arab countries. Another sort of programme will be a fifteen minute programme that introduces influential Arabic literature, covering a variety of topics by reading several paragraphs and discussing their writings. Amongst the authors are scholars Ibn Khaldoun and Malik Bin Nabi; authors Najeeb Mahfouz and Jaber Rabe'e'a; and poets AlJawahiri and Ahmed Shawqi. This channel is not a news agency and it has nothing to do with news reporting. However, politics is a part of Arabs' lives and the Arab Uprising of 2011 in the Arab world; thus, the channel will have a programme that

discusses politics. This programme will introduce the political aspect of Arab youth by highlighting that they are not ignorant and they can form their own personal opinions; however, they might not be practicing politics in the Western modern democratic perspective. By doing this, the channel would be able to promote the temporary political thoughts of Arab youth. The programme will highlight personal perspectives on the political issue, as this reflects individuality. Cultural aspects of Arabic and Islamic art will also be presented in twenty minute programmes. Examples of these are programmes discussing Arabic calligraphy, Islamic architecture and the importance of symbolism, such as the symbol of horses in the Arabic and Islamic culture. There will also be a programme on innovators in the Muslim and Arab world, highlighting intellectual property and inventors. This show will be twenty minutes long and will incorporate the use of social media to increase the lively participation of the audience within the programme. An additional programme to the channel will be a competition programme on Arab information, and according to the current time zone, participants can join the competition and the winners get Arabic-inspired novelty items. As the major basis of society, there will be a programme to highlight the concept of family values in the Arabic and Islamic culture by presenting its importance and the relationship between the individual family members and their roles and rights. Also, the channel will have a live feature to connect the organising team virtually on special occasions and air it live to introduce the team's channel via a live video conversation. Also, there will be a live show to introduce the channel, discuss issues and answer audience questions.

By providing the above-mentioned programmes, this virtual broadcaster will be able to fill five gaps that other broadcasters have left empty. The first is emphasising the *elements of unity* which have been neglected in order to avoid

strengthening the relations between Arabs and Muslims at the international level. The second is promoting inspirational role models to encourage efficiency and positivity in achievements. The third is addressing the language as the main element of culture; Arabic in this case, which is also the language of not only Arabic countries but all Muslims who have learned to read the Holy Quran. In fact, Arabic as the Quran language is the main base of the *elements of unity*, which reflects the shared principles and beliefs amongst Muslims, regardless of their ethnicities, under one language. The fourth is highlighting the richness of the arts and architecture in the region. This will help strengthen the spiritual cultures of Arabs of all religious sects. The fifth is showing the importance of family values as the basic element of society for audiences to understand what the Arab collectivist societies mean.

Appendices

I. Online Resources of the Programmes

DW-TV Arabia's Programmes

Youth Without Borders: <http://goo.gl/8ugQn>

The Cultural Salon: <http://goo.gl/XvQzN>

Between the North and the South: <http://goo.gl/lzBep>

Youth Talk: <http://goo.gl/jmohk>

With the Event: <http://goo.gl/BHvnY>

The New Arab Debates: <http://goo.gl/6YLfQ>

TRT-Etturkiyye's Programmes

Without Restrictions: <http://goo.gl/twMzA>

Etturkiyye Morning: <http://goo.gl/yXRAo>

Good Morning from Istanbul, East and West, In the Shades of the Event and A Thousand and One Nights programmes were removed from the websites, most probably due to the policy changes of the channel.

II. DW-TV Arabia Episodes Sample:

DW-TV Arabia First Phase Episodes:

Youth Without Borders:

First Episode: March 24th, 2010:

This episode's theme focused on how the youth maintain a healthy and hygienic life by looking at the two cultures' daily health style. The main theme of the episode was covering health education through multiple perspectives. There were sixteen participants, which assisted in bringing multiple perspectives to themes discussed. The first report began with Axel entering Cairo International Airport and walking through machines to detect the swine flu signs. Then, he passed by a school to see the type of health lessons provided for students and parents. Mentioning the precautionary measures for the swine flu at Cairo International Airport reflected a cultural difference as shown throughout the discussion. The main difference was the process of how to deal with infectious diseases; unlike the Egyptians, Germans have not exaggerated the size of the disease and its circumstances.

The second report was a group video showing Aymen, Husam and Angi. Aymen presented the issue of buying food from the street regardless of the cleanliness of the place. He also presented health concerns when going to the barber; these were of such a concern that it was necessary for a person to bring his own tools with him. Husam presented the issue of preparing one's self to fight diseases by reading and expanding one's knowledge. Angi presented the importance of maintaining a balanced diet with exercise to have a healthy life.

The third report was another group video showing Caroline and Janouch. Caroline presented her daily lifestyle of taking care of your skin and outlook because it reflects the personality and gives others a good impression of her. She also cycled

to work because cycling is of importance as an alternative to daily exercise and was energy-refreshing. Janouch presented the importance of understanding different types of vaccines and keeping a record of what has been taken and what needs to be taken. He then showed his usual grocery-shopping list and that he concentrates on buying vegetables and milk rich with vitamins. Both Caroline and Janouch cook their own meals. Comparing report two and three, it can be interpreted that the Egyptian youth diet and health lifestyle were in need of more redirecting and awareness by providing the German youth lifestyle as a much positive and healthy example that can be taken as a model. For example, buying fresh vegetables, washing them, cooking food for themselves, as well as riding bicycles on a daily basis. However, there is another aspect which can be observed from this episode: the Egyptian youth were more reliant on their family and a major component of their diet was their family-gathering meal at the end of the working day, which was missing in all of the German examples. Aside from the basic health and diet tips, both Germans and Egyptians youth examples can be interpreted differently according to the observer's cultural and value-system background.

The fourth report covered by Mohammed presented the topic of health and sex issues in Egypt and how the Egyptian youth can learn more about these issues. This report highlighted the youth questions asked through a Hotline service that maintains the privacy of the caller. This report lasts for one minute and twenty-nine seconds.

The fifth report covered the issue of AIDS in Germany and the participant covering the topic was Emily. The report introduced an organisation in Berlin that arranges workshops, forums and lectures for young adults. Although none of the Egyptian youth discussed the issue of AIDS in Egypt in the same open way as the German report due to religious, traditional and ethical sensitivity of the issue, the final

report covered random youth opinions from both Germany and Egypt on how to deal with an AIDS patient. There were seven opinions from Egypt and six from Germany in which answers vary from one person to another but, overall, showed some sort of an awareness of the case according to the individual's health knowledge.

Second Episode: July 28th, 2010:

The topic of this episode was the culture of protesting, and there were fifteen participants attending the episode. It focused on how youth from the Egyptian culture as well as the German culture express their opinions and protest. The first report was a group video showing Katarina, a German lady visiting Egypt and investigating how Egyptian youth practice their rights to protest. It is critical to point out here that the first report was an investigative report done in Egypt by a German lady instead of an Egyptian person due to the restrictions over the expression rights there. The first Egyptian lady introduced in this report was Yasmin, who works for an organisation to prevent violence against women. The second Egyptian lady was Ola, who is protesting against the ideas and traditions and questioned them. The last Egyptian youth introduced in this episode was Ahmed, who created a website called "Ana Tkhana'at"³⁰ as a platform for all Egyptian youth to protest against whatever bothers them.

The second report covered another group of youth from Germany: Marin, Markos, Robert and Vilmos. Marin is a German lady who is protesting against fixing CCTV in front of her accommodation by sending formal letters and emails to the authority in charge, informing them that this is an act of violation of her privacy. Markos is a student activist who is protesting against the rise in study fees by meeting the student affairs director and organising a petition to be submitted to the higher

³⁰ *Ana Tkhana'at*: I'm fed-up!

administration of the university. Robert, on the other hand, is participating in a demonstration against building a wall around a public park to control the opening hours of the park. Vilmos, a young man with a traveller's soul, is considering his lifestyle as a protest against living without a goal in life because he does not want to live a life without a message, principles and values. This report lasts for three minutes and six seconds.

The third report was another group video showing Heidi, Shareif and Jasmeen. Heidi is adopting a lifestyle that is not acceptable in traditional Egyptian society by living on her own in Cairo as a way to protest against this way of thinking. She is publishing her experiences and opinions online for society to hear her. Shareif, a third-year undergraduate student, is protesting against a brand new curriculum that is going to be enforced in their class during their final year, because he cannot adopt the new plans and, thus, this will affect his grades. Also, he presented the issue of proposing to a lady regardless of his family's refusal. Jasmeen is organising an awareness campaign about the importance of maintaining the identity of their city against the demolition of an old historical building in their neighborhood.

The variety of the issues that each youth groups were protesting for reflects how both cultures are different in terms of their political systems and their rights and needs. For example, the German youth reports focused on the privacy rights, students' rights, public rights, and individual rights to choose their way of living. Also, the report shows how such protests were taken in terms of directly contacting the authorities or expressing themselves. On the other hand, the Egyptian youth reports shed light on women's rights, questioning traditional ideas and taboos, virtual protests, students' rights, choosing their marriage partners and the heritage places rights. As can be noticed, none of the mentioned Egyptian youth reports and

comments stated the role of the authority or reflected on how the authority has accessible communication means with its own citizens in comparison to the German youth reports content. This is a crucial difference between the two groups of culture. The episode was aired six months before the Arab Uprising of 2011, and as will be shown in the second phase of this analysis, the way the youth are asking for their needs to be met has been changed dramatically in terms of the language used as well as their self-confidence.

The fourth report was presented by Lewis and covered the duties of peaceful demonstration police: the Anti-Conflict Team. He explained the role of the police during demonstrations and the right of people to not be offended by the police. This report lasts for one minute and twenty-eight seconds.

The fifth report covered the importance of caricature as a form of protesting against political, social and economic problems. Hind presented the topic by interviewing the head of the Egypt Cartoon Group. This report lasts for one minute and thirty-four seconds.

The final report covered random youth opinions from both Germany and Egypt on the reasons for people to protest. There were eleven answers from Berlin; these were: against war, social injustice, Neo-Nazi, because they are not satisfied, to change, to show that we have a presence, because I'm responsible towards the society, it is important, I don't protest because I don't see a reason for that, and I protest peacefully; and six from Cairo: I protest against nepotism and bribery, I protest against sexual harassment, those who don't protest are either ignorant or are bored, they have hope to change, new styles and looks are a form of protest, we've inherited a massive amount of ideas that we've never questioned and it is time to give it a second thought.

Looking at both groups' answers, the German youth reflects the relations between the German Nazi history and the post-war German culture, in which the first three interviewees said they protest against war, social injustice and neo-Nazism. This is also evident in the last youth's comment that he protests *peacefully*. The other group of answers did not have a specific concentration in which it reflected their understanding of the importance of protesting as part of their responsibilities towards the society when change is needed without stating changing what exactly. On the other hand, the Egyptian youths' answers show a much more practical and mature perspective of why to protest. In fact, four out of the six answers were clear indicators of the Arab Uprising of 2011 that nobody considered them seriously at that time. The other two answers reflected the type of society's culture in which the individual is to consider the people around him/her dressing or acting. In comparison to the Egyptian youths' radical way of interpreting protests due to their situation, the German youths' answers can indicate how the Western democracies political systems consolidated in their subconscious that it is *their* responsibility to protest and express themselves towards any issues. However, policy-makers are the only group of people who can really take any of the necessary decisions in order to create change.

The Cultural Salon:

First Episode: July 15, 2009:

The topic of this episode was the "Arab World and the Modernity Crisis" aired from Berlin. Guests were Prof. Dr. Gudrun Krämer, an Islamic history scholar and the Chair of the Institute of Islamic Studies at the Free University of Berlin; and Prof. Muhammad Nur alDin Afayah, a contemporary philosophy scholar at Mohammed the 5th University, and he is the head of an intercultural communication centre in Rabat. The introductory reportage opening scene was the towers of Dubai as a symbol of

modernity and trade followed by the labour rights, which is, in fact, presenting it as a negative modernity that focuses on the outlook of development while neglecting the basic labourers' rights and needs. Then, the report went on to present the requests of European countries to Arabs to adapt modernity. Examples of this adaptation were presented as in women's rights and political rights, along with scenes of the Mubarak regime's efforts in promoting democratic elections regardless of the fact that he is clinging onto power. It seems that one of the reasons that forced DW-TV Arabia to change the way programmes' reports are produced is the fact that the channel was biased towards Arab governments to maintain its political and economic relations. For example, the channel have chosen a scene of the Mubarak regime's efforts in organising elections in Egypt as an attempt from the channel to expose it as a positive effort by an Arab government. As will be seen in the second phase, the Arab Uprising of 2011 has opened the gates for DW-TV Arabia to discuss publicly and critically the political issues of the Arab countries and to invites all guests that reflect the Arab public opinion. After that, the report shed light on the fact that the same European countries calling for reforms are the same powers that made the Arab public inherit these regimes due to the colonial era. This shows how DW-TV Arabia is easily addressing the former colonial powers because Germany has never occupied an Arab country. For Germany's advantage, the channel can criticise the French and British policies towards Arab countries; however, the German policies have never reached the needed amount of a general acceptance amongst Arab publics due to its diplomacy approach of being neutral towards Israeli policies in the region. As a result, the Turkish policies are gaining the full trust of the majority of Arabs.

Following that, the report stated that this time can be considered to be the same industrial era that Europe had witnessed previously; however, Islam is

becoming the most influential factor even at the political sphere. The report concluded with these questions: “Is there a need to globalise the Islamic communities? Would the literacy movement help in creating a modernity movement from within? Or would the contact with Europe be the way to modernity?” The last scene of the report showed President Butaflia of Algeria welcoming the Chancellor of Germany, Merkel, at the airport. By choosing this concluding scene, DW-TV Arabia is trying to show a positive image of the relations between Germany; represented by the Chancellor, and the Arab countries; in this case the Algerian president. This is a typical propagandist method that would not work anymore amongst Arabs, let alone the radical changed following the Arab Uprising of 2011.

The first guest report of Prof. Krämer starts with a close-up scene of her writing in Arabic. She was introduced as an orientalist who blames politics for spoiling the relations between the two civilizations and that fear is the reason for the conflict. She added that the West could be considered as an arrogant power, yet the West is not anti-Islam. The report went on to state that understanding the existence of differences amongst cultures is the highest degree of modernity, in Prof. Krämer’s point of view. She considered her role to be to understand Islam, to present it to the German public and to be the bridge between the Germans and Muslims.

Next, the report presented the Institute of Islamic Studies at the Free University of Berlin and stated that its chair, Prof. Krämer, sees modernity as the relationship amongst people and the world by adapting to new lifestyles without leaving one’s religious principles and values. The report concluded that Prof. Krämer does not see a modernity problem amongst Arabs, because as long as they are thinking and solving their social problems, then they are not struggling against modernity.

The second guest report started with a scene of Prof. Afayah in his home with his young daughter flipping through his books on modernity, followed by his collection of books. Then, he stated that modernity is not a matter of choice; Islamic societies are developing, thus, there is no way to avoid modernity. Next, the report showed the traditional market of Rabat as a place of richness of identity that sells both traditional clothes and DVDs. After that, the Authority of Visual and Audio Communications was introduced by stating Prof. Afayah's role there as a counsellor. He believes that the media are the way forward for modernity. The report concluded that the historical richness of Rabat that witnessed both the Romans and Islamic heritage is proof that civilizations were not there to struggle and deny one another.

Second Episode: August 11, 2010:

The topic of this episode was the "Artists' Industry" aired from Berlin. The first guest was Michael Jürgs, a journalist and an author of *Seichtgebiete*³¹, a book that criticises the new trend of misleading audiences by using the youth dreams by giant media outlets to brand them as singers or artists for a short period of time to recycle their money and gain more. The second guest was Ahmed Soultan, a Moroccan singer and artist who refused the idea of participating on television talent shows because he wanted to create his own style. Besides, he believes the arts are something to be developed throughout the years. The chosen invited guests represent a theoretical point of view from a German journalist and a practical point of view from a Moroccan singer in order to address both Arab intellectuals and youth alike. Also, it helps the viewers to understand the overall situation of the discussed topic.

The overall discussion was against talent shows, in which both guests presented different aspects of this type of programme's negativities. The introductory

³¹ Shallow Areas: Why We Dumbed Down Uncontrollably.

reportage took three minutes and two seconds. The report started by presenting the German 19-year-old lady who won the Eurovision talent-show competition and became a superstar for her song “Satellite” in 2009. Then, the report presented the European perspective of the show by stating a philosophical statement by the German contemporary philosopher Peter Sloterdijk: “The belief in a miracle” of “reaching the celebrities’ life-style without efforts”, as this sort of show plays with the youths’ dreams in changing their lives instantly. From the Arab perspective, the report presented Prof. Dr. Marwan Kraidy’s argument that this sort of show is a chance for the youth to challenge the whole society by presenting him/herself publicly; moreover, it gave Arab publics the feeling of living in a democratic atmosphere, which they are missing in reality, by voting for the best performance. The channel presented viewpoints of a German philosopher as well as the Arab scholar's to allow major comparison between the two societies, where the German point of view carry's a capitalist idea of reaching a luxurious life using the shortest means possible, while the Arab view is out of the dream of practicing their freedom of choice and expression. This is a core different between the two cultures that resulted in the unexpected Arab Uprising of 2011. The report then attributed the fast disappearance of the recently discovered talent to the fact that a new season means a new talent – that is how brands are promoted. After that, the report presented the German band *Silbermond*³² and the Moroccan band DARGA as examples of successful youth bands.

The first guest reportage took three minutes. It started with scenes of Jürgs refusing in a mocking way what is being said at FaktenFürFiktionen forum without mentioning what is being said. Then, the report discussed his book *Seichtgebiete* to

³² Silver Moon.

present his argument about talent shows, followed by his story with *Stern* magazine and how he worked there as a journalist and an editor before being fired. His love for Hamburg was expressed, followed by concluding scenes of the city.

The second guest's reportage took three minutes and twenty-one seconds. It started with scenes of his town's local traditional shoes craft market – Taroudant. His story of how he started to work with his father in planting and trading Saffron and Argan oil was presented as his first steps towards accomplishing his dream. Then, the report presented the importance of travelling between Morocco and France as a way to create his music styles. His sister's support and his patience in working in the farm helped him in reaching his dream. One of his video clips shows him singing in French. Next, the report presented the street dances in Taroudant and how this lifestyle helped Suoltan to form his identity. The report concluded with the importance of Suoltan's Amazigh origins that strengthen the loyalty towards the African culture. The Amazighi case can be consider as a major issue of conflict in not only Morocco, but also, the Arab Maghreb. There are movements that call for their political liberation and separation from the Arab countries. Highlighting this issue at the end of a cultural episode that discusses music and arts can be interpreted as a way to support a human right issue from the DW perspective. However, it might be interpreted also as a channel that promotes sectarianism. It can be argued that this episode tends to have one core argument towards the discussed topic, which can be seen not only in the negative opinions of the guests towards the talent shows but, also, in the overall structure of the episode and its reportages. For instance, it started by presenting the German journalist's negative opinions of the topic, then presenting the Moroccan singer as an inspirational model to achieve, as well as another two reported positive

examples from Germany and Morocco.

Between the North and the South:

First Episode: July 2, 2009:

This episode's topic was "The Culture between the North and the South" and was aired from Algeria. The reportage length was one minute and fifty-two seconds and included Dalila Nadi, a researcher on Chinese enterprises and labour in Algeria, Zentrum Moderner Orient³³, Berlin; Nor alDein Othmani, the advisor of the Algerian Minister of Culture, Algeria; Mohamed Baghali, editor-in-chief of the Algerian newspaper *AlKhabar*; and Prof. Brend Tom, College of Social Studies at Karlsruhe University, Germany. The in-studio audience consisted of fifteen members.

The introductory report covered four issues by introducing the fact that the Mediterranean has a diverse, rich culture around its coasts, followed by the official efforts and initiatives to create a cultural collaboration to build a long-term understanding between the nations. The report went on to present examples of these initiatives, for instance, the Algerian Cultural Festival, the Paris Summit and the NEPAD³⁴. In fact, aside from the Algerian Cultural Festival, the others are development initiatives that include a cultural item, in other words, these examples are not pure cultural initiatives that serve to bridge buildings and cultural understanding.

The first in-studio questions slot had two questions; the first was from an International Relations graduate who asked: "Can this sort of collaboration considered to be an organised form of soft power that will not be fair for the general public interest?" The second question was from a Media and Communications graduate who asked: "To what extent does the economic crisis affect the EU's financial support to

³³ Institute of Modern Oriental Studies.

³⁴ The New Partnership for Africa's Development.

the South coast of the Mediterranean?” The second in-studio questions slot had two questions; the first was from a Media and Communications graduate who asked: “Is dialogue enough to build bridges among nations?” The second question was from an undergraduate Politics and Media Sciences student who asked: “How can we overcome the crisis of selectivity in the brain-drain from the South to the North?” The total time of the questions was one minute and twenty seconds.

Although the episode’s report did not define culture and the opening scene featured a tanker sailing, followed by the heads of the Mediterranean governments, Ghaddafi, Mubarak, Sarkozy and Merkel, while the narrator is stating how the economic and political relations have lasting historical strength. The in-studio questions were focusing on the form of collaboration between Europe and the Maghreb rather than the cultural aspect of the relations. Culture seems to be presented as a public diplomacy tool and a soft form of power allowing the strong nations to expose other nations to its own way of life, thus, its own point of view towards the surrounding issues as well as gain its own economic and political interests.

Second Episode: August 18, 2010:

The topic of the episode was "Public Opinion Industry" and was aired from Berlin. Guests were Prof. Dr. Oliver Hahn, VP of the Department of Media Studies at the Business and Information Technology School (BiTS), University of Applied Sciences, Iserlohn, Germany; Prof. Dr. Ahmed Adhimi at Algiers University, Algeria; and Dr. Achour Fenni, a lecturer and researcher at the Institute of Information Science and Communication (ISIC), University of Algiers, Algeria. The in-studio audience consisted of twelve members.

This introductory report took two minutes and seven seconds. It started by stating that public opinion played a crucial role in moving the political situation of a

country; however, its efficiency depended on the social and political system of the country. The first statement of the report reflects DW-TV Arabia's caution and sensitive sense towards reporting Arab political issues, especially in discussing the issue of freedom of expression. Another sign of this cautious approach is the overall structure of this report, in which it is stated that global public opinion was able to change policies concerning natural disasters with the power of connectivity provided by technology, yet, it was followed by the statement that global public opinion cannot stand against major state interests, as if DW-TV Arabia is providing a safe cover for itself that it did not *call* for the global public opinion to struggle against the interest of these international actors. The report went on to state that there were events in which public opinion managed to change their political situation, whereas, on other occasions, politicians managed to gain the public vote and move it towards supporting their international policies according to its interests and needs. After that, the report presented scenes of recent natural disasters and the economic crisis, presenting how these issues brought up the power of public opinion, especially with the fact that the high technologies made them more visible. The report concluded by stating that technology is getting global publics closer than ever before in terms of their fears and hopes. Also, it stated that the global public opinion cannot affect major international actors and an individual state's interests, such as the example of the Copenhagen Summit of Climate Change and the US-led war against the Iraqi regime. The report focused on the latter case by stating that there were public movements against the war, yet, the main international actor led the campaign for the war and misled the international public opinion with the claim that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. Finally, the report concluded that nobody paid back the misled public or at least apologised to them. The question of the first two polls was: "Is it possible to influence

public opinion and direct it?" The first public poll was conducted in Berlin and there were seven participants: three women and four men. The second public poll was conducted in Algeria with five participants, all men, which might be the result of the cultural tradition of the Algerians, the unavailability of women willing to express their opinion at the recording time, or the interviewer did not pay attention to the possibility that interviewing only men would be interpreted negatively. All participants agreed that the media does affect the public opinion and they are well aware that the media can redirect and mislead it. The second question of the third and fourth public polls was: "To what extent does the public opinion impact on the international decision-making?" The third poll was conducted in Algeria and the same five men answered the question. The fourth poll was conducted in Berlin and there were nine participants, five of whom were women and four were men. There were two participants, an Algerian and a German, who answered with: yes, the public opinion does affect the international affairs; however, the rest of the participants were looking negatively at the issue because of the interests of those who are in power and the lobbyist groups.

DW-TV Arabia Second Phase Episodes:

Youth Talk:

First Episode: September 13, 2011:

The main question discussed in the first episode was: "Will the youth lose their revolution?" As it suggests, DW-TV Arabia admitted that the Arab Uprising of 2011 is a revolution belonging to the youth. This is a clear indicator of the position of not only the channel but also the German Foreign Office. However, it also suggests that the invited guests represent the Arab youth opinion in which – for the first time – DW-TV Arabia present youth with their activism titles and discuss Arab political

systems openly. The guest speakers were Thomas Folk, a member of the Christian Democratic Union; Ahmed Moez, an individual political activist; and Asmaa Mahfoodh, one of the founder members of the Egyptian Party and a youth who wanted to elect herself for the presidential position. Part of the opening statement of all episodes was: "... We welcome your comments and opinions regardless of its differences." It has been said repeatedly in all the episodes, at the introductory as well as the concluding statements, because the focus of using social media as a communication means with the audience and to view their opinions during the episode is considered to be a new approach for DW-TV Arabia.

After a short introduction of the topic, the moderator introduced the guests by saying, "Our first guest is Thomas Folk from CDU, who wonders if the youth who get the Mubarak regime's down can participate in the democratisation process of Egypt."

The whole structure of the programme is orbited around five social-media slots. After the introduction of the topic and the guests, each guest was allowed to state his opinion, and then the social-media slots started. The first slot lasts for nine seconds to show an interactive population map about the youth percentage in Egypt, Libya, Tunis and Syria, representing the Arab youth importance. Then, the guests discussed the satisfaction level of the results of the uprisings so far. The second slot lasts for twenty seconds and shows a cartoon in one of the Facebook pages, picturing a Salafi man climbing the ladder of people towards the presidential chair. After that, the guests discussed the fear of Islamist parties ruling Egypt. In fact, the fear of Islamists ruling Egypt was a major issue that the German guest was repeatedly stressing over for the sake of the peace treaty with Israel. The third slot lasts for twenty-two seconds, with a video by a young Egyptian man stating his opinion during the Friday of "Path Redirecting" September 9th, 2011. Then, the guests discussed

what had happen during that day and whether or not Israel prepared for that event. Again, the German guest insists that Islamists and, specifically, Muslim Brotherhood are to be feared, especially after the attack on the Israeli Embassy in Cairo. However, the Egyptian activist clarifies that the Muslim Brotherhood members were not participating on that Friday's protests. Besides, the Egyptian lady mentioned that there is a strong belief that there are forces that wanted to spoil the protests by attacking the embassy. This open debate over the Israeli case in the very first episode of the programme gave a direct impression that Arab youth are ready to discuss any topic regardless of its sensitivity, which might challenge DW-TV Arabia's approaches. The fourth slot lasts for seventeen seconds and scrolls through a Facebook page "No to the Emergency Laws". Next, the guests discussed the nature of the civil disobedience and its importance. Here, it can be seen clearly that DW have shifted radically in addressing the political issues in the Arab world; for instance, instead of addressing public opinion and protests topics, this episode discusses the civil disobedience of the Arab Uprising. The final social media slot showed the programme's Facebook page with comments about today's question. The episode concluded with a brief statement from each guest when asked: "When do you think the revolution was fruitful?" The approach of using social media by DW-TV Arabia to reach the Arab youth directly reflects an understanding of the overall situation and where the region is heading to. Although the selective process of the Tweets and Facebook comments is still prepared before the episode starts, it can be considered as a positive step towards understanding their target audiences.

Second Episode: September 20, 2011:

The topic of the second episode was "The Price of Freedom". The invited speakers were Zahraa Saeed Qasem, the elder sister of the murdered Khaled Saeed;

Johannes Shtemler, a journalist and writer from Eastern Germany; and Ghaydaa AlTawati, a Libyan female blogger who was jailed for three months from February 16, 2011 to May 17, 2011 by the Qadhaffi regime.

As in the previous episode, the episode started by introducing the topic and the guests and encouraged the audience to participate by posting their comments on the Facebook page to be viewed by the end of the episode. Following the social-media slots method, the episode went as follows: the first slot was divided to present two videos, fifteen seconds for awarding the late Khaled Saeed with the Friedrich Albert Award for Human Rights Activist of 2011 along with the Tunisian Al-Buazizi and a ten-second video of graffiti for Khaled Saeed painted over the Berlin Wall. The discussion then covered the emotional aspect of the cost of freedom in terms of the families' reactions and feelings towards the high costs of losing their sons or daughters. In fact, the post-Arab Uprising of 2011 programmes repeatedly linked between the post-Arab Uprising of 2011 and the Berlin Wall revolution, which can be considered as a new approach by DW-TV Arabia to create a subconscious historical bond with the Arab youth. Such an approach might be fruitful and influential in the near future.

The second slot took thirty-three seconds, showing a cartoon from the Facebook page of Kulluna Khaled Saeed, showing Khaled Saeed wearing a youthful hoody with the Twitter hashtag of #Jan25 written on his chest; he was holding Mubarak as a rat in his hand, ready to throw it. After that, the discussion measured the amount of satisfaction with the current situation of the revolutions and looked at the reasons behind each guest's opinion.

The third slot showed a thirty-five second investigative video by DW when they joined Ghayda at her former prison. The moderator led the discussion to find out

what drives the youth to stay strong against such dictatorial regimes. Choosing Ghayda as a guest for this episode of “the Price of Freedom” was excellent because she is a woman who stood up against not only a dictatorial regime but, also, against the false stereotype that Arab women are to *obey* only. In fact, the cost she paid was her reputation as a woman that is very high in such a traditional and closed society as the Libyan societies; however, she stated clearly that she will continue to struggle by writing blog posts as long as injustice exists in Libya.

The fourth social media slot showed ten seconds of a cartoon in a Facebook page by Ahmed Nadi of a military man sitting over the people, followed by another ten-second scene of a photograph copyrighted to R. N. N., showing how an activist is being mistreated. Then, twelve seconds of a Twitter comment was shown, questioning why the military tanks are not visible to protect the families of martyrs. The discussion concluded by asking the guests to send very brief advice to other youth fighting for their freedom. The final social media slot presented two Facebook pages; the first of these was seventeen seconds of Youth Talk’s Facebook page, with one of the audience members, Anas Syria, stating his opinion about the cost of freedom. The second Facebook page was eighteen seconds of the Syrian “Freedom Print” page, providing information about missing youth, and a twenty-five second video about one of the missing youth. The talk then moved towards discussing the role of the human rights organisation and what the guests are planning to do in the future.

Third Episode: September 27, 2011:

In this episode, the talk centred around “the Role of Citizen Journalism in Forming the Arab Spring”. Guest speakers were from Syria, Germany and Egypt and included Sundus Sulaiman, a Syrian blogger, activist and a political opposition;

Matthias Spielkamp, a journalist and online copyrights activist; and Wael Abbas, an Egyptian blogger and former journalist.

In leading the talk, Jaafar started the session as usual by introducing the topic and the guests, followed by his usual statement: "We welcome your comments and opinions regardless of its differences." Then, three core questions started the discussion: has the media blackout era ended due to the existence of blogging? Why was there no role for citizen journalism in Germany? And why did you become a blogger? After that, the social-media slots started. The first social media slot was a thirteen-second interactive screen showing statistical findings by the Dubai School of Government about the sources of news in both Egypt and Tunis during the Arab Uprising of 2011. The questions were formed to answer questions regarding the reasons for the reluctance of people from the traditional news sources, the credibility of the blogger-activist sources, the changes that occur in the traditional media after the revolutions and the need of laws to protect bloggers and their sources. The invited guests' answers and comments about the role of citizen journalism and its credibility in comparison to the traditional media and news sources shows how the two different cultural and political systems of Germany and Egypt affected their ways of reflecting on the usage of citizen journalism as trusted media.

The second social-media slot took thirty-eight seconds, showing Sundus' Facebook pages after being hacked by the Syrian virtual regime. The discussion centred on how an activist in this case can continue his/her work, whether blogging is a responsible act, what sort of harassment a blogger might face and from where a blogger gets the power to continue. The third social-media slot took twenty-six seconds, showing through the official Syrian satellite channel another way to put emotional pressure on the activists: by interviewing their family members, as in the

case of Sundus. Emotional questions followed; for instance, how is your relationship with your family? Is blogging the only solution in dictatorial regimes? And what are the differences between journalism and citizen journalism? Almost the same questions were asked to the previous episode's guests. Addressing the emotional part of the issue is what the majority of Arab publics understand. In fact, by presenting a woman who is an oppositionist to the corrupted regime, like Sundus in this episode and Ghayda in the previous episode, contains a direct message to all Arab women to struggle because they are not alone and other women are struggling too.

The fourth social-media slot took twenty-three seconds to show Facebook and Twitter comments about Tantawi's witness statement during the Mubarak trial, followed by questions focusing on the credibility of the sources, the information chaos and the future of blogging. Although Arab youth are already active online, DW-TV Arabia is trying to find its own virtual common grounds with them. As mentioned earlier, the approach of using social media can strengthen its presence in the Arab media market; however, DW should keep in mind that there are other competitors who are using almost the same methods.

Fourth Episode: October 4, 2011:

The fourth episode was aired from Cairo, where the political situation is not yet settled, and moderated by Yasmin Saeed, a young woman in her twenties. The following details what occurs in this episode; however, it must be noted that there were several cuts and edits in the montage.

This episode was trying to find the answer to: "From where can the youth start?" All the invited guests were political representatives: Muhammed AlQasas, member of the Tayyar elMasri (TM) Party; Nasser Abdul Hameed, member of the Executive the Youth Revolution Coalition; and Sebastian Nerz, the leader of the

Piratenpartei Deutschland³⁵ from May 2011 to April 2012, the new German Party that won 9% of the German Parliament seats.

The moderator started the discussion by asking a direct question to her Egyptian guests: "Where are you going to start for the parliament election preparations?" followed by a question to the German guest: "How did you managed to reach a high percentage of seats for a brand new party?"

Then, instead of the structured social-media slots, this episode moved back to DW's old approach of reportage of videos asking youth their opinions, due to either sensitivity of the discussed topic or the lack of equipment. This video lasts for fifty-seven seconds and showed two Egyptian youth, of which one was a Salafi and the other was an ordinary man who did not state his political orientation.

Then, the discussion focused on the type of obstacles facing youth parties, ways to win more votes, the importance of social media, and their hopes. Next, a social-media slot showed a Facebook page for nineteen seconds, followed by a Twitter comment for eighteen seconds; both are commenting about the elections. The group discussed the youth vision of the coming elections, chances of getting into blocs, and the German election experience. It was evident that throughout the episodes the German guest was there to pass his party's experience and advice not to discuss issues with the Egyptian youth.

Then, a twenty-seven second video reportage showed two of the Piratenpartei Deutschland members stating their opinion as follows: "What makes us unique is the large number of our members whom have never thought of participating on the political spheres" and "We are looking for transparency in our political strategy; even in the relations with companies and other partners, we have to be clear in how we deal

³⁵ Pirate Party Germany.

with others.” These two comments reflect how, even in Germany, youth are seeking transparency in their political system, which led them to engage in the realm of political participation. This was followed by a discussion of the Egyptian youth role, problems of the Egyptian parliament elections, the fear of the former regime members, and Germany’s methods of dealing with former Nazi members. The moderator ended the episode by addressing a direct concluding question to all: “What are your hopes for the future?”

The overall evaluation of the episode was weak in comparison to the previous episodes in terms of how the moderator was managing the discussion and the overall level of the discussion. Besides, the episode presented a reportage getting the old style of DW instead of focusing on social media videos. The episodes’ reports enhance the image that the programme was prepared previously, which loses its main goal of gaining the trust of their target audience.

With the Event:

First Episode: September 14, 2011:

This episode's topic was about the Libyan situation: "Libya After Gadhaffi". As the very first episode of the programme, this topic was very daring because Gadhaffi had not been captured yet. It indicates that the channel no longer supports the corrupted Arab governments. The guests were Jürgen Klinke, member of the German Parliament of the Christian Democratic Party and a member of the Parliament Foreign Affairs; Guido Schneider, an expert at the Institute of the Security and International Affairs Research in Berlin; and Ahmed Al-Abbar, member of the Libyan National Transitional Council. The invited guests reflect two of DW-TV Arabia’s new approaches: firstly, building networks with the upper high officials and, secondly, understanding how the new leaders of the Arab world are thinking by

engaging them in a direct broadcasted debate show. Here, DW-TV Arabia is operating as a strategic diplomatic tool for the German Foreign Affairs Office.

The first video reportage covered the women's celebrations in Benghazi and Tripoli, the fear of leakage of weapons to unwanted groups, the concerns regarding oil wealth, the overall vision of the future political situation by the National Transitional Council from preparing a new constitution, the legislative elections, the NATO positions and their willingness to support the National Transitional Council. The overall shown scenes reflect the interests of Germany in terms of highlighting women's participation as a way to address women's rights and empowerment, maintaining peace in the region, the economic issues of the distribution of Libyan wealth, understanding the new political system in Libya and the cost of NATO intervention in Libya. The discussion addressed the following questions: 1) What is the scene that the Libyans are moving towards? 2) How is the National Transitional Council going to unite the different parties and tribes? 3) What are the approaches taken to maintain security and national unity? 4) Are there concerns regarding the availability of weapons in the hands of all and are there any chances to have guerrilla war? 5) Do you have any comment on the previous answer and how is the National Transitional Council going to stop the spread of weapons, to integrate the youth, and to deal with splits? 6) What is your opinion of what has been discussed and what is the NATO role in the coming phase? 7) Is Gadhaffi now a role in shaping your politics? 8) Mentioning the NATO role, what sort of support is the National Transitional Council seeking from NATO? 9) What is your opinion of what has been said already and what do you think of Libya's Islamic parties? The flow of questions in the first part of the episode focused on the internal situation of Libya in which the

Libyan guest was giving the majority of time to answer while the concluding question was addressed to the German guest to reflect over what had been said.

The second video reportage covered the German position of the Libyan's case, starting with the refusal to vote for or against the NATO intervention coverage of Bashar's regime at the UN, the circumstances facing the foreign minister, his announcement of supporting NATO's actions after the situation changed and the revolts took over Tripoli; this was concluded with a scene of Merkel's participation in the supporting conference in Paris. This video moved to address the Libyan case from Germany's point of view and strategies. After that, questions were asked follows: 1) What does the National Transitional Council want from Germany? 2) How is the German Parliament going to fulfill the stated requests? 3) What is the German private sector's role in Libya? 4) With regard to the oil deals, France would have the large sum of it, right? 5) There are those who claim that the new government is going to rely on the oil income to regain the satiability. What do you think? It is critical to ask the Libyan guest to address what is needed from the Germans because it might be interpreted that Germany, represented by DW-TV Arabia, is still looking at Arabs as *the North giving the South*. Such an interpretation might affect the relations; in fact, even if it is to be interpreted as good will to support Libya, all the questions that followed reflect the economic interest of Germany in the Libyan's wealth rather than the humanitarian support for the Libyan people – another evidence of the capitalist motives of DW-TV Arabia.

Second Episode: September 21, 2011:

This episode's topic is about the Syrian situation: "Syria Between the Internal Repression and External Pressure." The guests were Joachim Hörster, MP of the of the Christian Democratic Party at the German Bundestag, Chairman of the

Parliamentary Friendship Committee for Relations with Arab-speaking Countries in the Middle East, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs as well as covering other high official positions; Tawfeeq Binamaarah, the United Nations representative of the development projects in the region and an international affairs expert; and Haytham Manna'a, political opposition of the current Syrian regime and a human rights activist. Unlike the previous episode, this episode invited the representative of the UN in order to add more depth to the discussion of the internal and external affairs of Syria.

The episode was divided into two parts: the first part discussed the internal situation of Syria in an attempt to find the solution to the daily killing as a result of Bashar's regime. The first video reportage showed how the UN and the EU were denouncing the repression and accusing Bashar al-Assad and his regime of committing war crimes and massacres of more than 2,700, the revolts demand that the regime has to leave, the issue of the international interference, the EU's role in pressure over Bashar's regime while the Arab League confined itself by just denouncing the situation, requesting Bashar's regime to stop the bloodshed of the citizens and to form a dialogue with the opposition. The Syrians revolts, on the other hand, are calling for a stronger international position to be taken. This report did not address the massacres or present the opposition group and the Free Syrian Army's point of view; instead, it focused on the difference between the EU and the Arab League positions towards the case.

The discussion followed with ten questions: 1) How can the Syrian regime be stopped? Were the economical economic sanctions efficient? 2) If the Syrian opposition needs support, do they have a clear programme and goal? Who is the representative? 3) What hinders the availability of a clear agreed-upon programme? 4)

If the international society would like to offer support, with whom are they going to talk? 5) Why is the UN not taking serious action regardless of Ban Ki-moon's announcements against Bashar's regime? 6) Will the Syrian revolts support the international interference? 7) Is it realistic to raise the slogan of overthrowing the regime without international support? 8) If the regional situation allows international interference, would an Arab country allow the NATO air jets to board from its land? 9) How are you asking for international responsibility without allowing international actors to interfere? The moderator then asked the German politician to reflect on what had been said. The way the questions were asked gave a negative situation of the Syrian case, thus, the uselessness of the matter, which resulted in the lack of interest and motive for Germany and EU to act for the benefit of the Syrian case. The second video reportage covered the Russian coverage of Bashar's regime at the UN. Questions went as follows: 1) What is the German position towards the Russian position? 2) In your opinion, what do you think of the UN role? 3) Is there any chance for a dialogue? 4) There is information that the Turkish government is going to provide the Free Syrian Army with weapons: what do you think? Again, the addressed questions are not looking at the Syrian people humanitarian situation but the interest of main international state actors. Also, it is representing it as a hopeless case.

Third Episode: September 28, 2011:

This episode's topic is "Trial of the Former Regimes: Justice or Revenge?" focusing on the Egyptian and Tunisian cases. The guests were Roland Jahn, a journalist and the former federal commissioner for the Stasi³⁶ Archives; Naser Amin, an Egyptian lawyer, human rights activists and the director of the Arab Centre for the

³⁶ German Ministry for State Security.

Independence of the Judiciary; and Mokhtar Yahyaoui, Judge and political activist and a member of the High Commission for Fulfilment of the Goals of the Revolution. Again, DW-TV Arabia is trying to create a historical bond in terms of how Arab activists should deal with the security and state police documentation by providing the example of how to deal with Stasi after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The first video reportage covers Mubarak's trial while he is on his sick bed, along with his sons and others, Bin Ali's trial in absentia and the massive amount of pressure over the trial by the public and the media. The questions that followed were: 1) How do you evaluate the situation? What are the differences between revenge and a fair trial? 2) Does the trial of the head of the regime mean the whole regime is overthrown? 3) You've stated that the defendants will be freed because the law has lots of gaps: what do you mean? 4) Did justice find its way, or was it accelerated actions without justice? 5) What is the danger of the trial of icons of the regime but not the regime as a whole in the future? 6) How is the cleansing process going? From where is it going to start? 7) Where do the difficulties lie? 8) Is the cleansing process facing the same obstacles in Tunis as well? The second video reportage covered the burning of offices of the state security services in Egypt after the rumours that officers destroyed official documents and evidence of their activities. This was followed by scenes in Tunisia of both the state security and the state political police, which resembled the events of 1989 in Germany when German citizens attacked the Stasi offices to protect documents from being destroyed, and how they had managed to establish an authority to take care of these archived documents so that people could see what had happened to them. After the report, the questions went as follows: 1) How do you see the solution from the German experience? 2) Is there a fear of the reappearance of the former leading party under a different name in Egypt? 3) Is the Tunisian situation similar? How? 4) Have

you asked, in Tunisia, to open the police security documents for the public to know who was who? 5) Will Egypt be able to open such sensitive documents? 6) How can the German example be applied in both Egypt and Tunisia? 7) How are they going to change the regime and not the head of the regime? DW-TV Arabia is still insisting in presenting Germany as a role model for Arabs revolts in how to deal with the current situation, neglecting the fact that there are huge differences between the cases.

Fourth Episode: October 05, 2011:

This episode's topic is about the Yemeni situation: "What follows the return of Saleh to Yemen?" The guests were Joachim Spatz, FDP member of the German Bundestag and a member of the Parliament's Foreign Affairs committee; Ahmed Obaida, a member of the Yemeni National Council and an opposition; and Ali Alme'amari, the media advisor of the Yemen Embassy in Lebanon. This is the first episode for the programme to invite an official representative from a corrupt Arab regime, which is legitimising Ali Saleh's regime from the German position. The episode starts with the reportage of the Yemeni situation, starting with scenes of the Yemeni publics covering the main highway and streets of the capital and other cities, followed by the televised speech of Ali Abdulla Saleh after he recovered from the attempt to assassinate him. Next, the report showed Saleh's unexpected return from Riyadh after he was treated and healed, followed by a scene of the crowds screaming, "The people want to trial the butcher!" Also, the report discussed the issue of the possibility of civil war due to the wide distribution of guns amongst the Yemeni tribes, the splits amongst the National Army, and the existence of Al-Qaeda in Yemen. The report concluded with scenes from the GCC initiatives in solving the issue and the UN support of this solution. After that, the discussion went as follows: 1) How do you see the crisis after the return of Saleh? 2) What are Saleh's reasons not to sign the

GCC solution? 3) Does the return of Saleh mean the return of the destruction to Yemen? 4) How do you evaluate the Saudi position? 5) Should the international community interfere immediately in Yemen? 6) Does the West not take some responsibility in delaying the support in comparison to Libya? 7) What are the strong points that Saleh's regime is betting on in order to remain in power? 8) Why did the opposition refuse to accept the ballot solution? 9) Why are you talking as if the opposition are one entity? Which opposition are you talking about? 10) Why did Saleh not sign the GCC solution? 11) What are the fears of Al-Qaeda's appearance if Saleh's regime disappears? 12) Change is a must: are we witnessing a unity amongst the resistance groups? 13) Who is taking the responsibility in Yemen: Ali Saleh or his son, Ahmed Ali? The episode showed some cautiousness from DW-TV Arabia's side in terms of how the montage was prepared and how the questions were asked. This can be attributed to the doubts over who are the representatives of the Yemeni revolts and the continuity of Saleh's regime in the power. This is an indicator that DW-TV Arabia is still limited in the way it discusses Arab issues according to its editorial board's priorities and interests.

The New Arab Debates:

First Episode: November 22, 2011:

This episode took place in Tunisia and focused on debating the recent elections in Tunisia, where it "has been believed that during the last elections Islamists won a dangerously large majority." For the motion was Sana Ouechtati, a constitutional lawyer and a lecturer at Katheidge University, a member of the drafting committee Democratic Modernist Group party and a board member of the Observatory of Democratic Transition Civil Society organisation. Against the motion was Yusra Ghannouchi, the spokesperson of the Al-Nahdha Party, which won the

majority of seats during the last parliament elections, and who is currently reading for her doctorate in Middle-Eastern Studies at London University.

Second Episode: February 8, 2011:

This episode, which was aired from Cairo, debated the readiness of Egypt for democracy. "Is the country prepared for this freedom and rights protecting so often called democracy?" For the motion was Ragia Omran, political activist, one of the famous Egyptian lawyers defending human rights cases, and who had worked as an inspector of the recent parliament elections. Against the motion was Nadein Wahab, a political activist, the deputy director of the ElBaradei campaign, one of the administrators of the Facebook page of "We Are All Khaled Saeed" and currently working with a campaign of "Liars Militants", a protest movement opposing the practice of the current military council leading Egypt.

III. TRT-Etturkiyye Episodes Sample:

TRT-Etturkiyye First Phase Episodes:

Good Morning from Istanbul:

Episode of January 10th, 2011:

The programme's length is two hours and aired live from three studios: Istanbul, Cairo and Beirut TRT's studios. The chosen Arab cities are well known for their cultural richness, in which both cities are considered to be the home of major Arab authors, singers, actors, etc. The first ten minutes of the programme introduces the episode's content and guests, followed by a live performance of a Turkish song. The following fifteen minutes are aired from Cairo and introduce two stories; the first is the story of a young jeweler and the second is the popularity of carpet handcraft amongst Egyptians. Then, the Istanbul studio took over for twenty minutes, introducing the two guests, a singer and an artist, and in which five minutes was devoted to a live Turkish song performance, followed by a short break. The third part of the episode introduced the Turkish artist's specialty in painting the marine lifestyle of Istanbul, including a minute and fifty-three-second report about him. After that, Beirut studio took a fifteen-minute section by introducing a humanitarian project about the first charity medical centre for corneal donation. The fifth part of the episode went back to the Istanbul studio and their guests for fifteen minutes to discuss how Istanbul is an inspirational city for artists and musicians alike. This part was concluded with a final Turkish song of two minutes and fifty-eight seconds. Aside from the following special guest part, the episode started and ended with a Turkish song because music is a major tool in public diplomacy. Although there were slots of stories from Cairo and Beirut that did not take thirty minutes in total, this entertainment programme serves to promote Turkey's cultural aspects through

entertainment only. The final part of the episode was twenty-five minutes of conversation with the guest of the day, in which a live call-in service with the audience is provided. In this episode, the guest was the international musician and singer Sami Yousif.

East and West:

Episode of December 28th, 2010:

The topic of this episode was the Turkish constitutional amendments, in which the first part was an overall view of the support of the Turkish citizens for Erdoğan's government policies and arguments towards changing the constitution, while the second part was an attempt to argue whether this governmental model could be implemented in the Arab countries. Also, the guests were Fahmi Huwaidi, an Egyptian political thinker specialising in Islamic political thoughts; AbdulBari Atwan, British but originally from Palestine, the editor-in-chief of the pan-Arab newspaper *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*; Prof. Dr. Muhamet Altan, Turkish, who was the former editor-in-chief of *Star* newspaper; and Michel Nawfal, Lebanese, who is the managing editor of *Al-Mustaqbal* newspaper. Amongst the issues discussed were the Arab-Turk relations and its future, the Israeli reaction to this relationship, the political Turkish democratic model and the power of managing the public as the core soul of any democratic sphere. Arab postgraduate students stated the audience's questions, three of whom were Moroccans and one Sudanese. The total time taken for the students' questions was seven minutes and fifty-six seconds. Unlike the previous programme, this was a rich intellectual discussion that engaged Arab postgraduate students reading social sciences in Turkish universities. Notwithstanding that this programme is part of the pre-Arab Uprising of 2011 programmes or, in other words, TRT-Etturkiyye placed a special attention to Arab youth before the uprising. In fact, having the students' direct

involvement in the programme is an excellent way to promote Turkish universities in the Arab world; also, it is an excellent motivation for students to give them the chance of directly asking their questions to high intellectual scholars, journalists and activists. This approach is totally different from DW-TV Arabia, which was promoting studying in Germany by advertisement slots between its programmes. TRT-Etturkiyye is building inner bridges with Arabs in Turkey by inviting them to its programmes and giving them the chance to speak about their issues live. This is considered to be one of the best public diplomacy methods for gaining the trust of Arabs all over the world; building inner bridges is the best way to build strong outer bridges.

***TRT-Etturkiyye Second Phase Episodes:
In the Shade of the Events:***

Episode of December 4th, 2011:

This was a special edition episode covering “The Future of the Middle-East after the Arab Spring and Turkey” forum in Gaziantep city in the southern part of Turkey – close to the Syrian borders. It was aired from the forum’s location and lasted for eighty minutes. Although airing a live programme is considered to have a high risk, especially for broadcasters that represent foreign affair offices of governments, TRT-Etturkiyye is practicing it. As a result, this would give the channel more acceptance amongst Arabic-speaking audiences because they trust those who *listen* to them and discuss their issues openly. There were three academic scholarly guests: Prof. Dr. Ibrahim Ghanem AlBayoumi, socio-political Islamic studies, Zayed University; Prof. Dr. Bakinam Rashed El-Sharqawi, political studies, Cairo University; and Dr. Samir Boudinar, Head of the Centre for Human and Social Research and Studies, Morocco. As can be noticed, all invited guests are professors

participating on the forum. Turkey became the hub for all forums and workshops discussing the circumstances of the Arab Uprising of 2011. At the beginning of the episode, the moderator, Esam Najah, introduced the episode by stating the questions which would be addressed throughout the episode as follows: What are the real motives for the Turkey to support Arab revolutions and what were the consequences? Will Turkey restructure its foreign relations? Will Turkey change its current alliances? However, the episode discussed twelve points, which were: the terminological accuracy of the Arab Spring, the international role, the unavailability of traditional leadership for the revolution, features of the Arab revolutions, the possibilities of the return of the Doctrines, the energy and oil issue that accelerated the international intervention in Libya, the Arab revolutions as a new protest model, the role of Islamic movements during the revolutions and why they became alternative solutions for the current governments, the other religious minorities' fears, the Turkish position in the Arab revolutions, the Egyptian missile shield and the alliances substitution issues. Although the opening statement of the episode mentioned three core questions that is focusing on Turkey to be addressed in this episode, the scholars redirected the discussion and debates over issues directly related to Arab revolutions; which is either a weakness of the episode moderator to moderator live discussions or the willingness to give guests the priority to speak about issues of importance.

A Thousand and One Nights:

Episode of June 7th, 2011:

This episode was devoted to Syria, in which Abeer, a Christian Lebanese, sang for the Syrians; this was at the beginning of the Syrians' struggle against Assad's regime to show some solidity with their uprising for freedom. Her role in each episode is to perform Arabic classical songs; therefore, she had the most air time of

the episode with nineteen minutes and forty-one seconds. She spoke about several Syrian towns which major Arab singers and performers came from. The guests were Turkish; the first was Ümit Sayın, a singer. His total air time was eight minutes and twenty-five seconds, during which he performed four songs. The introductory report about him took a minute and two seconds. The second guest was Hamde Subasi, Miss Turkey of 2010, and an actress. Her total air time was eight minutes and fifty seconds, during which she sang one song, and her introductory report took one minute and forty-four seconds. Like the former *Good Morning from Istanbul* programme, this entertainment programme is being used as a means for public diplomacy through shedding light on shared cultural and musical history between Arabs and Turks, in which, throughout the show, guests kept on stressing on the idea that the Turkish and Arabic music and songs have lots of shared roots. It is also the widest attended in-studio show on TRT-Ettukriyye due to the celebrities invited.

Without Restrictions:

Episode of March 16th, 2012:

This episode's topic was about the Israeli escalation in Gaza and opportunities to calm the situation. The guests were Mustafa Özcan, a Turkish political analyst on the Middle East; Dawood Shehab, a spokesperson for the Islamic Jihad Palestinian group in Gaza; Ahmed Al-Taibi, an Arab Knesset MP; and Yahya Al-Abadsah, Hamas member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. By inviting the major actors in the issue; that is, a representative from Hamas and Islamic Jihad as well as an Israeli representative from an Arab background, TRT-Ettukriyye is continuing the role of the Turkish Foreign Ministry in being the bridge-builder and the regional moderator of dialogue between Arabs and Israelis. The reportage took five minutes and fifty seconds and covered the following issues:

1. The truce between Israel and the Palestinian resistance factions after three days of escalating the attacks over Gaza, resulting in a total of 120 martyrs.
2. The Palestinian resistance factions attacked Israel with Grad rockets.
3. Hamas found itself in a dilemma because they did not participate in firing the rockets, nor did they stop the attacks.
4. Hamas tried to not to give Israel an excuse to attack Gaza as had happened previously in 2008, for Hamas is responsible for more than two and a half million of the Palestinians living in Gaza, yet, they are holding tight over their military arms as a strategic alternative and they've never signed any agreement to give a sign of recognition to Israel.
5. Hamas is trying to seize the success of Islamic movements during the Arab Uprising of 2011 by creating dialogue with Qatar and Turkey and withdrawing Khaled Meshaal from Syria as a sign of leaving the Syrian-Iranian axis.
6. Israel had a feeling of wining the last round against Gaza; however, Israel wanted to test its new Iron Doom defence strategy. Analysts argued that Israel was provoking the Palestinian groups in Gaza to test their strengths as well as to test the new political trends amongst other Arab governments' positions after the Arab Uprising of 2011.
7. Gaza Strip will remain a field test for all.

The report covered all major political aspects of the situation. However, looking at points 3, 4, 5 and 7, the report seems to be presenting Hamas' point of view. This is another reflection that the channel is representing its foreign ministry by standing at the side of Hamas.

Episode of April 5th, 2012:

This episode's topic covered the Egyptian constitutional crisis and the presidential candidates. The guests were Mustafa Özcan, a Turkish political analyst on the Middle East; Dr. Ashraf Abdel Ghaffar, a leading member of Muslim Brotherhood; Mahmood Ghazlan, the Egyptian media spokesperson for Muslim Brotherhood; and Dr. Abdulla AlAshaal, previous Egyptian foreign minister assistant, retired ambassador and the nominee of the Authenticity Party, who withdrew from the Egyptian presidential election. Although the topic revolved around a widespread Egyptian issue, TRT-Etturkiyye invited representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood and a guest who withdrew from the presidency elections to increase the chances of Muslim Brotherhood representatives. In other words, the episode's topic was Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian situation. The reportage lasted for three minutes and thirty-three seconds and included the following issues:

1. The political situation during the Egyptian revolts due to the political activities of Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic movements.
2. While those taking part in the revolts are criticising the selection committee for the Constitution and prompting to select representation ratios for each category of the citizens, the Freedom and Justice Party emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood. Muslim Brotherhood announced their support to the committee and some, but not all, members of the committee can be changed when needed.
3. Accusing the Muslim Brotherhood of trying to control everything in the country, especially after nominating Al-Shater for the presidential elections.

4. Problems occurring within Muslim Brotherhood are reflected by the dismissal of Abu AlFutuh for nominating himself as a candidate for the presidential position.

5. Muslim Brotherhood stated two reasons for nominating an official member to represent them. Firstly, they could not trust the current council in charge of elections and, secondly, they claimed to receive information that the U.S. and Israel are stressing over the SCAF to not allow Muslim Brotherhood to fill any major position.

6. The SCAF, on the other hand, did not comment on the Muslim Brotherhood nominated member, which was interpreted by analysts that he is a consensus candidate between Muslim Brotherhood and SCAF. This is a result of the meeting held between Al-Shater and a U.S. representative, who managed to get a message from Al-Shater that he will respect the Camp David agreement.

Etturkiyye Morning:

Episode of March 4th, 2012:

This episode started with today's Arabic and international press news stories. The Arabic component of the news was given thirteen minutes and thirty seven seconds. Arabic press covered stories from the following newspapers: *Al-Arabiyye*: Qatar: the execution of forty splinters from the Syrian Army; *Al-Quds Al Arabi*, U.K.: a slightly change in the Russian position and Europe is threatening Al Asad; *Zaman*, a pan-Arab newspaper from Baghdad, London and Beirut: Damascus prevents the Red Cross from entering Baba Amr; *Al-Ahram*, Egypt: urgent meetings of the Judicial Council to discuss the financing circumstances from abroad; *Al-Qabas*, Kuwait: the establishment of the Egyptian Constitution is moving towards compatibility; and *Al-Nba'a*, Kuwait: Ahmadinejad's rivals are forefront of the election results. Then, the

international newspapers took thirteen minutes and one seconds: *Jerusalem Post*, Israel: ahead of U.S. visit, Netanyahu clarifies Israel's stance on conditions for talks with Iran; *The Independent*, U.K.: journalists' bodies handed over by Syrian regime; *Le Figaro*, France: Edith Bouvier "How I survived a hell in Homs"; *The Times of India*, India: Pollsters back Putin as Russia votes today; *Pakistan Today*, Pakistan: Sherpao survives yet another suicide attack; and *Aujourd'hui*, France: deadly hurricanes in the United States.

Then, the Turkish governmental news started from Ankara. This section included the following stories: Ankara snow and the Transportation Ministry efforts to clear roads for citizens; the Constitutional Forum in Izmir: "Turkey Speaks"; the recent work agenda of President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan; Atatürk Cultural Centre activities; the Green Crescent initiative to promote cycling in Istanbul; and the Justice and Development Party meeting. The perspective taken by the news to highlight the Turkish governmental stories focused on social initiatives and clearly focused on two things: transportation and political parties. After that, the news reportage took seventeen minutes and four seconds. It started as follows: Syrian report, Egyptian report, U.S. and the Iranian nuclear report, Iranian elections report, and a random visit by Erdoğan to check on a Turkish mother. The pattern of the stories in these reportages went in the same pattern that has been previously presented through the Arabic news, international news and government news. This may suggest that it is a visual summary of the events.

The episode then went on to present the Turkish press news stories as follows: *Yeni Safak*: Davutoğlu is calling to put more pressure over Syria; *Sabah Gazetesi*: the Syrians have broken the border out of fear; *Star*: Al-Asad converted the children's playgrounds into cemeteries; *Zaman*: Syrian authorities detain children; *Bugün*

Gazettes: killings in Hems are no different from massacres; *Al-Watan*: Syrians assemble at the Turkish borders; *Cumhuriyet*: the missile shield would create problems; *Aksam*: a law project to trial militants; *Milliyet*: boycotting major museums; *Turkey*: the happiness of snow in the middle of the desert; *Tarf*: Davutoğlu meets the leaders of minorities; and *Radskal*: the Cyprus case does not affect the Turkish membership in the EU.

The final part of the episode presented seven top news stories from both international and national news: Syria's revolution brief, the Turkish foreign affairs view of the Syrian case, the Russian elections, train accidents in Poland, tornados in the U.S. and floods in Australia.

Episode of March 5th, 2012:

There was a slight change in the outline of this episode in which it followed in the following order: Arabic press, Ankara news, news report, Turkish press, another news report and international press. Arabic press news stories covered in newspapers were: *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, K. S. A.: air strikes and ground offensive on Al-Rastan, and Al-Faisal said: "Al-Assad on the burden to his people"; *Al-Mustaqbal*, Lebanon: AlFaisal: "Syrians have the right to arm themselves to self-defense"; *Zaman*, Iraq, Al-Faisal: "Our representation at the summit depends on resolving outstanding issues"; *Al-Ahram*, Egypt: "Communications heaped accountability for those involved in the release of the accused in foreign financing"; *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, London: "Obama: military action against Iran is still on the table"; *Al-Nba'a*, Kuwait: "Martyrs' Square translates Lebanese divisions"; *Al-Dustoor*, Jordan: "Scheme to transform the Islamic Museum in Al-Aqsa into a Jewish temple"; *Al-Bayan*, U.A.E.; "Targeting suspicious of military positions in southern Yemen"; and *Al-Arab*, Qatar: "Khamenei's allies are causing the defeat of Ahmadinejad in Iranian elections."

Then, the Ankara news slot started with nine different stories. The stories were as follows: Eyad Allawi meets Davutoğlu and Abdulla Gül; Prime Minister Erdoğan's daily agenda is going to be attending the following meetings: the Justice and Development Party meeting, Citizens for a New Constitution meeting, the English authority of rails meeting, the Minister of EU meeting, the Minister of Culture and Tourism in an official meeting with filmmakers and the automobile market increasing positively with the spring.

Then, the news story reportages started and concerned: the Syrian crisis report, the Syrian refugees in Turkey report, the unsettled Yemen report, Afghani military chief warns of the consequences of NATO's repeated burning of the Holy Quran incident, the North and South Sudan citizens' situation and their new train report, the role of Syrian women in the Syrian Revolution report, and Sinop city bridge and island bridge report.

The Turkish press part followed with sixteen stories from different newspapers: *Turkey*: snipers target any moving object; *Hareit*: thousands of Syrians ran away to Lebanon; *Star*: the Syrian military army prevent the Red Cross from entering Baba Amr; *Cumhuriyet*: doubts around the Iranian election results; *Zaman*: French farmers are happy for repealing the law that relates to the claimed Armenian genocide; *Sabah*, one hundred million dollars to rebuild Istanbul; *Sabah*: Turkish veto against Sarkozy; *Zaman*: a Turkish marketing campaign at Geneva's motor fair/exhibition; *Yeni Safak*: Northern Iraq region refuse to organise KCK³⁷; *Sabah*: 100 billion dollars to rebuild Istanbul; *Radical*: Ahmadinjad loses the elections; *Star*: Azerbaijan bought weapons from Israel to liberate Nagorno-Karabakh; *Radical*: front support Israel in the Caucasus; *Yeni Safak*: escalating Israeli statements about attacks

³⁷ Union of Communities in Kurdistan.

on Iran; *AlWatan*: Sarkozy: “I will not allow Halal meat at schools!”; *Hureit*: meeting of Turkish religious scholars in U.S.; and *Khabar Turk*: a Turkish businessman borrows a German citizen’s face.

After that, the news slot presented five main stories. The major highlighted stories went as follows: the number of murdered Syrians, then the winning of Russian elections by Putin, EPAC – Obama and Iran’s nuclear file, and an explosion in the Congo.

Finally, the episode concluded with the international press section that presented stories from the following newspapers: *Jerusalem Post*, Israel: Israel offers humanitarian aid to Syrian people; *The Independent*, U.K.: Israel dangerously deaf to criticism; *Jerusalem Post*, Israel: Abbas to send PM letter detailing reason for collapse of Oslo Accords; *International Herald Tribune*, United States: Obama answers his critics on Iran policy; *Moscow Times*; Russia: Putin cries after winning in front of his supporters; *The Australian*, Australia: Putin win set to trigger violence; *China Daily*, China: defense spending fees lower growth; and *Wall Street Journal*, Asia: China to lift spending on defense.

Similarly to the previous episode, this episode focused on the Syrian case followed by the Iranian and the Israeli news story. *Morning Etturkiyye* is a regional news programme that focuses over news that affects Turkey as well as Arab countries alike. However, it is not a news agency because this programme is a morning programme that summarises what is being said in the press news.

"Intercultural broadcasting: The approaches of DW-TV Arabia and the TRT etturkiyya when targeting Arabic audiences"

To whom it may concern,

This survey is conducted as part of Alyazia AlSuwaidi's PhD thesis; a PhD student at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences - Kingston University. The research is a comparison study between the German international broadcaster (DW-TV Arabia) and the Turkish international broadcaster (TRT Etturkiyye) while targeting Arabic speaking audiences.

There are two objectives for the survey: first to give an over-all measurement tool of the achievements of both channels in widening its Arabic audiences and to help in selection process of forming the focus-groups to discuss in-depth issues that concerns the research.

The survey could be answered in either Arabic or English and it would take around 15 minutes. Questions varies between simple ticking the answer(s) questions and open-ended questions. Your participation would be greatly appreciated.

Regards,

Alyazia K. AlSuwaidi

May 1st, 2011 - Abu Dhabi, UAE

K0846210@kingston.ac.uk

PART I. Demographical Questions:	قسم ١. أسئلة ديموغرافية:
<p>1. Gender</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Male <input type="checkbox"/> Female</p> <p>2. Are you an Arab?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>3. What is your age range?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> 16-20 <input type="checkbox"/> 21-25 <input type="checkbox"/> 26-30 <input type="checkbox"/> 31-35 <input type="checkbox"/> 36-40 <input type="checkbox"/> 41-45 <input type="checkbox"/> 46-50</p> <p>4. What is your mother language?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Arabic <input type="checkbox"/> English <input type="checkbox"/> German <input type="checkbox"/> Other.....</p> <p>5. Name other language(s) you speak.</p> <p>6. What is your nationality?</p> <p>7. Tick as appropriate: I've been to:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Germany <input type="checkbox"/> Turkey <input type="checkbox"/> None of the above</p> <p>8. How often do you watch TV?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Addicted <input type="checkbox"/> Always <input type="checkbox"/> Occasionally <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely <input type="checkbox"/> Never</p>	<p>١. الجنس: ذكر أنثى</p> <p>٢. هل أنت عربي? نعم لا</p> <p>٣. إلى أي فئة عمرية تنتمي? ٢٠-١٦ ٢١-٢٥ ٢٦-٣٠ ٣١-٣٥ ٣٦-٤٠ ٤١-٤٥ ٤٦-٥٠</p> <p>٤. ما هي لغتك الأم? العربية الإنجليزية الألمانية أخرى.....</p> <p>٥. أذكر اللغات الأخرى التي تتحدثها</p> <p>٦. ما هي جنسيتك?</p> <p>٧. اختر ما يناسبك، سبق لي أن زرت: ألمانيا تركيا ليس من سبق</p> <p>٨. كيف تصف علاقتك بالتلفاز? مشاهد مدمن دائماً أتابع التلفاز أتابعه في مناسبات نادراً لا أشاهد التلفاز</p>
PART II. DW-TV Arabia Questions:	قسم ٢. أسئلة متعلقة بالقناة الألمانية:
<p>1. Have you ever watched The DW-TV Arabia?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No (skip to PART III)</p> <p>2. How would you identify The DW-TV Arabia?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> An international broadcaster <input type="checkbox"/> An intercultural broadcaster <input type="checkbox"/> A news channel <input type="checkbox"/> A Promotional channel of Germany <input type="checkbox"/> Other.....</p>	<p>١. هل شاهدت يوماً قناة DW-TV Arabia? نعم لا --- انتقل إلى قسم ٣</p> <p>٢. ما هي قناة DW-TV Arabia? إذاعة دولية إذاعة ثقافية دولية قناة إخبارية قناة ترويجية لألمانيا أخرى.....</p>

10. What would hinder you to watch DW-TV Arabia?

- No live shows;
 Doesn't provide in depth information on Arabs and Muslims communities in Germany;
 Advertising for living and studying in Germany;
 30 minutes of news every hour;
 Using English and Arabic languages instead of the German language;
 No live interactions and calls from audience;
 Over emphasis on European Union;
 Promotes homosexuality;
 Promotes intercultural communications from the German perspective;
 Others; please specify:

11. Can you see efforts in building bridges with the Arab and Islamic World? If yes how?

- Yes;
- No

12. In your opinion, what makes the DW-TV Arabia a German international Channel?

- Speaks a foreign language
 Discusses global issues
 Presents the German government point of view
 Promotes Germany
 Targets foreign audiences
 All of the above
 Other, please specify

13. What is the difference between the DW-TV Arabia programs' content and your country's traditions?

14. which of the following genre the DW-TV Arabia should put more emphasis on? (tick as it apply)

- Culture
 Dialogue
 Tourism
 Music
 History
 Competitions
 Sports
 Health
 Political
 Economics
 EU
 Documentary
 Science
 Religious
 Children
 Drama
 Ramadan programs
 none of the above; because

١٠. لماذا تتخالف في مشاهدة DW-TV Arabia

١٠. لماذا تتخالف في مشاهدة DW-TV Arabia
 لا توجد برامج مباشرة
 لا توفر معلومات عن العرب والمسلمين في ألمانيا
 دعابة للتراسة والإقامة في ألمانيا
 ٣٠ دقيقة من كل ساعة للأخبار
 ناطقة بالإنجليزية والعربية بدلا من الألمانية
 لا يوجد تفاعل حي ومباشر مع الجمهور
 المبالغة في التركيز على الاتحاد الأوروبي
 الترويج لتحسن الثالث (مثلي الجنس)
 الترويج للتواصل الثقافي من وجهة نظر ألمانية
 أسباب أخرى، أذكرها

١١. هل تستطيع ملاحظة جهود القناة لبناء جسور التواصل مع العالم العربي والإسلامي إذا نعم، كيف؟
 نعم
 لا

١٢. في رأيك، ما الذي يجعل قناة DW-TV Arabia قناة ألمانية دولية؟

- ناطقة بلغات أجنبية
 تناقش قضايا عالمية
 تعرض وجهة نظر الحكومة الألمانية
 تروج لألمانيا
 استهداف جماهير أجنبية
 كل ما سبق
 أخرى، أذكرها

١٣. ما أوجه الاختلاف بين محتوى قناة DW-TV Arabia وتقليد دولتك؟

١٤. مما يلبي، ما نوعية البرامج التي يجب أن تركز عليها قناة DW-TV Arabia

- ثقافة
 حوار
 سياحة
 موسيقى
 تاريخ
 مسابقات
 رياضة
 صحة
 سياسة
 اقتصاد
 اتحاد أوروبي
 برامج وثائقية
 علوم
 دينيات
 أطفال
 دراما
 برامج رمضان
 ليس مما سبق، لأن

15. Which of the following genre the DW-TV Arabia should decrease the amount of its airing time? (Tick as it apply)

- Culture
- Dialogue
- Tourism
- Music
- History
- Competitions
- Sports
- Health
- Political
- Economics
- EU
- Documentary
- Science
- Religious
- Children
- Drama
- Ramadan programs

none of the above: because

16. Have you ever encouraged someone to watch DW-TV Arabia?

- Yes
- No

17. How would you assess quality of the DW-TV Arabia?

- Excellent
- Very good
- Satisfactory
- Not good
- Other: Please specify:

18. If you have ever given any feedback to the DW-TV Arabia team, how? Did you get a response?

- No, I haven't
- Sending an E-mail
- Commenting on their youtube/twitter/facebook accounts
- Posting a letter
- Meeting in person with one of its journalists or employees
- Other - please specify:

19. In terms of content do you think the DW-TV Arabia needs improvement?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know
- Doesn't matter
- I refuse to answer

20. If yes, can you specify areas in need of development?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

١٥. سائلي متابعي القناة العربية التي تسمى DW-TV Arabia النظم من بين هذه النظم ما تفضل تقليلها من ايرتاجها

- ثقافة
- حوار
- سياحة
- موسيقى
- تاريخ
- مسابقات
- رياضة
- صحة
- سياسة
- الاقتصاد
- اتحاد أوروبا
- برامج وثائقية
- علم
- رياضات
- أطفال
- دراما
- برامج رمضان

لا يوجد منها سبب

١٦. هل سبق لك ان اقنعت احدًا لشاهدة القناة؟

- نعم
- لا

١٧. كيف تقيم اداء القناة؟

- ممتاز
- جيد جدا
- جيد
- غير جيد
- غير واضح

١٨. اذا سبق لك ان قدمت ملاحظة للقناة،

- فكيف؟ وهل تطلبت ردًا؟
- لم يهتد لي ذلك
- بهتت بريد إلكتروني
- تواصلت مع فريق youtube/twitter/facebook
- أرسلت رسالة
- قابلت مصفحًا/مصحبة في القناة؛ بشكل شخصي
- غيره:

١٩. هل على القناة تطوير من ارجو؟

- نعم
- لا
- لا اعرف
- لا يهمني
- ارفض الاجابة

٢٠. اذا كنت اجبت بـنعم، ماذا عليها ان تكون؟

.....

.....

.....

.....

13. What is the difference between TRT Etkurkiye programs' content and your country's traditions?

١٣. ماوجه الاختلاف بين محتوى القناة التركية وتقاليد دولتك؟

14. Which of the following genre TRT Etkurkiye should put more emphasis on? (tick as it apply)

١٤. مما يلي، ما نوعية البرامج التي تركز عليها القناة التركية؟

- Culture
- Dialogue
- Tourism
- Music
- History
- Competitions
- Sports
- Health
- Political
- Economics
- EU
- Documentary
- Science
- Religious
- Children
- Drama
- Ramadan programs
- none of the above; because

- ثقافة
- حوار
- سياحة
- موسيقى
- تاريخ
- مسابقات
- رياضة
- صحة
- سياسة
- اقتصاد
- اتحاد أوروبي
- برامج وثائقية
- علوم
- ديانات
- أطفال
- دراما

15. Which of the following genre TRT Etkurkiye should decrease the amount of its airing time? (tick as it apply)

١٥. مما يلي، ما نوعية البرامج التي على القناة التركية التقليل من بثها، اختر ماينطبق

- Culture
- Dialogue
- Tourism
- Music
- History
- Competitions
- Sports
- Health
- Political
- Economics
- EU
- Documentary
- Science
- Religious
- Children
- Drama
- Ramadan programs
- None of the above; because

- برامج رمضان
- ليس مما سبق، لأن
- ١٥. مما يلي، ما نوعية البرامج التي على القناة التركية التقليل من بثها، اختر ماينطبق
- ثقافة
- حوار
- سياحة
- موسيقى
- تاريخ
- مسابقات
- رياضة
- صحة
- سياسة
- اقتصاد
- اتحاد أوروبي
- برامج وثائقية
- علوم
- ديانات
- أطفال
- دراما
- برامج رمضان

16. Have you ever encouraged someone to watch TRT Etkurkiye?

- Yes
- No

17. How would you assess quality of TRT Etkurkiye?

- Excellent
- Very good
- Satisfactory
- Not good
- Other. Please specify:

١٦. هل شجعت أحدا لمشاهدة القناة؟

- نعم
- لا

18. Have you ever given any feedback to TRT Etkurkiye team? If yes, how?

- No, I haven't
- Sending an E-mail
- Commenting on their youtube/twitter/Facebook accounts
- Posting a letter
- Meeting in person with one of its journalists or employees
- Other - please specify

١٧. كيف تقييم آراء القناة؟

- ممتاز
- جيد جدا
- جيد
- أور جيد
- أجور، حدد رأيك.

<p>19. In terms of content do you think TRT Eeturkiyye needs improvement?</p> <p> <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know <input type="checkbox"/> Doesn't matter <input type="checkbox"/> I refuse to answer </p> <p>20. If yes, can you specify areas in need of development?</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	<p>١٨. هل سبق أن لك أن قدمت ملاحظتك للقناة؟</p> <p>بأي طريقة؟</p> <p>لم يسبق لي ذلك</p> <p>بعثت بريد إلكتروني</p> <p>تواصلت عن طريق youtube twitter: Facebook</p> <p>أرسلت رسالة</p> <p>قاربت صحفياً/عاملاً في القناة بشكل شخصي</p> <p>غيره.....</p> <p>١٩. هل على القناة تطوير برامجها؟</p> <p>نعم</p> <p>لا</p> <p>لا أعرف</p> <p>لا يجدي</p> <p>أرفض الإجابة</p> <p>٢٠. إذا كنت أجبت بنعم، صاذاً عليها أن تطورها؟</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>
<p>PART IV. An Arab Intercultural Broadcaster* Questions:</p> <p>* Intercultural Broadcaster is an international satellite channel that focuses on culture and sends its messages across borders globally through television, radio and social network media using its international targeted audience's mother language.</p>	<p>قسم ٤. أسئلة متعلقة بقناة ثقافية عالمية عربية.</p> <p>* القناة الثقافية العالمية هي قناة فضائية عالمية تخدم بشرق كافة ما إلى جماهير عالمية محددة عن طريق وسائل الإعلام الرئية والسموعة الرقمية وينظمهم بلغتهم الأم</p>
<p>1. Would you like to see an Arab Intercultural Broadcaster</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No (Skip to question 7)</p> <p>2. If yes, why?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> To spread the awareness of the Islamic civilisation's role in spreading knowledge and sciences</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> To promote Arab's culture</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> To promote Arabic language</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> To change the global stereotype that Arabs are terrorists</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> To explain the relationship between Arabs and Islam</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> To compete with the global trend of International Broadcasting</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> To promote tourism in the Arab world</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> To build bridges with the world</p> <p>3. In your opinion, which of the following bodies should this channel be funded by?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Gulf Corporation Council (GCC)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Non-government organisation</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Joint governments</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> A specific government; specify.....</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> It should be an independent channel</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Other.....</p> <p>4. Where should the headquarter of the channel be based?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Cairo</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Tunis</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Beirut</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Doha</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Abu Dhabi</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Dubai</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Masqat</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Kuala Lumpur</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Riyadh</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> AlQuds</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Jakarta</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Istanbul</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Other.....</p>	<p>١. هل ترغب في مشاهدة قناة ثقافية عالمية عربية؟</p> <p>نعم</p> <p>لا ----- (انتقل إلى السؤال ٧)</p> <p>٢. إذا أجبت بنعم، فماذا؟</p> <p>التوعية بغضب الحضارة الإسلامية في نشر العلوم والحرفة</p> <p>للترويج للثقافة العربية</p> <p>للترويج للغة العربية</p> <p>لتغيير الصورة النمطية العالمية أن العرب إرهابيون</p> <p>لتدريج العلاقة الرابطة بين العرب والإسلام</p> <p>للمناقشة العالمية في مجال الإداعات العابرة للقارات</p> <p>للترويج للسياحة في العالم العربي</p> <p>لبناء الجسور مع العالم</p> <p>٣. في رأيك، من عليه تمويل هذه القناة؟</p> <p>مجلس التعاون الخليجي</p> <p>المنظمات الغير حكومية</p> <p>بعض الحكومات المشاركة</p> <p>حكومة منفردة، انكرها.....</p> <p>منظمة المؤتمر الإسلامي</p> <p>بحد أن تكون مستقلة من أي جهة</p> <p>أخرى، حدد.....</p> <p>٤. أين يجب أن يكون مقر القناة؟</p> <p>القاهرة</p> <p>تونس</p> <p>بيروت</p> <p>الوجهة</p> <p>أبوظبي</p> <p>دبي</p> <p>مسقط</p> <p>كوالا لومبور</p> <p>الرياض</p> <p>القدس</p> <p>جاكرتا</p> <p>استنبول</p> <p>أخرى، حدد.....</p>

5. How many foreign languages should the channel air?

- 1 language;
2 language;
3 language;
Other
Only Arabic with different subtitles
Only Arabic

6. If you are to choose from the following targeted audiences, which would be the most important for the Arab Intercultural Broadcaster to focus on (tick as appropriate)

- Pan-Arabs
Europeans
Americans
South American
Chinese
Persians
Indians
South Africans
Turkish
Other -- please specify

7. In your opinion, why wouldn't you like to see an Arab Intercultural Broadcaster?

8. Do you have any comment?

9. We are organising focus-groups sessions to extend the study, please leave us your contacts if you wish to participate.

- Yes, I wish to participate in your focus group.**
No, thank you.

Your name.....
Email.....
Mobile

٤. كم لغة طو القناة أن تستخدمها في البث؟
لغة واحدة
لغتان
ثلاث لغات
أخرى: حدد.....
باللغة العربي بالإضافة إلى الترجمة المكتوبة
باللغة العربية فقط

٥. إذا كان لك الخيار في أن تتخذ قراراً بشأن الجمهور المستهدف للقناة، فأي الجماهير من أهم أولوياتك؟
الجمهور الغربيين العرب
الجمهور الأوروبي
الجمهور الأمريكي
جمهور أمريكا الجنوبية
الجمهور الصيني
الجمهور الفارسي
الجمهور الهندي
الجمهور جنوب أفريقيا
الأثرياء
غيرهم: حدد.....

٦. في رأيك، لماذا لا ترغب بوجود قناة ثقافية عربية عالمية؟

٨. هل لديك أية ملاحظات؟

٩. نحن في صدد توسيع نطاق الدراسة عن طريق تنظيم جلسات التركيز الجماعية لمناقشة موضوع البحث. إذا كنت ترغب في المشاركة، يرجى ترك اسمك ورقم هاتفك أو بريدك الإلكتروني للتواصل معكم.

نعم أرغب في المشاركة

لا شكراً

الاسم.....
البريد الإلكتروني.....
الهاتف.....


V. Copy of the detailed results of the survey

91 responses

Summary [See complete responses](#)


PART 1. Demographical Questions

Gender




Male	51	56%
Female	40	44%

Are you an Arab




Yes	78	86%
No	13	14%

What is your age range?



What is your mother language



Arabic	76	84%
English	2	2%
German	4	4%
Other	9	10%


Name other language(s) you speak.

english English, German German & English English, German English, Arabic, French, Russian german italy
 english German English German, English, French german, eng. English & German English, Spanish, a bit of Fr ...

What is your nationality?

ontrean UAE egyptian
 Egyptian German egyptien Egyptian Turkish u.a.e UAE Jordanian Palestinian Algerian Jordanian German USA


Tick as appropriate: I've been to:



Germany	49	54%
Turkey	37	41%
Non of the above	28	31%

People may select more than one checkbox, so percentages may add up to more than 100%.


How did you hear about this survey?



Goethe Institute - Abu Dhabi	41	48%
German Club - Abu Dhabi	4	5%
A tweet in Twitter	35	41%
A friend - please state who in other	2	2%
Other	7	8%

People may select more than one checkbox, so percentages may add up to more than 100%.


How often do you watch TV?



Addicted	1	1%
Always	37	41%
Occasionally	44	48%
Rarely	8	9%
Never	1	1%


PART 2. DW-TV Arabia Questions:

Have you ever watched The DW-TV Arabia



Yes	59	65%
No	32	35%

How would you identify The DW-TV Arabia?




An international broadcaster	22	37%
An intercultural broadcaster	17	28%
A news channel	12	20%
A Promotional channel of Germany	27	45%
Other	4	7%

People may select more than one checkbox, so percentages may add up to more than 100%.

How did you hear about the DW-TV Arabia?

I didn't hear about it by myself Via my friends by TV Goethe Institut TV in many tv worldwide A friend recommend I cant remember but just to let you know, I follow their FB page more than the TV channel Goe ...


What are your favourite shows?



What is the logo of the channel?

DW DW dw.world.de DW-TV DW-TV dw.tv DW-TV with a half circle blue mark DW with a swish
 thingie on side DW-welt.de DW-TV DW-TV a wave DW-
 world DW-world DW-TV Arabia DW DW-TV DW DW-TV dw.tv in a white
 box DW dw DW DW blue ...


How many times do you watch The DW-TV Arabia



If you watch it regularly for specific shows; name the show, please.

no in focus NEWS in focus FB page the News Feed Euromaxx none specific
 show In Focus Euromaxx kino,quadriga


Why do you watch the DW-TV Arabia



Because it provides me with useful information about the Arab world;
 Because it is fun to watch;
 Because it teaches me German language;
 Because it provides news about Germany & Europe;
 Because I'm seeking a foreign news source;
 Because another family member watches it;
 Because it provides economical reports;
 Because it provides cultural reports;
 Because it is a free channel;
 Other

People may select more than one checkbox, so percentages may add up to more than 100%.


What would hinder you to watch DW-TV Arabia?



No live shows;
 Doesn't provide in-depth information on Arabs and Muslim world;
 Advertising for living and studying in Germany;
 30 minutes of news every hour;
 Using English and Arabic languages instead of the German language;
 No live interactions and calls from audience;
 Over emphasis on European Union;
 Promotes homosexuality;
 Other

People may select more than one checkbox, so percentages may add up to more than 100%.

Can you see efforts in building bridges with the Arab and Islamic World?



Yes 37 62%
 No 24 40%


People may select more than one checkbox, so percentages may add up to more than 100%.

If yes, how?

It's enough because it translates most of its programs into Arabic.
 KNOWLEDGE BETWEEN ARAB AND GERMAN

dialogue on different themes ENHANCE COMMUNICATION AND
 They do some effort to cover the news of the Arab world.

In your opinion, what makes the DW-TV Arabia a German International Channel?




People may select more than one checkbox, so percentages may add up to more than 100%.

What is the difference between the DW-TV Arabia programs' content and your country's traditions?

I think as I said earlier that DW-TV sometimes or rarely maybe it promotes homosexuality, while ours don't. Although some of ours have already started in that. DW-TV is interesting and provides useful information, ours nowadays provides the most boring and useless programmes. Pure Reality & most attractive because it always bring to me all what new and i need it plus i never feel pooring. It's more cultural and life style oriented but shallow right now where we need more different points of view and more in depth analysis of the political situation in the arab countries. n/a IT DEPENDS ON THE ...


Which of the following genre the DW-TV Arabia should put more emphasis on? (tick as it apply)



Culture	35	61%
Dialogue	25	44%
Tourism	20	35%
Music	10	18%
History	25	44%
Competitions	5	9%
Sports	12	21%
Health	15	26%
Political	17	30%
EU	8	14%
Documentary	33	58%
Science	24	42%
Religious	11	19%
Children	14	25%
Drama	8	14%
Ramadan Programs	10	18%
Non of the above	1	2%
Other	6	11%


People may select more than one checkbox, so percentages may add up to more than 100%.

Which of the following genre the DW-TV Arabic should decrease the amount of its airing time? (tick as it apply)




Culture	6	13%
Dialogue	7	15%
Tourism	3	6%
Music	9	19%
History	4	9%
Competitions	5	11%
Sports	7	15%
Health	2	4%
Political	6	17%
EU	9	19%
Documentary	0	0%
Science	1	2%
Religious	11	23%
Children	1	2%
Drama	5	11%
Ramadan Programs	4	9%
Non of the above	11	23%
Other	2	4%

Have you ever encouraged someone to watch DW-TV Arabia?




Yes	29	32%
No	30	33%

How would you assess quality of the DW-TV Arabia?



Excellent	12	13%
Very good	18	20%
Satisfactory	25	27%
Not good	0	0%
Other	36	40%


If you have ever given any feedback to the DW-TV Arabia team, how?



- No, I haven't
- Sending an E-mail
- Commenting on their youtube/twitter/ facebook accounts
- Posting a letter
- Meeting in person with one of its journalists or employees
- Other


People may select more than one checkbox, so percentages up to more than 100%.

If you did contact DW-TV Arabia, did you get a respond?



Yes	9	10%
No	14	15%

In terms of content do you think the DW-TV Arabia needs improvement?




Yes	67	74%
No	4	4%
I don't know	12	13%
Doesn't matter	3	3%
I refuse to answer	5	5%

If yes, can you specify areas in need of development?

I have mentioned that above because it is talking almost to arabic speakers and most of arabian who are interested in German Culture watch it why DW-TV doesnt have a few of arabic interviewer who are talking arabic as mother language and german as second language also and definetly english language it will be more attractive. more in depth analysis of the current political situation. MORE DEBATES WITH ARAB COMMUNITIES MORE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE CURRENT EVENTS DW is not honest. The DW takes in Arabic in a way that is different than this in English or German Example: they were reporting about ...


PART 3. About The TRT Etturkiyye

Have you ever watched TRT Etturkiyye



Yes	17	19%
No	73	80%


How would you identify TRT Eeturkiye?



An international broadcaster	8	36%
An intercultural broadcaster	8	36%
A news channel	3	14%
A promotional channel of Turkey	11	50%
Other	2	9%

People may select more than one checkbox, so percentages may add up to more than 100%.

How did you hear about TRT Eeturkiye?



What is your favourite show?

News	6	30%
Today in history	4	20%
Arabic Historical Drama	1	5%
Turkish Dramas	3	15%
Our culture	3	15%
Children programs	2	10%
Maq sahafeya	4	20%
Good Morning from Istanbul show	7	35%
Dinner invitation	3	15%
İftesakçiyat	0	0%
Dalal Amataha	0	0%
Madarat	4	20%
Rahhal	4	20%
Turkish Cinema	4	20%


Shahidun ala attareekh	4	20%
Asharq wa algharb	4	20%
Akhat alhadidi alhejazi	2	10%
Nahr Turan	1	5%
Af layla wa layla	1	5%
Min Istanbul	5	25%
Amalqab	2	10%
Aqahwa alTurkeya	2	10%
Sawt alMusiqa	3	15%
Aeshq alalahi	0	0%
Min Gazza	2	10%
Bat alHakma	0	0%
Aadhath alOdeameya	0	0%
alTuruk alwaara	0	0%
Alwan	2	10%
Dall AlAhdath alEjameya	1	5%
Juma'a Prayer	2	10%
Nujum	1	5%
Musiqa felHay alSharq	3	15%
Madina w Jame'a	2	10%
Qaraqoz wa Ewadh	1	5%
Ramadan programs	4	20%
Min wahay alabdala	1	5%
Kalimi Arabi	2	10%
Mukheyamat	0	0%
Law Samaht	0	0%
alMughameroon	1	5%
AMunshed AlSeyahi	3	15%
I don't have a favourite show	5	25%
Other	0	0%

People may select more than one checkbox, so percentages may add up to more than 100%.

What is the slogan of TRT Etturkiyye

Turk

What is the channel's theme colors?




White & Red	9	10%
White & Green	1	1%
White & Blue	0	0%
Black & Red	0	0%
Black & Green	0	0%
Black & Blue	0	0%
I don't know	7	8%
Other	74	81%

What is the logo of the channel?


TRT
 TRT in red lozenge
 TRT
 TRT
 (التركية باللغة)
 TR

How many times do you watch TRT Etturkiyye?



Rarely by chance	80	88%
Once a month	1	1%
Every weekend	0	0%
Random during the week	4	4%
Once a week	0	0%
Every other day	3	3%
Daily	2	2%
Regularly	0	0%


Why do you watch TRT Etturkiyye?



Because it provides me with useful information about the world
 Because it is fun to watch;
 Because it teaches me Turkish language;
 Because it provides news about Turkey & the Islamic World
 Because I'm seeking a foreign news source;
 Because another family member watches it,
 Because it provides economical reports;
 Because it provides cultural reports;
 Because it is a free channel,
 Other

People may select more than one checkbox, so percentages may not add up to 100%.


What would hinder you to watch TRT Eeturkiyye?



- Because Some of the programs are very short.
- Because it doesn't provide in depth information on Arabs
- Because it is a mirrored channel of Arabs' channel - I wa
- Because it devoted too much of time for Turkish Drama.
- Because it uses Arabic language instead of Turkish lang;
- Because it concentrates on the Eastern life style of Turki
- Because it over emphasis on positive relations with the A
- Because it promotes Liberalism.
- Because it promotes Turkey as the leader of Middle East
- Other

People may select more than one checkbox, so percenta

Can you see efforts in building bridges with the Arab and Islamic World?




Yes	11	12%
No	8	9%

If yes, how?

- MORE COMMUNICATIONS
- similarity between turkish and arabic culture
- Arab world issues
- in the live ...
- Anyway
- Arabic language used , cultural programs and detailed news coverage of
- Lots of live calls

In your opinion, what makes TRT Eeturkiyye a Turkish international Channel?



What is the difference between TRT Eiturkiyye programs' content and your country's traditions?

No

answer

almost same except some

old cultural stuff like believing in some legends which is more in turkish culture

it's same mentality , very weak.

although its new channel it's not implacable to be as international channel focus on songs and humors issues is not important

focus on drama is not the main thing to interact with the viewer

Some

differences such as the dress of some of its reporters


Don't know

Nothing. The same conservativeness which

hinders our progress, freedom & modernity. لا شيء تقريبا very similar

a lot of difference


Which of the following genre TRT Eiturkiyye should put more w emphasis on? (tick as it apply)



Culture	11	56%
Dialogue	4	20%
Tourism	7	35%
Music	6	30%
History	11	56%
Competitions	2	10%
Sports	3	15%
Health	0	0%
Political	9	45%
Economics	5	25%
EU	2	10%
Documentary	8	40%
Science	5	25%
Religious	1	5%
Children	1	5%
Drama	0	0%
Ramadan programs	2	10%
Non of the above	5	25%
Other	0	0%


People may select more than one checkbox, so percentages may add up to more than 100%.

Which of the following genre TRT Etkrkiyye should decrease the amount of its airing time? (lick as it apply)




Category	Frequency	Percentage
Culture	0	0%
Dialogue	0	0%
Tourism	0	0%
Music	3	18%
History	2	12%
Competitions	4	24%
Sports	2	12%
Health	0	0%
Political	2	12%
Economics	1	6%
EU	2	12%
Documentary	0	0%
Science	0	0%
Religious	3	18%
Children	0	0%
Drama	2	12%
Ramadan programs	2	12%
Non of the above	6	36%
Other	0	0%

Have you ever encouraged someone to watch TRT Eeturkiyye?




Yes	11	12%
No	9	10%

How would you assess quality of TRT Eeturkiyye?



Excellent	3	3%
Very good	7	8%
Satisfactory	4	4%
Not good	3	3%
Other	74	81%

Have you ever given any feedback to TRT Eeturkiyye team?



No I haven't

Sending an E-mail

Commenting on their youtube/twitter/facebook accounts

Posting a letter

Meeting in person with one of its journalists or employee


Other

People may select more than one checkbox, so percenta up to more than 100%.

Did you get a respond?

didn't respond

In terms of content do you think TRT Eeturkiyye needs improvement?



If yes, can you specify areas in need of development?


Never heard

about it style
 Cover a larger spectrum of the Turkish people, culture and life
 Focus on middle east countries and awarness programs that
 focus on religion, history in turkey
 تعريف العرب بالتاريخ التركي وخصوصاً المشتركات توضح دور تركيا اليوم والثقافة التركية ربما
 تعليم اللغة التركية متابعة ما يهم الشباب العربي معرفته عن تركيا وكيف يمكن التواصل
 More about cultural and history programs

Part 4. An Arab Intercultural Broadcaster* Questions:


* Intercultural Broadcaster is an international satellite channel that focuses on culture and sends its messages across borders globally via television, radio and social network media to its international targeted audiences.

Would you like to see an Arab Intercultural Broadcaster




Yes: 81 89%
 No: 9 10%


If yes, why?



In your opinion, which of the following bodies should this channel be funded by?




Where should the headquarter of the channel be based?




People may select more than one checkbox, so percentages may add up to more than 100%.

How many foreign languages should the channel air?



If you are to choose from the following targeted-audiences, which would be the most important for the Arab Intercultural Broadcaster to focus on (tick as appropriate)



In your opinion, why wouldn't you like to see an Arab Intercultural Broadcaster?

It's a sign of civilization and it's our job to convey a good correct message about who we really are at the moment because our situation in most of field may be all of it is not feel me proud like EU. to correct the misconception of the arab and moslem culture and people. n/a Only if they broadcast silly program with no added value. Acculturation is needed to understand others Because there is so much misinformation particularly among American TV consumers I would like to see an arab intercultural broadcaster have no objection on this, but proper content and satire are important to capture aud ...


Do you have any comments?

no Yes, However I need one week at least to say what I want to say. no I should arabic and europe would ...? Any Arabic channel should accept the other the same way the other accept the Arabs. No A quality TV channel should first and foremost address the Israeli population. The biased and uninformed Israeli public prevents a Middle East settlement. But what do they know about Arabs??? How can they find out that they are being fed lies and half-truths by their own media and the propaganda of their government ? - no None in europe and america people

have enough channels to watch all the time, and u wil ...

We are organising focus-groups sessions to extend the study, please leave us your contacts if you wish to participate.

No, thank you. [45]



Yes, I wish to participate in your focus group. [45]

Yes, I wish to participate in your focus group. 45 49%

No, thank you. 45 49%

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