


Ioannis Sygkelos

“Nationalism from the Left:

The case of the Bulgarian Communist Party
during the Second World War and the early post-war years
(1942-1948)”



**Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Kingston University
for the degree of PhD.**

**Kingston University,
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences,
September 2005**

COPYRIGHT © This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that this copyright rests with the author and that no quotation from the thesis, nor any information derived therefrom, may be published without the author's prior written consent.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	1
Acronyms	3
Abstract	4
Statement of objectives	6
Introduction	8
0.1 Hypothesis	12
0.2 Methodology	15
0.3 Sources	22
Chapter 1	
Marxism and nationalism – the development of a syncretic discourse	24
1.1 An uncomfortable anomaly for Marxism	24
1.2 Breaks within Marxist tradition: first reconciliation with nationalism	32
1.3 The Stalinist adoption of nationalism	38
1.4 The Communist International: towards the symbiosis of Marxism and nationalism within the communist movement	42
1.5 The BCP as a part of the Comintern	50
Conclusion	54
Chapter 2	
Nationalism and the ideology of the BCP in the Second World War	56
2.1 The situation of Bulgarian society, the BCP, and the partisan movement	56
2.2 Politics and the discourse of the Bulgarian communist leadership	69
2.2.a Origins	69
2.2.b The anti-imperialist theory	72
2.2.c Socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism	77
2.2.d Binary divisions	79
2.3 Partisan movement	86
2.3.a Objectives and apparatuses of the partisan movement	87
2.3.b Commemoration, symbols, and word	92

Conclusion	102
Chapter 3	
The nationalist discourse in domestic politics	105
3.1 Disadvantages and advantages of the BCP	107
3.2 The political spectrum in post-war Bulgaria	110
3.3 Communist tactics	119
3.4 Communist nationalism as a totalitarian discourse	123
3.5 Self-presentation of the BCP via the Fatherland Front as national party	127
3.6 Nation, people, state, and party	132
3.7 National enemies	142
Conclusion	150
Chapter 4	
The nationalist discourse with regard to the international arena	152
4.1 Binary divisions	158
4.2 The nation and its friends at the international level	162
4.2.a Socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism	162
4.2.b The anti-imperialist idea and the Cominform	165
4.2.c Pan-Slavism	166
4.2.d The Soviet Union	169
4.2.e Non-Slav socialist friends	172
4.3 The nation and its enemies at the international level	173
4.3 a The past and the present worst enemy of the Slav peoples	173
4.3.b Neighbouring enemy nations of Bulgaria	175
4.4 National questions	177
4.4.a The Thracian question	177
4.4.b The Macedonian question	178
Conclusion	191
Chapter 5	
Flagging nationhood: the BCP and the construction of the nation's past	193
5.1 Historiography, textbooks and nationalism	193
5.2 (Re)construction of the past: institutional framework	196

5.3 The setting and the conditions of history-writing under the Bulgarian communist regime	203
5.4 A peculiar Marxist version of history-writing	204
5.5 The historical apparatus	217
5.6 An outline of how the Bulgarian communists imagined the past of Bulgaria	221
--- Bulgarian lands since prehistory	221
--- Presentation of origin	222
--- Byzantine Empire	226
--- Cyril and Methodius	227
--- Survival of the nation under the Ottoman yoke (14 th -18 th century)	229
--- National liberation movement against the Turkish Yoke (circa 1860-1878)	234
--- National integration: Eastern Rumelia-Macedonia (1885-1913)	241
--- Bulgaria as a semi-colonial country (interwar years)	243
--- Second World War–Resistance movement–9 September 1944	246
Conclusion	248
Chapter 6	
Flagging nationhood: events and symbols	249
6.1 The nationalist discourse of the BCP with regard to commemorations and anniversaries	249
--- September 9 th (the transition day)	257
--- 1 st May (May Day)	260
--- 24 th May (Day of Cyril and Methodius who enlightened the Slavs)	262
6.2 National symbols	264
6.2.a The national emblem	265
6.2.b The national flag	267
Conclusion	268
Conclusion	270
Appendix one: Political Parties	278
Appendix two: Figures	282

Appendix three: Tables	300
Literature	304

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

Main objective: investigation, examination, analysis, and interpretation of the nationalist discourse of the Bulgarian Communist Party between 1942 and 1948 based on uncovering and interpreting of archival data; to show how and why Marxism and nationalism combined to form a particular syncretic discourse and to trace the development of the main concepts of this discourse; to examine and analyse the development of this discourse in several domains; to explain why nationalism was necessary for the BCP; to supply the already existing literature on the communist takeover in Bulgaria with a parameter that has been largely ignored.

Chapter 1: to show how Marxism and nationalism combined to form a syncretic discourse in the period leading up to the Second World War; to explain why the discourse of the BCP was infiltrated by nationalism; to analyse the origin of a set of key concepts used by the BCP in this process.

Chapter 2: to contextualise the evolution of this discourse in the context of Bulgarian politics during the Second World War; to analyse central elements of this in a number of domains.

Chapter 3: to analyse and explain the further development of this discourse in the context of post-war domestic Bulgarian politics; to explain why nationalism was necessary for the BCP; to analyse and show extensive evidence of the nationalist discourse of the BCP in a number of domains; in parallel, to give reasons why this particular discourse was opted for and how exactly it operated and was deployed.

Chapter 4: to examine how the nationalist discourse of the BCP operated with regard to the international arena and to argue that despite the limits set up by the Soviet Union and the socialist block the Bulgarian communists were still able to express their nationalism.

Chapter 5: to show how the BCP “flagged” nationhood and how it imagined the Bulgarian nation in various ways, illustrating this with a number of examples drawn

from educational policy and materials, including textbooks, and through an analysis of the historiography that underpinned their production.

Chapter 6: to show how the BCP manipulated specific fields of nationalism: commemorations, anniversaries, and symbols.

INTRODUCTION

Marxism and nationalism are two of the most significant ideologies of the 20th century. A number of theorists on nationalism have already addressed the question of the relationship between them. One of the most prominent theorists on nationalism, Benedict Anderson¹, points out this relationship in the introduction to his influential book “Imagined Communities” with particular references to nationalist wars between Marxist, allegedly internationalist, states (Cambodia, Vietnam, and China), which were not supposed to occur.

In addition, a number of contemporary Marxists, such as Munck², Nimni³, Schwarzmantel⁴ and Debray⁵, have analysed the political and historical significance of the dialogue between these two ideologies, arguing that Marxism could not disregard nationalism. On the contrary, they argued, nationalism could be compatible with socialism; nationalism, indeed, is presented as an opportunity for socialism rather than a threat. Marxists could benefit from nationalist movements, as nationalism could and did reinforce and empower communist parties. More specifically, as Nairn and Hobsbawm point out, anti-imperialist movements noticeably reinforced the association of the left with nationalism⁶. Hobsbawm, moreover, notes that already in the mid-1930s the communists, proclaiming an antifascist patriotism or nationalism, had attempted to recapture the symbols of patriotism; as a result, ‘the combination of the red and national flags was genuinely popular’⁷. All the above authors, admitting that Marxism has turned to nationalism seeking support and popularity, have identified the relative weakness of the position of Marxism in its dialogue with nationalism.

They have, however, not taken into consideration a significant parameter of the aforementioned dialogue: the syncretism of Marxism and nationalism might have made Marxist parties larger and more successful, but they might also have led to a

¹ Anderson (1991): 1-2.

² Munck (1986).

³ Nimni (1991).

⁴ Schwarzmantel (1991).

⁵ Debray (1977).

⁶ Nairn (1977) and Hobsbawm (1993): 148.

⁷ Hobsbawm (1993): 145-147.

profound mutation. Hobsbawm, for example, notes that ‘Marxist movements and states have become national not only in form but in substance, i.e. nationalist’⁸ without, however, paying much attention to the side-effects of this event. Without completely abandoning Marxism, the character of Marxist parties was arguably transformed to a significant extent. Without formally abandoning internationalism, the nature of which, as we shall see, had been problematic even since the dawn of the twentieth century, they became, it will be argued, what might be called Marxist nationalist parties⁹.

A number of non-Marxist authors of nationalism, on the other hand, have focused on what they have seen as the weakness of Marxism in countering nationalism. Gellner, for example, has developed the theory of the ‘terrible postal error’¹⁰; instead of having been sent to classes, the awakening message has been sent to nations. Nationalism rather than Marxism has been the predominant and most popular ideology of modernity. In the contest between Marxism and nationalism, Marxism has emerged as the loser. It has also been argued against this judgement that, in many cases, in order to emerge triumphant, nationalism has seemed itself to need Marxism. Munck, for example, has shown how Marxism influenced nationalism in a number of ways, citing examples¹¹ of a range of national liberation movements which had a pronounced Marxist character. Indeed, it could be argued that many nationalists of the Third World turned to Marxism-Leninism, because it helped to explain away their countries’ backwardness and provided national liberation movements with an effective anti-imperialist discourse. This generous contribution of Marxism to its ostensibly competing ideology has been ignored to a great extent.

Although there has been some work at the general level on this relationship, there is a lack of literature regarding the national idea and the national discourses that were articulated by communist parties in the Second World War and early post-war years.

⁸ Hobsbawm (1977): 13.

⁹ Harris (1990): 1 notes that ‘in Angola and Mozambique, there are strange creatures called “Marxist-Leninist states”... but the media mean no more by this phrase than radical nationalists’.

¹⁰ Gellner (1983): 129: ‘the awakening message was intended for classes, but by some terrible postal error was delivered to nations’.

¹¹ The Cuban revolution fought the foreign enemy (US imperialism) and its local representative (the dictator Batista), while Guevarist organisations built “National Liberation Armies” and had *Patria o Muerte* (Fatherland or Death) as their main slogan, in Munck (1986): 114-115.

This is for many reasons. First, from within, communist parties did not pay attention to their nationalism because they were not able to recognise it; they identified themselves with the nation, they considered their patriotic sentiments as genuine and their deeds as patriotic. As a nationalist is unlikely to criticise himself for nationalism, the same happened with regard to the communist parties. Furthermore, both communist and non-communist scholars have taken the internationalist “imaginary” of communist parties for granted, to a large extent, so that the nationalistic core of the discourse of the communist parties has been largely overshadowed. Only in recent decades, when a considerable literature began to engage in analysing nationalism, has the “owl of Minerva” begun circling round ‘Marxist nationalism’ as well.

This thesis examines the phenomenon of the association of Marxism with nationalism, taking the Bulgarian Communist Party as a case study. This phenomenon is not unique of course to the BCP. There is evidence regarding a systematic and widespread adoption of nationalism by Marxist parties before and after the Second World War. Martin, for example, has written on the ‘paradox of internationalism through nationalism’¹² and analysed Stalin’s categorical rejection of internationalism in 1929-1930¹³.

Kagarlitsky too has argued that in this context ‘nationalism had been concealed behind internationalism. After the [Second World] war... from defence nationalism went over to the offensive’¹⁴. He gives an account of Russian nationalism (overestimating everything Russian, rethinking history along nationalistic lines, and the onslaught against the internationalist-cosmopolitan intelligentsia at the end of 1940s) and of “little nationalism”, that is, the nationalism of non-Russian republics, which coexists with Russian nationalism¹⁵. In fact, as Slezkine too points out, the “little nationalism” of Soviet republics had been praised since the 1930s: at the Congress of the Soviet writers in 1934, ‘all Soviet peoples possessed, or would shortly acquire, their own classics, their own founding fathers and their own folkloric riches’¹⁶. Since there was a nationalistic tendency in Russia long before the 1940s,

¹² Martin (2001): 5.

¹³ Martin (2001): 245-249.

¹⁴ Kagarlitsky (1988): 131.

¹⁵ Kagarlitsky (1988): 128-133.

¹⁶ Slezkine (1996): 225.

why was there not one in Bulgaria? And, given the “little nationalism” of non-Russian Soviet republics, why would there not be People’s Republics too expressing their nationalism?

There is relatively little literature on the national discourses of communist parties in Eastern Europe. However, there is no literature at all on their national discourses during the 1940s, since the dominant view with regard to the political character of communist parties of that time is that they were non-nationalist. It has been claimed that communist parties of that time eschewed nationalism¹⁷, if not that they were purely internationalist¹⁸.

Many authors (Verdery, Todorova, King, and Fejto) argue that communist parties turned to national discourses only in the late 1950s, that is, after their destalinisation, for several reasons. To begin with, Fejto has argued that, at the time, communist leaders blamed the Comintern’s directives for setting the communist parties at variance with national opinion in the past and had often made them appear mere agents of Soviet policy¹⁹. Second, Verdery, discussing the turn of the Romanian Communist Party to nationalism, claims that the rulers of socialism’s “weak state” used nationalism in order to pursue the discursive constitution of a strong, unified image²⁰, since nationalism provided an expedient basis on which the image of a unified will could be constructed²¹. This happened at the time when the RCP sought to lessen the Soviet control over it, that is, after destalinisation. Third, King argues that the RCP identified itself with Romanian historical tradition because it sought to secure a measure of popular support for the Party and to achieve party goals by inspiring greater popular effort to achieve economic progress²² (state-building and modernisation). Finally, Todorova has claimed that communist parties turned to nationalism in the late 1950s, when étatist communism had become dominant at the expense of classical Marxism²³.

¹⁷ Pundeff (1970): 150, 153. It is the first discussion of Marxism and nationalism in Bulgaria.

¹⁸ Mutafchieva (1995): 8-12.

¹⁹ Fejto (1974): 257 and 271 ff.

²⁰ Verdery (1991): 307.

²¹ Verdery (1991): 131.

²² King (1980): 125.

²³ Todorova (1995): 88, 90, and (1993): 146.

As we shall see, the argument of this thesis accepts all the above reasons with regard to the turn of communist parties to nationalism but dates this rather earlier than these authors. It recognises that the BCP pursued

- its presentation in national terms in order to refute opposition claims that it was a Russified party
- identification of the party with the state as part of a wider totalitarian discourse the BCP engaged in
- use of the national idea as well as self-presentation of the BCP as the embodiment of national unity in order to gain mass support and consolidate its power
- self-presentation of the BCP as a protagonist and hegemonic power in a large-scale national project and not solely as a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary and purely proletarian party in order to achieve state-building, modernisation, and industrialisation; nationalism was a discourse that articulated the étatist project of both modernisation and industrialisation²⁴.

This thesis aims to contribute to knowledge by showing that the BCP (and by implication other communist parties) reconciled itself much earlier with nationalism and articulated a fully-fledged nationalist discourse, that is, since the 1940s, if not earlier. Thus, in the late 1950s, nationalism of communist parties became completely overt and dominant, as limits set by the Soviet block substantially widened.

0.1 Hypothesis

The present thesis aspires to contribute to the ongoing debate on the relationship between Marxism and nationalism and, in particular, it concerns itself with the increasing adoption of a nationalist discourse by a Marxist party. More concretely, my thesis examines the case of the BCP and the version of nationalism it articulated during the Second World War and early post-war years. The case of the BCP is very interesting for several reasons. First and foremost, the BCP was a self-proclaimed Marxist party, which identified itself with self-proclaimed Marxist institutional domains, that is, the Comintern and the socialist block, and the Comintern's post-war

²⁴ See Chapter 1 Part 5.

successor, the Cominform. Moreover, its prominent and historic leader, Georgi Dimitrov²⁵, was himself the architect of People's Fronts; his speech at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern was in particular crucial for the syncretism of Marxism and nationalism that communist parties were henceforth to pursue.

The BCP had a clear aim in the 1940s: to become a mass party, to seize power, and to consolidate its power. To realise this project, it developed a particular strategy: it set up a wide political umbrella of political allies, the Fatherland Front, since the Party on its own was in a quite weak position. Its strategy involved a series of tactics: the resistance movement, occupation of key apparatuses, salami tactics²⁶ and elimination of the opposition, a close association with the Red Army and the Soviet Union, adherence to the socialist block.

My thesis aspires to go beyond strategy, tactics, and means of violence already highlighted by authors that have discussed the politics of the BCP in that time. Strategy and tactics depend on a discourse within the frame of which they can be deployed. Violence also needs legitimation. A regime, a totalitarian one even more, so needs propaganda. The hypothesis of this thesis is that the BCP articulated its strategies and tactics and legitimised its violence speaking effectively in, what we might call, the native dialect²⁷ of Bulgarian society, that is, nationalism; therefore, using, to a great extent, a specific nationalist discourse, even though it was not its unique discourse. By nationalist discourse, I mean a discourse which has the nation in its epicentre, as defined by Anderson²⁸, that is, 'an imagined political community... inherently limited and sovereign', or a state for the nation, as defined by Giddens²⁹, that is, 'a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries' having the control of the means of violence and existing 'in a complex of other nation-states'. That means that a nationalist discourse involves the interpretation of politics in national terms; the

²⁵ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

²⁶ I elaborate on these tactics in Chapter Three, Part Three.

²⁷ By this term, I mean the language which has gained centrality in the political life. It is the discourse inscribed in and emanating from most, if not all, the official quarters of a society, which play a central role in forming public opinion (ruling elites, popular politicians, intellectuals, institutions etc.). This language guarantees to get people's attention, because the people have become familiar with and use it themselves.

²⁸ Anderson (2002): 6.

²⁹ Giddens (1985): 121.

prioritising of the nation-state; deployment of national symbols; imagining the Other and the enemy in particular ways; determination of national interests and ideals; sacralisation of territory; imagining of the national past; and ritualisation of the nation's celebration. A nationalist discourse, then, revolves around the nation, which is used as a principle of social organisation and mobilisation. Where the term national discourse is used, I mean a discourse with particular significant references to the nation. A national discourse might become nationalist under specific material conditions.

However, as it adopted an extensive and ambitious nationalism, the BCP itself underwent a profound transformation. It placed a nationalist discourse side by side with another discourse, that of Marxist socialism. The systematic and increasing nationalism in combination with the already existing Marxist discourse generated a specific pattern of nationalism, which could be called 'Marxist nationalism'. This specific version of nationalism is investigated, examined, analysed, and interpreted here.

At another level, an examination of the case of the BCP can help us address a very interesting question, notably the fate and understanding of internationalism or the universalism of the working class in the context of the adoption of a nationalist discourse by a Marxist party. In one sense, nationalism cannot, in principle, be reconciled with Marxism, since nationalism is premised on a perception of horizontal social organization, integration and structure, while Marxism emphasises the importance of vertical modes of social structure. Indeed, classical Marxists had always predicted the end of national divisions (Marx himself already in mature capitalism) and had placed a great faith in the universalism of the working class. Classical Marxism³⁰ saw the world primarily as divided vertically into classes and considered the division of the world into nations as illusory. Nevertheless, in the event, Marxist revolutions accommodated themselves to national boundaries.

It should be emphasised that in this thesis, I focus primarily on the nationalist discourse of the BCP and not its discourse in general; the aim is not to draw a line

³⁰ Classical Marxism includes all Marxists up to the First World War but the so-called revisionists.

between what is Marxism and what is not, or even what is nationalism and what is not, but rather to focus on the degree of emphasis and importance attributed, for example, to the nation or class within the discourse. Therefore, Marxism is discussed only to the extent that it contributed to the formulation of the national discourse of the BCP or fused with the latter rather than as a separate discourse. In that way, I aim to present the form that nationalism can take within a Marxist institution and in association with a Marxist discourse. To do this, I examine only the official and central party line, as it was articulated by the leadership of the BCP. The fundamental aims of my thesis are to document and analyse this particular discourse, its character and content, assess the reasons why the BCP opted for it, and how it operated in the major spheres of social and political life. This thesis also aspires to contribute to the more general debate on the character of the communist parties in the 1940s and to open the way for other research on communist parties of Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Since communist parties had adopted and adapted nationalism, a metamorphosis of their character might have occurred.

0.2 Methodology

In analysing the phenomenon of the ‘Marxist nationalism’ of the BCP, I have drawn upon different theories and attempted to work within a multiperspectival research framework. In this context, theoretical perspectives on hegemony, the interplay between domestic and international politics, the role of historiography in constructing versions of the national past, the literature on anniversaries and commemorations as key means of collective remembering have provided important insights. The advantage of the combination of different theories and methods is that it allows cross-fertilisation and produces a broader, albeit contingent, understanding of the phenomena investigated. Within a multiperspectival framework, research can cast light on a phenomenon from different angles and thus take more account of the complexity of the phenomenon. Thus, this thesis involves theories of the ideologies in question (nationalism and Marxism), approaches to hegemony, discourse theory and analysis, and disciplines that study the social: politics and history.

First, the thesis draws on a number of theoretical debates on the relationship between Marxism and nationalism (e.g. Schwarzmantel, Nimni, and Munck) as well as those that are more closely focused on the relationship between Marxist institutions and nationalism (e.g. Verdery). This provides a preliminary understanding of the nature of the discourse in question and clues to, as well as for understanding, how this particular discourse operated.

Closely related to the above debates, in particular those exploring the links between Marxist institutions and nationalism, are the debates on the Marxist, and, eventually, post-Marxist notion of hegemony. The attainment of hegemony and the establishment of a national-popular collective will was considered to be necessary for the establishment and durability of effective Marxist institutions (cf. Gramsci but also Laclau). The Communists' major goal during the 1940s was to form a coalition government in which they would hold key offices, break the existing political structures, and establish new ones in which they would be the guiding spirit of social and political change³¹. Thus, in understanding the way the BCP tried to be hegemonic, which is what this thesis argues, we must turn to the ambitious Gramscian hegemonic project, since the BCP essentially and implicitly embarked on such a project, although it did not articulate this openly or in any self-conscious way.

Gramsci proposed a cultural ideological project in order to unite diverse political forces. This would enable the proletariat to transcend its corporate interests and represent the universal interests of the 'people' and the 'nation'. For Gramsci hegemony is not an instrumental political strategy, but a general political logic presupposing and prioritising the articulation of discourses able to construct a new common sense that can structure an emergent historical bloc³² and to express the national and popular aspirations in a broad sense through a "historical block", in which the communists are to exercise hegemony. In effect, the hegemonic practices of the BCP, even without acknowledging it, have a number of common characteristics with the Gramscian political project.

³¹ This is how Tomaszewski (1989): 55-56 interprets communist politics of the period I discuss here.

³² Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000): 14-15.

Some more recent interpretations of hegemony prove to be of significant value in helping to show how the hegemonic project of the Bulgarian communists allowed for the articulation of an extensive nationalism. They also establish links between the concepts and theories of hegemony and discourse. Howarth and Stavrakakis³³, or Laclau and Mouffe³⁴, for instance, define hegemonic practices as an exemplary form of political activity that involves the articulation of different identities and subjectivities into a common project. Smith and Laclau³⁵ interpret the Gramscian concept of hegemony as the construction of a political leadership that offers itself as an apparently neutral space for the inscription of a broad range of political demands. Thus, in the process, a communist hegemonic discourse can allow more and more diverse, or some times antagonistic, discursive elements to position themselves under its banner. However, this could also constitute a potential weakness, as discursive elements could, in the process, be mutated to the extent that in effect a completely new subject can emerge. The Marxist nationalism of the BCP could be conceived of, in these terms, as a new subject emerging through a metamorphosis of former communist discursive elements (e.g. internationalism into nationalism) in the process of a hegemonic project (People's Front).

The hegemonic strategy of the BCP was articulated within the discursive ensemble of 'Marxist nationalism'. Laclau argues that 'a communist movement can denounce the betrayal by capitalist classes of a national cause and articulate nationalism and socialism in a single ideological discourse'³⁶. This thesis, then, discusses a particular case of Marxism (that interpreted and practiced by the BCP – and, by extension, its contemporary communist parties in Eastern Europe), which in certain social-historical conditions became compatible with nationalism and gave rise to a peculiar version of nationalism, that is, 'Marxist nationalism'. In this sense, it challenges Hobsbawm's dictum³⁷ that Marxists as such are not nationalists. Under certain circumstances, Marxists, in effect, can and, indeed, did become nationalists.

³³ Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000): 14-15.

³⁴ Laclau (1977): appendix; Laclau and Mouffe (1983): 113.

³⁵ Smith A. M. (1998): 166 and 168.

³⁶ Laclau (1977): 160.

³⁷ Hobsbawm (1977): 10.

It should be noted that this articulation of nationalism with Marxism, as all articulations for that matter, should be seen within the context of competition and antagonism between, and dislocation of alternative projects and discourses. Thus, by articulating the meaning of socialist patriotism, Bulgarian communists dislocated bourgeois nationalism. As Norval argues 'the space opened by a dislocation is the space from which we can think the possibility of hegemonic re-articulation'³⁸. Struggles of articulating and disarticulating discourses show that hegemony is achieved in social battlefields; one of them is the battlefield of nationhood. Through the battle for nationhood, a part of the national political spectre (e.g. the BCP) claims to speak for the whole nation, to define its national identity, to represent the national essence, and to realise the nation's interests.

Nationalist discourse, as my thesis argues, provided a major underpinning for the BCP's hegemonic strategies. Smith³⁹ argues that a hegemonic force prevails to the extent that it deploys a combination of tactics –involving violence, exclusion, articulation and redefinition, persuasion, the general framing of the political terrain, institutionalisation- that allows it to exploit the unique opportunities that are available in a given historical configuration. Without an effective discourse no common sense can be constructed, no common project of different identities can be articulated and no social battle can be won. For this reason, discourse analysis constitutes a significant methodological tool. My thesis draws on different versions of discourse analysis taking into consideration Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe's theory (Laclau, Mouffe, and Norval), critical discourse analysis (Fairclough), and discursive psychology (Billig).

Discourse consists of a set of statements and utterances, both limited but repetitive⁴⁰, that possess specific properties; they are unified by common themes, they are marked by repetitiveness (therefore are institutionalised, naturalised, verified). They together form what discourse theorists call an archive; in other words, a repository of meaning, which is available for construction, reconstruction and mobilisation as the case may be. Three parameters of discourse analysis are central for the needs of the present

³⁸ Norval (1994): 133-134.

³⁹ Smith A. M. (1998): 184.

⁴⁰ As post-structuralist theorists drawing upon the analysis of Foucault note; see Danaher, Schirato, and Webb (2000): 35.

thesis. First of all, discourse analysis presupposes contextualisation and periodisation. The syncretism of nationalism and Marxism is contextualised in terms of period: up to the Second World War (Chapter 1), during the Second World War (chapter 2), when the BCP fought to create the conditions to seize power, and in the early post-war years (chapter 3-6), when it took power and was interested in its consolidation. It is also contextualised in terms of institution⁴¹ (the BCP), and events (domestic and international politics of the BCP, and flagging the nation).

A second parameter crucial for this thesis is that a unified-single discourse cannot exist; discourse shifts and changes over time. As Howarth and Stavrakakis point out, agents and systems are social constructs that undergo historical and social change as a result of political practices⁴². Marxism and nationalism explicitly set off from distinct points of departure. In their historical course they changed their shape at will depending on political agents involved. If one can use the example that Smith provides to explain the transformative nature of nationalism, that is, the river god Achelous⁴³, then we could argue that in specific historical circumstances, after a series of shifts and transformations, the courses of the Marxist and nationalist “rivers” flowed together into the same channel.

The emerging literature focusing on the articulation and disarticulation of discourses provides us with useful ways of making sense and dealing with the polysemic character of the various discursive components. As Derrida explains, ‘a particular signifier always has more than one meaning, because “meaning” is an effect of differences within a larger system’. Hence, ‘particular individuals and communities can actively create new meanings from signs or cultural products which come from afar’⁴⁴. In addition, to quote Derrida, signifiers and signified are continually detaching themselves from each other and are then reattached in new combinations. Notions such as “empty signifiers” and “nodal points” are thus useful to the development of the arguments of this thesis and the analysis that underpins it. For example, certain key flags of both Marxism and nationalism, that is, “social change”, “nation”, and

⁴¹ Danaher, Schirato, and Webb (2000): x argue that discourse generally refers to a type of language associated with an institution, and includes the ideas and statements which express an institution’s values.

⁴² Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000): 6.

⁴³ Smith Ant. (1999): 98.

⁴⁴ Derrida (1993): 6-7.

“national interests” can be considered as *empty signifiers*. Howarth and Stavrakakis define empty signifiers as those of the lack, of the absent⁴⁵. Different political strategies “fill in” empty signifiers with meanings and connotations. To quote Foucault, discourses are practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak⁴⁶. Accordingly, “social change”, “nation”, “people” and “national interests” are articulated in different ways within the discourse of a communist, a liberal, and a fascist party.

“Nation” and “national interests” acquire a different meaning by being articulated around the signifier ‘Marxist communism’, which occupies the structural position of the *nodal point*. According to Laclau and Mouffe, nodal points are privileged signifiers or reference points in a discourse that bind together a particular system of meaning or ‘chain of signification’⁴⁷. Thus, due to the intervention of this nodal point (Marxist communism), “nation” and “national interests” are transformed into internal *moments* of a specific Marxist discourse. In other words, their meaning is partially fixed by reference to the nodal point ‘Marxist communism’, as Dimitrov and the leadership of the BCP defined it.

Another dimension of the politics of signification inherent in the polysemic character of discourses relates to the plays of distinction and difference that they set in motion. A distinction between patriotism and nationalism carries ideological implications and political considerations. As Billig notes, nationalism as a condition is projected on to ‘others’; ‘ours’ is overlooked, forgotten, even theoretically denied or appears as patriotism⁴⁸. For nationalism and patriotism took different meanings within the discourse of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Bulgarian communists claimed to be patriots. According to their discourse, patriotism is defined as the pure and genuine love to the fatherland, whereas nationalism is seen as an aggressive, bourgeois ideology.

⁴⁵ Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000): 9. To quote their example, “justice” performs the role of an empty signifier in Irish Republicanist discourse.

⁴⁶ Foucault (1972): 49.

⁴⁷ Laclau and Mouffe (1985):113.

⁴⁸ Billig (1995): 16-17.

As Billig⁴⁹ has argued, this differentiation between nationalism and patriotism is artificial, as the nation-state is the common object of loyalty and identification. First, patriotism is considered to be the persistence and genuine love of a country; however, the most extreme nationalists would claim patriotic motivation for themselves. Second, patriotism is considered to be defensive whereas nationalism is aggressive; however, Hitler also imagined that he was defending Germany against the Jews. Lastly, it is generally believed that patriots are not motivated by hatred of the enemy; however, they are ready to kill him. Therefore, one can characterise Bulgarian communists as nationalists despite the fact that they were self-defined as patriots.

Finally, it is increasingly recognised that discursive practices revolving around the notion of the nation, include practices of remembering and commemorating, of essentially establishing narratives about the past⁵⁰, the genealogies of nations, elites, bureaucracies, institutions, narratives of loss and discovery that culminate in the establishment of nations and –what is of particular relevance to this thesis- the vindication of its political leadership and its choices. In the context of this thesis, the BCP engaged in such attempts to define and demarcate Bulgaria's past in ways which represented its ascendance to power as the natural culmination of centuries of national struggles against enemies, external and internal.

To conceptualise a particular discourse, one needs to resort to interdisciplinary analysis of the relations between the discursive practice and the social practice. Discourse is a moment in social practices. My thesis explores a discursive practice within a particular institution (national discourse/BCP) in the broader social practice of establishing popular fronts for seizing and then consolidating power by the communists.

Discourse analysis is not sufficient in itself for analysing the wider social practice, since the latter encompasses both discursive and non-discursive elements. In other words, the national discourse that the Party adopted can only partly explain the success of the Fatherland Front, while a wider social analysis is needed concerning the hegemonic strategies of the communists. Thus, additionally to discourse analysis,

⁴⁹ Billig (1995): 55-59.

⁵⁰ Spillman (1997): 7.

one need to take into account economic, social, political, ideological, and cultural parameters, given that the possibility of a specific discourse depends on particular material conditions. That is to say that even though a discourse has the dynamics to transform its agents, it is also designed and determined by them. At the same time, agents are producers as well as products of discourses. For these reasons, the nationalist discourse of the BCP is seen as a necessary constituent element of its hegemonic strategy and in terms of the material conditions that prevailed in Bulgarian society and the party at a specific time. I attempt historical and political analyses at the outset of each chapter to show the material conditions which allowed the national discourse of the Bulgarian communists and which made this particular discourse possible.

0.3 Sources

This thesis draws on both archival and secondary sources. First and foremost, the records and archives of the BCP and the Bulgarian State have been examined and systematically used. Instances of the national discourse of Bulgarian Marxists were found in a variety of sites: the official newspaper of the Party (the *Rabotnitsesko Delo*), public speeches and publications of the leadership of the BCP, and, concerning Chapter Five, historical textbooks and books. Intertextuality has also been applied; in a broader sense, I investigate how an individual text draws on elements and discourses of other texts (political texts, scientific texts, journalistic texts etc) and how different texts supplement discourses on specific political domains. Additionally, a range of secondary literature, mainly concerning nationalism and Marxism, has been drawn upon and discussed.

Empirical data are viewed as sets of signifying practices that constitute a “discourse” and its “reality”. They have been contextualised in social, historical, and political terms, analysed and interpreted. Empirical data also have been analysed in the light of the form of depth hermeneutics, as proposed by Thompson⁵¹ and consisted of the following three phases: a. the analysis of the social-historical conditions within which agents act and interact, b. discursive analysis, and c. “interpretation”, that is,

⁵¹ Thompson (1984): 10-11.

construction of meaning which shows how discourse serves to sustain relations of domination.

Chapter One

Marxism and Nationalism – The Development of a Syncretic Discourse

The present thesis shows a particular case of the symbiosis of Marxism and nationalism, that is, a case of ‘Marxist nationalism’. Classical and, especially, Marxian Marxism⁵² is generally thought to be firmly internationalist. This raises a number of questions. How and why did an internationalist ideology come to generate nationalist versions? What factors prioritised the national question? Were there significant breaks and discontinuities in Marxist ideology which created the conditions for this turn to nationalism?

This chapter discusses how the syncretism of Marxism and nationalism came about. Over a long period, the communist movement eclectically adopted national elements. In different times and for diverse political considerations, the communists welcomed national ideals and discourses. This process needs to be analysed at three levels. First, at the level of theory, the Marxist inability to fully comprehend nationalism and its dynamics needs to be explained, as the syncretism of the above ideologies is partly due to the limitation of Marxist theory. Second, a series of concessions of the international communist movement to nationalism (beginning with Leninist theoretical innovations, to Stalinist Soviet practices and, then, to Comintern’s politics) account for the Marxist adaptation to nationalism. Lastly, there was a gradual merging of Marxism and nationalism within the Comintern at both a strategic and a tactical level.

1.1 An uncomfortable anomaly for Marxism

The Marxist nationalism of the BCP needs to be seen as a part of a more general convergence between Marxism and nationalism. The grounds of this convergence pertain to some classical Marxist theoretical principles and axioms that prevented subsequent Marxist generations developing a coherent theory of nationalism and an effective strategy for confronting it. As a result, Marxists were driven to reconcile

⁵² By this term I mean the writings of Marx and Engels.

themselves to nationalism, since they were unable to react, at the theoretical level, to its sweeping influence.

There is, to begin with, no consistent and uniform theory on nationalism in Marxist tradition. As a Marxist scholar on nationalism puts it, ‘nationalism has been largely elided in Marxist theory, rather than confronted’, because ‘it has proved an uncomfortable anomaly for Marxist theory’⁵³. The national question had long been underestimated, at least until the First World War and the October Revolution. Classical Marxists had been focused on other issues, such as “class”, “socialism and communism”, and “progress”. They left then, at best, what many have identified as a contradictory legacy on the national question⁵⁴.

In the writings of Marx and Engels, the national question is rather marginal and of peripheral interest⁵⁵. Marx and Engels referred to nationalism mainly in journalistic writings, letters and occasional comments on events when the topic of nationalism forced itself on their attention, as Schwarzmantel points out⁵⁶. They became interested in the national question, especially after the revolutions of 1848; but still they tended to relate any national question to what they saw as a more pressing or fundamental political or economic issue (the Irish question to Anglo–Irish landlordism, the Polish to Russian expansionism, and the Indian to British imperialism). In contrast with recent literature claiming that a theory on nationalism and national identity can be detected in Marxian writings⁵⁷, it is argued here that, in effect, Marxian theory prevented systematic theoretical analysis of the national question.

The reason of the underestimation of the national question may well be, as Hobsbawm argues, that Marx and Engels ‘were not in favour of nations as such’⁵⁸. Indeed, it can be argued that they were never clear about what was meant by the term nation. Their use of the concept of nation is inconsistent. To the extent they used the term nation, it

⁵³ Anderson (1991): 3.

⁵⁴ Munck (1986): 9 and 20 ff, Davis (1967): 79, and Debray (1977): 31-32.

⁵⁵ For instance, throughout *Capital* Marx did not treat the national question at all; even if Marx mentioned colonialism in several volumes, he treated it from the point of view of the metropolitan countries and the emergence of the global market. See Benner (1995): 172 footnote 2.

⁵⁶ Schwarzmantel (1991): 59.

⁵⁷ Benner (1995).

⁵⁸ Cited by Munck (1986): 21.

was applied to the concept of statehood. Nation means the viable independent state; even if nation implies a community, as Blaut claims⁵⁹, it refers to a non-state community, which positively has the potential for becoming, and staying, politically independent, that is, to form a state. Hence, nation and state effectively became coterminous.

As a result, no Marxist up to the First World War unfolded a systematic and extensive theory on nationalism, which could seriously be taken into consideration by subsequent Marxist generations. Luxemburg and Lenin did not develop a theory on nationalism on its own, even though they did turn their attention certainly to issues relevant to the national question. Marxists wrote a number of treatises on the national question but never launched a major polemic against nationalism as such. This was the case even for both Bauer and Stalin who produced the only major works⁶⁰. Bauer's main objective was the unity of Social Democracy and the territorial integrity of the Habsburg Empire, which the "United States of Great Austria" would succeed. Stalin, on Lenin's instructions, wrote his treatise on the national question for polemical purposes against 'cultural national autonomy' and organisational autonomy within the socialist movement as the Bolsheviks were for a centralised and well-disciplined organisation. Significantly, in this treatise, Stalin, instead of confronting nationalism, contented himself with defining the nation.

At a deeper level, a number of Marxian theoretical principles (class and economic reductionism) and tactics (instrumentalism) inclined Marxists to underestimate the dynamics of nationalism. They led to a crisis in Marxist discourse at the beginning of the 20th century, which together with outcomes of the October Revolution resulted in the first major reconciliation of Marxism with nationalism.

⁵⁹ Blaut (1987): 199. Blaut (1987): 201, also argues that Engels distinguished the Marxian view from the 'principle of nationalities'. Instead, Engels underlined the importance of language, territory, external political context, and other factors. Nevertheless, the 'principle of nationalities', according to which every nation should form its own state, comprised all these notions, as nation relates to language or cultural and social integrity, for instance, and state relates to territory and external political context. Marx and Engels could not go beyond their age.

⁶⁰ *The Nationality Question and Social Democracy* (1907) of Bauer; *How does Social Democracy Understand the National Question* (1904) and *Marxism and the National Question* (1913) of Stalin.

Class reductionism, that is, an over-riding emphasis on the primacy of class, obscured the significance of nationalism. Luxemburg and the “radical left”, in particular, stressed the primacy of class over nation⁶¹: ‘rather, there exist within each nation, classes with antagonistic interests and rights’⁶². Classical Marxists were adamant that the ‘necessary and objective laws of capitalist development’ guarantee the proletarian revolution, which was only a matter of time⁶³. Capitalism leads to an increasing proletarianisation of the middle social strata and the peasantry. Afterwards, a straightforward confrontation between the bourgeoisie and proletariat, that is, the already proletarianised broadest masses, would occur “spontaneously”. There is no room for the national question in this conception. As class-consciousness developed, national consciousness, it was assumed, would wither away.

Marxism, to a great extent, owes its internationalism to this class reductionism. Engels declared that ‘the proletarians of all countries have one and the same interest, one and the same enemy, and one and the same struggle... [their] movement is essentially humanitarian, anti-nationalist’⁶⁴. Marxism conceives of mankind in its entirety and envisages communism on a global level. So, as Debray argues, the philosophical understanding of the world and the concept of Revolution were based upon the idea of universality⁶⁵. The proletariat as an international category makes the communist movement seem non-national. Marx explicitly argued that ‘in the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, [communists] point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat’⁶⁶. As Harris puts it, ‘the intellectual atmosphere... and [Marx and Engels’] convictions made it seem that internationalism was the force that would grow most powerfully in the future’⁶⁷. Luxemburg believed that the internationalisation of the economic system would suppress national interests⁶⁸. Lenin too declared that ‘in place of all forms of

⁶¹ Munck (1986): 4 and 57-62.

⁶² Luxemburg, *The National Question and Autonomy* (1908), in Davis (1976): 135.

⁶³ Himka (1986): 4, explains their revolutionary optimism pointing out that ‘Marx and Engels were expecting the *imminent* collapse of capitalism and the advent of communism’ (italics in the original).

⁶⁴ Engels, *The Festival of Nations in London*, in Marx and Engels (1976): 6.

⁶⁵ Debray (1977): 30-31.

⁶⁶ Cited in King (1973): 15.

⁶⁷ Harris (1992): 40.

⁶⁸ Harris (1992): 59.

nationalism, Marxism advances internationalism, the amalgamation of all nations in the higher unity'⁶⁹.

Insofar as Marxism is a form of economic reductionism, the predominance of the economic criterion over any other prevented Marxists from developing a theory of the nation. Marxist economic reductionism involves a kind of historical evolutionism, that is, the 'stage' theory or the theory of successive economic formations, based on the modes of production. According to it, primitive society (the Asiatic mode of production) was succeeded by feudalism, then by capitalism, while the last formation is bound to be socialism. Nationalism, as a bourgeois ideology, represents an epiphenomenon; it belongs to the realm of capitalist superstructure. As Munck argues, the modern nation was seen as fated to disappear when the bourgeoisie was overthrown⁷⁰. Lenin and the Bolsheviks believed that 'the future lay with full assimilation of all peoples into one and the emergence of an international culture'⁷¹. As nationalism was to disappear with the collapse of capitalism, which was taken for granted, a theory of the nation seemed needless.

Economic reductionism engendered the base/superstructure distinction. For that reason, as Boggs concludes, politics was a secondary issue in Marxian thought⁷². Consequently, ideologies and consciousness, such as nationalism, are reduced to superstructure. As economic relations can explain everything, an autonomous theory of nationalism as a political phenomenon was deemed unnecessary.

Economic reductionism also resulted in support for the establishment of large states and incorporated the idealist conception of "historyless" people, bequeathed from Hegel. Both led to the underestimation of the dynamics of nationalism. Marxists believed that large states guaranteed the advance of productive forces, a condition that

⁶⁹ Cited by King (1973): 21.

⁷⁰ Munck (1986): 21.

⁷¹ Harris (1992): 69. To remedy for the Jewish question, Lenin assumed that complete equality between Jew and non-Jew should allow Jewish assimilation in the majority; Harris (1992): 66.

⁷² Boggs (1976): 36 and 101 ff. maintains that 'Marx himself never really got around to developing a systematic theory of politics and the state, which left a void that encouraged a tendency towards economic determinism by the time of the Second International'. For the connection between Marxism and economism see, also, Simon (1991): 17.

would shorten the coming of a classless society⁷³. The conception of the historyless people led to the underestimation of the potential of some nations to achieve national independence in the future. The inability to create a viable state and the economic criterion, whether there is a healthy bourgeoisie to rise and advance a capitalist economy, were decisive in their conviction that Slav ‘petty, bull-headed nations’, for example,⁷⁴ were to die through natural causes⁷⁵. In fact, the late 19th and the 20th century saw the emergence of a number of small states including these of so-called historyless people, such as Bulgaria.

Lastly, the instrumentalist approach to the national question that they adopted deterred Marxists from constructing a theory of nationalism. Hobsbawm argues that the fundamental criterion of Marxist pragmatic judgement was whether nationalism, or any national movement, advanced the cause of socialism or conversely, how to prevent it from inhibiting its progress; or alternatively, how to mobilise it as a force to assist its progress⁷⁶. A good example of the tactical approach to nationalism can be found in a public speech of Zinoviev, in 1924: ‘we [Bolsheviks] did not admit Ukrainian nationalists into our Party...But we did exploit their discontent for the good of the proletarian revolution... They had been told that after the revolution they would be independent, not that Karl Marx had said that the proletariat had no fatherland’⁷⁷.

This tactical approach to the national question led Marx and Engels to divide national movements into progressive and reactionary. This approach led to the following contradiction, identified by Seton-Watson⁷⁸: the Romanians of Bessarabia, who were against Czarist Russia, were considered revolutionary people, whereas those of Transylvania were called the reactionary mercenaries of the Habsburgs. Davis argues that Marx and Engels, in general, defended the Polish national liberation movement,

⁷³ Marx and Engels sometimes justified overseas colonialism and imperialism provided that they might benefit backward people to ‘be civilised’ in economic and technological terms in Davis (1967): 18-19, and Blaut (1987): 24, 60. For Luxemburg see Davis (1976): 15-21 and Nimni (1991): 50.

⁷⁴ Munck (1986): 12 and Connor (1984): 15. Marx stated in *Revolution in China and in Europe (1853)*, that ‘it would seem as though history had first to make this whole people drunk before it could rouse them out of their hereditary stupidity’, quoted in Davis (1967): 61.

⁷⁵ ‘Czechs and Turks are dying’, quoted in Connor (1984): 15.

⁷⁶ Hobsbawm (1977): 10.

⁷⁷ Cited by Degras (1971, vol. 2): 158.

⁷⁸ Seton -Watson (1977): 446. See, also, Rosdolsky (1986): 80.

because a Polish state would serve as a buffer against reactionary Russia⁷⁹. Benner⁸⁰ argues that they accepted Irish freedom as a means to revolution in Britain. Marx wrote to his daughter in 1870 that in order ‘to accelerate the social revolution in Europe, you must push on the catastrophe of official England. To do so, you must attack her in Ireland’⁸¹, because ‘the English working class will never accomplish anything, until it has got rid of Ireland’⁸². However, after the British revolution the ‘potato-eating children of nature’⁸³ would be incorporated into a socialist, multinational Britain. Lastly, Marx and Engels denounced the South Slav movements, which fought the revolutions of 1848, as reactionary and counterrevolutionary⁸⁴, because, as Rosdolsky explains, Czarism could influence and manipulate them easily, with the idea of Pan-Slavism⁸⁵ and become the absolute master of central Europe.

Following Marx and Engels in this respect, Luxemburg divided national movements into progressive ones, which could accelerate the coming of socialism by improving the productive forces⁸⁶, and ‘fruitless national struggle’, which could only undermine the ‘coherent political struggle of the proletariat’⁸⁷. As Davis and Munck point out, Lenin treated each national movement separately, putting it in terms of the strategic interests of the international proletariat⁸⁸, or more concretely, in terms of those of its vanguard, the communist party. Thus, ‘Social Democracy... should make [the greatest] use of the conflicts that arise in this sphere [imperialism]... as ground for

⁷⁹ Davis (1967): 44-45.

⁸⁰ Benner (1995): 186-197.

⁸¹ Cited in Munck (1986): 18.

⁸² Benner (1995): 191.

⁸³ As Marx called the Irish people, cited in Connor (1984): 15.

⁸⁴ For the linking of some nations with counterrevolution see, also, Engels, *The Magyar Struggle (1849)*, in Marx – Engels, (1976, vol. 8): 234. ‘There is no country in Europe which does not have ... one or several ruined fragments of peoples ... these residual fragments of peoples always become fanatical standard-bearers of counterrevolution ... a protest against a great historical revolution’. Rosdolsky (1986): 23-50 gives lots of extracts from Engels articles in *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* on this issue.

⁸⁵ Rosdolsky (1986): 47.

⁸⁶ For instance, movements of Balkan nations under the Ottoman Empire at the first half of nineteenth century, in Luxemburg, *The National Question and Autonomy (1908)*, in Davis (1976): 112-114.

⁸⁷ ‘The national liberation of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Ireland... are equally utopian objectives’, because they would be bad examples for all the oppressed nations which would demand national liberation with national struggles rather than class struggles, Luxemburg, *The Polish Question at the International Congress (1896)*, in Davis (1976): 57-58. See, also Munck (1986): 52.

⁸⁸ Davis (1967): 193-194 and Munck (1986): 4.

mass action and for revolutionary attack on the bourgeoisie'⁸⁹. Connor notes that between 1914 and 1924 there are a number of instances in Lenin's writings where he shows how the international proletariat can combat nationalism when necessary and how it can manipulate nationalism whenever possible⁹⁰.

In the First World War, Lenin vehemently criticised the slogan of 'defence of the fatherland', because he was expecting the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil one and the imminent international socialist revolution, whilst at the same time indirectly accepting the defence of the fatherland as he exalted the slogan of national self-determination to the epicentre of revolutionary discourse. Thus, as Harris argues, he now ascertained the importance of the national question⁹¹, the dynamics of which he had previously underestimated. Indeed, Lenin had left it up to Stalin with conceptualising the national question instead of assuming it himself. The Bolsheviks handled the right of nations to self-determination in a tactical manner as well. They declared the right of national self-determination in the ramshackle 'prison of the peoples', as they described the Tsarist Empire. However, they were never to apply it themselves. Schwarzmantel explains that 'Lenin made a clear distinction between the right of secession and the actual exercise of this right... A decision of secession was never taken in the history of the Soviet Union⁹²... The right of nations to self-determination became a dead letter'⁹³.

The inability of Marxism to connect theory and practice here was increasingly manifested at the turn of the century. Theoretically, it was believed that the universality of the market would abolish national barriers; capitalism and the bourgeoisie would accelerate marginalisation of national economy and, therefore, the nation; and the proletariat would unite and its international revolution would triumph. In fact, national aspirations appear to have actually strengthened national barriers and, in some cases, enforced new frontiers; a world war was to break out but between nations and not classes. As a result, when nationalism loomed large at the beginning

⁸⁹ Lenin, *The Socialist Revolution and the Rights of Nations to Self-determination (Theses) (April 1917)*, (1969): 159.

⁹⁰ Connor (1984): 30-31.

⁹¹ Harris (1992): 88.

⁹² The Soviet constitutions of 1924, 1936 and 1977 possessed the right to secede, whereas there were a lot of political prisoners condemned because of separatist, 'anti-state' activities, Connor (1984): 51.

⁹³ Schwarzmantel (1991): 176.

Two main events of great historical significance then demonstrated the centrality of nationalism in the political life of the beginning of the twentieth century: the First World War and the October Revolution. In the First World War, workers, instead of joining their fellow proletarians all over the world in a revolution against the bourgeoisie, followed their own national bourgeoisie into a war against the proletarians of other nations. Socialists defended their fatherland and the Second International dissolved. As Schwarzmantel argues, ‘the nation-state had its schools, its army, its symbols and traditions’, adding to its propaganda and monopoly of violence, that is, ‘many more channels at its disposal for the diffusion of the national culture than did the international socialist movement to spread its own “counter-culture”, its aspirations to a supra-national community’⁹⁸. As a result, nation triumphed over class and nationalism overrode internationalism.

During the October Revolution, the national question came to the fore. As Seton-Watson notes, the Revolution of 1905 was ‘as much a revolution of non-Russians against Russification as it was a revolution of workers, peasants, and radical intellectuals against autocracy. The two revolts were connected: the social revolution was in fact most bitter in non-Russian regions, with Polish workers, Latvian and Georgian peasants as protagonists’⁹⁹. Lenin and the Bolsheviks were constrained to take into account and theorise the national question, as the October Revolution took place in a multinational empire.

This double crisis for classical Marxist discourse, the nationalist World War and the out-break of Revolution in a country with acute national questions, led to the first major attempted reconciliation of Marxism and nationalism. Munck argues that Lenin and the Bolsheviks now ‘recognised for the first time in Marxist discourse the “relative autonomy” of the national question’¹⁰⁰.

As the national question loomed large however, Lenin and the Bolsheviks could not turn to an existing set of theoretical tools from the Marxist tradition to conceptualise and confront nationalism. Instead, Lenin introduced three theoretical innovations: the

⁹⁸ Schwarzmantel (1991): 172.

⁹⁹ Seton-Watson (1977): 87.

¹⁰⁰ Munck (1986): 76.

of the 20th century, Marxists had not developed serious theoretical tools capable of explaining, analysing, and, for that, contending nationalism. Consequently, when they needed ideological tools to attract the masses, they did not hesitate to compromise with nationalism and to seek to integrate it into their own view. Luxemburg, in the long run, proved prophetic, saying that if Marxism adopted nationalism⁹⁴, it would downplay class struggle, socialism, and of course, internationalism.

Apart from the crisis of theory, the practice of internationalism, as developed in the time of the Second International, was itself flawed. Der Linden speaks of the “national” phase of internationalism from about 1900, as trade unions had been “nationalised” and the Social Democratic parties had been established at a national level⁹⁵. Instead of promoting the amalgamation of all nations, internationalism was being organised on a national, non-internationalist basis. To some extent, this form of internationalism echoed the enigmatic approach to the national question in the Communist Manifesto, where there is a contradiction between the globally common struggle of the proletariat (internationalism) and the national struggle of the proletariat (national occupation of the state power)⁹⁶. There is something of a paradox in the call “Working men of all the countries unite!”, as it seems that they should first settle matters with their own bourgeoisie at a national level⁹⁷.

1.2 Breaks within Marxist tradition: first reconciliation with nationalism

The political and historical situation at the turn of the century posed a major set of problems to Marxists in this context. The Marxist imaginary of “scientific socialism”, which understood society and history to be based on a set of objective and inevitable laws, went through a major crisis. The October Revolution, in particular, breaking out in a non-advanced industrial country, where a proletariat hardly existed, caused a great rupture in the classical Marxist creed that socialism is guaranteed by historically given laws.

⁹⁴ ‘In the imperialist environment ... it was either patriotism or class struggle, either imperialism or socialism’, cited by Davis (1967): 91.

⁹⁵ Der Linden (1988): 335.

⁹⁶ Munck (1986): 26.

⁹⁷ Marx-Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848)*, (1976, vol. 6): 495.

right of nations to self-determination, the anti-imperialist idea, and the distinction between oppressed and oppressor nations. Thus, he essentially introduced nationalism to the Leninist discourse.

The right of nations to self-determination and secession recognised any national movement claiming independence and any nation claiming itself as such. However, this right was, in effect, to be quite limited, as Lenin and the Bolsheviks subordinated it to 'the interest of the Soviet Union, socialism and toiling masses'¹⁰¹. As far as the eighth Congress of the Bolshevik Party (1919) was concerned, the right of self-determination lay in the working class, according to public and official declarations¹⁰². Afterwards, the Party decided that the rights of self-determination and secession were to lie in the working class's Party, the Communists¹⁰³. Thus, the Party and the state bureaucracy had assumed the right to define which people was and which was not nationally oppressed. It was presumed, also, that the people, definitely, preferred to receive their freedom 'from the hands of socialist Russia'¹⁰⁴. In other words, the Soviet Union, the fatherland of socialism, could most clearly estimate where this right could be applied.

With the predominance of Leninism and Stalinism within the communist movement, the right of nations to self-determination came into force as a basic principle for communist parties¹⁰⁵. Opposition to the Leninist approach to the national question was soon to become out of date and effectively marginalised. It will be recalled how Luxemburg had opposed national autonomy as a harmful obstacle to the proletarian revolution and claimed that the right of nations to self-determination was fictitious¹⁰⁶.

¹⁰¹ Connor (1984): 49-50. Lenin underlined that '[the proletariat] assesses any national demand, any national separation, from the angle of the workers' class struggle', cited in Smith J. (1999): 16.

¹⁰² Ferro (1985): 108. Schwarzmantel (1991): 183 quotes Stalin's words in 1921 that 'the proletariat becomes the legitimate bearer of the national will, and the right of secession belongs to it'.

¹⁰³ Stalin declared at the 12th Party Congress (April 1923) that '...the right of self-determination cannot and must not be a barrier to preventing the working class from expressing its right to dictatorship', in Harris (1992): 113.

¹⁰⁴ As Stalin contended concerning Finland, after it received its independence with the aid of the Finnish bourgeoisie, cited in Carr (1950): 288.

¹⁰⁵ 'Socialist parties which did not show by all their activity, both now, during the revolution, and after its victory, that they would liberate the enslaved nations and built up relations with them on the basis of a free union -and free union is a false phrase without the right to secede- these parties would be betraying socialism', *Lenin, The Socialist Revolution and the Rights of Nations to Self-determination (Theses) (April 1917)*, (1969): 157.

¹⁰⁶ Luxemburg, *The National Question and Autonomy 1908*, in Davis (1976): 103-104, 140, and 279-280. She deprecates self-determination: 'the 'right' of nation to freedom... under existing social

Munck, also, notes that Lenin's position had not early been widely accepted within the Bolsheviks¹⁰⁷. Martin outlines the two sides within the Party; on the one side were the nation-builders, led by Lenin and Stalin, on the other side were the internationalists, led by Piatakov and Bucharin¹⁰⁸. They believed, as Smith notes, that the slogan of self-determination was utopian and harmful, because it disseminated illusions¹⁰⁹.

'Lenin's theory of imperialism grew in internal association with his theory of the right of nations to self-determination', as Bagchi argues¹¹⁰. The Leninist theory of imperialism¹¹¹ was originally formulated as an analysis of the monopolist capitalism at the dawn of the twentieth century. As such it effectively introduced nationalism from the back door. Not only did it anticipate the establishment of small and scattered nations, but it also legitimated and reinforced national liberation and anti-colonial movements. Any national liberation movement could now draw on Leninist anti-imperialist theory whilst anti-capitalist or socialist struggle could rely on a nationalist discourse. The anti-imperialist idea essentially distinguished the national bourgeoisie, which was imposed by the needs of foreign capital and presented as the 'lackeys of imperialists', from the nation, which was substantially disenfranchised by colonialism. Anti-imperialism would be a concept flexible and easy to use; it would take diverse interpretations: from, for instance, the anti-imperialism of the BCP to the Japanese militarist anti-imperialism of Kita Ikki.

Within the framework of anti-imperialist theory, Lenin stressed that 'the programme of Social-Democracy... must postulate the division of nations into oppressor and

conditions, (is) only worth as much as the 'right' of each man to eat off gold plates, which, as Nicolaus Chernyshevski wrote, he would be ready to sell at any moment for a ruble', *ibid* 122-123. Luxemburg strictly criticised Lenin in the *The Nationalities Question in the Russian Revolution (1918)*, in Davis (1976).

¹⁰⁷ Munck (1986): 71.

¹⁰⁸ Martin (2001): 2.

¹⁰⁹ Smith J. (1999): 17.

¹¹⁰ Bagchi (1983): 16.

¹¹¹ Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1917) and Preface to the French and German edition (1920)*, (1970³). This treatise analyses imperialism in a pure economic manner; Lenin noted that 'we are interested in the *economic* aspect of the question, which Kautsky *himself* introduced into *his* definition' p. 108 (*italics as in the original*). Lenin, however, estimates that 'national question... is extremely important in itself as well as in its relation to imperialism' p. 108.

oppressed as basic, significant and inevitable under imperialism'¹¹². Slezkine characterises this distinction as an early defence of nationalism by Lenin and Stalin¹¹³. By this premise, the notion of exploitation is displaced from class to nations and changed into national domination. Slezkine argues that nations now equalled classes¹¹⁴. Indeed, Lenin developed a national stratification similar to the social one: the imperialist powers could be seen as the capitalists, nations struggling for national self-determination or semi-colonies as middle classes, and colonies as the proletariat¹¹⁵.

Likewise, Stalin distinguished between 'the handful of ruling, "civilised" nations and the hundreds of millions of the colonial and dependent peoples of the world'. This contradiction results in the 'awakening of national consciousness, the growth of the liberation movement'¹¹⁶. Oppressed nations, exactly as the proletariat, experience the overall force of super-exploitation. Semi-colonies, exactly as the middle classes can be proletarianised, can be transformed into colonies, when imperialism goes into crisis.

Apart from theory, Lenin and the Bolsheviks used nationalism for strategic political purposes. Indeed, Lenin 'placed politics in command, when discussing the national question'¹¹⁷. Inside the USSR, Lenin and the Bolsheviks needed an effective discourse to win over oppressed nationalities and 'the slogan of national self-determination was a means of overcoming national mistrust', as Smith argues¹¹⁸. This slogan aimed both to attack Czarism and, after the revolution, to help underpin the survival of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the Bolsheviks had promised national self-determination to the peoples of the borderlands, where the civil war against the Whites was fought in the main, in order to gain their sympathy for the Revolution.

¹¹² Lenin, *The Socialist Revolution and the Rights of Nations to Self-determination (Theses) (April 1917)*, (1969): 160. In *The State and Revolution (August 1917)*, (1976): 8, Lenin states that 'the majority of the so-called Great Powers have long been exploiting and enslaving a whole number of small and weak nations'. See, also, Blaut (1987): 23, 130-131, 151.

¹¹³ Slezkine (1996): 206.

¹¹⁴ Slezkine (1996): 208.

¹¹⁵ Lenin, *The Socialist Revolution and the Rights of Nations to Self-determination (Theses) (April 1917)*, (1969): 163-164. Similar categories are drawn in Lenin, *Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism (1917)* and *Preface to the French and German edition (1920)*, (1970³): 97 and 101 and in Stalin, *The Foundations of Leninism (1924)* in Bruce (1973): 150.

¹¹⁶ Stalin, *The Foundations of Leninism (1924)*, in Bruce (1973): 93.

¹¹⁷ Löwy (1976): 97.

¹¹⁸ Smith J. (1999): 16.

Outside the Soviet Union, the anti-imperialist idea aimed to win over international allies, anti-imperialist and national liberation movements and to break the chain of capitalism at its weakest link. Lenin promoted the anti-imperialist idea, because he saw the colonised people of the East as the weakest link in world capitalism. As Hoston notes, Lenin anticipated that nationalistic revolutions in colonies would sever the vital link between the capitalist metropolises and them as a first step. Finally, by the alliance of colonial peoples and the proletariat of the advanced countries, they would catalyse the international revolution¹¹⁹. As Blaut points out, Lenin considered national liberation struggles as a part of the emergence of socialism¹²⁰. Stalin, also, stressed the significance of national liberation movements for world revolution¹²¹ and the eventuality of their becoming allies of the USSR, because the proletariat was to lead the fight against national oppression and it was to transform the national liberation revolution into a socialist one.

Leninist theoretical innovations concerning nationalism were however both inconsistent and instrumentalist. The right of nations to self-determination does not contradict Leninist centralism, as it does not mean separation, fragmentation, small states or federation. Harris notes that 'recognising the right to secede was seen as the means of securing the unity of the peoples of the old empire in a new state, not of precipitating disintegration'¹²². However, insofar as the right of nations to self-determination could support the Revolution and the Soviet Union, the communists would advance it promoting, at the same time, nationalism.

Lenin and the Bolsheviks accepted the right of nations to self-determination and secession only in the cases of the Baltic States, because they had no alternative. In reality, however, Lenin and the Bolsheviks were reluctant to accept any separation. They did, in effect, nothing to prevent the military intervention in Ukraine, Armenia and Turkestan; the forcible incorporation of Bashkiria into the RSFSR; the annexation

¹¹⁹ Hoston (1986): 56.

¹²⁰ Blaut (1987): 29.

¹²¹ Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question* (1913), in Bruce (1973): 54-55 (footnote), Bruce commenting Stalin writing.

¹²² Harris (1992): 70.

of Bokhara and Khiva; and the tightening of Russian control over Outer Mongolia¹²³. Finally, the ‘autonomization plan’ in 1922 that Stalin drew up provided for the entry of the non-Russian republics into the Soviet Union as autonomous areas with central authority based in Moscow¹²⁴.

To conclude, Lenin and the Bolsheviks contributed hybrid concepts and new theoretical tools (the right of nations to self-determination, anti-imperialism, oppressive and oppressed nations) concerning the national question. These became central elements of Comintern dogma because of the victorious Bolshevik Revolution. Bauer and Luxemburg’s criticism would be ostracised and the communist movement would deprive itself of alternative approaches to the national question.

1.3 The Stalinist adoption of nationalism

Domestic Soviet politics also elevated nationalism. As Martin shows, the policy of “korenizatsiia” (indigenisation)¹²⁵ aimed originally to disarm nationalism. It sought exclusively to create national elites at the republican level and below¹²⁶ in order to eliminate nationalist demands of non-Russian republics and put forward a “cultural revolution”. Paradoxically, the antidote against the nationalism of non-Russian republics was the satisfaction of their national ideals. According to Stalin, the “cultural revolution” meant the flowering of nations (albeit not all nations and not all the time)¹²⁷. Slezkine points out that the “Great Transformation” of 1928-1932 ‘turned into the most extravagant celebration of ethnic diversity that any state had ever financed’¹²⁸, although Martin explains that, by 1933, the Soviet leadership felt this strategy had become out of hand and entailed the exactly opposite result. The

¹²³ Harris (1992): 88-94, Carr (1950): 286-350.

¹²⁴ Block (1975): 18.

¹²⁵ Korenizatsiia involved the promotion of national territories, elites, languages, and cultures for all Soviet nationalities regardless of their size, their level of development, or the strength of their nationalist movement.

¹²⁶ Martin (2001): 181.

¹²⁷ Martin (2001): 401-402. In 1929, Stalin had stated: “it is well known that assimilation is categorically excluded from the arsenal of Marxism-Leninism as an antinational, counterrevolutionary and fatal policy”.

¹²⁸ Slezkine (1996): 203.

Bolsheviks “understood” that “korenizatsiia” was exacerbating rather than disarming nationalism¹²⁹.

After 1933, to intercept the advance of nationalism in the non-Russian republics, the Soviet leadership turned to “Russification”, sanctioning Russian self-expression. In that way, the Bolsheviks transferred the epicentre of nationalism from the Republics to the centre. In other words, when the Bolsheviks intended to strike a heavy blow against “Great-Russian chauvinism” and to satisfy national demands of nationalities and ethnicities of the USSR, they turned to indigenisation; and when they became disappointed with or worried about the advance of non-Russian nationalisms, they turned to Russian nationalism. Russification, however, did not mean annulment of the policies of indigenisation, as now only a few full-fledged, fully equipped nations that had their own republics and their own bureaucracies could build up national cultures¹³⁰. Russification, in essence, aimed to reinforce the administrative prominence of the Soviet centre and balance nationalism of republics. That is to say, this nationalism of republics had now to reconcile itself with Russian nationalism. “Korenizatsiia” and Russification show that playing with nationalism is a very dangerous political venture for a communist party. Stalin’s paradox constituted that he attempted to disarm one kind of nationalism with another; either way, nationalism was always present.

The development of ‘socialism in one country’ justified by the ‘law of the uneven development of capitalism’¹³¹ had three outcomes. In this context, first, it broke with internationalism. Paradoxically, the proletariat, an international class by its nature, gained a socialist fatherland, limited to the boundaries of the USSR. Second, as all the communist parties were obliged to support the Soviet Union, the Comintern, an international organisation by its nature, substantially became the instrument of a nation, that is, the USSR.

Third, the theory of uneven development was to some extent articulated in national terms. In arguing that revolution could occur in different times and places, it located

¹²⁹ Martin (2001):303.

¹³⁰ Slezkine (1996): 223-225.

¹³¹ Claudin (1975): 73.

revolutionary possibilities inside a national rather than an international space. During the era of imperialism, as Stalin argued, ‘the victory of the proletariat in individual countries’ is both possible and indeed necessary¹³² and that for this to happen, national peculiarities had to be taken into account (although of course it was still up to the Comintern to evaluate what the possibilities were in any case). This implied that revolution was to some extent a national issue and that socialism would be built separately in each nation.

Nationalism was also used to assist the Soviet project of modernisation. Nationalism, it can be argued, constitutes in part an ideology of modernity and economic progress. A number of theorists of nationalism link nationalism with transition to a modern state and underlines its positive consequences for successful modernisation¹³³. At the same time, as Todorova argues, Soviet etatist communism was itself another ideology of modernity, ‘an attempt to meet the challenge of a hegemonic West’¹³⁴. As the nation-state was imposed as the gold standard of modernisation, industrialisation became the standard for economic progress under etatist communism. As a result, etatist communism met nationalism on the axis of modernisation. As Stalin put it, ‘we are fifty to a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or they crush us’¹³⁵. Since, he had spoken about Russian backwardness only a few lines ago, the deixis of “we” and “us” is striking, meaning both the Soviet socialists and Russians. Thus, nationalism was used to strengthen Party’s legitimacy; it was developed in order to secure the acquiescence of the masses for industrialisation and collectivisation.

During the 1930s, nationalism started to gain ground in the Soviet Union. As Drandenberger points out, terms like ‘motherland or fatherland’ (rodina) were rehabilitated. The USSR from being the “country of the proletarian dictatorship” and the “motherland of socialism” became simply “our motherland”¹³⁶. Drandenberger

¹³² Stalin, *The Foundations of Leninism* (1924), cited in Bruce (1973): 119.

¹³³ Gellner (1983), Giddens (1985).

¹³⁴ Todorova (1993): 143.

¹³⁵ Stalin, *The Tasks of Business Executives* (1931), in Sakwa (1999): 188.

¹³⁶ According to the commentator of ‘Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik’, Vera Alexandrova, (1939-1940) ‘...at first, one was to speak of the USSR as the “country of the proletarian dictatorship”, and then the “motherland of socialism” ... During the “socialism in one country” construction period, the USSR was referred to officially as the “socialist motherland”. Towards the end of the first five-year plan...

adds that a russocentric thousand-year political narrative was established in official historiography¹³⁷. Movies of the majestic Russian past, such as S. M. Eisenstein's 'Aleksandr Nevski' and V. Petrov's 'Peter the First', were shown and promoted by the state.

During the 'Great *Patriotic*¹³⁸ War', nationalism reached its peak. The Red Army was reformed in a pre-Revolutionary military traditional way (by subordinating the political commissars to the military commanders and by reintroducing epaulettes, saluting and traditional uniforms)¹³⁹. The old anthem of the Soviet Union, the anthem of the Labour movement of the world (that is, the anthem of the workers' fatherland), was replaced by a new one, patriotic and Russocentric¹⁴⁰. A new slavophile movement was sponsored¹⁴¹. The Orthodox Church was rehabilitated and the Holy Synod was restored¹⁴².

In the same manner, Stalin, in his speech of 7 November 1941 in front of the Lenin mausoleum, in an ultimate attempt to exalt the Soviet people, appealed to Russian heroes (Alexander Nevsky, Dimitry Ronskoy, Kuzma Minin, Dimitry Pozarsky, Alexander Suvorov, Michail Kutuzov)¹⁴³. He tried to recall Russian historical memories (the so-called 'national patriotic war' against Napoleon for the freedom of all people)¹⁴⁴. He denominated the Soviet 'we' as nationalists and the Hitlerist 'other' as imperialists¹⁴⁵, introducing a manichean distinction. On the eve of the anniversary of Revolution in 1943, Stalin dressed and stood before the Soviet like the 'very embodiment of Tsarist Russia' but speaking a Leninist language¹⁴⁶.

"socialist or soviet motherland", while today... as simply "our motherland"...less official and bureaucratic', in Drandenberger (2000): 401.

¹³⁷ Drandenberger (2000): 391 note 19.

¹³⁸ Emphasis added.

¹³⁹ Deutscher (1967): 488 and Drandenberger (2000): 391.

¹⁴⁰ Deutscher (1967): 491. It begun with the following words: 'An indestructible union of free republics *Great Russia* has rallied for ever' (emphasis in Deutscher).

¹⁴¹ Deutscher (1967): 492.

¹⁴² Deutscher (1967): 490.

¹⁴³ Ulam (1974): 556-557 and Deutscher (1967): 468.

¹⁴⁴ Deutscher (1967): 463-464 and 487. Molotov had already done the same in his June 22, 1941 address, in Drandenberger (2000): 405.

¹⁴⁵ Deutscher (1967): 489.

¹⁴⁶ Deutscher (1967): 492-493.

1.4 The Communist International: towards the symbiosis of Marxism and nationalism within the communist movement

Munck argues that ‘the theory and practice of the Third International contains some of the most fruitful contacts between Marxism and nationalism’¹⁴⁷. There is a process from the internationalist outset of the Comintern to the reconciliation of Marxism with nationalism¹⁴⁸. The First Congress (1919) criticised the ‘steady corruption which created the patriotism of the working class’¹⁴⁹ and the social-patriots were hammered for underpinning the bourgeois state¹⁵⁰. The First Congress put the international revolution above all. However, as Carr points out, the words “world revolution” scarcely appeared in Dimitrov’s long report at the Seventh Congress (1935). What had happened by then and what would follow? A spectre was haunting the international communist movement during the Comintern’s age: the spectre of nationalism.

From the outset, the Comintern was put under the control of the Soviet state. In parallel with expectations for international revolution, the Comintern was conceived of as the instrumental agent of a powerful state. This was clarified as early as in the Second Congress: ‘every Party that wishes to belong to the Comintern is obligated to render unconditional assistance to every Soviet republic struggling against the forces of counterrevolution’¹⁵¹. As a result, the Comintern was soon to abandon the project of the world revolution, as the new Soviet state followed a foreign policy contradictory to the interests of the world revolution. Two examples may be given to show this. First, the Soviets gave military and financial aid to Turkish nationalist Mustafa Kemal (1920-1921), despite the fact that he had launched a fierce repression of Turkish communists. In 1922 Radek could still say to the Comintern that ‘we do not regret for a moment what we said to the Turkish communists: your first duty, once you have organised yourselves in an independent party, will be to support the national

¹⁴⁷ Munck (1986): 88.

¹⁴⁸ Carr (1983): 406.

¹⁴⁹ *Platform of the Communist International Adopted by the First Congress (March 1919)*, drafted by Bukharin, in Degras (1971, vol. 1): 18.

¹⁵⁰ *Manifesto of the Communist International to the Proletariat of the Entire World (March 1919)*, written by Trotsky, in Degras (1971, vol. 1): 38.

¹⁵¹ *Theses on the Conditions for Admission to the Comintern, Adopted by the Second Congress (06 August 1920)*, in McDermott and Agnew (1996): 226-227.

liberation movement'. Second, the trade agreement signed with Britain in 1921, which pledged the Soviets to abstain from any propaganda which might incite the peoples of Asia to act contrary to British interests. Munck concludes that the national interests of the Soviet state were taking precedence over the world revolution, even before the death of Lenin¹⁵².

Leninist theoretical innovations concerning the national question had a significant impact upon the Comintern. Thus, as Munck notes, 'the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920 saw the first sustained theoretical debate on the national and colonial question'¹⁵³. Lenin put forward the concept of "revolutionary nationalist" movements, as national liberation movements in backward countries were seen to be a part of the struggle for socialism. Bolshevik politics 'had to bring a close alliance of all national and colonial liberation movements with Soviet Russia'¹⁵⁴. The Sixth Congress (1928) distinguished the comprador bourgeoisie, which directly served the interests of imperialism, from the petty-bourgeoisie, whose national revolutionary movement could constitute a "powerful auxiliary force" in the socialist world revolution¹⁵⁵. As a result, Marxism, in essence, recognised nationalism as a potential ally.

During the 1920s, a number of events heralded the forthcoming marriage of nationalism and Marxism. In 1923, the attempts of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) to influence the proletarian masses and the impoverished German middle classes led to 'national Bolshevism'. There were talks between the KPD and the Nazis as well as a joint pamphlet on the Schlageter issue¹⁵⁶. As Harris points out, Germany was thought of as a "semi-colony", and anti-imperialist tactics were therefore appropriate – the creation of a coalition of forces to win national independence¹⁵⁷. Frölich, a communist deputy in Reichstag, distorted (or rather abused) Marxism

¹⁵² Munck (1986): 91.

¹⁵³ Munck (1986): 89.

¹⁵⁴ *Theses on the National and Colonial Question Adopted by the Second Congress (July 1920)*, written by Lenin, in Degras (1971, vol. 1): 131 ff.

¹⁵⁵ Munck (1986): 93.

¹⁵⁶ For the 'Schlageter case' see Harman (1982): 252 ff. and McDermott and Agnew (1996): 36-37.

¹⁵⁷ Radek declared: 'Today, national Bolshevism means that everyone is penetrated with the feeling that salvation can be found only with the communists... The strong emphasis on the nation in Germany is a revolutionary act, like the emphasis on the nation in the colonies', Harris (1992): 125. Radek himself had bitterly denounced national Bolshevism in 1919, Harman (1982): 253.

stressing in a parliamentary speech that ‘Karl Marx told us that when danger threatens the whole nation, it is necessary for the working class to constitute itself as the nation by taking political power’¹⁵⁸. Marx wrote that ‘*since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the national class, must constitute itself the nation, it is so far itself national, though not national in the bourgeois sense of the word*’¹⁵⁹. In this extract, nation connotes statehood; also, its context is absolutely irrelevant to the national question. The irony is that, just a line above in the Communist Manifesto, the phrase ‘the working men have no country’ is located.

Two years later, the Comintern recognised the need for ‘the reclamation of the mistake, made by communists again and again in the past, of underestimating the national question’¹⁶⁰. Regarding Germany, the twelfth ECCI (1932) suggested that nationalist aims could not be excluded from the programme of the KPD, which demanded ‘a worker-peasant republic, i.e. a Soviet Socialist Germany, guaranteeing the voluntary adhesion of the people of Austria and other German regions’¹⁶¹.

Apart from Marxist flirtations with nationalism within the communist domain, the Leninist anti-imperialist idea met distorting interpretations, showing the paths that the syncretism of Marxism and nationalism could follow. Kita Ikki¹⁶², a Japanese radical nationalist, applied Japanese militarism and aggressiveness to an anti-imperialist theory. Thus, ‘as the class struggle within a nation is waged for the readjustment of unequal distinctions, so war between nations for an honourable cause will reform the present unjust distinctions. The British Empire is a millionaire possessing wealth all over the world; and Russia is a great landowner... Japan ... is one of the proletariat, and she has the right to declare war on the big monopoly powers... In the name of national social democracy, Japan claims possession of Australia and Eastern Siberia’¹⁶³. Japan, as a nation, was thought of being in the position of the proletariat.

¹⁵⁸ Harman (1982): 252.

¹⁵⁹ Emphasis added. Marx – Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848)*, (1976, vol. 6): 502-503.

¹⁶⁰ *Extracts from the Theses on the Bolshevisation of Communist Parties Adopted by the Fifth ECCI plenum (April 1925)*, in Degras (1971, vol.2): 195.

¹⁶¹ Carr (1983): 73.

¹⁶² Storry (1957): 37 describes Kita Ikki as a controversial figure. Kita Ikki has been described as the ‘founder of Japanese fascism’, whereas he interpreted history in a Marxist manner and he supported nationalisation. He ‘brought socialism and Japanese militarism under one umbrella’.

¹⁶³ Cited in Storry (1957) 38.

The Seventh Congress (1935) is a landmark in the course of the marriage of Marxism with nationalism. Dimitrov introduced a national discourse at this Congress in several ways. First Dimitrov argued that ‘communists are not believers in national nihilism’, having cited an excerpt of Lenin’s article “On the national pride of the Great Russians”, and he added that ‘they do not ridicule all national feeling of the broad working masses’¹⁶⁴. Second, he elaborated the Manichean pattern of the polar concepts of chauvinism versus patriotism. A sense of “good” nationalism, patriotism or “the nationalism of us, the Communists” opposed “bad” nationalism, chauvinism or rather fascism. Thus, communist patriotism, which implied real and honest love of the fatherland, was in contrast to bourgeois nationalism, which is militarist and expansionist against neighbouring countries, and, most importantly, servile to the imperialist interests of the Great Powers. Last, Dimitrov stated that the communists had in every way to combat the fascist falsification of the history of the people, as fascists were representing themselves as the heirs of all that was exalted and heroic in the past of every nation. For instance, the Bulgarian fascists made use of the national liberation movement of the 1870s and its heroes (Vasil Levski, Stefan Karadja and others). The communists had to enlighten the toiling masses on the past of their own people in ‘a historically correct fashion’, in the true spirit of Lenin and Stalin, so as ‘to link their present struggle with the revolutionary traditions of the past’¹⁶⁵. A new historical narrative was to be written in accordance with Leninism and Stalinism, which would unfold the revolutionary and glorious past of the nation.

At the Seventh Congress of the Comintern (1935), Dimitrov proposed the so-called popular front tactics. The people’s front originated in the “united front” as had been formulated during the Third Congress (1921), when the intoxicating optimism for the expansion of revolution was dissipating¹⁶⁶ and the Comintern was gradually weakening¹⁶⁷. Nevertheless, as Hoston notes, the Fifth Congress of the Comintern

¹⁶⁴ Carr (1983): 406.

¹⁶⁵ *Extracts from the Resolution of the Seventh Comintern Congress on Fascism, working-class unity, and the Tasks of the Comintern (August 1935)*, in Degras (1971, vol. 3): 366. See, also, Dimitrov, *The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International in the Struggle of the Working Class against Fascism (Report before the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, delivered on August 2, 1935)*, (1972, vol. 2): 70-71.

¹⁶⁶ McDermott and Agnew (1996): 28.

¹⁶⁷ Braunthal (1967): 297-298 argued that its weakness was due to the strict Stalinist policy. Moreover, Lenin’s ‘21 Conditions’ had already contributed to excluding parties and personalities from the Comintern, thus reducing its size and dynamism.

(1924) strictly prohibited co-operation of communist parties with social-democratic and other progressive and reformist leaderships, and with right-wing parties in particular¹⁶⁸. The united front strategy was an attempt to break the political isolation of the communists by joint action on two levels: first and foremost from below, by the approach to trade unionists, anarchist-syndicalists, and rank-and-file socialist workers; second and secondarily from above, by a broader conception of united actions (not coalitions) with socialist parties and trade union leaders, as was for instance the conference of the Third, the Second and the Two-and-a-half Internationals in Berlin (April 1922)¹⁶⁹, which, as McDermott and Agnew argue, exposed the restricted limits of “united front” tactics¹⁷⁰. Up to the Fifth Congress, the united front tactics were reduced to being merely a method of agitation and revolutionary mobilisation of the masses. After the Fifth Congress, the united front policy became a monotonous appeal to rank-and-file socialists only.

In their efforts to promote popular front tactics, Dimitrov, Thorez, and Togliatti confronted the objections of fundamentalists¹⁷¹. McDermott and Agnew outline the “triple interaction” of national factors (the successful political front that the French Communist Party established in 1934), internal dynamics in the Comintern leadership (assumption of it by Dimitrov, the hero of the Leipzig trial)¹⁷² and the shift in domestic and foreign Soviet policy that made the popular front feasible¹⁷³. Moreover, as many authors confirm, the popular front tactics were advanced, because they could serve Soviet foreign interests, that is, collective security with the western democracies and the formation of an allied front against fascist Germany¹⁷⁴.

¹⁶⁸ Hoston (1986): 57.

¹⁶⁹ *Extracts from the Directives on the United Front of the Workers and on the attitude to Workers Belonging to the Second, Two-and-a half Internationals, and to those who Support Anarcho-syndicalist Organisations, Adopted by the Executive Committee (December 1921)*, in Degras (1971, vol. 1): 307-309.

¹⁷⁰ McDermott and Agnew (1996): 33-34.

¹⁷¹ McDermott and Agnew (1996): 125 and Carr (1983): 123-146.

¹⁷² M. Thorez stated at the Seventh Congress: ‘No one else could deal with these questions [including the question of the popular front] with greater competence and authority than our comrade, Dimitrov, the hero of Leipzig’, in Zarchev (1972): 29.

¹⁷³ McDermott and Agnew (1996): 121.

¹⁷⁴ McDermott and Agnew (1996): 121-131, Haslam (1987): 153 ff., Hallas (1985): 141 ff.

At the Seventh Congress (1935), the creation of people's fronts became the chief pursuit of the communist parties¹⁷⁵. They would broaden political, popular and national goals in order to win over allies. Claudin maintains that, for the aforementioned political purpose, the communists were to propose a political platform as the basis for a popular front, which had to guarantee the fundamental liberties of the people and which was not to include excessively radical aims that might have 'frightened off' politically undeveloped sections of the population¹⁷⁶. The final aim, as Dimitrov made palpably clear, remained Soviet power¹⁷⁷; however, communism and sovietisation could not constitute the basis of common political platforms and, at the same time, they would frighten off the masses. Hence, communist parties put aside overtly communist discourses; the ground was clear for an ideology able to attract political allies as well as the masses, that is, nationalism. Nationalism now became a core discourse in communist hegemonic strategies.

Communist parties were to assume hegemony within and through popular fronts. The concept of hegemony originated from Russian Social Democracy, but acquired a new type of centrality with Gramsci, as Simon as well as Laclau and Mouffe argue¹⁷⁸. Even though Gramsci appears nowhere in the Comintern's resolutions on popular front policy, Togliatti had probably read Gramsci's prison notebooks, as Allum and Sassoon suggest¹⁷⁹. The working class had to become the hegemonic class. According to Gramsci, as Simon explains, hegemony has a national popular dimension as well as class dimension. Given that Gramsci recognises that "patriotism" can have the force of popular religion, namely to acquire a social status of common sense, a hegemonic class needs to combine patriotic struggles and ideas with its own class interests to achieve national leadership¹⁸⁰. In other words, the Gramscian project proposed a specific conciliation with the national idea.

¹⁷⁵ Dimitrov stressed the need for the creation of a broad popular front against the capitalist offensive, against fascism, for peace and against the imperialist war, a popular front of labour, freedom and peace, in Carr (1983): 406-426 passim.

¹⁷⁶ Claudin (1975): 193.

¹⁷⁷ McDermott and Agnew (1996): 132.

¹⁷⁸ Simon (1991): 22-46 passim, and Laclau – Mouffe (1985): 7-8, 48.

¹⁷⁹ Allum and Sassoon (1977): 172.

¹⁸⁰ Simon (1991): 44.

Following the Gramscian project, the communist parties sought to express the “national-popular unity” and to be recognised as the authentic representative of popular aspirations and national claims¹⁸¹. They were to realise this project through the establishment of People’s Fronts, which culminated during the anti-fascist struggle and the partisan movement and finally through the establishment of united “popular front” governments, the People’s Republics. Then, the communist parties presented themselves as the backbone of national-popular unity.

A set of tactics, within the overall strategy of the popular front, link Marxism and nationalism. First, national peculiarities had to be taken into account. These peculiarities affected the situation of the struggle of the working class in each country and the political context for forming the coalition between the communist Party and other democratic forces¹⁸². Communist parties then had a set of what were essentially national tasks.

Second, as McDermott and Agnew point out, popular front tactics attuned nationalism to proletarian internationalism, given that national forms of the proletarian class struggle were supposed to be able to defend successfully the international interests of the proletariat¹⁸³. Through the people’s front of each country, since they were national units, the communist parties presented themselves as the representative of the political and national interests of the people.

Third, there was the antifascist struggle¹⁸⁴. In a declaration of 1938, the Comintern appealed to all workers for the replacement of ‘the governments of *national* treachery... by governments... ready to repulse *fascist* aggressors’¹⁸⁵. Hobsbawm¹⁸⁶ outlines the complexities that this marriage of social revolution and patriotic

¹⁸¹ In Gramscian terms, see Gramsci (1978): 123-133, Simon (1991): 25 ff., 34 ff., 43-46, and Boggs (1976): 108 ff.

¹⁸² Zarchev (1972): 29-31.

¹⁸³ McDermott and Agnew (1996): 131.

¹⁸⁴ French People’s Front declaration is revealing: ‘Eternal France presided over this now historic day: Joan of Arc and 1789, the Marseillaise and the Internationale’, in Claudin (1975): 182. Likewise, in his speech at the Seventh Congress, the Italian Communist, Grieco, stressed in the same patriotic tone, that ‘precisely because we [Italians] are the heirs of great patriots like Garibaldi, we are against all imperialist wars and against all oppression of other people’, in Carr (1983): 409.

¹⁸⁵ Emphasis added. *Extracts from an ECCI manifesto on the Anniversary of the Russian (sic) Revolution (November 1938)*, in Degras (1971, vol. 3): 432.

¹⁸⁶ Hobsbawm (1993): 145-148.

sentiment now created. 'Antifascist nationalism emerged in the context of an international civil war'. Hobsbawm sees antifascist patriotism as a 'kind of internationalism'; but this internationalism involved a significant amount of nationalism: to accomplish their internationalist duty, communists had to defend their nation against a pro-fascist government and, of course, against a fascist attack, and they had the opportunity to identify the ruling classes with the national enemy. Hobsbawm also argues that antifascist nationalism made victory and social transformation inseparable; therefore, it could be claimed that as social transformation would be the product of national liberation, the communists could claim that they were liberating the nation by transforming it or that they were transforming the nation by liberating it.

Lastly, popular front tactics created a synthesis of social revolution and patriotic emotions. The French People's Front provides a revealing example. On the hundredth anniversary of Rouget de Lisle's death, the author of "La Marseillaise", Maurice Thorez took the opportunity to say: '...to the mingled strains of La Marseillaise and L' Internationale, wrapped in the reconciled folds of the tricolour and the red flag, we shall build a free, strong, and happy future'. Afterwards, La Marseillaise would be sung by the resistance movement¹⁸⁷. Thanks to this synthesis of social revolution and patriotic emotions, especially in the Second World War, the communist parties achieved considerable successes¹⁸⁸.

To quote Hobsbawm¹⁸⁹, in the mid-1930s and the Second World War, the communist movement deliberately broke with the tradition of abandoning symbols of patriotism to bourgeois states and petty-bourgeois politicians. Ironically, even the liquidation of the Comintern had inter alia a nationalist interpretation: 'the dissolution of the Comintern ... facilitates ... the common onslaught ... against ... Hitlerism ... It facilitates the work of *patriots* (sic) of all countries for uniting the progressive forces of *their respective countries* regardless of party or religious faith, into a single camp

¹⁸⁷ Vovelle (1998): 69-70.

¹⁸⁸ Vlahovich (1974): 132 points out that 'in the hard trials of the Second World War, the most considerable successes were achieved by the countries where the revolutionary forces were able to use tactics ... linking successfully the task of liberation war with the social aspirations of the working class and the other working strata. Almost all the great revolutionary exploits of that period contain elements of this synthesis'.

¹⁸⁹ Hobsbawm (1993): 145-148.

of *national liberation*¹⁹⁰. A long time had passed since Zinoviev's clear-cut declaration that the communists simply exploited nationalism for short-term political considerations. Now the communists believed that they represented national interests. They demonstrated that they were fighting for national independence and freedom. The communist movement brandished national flags side by side with communist ones and combined democratic slogans with national ones.

1.5 The Bulgarian Communist Party as a part of the Comintern

After explicating the accommodation of nationalism to Marxism, we turn now to some basic characteristics of the BCP. First and foremost, the BCP was, of course, located within a particular Marxist organisational and institutional domain, that of the Comintern. The reconciliation of Marxism with nationalism that took place within the Comintern had a serious impact upon the discourse of the Bulgarian communists.

The BCP was also a Stalinised party and, since the mid-1930s, was controlled by the Bulgarian communists situated in Moscow. Key Bulgarian communist policy-makers were politically educated in Moscow and witnessed the adoption of core nationalist assumptions. Dellin argues that 'by the late 1930s, the Bulgarian old guard in Moscow had restored its control over the Party'¹⁹¹ and the official ideology of the BCP was engraved by the leadership of Moscow, having Dimitrov in premier position. Moscow-centred discourse prevailed over the local mechanism inside Bulgaria, since the latter was underground and with an extremely low membership.

Dimitrov became the acknowledged and unchallenged leader of the BCP after the mid-1930s. Rothschild and Dellin point out that after 1935 Dimitrov's front policy gained mastery over the so-called "ultra-left sectarians" of the Youth League (Vasilev, Iskrov), who had favoured an insurrectionary policy and opposed frontist policies¹⁹². Vasilev shows that the Youth League had developed a strong anti-nationalist discourse; significantly, it declared the day of Cyril and Methodius as

¹⁹⁰ *Resolution of the ECCI Presidium recommending the Dissolution of the Comintern (May 1943)*, in Degras (1971, vol. 3): 476-479.

¹⁹¹ Dellin (1979): 52.

¹⁹² Sharova (1986): 143 ff, Rothschild (1959): 287-290, and Dallin (1979): 52.

chauvinistic and priest-ridden, and it branded Vazov as a wild bourgeois chauvinist¹⁹³. On the contrary, the BCP was to pay tribute to all these national figures by organising national anniversaries¹⁹⁴. The domestic “ultra-left sectarian” leadership, blamed for Trotskyism, was purged by none other than the future dissenter, “Titoist” Traicho Kostov together with Damyanov and Stanke Dimitrov-Marek¹⁹⁵, who came from Moscow in the mid-1930s.

By the late 1930s, the “Muscovites” had finally prevailed. The sixth Party plenum of 1936 installed popular front policy as the Party’s new line¹⁹⁶. The leadership of Dimitrov, the hero of Leipzig, was henceforth indisputable. Home-based militants welcomed the “seizure of power” by their experienced comrades from Moscow, especially by Dimitrov, without objections¹⁹⁷. Thus, since Dimitrov had played a key role concerning the introduction of popular front tactics, the reconciliation of Marxism with nationalism that popular front tactics anticipated was to be pursued by the BCP itself.

Dimitrov was the leader of the Comintern and a major Stalinist himself. Most importantly, he was the architect of popular front tactics. Hence, since the BCP operated within the Comintern, was a Stalinised party, and its leader was Dimitrov, it could be argued that it was the most ideal domain, where ‘Marxist nationalism’ as introduced by popular front tactics could be articulated.

Operating within the institutional domain of the Comintern and being a Stalinised party, the BCP was both an étatist and a centralised organisation. Classical Marxism had always paid attention to the significance of the state, as a major aim of communists was the occupation of the state machine to be wielded against those elements of the old ruling class that resisted the revolution. However, it was supposed, that soon after this happened, the state would wither away. In fact, the October Revolution and, especially, Stalinism promoted the consolidation of an extremely powerful state. In parallel, the international communist organisation, that is the

¹⁹³ Vasilev (1989): 13-14.

¹⁹⁴ See Chapter 6.

¹⁹⁵ Dellin (1979): 52 and Bell (1986): 49.

¹⁹⁶ Bell (1986): 49.

¹⁹⁷ Isusov (2000): 161 and 165 citing some letters of Kostov to Dimitrov. Kostov insisted in the necessity of Dimitrov’s return to Bulgaria.

Comintern, was very soon transformed into an etatist organisation, forced to play the role of a mechanism defending the power of the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union¹⁹⁸. Thus, the Comintern was highly disciplined and directed by a state, the USSR. Within the administrative domain of the Comintern, the communists were trained on how to seize power and how to rule. Each national party was seen as the representative of its own country and called upon to impose discipline on rank and file communists and obedience to the Central Committee.

The communist parties had become etatist also as a result of a profound process of bureaucratisation. Communist parties, long before they seized power, had transformed themselves into typical bureaucratic institutions even as tiny parties. They had acquired all the necessary characteristics, as shown by Lefort¹⁹⁹, of étatist bureaucracies: functions are ranked hierarchically in the exercise of power within the Party itself; decisions are taken in the absence of any control from below; responsibilities are allocated in an authoritarian way; organisational discipline prevails over the unrestricted analysis of decisions; and continuity of roles, activities and persons is established so that a ruling minority is rendered practically irremovable. Such a bureaucracy was well-suited to taking state power in some ways –its own bureaucratic structures paralleled those of the state.

Nationalism has been developed in parallel with the modern state, as many theorists of nationalism have argued. To begin with, Gellner²⁰⁰ has argued that nationalism fitted a series of modern etatist politics: centralizing administration, homogeneity of culture, massive communication, and a monolithic educational system. Breuilly argues that there is a close relation between nationalism and the modern state, as the possessor of (indivisible) sovereignty over a given (limited) territory²⁰¹. He suggests that nationalism was closely bound with political modernisation in the 19th century, urban-industrial growth, mass literacy, and increased social and geographical mobility²⁰². Breuilly also sees nationalism as ‘a way of making a particular state

¹⁹⁸ *Theses on the Conditions for Admission to the Comintern, Adopted by the Second Congress, 06 August 1920*, in McDermott and Agnew (1996): 226-227. See the first and the fourteenth theses.

¹⁹⁹ Lefort (1986): 110.

²⁰⁰ Gellner (1983).

²⁰¹ Breuilly (1993): 367-369.

²⁰² Breuilly (1993): 379-380.

legitimate in the eyes of those it controls'²⁰³ and 'can help provide an acceptable formula for orderly political change'²⁰⁴. Giddens underlines that 'nationalism is distinctive property of modern states'²⁰⁵, which sought unitary administration, sovereignty, industrialisation, social transformation, internal pacification, and the legitimate monopoly of the means of violence²⁰⁶. Todorova links nationalism with statist communism (that is, the communist state praxis), since the state is the *raison d'être* and the *modus vivendi* of both of them and notes that nationalism meets statist communism at the path towards state modernisation; both of them articulated to a great extent a discourse concerning modernisation of nation-states²⁰⁷. As the following chapters show, all the above links between the modern state and nationalism are applicable in the case of the BCP.

Nationalism fitted the centralism and authoritarianism of the Party, because nationalism involves a discourse of unity and continuity, ideal for an authoritative power conceiving of society as a collective body. As we shall argue, legitimation of the Party's power depended on its ability to present itself as the embodiment of national unity and as representative of the people's will as well as to present the Fatherland Front as a "a continuous, all-national union". Nationalism could strongly reinforce this discourse. A series of so-called great national issues or tasks were presented which legitimated the Party's power and its hegemonic strategies. At a different level, nationalism offers a great opportunity for centralising culture and its means under the control of the political apparatus. In that way, the Party-state can produce a monolithic nation and nationalism, disabling alternative foci²⁰⁸. Command-type socialist systems find cultural centralisation useful for their totalitarian project as they can exercise considerable control over values and symbols nationally legitimated, that is, supposedly common and not only Party-determined, and exclude any alternative.

²⁰³ Breuilly (1993): 387.

²⁰⁴ Breuilly (1993): 388.

²⁰⁵ Giddens (1985): 116.

²⁰⁶ Giddens (1985).

²⁰⁷ Todorova (1995): 88-90.

²⁰⁸ Verdery (1991): 304 and 315.

Conclusion

In the age of the Comintern, the international communist movement had to solve a great riddle: how could the communist parties maintain the purity of their philosophy and political programme, whilst making some theoretical as well as practical concessions or compromises in order to attract the masses as much as possible. The ‘intoxicating optimism’ which the October Revolution had brought, had already passed after the frustration that the failure in expanding the revolution abroad had caused. The crisis of the Marxist discourse at the beginning of the twentieth century channelled the international communist movement into seeking an ideology attractive to the masses.

Lenin and the Bolsheviks had recognised the great importance of nationalism for winning over the masses since the October Revolution²⁰⁹. In effect, national sentiment seemed stronger than class-consciousness. The international communist movement had to take nationalism seriously and redefine it, attributing a red dimension to it, in order to attract the masses. Nationalism could provide communist parties with a “common language” with the broadest strata for the purpose of fighting the class enemy and for overcoming the isolation of communist parties from the proletariat and its natural allies, as Dimitrov declared²¹⁰. Consequently, the communist parties had to combine national sentiment and democratic aspirations of the people with their political interest, so as to achieve national leadership, or the hegemony. The political goal of communist parties to achieve a ‘hegemonic role’ stemmed from the crisis of the doctrine of the “historical necessity” of communist revolution; this doctrine was the cornerstone of Marxism of the Second International.

Nationalism could help communist parties to become a hegemonic force by broadening to the maximum the space of their political slogans and could transform them from small, cadres’ parties into massive ones. After the Italian Communist Party

²⁰⁹ Harris (1992): 88 quoted Lenin’s view that ‘the social differentiation between classes and awareness of this differentiation were not yet sufficient to take for granted the primacy of class, as opposed to national, identity’. Thus, Lenin urged Communists to take into account the national question.

²¹⁰ Lukaszewicz (1974): 152.

became a “new party”, as Togliatti declared²¹¹, its membership dramatically increased from 5,000 in July 1943 to 1,676,000 by the end of 1945. Hence, the communist movement, having realised the importance of the national question, orientated itself to redefine nationalism in a “progressive” sense.

In this chapter, the theoretical weakness of Marxism to comprehend nationalism and develop a coherent theory of it, the syncretism of Marxism and nationalism as took place within the Comintern, and the characteristics of the BCP that contributed to the adoption of nationalism have been analysed. The rest of the thesis is dealing with the particular version of ‘Marxist nationalism’ that the BCP adopted.

²¹¹ Allum and Sassoon (1977): 173.

Chapter Two

Nationalism and the ideology of the BCP in the Second World War.

As it has been argued in the previous chapter, the Bulgarian Communist Party as a part of the Comintern had embraced the People's Front policy since 1936. In the process, it had adopted a national discourse and an increasingly nationalist outlook. This chapter examines the origins of the national discourse of the BCP, the anti-imperialist idea, the linking of patriotism and internationalism, and schemas of binary divisions. They constituted basic parts of the national discourse of the BCP during the Second World War even though they had been formulated in the inter-war period. It takes a closer look at Dimitrov's ideas, since Dimitrov was a significant political figure of international communism and fundamental exponent of People's Front tactics as well as the acknowledged leader of the BCP in the period in question. In parallel, discourses of other central communist figures will be taken into consideration.

This chapter also attempts to illustrate how this particular national discourse was articulated and operated during the Second World War. It examines the nationalist discourse of the BCP during the Second World War -a discourse that was to be very influential in the post-war period as well. In order to do this the objectives of the Fatherland Front during this period are discussed and an examination of the most crucial organisations of the resistance movement is attempted. Focusing more closely on the Party's powerful propaganda tools, attempts to redefine the country's past and present such as the names used by the partisan movement, proclamations and manifestos on anniversaries and commemorations, partisan songs, oaths, flags, lectures and instructions, and the most important political messages and slogans, are analysed.

2.1 The situation of Bulgarian society, the BCP, and the partisan movement

The BCP operated in a society where nationalism was well-entrenched. Nationalism, in contrast with Marxism, which was the ideology of a usually clandestine party,

relied on such powerful apparatus as the schools, the army, the official propaganda. Nationalism had become in Bulgaria what Bourdieu calls *habitus* or in Billig's words *common sense*. If we follow Bourdieu's claim that habitus is the mediating link between individuals' subjective world and the cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others, inculcated as much, if not more, by experience as by explicit teaching¹, it could be argued that the reproduction of inter-war Bulgarian society rested on the prevalence and reproduction of what we could call a national(ist) habitus. Billig, for his part, argues that nationalism is endemic in a world of nation-states. He explains how nationalism has become common sense, that is, the uncritical and largely unconscious way that people perceive the world, in a banal and hot way². Both forms of nationalism can be identified in Bulgaria during the first half of the 20th century.

The BCP was unable to outflank established and influential nationalist discourses concerning national interests and aspirations of Bulgaria. During the first half of the 20th century, not only did the right and the ultra-right articulate nationalist discourses but also progressive political movements, such as the BANU³ and the BCP (though the later only after the mid-1930s⁴), defined and expressed Bulgaria's national aspirations and demands and pursued her national interests, as they envisaged them. Since it is quite difficult to explore the minds of ordinary peasants and working people, we will focus on discourses articulated by the leadership of parties that claimed their representation. We can assume the influence and impact of progressive movements on the peasantry and the working classes from the elections held in times when there was open parliamentary competition among the parties.

At this point, it should be noted that the Agrarians had never developed a systematic, extensive and ambitious nationalism. This is due to their ideology that society is divided into estates and the Agrarians were formulated the most massive and influential one, that of the peasantry. They had conceived of a society consisting of diverse estates that compete each other; thus, national unity seemed to be hardly

¹ Bourdieu (1977): 93-94.

² Billig (1995): 43-46. Bulgaria had participated in two Balkan Wars and the First World War.

³ For details on the BANU, see Appendix 1.

⁴ As we have already seen in Chapter One, Part Five, the leadership of the BCP between 1929-1934 was firmly anti-nationalist.

integrated into their discourse. Later on, as we shall see⁵, despite their class worldview the communists would articulate an extensive nationalism because of the all-embracing totalitarian project they would deploy.

At the beginning of the 20th century, what we have called the native dialect of Bulgarian social life involved a “syndrome of the lost territories of San Stefano”, a discourse on “unredeemed lands”, discourses about national injustices and national ideals. Later on, after the Balkan wars, discourses on the uprooting and refugisation of the Bulgarian element came from the so-called lost parts of the homeland were added to the aforementioned discourses. Bell points out that ‘schools indoctrinated their students with jingoistic nationalism and hatred for Bulgaria’s neighbours’⁶. It could be argued that schools were not the only locus of nationalism. As Giddens notes, the origins of early nationalist feeling lie exactly in state mobilisation of different classes and strata to fight against an ostensibly common enemy⁷. During the Balkan Wars and the First World War, the Bulgarian state mobilised all social strata (the peasantry as well) to fight for the “unity of the Bulgarian nation” within one state. It could be argued then that the peasantry learnt nationalism in the barracks, if not in the schools.

Militaristic nationalism, irredentism, aggressiveness and expansionism (what later on the communists would call great-Bulgarian chauvinism) loomed large up to 1918. As Pavlowitch notes⁸, ‘the agrarian movement was unable to dent popular enthusiasm for a military solution to the Macedonian question [and]... the Treaty of Bucharest created a revanchist mentality in a large body of opinion’. Nevertheless, within a political framework favourable to war and annexation, progressive political movements articulated and developed anti-war discourses. First and foremost, the Agrarians rejected militarism and imperialism as needless and of no benefit to the country; instead, they propagated disarmament, improving of human resources, modernisation, economic growth, and prosperity of the country⁹.

⁵ See Chapter Three, Part Four.

⁶ Bell (1977): 176.

⁷ Cited in Spencer and Wollman (2002): 46.

⁸ Pavlowitch (1999): 182. See also Bell (1977): 101.

⁹ Bell (1977): 62-65 and 72-73.

Similarly to the Agrarians, the communists were against the war. They voted against the war credits and, significantly, Blagoev¹⁰ sharply criticised the German Social-Democratic Party for having voted in favour of the war credits and for having involved the proletariat in the war, without consideration of the international proletarian solidarity¹¹. The communists put peace above all¹² and propagated class war against the war prepared by the capitalists and an uncompromised struggle against capitalism, imperialism, and militarism¹³. Kolarov¹⁴ underlined that the Bulgarian communists were “remaining true to [their] first stand against the war... down with the war, [they] want peace among the Balkan peoples, peace among all nations”¹⁵.

Despite the firm stance of the Agrarians against war in the 1900s and 1910s, they were affected by nationalist discourses already well-entrenched in Bulgarian society. As a result, they developed their own national discourse distinct to that of the establishment and they counter-posed their own approach to Bulgaria’s national interests and ideals to that of the ruling elites. The BANU declared that modernisation, economic growth and development could secure genuine national independence¹⁶. The Agrarians denounced the pre-1918 ruling elites of Bulgaria who sought to gain Bulgaria’s independence and unite all the Bulgarians within one state by placing her in foreign guardianship or, even, domination¹⁷. They envisaged a Bulgaria independent of any foreign intervention and equal to all other states in the international arena.

The Agrarians argued that militaristic nationalism could never be effective and Bulgaria could never gain her nationalistic goals by war. The Agrarians were against the war because they conceived of it as dangerous to Bulgaria. In his reply to Czar Ferdinand’s¹⁸ speech in 1914, Stamboliski¹⁹ underlined that ‘we will suffer to protect

¹⁰ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

¹¹ Blagoev, *Magister Dixii 1915*, (1976): 313.

¹² Blagoev, *Peace 1913*, (1976): 295-298.

¹³ Blagoev, *War against war 1912*, (1976): 288-290.

¹⁴ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

¹⁵ Kolarov, *Against the war credits, against war, for peace, speech delivered on 15 July 1916 in the National Assembly*, (1978): 52.

¹⁶ Gallagher (2001): 96-99.

¹⁷ Bell (1977): 92-94.

¹⁸ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

Bulgaria from this terrible danger [the war]... we will not live to see the shame and doom of Bulgaria'²⁰. They identified enemies of the Bulgarian people with absolutism and blind nationalism, while they declared that Ferdinand and the political parties manipulated national sentiments of people for their own political purposes²¹. Despite the opposition to war, as Bell argues, the Agrarians 'did not object to acquiring Macedonia or regaining the Dobrudzha from Rumania if it could be done peacefully'²². They considered them to be Bulgarian lands. Hence, it could be argued that the Agrarians were not deprived of national interests and ideals.



At the end of the First World War, militaristic nationalism, irredentism, expansionism, war and annexation experienced total failure. Nevertheless, this did not mean loss of any affection to the fatherland. The concept of "national disasters", which would become central in the discourse of the BCP after the Second World War, became predominant. The term "national catastrophe/disaster" implies the national/territorial shrinkage of Bulgaria, economic collapse, misery and poverty for the people.

After the First World war, the Agrarians manipulated the concept of "national catastrophe/disaster" to castigate the policies of Czar Ferdinand in the Balkan Wars and the First World War²³. The impact of this concept on the Bulgarian society was very significant. After the First World War, all political parties blamed for national disasters sank in the elections, were founded anew under different name, and merged with each other to stave off the danger of disappearing from the political stage²⁴. After initiatives taken by the BANU, a referendum held in November 1922, where 70% of the Bulgarians voted for the trial

¹⁹ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

²⁰ Cited in Bell (1977): 85.

²¹ Bell (1977): 104.

²² Bell (1977): 114.

²³ Bell (1977): 109 and 113.

²⁴ Tzvetkov (1993) vol. 2: 162 and Kumanov (1991): 58-60.

of culprits for national disasters, who had not been tried in 1919²⁵. Similarly to the communists at the aftermath of the Second World War, the Agrarians claimed that only a republican “people’s government” could save the country²⁶.

In 1919, the BANU formed a government. In domestic politics, the Agrarian government took advantage of the completely disappointing consequences of policies that past regimes applied. In that time, Bulgarian society seemed to have turned definitely against the version of nationalism that the dynasty and pre-1918 ruling elites articulated. Thus, the Agrarians were able to overthrow expansionism, militarism and bureaucratism. In particular, as Bell argues, they used the ‘Compulsory Labour Service in order to replace the nationalistic indoctrination received in military service’²⁷ and thus to strike a heavy blow against the ideology of the past regime. Not only the BANU took a firm stance against the past militaristic nationalism, but also the BCP was anti-nationalist as it chose to ignore (if not opposed) national holidays and anniversaries²⁸.

In the international arena, as Stavrianos notes²⁹, the Agrarians ‘followed a type of foreign policy traditionally desired by peasants: international co-operation, avoidance of war, reduction of army expenditures, and elimination of the role of the military men in national affairs’. Within such an atmosphere of peace and co-operation and despite their anti-militarism³⁰, the Agrarians did not neglect to express the national interests and ideals of Bulgaria as they conceived them of. Thus, the BANU aimed at eliminating militarism³¹ and the influence of the army and military officers in national affairs and, therefore, at breaking down its most significant political rival, while the BANU deployed its own national policy, which it considered as genuinely of Bulgaria’s benefit.

As Sforza points out, Stamboliski was ‘the first politician from the Balkans that Sforza met, who thinks of the good of his country [Bulgaria] otherwise than in terms

²⁵ Tzvetkov (1993) vol. 2: 165 and Kumanov (1991): 63.

²⁶ At the time of Radomir rebellion, in Bell (1977): 136.

²⁷ Bell (1977): 171.

²⁸ Bell (1977): 179.

²⁹ Stavrianos (2000²): 648.

³⁰ For BANU’s antimilitaristic stand see Bell (1977): 161.

³¹ Bell (1977): 184-186.

of war and annexations'³². Taking this excerpt into account we can conclude that the Balkans (including Bulgaria) lived in a nationalistic atmosphere, and the Agrarians did articulate a specific version of nationalism completely different to the nationalism that the royal and right-wing political elites had articulated. This version of Agrarian nationalism, of course, had its impact on the peasant followers of the BANU.

At the epicentre of national goals of the BANU was the liberation of Bulgaria from dependence on a foreign power³³. For the Agrarians national independence and sovereignty meant that Bulgaria would not rely its foreign policy on big powers and would not follow any directives from abroad. Indeed, Bell's account on the outcomes of Stamboliski's foreign policy³⁴ suggests that Bulgaria had achieved her national independence by ensuring it was not the servant of any of the great powers and resisting Italian plans of domination in the Balkans. Bulgaria had also pursued peaceful and amicable relations with big powers and neighbouring countries.

As Sharlanov argues³⁵, Stamboliski followed a peaceful foreign policy and sought to gain the confidence of the big powers and neighbouring countries in order to realise the following goals: an outlet to the Aegean Sea in an autonomous Western Thrace, protection of minorities' rights of the Bulgarians of the territories that Bulgaria had lost, and reduction of war reparations. Stamboliski and the Agrarians claimed all these demands in Peace treaty conferences and in visits in many European countries³⁶.

With regard to the Macedonian question, it is true that the BANU fiercely opposed and fought the IMRO³⁷. Stamboliski's interpretation of the country's interests led him to choose to crack down on Macedonian extremists to ease rapprochement with Yugoslavia³⁸. For these reasons, the Agrarians signed the Nis Convention, which precipitated common action by both states against IMRO militants. Nevertheless, the BANU would opt for an autonomous Macedonia and was interested in the rights of the Bulgarian population which, as was claimed, lived in the parts of Macedonia that

³² Cited in Bell (1977): 184.

³³ Bell (1977): 184-186.

³⁴ Bell (1977): 206.

³⁵ Sharlanov (1987): 4-7.

³⁶ Bell (1977): 184-207 *passim*.

³⁷ For details on the IMRO, see Appendix 1.

³⁸ Pavlowitch (1999): 246-247.

Yugoslavia and Greece had occupied³⁹. As the communists did in the 1940s, the BANU was ready to give up any demand or project of annexation of Macedonia to Bulgaria, but it considered Macedonia as lost Bulgarian lands, where a Bulgarian minority still used to live. In other words, instead of preparing the country for a new war to occupy Macedonia the BANU chose amicable relations with Yugoslavia and normalisation of Bulgaria's relations with big powers.

The Agrarian government was overthrown by a coup plotted and organised by military officers and opposition parties in June 1923. In September 1923, the communists attempted an uprising, which totally failed, while in 1925 they tried to assassinate Czar Boris. All these events caused a fierce attack of the Tsankovist⁴⁰ regime against the left, which finally was eliminated⁴¹. Since parties were abolished, peasants and working people lost contact with the progressive movements of Bulgaria and remained exposed to governmental fascist propaganda of Tsankov.

Ultra-nationalism and fascism gained momentum during Tsankov's regime between 1923 and 1926. First and foremost, the Military League⁴² legitimated the coup of 1923 on national grounds that the Agrarians had committed national treason and there was a dire need of a resolute force to save Bulgaria⁴³. Tsankovists and other participants in the government of National Entente openly declared themselves as fascists, emulated Mussolini tactics, and adorned his ideas⁴⁴.

At the beginning of the 1930s there was an interlude of parliamentary competition and parties operated openly. In that time, there were many agrarian wings: right, centre and left. They followed diverse political paths and had controversial and inconsistent attitudes towards the politics of that time⁴⁵. Agrarian wings articulated national discourses in the 1930s, because, as we shall argue, the political framework of that time was to a great extent nationalistic. Some examples may be necessary. In 1931,

³⁹ Sharlanov (1987): 11-15.

⁴⁰ For a short biography of Tsankov and Czar Boris see Appendix 2.

⁴¹ Bell (1977): 244-245 speaks about 16,000 Agrarians and Communists that were killed between 1923 and 1925.

⁴² For details see Appendix 1.

⁴³ Bell (1977): 209.

⁴⁴ Bell (1977): 212-213.

⁴⁵ See Petrova (1977): passim for the period from 1930 until 1931 and Petrova (1963): passim for the period from 1935 until 1939.

the official newspaper of the BANU-Vrabcha-1 called the government of Lyapchev as a 'danger for the nation'⁴⁶; in 1936, the BANU-Pladne considered Tsankov's attempt of a coup to be 'the greatest treason to the interests of the Bulgarian people'⁴⁷; and both the BANU-Vrabcha-1 and the BANU-Pladne used the slogan of economic independence of Bulgaria⁴⁸. However, as primary research on the political discourse of the Agrarian wings of that time has not taken place so far, it is quite difficult to indicate the content and the extent of discourses about the nation. The impact of Agrarian ideologies on the overwhelmingly agrarian society of Bulgaria was still significant, even though the dynamics of an Agrarian movement divided into many Agrarian wings in the time of royal dictatorship, that is, in the late 1930s, are questionable.

In the same time, ultra-nationalism and fascism gained ground in Bulgarian society. Tsankov's fascist party, the National Social Movement, won a 10-12% of the vote in municipal elections of 1932 and parliamentary elections of 1934, despite the fact that had only been founded in 1932. After 1934, as Shopov shows nationalistic education and governmental propaganda became one; the programmes of the secondary school education since 1934 had institutionalised the nationalist character of education; and fascist organisations, such as Ratniks, Legionaries, and Otets Paisii had a serious presence and success in schools⁴⁹. As King notes, 'national consciousness had been heightened in the interwar period by ultranationalist governments, economic crisis, conflict over ethnic minorities'⁵⁰, while ruling political élites of Bulgaria developed a strong revisionism towards the Versailles Treaty, which culminated after 1935. Since the mid-1930s then the ruling ideology was identified with nationalism.

In the Second World War, the national politics of the dynasty and government accomplished the inclusion of Southern Dobruzha to Bulgaria's territory (Craiova agreement, August 1940), while in April 1941 Bulgaria annexed most of Macedonia and Thrace. All this was accomplished without a substantial involvement in the War. Since the overturn of the Treaty of San Stefano the historical injustices that created a

⁴⁶ Petrova (1977): 29.

⁴⁷ Petrova (1963): 14-15.

⁴⁸ Petrova (1963): 24.

⁴⁹ Shopov (1975) *passim* shows that after 1934.

⁵⁰ King (1973): 23.

“truncated” Bulgaria and the need to rectify the country’s borderline were key elements of a potent elite discourse and, in this context, the incorporation of these ‘unredeemed’ territories into the Bulgarian territory gave substantial credibility to Boris and his government.

These national successes of Bulgaria came however at a considerable price. To pursue Bulgaria’s territorial demands and secure its gains, Boris had joined the Axis converting Bulgaria into the gendarmerie of the Balkan Peninsula and depriving her of substantial material resources. Moreover, with the looming defeat of the Axis, Boris’ policy brought Bulgaria in a precarious position contributing to the discrediting of the monarchy and the increase of communist prestige and credibility. Miller maintains that Boris was planning to take Bulgaria out of the war and approach the Allies, with a view to keeping Bulgaria’s territorial gains after the end of war⁵¹. However, the removal of Boris from the political scene, after his “unexplained” death, furthered the communist cause. The regent, Prince Cyril, was strongly pro-German, so Bulgarian subservience to fascist Germany became more marked than in the past. This facilitated the efforts of the BCP to attribute Bulgaria’s predicament to the policies of her “treacherous” rulers.

During the Second World War, the BCP was rather weak. First of all, it had been outlawed for many years and had a small following. Its membership had reached its peak long ago: 39,000 in 1923⁵². In 1928-1929 it almost collapsed, as nearly all its high-rank members were arrested. The membership of the BWPC, created in 1927 as a legally constituted communist front, reached its peak in 1932-1933 (27,078), when the illegal BCP had 3,732 members⁵³. After the coup of 1934, the membership of the BWPC dramatically declined⁵⁴. After the merger of the two communist organisations, the BWPC had 6,890 members⁵⁵. Nevertheless, the BCP had a membership of around 2,500 in the Soviet Union consisting of Bulgarian political emigrants⁵⁶.

⁵¹ Miller (1975): 135-146.

⁵² Bell (1986): 31.

⁵³ Oren (1971): 109.

⁵⁴ 3,837 in 1936, when the BCP had 3,395, in Oren (1971): 109.

⁵⁵ In 1940, Oren (1971): 109.

⁵⁶ Valeva (1997): 42.

Second, the BCP had suffered from an increasingly declining membership having been struck by heavy blows during the Second World War. As a result, its members had been dramatically decimated. The police were so effective in persecuting communists that by the end of 1942, most of the BCP leadership and cadres were dead or in prison, while those outside prison were preoccupied with survival⁵⁷. Under these circumstances, the BCP was unable to operate even underground.

Third, as the BCP was clandestine, it could not develop a significant net of communication with the masses. Similarly to other countries which were satellites of Germany, such as Hungary⁵⁸, which had not experienced war conditions and barbarous policies of German occupation to a great extent, efforts of scarce communist militants to win over the masses had limited results.

The partisan movement was weak as well. It numbered approximately 10,000 partisans⁵⁹. There were intrinsic difficulties concerning the development of a resistance movement. Since Bulgaria was at peace, partisans were unable to supply themselves with weapons from a defeated army. In the first half of 1943, the record of the resistance movement comprised primarily acts of urban terrorism, political assassinations and minor sabotage as partisans had to fight the Bulgarian army and gendarmerie rather than the few German troops stationed in the country⁶⁰. Assistance from the Allies could not reach Bulgarian partisans, as the resistance movement was small, and the Allies wanted Bulgaria to remain neutral in terms of participation in war operations⁶¹. The BCP could not substantially influence or mobilise the masses and develop a strong resistance movement despite two seemingly favourable conditions -the lack of a right-wing resistance movement seeking to restore the pre-war status quo and the popular resentment caused by the allied air-raids⁶² (November

⁵⁷ Bell (1986): 61.

⁵⁸ Molnar (1990): 68-83.

⁵⁹ Kalonkin (2001): 43 gives data on 8,814 partisans. Bell (1986): 63 estimates figures of partisans and helpers (iatatsi) at 10,000 and 20,000 respectively. Dellin (1979): 53 agrees with Bell's estimation. Lastly, Padev (1948): 27 gives figures of killed partisans at 9,415 and of the total movement at approximately 28,000, when it reached its peak in the summer of 1944. Anyway, whatever the real number is, it implies the weakness of the movement.

⁶⁰ Stavrianos (2000): 769.

⁶¹ Bulgaria had joined the Axis, but did not declare war on the Soviet Union. She maintained occupying forces in Yugoslavia and Greece, but did not fight against the Allies on any front, especially the crucial Eastern Front.

⁶² For the allied air-aids and their effects, see Miller (1975): 166-168 and Stavrianos (2000): 770.

1943 – March 1944). Tsar Boris's policies seemed to be successful, his regime was deprived of ideology (*bezpartien rezhim*)⁶³ and people were apathetic toward politics. As a result, an armed resistance movement did not begin to grow until spring 1944⁶⁴.

Apart from its weakness, the BCP faced a series of difficulties. First, it had to contest the successful economic politics of Tsar Boris and Filov's⁶⁵ government, as at the outset of the war, in particular, Bulgaria witnessed an economic revival. Radice notes a temporary boom in processed foodstuffs up to 1942 and a constant expansion in tobacco manufacture and shipbuilding industry⁶⁶, while Brown points out that the population were relatively well off and untouched by the rigors of the conflict until later in the war⁶⁷, due to Bulgaria's neutrality. Second, the fact that Boris tolerated a moderate opposition undermined the Party's approach to opposition. Third, an ardent nationalist enthusiasm emanating from the national successes of Boris also attracted communists. Many of the BCP's sympathisers had been won over by the government's nationalist policy. As a result, as Miller points out, some Party cadres found nationalism more appealing than internationalism⁶⁸. Fourth, the Nazi–Soviet Pact of August 1939 and the Soviet invasion on Poland in September undermined the strategy of building popular fronts. Despite the fact that the Bulgarian Marxist philosopher, Todor Pavlov⁶⁹, justified the pact as a contribution to peace and the Soviet invasion on Poland as an intervention to protect fellow Slavs⁷⁰, the BCP's ability to implement popular front tactics was clearly impaired. After Germany invaded the Soviet Union, the BCP was unprepared for partisan activity.

Confronting this harsh political reality, the BCP had to broaden its membership and implement People's Front tactics, that is, the pursuit of alliance and unity with opposition parties and the so-called "patriotic and democratic or anti-fascist forces". The BCP showed increasing flexibility in negotiating; it sought alliance with various

⁶³ Miller (1975): 90-92 and Pavlowitch (1999): 323.

⁶⁴ Bell (1986): 59-63 and Miller (1975): 195-199. As Bell (1986): 69 points out, not earlier than 10 August 1943 a National Council of the Fatherland Front was established.

⁶⁵ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

⁶⁶ Radice (1977): 16.

⁶⁷ Brown (1970): 6.

⁶⁸ Miller (1975): 39, 53 and 56-57. See, also, Valeva (1997): 43.

⁶⁹ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

⁷⁰ Bell (1986): 55 and Miller (1975): 16-17.

political forces and figures, even some from the Right (e.g. the Zveno)⁷¹. Furthermore, the BCP participated in the negotiations of the Fatherland Front with Bagryanov's⁷² government, which only ended after an article written by Dimitrov on the pro-German character of Bagryanov's government⁷³.

The implementation of popular front tactics, however, was a difficult task, since the popular non-communist opposition leaders⁷⁴ rejected a broad coalition with the BCP. Three main reasons deterred them from joining the Fatherland Front. First, non-communist opposition leaders feared that the communists would try to dominate the coalition. Second, they believed that Boris would change his attitude and extricate Bulgaria from the war, at the right time for Bulgaria. Then, they expected to be called to "save Bulgaria" and restore the constitution⁷⁵. Finally, many political figures embarked upon the course of collaboration with "quislings and hirelings", because they sought to ensure a non-communist post-war regime. For this reason, they chose collaboration as the lesser of two evils⁷⁶.

The national successes of Boris' regime and the enthusiasm they caused affected the political discourse of the BCP. The necessity of winning over the masses under a partisan movement prompted the Party to adopt ideological elements that would be familiar and have resonance among the latter. In this strategic context, a discourse giving prominence to the 'nation' proved the ideal means, since nationalism constituted a convenient ideology for overcoming "heteroglossia". Verdery, drawing on Bakhtin, uses this term to define the difference between the language of power and the social dialects that people below speak⁷⁷. This condition results in an ongoing struggle of power to impose a uniform language from above for certain political purposes. As Verdery explains⁷⁸, Marxism-Leninism in societies such as Romania and Bulgaria had little appeal, since the communist ideology had not acquired deep roots.

⁷¹ For details on the Zveno, see Appendix 1.

⁷² For a short biography see Appendix 2.

⁷³ Miller (1975): 176.

⁷⁴ The most important figures of the opposition were Mushanov, the leader of the Democratic Party, and Gichev, the leader of the conservative wing of BANU-Vrabcha-1 (for a short biography see Appendix 2).

⁷⁵ Bell (1986): 67-68.

⁷⁶ Stavrianos (2000): 763

⁷⁷ Verdery (1991): 122.

⁷⁸ Verdery (1991): 122.

On the contrary, these societies were heirs of old politics couched in a language of national identity⁷⁹. The ‘nation’ and its interests already constituted elements of the Bulgarian communists’ discourse, but now they became more pronounced and -as I hope to show- dominant and durable. The writings and broadcasting of prominent Bulgarian communists, above all of Georgi Dimitrov, are revealing of the syncretism of nationalism and Marxism that had developed before and during the Second World War.

2.2 Politics and the discourse of the Bulgarian communist leadership

2.2.a *Origins*

The origins of the national discourse of the BCP in the Second World War and after can be detected in the 1930s, and, in particular, in Dimitrov’s plea before the Leipzig Court and the political theses around the establishment of popular fronts.

Dimitrov’s plea before the Leipzig Court combined both internationalist and national discourses. At its very beginning, he undertook to defend the Bulgarian narod (people–nation)⁸⁰, which defence, during the Second World War, the “Hristo Botev” radio station often broadcast and drew on⁸¹. Responding to charges that he was a ‘suspicious character from the Balkans’ and a ‘savage Bulgarian’, Dimitrov, declaring his complete indifference to the personal abuse he suffered from the press, insisted that it was the Bulgarian narod that had been offended through him, thus implying that the honour of the Bulgarian narod was more important than he was. Overall, the way he conducted his plea turned to a large extent on presenting himself in nationalistic light.

⁷⁹ Significantly, even anarchist-communists, whose orientation was unambiguously political and internationalist, recognised an organisational structure on national grounds; see, BCP Records Fund 272, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 1 (1945): 2-7. However, their argument that there are not patriotic and national ideals for the working men was not influential at all; see BCP Records Fund 272, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 37 (1946): 1.

⁸⁰ Dimitrov, *Minutes of the Speech before the Court (1933)*, (1972, vol. 1): 364-365.

⁸¹ See, for instance, broadcasts of Kolarov, *Anniversary of the Reichstag Fire*, Lukanov, *10 years of the Reichstag Fire*, and Chervenkov, *11 years*, in Radio Station “Hristo Botev”... (1951, vol. 2): 124-126, (1952, vol. 5): 151-153, and (1952, vol. 6): 138-140 respectively.

Dimitrov's defence of the Bulgarian narod consisted of two main arguments. First, he asserted the 'antiquity' of Bulgarian civilisation, of which the history of the Bulgarian language provides evidence. He tried to use this to prove the superiority of Bulgarian civilisation in comparison with the German one stressing that 'at a period when the German Emperor Karl V vowed that he would talk German only to his horses, at a time when the German nobility and intellectual circles wrote only Latin and were ashamed of their mother tongue, in "barbarous" Bulgaria the apostles Cyril and Methodius invented and spread the use of the old Bulgarian script'. Thus, Dimitrov alleged that the Bulgarians attained national consciousness by developing a vernacular into a literary language much earlier than the Germans and other 'civilised' Europeans. By arguing that the Bulgarian civilisation is superior to the German one, Dimitrov countered German nationalism and racism with a kind of Bulgarian nationalism and even racism.

Secondly, Dimitrov argued that proof of the civilised character of the Bulgarian narod lies in the preservation of the Bulgarian language and the Bulgarian nationality [natsionalnost] through the centuries under very difficult historical conditions: 'five hundred years under a foreign yoke'. He declared, also, that he was proud to say that he was a 'son of the Bulgarian working class' combining class and national pride at the same time. Through his plea Dimitrov accomplished his international communist task, since he defended the international communist movement and his national task alike, drawing upon both Marxist and national discourses.

The recognition of Dimitrov as a hero of the international communist movement and a significant figure of international anti-fascism as a result of his plea and exoneration from blame before a fascist court gave credibility to the project of the establishment of People's Front proposed by Dimitrov's group in the Comintern. The ideological forerunners of the popular front can be traced back to the Leninist view that the alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry could ensure a successful revolution⁸². Post-war Bulgarian communists went further and assigned a Leninist character to

⁸² Lenin, *The State and the Revolution* (1917), (1969): 291 and Lenin, *Preliminary Draft Theses on the Agrarian Question (for the Second Congress of the Communist International, 1920)*, (1969): 592-601 passim.

popular and anti-fascist fronts. In a lecture in the Party school, in 1947, Dramaliev⁸³ criticised the “anti-Leninist tactic” of the uprising of 1923 to lead agrarian masses without a leadership. Similarly, he claimed that failure of the “ultra-leftist sectarians” to attract the masses was due to their “anti-Leninist line” of a united front from below⁸⁴.

Nevertheless, the People’s Front tactics of the 1930s implicitly involved a Gramscian sense much more than a Leninist, since the People’s Front tactics went beyond a temporary alliance of classes. The communist parties had to assume the hegemony of the anti-fascist struggle and the national liberation movement after shaping a new social “historical block” of ‘workers, peasants, intellectuals, patriotic bourgeois strata, and patriotic military circles’⁸⁵. To become a hegemonic class, as Gramsci recommended, the proletariat had to succeed in combining patriotic struggles and ideas with its own class interests⁸⁶. In that way, the communist parties intended to attract the masses, achieve national leadership and take over political power after the collapse of fascist Germany.

A declaration of the BCP in 1936, aiming at clearing the way for the establishment of a People’s Front, is very revealing concerning the turn to nationalism inherent in People’s Front tactics. The Bulgarian communists declared their love to their fatherland, opposed assimilation [of nations], blamed the Bulgarian bourgeoisie for ‘having severed living parts of Bulgaria and placed them under foreign yoke’, fell in with revisionist views, and spoke about Bulgarian minorities in neighbouring countries (Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece)⁸⁷. According to the Party leadership, a programme of national and democratic character, related to the immediate interests of the masses could reach even the most hesitant fascist⁸⁸. According to the founding declaration of the Fatherland Front⁸⁹, this programme could awaken and rally around a powerful Fatherland Front all the patriotic forces of Bulgaria.

⁸³ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

⁸⁴ Dramaliev (1947b): 3-18.

⁸⁵ Daskalov (1989): 80.

⁸⁶ Simon (1991): 44.

⁸⁷ Vasilev (1989): 17.

⁸⁸ Sharlanov (1966): 69.

⁸⁹ Dimitrov (1971): 14 ff.

As the Secretariat of the Comintern declared in August 1942, possibly under Dimitrov's direction, "Fatherland Front", "National Front", "Anti-Hitlerist Front"⁹⁰ could gather all 'national anti-Hitlerist forces'⁹¹. Consequently, the national character of the communist parties was reinforced, whereas the international one was muted. Nationalism was to play a key role in the formation of anti-fascist coalitions and national discourse was eased into that of the communist parties. The tactic of building political alliances on a national basis charted by the Seventh Congress was to prove efficient in each partisan movement. The pre-war idea for a broad anti-fascist coalition substantially materialised in the resistance movement of all anti-fascist, fatherland or national or patriotic fronts⁹².

2.2.b *The anti-imperialist theory*

Dimitrov implemented and furthered the Leninist anti-imperialist theory through his discourse on the national question. Lenin had proposed the division of the world into three main types of nations: the advanced capitalist, that is, the imperialist powers; the nations of Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Russia; and the semi-colonial countries and colonies⁹³. As has been argued, Lenin had developed a national stratification similar to the social one⁹⁴; therefore, a nation of Eastern Europe could be proletarianised in times of imperialist crisis and fall into a semi-colony or a mere colony. These Leninist premises were then developed in a particular direction by Dimitrov.

Within this initially Leninist frame of reference, imperialist powers are presented by Dimitrov as foreign conquerors of Bulgaria keeping Bulgaria virtually occupied by the onerous war reparation payments. In the inter-war period, Bulgaria was regarded as having been transformed into a semi-colony of imperialist powers who exploited the Balkans due to their geographical, military, strategic and economic position. Dimitrov argued that the Balkans supplied imperialist powers with an important

⁹⁰ Nevertheless, no Front with this name was established. All Fronts opted for the other two varieties.

⁹¹ Daskalov (1989): 80.

⁹² Hadzhinikolov et al. (1973): 204-205.

⁹³ Lenin, *The Socialist Revolution and the Rights of Nations to Self-determination (Theses) (April 1917)*, (1969): 163-164. Similar categories are drawn in Lenin, *Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism (1917) and Preface to the French and German edition (1920)*, (1970³): 97 and 101 and in Stalin, *The Foundations of Leninism (1924)*, in Bruce (1973): 150.

⁹⁴ Chapter One Part Two.

market, sources of raw materials and soldiers for imperialist war. Imperialists maintained the national conflicts in the Balkans ‘by preserving their intolerable territorial division’⁹⁵, in order to facilitate the creation of an anti-Soviet bloc for the threatened war against the Soviet Union. Thus, imperialist powers were oppressing, denationalising and colonising Balkan nations⁹⁶. Accordingly, all the Balkans and Bulgaria in particular could not pursue an independent national policy.

During the Second World War, Dimitrov sharply criticised German imperialism in particular, as the rest of the Great Powers were allies of the Soviet Union. In that time, Bulgaria, despite the official discourse of “united Bulgaria”, had, in effect, been reduced to ‘a [mere] colony of Germany’ rather than a semi-colony of imperialists⁹⁷. In his writings, Dimitrov stressed the ‘total national enslavement of the Bulgarian people’ to Germany, since German military authorities controlled Bulgarian main railway lines, ports and airports and exploited Bulgarian production and raw materials rendering Bulgaria’s economy an ‘appendage of Germany’⁹⁸. Germany’s interference extended also, in domestic political affairs. Dimitrov implied that Germany plotted the death of Czar Boris, because the monarchy had begun to depart from German absolute influence and stressed that the German delegation, which arrived in Sofia for the funeral of Boris, sought to secure Bulgaria’s pro-German policy by appointing the Council of Regents⁹⁹. Within this context, the will of the Czar could not change Bulgaria’s pro-German policy, because Bulgaria had become a real vassal of Germany rather than an ally¹⁰⁰. The only force that could subvert Bulgaria’s status as an oppressed nation was the growth of a national liberation movement, which, according to the Stalinist interpretation of the anti-imperialist theory, would result from the awakening of Bulgarian national consciousness¹⁰¹.

⁹⁵ Dimitrov, *Imperialism in the Balkans (La Federation Balkanique, 15.08.1929)*, (1972, vol. 1): 308-310.

⁹⁶ Dimitrov, *The Main Tasks of the Balkan Communist Parties (Sixth Congress of the Comintern 4.08.1928)*, (1972, vol. 1): 293-294.

⁹⁷ Kolarov, *The Botev Den (02.06.1942)*, Radio Station “Hristo Botev”... (1951, vol. 2):397-399 and Poptomov, *A Sacred and Just Struggle of our People (20.08.1942)*, (1951, vol. 3): 137-139.

⁹⁸ Dimitrov, *Wither Bulgaria?*, in *Pravda* #230, 16.09.1943, (1972, vol. 2): 212-213. See, also, Radio Station “Hristo Botev”... (1951, vol. 2): passim.

⁹⁹ Dimitrov, *Wither Bulgaria?* (*Pravda* #230, 16.09.1943), (1972, vol. 2): 214-215.

¹⁰⁰ According to the founding declaration of the Fatherland Front, Bulgaria was being ‘transformed into a vassal of Hitler’ during the war and the Bulgarian people ‘into slaves of the German imperialism (sic)’, in Dimitrov (1971): 14.

¹⁰¹ See Chapter One, Part Two.

According to anti-imperialist theory, within the boundaries of the oppressed nation, a comprador bourgeoisie obedient to the dominant or imperialist nation reigns, expressing its own nationalism, which serves the interests of the dominant or imperialist power, and is distinct and definitely alien to the people's national idea¹⁰². In Dimitrov's application of anti-imperialist theory, bourgeois classes and dynasties constituted lackeys of imperialists in the Balkans. In Bulgaria, anti-patriotic ruling classes and a treacherous government made up of 'servants obedient' to imperialist powers or 'German agents'¹⁰³ oppressed and exploited the narod (people-nation). Imperialist aid empowered the ruling class¹⁰⁴ while in return, the Bulgarian bourgeoisie and monarchy handed over Bulgaria to imperialist states¹⁰⁵.

The identification of Bulgaria with colonies and oppressed nations as well as the presence of a comprador bourgeoisie rendered Bulgaria potentially anti-imperialist international force. Bulgaria, then, was embarking on an anti-imperialist and a national liberation struggle in order to gain its national independence and freedom. Having been experienced in conducting anti-imperialist struggles, the communists were the most suitable to assume the hegemony of this national liberation movement. The anti-imperialist theory allowed the Communist Party to deploy national discourse, but, at the same time, to retain a Marxist idiom. Thus, to compete with the nationalist politics of the Tsar and his government, the BCP and the Fatherland Front developed the theory that Bulgaria could be transformed from an oppressed, humiliated nation, vastly exploited by an aggressive imperialism, into an independent and liberated land.

In their anti-imperialist struggle, the Bulgarian people could expect assistance from the great fighter against imperialism, the socialist Soviet Union. It was underlined that 'Bulgaria [had] won its national liberation by dint of the Russian people [in 1877-

¹⁰² According to the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, see Chapter One, Part Four. A distinction between the national idea of the ruling class and the one of the working class echoes Bauer's thought, Balakrishnan (1996): 46-50. Notwithstanding, there is no reference to Bauer, because of the vehement criticism of his theory by Lenin and, especially, Stalin.

¹⁰³ Chervenkov, *Wither?* (08.09.1941) and Kolarov, *Czar Boris-Hitler's Agent* (31.01.19420, in Radio Station "Hristo Botev"... (1950, vol. 1): 92-93 and (1951, vol. 2): 71-73 respectively.

¹⁰⁴ Dimitrov, *After the Uprising* (*Rabotnicheski Vestnik* #2, 07.11.1923), (1972, vol.1): 173-174.

¹⁰⁵ Dimitrov, *The Bloody Drive against the Labour Movement* (*Krasnii International Profsoyozov*, 1925), (1972, vol.1): 209, and Dimitrov, *The October Revolution and the Balkans* (*International Press Correspondence*, 18.11.1927), (1972, vol. 1): 276.

1878]’¹⁰⁶. It was argued that the Russian people -not the former Russian Empire- counterbalanced the ‘Teutonic’ threat, while the Germans were presented as eternal enemy of Slavs and Nazi imperialism, in particular, as their sworn enemy. Consequently, ‘the affinity of the Bulgarian to the Russian narod (people–nation)’¹⁰⁷ is natural. As a result, a pan-Slav discourse re-emerged declaring that ‘a common Slav destiny’ unites all the Slavs ‘against the Teutonic drive to assimilate the Slavs’¹⁰⁸. Dimitrov-Marek¹⁰⁹ and Chervenkov¹¹⁰ imagined this pan-Slav movement as different to past ones, since the Russians now were not guided by occupying interests and they respected the freedom and independence of other peoples; therefore, all Slav peoples united as equals¹¹¹. This pan-Slav discourse was to play a great role in post-war Bulgarian politics. Thus, the national independence of Bulgaria relied, first and foremost, upon its affinity with the (Russian) Soviet Union and the neighbouring Slav nations – the Macedonians, Serbs, Montenegrins, Croats and Slovenes¹¹².

Apart from the Soviet Union, the Bulgarian people could, also, ally with other Balkan peoples, who were groaning under imperialist yokes. The idea of a federation of the Balkan people or the South Slavs had a considerable impact on Bulgarian post-war nationalism regarding the Macedonian question and Bulgarian–Yugoslav relations. The Comintern-inspired idea of a federation is linked with the right of nations to self-determination or even secession, a fundamental Leninist principle that the communist parties had to apply¹¹³. Hence, following the example of the Soviet Union, Dimitrov argued, a federation of the Balkan peoples would accomplish the national liberation of the Macedonians, the Croats, the Dobroudzhans, the Thracians, the Albanians, the Bessarabians and any other oppressed ethnic group¹¹⁴.

¹⁰⁶ Dimitrov, *Wither Bulgaria?* (*Pravda* #230, 16.09.1943), (1972, vol. 2): 209-210, Dimitrov, *Bulgaria's Road to Salvation* (1944), (1972, vol. 2): 231.

¹⁰⁷ Dimitrov, *Wither Bulgaria?* (*Pravda* #230, 16.09.1943), (1972, vol. 2): 210.

¹⁰⁸ Dimitrov, *The Crisis in Bulgaria* (*Pravda* #318, 27.12.1943), (1972, vol. 2): 224.

¹⁰⁹ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

¹¹⁰ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

¹¹¹ Dimitrov-Marek, *Long Life to the Slav Unity* (06.08.1941), and Chervenkov, *Servants of Pan-Germanism in Bulgaria* (27.08.1941), Radio Station “Hristo Botev” (1950, vol. 1): 27-28 and (1950, vol. 1): 70-73 respectively.

¹¹² Dimitrov, *Wither Bulgaria?* (*Pravda* #230, 16.09.1943), (1972, vol. 2): 212 and 217.

¹¹³ *Extracts from the Resolution of the Fifth Comintern Congress on the Report of the ECCI (1924)*, in Degras (1971): 106.

¹¹⁴ Dimitrov, *A Socialist Balkan Conference* (*Inprekor* #43, 08.04.1924), (1972, vol. 1): 198, Dimitrov, *The October Revolution and the Balkans* (*International Press Correspondence* #114, 18.11.1927), (1972 vol. 1) 273-279 passim, and Dimitrov, *Imperialism in the Balkans* (*La Federation Balkanique*, 15.07.1929), (1972, vol. 1): 310.

The anti-imperialist idea and the dire need for potential allies led the communists even to invent 'ethnic' groups, such as Dobroudzhans and Thracians, which had never claimed national liberation. Rothschild argues that the communist parties, since the October Revolution, intended to be hailed as champions of national minorities, thus incorporating liberation movements in order to exploit minority grievances¹¹⁵. This tendency led to the foregone recognition of nationalities "fighting" for freedom. Moreover, it caused dismay in the sections of the Comintern concerned. For instance, as Manuilsky reported, the question of Macedonian independence provoked a strong protest from the Greek Communist Party¹¹⁶. Rothschild notes that the Yugoslav communists initially accepted the plan on the autonomy of Macedonia, albeit later they dismissed it¹¹⁷.

Not only did the recognition of a Macedonian nationality generate serious problems to the unity within communist parties and ruptures to the Comintern itself, but also gave rise to inconsistencies in the discourse of the Balkan communist parties. The slogan of united and independent Macedonia was adopted by the 5th Conference of the Balkan Communist Federation in 1922 as a compromise of the positions of the Balkan communist parties. Then, it constituted a controversial and problematic issue for all of them. In particular, the BCP recognised the Macedonians, even a national Macedonian minority in Pirin in 1936¹¹⁸, and spoke of Thracians and Dobroudzhans, imagining them however as a part of the Bulgarian nation. As a result, the Bulgarian communists tried to put Realpolitik and Comintern's resolutions in balance with their national imagination. This generated serious contradictions in the discourse of the Party.

Examples concerning the Macedonian question attest to this. In 1934, during the discussion of the Balkan Secretariat of the ECCI, which recognised Macedonians as a separate nation, Kolarov insisted on the Bulgarian nationality of the Macedonian

¹¹⁵ Rothschild (1959): 232.

¹¹⁶ Degras (1971): 157 and Rothschild (1959): 236 and 238. Pouliopoulos and Maximos were expelled from the Greek Communist Party because they criticised the Comintern's intervention in Greek affairs (and because of Trotskyism). Stavridis saw the Macedonian programme of the Comintern unrealistic and harmful to the electoral chances of the Greek Communist Party.

¹¹⁷ Rothschild (1959): 235-236 and 242-243.

¹¹⁸ Vasilev (1989): 17.

Slavs¹¹⁹. In an article of the partisan newspaper “People’s Comrade”, published in February of 1944, a few lines before the slogan “Macedonia to the Macedonians” and the view that only a free and independent Macedonia will stop to be an apple of discord, one reads: ‘every Bulgarian bows humbly and reverently to Macedonia. Macedonia is the cradle of the Bulgarian revival... After the establishment of the free Bulgarian state, the destiny of enslaved Macedonia was always in the mind of the Bulgarian people who gave great homage for her liberation’¹²⁰. Rothschild and King argue that at the beginning of the Second World War, the Bulgarian communists tried to bring Macedonia under their own organisational jurisdiction¹²¹. At last, as Sirkov describes, in two very crucial documents, the founding declaration of the Fatherland Front (1942) and the draft programme of the BCP (1943), only the demand of pulling-out of the Bulgarian troops of Serbia is posing¹²². Consequently, either Macedonia is not recognised or the Bulgarian communists did not see the occupation of Macedonia and Thrace as a yoke. To conclude, the Bulgarian communists were not against an independent Macedonia, but they imagined Macedonians as historically connected with Bulgarians.

2.2.c Socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism

Rousinov in his introduction to the English translation of Dimitrov’s ‘Selected Works’ claims that ‘Dimitrov never opposed patriotism to internationalism and internationalism to patriotism... A proletarian revolutionary... lies in a correct (sic) combination of patriotism and internationalism’¹²³. Dimitrov himself argued that ‘there can be no real people’s patriotism without international solidarity, just as there can be no international solidarity without effective people’s patriotism’¹²⁴.

Articulating such concepts, Dimitrov tried to bridge the gap between Marxism and nationalism that the Leninist tradition left unresolved. Dimitrov attacked bourgeois nationalism; however, he introduced a version of nationalism reconcilable with

¹¹⁹ Vasilev (1989): 14.

¹²⁰ BCP Records Fund 112, Opis 1, Archival Unit 2 (1944): 85-86.

¹²¹ Rothschild (1959): 235 and King (1973): 59. King aptly notes that Macedonia was finally given to Yugoslavia, because Stalin took an essentially conservative view of territorial changes.

¹²² Sirkov (1991): 17.

¹²³ Dimitrov (1972): xxvi.

¹²⁴ Cited by Svestka (1974): 167.

socialism at three levels. First, the internationalist communist movement had to acquaint itself with national peculiarities and, hence, to make socialism a national case. This concept was articulated at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern and it was in accordance with the Stalinist doctrine of “socialism in one country” and the nationalistic atmosphere, which prevailed in the Soviet Union at the same time, as described by Drandenberger¹²⁵. Dimitrov insisted that the path towards socialism is different in every nation and it depends on its own historical, national and other conditions. Thus, the path of socialism could not follow the same cut-and-dried Soviet pattern¹²⁶. Second, proletarian internationalism acquired a national dimension as addressed to the “socialist fatherland”. Third, ‘proletarian internationalism’ had to ‘*acclimatise itself*’ in each country in order to strike deep roots in its native land¹²⁷, in relation to the national forms of the proletarian class struggle. Thus, ‘proletarian internationalism’ gained a national feature, peculiar to each place in which it took root.

In their attempt to link Marxism with nationalism and national with social struggles, the Bulgarian communists found the word “narod” which means both nation and people,¹²⁸ very useful. The same applies to Russian. Greenfeld points out that, in Lomonosov’s nationalistic ideology (18th century), “narod” and “nation” completely coincided¹²⁹. The word “natsiia” (nation) is used much less than the word “narod” by the Bulgarian communists. Nevertheless, derivatives such as “natsionalno” (national) are quite frequent and interchangeable to “naroden”. Words like “otechestvo” (fatherland) and “patriot” are frequent as well¹³⁰.

¹²⁵ Drandenberger (2000): 388-406.

¹²⁶ Dimitrov, *Speech before the Sofia District Party Conference (1946)*, (1972): xxii.

¹²⁷ Dimitrov, *The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International in the Struggle of the Working Class against Fascism (Report before the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International August 1935)*, (1972, vol. 2): 73.

¹²⁸ See, for instance, the following very revealing title of Cvervenkov’s broadcast: ‘Liberation of the narod from the German yoke is the job of the “narod” itself’, in Radio Station “Hristo Botev”... (1952, vol. 7): 25-26. The following phrases were in widespread use: “narodni chetnics” (members of revolutionary groups), “narodni partisans”, “narodni fighters”, “narodna army”. The adjectives “narodna” and “natsionalna” are close to each other in Bulgarian, as the copyist of the B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 178 wrote “natsionalna” instead of “narodna”. Afterwards, s/he or a proofreader corrected it.

¹²⁹ Greenfeld (1992): 242.

¹³⁰ Radio Station “Hristo Botev”... (1950-1952, vol.1-vol. 7): passim.

As Chapter 3 shows, in the discourse of the BCP in the post war years, questions on who was to be included in the people and the nation were posed. These debates rendered these general by definition terms exclusive. The equation of people and nation made the BCP able to present its own interests as those of the whole people and the united nation. For instance, Chervenkov broadcasted from the Radio Station “Hristo Botev” that ‘the national unity of the Bulgarians... is dictated from root state, political, social and economic interests of the Bulgarian people’¹³¹. This tendency informed the Party’s post-war position: all the people had to consent with the patriotic line couched by the communists. Speaking in the name of the nation, the Bulgarian communists spoke in the name of the people, claiming to be their vanguard.

2.2.d *Binary divisions*

The BCP resorted to bi-polar schemata in order to construct its patriotic image in contrast to the anti-national character of its political opponents. At the level of domestic politics, selfish short-term interests of ruling classes historically alien to the Bulgarian nation were presented as antagonistic to the national interests of the BCP and the Fatherland Front. At the level of international relations, the following dilemma was put before Bulgarian citizens. The Bulgarian people had to choose between the policy of the dynasty and governmental parties, that is, supporting fascist Germany, with the disastrous effect this would have for Bulgaria, or the policy of the Fatherland Front, that is, supporting democratic nations, that is, opting for national salvation and ‘democracy, true national unity, peace and collaboration with the Balkan nations’¹³². At the level of ideology, the discourse of the Bulgarian communist leaders contrasted two mutually exclusive terms, bourgeois nationalism and “true patriotism”¹³³. This was, in effect, a Manichean scheme of bad versus good nationalism respectively.

¹³¹ Chervenkov, *For the National Unity of the Bulgarians (12.05.1944)*, Radio Station “Hristo Botev”... (1952, vol.6): 191-194.

¹³² B.C.P. Records: Fund 65, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 7 (March 1944): 2. In the founding declaration of the Fatherland Front, in Dimitrov (1971): 14-15, the pointing out of a ‘real national [natsionalna] danger’, having been coming from ‘the anti-national [narod] policy of the government of Czar Boris’, and the imminent necessity of establishing the Fatherland Front for ‘Bulgaria’s salvation’ are two notions with national allusion.

¹³³ See, also, similar polarities in the founding declaration of the Fatherland Front in Dimitrov (1971): 14-15.

The Bulgarian ruling groups are strongly criticised as historically alien to the Bulgarian nation. Firstly, the Bulgarian bourgeoisie was related to the Ottoman era and traditions. Secondly, it was accused of having opposed the national liberation movement of the 1870s and having not fought for Bulgarian national liberation. Lastly, the bourgeoisie and the dynasty were presented as they had obtained their privileges from Czarist Russia and they had been governing, since the liberation of Bulgaria from the Turkish yoke, because of the aid provided by and on behalf of imperialist powers¹³⁴. Furthermore, examples referring to the First World War, when a German agent king and corrupt political forces caused the disintegration of Bulgarian society and brought horrible national calamity, were also frequently used by the BCP¹³⁵. For these reasons, the Bulgarian ruling classes, namely, the Bulgarian bourgeoisie and dynasty, were not genuinely Bulgarian in nature and character.

In respect of the Second World War, Bulgarian rulers were characterised as definitely treacherous and anti-patriotic. The dynasty is identified directly as German: ‘the German Coburg dynasty’¹³⁶. Chervenkov presented Czar Boris as of German blood, of non-Bulgarian traits, and a life-lasting servant of the Germans¹³⁷. Therefore, it was implied that this “German dynasty”, in all cases, would always subject Bulgaria to the interest of German imperialist policy.

In Dimitrov’s writings, the Bulgarian government is called the ‘lackey of bloodthirsty Hitler’¹³⁸, ‘rabid pro-German agents’¹³⁹, ‘a government that had united the most reactionary, greedy and venal elements’¹⁴⁰, ‘dunces or people who had sold out their

¹³⁴ Dimitrov, *The Bloody Drive against the Labour Movement (Krasnii International Profsoyozov, 1925)*, (1972, vol.1): 209 and Dimitrov, *The Bulgarian Lesson (Krestyanski International)*, (1972, vol. 1): 236-237. For instance, in the second reference, King Ferdinand is called ‘crowned agent of Austro-German imperialism’.

¹³⁵ B.C.P. Records: Fund 65, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 1^a (March 1943): passim.

¹³⁶ Dimitrov, *Wither Bulgaria? (Pravda #230, 16.09.1943)*, (1972, vol. 2): 216, and Kolarov, *Ferdinand Saks-koburg-gotski (12.10.1941)*, in Radio Station “Hristo Botev”... (1950, vol. 1): 167-168.

¹³⁷ Chervenkov, *Who was Czar Boris? (04.09.1943)*, in Radio Station “Hristo Botev”... (1952, vol. 5): 116-118.

¹³⁸ Dimitrov, *There is one Way of Saving our People (Hristo Botev Broadcasting Station Speaking, 15.12.1941)*, (1972, vol 2): 206.

¹³⁹ Dimitrov, *Wither Bulgaria? (Pravda #230, 16.09.1943)*, (1972, vol. 2): 210. See, also, *Naroden Voice #1*, June 1944, in Lambrev (1944). Its complete name was “Naroden Voice, Tool of the national liberation movement – illegal publication of the partisan detachment Hristo Botev”.

¹⁴⁰ Dimitrov, *The Crisis in Bulgaria (Pravda #318, 27.12.1943)*, (1972, vol. 2): 223.

conscience to the foreign conquerors'¹⁴¹, 'meaner betrayal of narod (people-nation)'¹⁴². Chervenkov called intellectuals, who had aligned themselves to the government and disallowed the Slav origin of Bulgarians, "germanised", "shameful cosmopolitans", 'who had been sold to foreigners cheaper than Judas'¹⁴³. Chervenkov argued that Germany controlled the productive forces, the security apparatuses, everything in Bulgaria by dint of germanised governmental representatives¹⁴⁴. The Bulgarian rulers were blamed for betraying the interests and the future of Bulgaria, because 'they were personally and materially tied to Germany and put their private interest above the national interest of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian people'¹⁴⁵.

Dimitrov predicted that the 'so-called statesmen of Bulgaria' would transfer the capital they had accumulated during the war abroad and leave Bulgaria, when it collapsed, just as Czar Ferdinand and the Prime Minister Radoslavov¹⁴⁶ did in 1918¹⁴⁷. This scenario relied on the communist argument that the rest of the political forces were pursuing exclusively their own particular ends, by conspiring against each other to maintain the favour of a German agent, Czar Boris¹⁴⁸. In contrast to the provisional Bulgarian rulers, the ordinary Bulgarian people had no way of escaping the collapse and destruction brought by the war.

The pro-German policy, that the Bulgarian government and the dynasty implemented, brought the Bulgarian people to the brink of the abyss and caused a serious crisis in the country. The communists argued that there was the danger of total disaster, due to the harmful pro-German politics pursued by the Bulgarian treacherous Second World

¹⁴¹ Dimitrov, *On the Government of Bagryanov (Hristo Botev Broadcasting Station Speaking, 05.06.1944)*, (1972, vol 2): 225.

¹⁴² Dimitrov, *Bulgaria's Road to Salvation (1944)*, (1972, vol. 2): 229.

¹⁴³ Chervenkov, *Servants of Pan-Germanism in Bulgaria (27.08.1941)*, in Radio Station "Hristo Botev"... (1950, vol. 1): 70-73.

¹⁴⁴ Chervenkov, *Who does Bulgaria Command? (18.12.1941)*, and *For National Struggle against the Betrayal (23.12.1941)*, in Radio Station "Hristo Botev"... (1950, vol. 1): 357-358 and 378-379 respectively. Governmental representatives were called germanised in general in broadcasts.

¹⁴⁵ Dimitrov, *The Crisis in Bulgaria (Pravda #318, 27.12.1943)*, (1972, vol. 2): 223, and Kolarov, *Who does Govern Bulgaria nowadays? (02.03.1942)*, in Radio Station "Hristo Botev"... (1951, vol. 2): 128-129. The characterisation of the government of Czar Boris as treacherous, anti-narod and Nazi-government is repeated at the very beginning as well as the end of the founding declaration of the Fatherland Front.

¹⁴⁶ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

¹⁴⁷ Dimitrov, *The Crisis in Bulgaria (Pravda #318, 27.12.1943)*, (1972, vol. 2): 224.

¹⁴⁸ B.C.P. Records: Fund 65, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 1^a (March 1943): 1. See the article "Any other path brings a catastrophe".

War governments¹⁴⁹. Chervenkov stressed that the “national unification” of Bulgaria the clique of Boris claimed they had realised was not a genuine solution of the Bulgarian national interests¹⁵⁰. On the contrary, it had involved Bulgaria in a criminal Nazi war, which would result in a national disaster¹⁵¹, forfeiture of national independence, and detrimental outcomes for the country¹⁵².

Bourgeois nationalism -as expressed by the Bulgarian bourgeoisie, the Czar and the Bulgarian governments- was considered disastrous for the Bulgarian nation. Dimitrov argued that bourgeois nationalism and expansionism resulted in two national disasters both in the Balkan Wars and the First World War. Instead of annexing new territories to Bulgaria and establishing a Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkans, Bulgaria had been forced to sign the onerous Neuilly peace treaty¹⁵³.

During the Second World War, Bulgarian bourgeois nationalism followed a pro-German policy in order to achieve the so-called national “unification of all the Bulgarians”, by annexing Macedonia and Thrace. Levi contended that the unification of Macedonia and Thrace with Bulgaria was realised only after the rulers betrayed the present and the future of Bulgaria¹⁵⁴. Moreover, Dimitrov claimed that the cost to Bulgaria of regaining these territories was to ‘lose its own national independence under the boot of the German conquerors’¹⁵⁵. Bulgaria was going to suffer a third, ‘total national disaster’¹⁵⁶ because of the bourgeois nationalism of the Second World War. Nevertheless, Dimitrov and Levi did not object to the incorporation of

¹⁴⁹ In a proclamation the BCP calls them “Germanised Bulgarian fascists”, B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 219 (October 1943): 1.

¹⁵⁰ Chervenkov, *The clique of Czar Boris has Realised National Disaster and not National Unification* (29.12.1941), in Radio Station “Hristo Botev”... (1950, vol. 1): 398-400.

¹⁵¹ See the increasing broadcasting on the impending national disaster in 1944, in Radio Station “Hristo Botev”... (1952, vol. 7): *passim*.

¹⁵² ‘Are we going to except a new Dobro-Pole and a new Neuilly?’ in B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 219 (October 1943): 1. Dobro-Pole is the name of the battlefield, where the Bulgarian front was broken through in the First World War. As a result, Bulgaria was forced to conclude a peace treaty with the Entente. By the treaty of Neuilly, Bulgaria relinquished the Thracian coastline acquired in the Balkan Wars, her army was reduced and a great burden of reparation imposed.

¹⁵³ Dimitrov, *After the Uprising* (*Rabotnicheski Vestnik* #2, 07.11.1923), (1972, vol.1): 173-174. Regarding the Balkan Wars, see Dimitrov, *Against Military Credits* (1914), (1972, vol. 1): 40-48.

¹⁵⁴ Levi, *Agents of Hitler in Bulgaria are the Worst Enemies of the Bulgarian National Cause* (05.02.1944), in Radio Station “Hristo Botev”... (1952, vol. 6): 80-82.

¹⁵⁵ Dimitrov, *The Crisis in Bulgaria* (*Pravda* #318, 27.12.1943), (1972, vol. 2): 219.

¹⁵⁶ After the first she suffered in the Balkan Wars and the second in the First World War. Dimitrov, *Wither Bulgaria?* (*Pravda* #230, 16.09.1943), (1972, vol. 2): 210, Dimitrov, *The Crisis in Bulgaria* (*Pravda* #318, 27.12.1943), (1972, vol. 2): 222.

Macedonia and Thrace into Bulgaria. They suggested that “a genuine national unification of the Bulgarians” could be realised only through a friendly agreement with the Balkan peoples, with the assistance of the freedom-loving United Nations, and after the establishment of free, independent, democratic, and powerful Bulgaria¹⁵⁷.

In the face of the impending disaster of Bulgaria, a national movement, the polar opposite of pro-German ministries and deputies, national apostates, and national traitors was rising up: communists, partisans, and patriots rallied round the national, patriotic Fatherland Front¹⁵⁸. In Dimitrov’s words, a National Front ‘must encompass the whole nation with the exception of the traitors and the agents of the foreign invaders’¹⁵⁹. It was never emphasised that the Fatherland Front was controlled by the communists, but set up by the people themselves, intoxicated by their national feeling¹⁶⁰. Likewise, Kolarov stated that ‘the national front for Bulgaria’s salvation should gather 99% of the whole Bulgarian nation, that is, workers, peasants, artisans, and intellectuals apart from those around the clique of Boris’¹⁶¹. Every Bulgarian, who is honest, patriotic, devoted to the people and the country, and ready for sacrifices to the fatherland would assist or even join partisan detachments¹⁶². Thereby, the Fatherland Front would even attract some bourgeois-democrats¹⁶³. By these means, the Fatherland Front would win over the great majority of the Bulgarian nation and accomplish national unity¹⁶⁴. The Bulgarian nation would fight for its interests and national independence under the flag of the Fatherland Front and thus overthrow

¹⁵⁷ Dimitrov, *The Crisis in Bulgaria (Pravda #318, 27.12.1943)*, (1972, vol. 2): 221 and Levi, *Agents of Hitler in Bulgaria are the Worst Enemies of the Bulgarian National Cause (05.02.1944)*, in Radio Station “Hristo Botev”... (1952, vol. 6): 80-82.

¹⁵⁸ B.C.P. Records Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 2 (December 1944): 3.

¹⁵⁹ Cited by Velchev (1974): 26. A lot of leaflets appealed to all social strata; see, B.C.P. Records.

¹⁶⁰ B.C.P. Records: Fund 65, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 7 (March 1944): 2.

¹⁶¹ Kolarov, *Who are the Forces of Bulgaria’s Salvation? (20.07.1942)*, in Radio Station “Hristo Botev”... (1951, vol. 2): 476-479.

¹⁶² Dimitrov, *Bulgaria’s Road to Salvation (1944)*, (1972, vol. 2): 232, Kolarov, *The Road to Salvation (06.10.1941)*, in Radio Station “Hristo Botev”... (1950, vol. 1): 147-151, and Kolarov, *Every patriot in the Front of the Fatherland (14.08.1944)*, in Radio Station “Hristo Botev”... (1952, vol. 7): 171-173.

¹⁶³ B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 219 (October 1943): 4 and B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 175 (August 1943): 34-37.

¹⁶⁴ B.C.P. Records: Fund 65, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 53 (August 1944), B.C.P. Records: Fund 65, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 82 (March 1944), and B.C.P. Records: Fund 65, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 103 (May 1944). As Chervenkov, *For what is the Fatherland Front Fighting? (04.10.1942)*, in Radio Station “Hristo Botev”... (1951, vol. 3): 297-299 poses it, ‘out of the patriotic national unity will be only German agents and negotiators’.

pro-hitlerist agents and establish in the future a Fatherland Front government¹⁶⁵, a people's republic, "an independent Bulgaria"¹⁶⁶.

The BCP claimed that only the communist-dominated Fatherland Front showed genuine concern for the "rights and interests" of the Bulgarian narod (nation-people). The BCP declared that partisans defended interests of the whole Bulgarian narod (nation-people), whilst the government was only interested in keeping public life under its control in order to implement its anti-national and anti-popular politics¹⁶⁷.

A treacherous government and a national crisis imply the urgent need for a national salvation¹⁶⁸. National salvation, according to Chervenkov, was beyond political ideologies¹⁶⁹. Thus, the Fatherland Front, a coalition of parties and 'patriotic forces', gathered round the BCP to ensure salvation of country and people (sic) from 'ruin and threatening disaster'¹⁷⁰. As it was argued, a truly Bulgarian government¹⁷¹ could only achieve national salvation by proposing and implementing a genuine and independent national policy. Such a government originated in the anti-fascist national movement and the 'broad revolutionary struggle against the hated and ruinous German policy'¹⁷². Such a government would shift Bulgaria's wartime alliance from the Nazis to the Allies.

"Genuine patriotism" was expressed by the proletariat, its vanguard, that is, the BCP, and the Fatherland Front, having been set up for the defence of Bulgaria's "genuine

¹⁶⁵ B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 65, Archival Unit 49 (July 1944) and B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 65, Archival Unit 81 (February – March 1944).

¹⁶⁶ B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 175 (August 1943): 47.

¹⁶⁷ It is argued that for this reason, the government founded the "Public Force". B.C.P. Records: Fund 65, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 7 (March 1944): 4.

¹⁶⁸ B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 226 (1943), B.C.P. Records: Fund 65, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 4, see the article "Fatherland is in danger", B.C.P. Records: Fund 65, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 8 (April 1944), B.C.P. Records: Fund 65, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 9 (June - July 1944), and B.C.P. Records: Fund 65, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 82 (March 1944). For instance, the clandestine newspaper "Naroden Voice" appealed to the Bulgarian people to participate in the ranks of the Fatherland Front and to save Bulgaria from a new national calamity, the worst one in its history, in *Naroden Voice* #1, June 1944, in Lambrev (1944): 10-11.

¹⁶⁹ Chervenkov, *For Total Unity (28.02.1944)*, in Radio Station "Hristo Botev"... (1952, vol. 6): 143-145.

¹⁷⁰ Dimitrov, *Bulgaria's Road to Salvation (1944)*, (1972, vol. 2): 232.

¹⁷¹ The Fatherland Front set the goal of establishing 'a truly Bulgarian national [natsionalno] government', or 'a truly people's government', as it is underscored at the conclusion of its founding declaration, in Dimitrov (1971): 15.

¹⁷² Dimitrov, *The Crisis in Bulgaria (Pravda #318, 27.12.1943)*, (1972, vol. 2): 218.

national interests”. In Dimitrov’s discourse, the proletariat constitutes ‘the *only* true fighter for national freedom and independence’, since it is fighting to save the culture of the people and to liberate the nation from the shackles of capitalism and fascism. ‘*Only* the proletarian revolution can avert the destruction of culture and raise it to its highest flowering as a truly national culture – *national in form and socialist in content...*’ On the whole, the socialist revolution would secure a brighter future for nation¹⁷³. Such a concept of revolution appears to break with Leninist ‘socialist internationalism’, which had envisaged that national culture would give way to a broader international culture¹⁷⁴ and had anticipated assimilation and disappearance of separate nations in a universal and a-national human community¹⁷⁵.

Since the proletariat was the only genuine patriotic force and the socialist revolution the guarantor of the flowering of the national culture, the BCP claimed the unadulterated character of patriotism and attributed the identity of patriot to anyone who adopted its aspirations. Hence, no patriotic approach to the national question could differ from that of the Party¹⁷⁶. As Dimitrov had long ago declared, ‘the Communist parties... remain[ed] the *only* loyal defenders and leaders of the social and national liberation struggles of the working people in the Balkans’¹⁷⁷. Articulating a progressive nationalism or patriotism was thus the privilege of the vanguard of the oppressed people, that is, the Communist Party of each nation.

In a recommendation of the BCP Central Committee, the Party gave its own definition of the terms “patriot” and “patriotism”. ‘A patriot... fights for freedom of the Bulgarian narod (nation-people), for withdrawal of hitlerite conquerors from fatherland, for bread for the people... for peace and self-determination. He is one of the people who fight against Hitler and Bulgarian traitors, who mostly, gloat about

¹⁷³ Dimitrov, *The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International in the Struggle of the Working Class against Fascism (Report before the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, August 1935)*, (1972, vol. 2): 71-73.

¹⁷⁴ Schwarzmantel (1991): 174.

¹⁷⁵ Schwarzmantel (1991): 184, citing Traverso, E. (1984) ‘Socialismo e Nazione: Rassegna di una Controversia Marxista’, *Il Ponte XL*, (1): 49-64.

¹⁷⁶ ‘When the patriotism of all social groups and political organisations was put to a severe test, [the communist parties] manifested the greatest consistency and stamina, the highest heroism, showing that they were naroden (national-people’s) leaders devoted to the last to their country’, in Dimitrov, *The Fatherland Front, its Development and Impending Tasks (Report to the Second Fatherland Front Congress, 02.02.1948)*, (1972, vol. 3): 153. ‘The Fatherland Front held aloft the national banner’, *ibid* 159.

¹⁷⁷ Dimitrov, *A Socialist Balkan Conference (Inprekor #43, 08.04.1924)*, (1972, vol. 1): 199.

patriotism'¹⁷⁸. In the same manner, Chervenkov claimed that a patriot-Bulgarian was one who defended national independence and dignity of Bulgaria and gave his fraternal hand to the Yugoslavs and Greeks¹⁷⁹.

The appropriation of genuine patriotism and the monopoly claimed by the Party in distinguishing between patriots and traitors had a further impact on the politics of the BCP. Depending on their position vis a vis the communist ones, political parties and figures could often find themselves reclassified from patriotic to treacherous and vice versa. This opportunism was to be exercised during the Second World War, when the BCP sought alliances in a broad political scene. Whoever refused to join the Fatherland Front could easily depict as traitor; this discourse would be very useful during the post-war years.

Binary divisions between bourgeois nationalism and patriotism, between treacherous ruling classes and the patriotic Fatherland Front, and between pro-German policy and alliance with democratic nations, the merging of national and social interests, processes of linking patriotism with internationalism, and anti-imperialist theory provided the BCP with theoretical tools supporting its “left wing nationalism”, which proved to be a very effective strategic weapon for winning over the masses and for contrasting the so-called bourgeois nationalism.

2.3 The Partisan Movement

After the German attack upon the USSR, the BCP attempted to build a people's front and organise a resistance partisan movement. On 15 June 1942, Dimitrov delivered before the Foreign Bureau members of the BCP a report in which he urged the Bulgarian communists to seek an alliance with the democratic and patriotic forces of Bulgaria against the pro-Nazi policy of the Bulgarian ruling classes. On 17 July 1942,

¹⁷⁸ B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 143.

¹⁷⁹ Chervenkov, *For Unity and Traitors of the Bulgarian Nation (13.09.1941)*, and *The Clique of Czar Boris has Realised National Disaster and not National Unification (29.12.1941)*, in Radio Station “Hristo Botev”... (1950, vol. 1): 106-108 and 398-400 respectively.

the founding declaration of the Fatherland Front¹⁸⁰, namely, its programme, was proclaimed over the underground Hristo Botev radio station. The Fatherland Front would call for arming the nation by setting up a partisan revolutionary army, whose backbone would be the communists.

2.3.a Objectives and apparatuses of the partisan movement

The partisan movement had to accomplish a dual task: to free Bulgaria from German invaders and to overthrow the ‘Bulgarian Quislings’¹⁸¹. The Bulgarian partisan movement was, in essence, national anti-fascist; it had both a national as well as an international character¹⁸². The BCP toed the line that the Seventh Congress of the Comintern adopted and Dimitrov, personally, proposed. The partisan movement and, later on, the “Fatherland War” (1944 –1945) were intended to liberate Bulgaria from German conquerors and to contribute to the victory of the international anti-fascist coalition.

The horizon of the Fatherland Front did not go beyond the framework of bourgeois democracy. Its objectives were presented as moderate, without ‘frightening off’ the majority of the population¹⁸³. The founding declaration of the Fatherland Front involved two sets of goals: the national liberation of Bulgaria from the German yoke and the restoration of democratic liberties and rights. The subject of this declaration was Bulgaria and not the proletariat. Words such as communism or socialism and their derivatives made not a single appearance in the founding declaration of the Fatherland Front¹⁸⁴. National and democratic demands were put forward rather than overtly communist or more radical ones, since the communist parties themselves deemed that a plain socialist programme could not win over the masses. It is clear that

¹⁸⁰ Dimitrov (1971): 14.

¹⁸¹ Dimitrov, *Wither Bulgaria?* (*Pravda* #230, 16.09.1943), (1972, vol. 2): 216, Dimitrov, *There is one Way of Saving our People* (15.12.1941), *Radio Station Hristo Botev is Speaking*, (1972, vol. 2): 206.

¹⁸² See, also, Kalonkin (2001): 21, who states that two of the principles of the NOVA were patriotism and internationalism. See, also, the lyrics from the *March of the Bulgarian Insurgents*: ‘and into the fight for our fatherland/ and into the fight for annihilation of fascism’, in B.C.P. Records: Fund 77, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 31 (August 1944).

¹⁸³ The Comintern recommended exactly the same policy as popular front tactic in 1935; see Chapter One Part Four.

¹⁸⁴ Dimitrov (1971): 14 ff.

the communist parties did not believe that the masses were ready for the transition to socialism.

The logic of not frightening off the masses and the subsequent discursive supplanting of the communist ideology and internationalism was not uncommon among communist parties in general. Thorez, who led one of the most influential communist parties, estimated that the great mass of French people was not ready for socialist revolution and by no means all the sympathisers the French Communist Party had won during the resistance could have been mobilised for revolution¹⁸⁵. Significantly, Dimitrov characterised the programme of the Fatherland Front as a 'practical national democratic platform'¹⁸⁶. As Weydenthal characteristically points out, the Party of the Polish communists was called Workers' Party [AND NOT COMMUNIST] after Dimitrov's orders for several reasons pertaining to this logic. First, its enemies would not be able to use the scarecrow of communism. Second, the masses would look at it as an organisation closely linked with the Polish nation and its vital interests, so as a people's front would better attract them¹⁸⁷. Similarly, in Hungary, the political programme of the Hungarian Communist Party called for an 'independent, free and democratic Hungary'¹⁸⁸ while Allum and Sassoon argue that the Italian Communist Party strategy of progressive democracy and national unity was linked to the belief that 'the final partisan rising should be a national insurrection for the liberation of national territory and not a revolutionary insurrection for the immediate construction of socialism'¹⁸⁹.

Following such opportunistic politics, the communist parties did not hesitate to collaborate with right-wing parties, even with extreme ones, that is, their putative sworn enemies. In Bulgaria, the Fatherland Front forged an alliance with Zveno, a tiny group of fascist plotters and coup organisers. Likewise, the communist-dominated Hungarian Front included the League of the Patriarchal Cross, a monarchist anti-fascist organisation¹⁹⁰ while in Rumania, the communists backed and

¹⁸⁵ Cited in Mortimer (1979): 151.

¹⁸⁶ Cited in Nikolova (1983): 151.

¹⁸⁷ Weydenthal (1986): 35.

¹⁸⁸ Molnar (1991): 73.

¹⁸⁹ Allum and Sassoon (1977): 174.

¹⁹⁰ Molnar (1991): 79.

assisted the coup d' état carried out by King Michael and a group of officers in August 1944¹⁹¹.

Derogation from traditional communist demands and opportunistic politics, instead of a communist revolution, gave rise to a “national-democratic” revolution proclaimed by the people’s fronts. It could be argued that by promoting national ideals the communist parties risked their ideology being infiltrated by these ideals and getting reconfigured. Indeed, by articulating and advocating a national discourse as well as adopting national slogans and buttressing national demands the communists assumed their national role. Gradually before the Second World War and dramatically during it, leaders of the communist parties openly and deliberately utilised nationalist discourse and integrated it into Party activities.

The BCP named the variety of organisations that it established either by itself or in concert with other forces in ways that clearly and deliberately carried national connotations. The people’s front was, characteristically, called “Fatherland Front”. Having opted for this name, the Party tried to prove that the “Fatherland Front” was a political formation for certain national purpose. The belief was that a front for the fatherland would be more attractive to political leaders, whom the alliance the communist parties negotiated, and the masses than a front for socialism or social justice, for instance¹⁹². The Fatherland Front organisation aimed to rally the broadest possible segment of the Bulgarian people. It would involve workers, peasants, employees, civil servants and the progressive intelligentsia. It, also, claimed the right to represent the Bulgarian nation, as everyone with ‘Bulgarian heart... regardless of political convictions...as honest Bulgarians and patriots’¹⁹³ would join the Fatherland Front. Thus, it was represented as a nation-wide political organisation, centralised in terms of political leadership and consisting of a solid nation-wide net of committees¹⁹⁴.

¹⁹¹ Vago (1977): 112.

¹⁹² The logic of not frightening off the masses, which promoted a discourse related to the fatherland, has already discussed in Chapter One, Part Four, and the national democratic platform of People’s Fronts in the above lines.

¹⁹³ From a broadcast of the radio station “Hristo Botev” on 09 November 1941, cited by Nikolova (1983): 144.

¹⁹⁴ B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 175 (August 1943): 46.

Obviously, the Soviet, so-called “Fatherland War” exerted strong influence over the choice of name for the Bulgarian popular front as “Fatherland Front”. Apart from the Soviet Union, in December 1943, even without Stalin’s prior approval, Gomulka founded the “National Council of the Homeland”, a quasi legislative organ comprising communists, leftwing socialists, and radical-peasants, in Poland¹⁹⁵. Later on, the communist-led provisional government was called “Polish Committee of National Liberation”¹⁹⁶. In Hungary, the “Hungarian Front”, founded in May 1944, forerun the “National Independence Front” born in the following December¹⁹⁷. In Czechoslovakia, the first coalition government, consisting of six parties, was called “National Front of the Working People of the cities and the countryside”¹⁹⁸. The Italian Communist Party participated in the “Committee of National Liberation”, consisting of six anti-fascist parties. Lastly, their Rumanian counterpart was named “National Democratic Block” forerunner of the “National Democratic Front”¹⁹⁹. The choice of terms related to the nation rather than to socialism, let alone communism, gives more evidence that a national-democratic revolution and not a communist one was being proclaimed by the communists.

People’s Fronts were not the only organisations to carry names with national connotations: resistance armies, underground communist radio stations, partisan organisations also top the long list. The Bulgarian resistance army was called “National-People’s Liberation Insurrectionary Army” (NarodnoOsvoboditelna Vistanitseska Armiya). The BCP claimed that the NOVA²⁰⁰ and the Fatherland War (1944–1945) expressed the narod’s (nation’s-people’s) will and dignity and were a source of national pride²⁰¹. They also represented the freedom-loving pure Bulgarian national character. The Bulgarian experiment was not a unique one. The identical names chosen for resistance armies in neighbouring countries -Yugoslavia (National-People’s [Narodno] Liberation Army of Yugoslavia-NOVJ) and Greece, (National People’s Liberation Army-Ethnikos Laikos Apelefttherotikos Stratos, the acronym of

¹⁹⁵ Weydenthal (1986): 42 and Davies (1977): 43.

¹⁹⁶ Weydenthal (1986): 44.

¹⁹⁷ Molnar (1991): 70 and 79.

¹⁹⁸ Suda (1980): 179.

¹⁹⁹ Vago (1977): 112 and 114.

²⁰⁰ The NOVA was established in March 1943, when the Central Committee of the BCP decided to reorganize the partisan movement, in Hristov (1969): 175.

²⁰¹ Kalonkin (2001): 13 and 16.

which makes an amazing assonance with Hellas)-²⁰² and the Italian partisan movement's "Garibaldi brigades"²⁰³ were assumed to fight for the liberation of the nation and not strictly for that of the proletariat.

This was also the case of radio— a medium whose role in mid-twentieth-century nationalisms has been much underestimated and understudied according to Anderson, who argues that it 'made it possible to summon into being an aural representation of the imagined community where the printed page scarcely penetrated'. The underground radio station run by the Bulgarian communists in the USSR was called "Hristo Botev"²⁰⁴, instead of having been given the name of a prominent historical communist figure, e.g. "Dimitir Blagoev", the so-called grandfather of Bulgarian communism. Even though it is difficult to be precise about how many Bulgarians possessed a radio, it could be an effective tool in comparison with the difficulties of the Party in respect of distribution of printed material. At least, radio could summon into being an aural representation of the national liberation movement against the Germans and their "Bulgarian agents".

Kolarov explained the reasons for the selection of the name of Hristo Botev: the concomitance of socialist ideals and ardent patriotism²⁰⁵. Chervenkov explained that the radio station 'was called after Botev, because once again, as 70 years ago, the Bulgarians had to gather their forces and to fight valiantly for their freedom, which had been suppressed, and their independence, which they had been deprived of'²⁰⁶. "Hristo Botev radio station" appealed to 'Bulgarians! Patriots!'. Names with national connotations were given to other underground communist radio stations as well: the "Kosciuszko Radio Station" (Poland) and "Radio Kossuth" (Hungary)²⁰⁷.

²⁰² Pavlowitch (1999): 315 and 316. It is noteworthy that the Greek Communist Party used both the adjectives national and people's, as nation and people in Greek are different words.

²⁰³ Allum and Sassoon (1977): 173.

²⁰⁴ Anderson (1991): 54, footnote 28.

²⁰⁵ Kolarov, *Botev Den (02.06.1942)*, in Radio Station "Hristo Botev"... (1951, vol. 2): 397-399. Natan (1945-1946): 277-284 and 291, and Bulgarian communists in general, claimed that Botev fought for both national and social revolution.

²⁰⁶ Chervenkov, *The Legacy of Hristo Botev (28.03.1942)*, in Radio Station "Hristo Botev"... (1951, vol. 2): 214.

²⁰⁷ Both heroes of the national liberation movement in their countries, Weydenthal (1986): 36 and Molnar (1990): 79.

Names with national connotations also are present in the partisan movement. The names of a considerable number of partisan groups (detachments, brigades, and battalions) related to the Bulgarian national movement of the 19th century. The most famous names were these of Botev and Levski; there were also partisan military groups called Georgi Benkovski, Hadzhi Dimitir, Momchil Voivoda and Chavdar (a literary name from Botev's poetry)²⁰⁸. Two cheti, brands of partisan groups, of the "Chavdar" detachment were called Bacho Kiro, the name of a hero from the April uprising, and Boicho Ognyanov, the name of a well-known hero from the famous novel of Ivan Vazov, "Under the yoke"²⁰⁹. The names of the illegal partisan newspapers also were no exception, e.g. "Fatherland Appeal", "Fatherland Front", and "Patriot"²¹⁰. The word "narodn" (national-people's) is common, e.g. "Naroden Vistanik [Rebel]", "Naroden Glas [Voice]", "Naroden Drugar [Comrade]", "Naroden Partizan [Partisan]", and "Narodna Svoboda [Liberation]"²¹¹. Some nommes de guerre of partisans were derived from Bulgarian national heroes as well as historical and literary figures²¹².

2.3.b *Commemoration, symbols, and word*

Anniversaries and commemorations are moments of national uniformity, times when the entire nation suspends its ordinary and everyday duties to celebrate a memorable historical event together. Billig suggests that it is on these "special" days, that sentiments of national emotion can be most fully released²¹³. Carrier argues that anniversaries and commemorations can be used to reconstruct, year after year, a putative long and ancient history. They construct an annual calendar through which the entire history of a nation can be 'relived' and 'remembered'. As a consequence, he adds, through public commemoration, the appropriation of the past into the present public sphere becomes feasible²¹⁴. National commemorations are determined by the situation, which a nation has to confront in a specific time. In the case of a war, for

²⁰⁸ Guide on the Records of the Bulgarian Communist Party (2000): 159-187. See, also, Kalonkin (2001): 47-49.

²⁰⁹ Kolev (1964³): 199-200.

²¹⁰ B.C.P. Records: Fund 65, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 7 and Kalonkin (2001): 163 and 166.

²¹¹ As citing in Kalonkin (2001): 163 and 166.

²¹² Kostov (1990): 198.

²¹³ Billig (1997): 44-45.

²¹⁴ Carrier (1996): 431.

example, a national day becomes a strong cohesive element capable of being exploited to forge unity between people.

National anniversaries and commemorations during the Second World War offered a number of opportunities for political exploitation by the BCP and the Fatherland Front. Many broadcasts of the “Hristo Botev” radio station concerned anniversaries and commemorations. The way Bulgarian communists honoured and interpreted national anniversaries and commemorations provides further evidence of how they imagined the nation. In the Second World War, the communists had to confront the official state selective remembering and forgetting, that is, the official state appropriation of the past²¹⁵. They therefore had to deploy their own appropriation of certain figures and events of the past rendering national anniversaries and commemorations the field of antagonistic interpretations of the past and the nation.

The Bulgarian communists vehemently criticised the so-called ‘simulated’ patriotic emotions of the Czar and his government. They juxtaposed past and present in order to justify their politics and claim that they were the true national forces in the country. Hence, they declared themselves as the original and exclusive imitators of national heroic ancestors²¹⁶, such as Botev²¹⁷, Levski and the haiduks, the only credible guardians of the national pantheon and the only ones who genuinely celebrated the national past. The Party discourse regarding commemorations contains many key features that Spillman identifies in her analysis of such events²¹⁸. The BCP spoke about the Bulgarian nation; about what was important to it and what problems and opportunities it faced. It defined what Bulgarians shared and Bulgaria’s position in the world. It spoke about Bulgarian history, language, and economy. It sought to define the symbols of the Bulgarian nation and the features of the Bulgarian national identity.

²¹⁵ See a detailed analysis of these concepts in Chapter Five, Part One.

²¹⁶ The proposals of Dimitrov in the Seventh Congress of the Comintern were invoked by the Communists to appropriate the progressive past of the nation and to cope with the supposed falsification of history, which had been undertaken by the fascists, and the necessity of rewriting the national history from a Marxist–Leninist–Stalinist point of view.

²¹⁷ See, for instance, Chervenkov, *Who does the legacy of Botev follow? (02.06.1942)*, in Radio Station “Hristo Botev”... (1951, vol. 2): 391-393. The BCP used to speak in the name of Botev; ‘Bulgarian people! Botev is speaking to you!’ in B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 182 (March 1943): 4 and B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 236 (June 1943).

²¹⁸ Spillman (1997): 14-15.

The Bulgarian communists made considerable use of national anniversaries concerning figures of the national liberation movement of the 19th century. Botev and Levski were the most prominent. Botev represented the ‘leader of the Bulgarian national movement, the immortal tribune of national uprising against the foreign yoke, the proud apostle of South Slav unity’²¹⁹. In a proclamation on the anniversary of Botev’s day, it is argued that if Botev had been alive in the Second World War, he would have been hanged by the Gestapo and the foreign Czar Boris²²⁰. Levski and his ability of building secret revolutionary committees, as partisans did, also were honoured. Levski was still alive: ‘for 70 years, Levski crosses the enslaved fatherland... In every corner of the fatherland he sets up and organise a revolutionary committee to struggle against home and foreign despots – chorbadzhis and Turkish serdars’²²¹.

The commemoration of the 3rd May²²² fitted perfectly with the BCP’s politics²²³. In its discourse, the unity of the Bulgarian nation and the affiliation of Bulgaria with the Soviet Union are underlined. The BCP challenged the Bulgarian people to be ‘honourable descendants of Botev, Levski, Benkovski’. As their ancestors did in the 19th century, the Bulgarian narod (nation-people) had to expel the foreign occupiers from the country and overthrow the treacherous government²²⁴. The Bulgarian narod deprived of any right and ravaged had to fight for its own national, political, economical and cultural freedom²²⁵. In a proclamation concerning the 65th anniversary of the liberation of Bulgaria from the Turkish yoke²²⁶, the Russians are mentioned as liberators of Bulgaria; nevertheless, it is pointed out that the Bulgarian people by themselves had to be able to overthrow the German yoke, which was characterised as worse than the Turkish one. Thus, the BCP attempted to propagandise Bulgaria’s affiliation to the USSR, using a national day.

²¹⁹ Chervenkov, *Hristo Botev (01.06.1944)*, in Radio Station “Hristo Botev” (1952, vol. 7): 15.

²²⁰ B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 236 (June 1943).

²²¹ B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 178 (February 1943): 1-2. Serdars were commanders-in-chief of Muslim countries in the Ottoman era.

²²² The day when the San-Stefano treaty, which anticipated a large Bulgarian state, was signed.

²²³ B.C.P. Records: Fund 65, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 27 (1942) and B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 143 (May 1942).

²²⁴ B.C.P. Records: Fund 65, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 27 (1942): 1.

²²⁵ B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 143 (May 1942): 1-2.

²²⁶ B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 182 (March 1943): 4.

The 24th of May was another key date. It is a feast for saints Cyril and Methodius as well as for Slav culture and solidarity²²⁷. In the proclamation of 1942 concerning that day²²⁸, it is argued that the two saints, who were brothers, had provided all the Slav nations with the alphabet and literature. As regards Bulgarians, in particular, they had ‘saved them from assimilation during the five centuries yoke, they had equipped Paisii, Levski and Botev with nib and sword to achieve Bulgarian renaissance and liberation’. In addition, the authors of that proclamation compare the early literate Slav nations to the then backward, in terms of civilisation, ‘Teutonic hordes’. In modern times, the latter ‘had reduced themselves to a higher race’ in order to ‘physically and culturally extinguish slavdom’. The BCP argued that the reason why the treacherous governments of hitlerist agents refrained from publicly celebrating the Saints Cyril and Methodius day was their pursuit of the germanisation of the Bulgarians. The authors appealed to Bulgarian citizens to align themselves instead with the Russian nation, the pioneer in the struggle for ‘the salvation of the Slav alphabet and culture, peace and civilisation’. Chervenkov blamed the Bulgarian rulers for blaspheming the memory of Cyril and Methodius and, quoting Botev, he underlined Bulgaria’s contribution to the human civilisation²²⁹.

Music and verse too proved to be a successful propaganda tool for any regime²³⁰. Following Merriam, it could be argued that music as used in the resistance movement has more in common with music in non-literate societies, as there was no sharp distinction between the “artist” and the “audience”²³¹. Furthermore, the partisan “artist” did not possess a significant position just as their counterparts in non-literate societies. Even though the composers of partisan songs were individuals, the partisan community as a whole sung these songs and appropriated them. Partisan songs carried important functions similar to those that Merriam identifies in the case of songs in

²²⁷ B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 240 (May 1942) and B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 202 (1943): 4

²²⁸ B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 240 (May 1942): 4.

²²⁹ Chervenkov, *Towards the Celebration of the Brothers Cyril and Methodius (21.05.1942)*, in Radio Station “Hristo Botev” (1951, vol. 2): 345-347.

²³⁰ For the persuasive power of music and its ability to control the masses see Perris (1985). Especially, chapters 4 and 5, ‘Music for the totalitarian state: Marx, Lenin and Soviet Russia’ and ‘More totalitarian music: Confucius, Marx and Mao Zedong’ respectively, refer to how prominent leaders of the international communist movement dealt with music and how some communist regimes used it.

²³¹ Merriam (1964): 211-212.

non-literate societies: emotional expression (expression of ideas and emotions not revealed in ordinary discourse), communication, symbolic representation (of things, ideas, and behaviour), enforcing conformity to social norms (social control both through direct warning to erring members and through direct establishment of what is considered to be proper behaviour), and the integration of society²³². Music and verse also provide a rallying point around which the members of society gather to engage in activities²³³. Chang-Tai points out that music and verse are powerful tools in communicating, since rhyme rather than reason, can be more easily planted in the memory of the masses²³⁴. Moreover, a song is a particularly powerful vehicle for memory and simply evokes the current reality and past events.

In particular, for socially subversive movements, such as the Fatherland Front and the BCP inclusive, partisan songs were an important vehicle for achieving a sense of unisonance. Music and verse together, perhaps more than language, can forge a contemporaneous community, investing it with feelings of and occasions for unison, as Anderson discusses in respect of national anthems²³⁵. A partisan imagined community consisting of partisans themselves, helpers (the so-called *iatatsi* in Bulgarian) and sympathisers, is institutionalised through music. All of them, even if they had never met each other, were singing the same songs, or at least songs with the same philosophy²³⁶, which were able to encourage them to endure the hardships of the partisan life. Partisan songs eliminate the isolation and the dispersion of the partisan detachments. Furthermore, as the example of the Chinese communist war music that Chang-Tai examines shows, reductionism and polarisation, common place in propagandist music composition²³⁷, provided partisan songs with a potential distinction between heroes (patriots) and villains (lackeys).

The BCP and the Fatherland Front attempted to take advantage of propagandist music. Bulgaria is not unique in this respect. Schwarz shows how Russian musicians

²³² Merriam (1964): 219-226.

²³³ Merriam (1964): 227.

²³⁴ Chang-Tai (1996): 904.

²³⁵ Anderson (1991): 145.

²³⁶ Regarding the Bulgarian partisan movement, it is very difficult to argue that all the partisan songs were being sung from every partisan group. Sources cannot allow a certain conclusion. Nonetheless, the most famous partisan songs were, positively, being sung by the great majority.

²³⁷ Chang-Tai (1996): 928.

and poets responded to Hitler's attack in 1941 by producing many nationalistic songs, vowing to defend their country²³⁸. As Chang-Tai points out, the Chinese Communist Party also made wide use of songs combining nationalism and a socialist perspective²³⁹. The Bulgarian example, however, is quite different. The Bulgarian partisan movement was weak and the Party suffered heavy casualties and disintegration at its high ranks. Partisan units bloomed between April and May of 1944²⁴⁰. Partisan songs did not constitute a strong propagandist tool for the Fatherland Front. However, they do indicate and reflect political tendencies that affected the BCP. Through partisan songs, the BCP and the Fatherland Front were represented as political formations devoted to the fatherland. As partisan songs took a nationalist content *inter alia*, the communist-led partisan movement assumed nationalist character and orientation.

The partisan songs presented partisans as descendants of the national heroes of the Bulgarian national movement of the 19th century²⁴¹. The lyrics of a very famous partisan song²⁴² are revealing: "He who loves an enslaved narod / and preserves a great legacy-/ Levski's revolutionary legacy-/ may he come to us as a soldier". In another song, the idea that the partisan movement succeeded the Bulgarian national liberation movement of the 19th century, is more obvious: "There, Botev stands up furiously for his rights,/ there, Levski is in a meeting in the darkness,/ Dimitrov, pale and in chains,/ they make an appeal to the workers"²⁴³. Consequently, the two heroes of the Bulgarian national movement and the leader of the BCP (since Dimitrov is the third part of the sequence in the above lyrics) make an appeal to the workers, that is, a social stratum.

A struggle for land and narod, an inseparable struggle against foreign conquerors and local traitors, for both national freedom and social welfare are presented in partisan songs. The lyrics of a famous partisan song²⁴⁴, "Partisan March"²⁴⁵, illustrates this

²³⁸ Schwarz (1983): 181 ff.

²³⁹ Chang-Tai (1996): 901-929 *passim*.

²⁴⁰ Miller (1975): 199.

²⁴¹ 'Brave partisans/ descendants of Levski, Botev/ Stefan Karadzha', lyrics of *Srednogorians do not put up with yoke*, in Stoin (1955): 84.

²⁴² *Chavdartsii*, in Stoin (1955): 61 was the most popular song of the so-called dynamic partisan group.

²⁴³ *Soldier and booklet*, in Hanchev (1954): 14.

²⁴⁴ It was the most popular song in the "Hristo Botev" partisan group.

²⁴⁵ Andreev (1947): 45.

further: “Wave you, great flag/ of the Fatherland Front!/ Let’s throw ourselves into the battle/ *for land and narod* ²⁴⁶ – No more gloomy German yoke,/ no more hard to bear famine-/ fight against the German executioner,/ fight against your traitors”. The word “freedom” has both national and social meaning. The “Partisan March” ends with the following lyrics: “Freedom is near today,/ stand up and fight, country!/ Death to black fascism,/ freedom to narod ”²⁴⁷.

Partisans were presented as national and social heroes. Lightly equipped, they flocked to the mountains to fight for national liberation and a new, fair society. Heroism, glory, patriotism and bravery were attributed to their daily struggle through partisan songs. Patriotism and social vision took precedence over affection for family, even if the latter was the subject²⁴⁸. The love for the fatherland is openly declared in a number of partisan songs. For instance lyrics such as “for our Bulgaria”²⁴⁹ or lyrics that refer to devotion to the country²⁵⁰ appear frequently in the partisan songs. The name of Bulgaria takes on a pure and sacred meaning, which has to be preserved at all risks²⁵¹.

Further evidence of the nationalist discourse of the BCP can be found in partisan oaths. Dochev and Iliev recite the necessities of the partisan oath: discipline, underlining of the significance of the struggle, self-sacrifice, moral and psychological stimulation²⁵². The same authors quote that, even though some partisan groups developed their own statutes, the common place was outlined by the “War Instruction to Partisans”, established by the War Committee of the Central Committee of the BCP; therefore, oaths presumably involved some certain common elements²⁵³. A centrally decreed oath elaborated by the General Staff of the NOVA in the spring of

²⁴⁶ Italics are mine. Social and national claims are connected.

²⁴⁷ *Partisan March*, in Andreev (1947): 45. See, also, *There is dense fog* and *Start singing for freedom*, in Vakarelski (1961): 596 and 597 respectively.

²⁴⁸ “A partisan cannot stay with his mother/.../ and loves his/her beloved fatherland”, in *A partisan cannot stay with his mother*, in Stoin (1955): 70.

²⁴⁹ *It is impossible to put up with fascists* and *Dark cloud appears*, in Stoin (1955): 75 and 92 respectively.

²⁵⁰ “Oh, how much I yearn for revenge/.../ for Botev and for you, my fatherland” from the poem *On my gun*, in Andreev (1947): 18.

²⁵¹ “Thus, the fascist yoke,/ mother, let’s crush,/ the Bulgarian name/ we must preserve pure”, from the song *Farewell*, in Stoin (1955): 67.

²⁵² Dochev and Iliev (1974): 85.

²⁵³ Dochev and Iliev (1974): 80.

1943 explicitly conflated nationalist and internationalist aims²⁵⁴. Other common elements of oaths are as following: devotion to the fatherland and the Bulgarian narod, fight against fascism and its local agents, revenge on Bulgarian traitors, respect to the programme of the Fatherland Front, in order that Bulgaria be free, independent, democratic, powerful and prosperous²⁵⁵.

The linkage of the partisan movement with that of the national liberation movement of the 19th century is also present regarding the partisan oaths. For instance, during the ceremony of taking the oath of new partisans, a partisan captain highlighted that the partisan movement of the Second World War constituted the successor of the Bulgarian national Revival and liberation movement of the 19th century²⁵⁶.

In respect of symbols, the partisan movement adopted the national flag in parallel with the red one. For instance, the First Sofia National Liberation Brigade opted to adopt the red flag, having put the inscription “Death to fascism, Freedom to narod” on it, side by side with the tricolour national one, with the inscription “For a free, powerful and democratic Bulgaria”²⁵⁷. There are frequent references to the “tricolour flag of the Fatherland Front”²⁵⁸; therefore, the national tricolour flag of Bulgaria and the flag of the political organization of the Fatherland Front, in an abstract manner, became united. Thus, the Fatherland Front claimed that it represented the entire Bulgarian nation and that all of the “honest and true Bulgarian patriots” would join it. Consequently, whoever did not join the Fatherland Front, was a traitor, or at least not a patriot.

²⁵⁴ ‘For the liberation of the fatherland and the world from Hitlerite conquerors and their Bulgarian agents’, in Dochev and Iliev (1974): 86.

²⁵⁵ See, for instance, the oaths of some partisan groups, such as “Hristo Botev”, “Anton Ivanov”, the Razlokian partisans and, also, the oath of the NOVA, cited in Andreev (1981): 3-4 and 14 and documents 1, 2 and 4. See, also, BCP Records Fund 93, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 64; BCP Records Fund 92, Opis 1, Archival Unit 1; BCP Records Fund 130, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 2: 1; and *Partisan Oath (15 June 1944)*, in Radio Station Hristo Botev... (1952, vol. 7): 100-101.

²⁵⁶ He spoke as following, according to the literature: ‘the echo of our oath... reaches exactly that valley, Oborishte, where our grandfathers similarly... swore to give their life for national freedom’. in Dochev and Iliev (1974): 99. Andreev (1981): document 2 cites the following extract from the “Oath of insurrection”: “following the legacy of our great narodni (national-people’s) fighters, Botev and Levski, we swear...”.

²⁵⁷ Andreev (1981): 21 and Dochev and Iliev (1974): 98.

²⁵⁸ For instance, see Lambrev (1944) *passim*.

Elements of the nationalist discourse of the BCP can also be detected in political lectures and instructions. Not surprisingly, the partisan movement is seen as a sequence of the struggle against the Turkish yoke and Bulgarian chorbadzhis²⁵⁹. The following discourse, coming from a speech of a partisan captain to local peasants, is revealing: “Comrades, today is the day of narodnite (national-people’s) leaders of national revolution. Their great achievements were once successful thanks to the support that our brother, Russia, gave. The soul of the fighters of April²⁶⁰, who fought bravely against the Ottoman army, is still alive in us. The uprising begun on this mountain and your village had a very close relation to the uprising of April”²⁶¹. In addition, a historical narration of linear advance is developed: from the national liberation movement against the Ottoman yoke to the following yoke of capitalism and the uprising of September of 1923²⁶². It was implied that the narration of the nation would add up to the advent of a glorious future, as the vision of socialism anticipated.

Another common place of political instructions is the conflation of the national and international character of the resistance movement. In meetings with people in villages and cities, partisan leaders usually declared that the struggle that narod conducted, was for freedom from capitalism and the fascist yoke²⁶³. Lectures were given on the occasion of national anniversaries reinforcing the national propaganda of the BCP in the partisan groups. For instance, statements and lectures took place on the commemoration of the 3rd May and May 24th²⁶⁴.

Closing this section of commemorations and anniversaries, partisan songs, oaths, flags, lectures and instructions, the most central element of the nationalist discourse of the resistance movement should be analysed. The partisan movement was appropriating the past as a successor to the national liberation movement of the 19th

²⁵⁹ Kolev (1964³): 129. One partisan gives evidence that partisans regarded national heroes of the 19th century as their ancestors, in Andreev (1981): 9. See, also, the following description from Donev, *Descendants of Botev and Levski*, Andreev (1981): 24: “It seemed to me that an echo of our oath reached Oborishte, a small valley where our grandfathers, also, kissed guns (it was a part of taking the oath) and swore to give their life for narodna (national-people’s) freedom”.

²⁶⁰ The uprising of April 1876.

²⁶¹ Kolev (1964³): 199-200.

²⁶² Speeches of partisan captains often unfolded this story, Andreev (1981): 2-3.

²⁶³ Kolev (1964³): passim.

²⁶⁴ Kalonkin (2001): 168.

century against the Ottoman yoke. As a result, a whole set of interesting parallels of national significance emanate from this association: Bulgarian governmental institutions and chorbadzhis, partisan and haiduks, Red Army and Russian Army.

Associations are suggested between the situation of the Bulgarian people during the Second World War and their situation during the Ottoman era. The nation is presented as enslaved, starving, financially deprived and with its ethnicity in danger²⁶⁵. In addition, some native Bulgarians served the alien conqueror alike, because they were interested only in their personal interests. Parallels were drawn between the so-called fascists in governmental places, the high ranked officers in the police, army and administration, and chorbadzhis, the feudal, Bulgarian-speaking leadership of the Ottoman era²⁶⁶. Capitalists, bankers, and contractors were presented as descendants of chorbadzhis and wholesalers. The former as the latter have never fought for the fatherland; on the contrary, they betrayed it²⁶⁷. Furthermore, the police of the Bulgarian treacherous government of ‘German agents’ was described a ‘yenitserian police gang’²⁶⁸.

The partisans claimed that they fought for national liberation and independence, as the haiduks were supposed to have done in the Ottoman era²⁶⁹. It is stressed that Bulgarian treacherous governments faced haiduks and partisans alike²⁷⁰. Using the

²⁶⁵ *Damned Fascists*, in Burin (1970): 214-215.

²⁶⁶ *A mother cries for her son* and *Plea to Vapcharov*, in Stoin (1955): 140 and 63 respectively.

²⁶⁷ Significantly, Chervenkov, *Who does the Legacy of Botev Follow? (02.06.1942)*, in Radio Station “Hristo Botev”... (1951, vol. 2): 391-393 broadcasted: ‘Filov and Penchovich, together with Shakir Bei and Kyuchuk Said hung Levski; they are brothers’.

²⁶⁸ *Naroden (national-people’s) Voice* #1, June 1944, in Lambrev (1944): 8 and *Appeal to Bulgarian narod (nation-people)*, in Lambrev (1944): 84. The yenitsars were part of the Ottoman army and administration. They came from the non-Muslim population by the devsirme, a levy of non-Muslim children for conversion and Ottoman service.

²⁶⁹ The haiduks were considered by the BCP to be formed by people who sought to take revenge on the Ottomans. Afterwards, they were assumed to lead the Bulgarian national liberation movement. See, for instance, B.C.P. Records: Fund 1, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 295 (1944): 3. See, also, *Haidukian nights*, in Andreev (1947): 19, in which the way of life of partisans corresponds to the way of life of haiduks (relationship with nature and mountain, fun, song, appearance), *Chavdartsii*, in B.C.P. Records, Fund 135, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 33: 1, *Farewell*, in Stoin (1955): 67, *Mountain and partisans*, in Vakarelski (1961): 595.

²⁷⁰ ‘...sons of Bulgarian traitors, as one-time “Dunav”, newspaper of chorbadzhis and Turks,... called our blessed memory chetniks – “villains”, “idles”,..., so now in newspaper “Zora”... traitor Krapchev discredits our patriots. And remember: the same people utter the same words’, in B.C.P. Records: Fund 65, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 40 (1943): 2.

legend of haiduks²⁷¹, the Fatherland Front repeatedly pointed out the closeness, which needed to be developed, between the partisans and the masses. As Bulgarian villagers supposedly assisted and associated with haiduks during the era of the Bulgarian Renaissance, the masses were presumed to support the partisan movement. Thereby, the partisan movement could be divided in two branches: the fighters on the battlefield and their helpers, who mainly provided them with food and shelter. This scheme completely corresponded with the image that people carried of haiduks of the Ottoman era. Under the flag of the Fatherland Front, partisans were bound to repeat the feats of haiduks and heroes of the Bulgarian national liberation movement, such as Botev and Levski²⁷². They would lead Bulgaria to its second liberation²⁷³.

Lastly, the Red Army was expected to contribute to the liberation of Bulgaria from Germany just as the Russian army contributed to the liberation of Bulgaria from the Ottoman yoke²⁷⁴. The BCP tried to kindle the fraternal feelings of the Bulgarian people to the great Slav nation, the USSR. However, the consistent refusal of Tsar Boris to declare war on the Soviet Union, even to sever diplomat relations with her, hindered the BCP from engaging in a potential political argument on anti-Russian or anti-Slav political conduct of the government. The Soviet Union had declared war on Bulgaria just a few days before the Communists took power²⁷⁵.

Conclusion

At the beginning of the Second World War, the BCP faced a challenging situation. With the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the expansion of Nazism and the fear of an eventual collapse of “the motherland of all the workers”, became major threats to the international communist movement and contributed to the prioritization within

²⁷¹ For some details on this legend, in particular, and “social banditry”, in general, see Chapter Five Part Six.

²⁷² Chervenkov, *Let's Follow the Example of our Immortal National Heroes and Leaders of the Bulgarian National Revival (13.08.1941)*, in Radio Station “Hristo Botev”... (1950, vol. 1): 44-46 appealed to the Bulgarians as descendants of Father Paisii, Sofroni Vrachanski, Rakovski, Karadzha, and Levski.

²⁷³ B.C.P. Records: Fund 65, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 7 (March 1944): 2. Some lyrics from the *March of the Bulgarian Insurgent* are revealing too: ‘...our beloved bandit [haiduk]/ has woken up from a deep sleep/ and listen to his fighting hymn [being sung by partisans]’, in B.C.P. Records: Fund 77, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 31 (August 1944).

²⁷⁴ *Damned Fascists*, in Burin (1970): 214-215 and *Plea to Vapcharov*, in Stoin (1955): 63. See, also, *Naroden Voice* #3, June 1944, in Lambrev (1944): 39.

²⁷⁵ Pavlowitch (1999): 318 and 322, Miller (1975):210-211 and Bell (1986):59.

the latter, and the BCP in particular, of defeating Nazism. Thus, the objective aim of the Bulgarian communists was, in the first place, the survival of the Soviet Union and then, once this had been accomplished, the victory of the Red Army and the preparation of conditions favouring a takeover in Bulgaria.

To navigate the difficult situation it faced and to strengthen itself, the BCP deployed two main strategies: it set up a people's front and it conducted an anti-imperialist struggle at both an international (against the fascist Germans) and a national (against the so-called German agents of Bulgaria) level. Within this overarching strategy, it developed a series of tactics: a resistance movement to attack Germans and their so-called agents, connections with the Red Army and the Balkan resistance struggle, broadcasting, attempts to manipulate and usurp anniversaries. The Bulgarian communists opted for a nationalist discourse to underpin their politics. They developed binary divisions of patriots versus traitors; they gave names with national connotations to their political or military apparatuses; they articulated their nationalist discourse on the occasion of commemorations and anniversaries, through music and verse, oaths, symbols, texts and speeches, the press in a clandestine form, and radio broadcasts from the USSR.

The BCP took power on 9 September 1944, after the Red Army entered Bulgaria and following a number of strikes, public demonstrations and partisan operations. Henceforward the BCP had to transform itself from an underground, clandestine political formation into a central element within the Bulgarian government and articulate a state discourse.

The Party's discourse, as it had been developed and elaborated during the resistance movement, constituted a very valuable pool of concepts related to the national idea. The Party converted commemorations, for instance, from a chance for criticism of its opponents into nation-wide official celebrations. Recommendations, slogans and proclamations, which used to be clandestine, acquired a state nuance. "Rabotnitsesko Delo", the Party's newspaper, became a governmental political organ and sought the naroden (national-people's) consent and discipline. The political enemies and the former persecutors of the Party were denounced as if they had led Bulgaria to a tremendous national disaster in the Second World War. New enemies were presumed

to have emerged in the post-war period. They conspired with hostile nations pursuing intervention in Bulgarian domestic affairs against the interests of the country and the people (sic). As a state there after, the BCP could also use political instruments to promote national cohesion and consent, such as the construction of the national myth, especially through mass schooling. Bulgaria, since 9 September 1944, had already been a People's Democracy, *national in form and socialist in content*, but also, as is demonstrated in the following chapters, national in content as well.

Chapter Three

The Nationalist Discourse in Domestic Politics

The early post-war period in Bulgaria (1944-1948) has been analysed to a limited extent and interpreted in different ways. A number of authors (Isusov¹, Bell², Kalinova and Baeva³, Crampton⁴, Ognyanov⁵, and Tomaszewski⁶) have suggested several factors to explain the communist take-over and consolidation of power.

One of the most significant was the stationing of the Red Army in Bulgaria up to December 1947 and the backing of the BCP by the Soviet Union tend to present Bulgaria as a colonial state. This account, however, cannot adequately explain the huge expansion of the BCP membership and, some times, the enthusiasm of the masses in favour of the communists.

In addition, the repression, violence, terror, and purges have been emphasised but rather overestimated. It could be argued that such interpretation is rather inadequate, since even the most violent and authoritarian regimes have used means of propaganda extensively (e.g. fascist regimes). That is to say that authoritarian regimes seek ways to gain the consent of the masses and persuasive discourses seem to be ideal in this respect.

Another significant factor was the effective politics (such as authoritarian control of key-ministries, control over the police, the army, and the justice, the first stage of quasi-pluralist “people’s democracy”, and communist success in the political struggle against the opposition) have also been suggested. However, they need an effective discourse and means of propaganda to come into effect.

¹ See, for instance, Isusov (2000), whose book is one of the very few that examine this period on its own.

² Bell (1986): 79-96.

³ Kalinova and Baeva (2002): 49-72.

⁴ Crampton (2002): 52-66.

⁵ Ognyanov (1984): 8-13 and Ognyanov (1993).

⁶ Tomaszewski (1989): 39-40.

Furthermore, a series of political and moral advantages the communists had (such as legitimacy, maintenance of party structure and function all gained from the resistance movement) and significant prestige gained by the victory of the USSR and the Red Army have also been argued. However, it is questionable how a party, clandestine for a long period and without any governmental experience, would have made that successful use of the above factors.

Additionally, the massive support that the BCP gained after the war and the mushrooming of Fatherland Front committees is a pro-communist romanticised though less convincing interpretation. We need to find out the reasons that led to the above consequences. Why did it happen in this specific period and so suddenly?

Finally, social demands for reforms, justice, and democracy in parallel with the political corrosion of traditional right-wing parties and the acute exacerbation of socio-political contradictions in Bulgaria is still a non-convincing interpretation, since it does not explain why the masses opted for communists and not another left-wing or radical party. Therefore, what made Bulgarians join massively the BCP should be something more than slogans about social justice.

All the above factors did play a crucial role in the political life of Bulgaria in the post-war years. This chapter, all the same, complements the existing literature as it explains why and how the communists tried to gain the consent of the masses and political allies. Communist regimes needed to develop effective propaganda and a persuasive discourse. Furthermore, they seized power as the hegemonic force of a coalition of diverse political forces; this hegemonic strategy required consent as much if not more than coercion.

This chapter shows how a central, ambitious, systematic and extensive nationalism underpins the communist approach to different levels in a series of political domains. It describes the political situation the Party had to navigate: the political parties of that time are briefly presented (their position, social composition, membership, support, and ideology, including their own national discourses which competed with that of the communists, as well as the potential dangers they posed for the communist hegemony); the impact of international agreements on Bulgarian politics is examined;

and the tactics the communists used to weaken and marginalise serious rivals are illustrated. Within this political framework, it is argued, the nationalist discourse deployed by the BCP was a central factor in its consolidation of power and to the way in which it gained mass support.

This chapter examines the extensive nationalist discourse the communists constructed recasting and recombining in a syncretic manner central discursive elements coming from earlier discourses: a bourgeois nationalist one and a communist one. It analyses the self-presentation of the BCP as a national party which claimed to have sacrificed itself for the nation rather than a party representing a part of the nation. It analyses the communist efforts to promote the Fatherland Front in an explicitly nationalist way. The nationalist discourse of the BCP can be also found operating in particular political domains crucial to the communist regime: economy, security apparatuses, governance, and justice. Finally, this chapter shows how this nationalist discourse was used in the elimination of the opposition.

3.1 Disadvantages and advantages of the BCP

The BCP appeared to be by far the strongest party of the early post-war years. However, even within the Fatherland Front, before the fission of the BANU (Bulgarian Agrarian National Union), the BCP was not unchallenged, as communist members numbered slightly more than half of the Fatherland Front⁷. In reality, as occurred throughout Eastern Europe, the BCP only became all-powerful after 1947, when it launched a harsh offensive against the opposition and finally destroyed it. Significantly, even the most powerful and numerous communist party of Eastern Europe, that is that of Czechoslovakia, had strong rivals. In the autumn of 1945, when its membership rose to over 700,000, the Populist Party (weaker than the Social Democratic Party) had 350,000 members. At the same time, the Democratic Party gained over 60% of the electorate in Slovakia⁸.

⁷ 53.80% in December 1944 and 56.12% in the beginning of 1945, in Isusov (1983): 24 and 95 respectively. For the Fatherland Front membership, see Appendix 3, Table 1.

⁸ Tomaszewski (1989): 62-63 and 68. In other countries, such as Hungary, the communists were much weaker. In the elections of 1945, the Smallholders' Party gained 57%, while the communists gained 17.1%.

The BCP's membership immediately after 9 September 1944 was quite low (13,700 members⁹)¹⁰. Furthermore, the Bulgarian communists had little experience of open political competition in public sphere, as they had been clandestine for a long period; therefore, they had no sufficient experience of winning support through parliamentary means.



Bulgaria was an overwhelmingly agrarian country, so the Party could not appeal to a large proletariat¹¹. The industrial labour force was estimated at 15% in 1946, whereas the population dependent on agriculture at 66%¹². A discourse centred on the proletariat would not be able to reach or appeal to a substantial part of the overwhelmingly agrarian Bulgarian society. At the same time, appeals to the communist feelings of workers themselves were unlikely to be very successful, as only a small percentage of workers were party members¹³.

Significantly, the percentage of workers who had joined the BCP by the end of 1944 were 10.62% in Sofia, 14.23% in Plovdiv district, with its peak in Gabrovo district (24.72%) and its nadir in Blagoevgrad district (4.16%)¹⁴. Even more paradoxically, discourses based on the proletariat had no large audience within the BCP itself, as the workers constituted only 21.4% in January 1945 and 26.5% in 1948 of Party's

⁹ Isusov (1975): 49 and Ognyanov (1993): 17. Avramov (1965): 9 cited a report of Kostov giving the figure of about 15,000, whereas Dimitrov estimated 25,000 members, in Dimitrov (1949): 79-81.

¹⁰ This was a common fate for all communist parties of countries where a large resistance movement had not developed. Significantly, the erstwhile massive Communist Party of Czechoslovakia numbered only 37,000 members in the very beginning of the post-war period, in Suda (1980): 189. It should be noted that it had around 90,000 members in 1937, before it turned underground, in Lukes (1997): 245. According to Molnar (1990): 100, the Hungarian Communist Party, which was clandestine and tiny in the inter-war period, numbered just 3,000 members.

¹¹ Workers constituted 15.3% of Bulgarian society in 1946 according to Todorov (1981): 453, Appendix 3, Table 2.

¹² Lampe and Jackson (1982): 559, Appendix 3, Table 3.

¹³ For the low percentages of communist workers, see Avramov (1965): 15-16. Worker members of the BCP in January 1945 numbered 53,090, while in 1948 119,064, in Bell (1986): 81 and Isusov (2000): 367. Workers in 1946 numbered totally 638,249, in Todorov (1981): 453.

¹⁴ Isusov (1971): 140. For more details see Appendix 3, Table 4.

membership¹⁵. The non-working class majority of Party's members would not support the BCP if the latter did not develop a discourse addressing broader social strata. A national discourse was clearly one of the obvious options.

Despite the above serious disadvantages, the BCP had two significant advantages: rapid growth of its membership in the immediate aftermath of the war and the presence of the Red Army. Its membership grew to 253,522 in January 1945¹⁶, while in 1948 the BCP numbered 463,682 members¹⁷, although membership does not automatically translate into popularity, as the cases of the Italian Communist Party and the French Communist Party¹⁸ indicate. That means, in effect, the BCP was a new party after September 1944, as 94%¹⁹ of Party members joined it after 9 September 1944²⁰. Newcomers, however, did not have communist education, when they entered the BCP, and, as reports reproduced from party archives indicate, careerism, irresponsible and lunatic acts, hooliganism, larceny, intrigue and factionalism, moral and political degeneration, and abuse of ration cards were the state of affairs on the local level²¹. All these caused political embarrassment to Party leadership.

Fatherland Front committees cannot, also, be seen as the principal engine in the consolidation of communist power, because, as Bell argues²², 'there were numerous committees that were not under communist control, nor were the communist cadres sufficiently experienced and disciplined to carry out a co-ordinated policy'.

The BCP took advantage of the presence of the Red Army to become the major political force and achieve its goal of establishing a single-party regime. Its affiliation with the Soviet Union and the victorious Red Army reflected considerable prestige on the Bulgarian communists. Furthermore, the Red Army helped in creating favourable

¹⁵ Bell (1986): 81 and 131. For the social composition of Party's membership, see Appendix 3, Table 5.

¹⁶ Bell (1986): 81.

¹⁷ Bell (1986): 81 and 131. Burks (1961): 51 gives percentages of total population belonging to the BCP; whereas it was about 0.4% circa 1938, it had increased to 6.3% circa 1948.

¹⁸ The membership of both had to a great degree developed, but their electorate remained relatively small.

¹⁹ If we take into consideration its figure of 1948, then over 97% were newcomers.

²⁰ The membership of all communist parties of Eastern Europe dramatically increased after 1944. By 1949, a significant part of these societies had become members of the communist parties, Tomaszewski (1989): *passim*.

²¹ Bell (1986): 82.

²² Bell (1986): 82-83.

opportunities by providing material and psychological support to communists²³. The presence of the Red Army, however, was in some ways a problematic advantage, as anti-communists could claim that communist power relied on a foreign army and that the BCP was a Russified party alien and hostile to the Bulgarian historical tradition, Bulgarian national interests, and Bulgarian society²⁴. One of the reasons the Bulgarian communists resorted to nationalism was in order to minimise the Party's image as an alien and Soviet-imposed regime²⁵ and downplay the dependence of their regime on the Red Army.

3.2 The political spectrum in post-war Bulgaria

The BCP was faced with opposition, right across the political spectrum, to its right and its left. On the right, there were ultra right-wing organisations and the Democratic Party²⁶. The centre of the political spectrum was occupied by the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU), the Bulgarian Workers' Social-Democratic Party (BWSDP)²⁷, the Radical Party²⁸, and the Zveno, all of which consisted of allies of the communists within the Fatherland Front coalition. As there had been formed left, centre, and right groups within the above parties, during 1945 two parties under the same names were formed, except Zveno: one pro-communist, which remained within the Fatherland Front, and one which split off and set up an independent opposition party. On the far left, there were trotskyst and anarchist groups.

The ultra right-wing opposition consisted of illegal counter-revolutionary organisations, such as the "Neutral Officer", the "Tsar Krum", the "Military League", and the IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation)²⁹. They had a limited membership largely of army officers and the main focus of their propaganda

²³ Crampton (1994): 212-213.

²⁴ See, for instance, statements of Petkov and G.M. Dimitrov that a soviet regime had established in the country by virtue of the Red Army, which was against the will and the interests of the Bulgarian society, in Isusov (2000): 35 and 87.

²⁵ King (1980): 125-126 uses the same argument regarding the practices of the Romanian Communist Party.

²⁶ For details on the Democratic Party, see Appendix 1.

²⁷ For details on the BWSDP, see Appendix 1.

²⁸ For details on the Radical Party, see Appendix 1.

²⁹ For details on all these political organisations, see Appendix 1.

was anti-communism and anti-Russianism³⁰. They demanded the restoration of the democratic rights and the Tirnovo Constitution³¹; they were for a republic of western style. All the ultra right-wing organisations deployed nationalist discourses: they demanded unification of all Bulgarians within the same state and asserted the primacy of “national culture”. They insisted in the Bulgarian origin of the Macedonians, *territorial integrity* (opposition to the unification of Pirin Macedonia with the People’s Republic of Macedonia), sovereignty and independence of the Bulgarian state³². Even though these organisations were tiny, they constituted a threat to communist power, since they had developed a net of communications in the Army and were seen as having the potential to mount a coup if the Army was not purged and its loyalty to the communists ensured.

The political representative of the moderate right-wing opposition was the Democratic Party led by Mushanov and Girginov³³. It came out of the legal opposition against the pro-German dynasty and governments of the Second World War. Its leaders were blamed, however, for their participation in the last government, which only lasted one week, before 9 September and were tried for this, as we shall see, by the People’s Courts. Its membership fluctuated between 1,000 and 2,000³⁴. In the elections of October 1946, the Democratic Party gained 22,736 votes (0.5%)³⁵. As had been the case after the First World War, all right-wing political tendencies were discredited as they were seen as responsible for the Bulgaria’s weak domestic and international situation. At the same time, after the end of the Second World War the influence of right-wing parties was greatly reduced, because either they had identified themselves with Germany or had no substantial participation in resistance movements. Last but not least, as Tomaszewski points out, post-war societies demanded reforms and social justice³⁶, a fact that turned them to the centre and the left. The political programme of the Democratic Party involved liberal demands, such as the right to private property and the restoration of the Tirnovo Constitution as well as pro-American slogans.

³⁰ Isusov (2000): 208 ff.

³¹ The restoration of the Tirnovo Constitution would guarantee the maintenance of the capitalist mode of production and it would constitute a great obstacle to the communist legislation.

³² See ‘The trial...’ (1947): 60 (examination of Major Hadziatanasov) and 121-122 (examination of Colonel Ivanov), and Ognyanov (1993): 108-109.

³³ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

³⁴ Kumanov (1991): 131-132 and Isusov (2000): 195, 246. See Appendix 3, Table 7.

³⁵ Bell (1986): 95 and Appendix 3, Table 6.

³⁶ Tomaszewski (1989): 39.

Zveno (Link) was a tiny organisation with a history of involvement in coups and strong relations with the Army, which were of crucial importance for the communists. Indeed, the success of the 9 September upheaval was, to some extent, due to ties of Zveno to men of the previous regime, such as the War Minister, Ivan Marinov, as well as General Stanchev, and a group of officers of the General Staff and the War Ministry³⁷. In contrast with Communist Parties elsewhere in Eastern Europe, such as the Hungarian and the Czechoslovakian, which agreed to nominate as Prime Minister a representative of parties enjoying widespread popularity³⁸, the Bulgarian communists accepted Georgiev³⁹ (leader of Zveno) as Prime Minister. Zveno also participated in the first cabinet council with three more Zveno members. After 9 September 1944, it transformed its name from “Zveno-19 May”, which recalled the date of the coup in 1934, to “National Union Zveno”. Its membership fluctuated between 30,000 and 40,000, while its electoral support was tiny⁴⁰. In the post-war years, Zveno attracted officers, intellectuals, landowners, merchants, industrialists, and white collar workers⁴¹.

The ideology of Zveno had a number of themes in common with the communists: populism, democracy, unity of all progressive forces, the idea of Balkan Federation, etatist centralism, planned economy, and industrialisation⁴². On the other hand, however, Zveno was for private property, harmony among classes, and a kind of capitalism friendly to society⁴³. It saw the new era as a bourgeois democratic revolution to be led by the proletariat, which would restore civil rights and establish a social liberal political system in Bulgaria⁴⁴. Zveno subscribed to aspects of the communist party ideology but clearly did not share any enthusiasm for the

³⁷ Afterwards, instead of being tried as collaborationist, Marinov was appointed Commander in chief of the Bulgarian army during the Fatherland War, Isusov (2000): 19-21. See, also, Tzvetkov (1993): 263-265.

³⁸ In Hungary from the Smallholders' Party and in Czechoslovakia from the National Socialist Party.

³⁹ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

⁴⁰ Isusov (1983): 246, and Appendix 3, Tables 6 and 7.

⁴¹ According to accounts given by Ostoich (1967): 35, the social composition of Zveno was as follow: landowners: 62.57%, white-collars: 10.39%, artisans: 7.16%, merchants and industrialists: 6.53%, and workers: 3.62%.

⁴² Isusov (2000): 69-72 and Minchev (1988): 187-188.

⁴³ Minchev (1988): 106.

⁴⁴ Minchev (1988): 90.

establishment of a 'soviet regime' in Bulgaria⁴⁵. Zveno's nationalist discourse mainly consisted of slogans for the freedom and independence of Bulgaria and a bright future for the Bulgarian people⁴⁶; and claimed to defend the interests of the entire Bulgarian nation⁴⁷.

The Radical Party re-emerged in September 1945 but immediately split. The pro-communist Radical Party (led by Kosturkov⁴⁸) joined the Fatherland Front, whereas the Radical Party (united) emerged after the right wing of the party (led by Genov⁴⁹) decided to establish an independent opposition party. Both had very small memberships⁵⁰, were of liberal political character and attracted mainly artisans and white collars⁵¹.

BANU claimed to be the heir of the very popular Stamboliiski-led BANU⁵², which had formed one of the most popular governments in the history of modern Bulgaria after the First World War. Before its split (summer 1945), its membership had been dramatically increasing and it was the only party able to compete with the big membership of the Communist Party⁵³. BANU had gained considerable influence over the peasant masses as a result of its strong agrarian orientation. All social strata of peasants entered it and BANU claimed to be the political representative of all peasants.

As BANU drew on Stamboliiski's policies, it found a lot in common with the communists: agrarian reform, expropriation of private buildings and town estates of capitalists in favour of public needs, nationalisation of natural sources and banks, the setting up of People's Courts for war criminals, educational reform, peaceful foreign

⁴⁵ Similarly to the National Socialist Party of Czechoslovakia, Zveno considered the political structure established after 9 September 1944 to be the end of possible revolutionary changes, while the communists viewed it as the beginning, Tomaszewski (1989): 66.

⁴⁶ Isusov (2000): 70, 79 and 118.

⁴⁷ Minchev (1988): 99.

⁴⁸ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

⁴⁹ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

⁵⁰ See Appendix 3, Tables 6 and 7.

⁵¹ Ostoich (1967): 35.

⁵² After 1923, as BANU of Stamboliiski had collapsed, a lot of agrarian groups emerged claiming to be heirs of it.

⁵³ From 92,875 members at the beginning of 1945, when the BCP approached 250,000, to over 300,000 in mid-1945, when the BCP had overgrown 400,000 members, and a massive support in villages, in Isusov (2000): 53-54 and Minchev (1988): 127. By this, we could suppose that BANU had the dynamics to cover its handicap with regard to the membership of the BCP.

policy, understanding between Balkan peoples, Slavophil tendencies, friendship with the Soviet Union and the western democracies⁵⁴. Its most promulgated slogan was 'peace, order, legality, and freedom'⁵⁵. Its core ideology, however, differed from communism; BANU professed an agrarian populism, advocating agrarian-cooperative syndicalism, possession of peasant private smallholdings, economic democratisation based on labour private property, and democratic rights according to the Timovo Constitution⁵⁶. However, it too deployed a national discourse claiming to be the 'national stronghold of the dignity of powerful and prosperous Bulgaria'⁵⁷. BANU supported slogans for national unity and national independence; it stressed its own sacrifices for Bulgaria's national liberation from the Germans⁵⁸.

BANU constituted the biggest political threat to the communists. It threatened to exert the same level of influence over the masses that it had exerted in 1919-1923, because the political situation was in some ways similar: a political crisis after a disastrous war, generating social demands for a social transformation. As Bulgaria was still an agrarian country⁵⁹, agrarian slogans were very popular amongst the Bulgarian peasants. Furthermore, the huge mass of peasant smallholders, the great majority of whom owned their land, was a serious obstacle to any policy of collectivisation. Lampe argues that peasant owners of smallholdings had no desire to give up their lands voluntarily⁶⁰. Indeed, only 13% of arable land had been transformed from private peasant smallholdings into collective farms by 1949. There was no extended land for redistribution⁶¹, as there was for example in Rumania and Hungary⁶². Taking into consideration the agrarian factor in the political life of Bulgaria, the communists adopted a range of essentially liberal measures, unique in the post-war Eastern Europe. Despite communist plans for immediate and swift collectivisation⁶³, it was

⁵⁴ Bozhkov (1980): 22-27, Minchev (1988): 88 and 186, and Isusov (2000): 55-60.

⁵⁵ Isusov (2000): 53.

⁵⁶ Ionescu (1969): 107-110, Isusov (2000): 57, and Minchev (1988): 109.

⁵⁷ According to the first circular letter of BANU, cited in Isusov (2000): 52.

⁵⁸ Isusov (2000): 57.

⁵⁹ Appendix 3, Tables 2 and 3.

⁶⁰ Lampe (1986): 124.

⁶¹ Only 3.6% of total arable land redistributed to private smallholders and collective farms, in Lampe (1986): 125.

⁶² After the Agrarian Reform in Rumania, 822,170 ploughmen received redistributed land, Tappe (1950): 8. In Hungary, land distributed among some 640,000 small or new farms, Wiskemann (1950): 103.

⁶³ Lampe (1986): 125 notes that the delivery of thousands of tractors from the USSR had been arranged before the end of the Second World War.

decided that not all of the holdings needed to be contributed to the collective farm and the collective would pay the former owner rent for the land that was used⁶⁴. These two provisions were designed to attract voluntary members in the collectives.

In summer 1945, however, BANU split; a pro-communist BANU remained in the Fatherland Front and an opposition BANU was founded by Nikola Petkov⁶⁵, which was to be the most influential party of the opposition. After the split, most of BANU's membership preferred to remain within the ranks of the part of the governmental coalition⁶⁶ but the popularity of the opposition BANU seems to have exceeded that of its pro-Fatherland Front counterpart. Despite the threefold greater membership of the latter⁶⁷, the opposition BANU achieved a greater percentage of the vote in the 1946 elections than its rival. In the elections of 27 October 1946, the opposition BANU led the opposition Bloc, which gained 28.0%⁶⁸, while the Fatherland Front BANU gained 13.2%⁶⁹. Furthermore, the circulation of the opposition BANU newspaper was ten times that of the pro-Fatherland Front's publication⁷⁰. The political influence of Petkov's BANU is evident by the fact that in its conference in October 1944, when BANU was united, the pro-communist left wing of the party had been insignificant⁷¹.

The opposition BANU posed serious threats to communist power for several reasons. First, although there were similar political goals (including the priority of good relations with the Soviet Union; democracy, freedom, and independence; People's Courts; nationalisation and tax reform⁷²), the opposition BANU was very critical of the authoritarian character of power exercised by the communists (especially the authoritarianism of the Ministry of the Interior and People's Militia), and the sovietisation of Bulgarian social life. It emphasised the reluctance of peasants to accord their lands to collectives⁷³. It opposed "military communism" applied to the

⁶⁴ Lampe (1986): 125.

⁶⁵ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

⁶⁶ Isusov (2000): 127.

⁶⁷ Appendix 3, Table 7. The BANU of Petkov reached its peak membership in December 1946 (64,558), in Isusov (2000): 284.

⁶⁸ It should not be considered a low percentage, provided that the elections were not free.

⁶⁹ Appendix 3, Table 6.

⁷⁰ Seton-Watson (1950): 214.

⁷¹ Isusov (2000): 55-60. Isusov (1975): 52 points out that G.M. Dimitrov and the right wing of BANU enjoyed a considerable influence in 1944.

⁷² Isusov (2000): 55-60.

⁷³ Lampe (1986): 125.

outright requisitions in 1945-1946, handled by the People's Militia⁷⁴. The opposition BANU was seen as not compromised by those seeking alternatives to fascism or communism. It also could satisfy people's demands for social change without frightening people with sovietisation.

The communists, also, faced related political threats from outside Bulgaria. In the USA, the Agrarian Committee (Zemedelski Komitet) had been founded in the summer of 1947⁷⁵. Its leaders included not only G. M. Dimitrov, but also leaders of the agrarian parties of Eastern Europe, and other political groups antagonistic to the communist parties. This agrarianism was a major threat to the political predominance of the communist parties insofar as it drew on an ideology which had been popular right across Eastern Europe in the inter-war as well as post-war period. The Czechoslovak Peasant Party, for example, had been in power for much of the interwar period. The Romanian Peasant Party governed Romania between 1928 and 1933⁷⁶. Similarly, the Smallholders' Party in Hungary had gained 57% in the first post-war elections, while in Romania, the strongest party of the opposition was the National Peasants' Party of Maniu and in Poland, the Polish Peasants' Party of Mikolajczyk⁷⁷. Agrarian slogans had generally gained electoral support in the still predominantly agrarian societies of Eastern Europe.

The Bulgarian Workers' Social-Democratic Party (BWSDP), a member of the Second International, was the descendant of the party that the communists had split from, when their party has first turned to Bolshevism. The BWSDP had 854 members (3.25%) in the Fatherland Front in December 1944⁷⁸. Its social composition was mainly made of white collar workers and employees (mainly teachers and civil servants), artisans, and petty bourgeois rural strata⁷⁹. The first post-war political declaration of the BWSDP focused on socialism, nationalisation, democratic rights, and advocated close relations, first with the Soviet Union, and then with the western countries. The BWSDP expected the government of the Fatherland Front to apply

⁷⁴ Lampe (1986): 126.

⁷⁵ Isusov (2000): 339, footnote 257.

⁷⁶ Dimitrov G.M. (1948): 427-441 and Ionescu (1969): 110.

⁷⁷ Tomaszewski (1989): 44 and 109.

⁷⁸ Appendix 3, Table 1.

⁷⁹ Ostoich (1967): 35, Isusov (1975): 51, and Bell (1986): 87.

socialism in a way that was consistent with the Bulgarian conditions, and not with the Soviet model⁸⁰.

The issue of whether the party would follow an independent policy (Pastuhov, Lulchev) or would cooperate with the communists (Neikov, Popov)⁸¹ led to a split in August 1945. The pro-communist BWSDP declared its loyalty to the Fatherland Front and to Marxism. The BWSDP-united, to be distinguished from its counterpart in the Fatherland Front, was led by Lulchev and advocated socialism along the lines of the Labour Party in the UK. As with BANU, the opposition party appears to have had a much smaller membership than that of the Fatherland Front⁸², but may well have been more popular. According to non-communist evidence, its newspaper had a wider circulation than that of its pro-Fatherland Front counterpart⁸³. Before the split the centre group had been predominant, and the pro-communist left wing was the minority⁸⁴.

The left wing opposition to the Fatherland Front government consisted of the “Proletarian Communist Union–Bulgaria, Trotskyists”⁸⁵, some other tiny trotskyist organisations of mainly local character⁸⁶, and the “Federation of Anarchist-Communists of Bulgaria”⁸⁷. Both trotskyists and anarchist-communists had supported the Fatherland Front government in its very first steps. Afterwards, they became fiercely critical of the Fatherland Front policies. The trotskyists criticised the BCP over the militarism of the People’s Army, the function and structure of People’s Militia, the process of nationalisation, and the function of the courts⁸⁸. The Anarchist-Communists opposed any kind of power (capital, state, and church); they were for the immediate socialisation of land, industries, and mines as well as for a federal organisation of society⁸⁹. The existing evidence on these political formations is

⁸⁰ Minchev (1988): 99-100.

⁸¹ For a short biography of all these political figures see Appendix 2.

⁸² In September 1946, the loyal to the Fatherland Front numbered 31,529 members, whereas the BRSDP (united) 2,214, in Isusov (2000): 246.

⁸³ Seton -Watson (1950): 214.

⁸⁴ Isusov (1975): 50-51.

⁸⁵ For details on the “Proletarian Communist Union-Bulgaria, Trotskyists”, see Appendix 1.

⁸⁶ Isusov (2000): 170-171.

⁸⁷ For details on the Federation of Anarchist-Communists of Bulgaria, see Appendix 1.

⁸⁸ BCP Records Fund 191, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 62: 5.

⁸⁹ BCP Records Fund 272, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 1 (1945).

however quite limited, although it appears that anarchist groups existed in a considerable number of areas⁹⁰.

Apart from the competitive conditions that such opposition parties and groups created, international agreements also comprised a serious strategic problem for the communist power. Even though some clauses of these agreements could support the Party's attempts to eliminate the opposition⁹¹, other clauses limited its space for political manoeuvre. For instance, the Yalta Declaration (04-11 February 1945) and the Moscow resolution (16-25 December 1945)⁹² reinforced the political role of the opposition as well as centrifugal tendencies within the coalition of the Fatherland Front. American intervention through the Allied Control Commission postponed the elections in April and August 1945. The Moscow resolution also insisted that the Bulgarian government had to respect the following clauses: a neutral person to be appointed Minister of Interior; to accord democratic rights, such as freedom of press; parties which had abstained from the last elections to participate in the government after a cabinet shuffle; and the holding of free elections⁹³. These clauses encouraged the struggle of the opposition against the government and its pursuit of international support⁹⁴.

The international situation also, to some extent, empowered the position of the opposition. For instance, the USA, since the London Conference (11 September – 02 October 1945), had declared that only if Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary set up democratic governments, would the USA participate in negotiations on a Peace Treaty with them. Thus, there was a clear threat to the legitimacy of the Fatherland Front government in terms of its international recognition. This situation resulted in some

⁹⁰ Isusov (2000): 140-141.

⁹¹ The Moscow Armistice (October 1944) provided the Bulgarian government with the right to dismantle any fascist organisation as well as any organisation threatening the democratic rights of the Bulgarians and the political legality of the country.

⁹² It had been signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the USA, and the UK. It was the consequence of the Potsdam Conference (July-August 1945), which charged the council of the Foreign Ministers to examine the process of democratisation in some countries as presupposition for diplomatic recognition, see the relevant excerpt in Auty (1950): 33.

⁹³ Isusov (2000): 193-197.

⁹⁴ Isusov (2000): 179 mentions that the opposition sent a report to the Allied Control Commission asking for its intervention to solve the political crisis in Bulgaria. Lampe (1986): 122, also, mentions appeals of opposition parties to the American members of the Allied Control Commission and to the US political representative in Sofia. The most significant of them was that of Petkov, who asked the elections of August 1945 to be held under international control. Tomaszewski (1989): 91-92 describes protests of Romanian opposition towards the USA.

concessions to the opposition: opposition parties were recognised, publication of opposition newspapers was relatively free, and new elections were to be held in all of the aforementioned countries. More especially, in Romania, the Groza government decided on the inclusion of two representatives of opposition parties, the National Peasants and the Liberals⁹⁵. As Swain points out, Stalin prepared to ask the Bulgarian communists to include token opposition politicians in their government⁹⁶, but finally negotiations with opposition were inconclusive, because the opposition demanded posts that the communists would never concede.

3.3 Communist tactics

The wide spectrum and the potential popularity of the opposition to the Fatherland Front government as well as the uncertainty of international recognition of it show the difficult situation the BCP had to navigate. Under these circumstances, the communists were desperate to secure the unity of the Fatherland Front. After the secession of the right wings of the non-communist parties⁹⁷, the Fatherland Front was in danger of being presented as a barely disguised communist organisation. The BCP had to keep the Fatherland Front united for its own political purposes: to preserve its hegemonic role in Bulgarian political life. Under the umbrella of the Fatherland Front, the BCP presented itself as a party defending not merely the interests of one class but the interests of the entire nation.

To secure the Fatherland Front's unity, the BCP stressed national issues at the expense of others, as a whole series of difficulties threatened communist power. The post-war government had to reckon with economic difficulties, such as unemployment⁹⁸, lack of raw materials, industrial downfall, price increases, widespread black market, low standards of harvests because of lengthy droughts

⁹⁵ Vago (1979): 122.

⁹⁶ Swain (1998): 26.

⁹⁷ The case was similar in other Eastern European countries. In Rumania, for instance, the Social Democratic Party, the Liberal Party and the National Peasant Party split off; in Poland, it was the Peasants' Party that split off and constituted the main force opposite to the communists, Tomaszewski (1989): 90 and 109 respectively.

⁹⁸ Lampe (1986): 133 gives evidence of 38,000 of industrial unemployed workers or over 20% of the industrial workforce. As the BCP had promised the elimination of unemployment, the transition to the sovietisation of economy seemed all the more urgent.

(1945-1946), misery and serious food shortages caused the starvation of a considerable percentage of the population, especially in urban centres⁹⁹.

The communists subtly exploited traditional features of the political life of Bulgaria: conformism¹⁰⁰ and the development of clientelist networks, as the Bulgarian government controlled nomination of employees in all spheres of the public¹⁰¹ (security apparatuses, schools, army etc.). Significantly, 3,247 out of 4,385 (74%) positions of local offices were distributed to communists by the end of 1944, when the Fatherland Front was still united¹⁰². About 95% of the heads of primary schools and 80% of high schools were members of the BCP¹⁰³. Distribution of attractive public positions resulted in excessive increase of the membership of the BCP, which now attracted opportunists, careerists, and even political opponents¹⁰⁴.

To secure its grip on power, the BCP adopted salami tactics in order to weaken the opposition and make its elimination easier. Salami tactics became known by the policy of the Hungarian Communist Party, which used them to slice off [bit by bit] the opposition forces¹⁰⁵. Similar tactics were also deployed by the Polish and Romanian communists, who secured the support of the left-wing of parties that were to split and form opposition parties bearing the same name as their pro-communist counterpart¹⁰⁶. In that way, the communists succeeded in splitting political rivals dividing them into a stooge pro-communist party and an opposition one vulnerable to communist attacks.

A goal of the BCP in the period between 1945 and 1948 was to co-opt members of the opposition parties. In all Fatherland Front parties, three wings were formed: a right, a centre, and a left. Within Zveno, the right group (led by Yurukov) advocated

⁹⁹ Genchev (1962):187- 214 and Lampe (1986): 126. Significantly, as Lampe points out, 'the net value of crop and animal production for 1945-1946 fell to 60% of the 1939 level'.

¹⁰⁰ Every party involved in governing the country enhanced its membership during its running of the country; see Kumanov (1991) *passim*.

¹⁰¹ The same was the case in Czechoslovakia, where the Party fast became the source of employment for thousand of people too. The civil service was inflated in size and stuffed with communists, in Grogin (2000): 133.

¹⁰² Ostoich (1967): 76-77 and Appendix 3, Table 8.

¹⁰³ Ognyanov (1993): 63.

¹⁰⁴ Avramov (1965): 17-18 gives examples of fascists (Tsankovists) and anarchists.

¹⁰⁵ Molnar (1990): 110 and Gati (1994): 179-180. The slices of the Hungarian salami tactics were the leftovers of the regime of Horthy (in 1945), the right-wings of the Smallholders' Party and the Social Democratic Party (in 1946), and the centre of the Smallholder Party with its leadership, Kovacs and Nagy (in 1947).

¹⁰⁶ Weydenthal (1986): 49-52 and 56, and Swain (1998): 33.

independent political activities; the centre (led by Georgiev), opted for a close co-operation with the Fatherland Front; the left group (led by Dobroslavski and Trifonov), took a pro-communist side¹⁰⁷. Within BANU before its split, a right wing developed anti-communist and anti-Soviet theses (G. M. Dimitrov); a centre opposed the leading role of the communists (Petkov); a left wing (Traikov, Obbov, Tonchev)¹⁰⁸ advocated a close co-operation with the communists¹⁰⁹. Similar tendencies emerged also within the BWSDP.

The communists co-operated with the left-wing faction emerging in each party of the Fatherland Front coalition. Left-wing leaders of parties allied to the communists engaged in a fierce struggle for predominance within their own parties¹¹⁰. As the crisis in the ranks of Zveno¹¹¹ did not cause a split, representatives of the right group were sent as ministers plenipotentiary to various western countries¹¹². The left wing of BANU seized the leadership of the party after exerting pressure on the Supreme Union Council to remove G.M. Dimitrov¹¹³ (January 1945) and arbitrarily summoned a National Conference in May 1945, which mainly elected left functionaries under Obbov in the new Managing Council of the Union, without the participation of the main right-wing and centre political figures¹¹⁴. The right wing and the centre then established the opposition BANU. The left-wing of the BWSDP attempted to form a new Secretariat (October 1944), and then (January 1945) compelled the strong group of the centre to give ground regarding changes in the composition of the Central Committee¹¹⁵.

The communists made effective use of nationalism in applying a so-called salami tactics, that is, presenting their favoured left-wing factions of each allied party as the original leadership, claiming that pro-communist agrarians and social-democrats were

¹⁰⁷ Kumanov (1991): 129 and Isusov (2000): 72.

¹⁰⁸ For all the aforementioned political figures there are short biographies in Appendix 2.

¹⁰⁹ Isusov (2000): 56.

¹¹⁰ Isusov (1975): 50-51.

¹¹¹ Isusov (2000): 72-82 and 279-280.

¹¹² Isusov (2000): 280. Velchev was sent to Switzerland, Popzlatev to Stockholm, Yurukov to Brussels, and Dolapchiev to London. For short biographies on them see Appendix 2.

¹¹³ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

¹¹⁴ The main decisions of the Conference were tied unity with the BCP and exclusion from the government and the Fatherland Front of all Agrarian politicians who were against the communists. Isusov (2000): 65-68 and Isusov (1975): 52-53. See also Kumanov (1991): 127.

¹¹⁵ Isusov (2000): 41-44.

genuine patriots, since they had participated in the resistance movement¹¹⁶, remained in the ranks of the pro-communist parties and supported the Fatherland Front coalition. Anti-communist agrarians and social-democrats were said to have engaged in a series of anti-national activities: instead of joining the resistance movement, they had co-operated with the legal anti-German opposition of the Second World War and participated in the last war government of Muraviev¹¹⁷ in order to save the sinking ship of the anti-Bulgarian monarchy and bourgeoisie¹¹⁸. Even worst, they had split the Fatherland Front. As both the resistance movement and the Fatherland Front were presented the only national road, had, it was argued, opposition forces consciously put themselves out of the nation. Significantly, not only the BCP but also its political allies, that is, left-wing groups of Fatherland Front parties, which were not unwilling to acquiesce in the removal of a competing faction within their parties from political life, also used a national discourse to promote their struggle for predominance against right-wing leaders. Nedelchev (a pro-communist Agrarian) accused G. M. Dimitrov of being disastrous for Bulgaria. The suspension of Lulchev from the position of General Secretary of the BWSDP was considered to have been done for Bulgaria's benefit¹¹⁹.

After these salami tactics were completed, the Fatherland Front was transformed into a 'united people's political organisation' and an 'all-national movement'¹²⁰ in the All-National Second Fatherland Front Congress, convened in February 1948. Thereby, the Fatherland Front seemingly accomplished the ideal of the unity of the whole nation into a single political bloc. Zveno and the Social-Democratic Party that operated within its framework were abolished; their membership was absorbed by the

¹¹⁶ It seems that only a section of the Social Democrats under Cheshmedzhiev (for a short biography see Appendix 2) and Neikov participated in the meetings with the BCP for the entrance of the Social-Democratic Party in the Fatherland Front. Kuzmanov (1998): 225-226, 234, Kumanov (1991): 119-120, and Brown (1970): 7.

¹¹⁷ The case of P. Stainov discloses the eclectic manner that the communists were dealing with opposition high rank cadres. Even though he was a member of the Muraviev government, instead of being tried by a People's Court he became minister of foreign affairs in the first Fatherland Front government, in Auty (1950): 29. For a short biography of Muraviev and Stainov see Appendix 2.

¹¹⁸ Petkov was also blamed for signing the declaration of Mushanov, in September 1943, which represented the legal opposition to the then Bulgarian government, in Isusov (2000): 16.

¹¹⁹ Minchev (1988): 136.

¹²⁰ Second Fatherland Front Congress (1948): 68, 72, 74 and 95. The transformation of the Fatherland Front into a 'united political organisation of all anti-imperialist forces' had already been declared since 26 October 1947. For an analysis of the Second Fatherland Front Congress and for the 'moral-political unity' of the Bulgarian people see Manafov (1958): 6-14.

Fatherland Front¹²¹. The Fatherland Front henceforth consisted of the BCP and BANU only, symbolising the alliance of proletariat and peasants. Through the unity of all the Fatherland Front political formations, the unity of the proletariat and the peasantry (the only classes officially recognised), the unity of the people and the army¹²², that is, an all-national unity, the BCP, which dominated the Fatherland Front, emerged as the vanguard of the Bulgarian nation.


The tactics that Bulgarian communists deployed certainly helped them in holding power. However, the success of communists in gaining absolute control of power cannot be explained as the consequence of effective tactical political manoeuvres; we need also to analyse the discourse articulated in the process by the communists. Nationalism played a key role in this discourse without which these tactics could not have worked so effectively. The application of salami tactics involved a form of political polarisation in which a Manichean schema operated attributing negative features to the “other” and presented it as a threat to the whole society. As we shall see, a totalitarian discourse identified the Fatherland Front with the Bulgarian nation; therefore, every group, which split the Fatherland Front and became independent, was not only outside the nation but also harmful and dangerous to it. By opposing the Fatherland Front, it essentially opposed the nation. The schema “if you are not within the Fatherland Front, you are against Bulgaria” aimed to isolate and marginalise the “other”; to incriminate and finally destroy it. Such polarisation was designed to persuade communists’ allies that it was vital to maintain the Fatherland Front as a united organisation able to cope with such an “evil” menace. As a result, communist parties gradually emerged as the one fixed point capable of acting, as Gomulka put it, as ‘the hegemon of the nation’¹²³. They claimed to be the only political force able to achieve the national goals and represent the national interests.

3.4 Communist nationalism as a totalitarian discourse

¹²¹ Similar mergers took place in other Eastern European countries. In Romania, communists and social-democrats merged in the United Workers’ Party (end of 1947), Tomaszewski (1989): 94; in Czechoslovakia, communists and social-democrats were united in 1948, Tomaszewski (1989): 128; in Hungary, the Hungarian People’s Independence Front made up of all Hungary’s political parties, the trade unions, the youth movement, the women’s movement and other mass organisations (in February of 1949), Swain and Swain (1998): 53.

¹²² Rabotnitsesko Delo #230, 18.06.1945.

¹²³ Cited in Davies (1977): 47.



The BCP articulated a particular discourse involving extensive nationalism to legitimate the occupation of key institutions (army, police, and justice), to justify its policies in the economic and political domain, and to eliminate the opposition. It was a syncretic discourse recasting earlier discursive elements in a new way. On the one hand, it borrowed discursive

elements of a bourgeois nationalist discourse coming from the French Revolution; and, on the other hand, it used a communist discourse coming from the October Revolution (Leninism). From the former, Bulgarian communists recast the identification of people, nation, and state, whilst reworking from the latter the identification of people, state, and the Party. The syncretism of these discursive elements resulted in a new totalitarian discourse in which nationalism was a major component. As this discourse operated in a considerable number of policy domains, it deserves close examination.

The Bulgarian communists turned to bourgeois nationalist discourse in order to promote a discourse unambiguously identifying the state, the people, and the nation. The compatibility of popular sovereignty with the sentiment of nationality originates in the French Revolution. During the French Revolution, the people were mobilized calling upon the nation as a whole and identified directly and unambiguously with the nation. Sieyès argued that 'all public powers... come from the People, that is, to say, the Nation. These two terms ought to be synonymous'¹²⁴. Privileged orders, except the "patriot writers" of the "ancient regime"¹²⁵, were located outside the nation, much as the communists excluded the Bulgarian "ancient regime" (the bourgeoisie, the alien dynasty and their collaborators) from the nation apart the so-called patriotic

¹²⁴ Sieyès, *Rights of Man and Citizen*, cited in Forsyth (1987): 75.

¹²⁵ Sieyès, *What is the Third Estate?* (2003): 119-120.

merchants and industrialists, who, even belonging to the “ancient regime”, could remain inside the nation.

It is significant in this context that Sieyès specifically rather any classics of Marxism was cited by Kolarov in order to demonstrate the pure patriotic make-up of the Fatherland Front. He presented the Fatherland Front as including the entire Bulgarian nation excluding fascists, reactionaries and their mouthpieces¹²⁶. Chervenkov defined the Fatherland Front as a unity of ‘all robust Bulgarian, national and democratic forces’¹²⁷. The Communist Party argued that the Fatherland Front represented the embodiment of national unity, since it was a durable fighting union of all the vigorous, democratic and patriotic forces of the Bulgarian nation¹²⁸. Lastly, Dimitrov underlined that ‘there cannot be a real patriot who is not in the ranks of the Fatherland Front’¹²⁹, equating the Fatherland Front with the nation.

Alongside this paradigm, the Bulgarian communists borrowed the identification of people, state, and the Party from the Leninist discourse. Lenin had identified the state with the people, since a “proletarian state or semi-state”, by taking possession of the means of production, had become the real representative of the whole of society, the workers and the peasants¹³⁰. And since ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat is the organisation of the vanguard of the oppressed for the purpose of suppressing the oppressors’, he identified the state (proletarian or semi-state) with the Party (the political vanguard), and, of course, he rendered the Party the real representative of the people (the oppressed)¹³¹.

The discourse the Bulgarian communists had articulated brought together key discursive elements of both Sieyès and Lenin. To the Leninist identification of people,

¹²⁶ Kolarov (1945): 4.

¹²⁷ Chervenkov, *The Fatherland Front Government (11.09.1944)*, in ‘Radio Station Hristo Botev...’ (1952, vol. 7): 272.

¹²⁸ Manifestos and resolutions (1945): 4-6 passim and *The Fatherland War...* (1978, vol. 3): 46, 77 and 161. See also Rabotnitsesko Delo #236, 25.06.1945: ‘The Fatherland Front disposes in effect democratic and patriotic forces for our nation, rallied round the BWPC, BANU, Zveno and the BWSDP’. See, also, Chervenkov, *The Fatherland Front government (11 September 1944)*, in ‘Radio Station Hristo Botev...’ (1952): 272-274, and Bulgarian State Records Fund 28, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 4: 28 (a letter of Dimitrov to the National Congress of the Fatherland Front Committees).

¹²⁹ Dimitrov, *The Fatherland Front is a lasting militant alliance of all democratic forces (11 March 1945)*, (1972, vol. 2): 245.

¹³⁰ Lenin, *The State and the Revolution (August 1917)*, (1976): 19-21 and 43.

¹³¹ Lenin, *The State and the Revolution (August 1917)*, (1976): 84.

state, and party the Bulgarian communists would add the nation, from the Sieyes' theoretical framework. Lenin argued that it is the proletariat and its dictatorship which imposed restrictions on the former oppressing class¹³², whereas the Bulgarian communists, going beyond the Leninist tradition, had implied that it is the narod (people-nation) which imposed a series of restrictions on the oppressors and the parasite capitalists. Whereas, then, the proletariat independently exists in Lenin's view, proletariat, people, and nation are completely merged in the discourse of the BCP. As a result, within this theoretical framework, a task of the proletariat, that is, the oppression of the oppressors was to be realised by the power of the state of the nation.

Identifying the nation, the people, the state, and the Party in this way, the Bulgarian communists effectively began to articulate what, following Lefort, we might call a totalitarian discourse. Lefort defines totalitarianism not as a political regime but as 'a *form* of society, in which all activities are immediately linked to one another, deliberately presented as modalities of a single world... Totalitarianism claims to negate the separation of the various domains of social life'¹³³. In totalitarianism, the Party is 'the milieu in which the state changes itself into society and society into state'¹³⁴; thus, the distinction between the state and society is denied¹³⁵. The Party also is the vanguard of the proletariat, which in a totalitarian logic 'is no longer a class within a stratified society, but it has become the people in its essence and notably includes the bureaucracy' (People-as-One)¹³⁶.

Lefort, thus, offers a useful conceptual tool for explaining and comprehending the complete merging of Party with the people and all together with the state. As Bulgarian communists added the nation to this chain of identifications, their discourse became all-embracing. In essence, nationalism became a part of the BCP's totalitarianism. The collectivistic conceptualisation of the people and the nation composes what Lefort calls the totalitarian image of the Body¹³⁷. The political frontiers of the Fatherland Front, as the communists themselves had defined, were

¹³² Lenin, *The State and the Revolution (August 1917)*, (1976): 84.

¹³³ Lefort (1986): 79. Emphasis in the original.

¹³⁴ Lefort (1986): 80.

¹³⁵ Lefort (1986): 286 ff.

¹³⁶ Lefort (1986): 287.

¹³⁷ Lefort (1986): 292-306.

equated to national frontiers. Who was outside the Fatherland Front was outside Bulgaria as well. In that sense, national identity was individuated within the political framework of a particular political group.

In this model, there can be no other division than that between the people and its enemies, the 'Other'. Similarly, according to the all-embracing discourse of Bulgarian communists, nothing remained outside the Party as well as the nation but their common enemies. The 'Other'/enemy is the representative of the past (fascism, dynasty, bourgeoisie, already excluded in a Sieyes' logic) and the emissary of the foreigner, the imperialist world (the USA first and foremost now excluded in a Leninist logic). Thus, since people is discursively articulated as identical to nation, enemies of the people lie outside the nation. And, since the people have been identified with the state and the Party, opposition to the Party was excluded from the nation, reduced to national enemies and therefore delegitimised and incriminated.

Within this theoretical framework, to challenge the Party's policies became synonymous with challenging the nation. The denial of or attack against governmental measures, namely communist politics (agrarian reform, emulation and shock-work, brigade movement, monetary reform, and the Two Year Economic Plan) was identified with national treason¹³⁸. As the Party was identified with the nation, it became the only genuine representative of national interests. Consequently, its measures were by definition the only ones favourable to the nation. Any criticism to Party measures was against the nation.

As we shall see, this totalitarian discourse operated in a set of key policy domains: security apparatuses, the justice, the economy, the constitution and governance. However, before it would articulate this discourse effectively, the BCP had to present itself as the national Party and the Fatherland Front, which it led, as the only valid representation of the nation.

3.5 Self-presentation of the Communist Party via the Fatherland Front as national party

¹³⁸ The trial of Nikola Petkov (1947): 33-35 (indictment) and 367-375 (Prosecutor Petrinsky's speech).

As was the rule during the Second World War, communist-led governmental coalitions bore names with national connotations. In Yugoslavia, the National Anti-Fascist Committee was renamed into National Liberation Committee¹³⁹. In Romania, the National Democratic Block included the communists¹⁴⁰. In Poland, the Provisional Government of National Unity was established in June of 1945¹⁴¹. In Hungary, the Hungarian National Liberation Front formed a provisional government in December of 1944¹⁴².

All over Eastern Europe, communists claimed that a national revolution occurred. As Grogin points out¹⁴³, Gottwald explained to his colleagues that ‘in spite of the favourable situation, the next goal is not Soviets and socialism, but rather carrying out a really thorough democratic national revolution’. The Communist Party was very cleverly linking itself to the Czech democratic tradition –Gottwald even claimed to be a disciple of Thomas Masaryk- as it was trying to link communism with Czech nationalism by capitalising on the intense anti-German feelings of the Czech people. Gati also mentions¹⁴⁴ a set of secret meetings between Stalin and the cream of Hungarian communist émigrés in September and October of 1944. They decided that the party was to display both its red flag and the Hungarian national colours of red, white, and green. Vas, the first Muscovite to follow the Red Army to Hungary, had the task of making the Communist Party palatable to, and seem representative of, the Hungarian people. It could be argued that the last reflects a general tendency of communist parties to represent themselves as the hegemon of the nation.

One way of doing this was to give the Party a particular history, one full of struggles for the nation, struggles which had culminated in the foundation of the Fatherland Front coalition in the Second World War on its initiative. Specifically, the BCP claimed that it expressed the only, real “Bulgarian patriotism”, since it took the initiative in establishing the Fatherland Front and in carrying out the resistance

¹³⁹ Swain and Swain (1998): 23.

¹⁴⁰ Tomaszewski (1989): 41.

¹⁴¹ Tomaszewski (1989): 62.

¹⁴² Tomaszewski (1989): 52.

¹⁴³ Grogin (2000): 132.

¹⁴⁴ Gati (1994): 182-185.

movement against fascism¹⁴⁵. As Dimitrov stressed, the BCP and its youth had incurred the heaviest casualties in the struggle for national liberation¹⁴⁶. An image was presented that the bourgeoisie collaborated with German occupiers, whereas the communists fought them. The BCP by setting up the Fatherland Front was depicted as the only force that in essence resisted the German occupation of Bulgaria.

The Fatherland Front claimed that it did not just constitute a simple, temporary parliamentary alliance. Rather it declared that it constituted a continuous, all-national union required both to 'terminate the struggle against fascism and to build a new democratic and regenerated Bulgaria'¹⁴⁷. According to the BCP, all those genuinely loyal to the narod (nation-people) should now rally round the Fatherland Front¹⁴⁸. Dimitrov argued that the coalition parties of the Fatherland Front represented the 'common interests of entire Bulgarian people, the Bulgarian nation, and the fatherland'¹⁴⁹. Thus, the Fatherland Front claimed that it was inspired only by selfless, national motives.



The initials of the Fatherland Front printed on the Bulgarian flag.
Fly-sheet on 1st May, Bulgarian State Records, Fund 28, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 414: 4.

The Fatherland Front attempted to present itself as the authentic representative of the Bulgarian nation. It claimed that it constituted the only social and political group that could apply a truly national policy¹⁵⁰. Not only had the Fatherland Front saved Bulgaria from an awesome disaster, but also it faced the enemies of Bulgaria, who were at the same time enemies of the Fatherland Front¹⁵¹. It

¹⁴⁵ Many communist parties exploited their association with the Resistance in their post-war propaganda; for the French Communist Party, see Mortimer (1977): 155.

¹⁴⁶ Dimitrov, *All for the Front* (28.11.1944), (1972, vol. 2): 237.

¹⁴⁷ *Rabotnitsesko Delo* #79, 18.12.1944 (public speech of Kostov), *Rabotnitsesko Delo* #98, 11.01.1945, and Chervenkov (1945, 'The Fatherland Front...'): 5.

¹⁴⁸ Lazarov (1945): 2, 6.

¹⁴⁹ Dimitrov (1945): 9.

¹⁵⁰ Kolarov (1945): 9.

¹⁵¹ The following expression from the Manifesto to the Bulgarian narod (nation-people) from the First Congress of the Fatherland Front is very revealing: 'all the disclosed and concealing enemies of the Fatherland Front, of Bulgaria' in *Manifestos and resolutions* (1945): 4. See, also, *Rabotnitsesko Delo* #236, 25.06.1945: 'The way on which the Fatherland Front and its government proceeds on, is produced by the vital and lofty interests of the Bulgarian nation'.

argued that it had been supported over the 9 September events by the whole Bulgarian nation¹⁵². By that insurrection, it had saved the fatherland from a tremendous disaster and had established a truly narodno (national-people's) government¹⁵³. It had then resolved the international difficulties of Bulgaria by signing the Moscow armistice with the Allies and contributing to the withdrawal of Germans from the Balkans. In the process, it shifted Bulgaria's wartime alliance from the Axis to the Allies, so acting in the fundamental interests of the Bulgarian nation¹⁵⁴. The Fatherland Front thus claimed to be the 'first people's and genuinely national government of Bulgaria'¹⁵⁵.

9 September was presented as revolution of all democratic and patriotic forces of the entire nation¹⁵⁶, and not as a merely class revolution. 9 September represented the outcome of a successful national liberation movement¹⁵⁷, in which the communists played the major role. On that date the Bulgarian narod was liberated from the Germans and their fascist agents in Bulgaria¹⁵⁸. 9 September put an end to the policy that questioned the existence of Bulgaria as a free and independent country¹⁵⁹. It constituted a temporal milestone clearly separating the past from the present. After this date, a dawn of national life was supposed to have taken place, and the communists were identified with this dawn.

The communists declared the 'Fatherland War'¹⁶⁰ against Germany and fascism, the greatest national enemies of the Bulgarian nation. The Fatherland Front called on the

¹⁵² Bulgarian intellectuals in a pamphlet of 1945 argued that Fatherland Front's true national policy set the stage for a massive support, *The word of...* (1945): 6.

¹⁵³ Manifestos and resolutions (1945): 7, *Rabotnitsesko Delo* #15, 04.10.1944, and Chervenkov (1945, *For a total...*): 7-12.

¹⁵⁴ Bulgarian State Records Fund 28, Inventory 1, Archival Unity 4 (1945): 22.

¹⁵⁵ *Rabotnitsesko Delo* #230, 18.06.1945.

¹⁵⁶ Dimitrov (1949): 41.

¹⁵⁷ Kostov used this definition as well despite the fact that he was speaking to Party's members, in *Rabotnicesko Delo* #9, 27.09.1944. Gottwald, speaking to Czechoslovak Communist Party's members, pointed out that the most important goal of that time was to "preserve the accomplishments of the national revolution", Suda (1980): 194.

¹⁵⁸ In an Appeal to the Bulgarian narod (nation-people) of the National Committee of the Fatherland Front regarding the referendum of 1946 about the system of government in Bulgaria, it is argued that the monarchy and its governments led three disastrous wars. The outcomes of their policy were onerous reparations and disastrous obligations for the Bulgarian economy. *Recommendations, appeals...* (1947): 293-294. See, also, Grozev (1945): 5-9

¹⁵⁹ *Rabotnitsesko Delo* #31, 23.10.1944.

¹⁶⁰ The Fatherland War is, chronologically, divided into two phases. During the first phase, the Bulgarian army contributed to the withdrawal of Germans from Macedonia and Serbia; during the second one, the Bulgarian army took part in the Third Ukrainian Front.

Bulgarian people, who were supposedly imbued with great patriotism, to fight against Germany in order to defend their dear fatherland and expel the Hitlerist bandits¹⁶¹. The Fatherland War had saved Bulgaria from an outright capitulation, a long-term occupation, disarmament of the army and the loss of her sovereignty and independence¹⁶². Due to the initiatives of communists in conducting the Fatherland War, a new era of building a democratic and powerful Bulgaria had arrived¹⁶³. This enabled Bulgaria to emerge from its international isolation. Bulgaria was placed among the freedom-loving nations and rinsed of the stigma of 30 years pro-fascist policy¹⁶⁴. Because of the countless sacrifices of the Bulgarian people, Bulgaria could now claim to be practically a cobelligerent with the Allies in the struggle against fascism and Hitler's Germany¹⁶⁵. As a result, Bulgaria would not be judged as a war criminal country¹⁶⁶. She would forge relations with fraternal Slav nations and, above all, the Soviet Union. Furthermore, she would back the 'freedom-loving' nations, including the Great Britain and the United States. As a result, the conditions for a just solution of the national question of Bulgaria had emerged.

The Fatherland Front, also, insisted that it effectively defended the national interests of Bulgaria regarding the Peace Conference. Greek demands on Bulgarian territory were warded off and the amount of reparations was reduced. Bulgarian communists could rejoice over a 'great victory of Bulgaria', achieved as a result of 'the efficient national policy of the Fatherland Front'¹⁶⁷. The Fatherland Front could claim that it had secured Bulgaria's territorial integrity and national independence. Bulgaria was the Third Reich's only former ally to end the Second World War with a territorial gain, after Southern Dobroudzha's incorporation.

¹⁶¹ The Fatherland War... (1978, vol. 1): 203-204.

¹⁶² See, for instance, Chervenkov's statement: 'There is Fatherland Front, there is independent Bulgaria. There is not Fatherland Front, there is not independent Bulgaria', in Chervenkov (1945, 'The Fatherland Front...'): 22.

¹⁶³ BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 7, Archival Unit 3 (September 1944): 1 and BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 2: 1. See also The Fatherland War... (1978, vol. 1): 99 and The Fatherland War... (1978, vol. 2): 339-340.

¹⁶⁴ Dramaliev (1947b): 40. 'The struggle of the Bulgarian people against fascism' (1946) was written in order to rehabilitate the honour of the Bulgarian people in a global scale after the shameful conduct of the pro-German dynasty and the governments of the Second World War.

¹⁶⁵ 'The struggle of the Bulgarian people...' (1946): 98.

¹⁶⁶ BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 7, Archival Unit 2: 1-2.

¹⁶⁷ Rabortnicheskio Delo #229, 06.10.1946, and Dmitrov, *All for the Front* (28.11.1944), (1972, vol. 2): 239, and *The Fatherland Front, its Development and its Impending Tasks* (02.11.1948), (1972, vol. 3): 159-164.

The Peace Conference then provided the Party with the opportunity to speak in the name of the entire Bulgarian nation¹⁶⁸, as the most consistent defender of the Bulgarian national cause¹⁶⁹ ensuring a fair and lasting peace for Bulgaria¹⁷⁰ as well as achieving a “situation of no danger” (bezopasnost). Effective diplomacy and the maintenance of national unity at home were projected as the reasons for the recognition of the Bulgarian government by western democracies, normalising the international affairs of Bulgaria¹⁷¹.

Overall then, the establishment of the Fatherland Front, the conduct of the Fatherland War, and the defence of the national interests were presented essentially as the political achievements of the BCP. Within the Fatherland Front coalition, the BCP engaged in a hegemonic articulation, since it allied with non communist forces. The Communist Party was the hegemonic pole of the Fatherland Front, whereas its allies followed its policies and its patriotic deeds. Following a Gramscian hegemonic strategy, the Bulgarian communists saw hegemony as a relation of consent by means of political and ideological leadership. Their hegemonic project required a “national-popular collective will”, which would keep diverse social (workers, peasants, and intellectuals) and political (BANU, BWSDP, Radical Party and Zveno) forces united into a broad coalition and, as a result, the communists would become the national representative of a broad block of social forces¹⁷². For this reason, they had to develop a national approach. They constructed a nationalist discourse by merging nation, people, state, and the Party.

3.6 Nation, people, state, and party

There is a considerable degree of fluidity with regard to the use of the terms “nation”, “people”, “state” and “Party” in the totalitarian discourse of the BCP. They are relatively interchangeable, to a greater or lesser extent, in specific spheres of the Bulgarian political life, which concern means of coercion (army, police, and justice),

¹⁶⁸ Rabotnichesko Delo #285, 07.12.1946.

¹⁶⁹ Dimitrov (1946): 8. See, also, a slogan on the elections: ‘Only the Fatherland Front will secure the conclusion of a lasting and just peace for our [Bulgarian] country’, in Bulgarian State Records Fund 28, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 199 (1945): 191.

¹⁷⁰ BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 2 (December 1944): 3.

¹⁷¹ Rabotnitsesko Delo #37, 15.02.1947.

¹⁷² Simon (1991): 22-25.

economic policies central for the sovietisation and the survival of the regime, governmental institutions, and, finally, the elimination of opposition.

To begin with, application of merging nation, people, state, and party was realised in the sphere of the security apparatus, the army and the police. To legitimate and consolidate its power, the BCP needed to occupy the key security apparatuses of both army and militia. Whilst the People's Army safeguarded the Bulgarian borderline, the People's Militia had the task of securing the nation at home. As Schwarzmantel¹⁷³ implies, calling for a militia or a people's army to replace the standing army corresponds to call for 'arming the nation', for the nation in arms. This army, far from being mercenary or totally dependent to professional officers, is supposed to genuinely fight for national ideals. In this sense, the army is identified with the nation.

Both People's Army and People's Militia were said to belong to nation. These security apparatuses and the Bulgarian people were supposed to be in complete patriotic unity¹⁷⁴. Their task was to show perfect discipline and lofty patriotism in order to support the freedom, the independence and the prosperity of Bulgaria, and to defend the democratic rights, the freedoms and the interests of the people¹⁷⁵.

The "new army" had to demonstrate its military effectiveness; it had to be able to deal with the new international situation of Bulgaria. Bulgaria had to join the Allies in their struggle to defeat the Axis; accordingly, the Bulgarian army was fighting in the first line of the war front. For this reason, soldiers had to show a lofty patriotism and be ready to sacrifice their lives for Bulgaria. Furthermore, mobilisation of partisans in the first ranks of the Bulgarian army was presented as reconciliation of the army with the people. It was said that the partisans were inspired by 'overwhelming national enthusiasm and love to their fellow-countrymen'¹⁷⁶ and that the partisan detachments

¹⁷³ Schwarzmantel (1991): 84.

¹⁷⁴ Rabotnicheskio Delo #11, 29.09.1944. In Rabotnitseskio Delo #230, 18.06.1945, the welcome given to the army on its return from the front to Sofia in a delirium of populism: the same people who had judged and punished the national traitors by the People's Courts that now welcomed the army with flowers and deep emotions. Thus, the nation is conceived as a collective individual.

¹⁷⁵ BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 2 (December 1944): 4 on Militia, and BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 22, Archival Unit 15 (November 1944): 1 on the Army.

¹⁷⁶ The Fatherland War... (1978, vol. 1): 79-80. For the situation caused by the conscription of the partisans in the "People's Army", see BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 22, Archival Unit 18

were converted into a true, national liberation, revolutionary army. Thus, the People's Army was essentially considered as the successor of the "people's resistance movement".

The 'First Bulgarian Army' was considered by the BCP as the quintessence of Bulgarian national pride. The "People's Army" made the Bulgarian people extremely proud, since it had liberated 15,000 square metres in Hungary and 30,000 square metres in Yugoslavia. This was its contribution to the liberation of the Balkans from the German yoke and to the final defeat of Hitlerite Germany. The BCP argued that the Bulgarians also took national pride in the "People's Army" because Marshal Stalin personally appreciated its advance on the front. It was claimed that the First Bulgarian Army fought side by side with Slav nations against their eternal enemy – German aggression– and that, for the first time in history, the Bulgarian army fought for true national interests and for the material as well as the spiritual progress of fatherland¹⁷⁷.

Within this context, the army as well as the police (Militia) were essentially rehabilitated. In what was supposed to be a complete contrast with the past, the BCP proclaimed a "new, people's, democratic and national army"¹⁷⁸ to distinguish it from the so-called "Czarist army" of the old regime. The Army and the Militia no longer served "interests foreign to the Bulgarian people". To build its new character, the "new army" had to purge all the fascist elements, the enemies of the "new army" who had conspired against the state and the nation¹⁷⁹. The BCP declared that without cleansing the army from fascists there could not be built a 'real people's, democratic and national army'¹⁸⁰. A similar rehabilitation concerned the People's Militia. As Dimitrov declared, 'those who are now leading officers of the People's Militia, are persons who, together with the people, have fought for... the liberation of our country from the barbarous German yoke... They have proved that they are real Bulgarian

(September–December 1944): passim, and BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 191 (October–December 1944): 8-9.

¹⁷⁷ Rabotnitsesko Delo #166, 02.04.1945.

¹⁷⁸ The Fatherland War... (1978, vol. 1): 80 and (vol. 3): 47.

¹⁷⁹ A considerable number of documents are related to the purge of the army: The Fatherland War... (1978, vol. 1): 52-53, 62, 78, 146, 193-195 and The Fatherland War... (1978, vol. 3): 43-44, 64. See also Rabotnitsesko Delo #79, 18.12.1944.

¹⁸⁰ Rabotnicesko Delo #67, 04.12.1944.

patriots'¹⁸¹. Having been presented as fighters of national freedom partisans gave a specific national feature to militia, that is, an essentially state institution.

Another policy domain where the Party's totalitarian discourse operated was that of justice. The political hegemony of the communists would not have secured a complete, total recognition and their political power would not have been completely consolidated, if any alternative view was not delegitimated and eliminated. Elimination of the opposition required a legitimating judicial mechanism.

The People's Courts as well as the Courts of People's Republic were used to secure regulation of the jurisprudential gaps that could appear in the people's trials. At the same time, the People's Courts and criminalisation of "collaborationists" contributed to the process of nationalisation¹⁸², as the People's Courts decreed the confiscation of the properties on behalf of the state. Entrepreneurs and bankers, if not sentenced to death or imprisonment, were deprived of any compensation as "collaborationists" with the Axis. The Communist Party legitimised the People's Courts on the grounds of the clauses of the Moscow armistice (28 October 1944), whose fourth article dictated dismantlement of all fascist organisations in the country¹⁸³, and of the international denunciation of fascism¹⁸⁴ as well as on national grounds.

The People's Courts were supposed to judge "in the name of Bulgarian people"¹⁸⁵. They were to constitute a 'national tribunal' for the prompt and severe punishment of a small number of evil doers who brought calamities to Bulgaria and tortured the Bulgarian people¹⁸⁶. The BCP alleged that the nation approved the verge of People's

¹⁸¹ Dimitrov, *The People's Militia is the Unshakable Mainstay of the Democratic Government (21.01.1946)*, (1972, vol. 2): 315. A similar rehabilitation of police took place in Romania, where Militia consisted of partisan units renamed to patriotic guards, in Swain and Swain (1998): 32.

¹⁸² As Tzvetkov (1993): 308 mentions, it was very easy to accuse of "collaboration" any businessman in a country, whose trade relations with the Third Reich had exceeded during the war 80% of the total exchange. Auty (1950): 25 demonstrates the considerable dependence of Bulgaria on Germany, who, during the 1930s, had monopolised her exports of tobacco and agricultural supplies and in return exported to Bulgaria consumer goods and armaments.

¹⁸³ *Rabotnichesko Delo* #39, 18.02.1947.

¹⁸⁴ *Rabotnichesko Delo* #63, 29.11.1944.

¹⁸⁵ This expression introduced every sentence announced by the People's Courts, 'The struggle of...' (1946): 109 and Bulgarian State Records Fund 28, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 112 (1944): 8. As Gerasimov put it in a public meeting of 200,000: 'You have heard the conviction of People's Court, which is severe, but fair. This is the will of the entire Bulgarian nation', in *Rabotnichesko Delo* #116, 02.02.1945.

¹⁸⁶ *Rabotnichesko Delo* #54, 18.11.1944, #114, 31.01.1945, and #61, 27.11.1944.

Courts via public meetings¹⁸⁷. The BCP exerted its control on people's courts and their decisions through the Fatherland Front and the government. The Ministry of Justice appointed the judges for the People's Court. They were either legally trained or judges-candidates elected by the district committees of the Fatherland Front. As judges-candidates of the latter category, devoted anti-fascists were preferred¹⁸⁸. In other words, the Fatherland Front appointed both prosecutors and juries¹⁸⁹.

In the case of the People's Courts, the totalitarian discourse may be found in the claim that the juridical decisions that the regime was interested in were taken by the people. Not accidentally, People's Courts (Volkgerichte) were called the courts introduced by Hitler in the war years for the elimination of his political opponents¹⁹⁰. Thereby, the Fatherland Front, that is, the communist-dominated government, became synonymous with the people, that is, the Bulgarian nation. Accordingly, the People's Court was of the Party, of state, of people, of the nation.

Nationalisation¹⁹¹ is very revealing of the totalitarian discourse involving extensive national elements the Party engaged in¹⁹². The BCP made nationalisation an overtly national cause. Inasmuch as the bourgeoisie was unable to secure industrial development and obstructed the rationalisation and reconstruction of the country, nationalisation was presented as an imperative need. The BCP alleged that the state undertook the control of national resources and production in order that the Bulgarian people would enjoy the product of their toil and not imperialists.

¹⁸⁷ Bulgarian State Records Fund 28, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 112 (1944) : 8.

¹⁸⁸ 'People's Court' (1945): 3, and Bulgarian State Records Fund 28, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 112 (1944): 3 and 9.

¹⁸⁹ As Manafov (1958): 20 poses it, 'the Fatherland Front Committees expressed people's frame of mind and will'.

¹⁹⁰ Tzvetkov (1993), vol. 2: 266.

¹⁹¹ Lenin, *The Tasks of the Proletariat in our Revolution Draft Platform for the Proletarian Party (April 1917)*, (1982⁴): 35-36 mentions the nationalisation of the land, the banks and capitalist syndicates. Brokgaus and Efron's Russian dictionary of 1897 includes only the term Land Nationalisation (Natsionalizatsiia Zemli) as a linguistic loan coming from radical western European thought on land's reforms, namely the transfer of land to the state. In Russian, the term Land Nationalisation was phased in perhaps in the 1870s by the populist (Narotnik) group "Land and Will", a member of which was Plehanov. Therefore, Lenin and the Bolsheviks extended the term in a wider economic and social sphere. In essence, the initial content of the term "nationalisation" involved semantic merging of nation and state.

¹⁹² The term "popularisation" is met only twice, both referring to the nationalisation of banks (populyarnite banki), in *Rabotnitsesko Delo*. Nevertheless, anarchist-communists used the term socialisation (sotsializatsiya) instead of nationalisation; see BCP Records Fund 272, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 1 (1945): 2.

Nationalisation fostered a particular state-subject relation, which Verdery calls “socialist paternalism”¹⁹³. ‘Socialist paternalism posited a moral tie linking subjects with the state through their rights to share in the redistributed social product’¹⁹⁴. As production became a state affair and the state was identified with the nation through the doctrine of “national unity”, that is, the political consent of the entire nation with the will of the authority identical with the Party, production achieved a national content. Production, therefore, was an affair not only of the people but the state as well, and since ‘the property of the state was a public property’¹⁹⁵, was simultaneously a national affair.

The national economy became at one and the same time an affair of the people, of the state, of the government, and of the Party. Within this context, what Billig calls banal nationalism¹⁹⁶, -that is, the unconscious nationalism of everyday life- was deployed in the discourse of the Party. In expressions such as ‘nationalisation of *our* industry’, ‘we have no more than 500 enterprises of more than 50 workers’, and ‘industry should come under the authority of *our* state’¹⁹⁷, the first person plural is simultaneously attributed to the nation, to the people, to the state, to the government, and to the Party.

Nationalisation and industrialisation reach a nationalistic domain, that of modernisation. Todorova argues that both nationalism and state communism became ideologies and tools of modernisation¹⁹⁸. Discussing the case of the Rumanian Communist Party, King shows that patriotism is useful in achieving the party’s objectives with industrialism in premier position¹⁹⁹. As the Soviet model of modernisation involved nationalism, modernising and rebuilding Bulgaria as a state involved an extensive nationalist discourse. Following Stalin, the Bulgarian communists desired to modernise Bulgaria in a short period of time and to make up for her relative backwardness vis-a-vis the industrialised West.

¹⁹³ Verdery (1996): 227.

¹⁹⁴ Verdery (1996): 233 note 4.

¹⁹⁵ Bulgarian State Records Fund 47, Inventory 3, Archival Unit 5: 20.

¹⁹⁶ Billig (1995).

¹⁹⁷ Bulgarian State Records Fund 28, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 33 (1947): 225-226.

¹⁹⁸ Todorova (1993): 143.

¹⁹⁹ King (1980): 127.

National arguments were presented to the workers with emphasis on productivity, especially in a period when low wages and considerable urban food shortages led workers in state factories to leave their jobs to help cultivate the family smallholding and thereby assure their own food supply. As a result, Lampe argues that the communist regime was facing a long-term threat to the coal and metal production and a discipline crisis²⁰⁰. Within this context, increase of production was presented as a patriotic task²⁰¹. Workers inspired by an ardent patriotism who participated in the shock-work movement were contrasted with the negligent and saboteurs²⁰². In other words, hard work was interpreted as a result of patriotism. Thus, for instance, the initiative of the local committee of Pernik's miners to work Sundays was reckoned a patriotic deed²⁰³. A fast and effective harvest collection was counted as a sign of lofty patriotism and patriotic emulation²⁰⁴. Similarly, architects, engineers, and technicians were asked to perform their duty to the fatherland²⁰⁵.

Tasks of modernisation and nationalist discourse brought into being the whole new set of terms as “patriotic merchant and industrialist”, “patriotic intelligentsia”, and “patriotic officer” were deployed for a short time²⁰⁶. The above hybrid concepts revealed inconsistencies and paradoxes that compromises of the Party to nationalism had caused. In achieving national unification, the communists had to bind together a block of diverse social elements. A Communist Party, which is supposed to be a party of the class of the proletariat, appealed to industrialists, that is, the traditional class enemy of the proletariat, because of its nationalism. National unity presupposed as many social strata as possible and not only one class.

On the other hand, a national discourse could gain the consent of merchants and industrialists regarding nationalisation and reduce fronts of political conflicts of the BCP. Indeed, private industry, as Lampe describes, posed serious problems for the communist programme to consolidate economic power, as the war years had

²⁰⁰ Lampe (1986): 134-135.

²⁰¹ See, for instance, a slogan in *Rabotnicesko Delo* #33, 25.10.1944: ‘Praise to working men–patriots: textile workers increased production’.

²⁰² *Rabotnicesko Delo* #78, 09.04.1946.

²⁰³ *Rabotnicesko Delo* #224, 01.10.1946.

²⁰⁴ *Rabotnicesko Delo* #168, 24.07.1947 and *Rabotnicesko Delo* #123, 27.05.1948.

²⁰⁵ *Rabotnicesko Delo* #111, 13.05.1948.

²⁰⁶ See, for instance, BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 41.

accelerated the inter-war tendency towards an increasing number of smaller and smaller firms²⁰⁷, which could not be tainted by charges of collaborationism like the big-scale industries. Furthermore, confiscation on grounds of collaborationism was minimal in a number of industrial branches²⁰⁸. Since these small firms were not a likely basis for the modern large-scale industry the communists envisaged, the BCP appealed to the national consciousness of merchants and industrialists to gain their consent and eliminate as much as possible any potential conflict with them.

Trotskyists fiercely criticised concepts, such as “honest merchants” and “patriotic industrialists”. They reproached the BCP with applying ‘class co-operation and narrow-minded patriotism’ instead of ‘irreconcilable class struggle and revolutionary internationalism’²⁰⁹. Later on, the BCP itself criticised these concepts after the Stalin-Tito conflict. Then, Dimitrov categorically recognised the Stalinist doctrine of a prompt transition to socialism, that is, transition through “class warfare” and without compromises with hostile classes. The founding congress of the Cominform had elaborated important modifications to the political and tactical line adopted by the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. According to Gati, the reasons for this were Stalin’s doubts about the spectre of “incipient diversity” in international communism, Gomulka’s relative independence, Yugoslav successes, and the standstill in Czechoslovakia and Hungary²¹⁰. By the end of 1948, the term “people’s democracy” came to be identified with the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. The 16th Plenum and the 5th Congress (July and December 1948 respectively) of the BWPC applauded the sovietisation of the Bulgarian political system and the intensification of the class struggle, while peaceful transition to socialism and the concept of a patriotic merchant and industrialist were considered illusions, caused by the slow annihilation of the opposition²¹¹. The concept of “patriotic industrialist” was abandoned, because the BCP now “understood” that an industrialist could never be patriotic.

²⁰⁷ Lampe (1986): 132.

²⁰⁸ For instance, textile firms taken over during 1945 accounted for less than 9% of the joint-stock capital in the branch; see Lampe (1986): 134. According to Auty (1950): 49, in spite of measures of nationalisation, 61.3% of the national income was still in private hands in 1948.

²⁰⁹ BCP Records Fund 191, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 67 (1946): 1 and BCP Records Fund 191, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 62: 3.

²¹⁰ Gati (1994): 189.

²¹¹ Dimitrov (1948): 9-18 and Dimitrov (1949): 48-49, 52-53. This shift of the political line in the communist parties was more dramatic in other countries, like Poland, where Gomulka, who supported a

One other example of nationalism in the sphere of economy is the “Freedom Loan”. During the Fatherland War, it was argued, as the nation had relied on the mobilisation of the people in the army, it had also relied on hard work at the rear to increase productivity in wartime and to develop the economy. The Fatherland Front developed now the idea of “patriotic emulation” and the “Freedom Loan” was promoted as a way of dealing with the vital questions of productivity and supply²¹². As Lampe notes, ‘the entirely internal Freedom Loan for the 1945 state budget attracted some of the remaining private funds’ and contributed to consolidating financial control of the state over the Bulgarian economy²¹³. Moreover, high discipline was required for succeeding in providing the front with the necessary supplies. Even the Trade Unions were brought to argue that the interests of the country lay above all the other interests²¹⁴.

The BCP deployed a specifically nationalistic rhetoric to propagate the Freedom Loan. Nationalistic slogans stimulated the masses to participate: ‘Every amount paid in for the Freedom Loan is evidence of love to the fatherland’, ‘Whoever subscribes him/herself to the Freedom Loan, s/he guarantees his/her own existence and that of the fatherland’, and ‘Whoever did not subscribe him/herself for the Freedom Loan is an enemy of the fatherland’²¹⁵. Moreover the Fatherland Front alleged that “[our] lev”²¹⁶ was to be stabilised through the assistance of the Narodn (National-People’s) Freedom Loan. In his broadcast speech of February 26, 1945, Todor Pavlov²¹⁷, the communist member of the three-member regency, called the Bulgarian patriots to support the Freedom Loan generously. The Freedom Loan was presented as an historical and patriotic duty of the Bulgarians. Pavlov alleged that the Freedom Loan would financially empower the ‘new, free, independent and in terms of finance and culture progressive Bulgaria’.

peaceful transition to socialism and cooperation with non-communist parties, was unseated from the position of the Party’s secretary.

²¹² Manifestos and resolutions (1945): 9-10.

²¹³ Lampe (1986): 131.

²¹⁴ The Fatherland War... (1978, vol. 2): 11.

²¹⁵ Bulgarian State Records Fund 28, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 257 (March 1945): 5.

²¹⁶ The Bulgarian currency.

²¹⁷ Rabotnitsesko Delo #136, 26.02.1945.

The Bulgarian people were in fact supposed to lend to themselves through the practice of the Freedom Loan. The Freedom Loan was presented as an initiative for the fatherland, for the people, for the state, having been taken by the communist-dominated government. The Fatherland Front appealed to the Bulgarian people to subscribe to themselves in the Freedom Loan, for 'it would sustain our [Bulgarian] fatherland, our state, and our people'²¹⁸. A potential political consequence of the Freedom Loan, through the stabilisation of the economy, would be the stabilisation of state power and, therefore, of communist rule.

Rebuilding the national, and not the socialist, economy was claimed by the Fatherland Front as well. The nation was to benefit from the positive financial policy the Fatherland Front undertook. Its priority was a quick, nation-wide restoration of the national economy. The reconstruction of the economy became a national concern. This echoes the situation in Yugoslavia, where reconstruction and modernisation went side by side with nationalism, as the communists appealed to the national pride of people and parallelised the task of modernisation with struggles and heroism of the partisans²¹⁹. The Bulgarian nation, under the guidance of the Fatherland Front, was to avoid inflation, which would have seriously negative outcomes. As a consequence, the Fatherland Front alleged that it saved Bulgaria from financial calamity through collectivisation and industrialisation²²⁰.

The merging of nation, people, state, and the Party occurred also in the sphere of political institutions, such as the Constitution and the government. The BCP argued that the Czar was the centre of power according to the old, Tirnovo's Constitution in contrast with the new one, which recognised the people or the nation as the holder of power²²¹. As people and nation became coterminous, democracy and nationalism were linked together, as they had been in the era of the French Revolution. In this sense, the nation/people demanded political sovereignty, a constitution and civil rights.

²¹⁸ Bulgarian State Records Fund 28, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 257 (February 1945):2.

²¹⁹ Tomaszewski (1989): 130.

²²⁰ Lazarov (1945): 11-13.

²²¹ Rabotnitsesko Delo #110, 16.05.1947.

A number of key political acts, such as the Referendum²²² on the abolition of monarchy and the proclamation of People's Republic, assumed a largely national character. Characteristically, for example, the ballot of People's Republic depicted the Bulgarian national flag at the top left part of them, cornerways. The ballot for monarchy was a white piece of paper with the words "for MONARCHY" written in black letters²²³. Dimitrov argued that the ballot of People's Republic represented a salutary one for the fatherland²²⁴. Consequently, everyone who cast his/her ballot for the People's Republic voted for Bulgaria.

The same discourse was articulated with regard to the government as well. Kolarov argued that 'whoever attacks and offends the Fatherland Front and its leader, at the same time attacks and offends the Bulgarian people'²²⁵. Thus, the Fatherland Front became inseparable from the Bulgarian people. The government ruled on behalf of people's or nation's interests. It was not a government of an ordinary political party, but the government of the Bulgarian nation, of the Bulgarian people, of the Bulgarian state (and, of course, in effect, of the BCP). Any opposition to it would be determined as national treason.

3.7 National enemies

After 9 September People's Courts were established and "fascists and collaborationists" stood trial in them. In the second wave of show trials conducted by regular courts, the leaders of the opposition, former allies of the BCP in the Fatherland Front, (G. M. Dimitrov, Petkov, Lulchev) were incriminated and convicted on national grounds for two reasons. First, the communists declared that they eliminated the opposition for the nation's benefits. Thus, the communists presented themselves as the vanguard of the nation, a salvaging political force which purged the nation. Hence, the continuation of the communist regime was necessary; otherwise,

²²² All the legal political parties of that time were for Republic but they did not share the same vision of its form.

²²³ See both the ballots in Bulgarian State Records Fund 28, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 216 (June – September 1946): 100 and 102.

²²⁴ Dimitrov (1946): 30. A similar example of discourse on the anti-national character of monarchy could be found in Yugoslavia, where the Yugoslav Assembly blamed King Peter for having supported Nazi collaborators, in Tomaszewski (1989): 129.

²²⁵ Rabotnitsesko Delo #27, 04.02.1948.

the Bulgarian nation would be in danger. Second, if national reasons had not been used to legitimate the incrimination of the opposition, it would have been seen as a power game. Without national arguments, the communists would have failed to disguise their efforts to retain power.

A basic argument used to justify the elimination of the opposition was that the nation was in danger. Verdery, in her work on Rumanian communism, refers to Jowitt's image of the pristine "castle regime" that conceives of itself as surrounded by a polluting environment²²⁶. Such a conception allows a regime, having identified itself with both nation and people, to assume the protection of the people and the nation. Thus, it justifies its authoritative power and exacts obedience from the masses. It acclaims itself the original representative of its subjects, it demands their consent, and it warrants elimination of its political opponents.

A set of dangers threatening the nation could downplay the political character of opposition's elimination. Freedom, independence and financial prosperity of the Bulgarian nation were still not assured, even though 9 September marked the transition to a bright period. Warning of impending calamities remained a major tool of Party propaganda. Danger of a German attack upon Bulgaria threatened the country²²⁷. The Bulgarian army had to ward the German enemy off its west frontier and to annihilate it²²⁸. There was also a danger of returning to the 'bad past'. Sabotage, treason, and conspiracy of fascist elements, which needed to be purged, in administration and army, were dangers to the country²²⁹. The Fatherland Front, also, had to face provocative whispers, widespread from fascist elements, who aimed to create unrest in Bulgaria's interior²³⁰.

Dangers seemed to threaten Bulgaria after the war as well. Fascist reactionaries and financial speculators were allegedly 'preparing a systematic, internal and external,

²²⁶ Verdery (1991): 246.

²²⁷ BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 7, Archival Unit 3 (September 1944): 1, and *Rabotnicesko Delo* #1, 18.09.1944. See also *The Fatherland War...* (1978, vol. 1): 145,192, *The Fatherland War...* (1978, vol.2): 25-26 and *The Fatherland War...* (1978, vol. 3): 34.

²²⁸ *Rabotnicesko Delo* #59, 24.11.1944.

²²⁹ *The Fatherland War...* (1978, vol. 1): 61, 99, 192, *The Fatherland War...* (1978, vol. 2): 11 and *The Fatherland War...* (1978, vol. 3): 34.

²³⁰ *Rabotnicesko Delo* #31, 23.10.1944.

attack upon the Fatherland Front in order to hinder its saving, effective and regenerative role for our fatherland's [Bulgaria's] historical mission'²³¹. Speculators and profiteers, who exploited the situation of the Second World War to enrich themselves²³², were supposed to cause artificial difficulties (price increases, inadequacy of products in the markets, and inflation) in order to discredit the Fatherland Front government. Both reactionaries and capitalists tried to manipulate opposition groups to disrupt the Fatherland Front or to penetrate the ranks of it. Dimitrov added to these dangers the danger of invasion of Turkish troops, the danger of civil war, the danger of a complete economic disaster, the danger of coup and conspiracies, and the danger of foreign intervention²³³. This made it seem self-evident that Bulgaria needed a political force to save and protect her and rendered the elimination of elements threatening nation imperative.

The People's Courts were to try a specific category of national enemies: fascists and people who had collaborated with the national enemy, namely Germany, against whom the most vital interests of Bulgaria demanded a heavy blow²³⁴. All over Eastern Europe (with Poland a meaningful exception²³⁵), fascists and collaborationists were disenfranchised and severely punished. In Yugoslavia, Mihailovich and his chetniks were charged with fighting alongside the Germans²³⁶. In Albania, people who had developed contacts with Italian authorities were tried²³⁷. In Hungary, all politicians around Horthy were accused of collaboration with the Third Reich²³⁸. Tomaszewski explains how a social conflict could take a national dimension: a capitalist or a landowner who asked the Nazi authorities for help (e.g. against a strike) against his fellow citizens during the war, after the war was thought a collaborator and was severely punished²³⁹.

²³¹ Reactionaries are also called treacherous. *Rabotnitsesko Delo* #236, 25.06.1945 and Lazarov (1945): 3-4, 7, and 10.

²³² Lazarov (1945): 3 analyses the way they enriched themselves and Kostov in *Rabotnitsesko Delo* #79, 18.12.1944 vehemently criticised them.

²³³ Dimitrov, *The Fatherland Front will win, in spite of everything* (25.10.1946), (1972, vol. 2): 434 and *Our National Development is moving toward the destruction of the capitalist exploiter system and the emancipation from every imperialist dependence* (03.01.1948), (1972, vol. 3): 135.

²³⁴ *Rabotnicesko Delo* #101, 15.01.1945.

²³⁵ As Swain (1998): 34 notes, in Poland no pro-fascist or quisling administration had been formed.

²³⁶ Swain (1998): 23.

²³⁷ Tomaszewski (1989): 57.

²³⁸ Gati (1994): 188.

²³⁹ Tomaszewski (1989): 65-66.

The communists presented fascists and collaborationists not so much as enemies of communism, but as national enemies, culprits in a national catastrophe. They were in charge of the alliance that they contracted with Germany, which placed Bulgaria in danger of national destruction. They were accused of anti-national activities: they waged war against the USA and the UK and backed Bulgaria's national enemies in the international arena, that is, the German imperialists, who plundered the national wealth of the country²⁴⁰, a fact that resulted in turning her against her historical ally, the Soviet Union. The discourse that fascists were national enemies had long-term effects: in the late 1940s much incrimination of groups and individuals stemmed from their actual or alleged ties with the so-called fascist governments of the Second World War. Communist national discourse explicitly excluded fascists from the nation because of their anti-Bulgarian political acts.

The eradication of fascists was proclaimed a national task of Bulgaria, since it would secure the nation's future²⁴¹. The national interest of Bulgaria demanded show trials of people's courts, because a conviction for fascists would be evidence that Bulgaria had joined the freedom-loving coalition and had broken with her past. Equally, her international prestige would be elevated. Significantly, the BCP affirmed that culprits of violence, atrocities, and looting in Macedonia and Thrace would be severely punished²⁴². Thus, Bulgaria purged herself of international crimes committed by the old, anti-Bulgarian regime.

The legitimization of the elimination of the Opposition was justified on essentially national grounds. It was attacked for trying to deprive the nation of its democratic rights, being a foreign agency and a nest of national enemies, plotting a foreign intervention, and undermining army's discipline. The Communist regime, thus, attempted to totally morally disqualify the opposition, so as it could not be

²⁴⁰ Rabotnichesko Delo #61, 27.11.1944 and Rabotnichesko Delo #73, 11.12.1944.

²⁴¹ Kolarov, *National tasks and renovation of Bulgaria (1944)*, in 'Radio Station Hristo Botev...' (1952, vol. 7): 294.

²⁴² Chervenkov, *The Fatherland Front Government (11.09.1944)*, in 'Radio Station Hristo Botev...' (1952, vol. 7): 273, Rabotnichesko Delo#61, 27.11.1944, and Rabotnichesko Delo #73, 11.12.1944.

longer recognised as a legitimate form of politics. Therefore, its annihilation would be absolutely justified.

First of all, the opposition was blamed for depriving the nation of its democratic rights. Violation of democratic rights could imply assault upon the nation. The Bulgarian government had supposedly been entrusted with the task of prohibiting in the future ‘the existence of political, military or semi-military organisations, which aimed at depriving the nation of its democratic rights’²⁴³ by an “anti-national”²⁴⁴ coup.

The second national feature of the Party argument for the annihilation of the Opposition was that it committed high treason by collaborating with the national and international enemies of Bulgaria. Significantly, Dimitrov depicted the opposition as heralds who were playing the tune of foreign music and not the Bulgarian national bagpipes²⁴⁵.

Within the context of the Cold War, western great powers were, of course, considered imperialist enemies. As opposition politicians advocated an independent Bulgarian international policy of equal approach to the East and the West or total subordination to the capitalist camp, they were accused of seeking for backing from the western powers and of being the unconcealed agency of American imperialism²⁴⁶. Opposition leaders, such as Petkov, Chesmedzhiev, and Lulchev, were supposed to rely on the support on international reactionary circles, according to the indictment of Petkov’s trial and the lawsuits against military and semi-military organisations²⁴⁷. Hence, the opposition in general was denounced as an agency of dark, foreign forces and of sworn enemies of the Bulgarian nation, i.e. “agency of the aggressive imperialists” or the “Greek monarchist-fascists”²⁴⁸. Pastuhov and his like-minded followers were called military and political intelligence agents of Anglo-Saxons imperialists²⁴⁹.

²⁴³ That is how Dimitrov reasoned clauses of the Peace Treaty Bulgaria had been signed.

²⁴⁴ The truth... (1947): 14.

²⁴⁵ Dimitrov (1945): 8, and Dimitrov, *The Fatherland Front is a lasting militant alliance of all democratic forces* (11.03.1945), (1972, vol. 2): 245.

²⁴⁶ Dimitrov, *Political Report of the Central Committee to the First Congress of the BWPC* (19.12.1948), (1972, vol. 3): 294 and 307-308.

²⁴⁷ The trial... (1947): 11-12.

²⁴⁸ Rabotnitsesko Delo #241, 20.10.1946.

²⁴⁹ Rabotnitsesko Delo #32, 09.02.1947.

Petkov was denounced officially in his trial for seeking to alienate and isolate Bulgaria from the Slav nations, the USSR, and the other democratic nations. In parallel, he allegedly aimed at creating dissension between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in order to please the imperialist camp. Thus, he undermined the 'really national foreign policy of the Fatherland Front government'²⁵⁰.

The opposition was blamed too for serving the interests of enemy nations neighbouring Bulgaria, that is, Greece and Turkey and for putting their personal interests beyond the independence and the sovereignty of Bulgaria²⁵¹. The Party stigmatised the opposition arguing that their political fatherland was Greece²⁵². It called the opposition "Greek maniacs" (girkomani)²⁵³. The opposition BANU, in particular, was blamed for national treason on the grounds of facilitating the "Greek aggression" against Bulgaria. Petkov, by publishing a series of article in his newspaper, allegedly impeded the defence of the Bulgarian national cause at the Peace Conference by furnishing Tsaldaris with arguments²⁵⁴. Petkov and his followers supposedly furnished the arguments of Damaskinos on creating a Great Greek state and Yaltsin's claims against Bulgaria²⁵⁵. Greek and Turkish rulers, who pursued to annex vital parts of Bulgaria's 'national edifice', were seen as allies of the opposition²⁵⁶.

As Prosecutor Petrinsky pointed out in Petkov's trial, 'the evidence produced at the trial against G.M. Dimitrov's followers established that armed subversive groups and secret channels to Greece were organised'²⁵⁷. Members of the opposition BANU, as Prosecutor Minkovsky clarified, organised espionage in Smolyan district. They served the Greek intelligence service, by passing information of political and military character. They, also, organised a channel for conducting negotiations for ceding

²⁵⁰ The trial (1947): 376 and 379 (Prosecutor Petrinsky's speech).

²⁵¹ Rabotnichesko Delo #330, 12.10.1945.

²⁵² Rabotnichesko Delo #228, 03.10.1946.

²⁵³ They were wealthy and educated Bulgarians of origin who spoke Greek and accepted the Greek culture in the 19th century.

²⁵⁴ The trial (1947): 366 (Prosecutor Petrinsky's speech).

²⁵⁵ Bulgarian State Records Fund 28, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 199 (1945): 147. See, also, Dimitrov's speeches: *The two lessons* (10.04.1946), (1972, vol. 2): 345-346, and *Towards a nationwide victory over reaction and the ill-wishers of New Bulgaria* (15.11.1945), (1972, vol. 2): 259.

²⁵⁶ Rabotnichesko Delo #84, 16.03.1946.

²⁵⁷ The trial... (1947): 363-364.

Bulgarian territory to Greece.²⁵⁸. All these anti-national activities committed by the opposition put the national independence of Bulgaria in danger.

Not only did the Opposition back foreign enemies of Bulgaria, but it also constituted a nest of national apostates. The Opposition was accused in a series of trials for having become the centre of attraction for the fascist remnants of the past²⁵⁹. Furthermore, the opposition was blamed for including in its ranks past national apostates²⁶⁰, who had harmed the national interests of Bulgaria in the past.

The third national feature of the opposition's incrimination was that it committed high treason towards the freedom and independence of Bulgaria by fomenting a foreign intervention, which would take place after a coup that the opposition and military organisations were plotting. For this reason, they had tried to cause disorders as a pretext for foreign intervention²⁶¹. The opposition was accused of inciting sabotage actions, disorders and an armed struggle. This situation would supposedly provoke interference and penetration of foreign troops into Bulgaria from Greece and Turkey²⁶².

The opposition was presented as the centre of a network of spies and conspirators. Not surprisingly, the case of the Bulgarian opposition was not unique. In Romania, Maniu and several other politicians of the National Peasant Party were put on trial for conspiring against the government and spying for the USA²⁶³. In Poland, the Peasant Party of Mikolajczyk charged with close co-operation with British and American diplomats²⁶⁴. The Yugoslav communists eliminated the opposition with charges of collaboration with British spies²⁶⁵.

²⁵⁸ The trial (1947): 31-32, 38 (indictment) and 439 (Prosecutor Minkovsky's speech).

²⁵⁹ The trial... (1947): 7.

²⁶⁰ Rabortnichesko Delo #26, 02.02.1947.

²⁶¹ The trial (1947): 14 and 17. Dimitir Ivanov was accused that under instructions of Petkov had formed a terrorist group in Shistov in order to create disorders in the country resulting in a foreign intervention, *ibid* p. 27 and 40-41 (from the indictment against him).

²⁶² According to the "confession" of Dimitir Ivanov, in The trial (1947): 146.

²⁶³ Tomaszewski (1989): 93.

²⁶⁴ Tomaszewski (1989): 110.

²⁶⁵ Tomaszewski (1989): 131.

The most significant opposition figure, Petkov²⁶⁶, was considered guilty of national treason²⁶⁷ towards the freedom and independence of the Bulgarian nation by plotting a foreign intervention in Bulgaria²⁶⁸. Petkov was accused as an agent of foreign reactionary aggressive forces, which were ever ready to infringe on Bulgaria's national independence²⁶⁹. Petkov allegedly wrote a posthumous confession of his crimes 'after his death sentence' and some letters of mercy²⁷⁰. In these documents, he implicated the Opposition, the so-called "domestic reaction", such as the Democratic Party of Mushanov, the National Party of Burov²⁷¹, and the BWSDP of Lulchev. He incriminated, also, Exarch Stefan²⁷², regent Ganev²⁷³, G.M. Dimitrov and others. Moreover, he confessed that his activity was under the influence of the political representatives of the imperialist powers, that is, the external enemies of Bulgaria, which exploited his activity to struggle against the interests of Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.

Lastly, the Fatherland Front government accused the Opposition of undermining the army's discipline and weakening its fighting capacity. As shown above, the "People's

²⁶⁶ For contradiction and irregularities of the trial of Petkov see Padev (1948): 70-108 passim. Padev, an anti-communist, was a supporter of Petkov politics and a broadcaster of the BBC.

²⁶⁷ See the speech of Dimitrov in the Bulgarian Assembly on 13 January 1948: 'The Court fulfilled its role, fulfilled the wish of the people, and sentenced the national traitor to death', in Padev (1948): 65. Headlines of the newspapers "Rabotnichesko Delo" and "Otechestven Front" also denounced Petkov as national traitor: 'The whole nation condemns the traitor Petkov', 'Most important trial for treason', 'Petkov in net of conspiracy and foreign spy rings', 'Coward, foreign agent, saboteur – The true face of Nikola Petkov', in Padev (1948): 66.

²⁶⁸ The truth... (1947): 19-20 citing a headline in the "Otechestven Front" written by the Press Director. Prosecutor Petrinsky stated that 'Petkov and his followers dared conspire against their people and undermine the nation, relying mainly on foreign intervention and assistance', in The trial... (1947): 357-358. At this point, I have to mention that, even though the hearing is crawling with the accusation of fomenting a foreign intervention, Petkov was not sentenced to death or imprisonment on the basis of fomenting a foreign intervention. Foreign intervention is nowhere at the factual and juridical qualifications; see The trial (1947): 529-593. Nevertheless, Dimitrov justified the sentences against Petkov before the international public opinion as following: 'The most indignant circumstance, established in the course of the process, is the fact that N. Petkov's entire conspiratorial and sabotage activity aimed to precipitate foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Bulgaria, and his organisation was denounced as foreign agents, threatening the liberty and independence of our country', in The trial (1947): 621.

²⁶⁹ The trial... (1947): 7. See, also, Prosecutor Minkovsky's speech, *ibid* p. 440, who declared that 'he [Petkov] was preparing to sell our [Bulgarian] national independence'.

²⁷⁰ See the whole text of Petkov's posthumous confession in The trial (1947): 8-9 and details on his mercy letters in Isusov (2000): 308-309. Since all these documents are written in a communist jargon, their originality is severely challenged. Moreover, as Soviet trial methods of rendering the accused to witness for the prosecution were used, the authenticity of the above documents is seriously questionable.

²⁷¹ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

²⁷² For a short biography see Appendix 2.

²⁷³ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

Army”, conducting a patriotic war, was sanctified as defender of Bulgaria’s interests. The General Staff of the NOVA had issued a decree on discipline in the army. According to this degree, ‘everybody who attempts to perturb, disarray and cause disorder in the army, is people’s enemy and traitor²⁷⁴. G.M. Dimitrov was accused of organising anti-national and defeatist activity in the ranks of the army during the war against the Nazist Germany²⁷⁵. G.M. Dimitrov’s supporters were accused according to the Decree of Defence of the People’s Power²⁷⁶ that they had instilled defeatist activity both in the front and the rear during the Fatherland War and they had stitched up G.M. Dimitrov’s escape abroad²⁷⁷. Petkov confronted the same accusation: some of the articles published in his newspaper had supposedly undermined the army discipline by sowing discord in the ranks of the army and weakened the fighting capacity of the country²⁷⁸.

Conclusion

In the early post-war years, the main objective of the BCP was to hold power. To secure this objective the Party had to maintain the Fatherland Front. Its tactics were to develop a clientele network, salami tactics, and occupation of key institutions. A national communist totalitarian discourse framed strategies and tactics of the Party highlighting the struggles and the sacrifices of the communists for the nation, maintaining that the BCP was the authentic representative of the Bulgarian nation, politically sanctifying the 9th of September, and vindicating the conduct of the “Fatherland War”. The Bulgarian communists identified the Party with the state, the people, and the nation, in order to legitimate their economic politics (mainly nationalisation and the Liberty Loan), to justify the occupation of key ministries and political apparatuses (army and militia), and to underpin governmental politics.

²⁷⁴ Hristov (1969): 185.

²⁷⁵ The trial (1947): 12.

²⁷⁶ According to art. 6 of the Decree of Defence of the People’s Power, everybody who intends to harm the military potency of the army should be punished with severe imprisonment, in Bulgarian State Records Fund 136, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 85 (January 1945): 22-25.

²⁷⁷ See the indictment in Isusov (2000): 208.

²⁷⁸ The trial (1947): 22 (indictment). Pastuhov, also, encountered a similar indictment, Isusov (2000): 207. About Pastuhov see, also, Rabotnichesko Delo #49, 06.03.1946, and Rabotnichesko Delo #62, 21.03.1946.

National arguments were articulated in order to delegitimize the opposition and eliminate any political force antagonistic to the communists inside or outside the Fatherland Front. The communist-dominated regime had two categories of “other” to tackle: one (the opposition) that caused anomalies to the order and another (Fatherland Front allies) that generated ambiguity. Douglas, in her analysis on purity and danger, defines anomaly as an ‘element which does not fit a given set or series’ and ambiguity as a ‘character of statements capable of two [possibly contradictory] interpretations’²⁷⁹. Hence, ambiguity could turn to anomaly under certain circumstances. Douglas exposes several ways of treating anomalies and ambiguities²⁸⁰ including the following two that Bulgarian communists opted for: condemnation and punishment of the opposition, representing it as a polluting factor and dangerous to the nation; and creation of a new pattern of reality, that of the “all-national united Fatherland Front”, in which their allies found a new place.

As the nationalist discourse of the communists regarding domestic politics has been discussed, their nationalist discourse regarding international politics follows. The next chapter discusses how the communists explained in a national manner their international politics and, especially, the adherence of Bulgaria to the socialist bloc. The handling of national questions (Thracian and Macedonian) is also illustrated.

²⁷⁹ Douglas (1970): 50.

²⁸⁰ Douglas (1970): 51-52.

Chapter Four

The Nationalist Discourse with regard to the International Arena

The national discourse of the Bulgarian Communist Party had not only internal but also external components and dimensions. This chapter turns its attention to the national discourse the BCP used with regard to the international arena. This discourse is downplayed in much of the literature, which has tended to overestimate the extent to which the Soviet Union dictated to the BCP. Indeed, more generally, the continued development of nationalism during the Cold War era, particularly in the Eastern block, has been relatively ignored. Yet, arguably, nationalism did develop within the socialist block and had a significant impact upon political development across Eastern Europe, including Bulgaria.

Within the framework of the Cold War, nations still had a limited degree of independence. At the Moscow talks between Stalin and Churchill in October 1944, an agreement on the allocation of spheres of influence had been reached. It is widely argued in the literature that the socialist block set even more restricted limits to nation-states than the capitalist one¹. Pechatnov and Edmondson, for example, present the American sphere of influence as pluralist and open, while the Soviet one as totalitarian and closed. This happened because the USSR had to maximise her main asset, that is, military power, lacking “soft” power languages, such as economic power². Within the socialist block, the USSR dominated politics of satellite nation-states, since the communist parties of Eastern Europe were, to a great extent, subordinated to the Soviet Union.

Even though we shall agree that the degree of independence of Eastern European countries were more restricted than in the West, we shall argue that there was still some relative autonomy of the local communists to articulate nationalist discourses, provided that these were not hostile to the Soviet interests. It could be argued that the

¹ Gaddis (1997): 289 and Fejto (1974): 8 and 257. Grogin (2000): 142 highlights the complete conformity within the Soviet block, the suppression of national interests of the individual states, and the permanent priority of Soviet interests.

² Pechatnov and Edmondson (2002): 149.

expansion of the Soviet influence in Eastern Europe was not against the political interests, if not the political survival of the ruling national communists. Cold War interpretations involve regime-type security. Leffler argues that ‘the Cold War in Europe was the result of an interactive process in which leaders in many capitals were responding to multiple threats and opportunities to their interests, power, and security’³. Communists in most of the Soviet sphere countries were an insecure minority, with the exception of Yugoslavia. There, the presence of the Red Army was transient and, most importantly, Tito and Yugoslavian communists had risen to power and they had built an army, a party, and an administration on their own⁴. Tito was absolutely dominant in Yugoslavia. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to claim that security and stability of Eastern European communist regimes was exchanged with expansion of Soviet security.

Regarding the establishment of the Soviet sphere of influence, many authors argue that there was no overall blueprint for Soviet expansion. According to telegrams on Soviet policy in the Balkans, quoting by Volkov⁵, the Soviet Union did not plan the sovietisation of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as early as 1944. Stalin’s foreign policy was incoherent; however, Soviet policy shifted in 1947 because of Stalin’s fear of the offensive potential of American economic intrusion expressed in the Marshall Plan⁶. That means that in most of the period this thesis is about, Soviet flexibility allowed for diversifying national paths to communism.

Stalin close control and dominance over Eastern Europe begun in the summer of 1947. Does it mean, however, suppression of nationalism and prohibition of articulating national discourses? Two factors give evidence of how the Soviet Union clamped down on the Eastern European states: the Cominform and sovietisation of their societies. However, the founding declaration of the Cominform itself articulated a nationalist discourse: ‘communist parties should brandish the flag of defence of

³ Leffler (2000): 53.

⁴ Grogin (2000): 137. This was the reason why the Soviet Union, even though had her forces massed on Yugoslav frontiers, finally decided not to invade, *ibid* 141.

⁵ Volkov (1997): 56.

⁶ Lundestad (2000): 73-74, Grogin (2000) 128, and Parrish (1997): 268-287. Swain and Swain (1998): 28-29 argue that Stalin had no interest in seizing Eastern Europe in his orbit. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the exclusion of the communists from the post-war coalition governments in France and Italy changed his mind.

national independence and sovereignty of their countries... In their struggle against attempts at the economic and political enslavement of their countries, if they contrive to head all the forces ready to uphold their national dignity and independence, no plan for enslaving European or Asiatic countries will be successful'. The task of communist parties was to rally round them and unite all the democratic and patriotic forces⁷.

Sovietisation, indeed, altered all economic, political, cultural, and institutional life in accordance with the Soviet model⁸. However, sovietisation of culture did not imply renunciation of nationalism. Rather, what was extended from the Soviet Union to satellites was an ideology that also focussed on the expulsion of foreign influences, rethinking of history on nationalist lines, the "little nationalism" of Soviet Union Republics, the fight against "anti-patriotism", "national nihilism", and "rootless cosmopolitanism"⁹.

Apart from the above politics of the early post-war years, as we have already seen, nationalism had been successful in the USSR during the 1930s and, especially, during the Second World War. Nationalism had also been integrated into the international communist movement via the Comintern and popular front tactics. Therefore, the development of Bulgarian communist nationalism was not in contrast with the background of the BCP.

Some more arguments coming from the recent literature have also challenged the perspective that influence could flow only in one direction: from the so-called superpowers to small nations, and from centres to peripheries. Loth believes that the disclosure of the new primary sources leads to the conclusion that the impression that the Cold War was mostly determined by decision makers in Moscow and Washington cannot be maintained¹⁰.

⁷ Rabotnichesko Delo #232, 05.10.1947 (the founding declaration of the Cominform).

⁸ Grogin (2000): 129-130

⁹ Kagarlitsky (1988): 128-133 and Slezkine (1996).

¹⁰ Loth (2000): 255.

The significance of domestic factors rather than superpower directives may be seen in particular in the German case¹¹, where, as Loth argues, whereas there was an intention (for different reasons) on the part of both the USA and the USSR to prevent Germany's partition¹², the domestic strategies of political forces, headed by Adenauer¹³ and Ulbricht, reinforced and underpinned Germany's division. In the case of East Germany, as Loth suggests, 'Ulbricht appears to have been a revolutionary in his own right –in developing his own course he is comparable to Tito, Gomulka¹⁴, or Mao, and in his technique of influencing Stalin to Kim Il-Sung',¹⁵ although his regime depended on the Soviet military presence. Moscow did not intend the changes to take this form, but national communist forces advanced in the shadow of the Red Army. "They were sanctioned by the Cold War, which they themselves had helped to provoke"¹⁶.

Nations-states, then, had what might be called a relative autonomy to articulate their own discourses. As many examples can show even in the early post-war years (Bulgarian-Yugoslav dispute on Macedonia, Polish-Czechoslovak dispute on the question of the so-called Zaolzie, the Trieste question, the Transylvanian question, the question of Polish borderlines, the question of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia,

¹¹ But not only. Grogan (2000): 132, relying on the transcripts of Benes discussions with Stalin, argues that it was Benes, a non-communist in Czechoslovakia, who 'took the initiative and offered his country as an instrument of Russian expansion in Central Europe'. Benes thought that Czechoslovakia would follow its own path to socialism and become a useful bridge between East and West.

¹² Loth (2000): 243-244, relying on the new primary sources, argues that American policymakers did not think that permanent military commitment in Europe due to the division of Germany could be justified domestically and financially. The Soviets feared that a Western German state would soon be allowed to rearm itself and pose a danger to the Soviet sphere of influence. Both would prefer a neutralised Germany excluded from the East-West conflict, as there are several attempts emanating from both the Americans and the Soviets to restore the German unity after the Berlin Blockade. Ulam (1999): 113-114 argues that Stalin was not confident that the division into two Germanys would become permanent, provided that he insisted on compensating Poland with German areas, which would have remained within the future East German state. In that way, Stalin unduly shrunk the population and territory of East Germany.

¹³ As early as the summer of 1945, Adenauer concluded that the Soviet occupied part was lost to Germany for an incalculable period of time, in Loth (2000): 245. And, as late as June 1953, he confessed that he had a nightmare named Potsdam. 'The threat of a joint policy of the great powers... continued to exist even after the founding of the Federal Republic. The foreign policy of the Federal Republic always aimed at moving out of this danger zone', in Loth (2000): 249.

¹⁴ Iazhborovskaia (1997): 123-138 argues that Gomulka followed a very distinctive path to socialism, with some important differences to Stalinist policies (egalitarian and mutual relations with the Soviet Union, gradual industrialisation and collectivisation, close ties between high rank Party cadres and people, opposition to the establishment of the Cominform).

¹⁵ Loth (2000): 252. In the same tune, Gaddis (2000): 32 argues that 'by the time Khrushchev came to power, such satellite leaders as Ulbricht and Gomulka were often in a position to determine the pace if not always the outcome of events'.

¹⁶ Loth (2000): 253.

exchange of populations between people's republics), there were national interests inside either block; each nation-state sought to satisfy them to the extent that the international situation and its commitment to either block allowed for. In parallel, each country tried to create a guarantee of assistance in the event of aggression; hence, a network of alliances was forged inside either block, where each country could find its national allies. Within this context then, the BCP could articulate its own national discourse and pursue Bulgarian national interests as it envisaged them, even though it had to operate within the limits set by the socialist block. At that point, we should take into consideration what Gaddis calls the 'tyranny of the weak', the extent to which a big power rivalry can enhance rather than diminish the influence of small powers, through their ability to threaten defection or collapse¹⁷.

Communist parties, then, could develop national discourses and took initiatives yet within the limits of the Cold War. The BCP could not, of course, reject Bulgaria's commitment to the socialist block and the Soviet Union. Its power relied, after all, to a great degree on the Soviet Union and the Red Army as well as the unity within the socialist block. However, as we shall see, the Bulgarian communists could interpret the integration of Bulgaria into the socialist block in national terms. They could argue that this was the best solution not only for the BCP but also for the Bulgarian nation. This chapter then traces the development of such a Bulgarian communist national discourse and suggests that in the early post-war years, this discourse was much more extensive than previously thought.

Although the case before the Second World War was that nation-states formed alliances and some times nearly subordinated their foreign policy to interests of empires or international coalitions, post-war settlements divided the world into two blocks. This transformed international relations and particularly affected less powerful nation-states, which now strictly operated inside blocks. Much of the literature has discussed nationalism before the Second World War in-depth¹⁸. There is relatively little literature on the nationalism of the Cold War era. What had happened to nationalism then? Had it disappeared? Examining the case of Bulgaria, it is argued

¹⁷ Gaddis (2000): 30-32.

¹⁸ The case of Hobsbawm (1993) is very striking. It seems that the course of nationalism stops at the end of the Second World War, whilst nationalism re-emerged after 1989, as if it was, for some reasons, frozen.

here that during the Cold War nationalism did develop but inside the two blocks. A nationalist discourse emerged in which belonging to one group or the other was of major significance. We may call this phenomenon as “nationalism of belonging”. Within this context, nation-states had to decide where they belonged, who was with them, and who were their friends and enemies.

The international polarisation, generated by the world wide dichotomy, was reflected in the Bulgarian domestic affairs, but, as shown in this chapter, was also articulated in national terms. Bulgaria’s membership of the socialist block was interpreted as a solution perfectly compatible with the national interests and the national identity of the Bulgarian people. As Chervenkov put it, “all honest and real Bulgarian patriots cannot imagine... a bright future of [our] people outside the democratic block, without eternal association with the Soviet Union”¹⁹. The normal position of Bulgaria, as all Bulgarian patriots could see, was in the socialist block. The Bulgarian communist leaders also argued that Bulgaria belonged to the Eastern block on grounds of tribal and language affinity, historical traditions and cultural mutual relations²⁰. The idea of Bulgarian-Soviet affinity was also described as a ‘law-governed result of eternal, or rather of a thousand-year old, intercourse between the Bulgarian and Russian people’²¹. The opposition’s interpretation of Bulgaria’s incorporation into the socialist block, that the Communist Party relied for its power on external forces, namely, the Red Army, could then be discredited and seen as opposed to the real national interests.

This chapter indicates that nationalism at this level generated a further set of binary divisions (originating both in the national and communist world view) and a clear-cut distinction between friends and enemies, in which certain qualities were attributed to one set of nations and the observe to the other set. If a nation is conceived as part of a certain block (insider), it is conceived of as sharing the same qualities with the fellow-nations of that block. If a nation is conceived outside that certain block (outsider), it is conceived of as being deprived of the qualities of the respective block. Insiders were friends, whereas outsiders were enemies. Key elements in the articulation of such

¹⁹ Rabotnichesko Delo #233, 07.10.1947.

²⁰ Kolarov (1977): 65.

²¹ Rabotnichesko Delo #269, 19.11.1946.

discourse were the anti-imperialist idea, the concept of “socialist patriotism”, the idea of eternal association with the Soviet Union, the idea of a new Pan-Slav movement, and strong competition with nations-enemies. At another level, specific questions of foreign policy were also addressed within this framework, drawing on and reinforcing the division of the world into friends and enemies of the nation.

4.1 Binary divisions

Billig has deployed bisecting notions such as “in-group” and “out-group”, or “insider” and “outsider” respectively, in order to show how a community, e.g. a nation, imagines the preconditions of including the fellow and excluding the other²². A group identity involves categorisation, which segmented the world, dividing “insiders” from “outsiders”. Extending these notions to the context of the Cold War, it could be argued that a group identity (what I call here nationalism of belonging) was established under the conditions of a worldwide division between the Western capitalist block and the Eastern socialist one. The world division into an “in-group” and “out-group” involved world wide binary divisions.

The division of world into two parts was convenient both for the communist and nationalist world view, not as Verdery claims one after the other (first communism and then nationalism)²³ but in parallel. Communist parties dichotomised the moral universe, dividing the world into Good and Bad, communism and capitalism, Party members and dissidents²⁴. Within the context of the Cold War, binary oppositions of peace versus imperialism, friends versus enemies, and the camp of Good versus the camp of Evil, came into force.

In the examination of what she calls the forging of the British nation, Colley argues that war and confrontation with an ‘obviously hostile Other (France) encouraged Britons to define themselves collectively against it’. They decided who they were by reference to who and what they were not. Attributing to the French Other qualities such as being Catholic, superstitious, militarist, decadent and unfree, they reassured

²² Billig (1995): 66.

²³ Verdery (1992) *passim*.

²⁴ Verdery (1992): 10.

the British Self²⁵. A similar path was followed Bulgarian communist nationalism in the Cold War era.

With respect to totalitarianism, Lefort similarly argues that the definition of the enemy is constitutive of an identity²⁶; hence, construction of the enemy is essential for the identification of the self. The homogenisation and substantialisation of the nation can only be obtained in and through the discursive construction of enemies of the nation.

The nation, however, had not only enemies but also friends. The distinction between friend nations and enemy nations can be explained by the complex interaction between equivalence and difference at different levels. The logic of equivalence functions by creating equivalential identities (progressive, freedom-loving, peaceful, democratic, and patriotic) and insisting on a political frontier between two opposed camps (socialist and imperialist). The logic of equivalence assisted the conceptualisation of the common socialist camp distinctly opposed to the imperialist. As Mouffe argues, drawing on Carl Schmitt, where clear-cut relations of equivalence are prevalent, relations between competing groups tend to take a 'friend-enemy' form²⁷. At a different level, the logic of difference operated. As it attempts to weaken and displace antagonisms, it facilitated the integration into the socialist block of different subjects (non-Slav and Slav nations, socialist countries and anti-imperialist movements).

The concepts of "friend nations" and "enemy nations", however, also have their parallels in the more recent and more immediately influential Soviet past. It could be argued that the former originated in the metaphor of the Friendship of Peoples, introduced by Stalin in 1935. Martin shows that the metaphor of the Friendship of Peoples granted the Russians a primary role as the motivating force that forged and sustained the friendship among the Soviet nations, while it stemmed from the notion of the Brotherhood of the Peoples, which presented Moscow as the centre of the

²⁵ Colley (1992): 5-6.

²⁶ Lefort (1986): 287.

²⁷ Mouffe (1993): 50. See, for example, Furet's analysis of the French Revolution, which shows that all identities belonged either to the equivalential chain of the "people" or that of the "ancient regime", in Furet (1978).

proletarian revolution, not the capital of Russia²⁸. In the post-war years, the Soviet Union assumed the key role of promulgating friendship among socialist nations. As had earlier occurred within the borders of the USSR, weekly cultural and art festivals were held to celebrate other socialist countries in order to promote the friendship of socialist nations. Martin argues that the Friendship of the Peoples allowed for a form of militancy directed against foreign enemies²⁹. As we shall see, the nation-friends of Bulgaria were, first and foremost, the Soviet Union, the Slav nations, and other socialist nations.

As Martin³⁰ indicates, in the Great Terror era, all the diaspora nationalities of the Soviet Union were characterised as enemy nations, quoting internal documents of the Soviet political police directed against “nationalities of foreign governments” and the Politburo decree of 1938 referring to the “operation for the destruction of espionage and sabotage contingents made up of Poles, Latvians, Germans, Estonians, Finns, Greeks, Iranians, Kharbintsy (ethnic Russians), Chinese, and Romanians, both foreign subjects and Soviet citizens”. These politics relied on Soviet fears of border-crossing recruited spies and saboteurs and contributed to the paranoia of the Soviet Union. Similar fears were developed in the Bulgarian communist state, which was deeply concerned that minorities remained loyal to the Fatherland Front government³¹. Enemy nations of Bulgaria were, first and foremost, the USA and members of the opposite capitalist block, such as neighbouring enemy nations, that is, the Greeks and Turks.

Because of the polarisation of international relations, the majority of political groups of a given national territory turned towards the particular international block, which could support their political aspirations and views, and attributed to the block of their political preference the role of the defender of people’s freedom and sovereignty. Moreover, each political group argued that alliance with one or the other block was in

²⁸ Martin (2001): 432-437.

²⁹ Martin (2001): 441. He, also, mentions Stalin’s remarks in 1935: “While the friendship of peoples lives and blossoms, we are afraid of no one, neither internal nor external enemies”.

³⁰ Martin (2001): 328-341 passim.

³¹ For dangers came from foreign propaganda, see BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 25, Archival Unit 67: 2 (about Turks), Bulgarian State Records Fund 28, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 116: 297-299 (about Pomaks), and BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 25, Archival Unit 71: 7, 11-12 (about Jews).

a country's national interests³². Belonging to the capitalist or the socialist block was identified with the national aspirations of a country and arguments of a nationalist kind were developed in order to justify alignment with one of the blocks.

This polarisation promoted the idea that “if you are not with us, you are against us”. As Chervenkov put it, ‘there is no middle before this clear outline of the fronts in the contemporary international situation: the front of imperialism and war versus the front of peace and democracy’³³. If a nation is not integrated into the category of “our block”, it simultaneously is against “us”. On a smaller scale, a similar conviction came into force regarding individuals within a nation. If an individual, or a political group, stepped outside the category of “our block”, they simultaneously were not only against “our block” but also against “our nation”. A neutral position or a third category could not be tolerated. On an international scale, socialists, such as Blum and Attlee, were said to conduct treacherous policy as tools of the imperialist enemy³⁴. In the Bulgarian case, the opposition of Petkov and Lulchev as well as the Trotskyites and Anarchist-Communists³⁵, who did not encourage Soviet affiliation and Slav unity, were depicted as outside the Bulgarian nation³⁶. Within this context, for instance, Dimitrov insisted that ‘whoever is against Bulgarian-Soviet association is against Bulgaria. He is not a patriot’³⁷.

Given that Bulgaria belonged to the socialist block, she was supposed to constitute a progressive, freedom-loving, peaceful, democratic, patriotic and anti-imperialist nation in contrast to an “out-group” of reactionary, fascist, warmonger, imperialist, and nationalistic nations. The new national world view thus divided the universe into two categories of nation: “friend nations” and “enemy nations”. Bulgaria's national friends were to be found within the Eastern socialist block, whilst enemy nations were

³² This is how Pastuhov grounded the subordination of Bulgaria to the capitalist block: ‘Let's listen to the voice of America and her president, Truman, with more respect and trust. This voice is friendly, affectionate, gratuitous, and exclusively to our [Bulgarian] benefit’, in Isusov (2000): 134.

³³ Bulgarian State Records Fund 28, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 33 (October 1947): 115-116. See, also, another excerpt of his report: ‘In the struggle against imperialists, in the struggle for peace and democracy, there is no place for any sort of neutrality’, *ibid* 119.

³⁴ Rabotnichesko Delo #232, 05.10.1947 (the founding declaration of the Cominform).

³⁵ BCP Records Fund 191, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 62: 4.

³⁶ Rabotnichesko Delo #7, 11.01.1947.

³⁷ Cited in Lefterov (1954): 32.

all nations being governed by so-called imperialist rulers within the so-called imperialist block.

4.2 The nation and its friends at the international level

By integrating herself into the socialist anti-imperialist block, Bulgaria defined herself as progressive, since she followed a socialist path, in contrast with the reactionary Other of the capitalist imperialist block. The second link of the equivalential chain of socialist nations then concerns the freedom-loving self. In the Cold War context, only the allies of the Eastern Socialist camp were called freedom-loving nations, a name that had been given to the Allies in the Second World War. The USSR was recognised as the leader of the freedom-loving nations. Third, Bulgaria was identified with the so-called block of peace, which would constitute a barrier to the plans of imperialist warmongers. Hence, Bulgaria was defined as peaceful in contrast with the warmonger Other. The fourth binary division was fashioned between democracy and imperialism, which were said to be incompatible³⁸. Finally, nationalism was divided into good and bad kinds. Patriotic nations of the socialist block, defenders of their territory, proclaimed absolute respect for frontiers and announced that they would fight for peace and national independence against any invader, while they would never commit an attack upon foreign territory. Thus, the socialist anti-imperialist block was considered as consisting of progressive, freedom-loving, peaceful, democratic, and patriotic nations. It was inside this camp that Bulgaria found her friends.

4.2.a *Socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism*

The BCP claimed that it had given ample proof of its lofty patriotism in resisting the foreign occupier during the Second World War. This patriotism had however a distinctly socialist dimension. Fighting against Nazism, it had participated in the international struggle of the working people to defeat fascism. Patriotism and internationalism were linked together in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: the Soviet Army fought for both the defence of the Soviet land and the liberation of other countries from the fascist yoke. Thus, in the Second World War, patriotism and

³⁸ Rabotnicheskovo Delo #232, 05.10.1947 (the founding declaration of the Cominform).

internationalism had become reconciled within a particular theoretical framework. In the post-war years, proletarian internationalism and socialist patriotism took a new shape: national unity at home and alliance abroad with the peaceful socialist countries against the imperialist powers.

In the discourse of Dimitrov this nationalism was given a particular inflection. Bulgarians ‘must keep their fatherland as the apple of their eye. This is our fatherland, not the fatherland of reactionaries, speculators, and appropriators. This is the fatherland of workers, peasants, free intelligentsia, honest and good industrialists and merchants, of the entire Bulgarian people’³⁹. Dimitrov’s nationalism echoes that of Stalin: ‘In the past we did not have and could not have a fatherland, but now, after capitalism’s collapse and the working class seizure of power, we do have a fatherland and we defend its independence’⁴⁰. In complete contrast with the Marxian dictum that “the proletarians have no country”, it seemed that the proletarians had now acquired many different countries.

This sort of nationalism, that is, defence of the socialist fatherland, was declared as a genuine patriotism, quite different to bourgeois nationalism, defined as the enemy of communism⁴¹. This version of nationalism, “socialist patriotism”, allowed for national peculiarities. Bulgaria could obtain knowledge from the Soviet experience; however, she could adjust the Soviet experience to its own national road to socialism⁴².

Socialist patriotism seems to be coterminous with the concept of the “socialist nation”, laid out in Stalin’s 1929 article “The Nationalities Question and Leninism” and meant the new Soviet nations. At that time, as Martin points out⁴³, Stalin suggested that only bourgeois nations would disappear with the end of capitalism, or rather not disappear but become transformed into socialist nations. Even though he still believed in the disappearance of nations in the distant future after the worldwide triumph of socialism, Stalin came close to asserting the permanence of socialist nations.

³⁹ Rabotnichesko Delo #381, 11.12.1945.

⁴⁰ From “Questions of Leninism” (1940), cited in Kalinin (1944): 5.

⁴¹ Dimitrov (1949): 55.

⁴² Rabotnichesko Delo #269, 19.11.1946.

⁴³ Martin (2001): 447-448.

“Proletarian internationalism”, as defined by Dimitrov, implies ‘a firm unified front of the new democracies and the USSR in the struggle against the aggressive forces of international reaction and imperialism’⁴⁴. As the Soviet Union was the key element of proletarian internationalism, every internationalist should defend the USSR, because by defending the universal basis of the revolutionary working movement internationalists were defending their own countries. Maintaining the integrity of the USSR would ensure integrity of the anti-imperialist front, the defender of national independence and state sovereignty of each socialist country.

A series of books, mainly translated from Russian⁴⁵, appeared in the early post-war years, which linked nationalism, internationalism, and socialism closely together. Soviet patriotism, as defined by Lenin and Stalin, co-ordinates love of fatherland, nation, mother tongue, national traditions and culture, on the one hand, and the vital interests of all working people, on the other. Soviet patriotism is not only love of the fatherland, but also of the socialist fatherland, which implies an independent and blossoming fatherland. Within this context, internationalism presupposes socialist patriotism. According to Obretenov⁴⁶ claims, Lenin⁴⁷ and Stalin had synthesised patriotism and internationalism, so that patriotism and the international solidarity of proletarians had now become indivisible. As Zhdanov put it, ‘Stalin made it clear that between internationalism properly understood and proletarian patriotism there can be no contradictions. Rootless cosmopolitanism that denies national feelings and the notion of a homeland has nothing in common with proletarian internationalism’⁴⁸. Zhdanov, also, underlined that ‘internationalism comes into existence where national art blossoms out. If we ignore this truth... we will become cosmopolitans without a fatherland’⁴⁹. For these reasons, the working class is the most patriotic because it is the best adherent of internationalism. Thus, the ideological gap between nationalism and internationalism could be bridged through Soviet patriotism and, also,

⁴⁴ Dimitrov (1949): 55.

⁴⁵ For example, see ‘Soviet patriotism’ (1948) and Sobolev (1949).

⁴⁶ Obretenov (1950): 10.

⁴⁷ Pavlov refers to an excerpt from Lenin in order to legitimate patriotism: ‘Patriotism is one of the deepest emotions, established during centuries and millennia in separate fatherlands’, in Pavlov (1939): 12-13.

⁴⁸ Banac (2003): 163, dated in 1941.

⁴⁹ Rabotnichesko Delo #114, 16.05.1948. Zhdanov sees cosmopolitanism as an imperialist world view.

“proletarian internationalism”. The convergence of proletarian internationalism and socialist patriotism justified the hegemonic role of the Soviet Union in the eastern block and the participation of Bulgaria in it.

4.2.b *The anti-imperialist idea and the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau)*

As argued above⁵⁰, the anti-imperialist idea had first been formulated in the inter-war period. Up to 9 September, the BCP had promoted the anti-imperialist idea to criticise the “anti-national conduct” of the ruling classes that had submitted Bulgaria to the imperialist powers. Insofar as the September 9 uprising guaranteed the independent political and economic development of Bulgaria, the Fatherland Front’s main objective was to ensure national independence, state sovereignty and territorial integrity for Bulgaria. No foreign power would interfere in the domestic affairs of Bulgaria and Bulgaria would stand on an equal footing to any nation. In the post-war period, the anti-imperialist struggle became a struggle for maintaining national independence and sovereignty. In this struggle, the communist parties and the socialist countries had to deal with the threat of a new form of imperialism that had emerged in the post-war period.

Anti-imperialism implied that members of the socialist block would not attack each other. Furthermore, membership of the eastern, so-called anti-imperialist block involved a common anti-imperialist front designed to shield socialist countries from the imperialist tendency of expansionism. Peoples within the capitalist block would use anti-imperialism to oppose exploitation, plundering, and enslavement pursued by great imperialist powers. A new type of international resistance movement against imperialism, and American imperialism in particular, was thus formed including the Soviet Union, first of all and above all, People’s Republics, the working-class movement and the democratic movement of every single country⁵¹, and the national-liberation movement of colonies⁵². Against the threats of the imperialist block, and the USA in particular, socialist countries had come together to establish a common front: the Cominform.

⁵⁰ See Chapter Two, Part Two.

⁵¹ Bulgarian State Records Fund 28, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 33 (October 1947): 115.

⁵² Rabotnichesko Delo #28, 05.02.1947.

The BCP integrated Bulgaria into the Cominform and the anti-imperialist block, arguing that the national interests of Bulgaria coincided with the interests of that block and, in particular, with the interests of the Soviet Union, the hegemonic power of that block. Within this context, defence of the anti-imperialist block was identified with defence of national independence and state sovereignty.

Within the framework of the Cominform, Bulgaria signed “agreements of friendship, solidarity and mutual assistance” with the Soviet Union and the country-members of the socialist block. These agreements were designed to collectively shield signatory countries against the aggression of imperialist states and their allies. They involved clauses on mutual assistance in economic and cultural matters, and due measures for the defence of state security, national independence, and territorial integrity.

Agreements between Bulgaria on the one side and Slav and democratic countries on the other were to ensure the unity of the socialist block. The signatories promised to support every initiative for obviating any danger of aggression and ensuring world peace⁵³. These agreements created a net of friendly and fellow countries pledged to resist to imperialism, in general, and to mobilise their subjects in the case of war, in particular⁵⁴. The Bulgarian regime presented these agreements as a common attempt to secure Bulgaria’s freedom, independence, sovereignty, and a bright future⁵⁵.

This anti-imperialist stance of communist parties and socialist countries made patriotic devotion to nation perfectly compatible with devotion to a foreign country, the Soviet Union. Socialist nations would defend their own independence but, at the same time, they would defend the national independence of their comradeship and the USSR, the legitimating leading force of the anti-imperialist block and the fatherland of world socialism.

4.2.c *Pan-Slavism*

⁵³ See, for instance, the Agreement of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance signed by Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, in *Rabotnichesko Delo* #279, 29.11.1947.

⁵⁴ See, for instance, the Agreement of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance signed by Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, in *Rabotnichesko Delo* #279, 29.11.1947, and Bulgaria and Albania, in *Rabotnichesko Delo* #296, 18.12.1947 respectively. The relevant articles are identical.

⁵⁵ *Rabotnichesko Delo* #143, 25.06.1947.

In developing their nationalist discourse at this level, the BCP turned to a version of Pan-Slavism. It developed its nationalist discourse in part by integrating what might, following Balibar, be called racialised elements, in this case in the form of Pan-Slavism. Balibar sees racism as a supplement internal to nationalism⁵⁶. He discusses the overall connection between racism and nationalism outlining cases where racism emerges out of nationalism⁵⁷.

In this sense, the Pan-Slav discourse of the BCP was not a unique discourse, where race and nation becomes closely articulated, with each other conferring legitimation on the other. As Gilroy argues⁵⁸, racialised elements could bridge opposing nationalisms (e.g. the Bulgarian and Serbian nationalisms). Racial discourses also are important in constructing in-groups, that is in this case, camps or blocks. These can be considered as locations in which particular versions of solidarity, belonging, kinship, and identity that transcend the nation have been devised and practiced.

To begin with, Pan-Slavism provided an image of what might be called multi-speed nations: Slav nations had reached a more advanced (socialist) mode of production than that existing in non-Slav countries (capitalism). This schema reflects the Stalinist doctrine of “socialism in one country” and the consequential uneven advance to socialism. As socialism is identified with the Slav world within this theoretical framework, some nations are presented as guides of the others, that is, superior to them. Thus, internationalism and solidarity essentially were to be developed between unequal subjects and to be exerted mainly for the defence of the socialist block and, in particular, for the motherland of socialism, the Soviet Union.

Secondly, Pan-Slavism helped to explain the advance of socialism on what were almost racial-national grounds. The Slav character was considered an asset with regard to socialist achievements. Chervenkov argued that the Slavs overthrew the fascist regimes of their countries and undertook democratic transformations. An alliance of workers, peasants, and intellectuals as well as the eradication of

⁵⁶ Balibar (1991): 54.

⁵⁷ Balibar (1991): 37-64.

⁵⁸ Gilroy (2000): 82-85.

unemployment took place in Slav countries⁵⁹. A social development is here effectively attributed to a racial-national cause. Slav countries were identified with socialism. This argument was particularly useful for the discourse of the Communist Party, because it helped to explain the international position of the Bulgarian nation. Since Bulgaria was a member of the Slav family, it had also to be simultaneously a communist one.

For Slav unity was a fundamental axiom in the discourse of the BCP. It was argued that the national interests of Bulgaria was dictated by the solidarity of the Slav nations⁶⁰. All the Slav people are depicted as members of one large family. Bulgaria is seen to belong to a community of nations, the family of Slav nations; therefore, the Bulgarian nation is conceived of as a collective individual. However, internal enemies in each Slav country, that is, national apostates, played the role of a Trojan horse and sought to disunite the Slavs. National apostates were seen as serving German, and later on American, imperialism⁶¹.

After the Second World War, a Slav Convention in Sofia (on 3rd March 1945, the anniversary of the national liberation of Bulgaria from the Turkish yoke) and a Pan-Slav Congress (December 1946) were convened. They were to affirm the new type of Pan-Slavism which Stalin and the Soviet Union had pioneered. To distinguish the new Pan-Slav movement from the old Tsarist Pan-Slavism, Stalin declared that the Soviet Union would foster a Slav union consisting of equal members⁶². The new Pan-Slav movement denounced aggressiveness and imperialism, whilst asserting that it would develop peace, democracy, and cultural progress.

The BCP bound the destiny of Bulgaria together with that of the USSR and the other Slav nations⁶³. The BCP, as Chervenkov announced in the Pan-Slav Congress of Belgrade, envisaged 'eternal association with the Soviet Union and fraternal co-

⁵⁹ Rabotnichesko Delo #284, 06.12.1946.

⁶⁰ Rabotnitsesko Delo #230, 18.06.1945.

⁶¹ Rabotnichesko Delo #135, 24.02.1945.

⁶² Rabotnichesko Delo #135, 24.02.1945.

⁶³ References to the Soviet Union having liberated Bulgaria twice (once in the Russo-Turkish war in 1877-1878 and then again in the Second World War), and slogans about Slav unity are frequent in the proclamations of the Fatherland Front and the BCP. See, for instance, Fund 1, Inventory 7, Archival Unit 3 (September 1944): 1, The Fatherland War... (1978, vol. 1): 98, The Fatherland War... (1978, vol. 2): 339-340 and The Fatherland War... (1978, vol. 3): 364.

operation and proximity with all Slav nations' for the future of a free and independent Bulgarian nation⁶⁴. It also recognised the hegemonic role of the Soviet Union within the socialist block. Nevertheless, communist politicians and intellectuals constantly highlighted the contribution of Bulgaria to Slav culture. They claimed that Bulgaria was the classical focus of Slav literature, the cradle of Pan-Slav education, and the apostle of Slav unity⁶⁵. In many ways, Bulgaria was presented in this discourse as a privileged member of the united Slav world.

4.2.d *The Soviet Union*

With regard to the relation between members of the Slav family of nations, Stalin and the BCP declared complete equality and common respect between Slav nations⁶⁶. However, the Soviet Union was always referred to in Party discourse separately from the rest of Slav nations; hence, its centrality in the Slav world was highlighted. The Soviet Union liberated Bulgaria and all Slavs from German imperialism; the Soviet Union, moreover, was the defender of the independence and sovereignty of the Slavs. As the Slav Convention declared, the Soviet Union was the flag of Slav nations and Stalin was the best friend of the Slavs⁶⁷. The Soviet Union, thereby, enjoyed a central and key position within the family of Slav nations: first among equals. At the same point, the Bulgarian communist leaders promoted an elevation of Bulgaria on the symbolic level, arguing that Bulgaria had developed a particular and favourable relation with the USSR because of their thousand-old affinity⁶⁸.

The international role of the Soviet Union rendered her the focus of international proletarian devotion. It represented the motherland of all workers and it was also the country where the first successful socialist revolution had occurred. The significance of the international role of the Soviet Union was enhanced after she defeated Germany: an image that she had saved Europe and civilisation from fascist barbarity was shaped. This role legitimised claims of national leaderships to approach to her as

⁶⁴ Rabotnichesko Delo #284, 06.12.1946.

⁶⁵ Rabotnichesko Delo #142, 05.03.1947.

⁶⁶ See, for instance, Rabotnichesko Delo #284, 06.12.1946.

⁶⁷ Rabotnichesko Delo #142, 05.03.1945.

⁶⁸ Rabotnichesko Delo #269, 19.11.1946.

a mighty democratic and progressive ally. The Soviet Union thus became the bond of cohesion within the “anti-imperialist coalition”.

Affinity between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union was considered the cornerstone of national policy in Bulgaria⁶⁹. Dimitrov insisted that ‘there is no sober-minded Bulgarian patriot who is not convinced that a real friendship with the Soviet Union is no less necessary for the national independence and prosperity of Bulgaria than sun and air for a live organism’⁷⁰. For this reason, all Bulgarian patriots had to support a ‘continuous and eternal alliance with the Soviet Union, our [Bulgaria’s] selfless defender and patron’⁷¹.

Bulgaria looked to the Soviet Union for assistance on a range of key issues, including for instance the conclusion of a peace treaty and financial matters⁷². The Bulgarian regime expressed its gratitude to the USSR for the support of the Bulgarian cause in the Paris Conference. Because of the alliance with the Soviet Union, the Bulgarian borders were secured from aggressive Greek aspirations backed by powerful allies, and Bulgaria improved her international situation. Significantly, the BCP stressed that the USSR contributed to the restoration of Dobrudzha to Bulgaria⁷³, which was an old, historical national claim of the latter. The Party also hoped that the protection of the Soviet Union, and support of Slav and democratic nations would restore Western Thrace to Bulgaria⁷⁴. The Soviet Army would prevent Bulgaria from being plundered by hostile imperialist powers⁷⁵. For her assistance, the Soviet Union expected Bulgaria to mould a free and independent nation, so as Bulgaria would never again turn against the Soviet Union in support of imperialistic pretensions of capitalist powers, as she had done in the past.

⁶⁹ Kolarov (1977): 65.

⁷⁰ Rabotnichesko Delo #269, 19.11.1946.

⁷¹ Rabotnichesko Delo #275, 26.11.1946. , Dimitrov’s letter to the Congress of the Bulgarian-Soviet Society.

⁷² Lazarov (1945): 9, 13.

⁷³ Kolarov (1977): 66-67.

⁷⁴ Rabotnichesko Delo #287, 10.12.1946. Indeed, Slav delegates and above all the Polish and the Ukrainian vigorously supported the Bulgarian claims on Western Thrace at the Peace Conference, in King (1973): 50.

⁷⁵ Rabotnichesko Delo #77, 02.04.1948.

Any kind of interference by the Soviet Union in the domestic affairs of Bulgaria was presented as based on the criterion of national interest. First of all, the advance of the Red Army within Bulgarian territory was not interpreted as an invasion but as a liberation campaign⁷⁶. The Red Army had come into Bulgaria to liberate the Bulgarian nation from the German yoke and fascism rather than to liberate the (Bulgarian) toiling masses from capitalist bonds. Afterwards, the stationing of the Red Army in Bulgaria was to preserve her national sovereignty and defend her from any international intervention. The Red Army also warded off civil war. The participation of Soviet specialists in the administration of the Ministry of the Interior had helped improve its services⁷⁷. Hence, the BCP provided a set of nationalist reasons to explain and legitimise the presence of the Soviet Union and the Red Army.

Bulgaria expressed her gratitude towards the Soviet Union for the central role she had played in Bulgaria's national survival, both past and present, by the establishment of the "Monument to the Red Army". The USSR and the Red Army were to be honoured by the establishment of a central, impressive monument dedicated to the Red Army. In the past, the Soviet Union had liberated Bulgaria and saved universal culture and civilisation from Teutonic hordes. In the present, the Soviet Union was recognised as the fighter for peace and defender of the small nations, such as Bulgaria, from imperialist aspirations and warmongers. For all these reasons, as the *Rabotnichesko Delo* stressed, 'no Bulgarian heart could exist that does not join initiatives for the immortalisation of the Bulgarian people's recognition towards the Soviet Army', and the Soviet Union in general. Gratitude towards the Soviet Union is also expressed for the financial assistance she offered with the reconstruction and stabilisation of Bulgaria's national economy. Bulgaria would never be once again a colony of capitalist and imperialist powers⁷⁸.

Bulgaria's national devotion was not confined to just the Soviet Union. Stalin, as an individual, was depicted as the best friend of the Bulgarian nation. On the occasion of Stalin's 66th birthday, the *Rabotnichesko Delo* expressed the gratitude of the Bulgarian people to the Red Army, the Soviet Union, and Stalin, since the Bulgarian

⁷⁶ See, for instance, Fund 1, Inventory 7, Archival Unit 3 (September 1944): 1, *The Fatherland War...* (1978, vol. 1): 98 and *The Fatherland War...* (1978, vol. 2): 339-340.

⁷⁷ Isusov (2000): 298.

⁷⁸ *Rabotnichesko Delo* #230, 03.10.1947.

people owed to them their freedom, their people's sovereignty, their independence, and their national survival. For this reason, every real and conscious Bulgarian was supposed to send their wishes to Stalin, the so-called best friend of Bulgaria⁷⁹.

4.2.e *Non-Slav socialist friends*

Within the socialist block, Bulgaria, of course, also had other, non-Slav friends. The foundation of the Cominform, the forging of the socialist block, and the signing of "agreements of friendship, solidarity and mutual assistance" were key elements in the articulation of a particular discourse which linked Bulgaria also to non-Slav nations in the socialist block. For instance, an old friendship and co-operation with Romania was projected in order to rationalise a bilateral agreement. In Ottoman times, Romania was supposed to have been a "Promised Land" for Bulgarian revolutionaries. Romanian soldiers had served in the Russian Army which liberated Bulgaria in 1877-78. Both countries suffered from the imperialist yoke and their national resources had been plundered by foreign appropriators with the collaboration of treacherous domestic rulers. The wars fought against each other were the result of imperialist conspiracies. After the collapse of fascism and chauvinism Bulgaria and Romania had now become unconditional allies⁸⁰.

Some effort was even made to forge equivalence between Slav and non-Slav nations in order that any disparity in "blood" be surmounted. An excerpt of Dimitrov's speech on the case of signing an agreement between Bulgaria and Albania provides a good example of this kind of argument: 'the Albanian people are not a Slav one in terms of blood. Nevertheless, concerning their national spirit, will and heroism, concerning their love of freedom and the independence of their fatherland, the Albanian people are certainly a friend nation of us; it is identical with Slav nations and belongs to the anti-imperialist block'⁸¹.

4.3 The nation and its enemies at the international level

⁷⁹ Rabotnichesko Delo #390, 21.12.1945.

⁸⁰ Rabotnichesko Delo #159, 13.07.1947, #160, 15.07.1947, and #20, 27.01.1948.

⁸¹ Rabotnichesko Delo #293, 15.12.1947.

The socialist anti-imperialist camp was contrasted to the capitalist imperialist one, made up of a set of reactionary, fascist, bellicose, imperialist, and nationalistic nations. Nations of the capitalist block were called reactionary, since they were fighting any advance to socialism. Reactionary nations were still competing to gain markets and spheres of influence, whereas progressive countries had already attained co-operation, equality, and peace. The capitalist block was, even indirectly, denounced as a successor to the fascist Axis, as we shall see below. The capitalist block was blamed for inciting new wars. Chervenkov claimed that reactionary forces and capitalist trusts and cartels of the West were inciting a new war. According to him, all who opposed Slav unity belonged to the block of warmongers⁸². For instance, the opposition of Petkov and Lultsev, who were critical of the role of the Soviet Union, was blamed for inciting a civil war on behalf of imperialists. The imperialist block was identified with the enemy of democracy and independence, as imperialism was attacked for enslaving peoples. Nationalistic nations of the imperialist block were denounced as warmongers that pursued military-strategic initiatives, economic expansionism, and financial enslavement of other nations⁸³. ‘Reactionary, rapacious, nationalist and cosmopolitan bourgeois ideology is in contrast with the progressive, patriotic and internationalist ideology of the proletariat’⁸⁴.

4.3 a *The past and the present worst enemy of the Slav peoples*

The common struggle of all the Slav peoples, for the first time in history, against their common, perpetual enemy was also a key theme in Party discourse⁸⁵. The First Congress of the Fatherland Front stated that proximity and collaboration between the Slav nations would defend them from German aggression and would guarantee that their nations would flourish⁸⁶. The definition, then, of Germany as the enemy of Slavs contributed to the idea of Slav unity. The Slav family of nations was juxtaposed with the Teutons. The clash between socialism and fascism was articulated in part as a clash between Slavs and Germans.

⁸² Rabotnichesko Delo #284, 06.12.1946.

⁸³ Rabotnichesko Delo #232, 05.10.1947 (the founding declaration of the Cominform).

⁸⁴ Obretenov (1950): 4.

⁸⁵ The Fatherland War... (1978, vol. 3): 545, Rabotnichesko Delo #284, 06.12.1946.

⁸⁶ Manifestos and resolutions... (1945): 17.

After the collapse of Germany, a new enemy had to be discursively constructed. The U.S.A. and the U.K. were now said to constitute the main threat to the USSR and the new communist regimes. The displacement of the inimical subject is evident in the following eloquent excerpt from Stalin: 'Hitler began his work of unleashing war by proclaiming a race theory, declaring that only German-speaking people constituted a superior nation... Churchill sets out to unleash a race theory that only English-speaking nations are superior nations, who are called upon to decide the destinies of the entire world... [Churchill claims that] superior nations should rule over the rest of the nations of the world'⁸⁷. In other words, the new enemy of the Slavs, that is the English-speaking nations, put in danger the national independence, socialist development and advancement of the Slav nations.

Imperialism of the post-war period was personified by the USA, which took over the role of Germany in seeking to predominate over the world. It was argued that France and the U.K. had been materially weakened because of the war⁸⁸. Germany -the old enemy of Bulgaria, Slav nations, and anti-imperialist forces- was now replaced by the USA. The USA embodied the number one enemy of the socialist block⁸⁹, and of Bulgaria, in particular. Members of the USA-dominated block were regarded as being coerced in contrast to the freely established socialist block. The USA could personify the evil nation, which strove to subjugate peoples in order to achieve her imperialist interests, whereas the Soviet Union appeared to be the defender of peoples' independence. Moreover, such a well-defined evil, which threatened the independence and prosperity of the country, could explain some of the domestic difficulties and authoritative measures undertaken by the Bulgarian regime (e.g. low productivity attributed to sabotages, violence of Militia etc).

It was argued that the Truman doctrine and the Marshal Plan gave clear evidence of American imperialist expansionism⁹⁰. With regard to the Marshal Plan in particular, the Soviet Union argued that all free people should not accept it, because it would violate their sovereignty⁹¹. The Marshal Plan was seen as an attempt by the USA to

⁸⁷ 'Stalin on the October Revolution...': 10.

⁸⁸ Bulgarian State Records Fund 28, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 33 (October 1947): 115.

⁸⁹ According to Zhdanov, the main force in the imperialist camp, in Loth (1988): 160.

⁹⁰ Bulgarian State Records Fund 28, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 33 (October 1947): 115.

⁹¹ Rabotnichesko Delo #144, 26.06.1947.

intervene in the domestic affairs of European countries and as an attempt to purchase the state sovereignty of each recipient. It was argued that American monopolies had fashioned the Marshal Plan essentially in order to maximise their profits⁹².

As Poptomov⁹³ stated, any kind of loan or assistance given from the USA aimed at subordinating the recipient to the USA in economic and political terms. These tactics constituted a gross interference in the domestic affairs of a state. The invocation of communist danger was just a cloak to conceal the imperialist expansion of the USA⁹⁴. The national interests of Bulgaria dictated that she kept herself outside the American-dominated block. The main objective of the anti-imperialist front was to stop the advance of imperialists and to protect the national independence and sovereignty of each nation-member of the block. The Fatherland Front considered it its foremost task to ensure Bulgaria's national sovereignty against imperialist aggression⁹⁵.

4.3.b *Neighbouring enemy nations of Bulgaria*

Apart from the most significant imperialist enemies, who were common for all the Slav and socialist countries, Bulgaria faced particular enemies in her surroundings. These were countries (Greece and Turkey in particular), which belonged to the opposite camp and thus, by definition, were hostile to the independence, integrity, and prosperity of Bulgaria and attempted to cause difficulties to her.

As the BCP claimed, Bulgaria had to be in a state of constant alert because of recurrent border incidents, provoked by the Greek monarchist-fascists and Turks, as well as the slanderous campaign of the Greek and Turkish press⁹⁶. The Bulgarian regime protested against air trespass by Greek airplanes. It also rejected claims that armed paramilitary groups were being concentrated along the Greek border and that the Bulgarian Army trained Greek partisans⁹⁷. Greece turned to the United Nations

⁹² Rabotnichesko Delo #156, 10.07.1947.

⁹³ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

⁹⁴ Rabotnichesko Delo #115, 22.05.1947.

⁹⁵ Second Fatherland Front Congress (1948): 10.

⁹⁶ Second Fatherland Front Congress (1948): 10, Rabotnichesko Delo #275, 25.11.1947.

⁹⁷ Rabotnichesko Delo #281, 03.12.1946, and Rabotnichesko Delo #282, 04.12.1946.

asking for an inquiry commission, which supported the Greek claims⁹⁸. On the contrary, the Bulgarian regime claimed that Greek armed units had invaded Bulgarian territory under the pretext of pursuing partisans⁹⁹. The Greek state was also accused of fomenting sabotage and diversions in Bulgaria and of supporting the treacherous opposition¹⁰⁰. The fundamental reason for the bad Greek-Bulgarian relations lay in Greek claims of a “strategic borderline” with Bulgaria, that is, the annexation of a strip of Bulgarian land from Greece, and the demands for high war reparations.

The Bulgarian regime strongly criticised the Turkish government after an incident surrounding the crash of two Turkish airplanes (February 1948). Kolarov declared that Bulgaria was a sovereign state and her right and duty was to maintain the inviolability of her territory and air space. The government launched a vehement criticism against the anti-Bulgarian campaign held by the Turkish “reactionary” government after the event¹⁰¹. Besides, the Fatherland Front government feared that the significant Turkish minority living in Bulgaria could develop relations with Turkey or orchestrated spy rings within Bulgarian territory¹⁰².

Incidents concerning either Greece or Turkey were used to mobilise support inside Bulgaria. The numerous meetings¹⁰³ held in Sofia on the occasion of the kidnapping of three Bulgarian frontier guards by Greek militaries, and the “constant invasion of Greek monarchist-fascists” are revealing. On national grounds, the Bulgarian people were united to express their support and confidence to the government. In that way, by invoking national dangers, the BCP attempted to bring the nation together, contrive national cohesion, and presented its government as able to solve national crisis. At the same time, it exploited a decades-long national discourse which projected Greece and Turkey as Bulgaria’s national enemies (centuries-long subjugation by the Turks, and annexation of a big part of Macedonia and Western Thrace by the Greeks).

⁹⁸ In December 1946, Greece demanded from the United Nations an international investigation committee to inspect the south frontier of Bulgaria, in Kalinova and Baeva (2003): 195-196.

⁹⁹ Rabotnichesko Delo #166, 22.07.1947.

¹⁰⁰ Rabotnichesko Delo #220, 21.09.1947.

¹⁰¹ Rabotnichesko Delo #45, 25.02.1948.

¹⁰² Rabotnichesko Delo #83, 09.04.1948. Dimitrov declared that no Turkish national movement in Bulgaria could be recognised, because it would generate a Turkish agency. He added that Turkey should go to Asia, in Kalinova and Baeva (2003): 203.

¹⁰³ Rabotnichesko Delo #86, 13.04.1948.

4.4 National questions

Two national questions mainly affected the relations of Bulgaria with her neighbouring countries. The Thracian and the Macedonian question are discussed here, since they illustrate two important parameters of the national discourse of the BCP. First, the interlocutor in each case was different in terms of the Cold War world division. Yugoslavia was an “insider” (but after 1948, an “outsider”) of the “socialist and democratic international front”, whereas Greece was a member of the block hostile to Bulgaria. Second, both questions clarify aspects of the malleable discourse of the Party concerning the national question. It was a particularly incoherent discourse, because Comintern’s resolutions on national questions, a Stalinist framework of the nation’s definition and nationalities’ policy, contemporary political considerations of the BCP and nationalism of the Bulgarian communists generated a number of contradictions to the approach of the BCP to the national question. Only by taking into account all these parameters we can cast light upon the contradictory discourses and policies of the Party concerning the national question of Bulgaria in that time.

4.4.a *The Thracian question*

The way the BCP dealt with the Thracian question reveals several features of the national discourse of the Bulgarian communist leaders. First, their national discourse reflects to some extent their Stalinist background. Second, the Thracian question involves a particular set of nationalist arguments, as the Party confronted Greek claims on Bulgarian territory and sought to defend the integrity of Bulgaria. In parallel, Bulgaria claimed territory belonging to a victorious country, although she was in essence a defeated country in the war. Territory is a permanent issue of nationalistic discourses and a fundamental feature of national identity¹⁰⁴. However, attempts to sacralise territory and landscape dissimulate the coercion and political

¹⁰⁴ Smith (1991): 14.

considerations that lie behind the demarcation of borders¹⁰⁵. Third, the Thracian question shows, to some degree, the continuity marking Bulgarian nationalism, since organisations and deeds of the “bourgeois” or “fascist” past were manipulated by the new communist regime.



Bulgaria officially claimed an outlet to the Aegean Sea, that is, the restoration of Western Thrace to Bulgaria, as stipulated in the Bucharest agreement¹⁰⁶ (1913). Bulgaria rested her claims for the restoration of Western Thrace on ethnographical and linguistic (an area settled by Bulgarian speaking population for centuries until 1924), territorial (geomorphology, geographical limits), economic (commercial reasons), and psychological (national emotions of Bulgarians as disunited without Western

Thrace) grounds¹⁰⁷. The way that Bulgaria claimed Western Thrace, therefore, recalls the Stalinist definition of nation and nationality, that nation is ‘formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture’¹⁰⁸. It could be argued that the psychological make-up also fashions the argument that about 150,000 Thracian refugees to Bulgaria from Western Thrace needed to be repatriated to their birthplace and the land of their ancestors¹⁰⁹.

Western Thrace was proclaimed a Bulgarian province¹¹⁰. However, as Spencer and Wollman have pointed out, the idea that an identified area of land belongs to a nation is not politically innocent, because frontiers can be matter of political manipulation

¹⁰⁵ O’Dowd and Wilson (1996): 6.

¹⁰⁶ Kolarov presented this demand before the Peace Conference of Paris in 1946, Bulgaria before... (1946): 16. See, also, Bulgaria claims Western Thrace V (1946): 4 and 8.

¹⁰⁷ Bulgaria before... (1946): 11-14, Bulgaria claims Western Thrace V (1946): 5, Memorandum... (1946): 3-12, Western Thrace (1946): passim.

¹⁰⁸ Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question* (1913), in Bruce (1973): 60.

¹⁰⁹ Bulgaria before... (1946): 14 and Bulgaria claims Western Thrace III (1946): 9.

¹¹⁰ Rabotnichesko Delo #102, 11.05.1946 (Kolarov).

and coercion¹¹¹. As Kedourie puts it, ‘natural frontiers do not exist... frontiers are established by power’¹¹². Kolarov, as the leader of the Bulgarian delegation in the Paris Conference, essentially demanded the annexation of a territory, annexed by the Greek state decades earlier and deprived of any Bulgarian element.

The Bulgarian cause that the Bulgarian delegation in the Paris Conference put forward was not limited to claims on Western Thrace. It run up against the Greek project for a “strategic frontier-line with Bulgaria”, that is the annexation of the Rodopian district to Greece. For this purpose, the Bulgarian delegation deployed economic and historical arguments. Kolarov asserted that Greece coveted the prosperous production of tobacco in that area¹¹³. He claimed that Great-Greek chauvinists were seeking an economic stranglehold of Bulgaria¹¹⁴. Kolarov also listed a set of historical injustices committed against Bulgaria: the uneven territorial compensation of Bulgaria by the Great Powers in comparison with her sacrifices in the struggle against the Ottoman Empire and fascism¹¹⁵. Thus, the restoration of Western Thrace to Bulgaria was presented as an issue of international justice¹¹⁶.

The Thracian question proved ideal for deploying a nationalist discourse for domestic consumption. It exposed international friends and enemies before the Bulgarian nation. Thus, the BCP constantly claimed that the deadlock of negotiations with Greece on the Thracian question was due to the so-called monarchist-fascist Greek government. Dimitrov explicitly rejected the ‘unrealistic imperialist pretensions of Great-Greek chauvinists to Bulgarian lands and reparations’¹¹⁷. The Greek fascist regime, which was accused of seeking to plunder foreign lands, was contrasted to the friendly Romanian democratic one, which had peacefully and justly resolved the question of Southern Dobrudzha.

¹¹¹ Spencer and Wollman (2002): 86-88.

¹¹² Cited in Spencer and Wollman (2002): 93.

¹¹³ Bulgaria before... (1946): 5 and Rabotnichesko Delo #102, 11.05.1946.

¹¹⁴ Rabotnichesko Delo #209, 14.09.1946.

¹¹⁵ Bulgaria before... (1946): 5-8 and 14-16, Rabotnichesko Delo #200, 04.09.1946 (speech of Kolarov), Rabotnichesko Delo #209, 14.09.1946.

¹¹⁶ Rabotnichesko Delo #201, 05.09.1946, and Rabotnichesko Delo #209, 14.09.1946.

¹¹⁷ Rabotnichesko Delo #182, 14.08.1946.

Domestic consumption of the Thracian question buttressed the Bulgarian communists in presenting the Fatherland Front government as a national one, which was able to further the Bulgarian cause and to invoke national acquiescence¹¹⁸. The BCP even went so far as to ally itself with the Thracian Organisation, a Great-Bulgarian chauvinist organisation of the past¹¹⁹, in order to support its own nationalist discourse and to win mass support.

The BCP tolerated the Thracian Organisation, a representative of the Thracian émigrés in Bulgaria, on condition that it would toe the Party line as concerns the Thracian question and would rally the Thracian émigrés round the platform of the Fatherland Front¹²⁰. On Dimitrov's instructions¹²¹, the Thracian Organisation addressed a Memorandum¹²² to the Foreign Minister of Great Britain, Ernest Bevin. Even though the integration of Western Thrace to Bulgaria was not plainly expressed, as directed by Dimitrov, in order that the international situation of Bulgaria would not deteriorate¹²³, the Bulgarian character of Western Thrace was emphasised using communist phraseology¹²⁴. Within this context, the Thracian Organisation staged protest rallies with slogans, such as 'Thrace is a Bulgarian land', 'We [Thracian refugees] want to be repatriated', 'A fair solution of the Thracian question is a guarantee for a lasting peace in the Balkans', and 'Fighting greetings to comrades Dimitrov and Kolarov for their brave defence of the Bulgarian national cause'. The Thracian population was dressed in national costumes, while the Thracian question was subordinated to the common Slav cause¹²⁵. Moreover, the Party seriously thought

¹¹⁸ During a strong debate with the opposition in the Bulgarian parliament, Kolarov declared that 'when I supported the right of Bulgaria to an outlet to the Aegean Sea in Paris, the opposition weakened our [Bulgarian] arguments saying that there is no freedom in Bulgaria', *Rabotnichesko Delo* #285, 07.12.1946.

¹¹⁹ According to Vidinski, a BCP member charged of minorities' issues, in BCP Records, Fund 1, Inventory 25, Archival Unit 75 (1945): 8.

¹²⁰ BCP Records, Fund 1, Inventory 8, Archival Unit 79 (1946): 10 and BCP Records, Fund 1, Inventory 8, Archival Unit 82 (1946): 6.

¹²¹ BCP Records, Fund 1, Inventory 8, Archival Unit 82 (1946): 6.

¹²² Memorandum... (1946). It was compiled on a project written by Ormandzhiev, who was to be charged of Great-Bulgarian chauvinism two years later; see BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 743 (1948): 100 and BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 745 (1948): 84.

¹²³ BCP Records, Fund 1, Inventory 8, Archival Unit 82 (1946): 6.

¹²⁴ '...[at] the Berlin Conference... upon the request of Austria, Hungary, Germany with the view of protecting the route to the East for their *imperialist* aims, cut off [Thrace]', 'the *chauvinist policy of expansion* pursued by king Ferdinand, that *German agent*' (emphasis added), Memorandum... (1946): 7 and 9 respectively.

¹²⁵ *Rabotnichesko Delo* #168, 29.07.1946.

of sending a delegation of the Thracian Organisation to Paris in order to support the 'restoration of Western Thrace to the motherland'¹²⁶.

National arguments for Western Thrace were advanced even when they appeared to contradict other political arguments. Thus, the Bulgarian communists argued that, after 09 September 1944, Bulgaria had been liberated from the aggressive politics that the dynasty and the fascist rulers of Bulgaria had pursued in the past. Furthermore, the new, peace-loving Fatherland Front Bulgaria was punishing the culprits of the last Bulgarian occupation of Greek and Yugoslavian territory. These arguments incriminated the past regime, while they implied that Bulgaria would have no pretensions to territory outside of Bulgaria, since she would not follow an aggressive and revisionist policy. However, Kolarov based his argumentation of restoration of Western Thrace to Bulgaria on wars (Balkan Wars), on treaties (the Bucharest Treaty of 1913), on the objection of the Protocol of Lausanne (1924), and on the occupation of Western Thrace from Bulgaria between 1912 and 1919¹²⁷, deeds that the damned dynasty and the fascist Bulgarian governments had committed. As Yugov¹²⁸ declared, 'the concession to Bulgaria of an outlet to the Aegean Sea was not a chauvinistic ideal of Filov, Boris, and Ferdinand, but a vital necessity of Bulgaria, her own struggle'¹²⁹.

4.4.b *The Macedonian question*

The Macedonian question is much more complicated than the Thracian one. One reason for this is that Macedonia was divided between three states, each of which had its own interests. Besides, Macedonia had been claimed by three states and was divided after extensive armed conflicts and two Balkan Wars. Last but not least, Macedonia was the apple of discord between Balkan states for many decades. At the risk of oversimplification then, we could identify the official claims of the three states concerned as follows. The Greek state claimed Macedonia due to mainly historical and religious reasons. Titoist Yugoslavia envisaged a unified Macedonia as an integral part of Yugoslavia. The historical position of Bulgaria was that Macedonia

¹²⁶ BCP Records, Fund 1, Inventory 8, Archival Unit 126 (1946): 1 and Rabotnichesko Delo #168, 29.07.1946.

¹²⁷ Bulgaria before... (1946): 5-6, Rabotnichesko Delo #210, 15.09.1946, and #89, 23.04.1946.

¹²⁸ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

¹²⁹ Rabotnichesko Delo #102, 11.05.1946.

was a Bulgarian land and the population living in Macedonia were Bulgarians. Within the Comintern, the Bulgarian communists admitted that there was an independent Macedonian nationality, even though they insisted on its Bulgarian orientation and the jurisdiction of their party in Macedonia¹³⁰. After 1944, as we shall see, they developed a contradictory discourse, although this always assumed the close affinity of Macedonians and Bulgarians. Thus, depending on the limits that the adherence of Bulgaria to the socialist block allowed for manoeuvring, the Bulgarian communists could recognise a Macedonian nation and, at the same time, they could underline the Bulgarian past and cultural elements of this nation.

Interpreted in a certain manner, the Macedonian question could potentially support the thesis that the BCP was anti-nationalist and consequently internationalist. Current literature sees the Macedonian question from different points of view. Some Bulgarian authors, such as Kalinova and Baeva, have underlined the weak international position of Bulgaria after the Second World War and the contradictory theses of the Comintern on the Macedonian question, which were ‘against the national interests of Bulgaria’¹³¹. Indeed, Bulgaria’s position was inferior to that of Yugoslavia. First, Bulgaria was a defeated country in the Second World War, whilst Yugoslavia was a victorious one. Second, Bulgarian communists depended on the Red Army, whereas Yugoslav communists took power without the support of the Red Army. Nevertheless, within the socialist block Bulgaria had some advantages: the Bulgarian communists were more loyal to the Soviet Union than the Yugoslavs, Dimitrov had a prolonged, very close co-operation with Stalin, and Tito’s hegemonic projects in the Balkan area were to be dismissed by Stalin. In terms of a potential contradiction between Comintern’s theses and Bulgaria’s national interests, it seems that the authors took for granted their own interpretation of Bulgaria’s national interests and overlook the turbulence that the Macedonian question caused within the Comintern and among communist parties interested in it.

Other authors claim that Bulgarian communist leaders of that time acquiesced in the relinquishment of Pirin Macedonia to the People’s Republic of Macedonia. Somewhat paradoxically, Bulgarian and Macedonian nationalists converge at this view. Angelov,

¹³⁰ For more details on the approach of the BCP on the Macedonian question, see Chapter Two.

¹³¹ Kalinova and Baeva (2003): 74 and 77.

from the Bulgarian side, speaks about ‘national treason’¹³². He argues that to realise their policy on Macedonia the Yugoslav communists ‘wisely manipulated the complicated domestic political situation of Bulgaria, her weak international position, and the lack of national interests of the Bulgarian communists regarding the Macedonian question’¹³³. Macedonian authors, such as Karobar and Neshovich¹³⁴, see Dimitrov’s era as a ‘path of reason, understanding, and equitable intergovernmental cooperation’¹³⁵. Thus, the then ‘non-chauvinistic’ Bulgarian communist leadership would forward Macedonia’s unification. All these theses cannot adequately explain why the Bulgarian communists did not, finally, unconditionally and immediately cede Pirin Macedonia to the People’s Republic of Macedonia.

King offers what seems the most credible explanation regarding the Macedonian question. ‘The Bulgarian communists saw Balkan Federation as a way of regaining Macedonia’¹³⁶. They envisaged an independent Macedonia, which due to her historical and ethnic links with Bulgaria would gravitate towards Bulgaria. This view could explain why the Bulgarian communists continued to advocate a separate Macedonian nation after 1948¹³⁷. This view, however, needs to be underpinned with an in-depth analysis of Party’s discourse on the Macedonian question; at the same time, all the contradictions that this discourse and Bulgarian communist policies are distinct for, need to be discussed and explained.

The argument here proposes that the Macedonian question should be seen within the framework of the formation of the socialist block in general and the Bulgarian-Yugoslavian rapprochement in particular. Bulgarian drafts of the unification of Macedonia and the project of “national and cultural self-determination” should be understood as political manoeuvres aiming at easing that rapprochement. Close analysis of them provides some evidence to support the view that the Bulgarian communists were not likely to relinquish Pirin Macedonia to Yugoslavia¹³⁸ and that

¹³² Angelov (1999).

¹³³ Angelov (1999): 290.

¹³⁴ Karobar (1986) and Neshovich (1986).

¹³⁵ Neshovich (1986): 144.

¹³⁶ King (1973): 61. Moore (1984): 194 also seems to share the mind of King.

¹³⁷ King (1973): 188.

¹³⁸ The example of Macedonian emissaries sent by the People’s Republic of Macedonia is striking. The BCP turned against them because they propagandised the immediate and unconditional incorporation of Pirin Macedonia into the People’s Republic of Macedonia. For the troubles they created for the BCP

they imagined Macedonians as a part of the Bulgarian nation. This discourse, however, is full of significant contradictions due to the co-existence of both Marxist (e.g. self-determination of nations) and nationalist elements (e.g. arguments on culture and language).

The Macedonian question was of international strategic significance for the socialist block. It aimed at easing the Bulgarian-Yugoslavian rapprochement and stabilising the incorporation of Yugoslavia into the 'camp of peace and democracy'¹³⁹ and the 'anti-imperialist struggle'¹⁴⁰. Kostov¹⁴¹ claimed that 'keeping the Balkans away from English domination lies mainly in the cooperation of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia'¹⁴². Stalin himself recognised the enormous historical significance that the alliance between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia would have for the future of Slav unity and the socialist block. As he feared a revival of German military strength and German aggressiveness, he perceived the alliance of the two Balkan countries as the basis of a union of all Slav peoples, who were to assist and defend each other in the certain case that Germany would rise again¹⁴³.

By December 1944, Dimitrov had already discussed proposals¹⁴⁴ for the military, economic and political union of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, which was considered the first step to a future unification. Thence the federation of the Southern Slavs could become a *fait accompli* before any English objection. Similarly, penetration of English and American influence in the area would be effectively avoided¹⁴⁵. Within this political framework, a South Slav Federation was being planned¹⁴⁶; the BCP assented to the idea of an independent and unified Macedonia, and to the consequent integration of Pirin Macedonia into the People's Republic of Macedonia¹⁴⁷.

see BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 191 (October 1944): 15; BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 916 (April 1948): 1; BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 7 (August 1946): 1; and BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 6, Archival Unit 546.

¹³⁹ BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 918 (April 1948): 6-7.

¹⁴⁰ BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 21 (April 1948): 21-22.

¹⁴¹ For a short biography see Appendix 2.

¹⁴² The BCP, the Comintern... (1998), vol. 2: 1173.

¹⁴³ Banac (2003): 357.

¹⁴⁴ Michev (1994): 191 ff. notes that such proposals were being developed since September 1944.

¹⁴⁵ The BCP, the Comintern... (1998), vol. 2: 1165-1166 and Michev (1994): 64-65.

¹⁴⁶ BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 918 (April 1948): 7-8.

¹⁴⁷ BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 191 (October-November 1944): 15 and 24, BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 6, Archival Unit 104 (April 1946): 3, and BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 3 (August 1946): 19 (Dimitrov's thesis).

Plans for the South Slav Federation, however, were inconsistent and problematic in themselves. The drafts drawn by the two sides (December 1944) had some significant differences. The Bulgarian communists linked together the unification of Macedonia and the establishment of a South Slav federation, despite the attempts of the Yugoslav communists to realise the unification of Macedonia irrespective of the issue of the federation¹⁴⁸. The agreement of Bled, as the climax of the Bulgarian-Yugoslavian negotiations on the Macedonian question, designated that the unification of Macedonia was to be realised *only*¹⁴⁹ after South Slav federation had been set up¹⁵⁰. The BCP also linked together the incorporation of Pirin Macedonia into the People's Republic of Macedonia and the restoration of the 'Western Border Region'¹⁵¹ to Bulgaria¹⁵².

A central and thorny problem of the Bulgarian-Yugoslavian negotiations on the future South Slav federation was its form. Whilst Yugoslavia proposed drafts on a federation consisting of seven states, Bulgaria proposed a Bulgarian-Yugoslavian united state. For this reason, she deliberately chose the name "South Slav federation", instead of Yugoslavia, for the future federation. Moreover, Bulgaria was vaguely contemplating Macedonia as an equal member within the federal state, most possibly as a third federal unit¹⁵³, since Bulgaria opposed a seven state federation whilst Macedonia is quoted separately in the drafts and both parts had declared their support for an independent and unified Macedonia¹⁵⁴. This was in accordance with earlier policies of the Bulgarian communists treating Macedonia as an independent state, separate from Yugoslavia. Tempo protested that Bulgarian propaganda claimed that 'our [Bulgarian] National Army is fighting shoulder to shoulder with the glorious Red Army, the

¹⁴⁸ BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 17: 32 (Dimitrov's diary) and BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 21 (April 1948): 17 (Chankov's thesis).

¹⁴⁹ Emphasis added.

¹⁵⁰ BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 916 (April 1948): 1, BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 917 (1948): 1, and BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 918 (April 1948): 9.

¹⁵¹ The Bulgarian territory annexed by Yugoslavia after the First World War.

¹⁵² All the drafts on a South Slav federation include such a condition.

¹⁵³ The BCP, the Comintern... (1998), vol. 2: 1174-1196 passim.

¹⁵⁴ See article 6 of the first Bulgarian draft: 'the two contracting parties wholly recognise the right of the Macedonian nation to self-determination', and article 5 of the second Bulgarian draft: 'recognition of the Macedonian nation to self-determination... after the establishment of the common federal state of the South Slavs... [and] the unification of Macedonia... [Macedonia would be] an equal part in the federation of the South Slavs', in The BCP, the Comintern... (1998), vol. 2: 1186 and 1188, whereas only Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were considered equals according to the Bulgarian drafts.

National Liberation Army of the Marshal Tito, and the Macedonian partisans and brigades'¹⁵⁵, as if Macedonian brigades were not a part of the Yugoslav National Liberation Army. The BCP also supported the right of Pirin citizens to maintain Bulgarian citizenship¹⁵⁶ and the necessity of co-existence of Bulgarians and Macedonians¹⁵⁷. Given that the Party took for granted the historical, ethnic, and cultural links of Macedonians and Bulgarians¹⁵⁸ and it anticipated loose borders of Macedonia with both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria¹⁵⁹, it could be argued that the Bulgarian communists reckoned that an independent Macedonia would gravitate towards Bulgaria.

The plan of South Slav federation met formidable difficulties from the beginning. As early as 26 December 1944, Molotov characterised the plan of a South Slav federation as inept, while England and the USA were against it in advance¹⁶⁰. Meanwhile, Bulgaria modified her position vis-à-vis Yugoslavia, with the provision that Stalin approved the Bulgarian drafts of two federal states. He vehemently criticised the ambitious proposals of Yugoslav communists, as he saw that they would entail the political hegemony of Tito in the Balkans (seven federal states, Greek Macedonia, Albania and parts of Austria and Hungary)¹⁶¹. Finally, the Stalin-Tito conflict (summer 1948) did away with the vision of a South Slav federation. The unification of Macedonia was to be realised in favour of the common Slav wealth and the internationalist communist cause. The main objective of negotiations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was the rapprochement of the two countries and the reassurance of the Yugoslavian membership in the “socialist and democratic international front”. Once Yugoslavia broke with the socialist block, Bulgaria ceased

¹⁵⁵ Cited in King (1973): 62.

¹⁵⁶ BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 7 (August 1946): 2.

¹⁵⁷ BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 7 (August 1946): 2 and BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 21 (April 1948): 20-22.

¹⁵⁸ See, for instance, BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 6, Archival Unit 546 (September 1948): 5-6; The BCP, the Comintern... (1998), vol. 2: 1133; and Michev (1994): 461.

¹⁵⁹ See article 5 of the *Resolution of the Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the BCP (09 August 1946)*, in 'Results of the Census...' (1986): 317: 'when there is a union of the Pirin area with the People's Republic of Macedonia it should be carried out in such a way that there should be no customs or any other border between Macedonia and Bulgaria just as there is now no such border between the People's Republic of Macedonia and the other units of the Federal Republics of Yugoslavia'.

¹⁶⁰ Michev (1994): 202-212 passim.

¹⁶¹ The BCP, the Comintern... (1998), vol. 2: 1174-1176 and Volkov (1997): 65-66.

any negotiations with the so-called nationalist, chauvinistic, anti-Bulgarian Titoist clique, which, it now argued, had gone over to the imperialistic front¹⁶².

Negotiations on the Bulgarian-Yugoslavian rapprochement involved the relinquishment of Pirin Macedonia to the People's Republic of Macedonia which caused side effects. As a result of moves towards the foundation of a South Slav federation, Bulgaria began to apply a project of "national and cultural self-determination" in the Pirin district, a series of measures¹⁶³ it anticipated might ease the rapprochement of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Cultural exchanges between populations on both sides of Macedonia (in Bulgarian and Yugoslavian territory) were to be advanced; activities and achievements of the People's Republic of Macedonia were to be popularised in the Pirin district; Macedonian language, literature and history were to be taught in schools; Macedonian bookshops and institutes were to be founded; intercommunication within the population was to be facilitated¹⁶⁴.

The project of "national and cultural self-determination" of the Pirin population was essentially instrumental and tactical. The BCP subordinated the Macedonian national question to the formation of a South Slav Federation, to the interests of the Eastern Socialist Block, and the Bulgarian nation within it. The right of the Macedonian nationality to self-determination, even secession, depended on 'the interests of our [Bulgarian] nation, the progressive movement of the Balkans, the unification of South Slavs... the rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the USSR as well as with all the Slavs'¹⁶⁵.

¹⁶² As early as November 1944, Poptomov, in his mission to Belgrade, claimed that the incorporation of the Petrich district (Pirin Macedonia) into Yugoslavia would be realised *only* if Yugoslavia would be within the sphere of influence of the USSR. Otherwise, if she was within the sphere of influence of England, *then* Yugoslavian Macedonia should have been incorporated into Bulgaria, BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 191 (November 1944): 66. See, also, BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 6, Archival Unit 546 (September 1948): 6 and Michev (1994): 461 (citing a speech of Chankov in October 1948).

¹⁶³ It was decided at the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee of the BCP. BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 7 (August 1946): 1. Stalin had also recommended cultural self-determination for Pirin Macedonia, since June 1946, in *The BCP, the Comintern...* (1998), vol. 2: 1269.

¹⁶⁴ BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 298 (July 1947): 7-9, BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 917 (April 1948): 1.

¹⁶⁵ *The BCP, the Comintern...* (1998), vol. 2: 1216-1218 (Poptomov's lecture).

The project of “national and cultural self-determination” of the Pirin district generated a number of side effects. Ceding a status of self-determination to the Pirin population implied recognition of a Macedonian language and nationality. Party politics reflected a Stalinist axiom that ‘the most important characteristic that distinguished one nationality from another was language’. As Slezkine¹⁶⁶ points out, according to the Soviet nationalities policy of the 1920s each recognised nationality should have a distinct and different language. Under the project of ‘cultural self-determination’ then, a Macedonian language in the Pirin district was to be instituted.

Institutionalisation of the Macedonian language resulted in difficulties at local level and led to criticism from high ranking communists. First of all, the local Party apparatus was unwilling to implement the (inconsistent) directives and instructions of the Central Committee on means of ‘cultural self-determination’. Second, the Party apparatus met tremendous difficulties in its efforts to persuade the population to learn the newly modernised, official and prescriptive Macedonian language¹⁶⁷. Third, high ranking Party members, such as Poptomov, strongly criticised the process of ‘artificially and by coercion macedonisation of the whole Pirin population through propaganda’¹⁶⁸. A few days after the Titoist schism, Poptomov reported to the Political Bureau and the Secretary of the BCP that the major part of the Pirin population is Bulgarian, speaks Bulgarian and has a Bulgarian national consciousness¹⁶⁹. Nevertheless, he had earlier acknowledged the politics of ‘cultural self-determination’ and he recognised the People’s Republic of Macedonia as a model of achieving the right of the Macedonian nation to self-determination¹⁷⁰.

Apart from the specificity of language, according to the Soviet nationalities’ model, each nationality should settle a distinct space, province, district or village. Slezkine¹⁷¹ suggests that, in the late 1930s, collective ethnicity became increasingly territorial. This theoretical framework can adequately cast light on Bulgarian communist

¹⁶⁶ Slezkine (1996): 215.

¹⁶⁷ BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 21 (April 1948): 2, 9, and 15.

¹⁶⁸ The BCP, the Comintern... (1998), vol. 2: 1264 and BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 918 (April 1948): 15.

¹⁶⁹ Michev (1994): 438. Kostov, in the Second Session of the Cominform in Bucharest (June 1948), underlined exactly the same, in Kalinova and Baeva (2003): 187.

¹⁷⁰ Michev (1994): 438.

¹⁷¹ Slezkine (1996): 224.

methods concerning the census of 1946¹⁷² and the reasons why an inseparable Pirin Macedonia of one ethnicity was taken for granted¹⁷³ (an approach based on Stalin's theory of the nation and nationality). This interpretation can more efficiently explain the contradictions of that census rather than interpretations claiming that the census aimed to ease the relinquishment of Pirin Macedonia to the People's Republic of Macedonia. After manipulation, intrigues, strict instructions to the local communists and violence, the census showed a strong Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, which comprised the overwhelming majority of the Pirin district¹⁷⁴. Nevertheless, the Bulgarian communists preserved a tool in their nationalist arsenal: only 28,611 out of 131,954 Macedonians declared that their mother tongue was Macedonian¹⁷⁵; in effect, a Macedonian minority speaking Bulgarian was recognised.

As the procedure of the realisation of the project of "national and cultural self-determination" of the Pirin district shows, the intention of the BCP was to announce it, but to not apply it fully. More importantly, the Bulgarian communists retained firm control over party and governmental organs in Pirin Macedonia¹⁷⁶. As a result, 'a little had been done' concerning each of the measures designated by the above project as local members of the BCP claimed¹⁷⁷. As a Party member from Razlog observes, literature programs in schools and many associations had still an almost completely Bulgarian character in April 1948¹⁷⁸. The resolution of the 16th plenum of the Central Committee of the BCP (July 1948) acknowledges that there was not a completely clear and consistent Party line on the Macedonian question¹⁷⁹.

¹⁷² According to Angelov (1999): 125-143, 63.6% of the Pirin population self-determined as Macedonians, 21.5% Bulgarians and 11.5% Pomaks. Significantly, the percentage of the Macedonian population appears more dense in areas close to the People's Republic of Macedonia (e.g. Petrich 85-90%), and sparser in areas close to central Bulgaria (e.g. Gorna Dzumaya/Blagoevgrad 45-50%) in 'Results of the census.' (1986): 324.

¹⁷³ See, for instance, an instruction of the Chief Direction of Statistics in Angelov (1990): 56.

¹⁷⁴ Angelov (1990). Michev (1994): 272-286, also, states that census' results were directed by the BCP. Nonetheless, there is a few evidence on the free character of the census, BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 21 (April 1948): 8.

¹⁷⁵ Angelov (1999): 125-143.

¹⁷⁶ King (1973): 63.

¹⁷⁷ BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 298 (July 1947): 7-9, BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 21 (April 1948): 11.

¹⁷⁸ BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 21 (April 1948): 10.

¹⁷⁹ BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 247 (July 1948): 98 ff. Stoichev, head of the local Party committee in Gorna Dzumaya (Blagoevgrad) by 1948, stated that whilst Chankov and Chervenkov were exerting pressure for the dissemination of the Macedonian language in the Pirin district, Kostov proclaimed that the local population had to be taught in its Bulgarian mother tongue, in Michev (1994): 444-445.

Despite concessions to Yugoslavia, it could be argued that the recognition of a Macedonian language and nationality served a Bulgarian national perspective. Institutionalisation and development of the Macedonian language could evoke allegations of its Bulgarian character, because the proximity of the Macedonian language to the Bulgarian one would become apparent. Such allegations would serve the national arguments of Bulgarian communists, such as Poptomov¹⁸⁰, about the cultural and national proximity of Bulgarians and Macedonians, instead of the proximity of the latter with the Serbians, which Titoists claimed. This theoretical framework was consistent with the way that the leadership of the BCP imagined Macedonians.

The leadership of the BCP imagined Macedonians as being of Bulgarian origin¹⁸¹. There is evidence during the Second World War and the early post-war years, that the prominent figures of the Party did not imagine Macedonians as a separate nation. In a letter of Dimitrov to Tito dated June 1st 1942, Macedonians were not mentioned among the Balkan peoples¹⁸². In April 1944, Dimitrov maintained that Macedonians were a populace (naselenie), 'an ethnic conglomerate made up of Bulgars, Macedonians, Slavs, Greeks, Serbs'. Despite his doubts concerning the existence of a Macedonian consciousness, he accepted that Macedonia could obtain its freedom and statehood, despite her ethnographic conglomeration¹⁸³.

After the uprising of 9 September and as early as October 1944, Poptomov theorised at a public meeting in the Pirin area that the Macedonian people had originated from the Bulgarian nation, but developed a Macedonian identity because of their long oppression and the Great-Bulgarian policy which gambled away the national ideals of Bulgaria. He supposed that if the San-Stefano treaty had not been retracted and Macedonia had been included in Bulgaria, no Macedonian question would exist¹⁸⁴.

¹⁸⁰ See next paragraphs.

¹⁸¹ For this reason, the BCP assumed to develop the national self-awareness of the Macedonian population in the Pirin district. There is much evidence on it: BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 191 (October 1944): 24; BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 7 (August 1946): 1; BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 916 (April 1948): 1; BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 918 (April 1948): 11.

¹⁸² Banac (2003): 220.

¹⁸³ Banac (2003): 315.

¹⁸⁴ The BCP, the Comintern... (1998), vol. 2: 1132-1134.

And later, in May 1945, he pointed out that Macedonian revolutionaries had had a Bulgarian national consciousness since Iliden, but they fought for the self-determination of Macedonia, because demands for incorporation of Macedonia into Bulgaria were not at the right time¹⁸⁵. It was not only Poptomov but also Party members from the Pirin area who stressed that Bulgarians and the Pirin population were identical, highlighting the proximity of their languages and cultures and introducing the term 'Bulgarian Macedonian'¹⁸⁶. Concerning the nomenclature that the BCP use to define that part of Macedonia within the Bulgarian territory, 'Pirin Macedonia' is the least used term in Party records, whereas it is interchangeable with alternatives, such as 'Pirin district', 'Petrich district', or 'district of Gorna Dzumaya'.

The discourse which the BCP developed concerning the Macedonian question involved a problematic and contradictory recognition of a Macedonian minority within the Bulgarian state. Even though the BCP undoubtedly recognised the People's Republic of Macedonia as the successful end of the struggle of the Macedonian nation towards independence, and as the basis for the future unification of the whole Macedonian nation (including Bulgarian and Greek Macedonia), it essentially did not imagine Macedonians of the Pirin area as separate from the Bulgarian nation. Imagining Macedonians as a part of the Bulgarian nation resulted from decades of discourse couched in a national language¹⁸⁷. Indeed, Bulgarians had grown up for generations with the official national aspiration of the Bulgarian state to incorporate Macedonia (Virhovism, Balkan Wars, First World War, revisionism, Second World War). School textbooks, historiography, and public rhetoric had argued that Macedonia was an inseparable part of Bulgaria and claimed that the struggle of a Macedonian nation was part of the tactics of the Bulgarian state to annexe Macedonia.

Conclusion

¹⁸⁵ The BCP, the Comintern... (1998), vol. 2: 1210-1211. Not only politicians but also historians shared the same view, Mitev (1948): 305-306.

¹⁸⁶ BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 21 (April 1948): 21, BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 6, Archival Unit 546 (September 1948): 8-9 (according to the Macedonian cultural-educational association), and Michev (1994): 57, 60-61.

¹⁸⁷ Both allies of the communists and opposition parties imagined Macedonians as Bulgarians, in Neshovich (1986): 146 and 151. Even the Federation of Anarchist-Communists of Bulgaria considered the Macedonian question artificial and it opposed any concession of Bulgarian territory, BCP Records Fund 272, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 40 (December 1946): 1.

In this chapter, a theory on nationalism of belonging is developed in order to explain the national discourse of the BCP at the international level. A nationalism of belonging identified a “self nation”, in contrast with the “other nation” dividing the international arena into friend nations and enemy nations. Thus, Bulgaria obtained a further set of positive national identities but, at the same time, the Bulgarian communists operated within certain limits designed by the socialist block. In order to do so, they had to deploy a fluid, flexible and inevitably contradictory discourse.

Within the political framework that Cold War conditions had set, the Thracian question as well as the Macedonian one has been analysed. Both involved nationalist arguments about territory, history, culture, and language. Both give some evidence of the nationalist discourse of the BCP and its attempts to pursue Bulgaria’s national interests and ideals, even as the communists had envisaged them, despite the conditions prevailed within the socialist block and the weak international position of Bulgaria as a defeated country. In other words, despite conditions that were relatively unfavourable to Bulgarian nationalism, the Bulgarian communists did in fact articulate an extensive and distinct national discourse.

After examining the nationalist discourse of the BCP in relation to the domestic and the international domain, another issue should be taken into consideration: how the BCP flagged nationhood. As the mainstream of the coalition of the Fatherland Front, which ruled Bulgaria, it had appropriated all the necessary means to promote a common sense for Bulgarian citizens.

Chapter Five

Flagging Nationhood: The BCP and the construction of the nation's past¹

5.1 Historiography, textbooks and nationalism

Discussing nationalism presupposes studying and understanding different ways in which a national idea has been developed. One of them is the construction of the past on a national basis, a task mainly undertaken by history-writing. The Bulgarian national idea of the early post-war years is well illustrated in the construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of the past of Bulgaria. The past is of central and crucial significance to nationalism. The historiography and the historical textbooks of that period provide us with crucial information for making sense of the role played by the BCP in the (re)construction of the past.

Smith underlines the centrality of the role of historians in the 'delineation of the nation'²; historians figure prominently among the creators and devotees of nationalism. Historiography is central to nationalism, because nationalism is profoundly 'historicist', as Smith argues. The reason is that nationalism 'sees the world as a product of the interplay of various communities, each possessing a unique character and history'³.

Myth-making is also essential in the formation and continued existence of nations. As ethno-symbolists (Smith in particular) argue, it is from elements of myth, memory, symbol, and tradition that modern national identities are reconstituted in each generation⁴. Even though ethno-symbolists rest on "ethnic heritages", they underscore the role of myth in "rediscoveries" and "reinterpretations" of the "popular living past". The role of national historiography is to engineer myth-making.

¹ In this chapter, there are a lot of references to historians of the 1940s. Short biographies with particular reference to that time can be found in Appendix 2.

² Smith A. (1999): 10.

³ Smith A. (1999): 39.

⁴ Smith A. (1999): 9.

Schöpflin shares the outlook of ethno-symbolists and considers myths to be one of the means by which nations establish and determine the foundations of their own being, their own systems of morality and values. Myth is a set of beliefs rather than historically validated truths⁵. National historiography is the main locus of national myth-making, provided that it assumes to narrate the past with national criteria.

Bhabha, who evaluates the ambivalence of nationalist discourse, argues that nationalist discourses produce the idea of the nation as a continuous narrative of national progress⁶. Nationalist discourses obscure crucial recesses in their effort to construct a cohesive national narrative⁷. Bhabha perceives the nation as an agency of ambivalent narration, which is able to subordinate, fracture, diffuse, reproduce, as much as produce, create, force, guide⁸. And it is this ambivalence of the nation as a narrative strategy that produces a continual slippage into analogous, even metonymic, categories, like the people, that overlap in the act of writing the nation⁹.

The recognition of the importance of the representation and narration of the past in the creation of nations has a longer history. Ernest Renan indicates the equal significance of remembering and forgetting (that is, the reconstruction) of a nation's past: 'forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation'¹⁰. More recently, Billig also focused on the issue of 'forgetting' arguing that 'once a nation is established, it depends for its continued existence upon a collective amnesia'¹¹. In other words, forgetting is necessary not only for the creation of a nation but also for its perpetuation. Historiography is the most crucial factor in cultivating collective amnesia. According to Billig, not only are historians involved in the creation of collective amnesia, but also creatively remember ideologically convenient facts of the past, while overlooking what is discomfiting¹².

⁵ Schöpflin (1997): 6-34.

⁶ Bhabha (1990a): 1.

⁷ Bhabha (1990a): 3.

⁸ Bhabha (1990a): 3-4.

⁹ Bhabha (1990b): 292.

¹⁰ Renan (1999): 11.

¹¹ Billig (1995): 38.

¹² Billig (1995): 38.

Selective remembering and myth-making thus are constitutive elements in the ambivalent narration of national past. Instrumentalists, such as Hobsbawm, challenge the ethno-symbolist approach to tradition claiming that elements of invention are often involved in the (re)construction of a past with national criteria. Hobsbawm remarks that ‘traditions’ which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented, constructed and formally instituted¹³. ‘Invented traditions’ are highly relevant to nation and national histories, which, according to Hobsbawm, rest on innovative exercises in social engineering. He insists that the national phenomenon cannot be investigated without careful attention to the ‘invention of tradition’¹⁴.

Myth-making, forgetting and remembering, and narrative strategy could cause contradictions in history-writing. De Certeau¹⁵ proposes an explanation for the compatibility of oppositions and contraries in historiography. He argues that historiography produces knowledge in a “discursive” or “diegetic” time (discourse advances at different speeds, slowing down or rushing ahead), which is placed at a distance from the “real” time. This discursive time creates a “depth” which allows the contrary or the remainder of a system to be placed near it.

At this point, it should be noticed that the Bulgarian national narration is going to be seen in three dimensions of time. The first is related to time of the historical events and actors. The second involves the time of the certain version of the national narration that the BCP engaged in. The third one concerns the time that the present research is written. Foucault sees history as a complex relationship of successive displacements, a plurality of discontinuities and transformations¹⁶.

Despite the debate whether a national past is completely a myth or involves elements of myth¹⁷, it could be argued that history-writing involves to a considerable degree elements of selectivity, invention, and myth-making; hence, the narration of the past

¹³ Hobsbawm (1983): 1.

¹⁴ Hobsbawm (1983): 13-14.

¹⁵ De Certeau (1988): 88-90.

¹⁶ Foucault (1972): 55-59.

¹⁷ See a discussion on this debate in Spencer and Wollman (2002): 81-83.

in any case is a product of construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction. (Re)construction of the past is definitely interwoven with politics.

Renan, also, perceives that ‘historical studies often constitute a danger for the principle of nationality’¹⁸. This may be seen as the reason why political elites are interested in controlling history-writing. As political elites and the state orchestrate the (re)construction¹⁹ of a national past, historiography can constitute a manipulating tool. As Smith puts it, ‘history serves the interests of elites who use selected aspects of the past to manipulate mass emotions’²⁰. In the case of post-war Bulgaria, the BCP showed a great interest in historical textbooks, because over a million of students studied them, and also teachers, parents and workers learnt history from them²¹.

In Durkheimian fashion²², Schöpflin argues that myth is vital in the establishment of coherence and in the maintenance of discourses. At the same time, myth creates an intellectual and cognitive monopoly in that it seeks to establish the sole way of ordering the world and defining world views²³. Political elites and the state, then, can achieve social coherence and consent to monopolising myth-making. Hence, they can mobilise people, exclude others, screen out certain memories, and reinforce the hierarchy of status and values. As a community is identified in national terms, national myth-making becomes very crucial.

5.2 (Re)construction of the past: institutional framework

Acknowledging the political significance of history-writing, Verdery argues that the point is not how history “really happened” in a given society or how it has been politically “distorted”, but how visions of the past are made; in other words, how history is produced²⁴. Foucault, rather than thinking of history as a fixed entity, thought of multiple, overlapping and contesting histories. Hence, a historical event or

¹⁸ Renan (1999): 11.

¹⁹ I use the prefix *re* in a Foucaultian manner, as there are a lot of layers of construction, while any construction of the past is ever-changing.

²⁰ Smith A. (1997): 37.

²¹ BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 745: 84 and 164.

²² See more in Overing (1997): 7.

²³ Schöpflin (1997): 19-20.

²⁴ Verdery (1991): 217.

a historical period are ongoing inventions that have been subject to revisions and reconstructions through each subsequent era²⁵. Therefore, it is the political considerations of the present that define the past and produce its narration.

The BCP, as the political mainstream of the Fatherland Front government, developed a particular construction of the past through history-writing. It deployed its own historiography by publishing a range of historical books. Thus the BCP set up the publishing house “Partizdat” (Party publications), controlled all the official editions of history after 1944 and progressively administered them. The official historical periodical “Istoricheski Pregled” (Historical Review) gives evidence of tendencies, scientific methodology and interests. Articles on historical subjects, published in the official Party newspaper, “Rabotnichesko Delo”, depict the past as the BCP publicly defined it. Archival material relevant to this topic exposes how the BCP thought of the Bulgarian national myth at that time.

For the government of the Fatherland Front and its dominant political component, the BCP, education was a crucial issue. A central state-driven educational system is conducive to promoting both nationalism and communism. Gellner mainly associates nationalism with the central educational system. He detects the emergence of nationalism in a period ‘when general social conditions make for standardised, homogenous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which well-defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind of unit with which men willingly and often ardently identify’²⁶. A state-driven educational system produces and requires a homogeneous culture and a standard language, both crucial in constructing a national identity, according to Gellner’s analysis of the nation²⁷. He concluded that in modern times ‘a well-centralised state... presides over,... and is identified with, one kind of culture... which... is dependent for its perpetuation on a centralised educational system supervised by and often actually run by the state in question, which monopolises legitimate culture and... violence’²⁸. In the case of the Bulgarian communist regime, a centralised state monopolised an educational system

²⁵ Danaher, Schirato, Webb (2000): 97-98.


²⁶ Gellner (1983): 55.

²⁷ Gellner (1983): 35-39.

²⁸ Gellner (1983): 140. See, also, Hroch (1985) on the importance of education for nationalism.

and, thereby, any kind of identity, including the national one. The Bulgarian communist state-driven educational system realised the doctrine “national in form and socialist in content”.

As the example of the educational system of the Third French Republic had shown, free, compulsory and state-driven mass schooling²⁹ can mould the consciousness of the future citizens and project current ideas into the past. Jules Ferry, Minister of Education and Prime Minister of the Third French Republic, argued that ‘when the whole French youth has developed, grown up under this triple aegis of free, compulsory, secular education, we shall have nothing more to fear from returns to the past’³⁰. Preventing a return to the past was of major importance for the BCP as well. Thus, free, compulsory and state-driven mass schooling helped to legitimise the regime and in the process certify a single, united conception of the national community³¹. A conflation of national and communist ideas was projected on the



central task of school: to create future citizens influenced by the progressive ideas of the Fatherland Front in order to be conscious builders and defenders of their fatherland³². School pupils would be future Party members and cadres, having been instilled with the Party’s sense of the Bulgarian national idea. According to Dramaliev³³, a scientific learning of national history, that is, a Marxist-Leninist one in the communist jargon, would evoke genuine patriotic emotions.

A state-driven mass-schooling is important for a totalitarian regime, even more than for a democracy. As Mueller shows, totalitarian systems consciously manipulate language and ideas through the rigid control of educational institution. The imposition of the

²⁹ For the free, compulsory and state-driven character of the Bulgarian educational system of the early post-war years, see Atanasov (1970): 10-12.

³⁰ Cited in Mayeur and Rebérioux (1984): 85. For the educational reforms of Jules Ferry, see, also, Randell (1986): 49-50.

³¹ Mayeur and Rebérioux (1984): 86.

³² Dramaliev (1945b): 12.

³³ Dramaliev (1945b): 23.

ideology of the totalitarian system usually takes the form of reinterpretation of all prior history and the elimination of references to any interpretative schema other than the dominant one³⁴. As a consequence, the interpretative schema, including the national ideology, that the totalitarian regime opts for excludes any alternative.

Schools are loci of what Billig calls the routine flagging of nationhood³⁵. Portraits of Bulgarian national revival figures were placed onto classroom walls³⁶; the national anthem opened every musical interlude in school celebrations³⁷. National ideology, meanings, and symbols were disseminated through mass schooling, especially on days of commemoration and national anniversaries³⁸. Moreover, the schools' skill can take hold of the minds of the students and shape them, according to the Foucaultian thought. As a result, they shared a key position in disseminating the new version of nationalism the BCP developed.

The BCP controlled the main tool of propaganda regarding school: textbooks. As early as the beginning of 1945, the Ministry of Education established the publishing office 'National-People's Education' (Narodna Prosveta), which published school textbooks. Any textbook influenced by 'fascist ideology and Great Bulgarian chauvinism' was banned, while programmes relating to school education underwent fundamental changes. The Fatherland Front cleansed presumed fascist elements from schools and all educational institutes³⁹.

Only a few school textbooks were published during the period between 1944 and 1949. Although the BCP and the Fatherland Front were concerned about education and mass schooling⁴⁰, there was a lack of raw materials, the context of war and post-war hampered the publication of school textbooks, and the elaboration of a new

³⁴ Mueller (1973): 24.

³⁵ Billig (1995).

³⁶ Bulgarian States Records Fund 142, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 1 (1945): 295.

³⁷ Bulgarian States Records Fund 142, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 1 (1945): 332, and Bulgarian States Records Fund 142, Inventory 2, Archival Unit 3 (1945): 120, 122, 140 ff.

³⁸ See, for instance, the day of National Revival's men, the centenary of Aprilov's death, the celebration of Vazov's memory, the day of Cyril and Methodius in Bulgarian States Records Fund 142, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 4 (1947): 20, 74, 148 and in Bulgarian States Records Fund 142, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 6 (1947): 93.

³⁹ BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 10 (1945): 91-92.

⁴⁰ Chervenkov emphasized the gravity of history and schooling in a meeting of the Committee in charge of writing historical textbooks, BCP BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 10 (1946): 159.

school-teaching programme needed time⁴¹. Historical textbooks of political education and of military education reveal tendencies of the BCP towards selectivity, invention, and myth-making with respect to the “national past”.

Textbooks reproduced and advanced the reconstruction of the past as the BCP engineered it. Billig claims that textbooks are good sources for discovering a social science’s common sense, because they tend to package the officially approved view in handy form⁴². Stringer, who examines textbooks of social psychology, argues that the wish of textbooks to be seen to be giving the approved version of the discipline is very strong. Textbooks produce a plausible text⁴³. By narrating the past without references to any sources, the historical schoolbooks provide the national myth with common sense. In other words, they diffuse the “truth”, in Foucaultian terms⁴⁴, of the nation. Since textbooks consist of the knowledgeable universe of pupils, they tend to believe that a textbook involves an unquestionable truth. In the event that there is a single textbook for a discipline, as in post-war Bulgaria with regard to history, its truth becomes completely unique.

The single and obligatory history textbook can inculcate the national idea as officially constructed by a regime. Nora evaluates the significance of the single history textbook for a conception of the national community, examining the textbook “Petit Lavissee”, written by the French historian Ernest Lavissee⁴⁵. Jules Ferry also indicated the significance of the obligatory textbook in mass schooling stressing that ‘he who is the master of the book is master of education’⁴⁶. In reality, to quote Ferro⁴⁷, historical schoolbooks supply a reconstruction of past events in accordance with the official point of view. Therefore, in a textbook of national history, nationhood is not seen as having been constructed, since the textbook can be considered, in Billig’s⁴⁸ terms, as a sort of constant, but unnoticed, flagging of nationhood. Such a flagging provides

⁴¹ Dramaliev (1945a): 9.

⁴² Billig (1995): 52.

⁴³ Stringer (1990): 27 and 31.

⁴⁴ “Truth” is produced by human sciences and is used to regulate and normalise individuals. Truth is the result of power struggles in which it has triumphed over other. Therefore, truth is the effect of the work of discourses and institutions, rather than absolute or essential. Danaher, Schirato, and Webb (2000): 26-27 and 41-42.

⁴⁵ Nora (1997): 151-184.

⁴⁶ Cited in Sowerwine (2001): 36.

⁴⁷ Ferro (1984): 96.

⁴⁸ Billig (1997): 174.

subtle daily reminders of nationhood in the susceptible minds of pupils. The reiteration of their national place in a national world is so familiar and continual⁴⁹, that they unconsciously become national thinking adults. Thus, if a “nation’s existence” is a “daily plebiscite”, as Renan⁵⁰ put it, pupils learn to cast their daily, positive ballot from a very young age.

The BCP legitimised its regime by identifying it with the fatherland through the use of educational textbooks. As the socialist regime prioritised the transition to socialism in Bulgarian national history, narrative of contemporary events in the textbooks became essential, despite this being an unusual phenomenon for historical textbooks and historiography. Contemporary political events, such as the people’s courts and the Titoist treason, are included⁵¹ in textbooks. The contemporary history was evaluated as crucial in educating the Bulgarian youth with the spirit of socialism and Slav unity in order that the patriotism of the Bulgarian people would be reinforced⁵². As a result, the central point of the historical narration is the new socialist era. To rephrase De Certeau, the time and the place of the production of the text is transformed into a place produced by the text⁵³. History is presented as a linear drift towards the socialist era, when Bulgarian history reaches its peak.

The textbooks aimed at stressing the significance of the Fatherland Front and socialism. The historical narration justified ‘the new path, which Bulgaria must follow – the path of the narod’s (nation-people) welfare, of all-Slav brotherhood and unity is a path, determined by our [Bulgarian] history, by our [Bulgarian] historical development. Every deviation from this path leads to national calamity. Our [Bulgarian] youth, which finishes its secondary education as well as the whole Bulgarian youth, must track this path...’⁵⁴. This continual repetition of ‘our’, constitutes essentially what Billig has identified as ‘the deixis of homeland [that] invokes the national ‘we’ and places ‘us’ within ‘our’ homeland’⁵⁵. Moreover, as

⁴⁹ Billig (1997): 8.

⁵⁰ Renan (1990): 19.

⁵¹ Burmov, Dikovski, Bliznev and Hristov (1950⁵): 100-110.

⁵² BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 745: 165.

⁵³ De Certeau (1988): 90.

⁵⁴ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 434.

⁵⁵ Billig (1997): 107.

Bilig puts it⁵⁶, it is a duty of national histories to tell the tale of 'our' common fate. School and textbooks are, indeed, convenient means of the constant flagging of the nation, tracing its path and showing its direction.

The Fatherland Front also exploited the opportunities that mass schooling offers in order to inspire the youth with the spirit of the new regime. Schools then became loci of communist propaganda and education. For instance, an hour of "antifascist education", which was replaced by "democratic education" in February 1946, was institutionalised⁵⁷. In some of these hours, the teachers most appropriate for the occasion spoke before pupils about the national necessity of the monarchy's abolition and the national significance of the Party's victory in the coming elections⁵⁸. The Bulgarian communist regime propagated its ideology towards youth. To such criticism of the opposition, the Party's leadership replied that the ideology promoted in schools was not that of the BCP, but of the Fatherland Front, the only genuine patriotic force in Bulgaria. The Party's leadership also based the function of the pupil organisation "Septemvrists" and the youth one "EMOS", both consisting of school children, on national reasons⁵⁹.



Under the communist regime, teaching staff became preachers of Fatherland Front politics. Teachers were being called on to take part in the Two Year Plan and other governmental initiatives so that pupils, their parents, and the entire society would emulate their example⁶⁰. Teaching staff explicated the new Constitution in classes⁶¹. One of the duties of teachers

⁵⁶ Bilig (1997): 71.

⁵⁷ Bulgarian States Records Fund 142, Inventory 3, Archival Unit 1 (1946): 196. Some of the issues of the agenda of that day were the following: the Two Years Plan, building of the People's Republic, imperialism, Slav unity, what is nation, the national policy of the Fatherland Front, national ideals of Bulgaria, in Bulgarian States Records Fund 142, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 6 (1947): 198.

⁵⁸ Bulgarian States Records Fund 142, Inventory 3, Archival Unit 1 (1946): 51.

⁵⁹ Dramaliev (1947a): 8-10.

⁶⁰ Bulgarian States Records Fund 142, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 6 (1947): 105 and 164. The occupation of teachers had also been bounded to their "task towards the fatherland" since the monarchist regime of Boris, Shopov (1975): 49.

⁶¹ Bulgarian States Records Fund 142, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 7 (1947): 115.

was to disseminate the national significance of the government and the anti-Bulgarian role of the opposition. Vis-à-vis the elections of 1946, teachers had to propagate the national achievements of the Fatherland Front⁶².

5.3 The setting and the conditions of history-writing under the Bulgarian communist regime

As concerns the setting and the conditions of history-writing, the BCP took account of the Soviet experience and Dimitrov's appeal at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern for rewriting history in a Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist sense. Even since the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, held in 1935⁶³, Dimitrov had been recommending to the communist leaders a rewriting of history emphasising reverence for the national past, strong criticism of national nihilism, recognition of the working masses as the guardians of national honour, and countering the falsifications of bourgeois history.

Soviet experience and guidance in writing history was seriously taken into account⁶⁴. The Bulgarian committee, which was in charge of writing historical schoolbooks, took advice from the Soviet one⁶⁵. However, limited access to materials and the necessity of criticising the literature which was likely to be taken into account caused some difficulties⁶⁶.

The implication of the Soviet model of historiography, however, did not yield a clear and consistent line concerning Bulgarian historiography. The Soviet Party line was ill defined; it was too often affected by the vagaries of the flux marking Soviet politics⁶⁷. In effect, in the mid 1930s, the 'abstract, schematic nature of Soviet historiography', caused by the introduction of socioeconomic formations (primitive communism,

⁶² Bulgarian States Records Fund 142, Inventory 3, Archival Unit 1 (1946): 44.

⁶³ Dimitrov, *The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International in the Struggle of the Working Class against Fascism (Report before the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, delivered on 02 August 1935)*, vol. II (1973): 70-73.

⁶⁴ Popov (1964): 65-67.

⁶⁵ BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 10 (1946): 159.

⁶⁶ Popov (1964): 67 and BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 10 (1946): 159.

⁶⁷ Mazour (1958): 197 ff and 211 ff, Mazour (1971): 363, and Ferro (1984): 118-119.

slavery, feudalism, capitalism and communism) ⁶⁸ into historical narration, was abandoned.

Soviet patriotism of the 1930s and the Second World War favoured a factological narration on a national basis, demanding a nationalistic interpretation and a reverence for the national past. The cult of personality led to an emphasis on the national figures of the past. As Nievsky or the Russian Generals of the Napoleonic wars defended Russia against foreign invaders, Stalin could protect the Soviet Union against the menace of fascism and Germany. Insofar as the emphasised figures were depicted as Russians, historiography was nationalised. In 1945-1946, traces of a return to Pokrovsky's⁶⁹ model can be detected. Pokrovsky's return explains the interest in outlining the periodisation of Bulgarian history. Nonetheless, after 1947, the Soviet historiography stressed national peculiarities and tended to eliminate any foreign influence over the evolution of the Russian nation, in particular, and the peoples comprising the Soviet Union, in general⁷⁰.

Within the context described so far, the Bulgarian historical apparatus adopted and adjusted the following Soviet principles⁷¹: the importance of social-economic formations, a schema of linear historical advance, a factological narration, a focus on individuals as national figures, and a reverence for the national past.

5.4 A peculiar Marxist version of history-writing

As shown so far, historical textbooks and historiography give evidence of nationalism. This section identifies and outlines a peculiar Marxist version with considerable national elements or, to say it better, a nationalist version of history-writing which respects some and pays lip service to other Marxian axioms. The historical apparatus of the BCP responded to the challenges of the new version of

⁶⁸ See Yareh (1962a): 35-77 about the debate on periodisation in the Soviet historiography.

⁶⁹ In the post-revolutionary years, Pokrovsky, the founder of the Marxist school of the Soviet historiography, introduced and elaborated history-writing in accordance with the social-economic formations. In the 1930s, he was blamed for vulgarization of history, Mazour (1971): 360-361 and Yareh (1962b): 77-105.

⁷⁰ Mazour (1958): 210-219.

⁷¹ All these principles are well indicated in the next pages, wherein the most important foci of the Bulgarian historical narration of that time are discussed.

nationalism the BCP promoted. Under these circumstances, however, it had to confront a set of practical but above all theoretical problems.

Regarding the purposes of the type of Marxist history the BCP oversaw, an instrumental use of history for short-term political purposes prevailed. The BCP opted for narrating the past in national terms for three main reasons. First, national historiography had been prevalent in Bulgaria by the early post-war years, as history-writing and education were controlled by governments speaking the national dialect⁷² and a communist approach to the national question was clandestine. Burmov, for instance, notes that views of the ‘reactionary fascist historiography’ were present to a considerable degree in the history-writing of the new regime⁷³. Participants in the Conference of the Workers of the Historical Front criticised influences of the so-called bourgeois historiography over writings of Marxist authors after 9 September⁷⁴. Mitev, a Bulgarian Marxist historian, recommended historians of the past regime to self-criticise themselves and espouse materialism⁷⁵. Moreover, since the interwar years communist parties had approached the past in national terms, as they sought to win over the masses and entered alliances. The climax of this approach was Dimitrov’s appeal at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern for rewriting history in the sense that communist parties would in various ways appropriate the glorious pages of a past already defined in national terms.

Second, the BCP could legitimate its regime, if it described it as an evolution of the version of the national history, already having been disseminated through the masses, rather than if it completely deconstructed national myth-making and substituted it with another one. As the BCP was concerned with sustaining its power, it needed a discourse about unity and continuity; the most effective discourse underpinning unity and continuity at that time was nationalism.

⁷² See Chapter Two for the national common sense prevailing in the Bulgarian society of the interwar period.

⁷³ BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 743 (1948): 54-55. He refers to Gandev, Ormandzhiev, Duitsev, and Stanev N., as authors who used old views embroidered with a new terminology. Mitev (1948): 314, a Marxist historian, also, fiercely criticized Gandev for his political and scientific past.

⁷⁴ BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 743, 744, 745 (1948): *passim*.

⁷⁵ Mitev (1948): 316.

Through historiography the BCP could present its own tasks as national and could present itself as the representative and defender not only of working class interests but of that of the entire nation. For this reason, the presumption 'if he was alive' referring to Blagoev, Botev, Paisii, Vazov and all national figures, was accompanied by the certainty that he would be an adherent of the Fatherland Front⁷⁶. A very striking example of this presumption is the following excerpt of Pavlov on Botev: 'if Botev was alive, he would join us [both the BCP and the Fatherland Front] and participate in the national liberation movement against the hitlerite-German yoke and against its agents in our country... he would welcome the Red Army... he would send greetings to Stalin...'⁷⁷.

Third, the BCP was deprived of cadres capable of producing a narration of the past different to the national one, since communist theorists were few in numbers before 9 September. In the significant Conference of the Workers of the Historical Front on the establishment and tasks of the science of history in Bulgaria⁷⁸, that is, the establishment of materialism in historiography, supervised by Chervenkov, 19 out of 29 historian-participants were members of the BCP. A considerable portion of historian-members of the Party joined it after 9 September. Some of the participants in that conference would be blamed for great-Bulgarian chauvinism (e.g. Ormandzhiev). In the general notes of the conference, most possibly written by Chervenkov, serious flaws of a Marxist sense committed by the historians-participants in the conference were highlighted. These were lack of emphasis on periodisation; little attention paid to modern history (75% of the discussion engaged in the ancient and medieval history); in many historical questions, interests and approaches of historian-participants resembled the old bourgeois methodology; sterile declarations of historical materialism without an essential use of it; and the degradation of the role of the working class in the social and political development of Bulgaria⁷⁹.

All these issues showed evidence of the inability of Party's cadres engaged in history-writing to apply a Marxist method.

⁷⁶ Bogdanova (1992): 63-64.

⁷⁷ Pavlov (1946): 12-13.

⁷⁸ BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 745 (1948). The conference was held in 1948. The tasks of the Conference were the eradication of falsifications made by the bourgeois historiography and the writing of a scientific, reliable textbook on Bulgarian history.

⁷⁹ BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 745 (1948): 157-166.

To confront theoretical problems, the Party's historical apparatus applied the fundamental axiom of Renan concerning writing history that forgetting is of the same importance as remembering. Thus, as will be shown in the next pages, a selective narration of historical events resulted in some crucial events being remembered and some others forgotten. Thus, for instance, some pages of the Marxist literature referring to the Slavs would have to be elided. For example, Engels's excerpts referring to the Slavs as the "historyless" peoples or 'the remnants of history'⁸⁰ had to be obliterated.

The historical apparatus of the BCP forgot that sentimental Pan-Slavism was derided within the BCP at the beginning of the 20th century. As Rothschild notes, the BCP emphasised the distinction between the socialist conception of a federation of progressive states and the Pan-Slav one of an agglomeration of Russian vassals⁸¹. The BCP insisted on the establishment of a Balkan Federation, based on internationalism, and not on a south Slav or a Pan-Slav one, based on kinship.

Selectivity is also central in the case of Bulgarian historical textbooks' treatment of party politics. A striking example constitutes the description of the political origin and history of Zveno, one of the allies of the BCP within the Fatherland Front coalition. Textbooks evaluate the political consequences of the coup of the 19th May, committed by the Zveno leadership disregarding its anti-democratic politics (suppression of political parties, execution of communists), yet stressing Zveno's intention to eliminate the power of the dynasty. Moreover, it is mentioned that Zveno followed a friendly foreign policy towards Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The political evolution between 1934 and 1944 seems to depict the transformation of Zveno from a fascist to a democratic group. Thus, textbooks gradually justify the participation of Zveno in the coalition of the Fatherland Front⁸².

⁸⁰ These excerpts of Engels were in complete contrast with the general Stalinist view on the flowering of the small nations in socialism, which the Bulgarian communist historians seemed to accept. However they contend that finally nations would disappear, even though national signs (language, territory etc) would survive, in Mitev (1948): 292-296.

⁸¹ Rothschild (1959): 210.

⁸² Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 405-409, Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 86-87, and Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴):244-245.

The treatment of Zveno constitutes a case of what Anderson calls ‘reassurance of a fratricide’⁸³, but in a Marxist sense. Anderson points out that a systematic historiographical campaign, deployed by the state mainly through the school system, can integrate slaughters into a ‘family history’. Anomalies in the national past could be seen as tragedies having to ‘have already been forgotten’, but which one needs unceasingly to be ‘reminded’ of. Bhabha states that this forgetting constitutes the beginning of a nation’s narrative and this phenomenon could more precisely be defined as forgetting to remember⁸⁴. In the case of Zveno, having to ‘have already forgotten’ the coup needs to be ‘reminded’ as a way of accommodating some of its members⁸⁵ to the historical and political evolution, or, in other words, to historical laws. Within this context, the approach of the communists to fascists and coup organisers who had mutated and moved to the left in the historical course, is reminded in order to be forgotten. As De Certeau has pointed out⁸⁶, temporalisation and narrativisation allows discourse to appear to be pertaining to another period what does not fit into a present system. The Zveno as group of plotters and coup organisers then seems to pertain to another period and not to that of the Fatherland Front. Within this context, an “anti-national deed” of Zveno, a coup, is dislocated from its present “patriotic conduct”.

A structural emphasis is laid on the mode of production in Marxian writings. Bulgarian communist intellectuals meticulously discussed the periodisation of the Bulgarian history⁸⁷, that is, the historical determination of the modes of production, in order to outline the context within which the Bulgarian narod evolved. As an old Marxist, Karakolov, puts it, every narod has its own history and its own periodisation⁸⁸. Such theoretical aspects divide the Marxist holistic concept of the modes of production into national parts.

⁸³ Anderson (1991): 199-203.

⁸⁴ Bhabha (1990b): 310.

⁸⁵ Mitev (1947): 158 points out that Kimon Georgiev, the leader of Zveno and the Prime Minister of the first Fatherland Front government, was one of the most consistent adherents of the People’s Front in the late 1930s and, afterwards, of the Fatherland Front.

⁸⁶ De Certeau (1988): 88-90.

⁸⁷ See, for instance the periodisation of the Bulgarian history that Mitev suggests, in Mitev (1947): 9-12.

⁸⁸ BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 745 (1948): 68.

The standard four economic stages of Marxist doctrine with respect to the evolution of the Bulgarian narod were primitive communal and slave-owning stage (to 679, in 681 the first Bulgarian state was established); feudalism (679-1878, which is the year of Bulgaria's national liberation); capitalism (1878-1944); and then socialism⁸⁹.

Thus, the Bulgarian communist history-writing shows the transition of the Bulgarian narod from primitive communism to feudalism, and then to capitalism, when it was transformed into a nation. Not accidentally, feudalism begins with the subjugation of the Bulgarian narod under the Byzantine yoke, while capitalism coincides with the times of Bulgaria's national revival and national liberation. Thus, Marxist social-economic formations within a peculiar national context delineated a schema of linear historical process, which substantially assisted and elaborated a construction of the past on a national basis. In other words, the mode of production mutated from a fundamental analytical tool into a framework of national evolution.

Merging national and Marxist categories resulted in some confusion between Marxian and national periodisations. On the one hand, historical narration respected the Marxian social-economic formations based on the modes of production; on the other hand, the historical narration articulated the establishment and collapse of the three Bulgarian states as well as the foreign yokes (Byzantine and Ottoman) over the Bulgarians.

The synthesis of the social-economic formations and the interpretation of the past in a national manner⁹⁰ caused a number of inconsistencies. The historical continuity of the Bulgarian people and Bulgarian identity since primordial times contradicts the Stalinist doctrine that the nation emerged in the capitalist era⁹¹. The denomination of peoples and empires of the 'pre-nationalist' era reflects this: Turkish (instead of Ottoman) Empire and yoke. The social-economic formations and classes are depicted

⁸⁹ Pundeff (1961): 684. See also the periodisation that Lambrev and Karakolov proposed in Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 744 (1948): 79 and Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 745 (1948): 65 respectively.

⁹⁰ For the co-existence of the social-economic formations with national historical narration in Bulgarian historiography, see BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 359 (1949): 5-6, concerning the resolution of the Central Committee of the BCP on an edition of a popularised Bulgarian history.

⁹¹ 'Nation is a historical category belonging to the epoch of rising capitalism', in Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question (1913)*, in Bruce (1973): 65.

in national terms, e.g. Turkish feudal system, Turkish feudal exploitation, and Turkish ruling class.

The ensuing confusion is revealed in the following excerpt cited in the schoolbook of 1951⁴: ‘under the denationalising pursuits of the Greek Patriarchate...’⁹². In so far as it refers to the Ottoman era, that is, before the emergence of nations, the question arises as to how a non-nation could be denationalised by a nationalised religious institution. This is even more striking, if Stringer’s view of textbooks is taken into account: contradictions reveal the devices that any text uses in order to achieve its own purposes of its discipline’s re-interpretation and representation. This contradiction is due to the attempt of the authors of the historical textbook to attribute a national character to the Marxist category of social-economic formations, which were formulated on the premise that there were no nations before capitalism. The device that that textbook engages was a marriage of Marxist categories with a national narration of the past.

Bulgarian communist intellectuals, such as Todor Pavlov⁹³, adopted the traditional Marxist approach that the nation is an historical product of the era of capitalism. Mitev dates the emergence of the Bulgarian nation in the 18th century, when the craft industry was being developed, the Bulgarian bourgeoisie shaped a powerful social stratum, and the new Bulgarian language (*novobilgarski*) was being formed⁹⁴. It was the economical and cultural activities of the class of merchants and manufacturers that caused the emergence of the Bulgarian nation.

However, it seems that only the procedure of the evolution of a “narod” to a nation takes place in capitalism⁹⁵. Capitalism then provides the proper conditions for the

⁹² Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 94.

⁹³ Pavlov (1940): 107-126. See also Mitev (1948): 292-293.

⁹⁴ Mitev (1948): 300-302. However, despite his declared position that the Bulgarian nation is a product of the early capitalism, he identified national yokes (Greek and Turkish) at the time of the Bulgarian renaissance and he considers that peasants had already acquired national consciousness in the national-liberation movement. The problematic points of his account are, first, the existence of national yokes before nations, and, second, the absence of socioeconomic reasons to explain how the peasantry learnt nationalism, provided that the bourgeoisie learnt it in the market (excerpt from Stalin’s writings *ibid* p. 301).

⁹⁵ Pavlov (1940): 117, BCP Records Fund 324, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 163 (November 1945-July 1946): 22, and Stoyanov (1949): 16-25. Mitev (1947): 35 specifies the time when the Bulgarian narod was transformed into nation: 1850-1860.

transformation of a “narod” to a nation, since the Bulgarian “narod” pre-existed long ago before the emergence of the Bulgarian nation and this was preceded by the Bulgarian tribe. In other words, a schema of evolution from tribe to “narod” and then to nation is elaborated, whereas a Bulgarian community has existed since primordial times. There is an interesting analogy with the evolutionary schema that Smith proposes⁹⁶. The Smithian ethnic category, that is, a cultural unit which members are bounded by a sense of kinship, could be considered as analogous with the notion of tribe as the BCP determined it. The Smithian ethnic community, that is, a named human population with ancestry myths, historical memories, common cultural traits, associated with a homeland, is compatible with narod. Significantly, the Bulgarian narod emerged after being settled to the south of Danube and being associated with the “Bulgarian lands”. The Smithian nation and the BCP nation are political phenomena of the modern era which originated in ethnic community and narod respectively. Thus, the Stalinist doctrine that the bourgeoisie introduced the national idea⁹⁷ is reconciled with the eternity of the Bulgarian consciousness in the following schema: the Bulgarian narod that had existed since primordial times was transformed into the Bulgarian nation through certain social and economic changes in the Ottoman Empire⁹⁸.

One of the main elements of Party historiography is that it embeds actors in the history of the nation whether or not they had any conception of the Bulgarian nation. This type of historiography is nationalist⁹⁹, as it draws non-national actors and events into the national narrative. For instance, a religious battle can be narrated as a national one. The prioritised agents of the history-writing of the Party’s historical apparatus were people, land, language, and religion.

As Verdery shows in her analysis of the Romanian case¹⁰⁰, the Party’s apparatus constructed a new subject, that of the entire people, through history-writing. This aspect of Party history-writing faded out class struggle and integrated the Party’s separate history and national history into a whole. Everything alien to the Party’s

⁹⁶ Smith A. (1999): 105.

⁹⁷ Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 12.

⁹⁸ Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 93.

⁹⁹ Calhoun (1997): 51.

¹⁰⁰ Verdery (1991): 248.

ideology was simultaneously not really in “the people”. The most prominent example was the approach of the Party’s historical apparatus to Great-Bulgarian chauvinism: it constituted a marginal phenomenon until German imperialist interests and a German dynasty imposed it on Bulgaria.

Moreover, there is, also, a slippage from use of the concept of the modes of production to the classification of the land or the state in Bulgarian historiography of the early post-war period. For instance, textbooks refer to Bulgarian lands even before the coming of the Slavs to the Balkans. The terms, “Bulgarian narod” and “Bulgarian state” are used for the medieval times, while the term “Bulgarian lands” is used for the ancient times.

A slippage of the notion of modes of production in favour of that of language also occurred. The invention of the Bulgarian script has a central position in the construction of a Bulgarian national past with Cyril and Methodius honoured in every textbook or historical book related to their time¹⁰¹. Thus, another feature of history-writing under the Bulgarian communist regime emerges: the role of the individual in history. Another inconsistency with Marxian axioms then emerged, since, as Yaresh¹⁰² points out, Marx and Engels subject individuals to unalterable and immutable laws of social development.

This nationalist turn introduced religious issues into history-writing, albeit within the Marxist distinction between progressive and reactionary social forces in terms of the evolution of the productive forces. According to the sense of the social-economic criteria in particular and Marxism in general, some historical factors promoted the productivity of labour and fostered culture and progress. Having a national point of view, Bulgarian Marxist scholars indicated that evangelisation of the Bulgarian people and the movement of the Exarchate constituted progressive forces in Bulgarian history. The former cemented the administrative centralisation of the Bulgarian state and contributed to the survival of the Bulgarian narod from the policies of

¹⁰¹ See, for instance, Mitev (1945-1946): 427 ff on the role of Kliment in disseminating evangelisation and the Bulgarian script and culture.

¹⁰² Yaresh (1962b): 77-81. A striking excerpt of Engels’ writings cited *ibid.* p. 78-79 argues as follows: ‘In the history of society... the actors are all endowed with consciousness... nothing happens without a conscious purpose... But this distinction... cannot alter the fact that the course of history is governed by inner general laws’.

assimilation occurred during '200 years of Byzantine yoke'. Moreover, the evangelisation contributed to the foundation and further development of the Bulgarian script and literature, which were to be very significant for the Slav civilisation¹⁰³. The Exarchate fomented the national movement in the 19th century.

Key actors in Marxian writing are classes. A Marxian analysis presupposes a certain social stratification and determination of a certain role for each class. Classes have certain international dimensions and they play a progressive or reactionary role in terms of the social evolution, as Marx and Engels conceive it. In the Party's history-writing classes acquired an international and national mutation. At the international level, especially in modern times, nations equated with classes through the anti-imperialist idea, a concept as we have seen largely originating with Lenin¹⁰⁴. In modern times, Bulgaria was a nation oppressed and exploited by German imperialism. At the national level, classes are progressive or reactionary depending on their role in the national evolution.

These concepts resulted in a slippage from the classification of class to that of the narod and in a slippage from terms implying exploitation, a Marxian fundamental principle of social-economic and political analysis, to that implying domination of the Bulgarian narod. Thus, during their long history, the Bulgarian people were subjugated by different rulers; liberated themselves; were again subjugated; however, eventually they were resurrected. The Bulgarian people fought for their liberation even at the very outset of their national subjugation¹⁰⁵. The rising against two parallel yokes (a political-military, the Ottoman yoke, and a religious-spiritual, the Greek-Orthodox one) principally manifests an immortal Bulgarian spirit preserved by the people through the centuries.

Classes increasingly acquired a national role. They became progressive or reactionary from a national point of view. This resulted in the ascription of a patriotic or a treacherous character to social classes. For instance, whereas the peasants, the

¹⁰³ Mitev (1945-1946): 420-421 and 425. He claims that the Bulgarians were not annihilated, as for example the pre-Baltic Slavs, because 'we [the Bulgarians] had set up our own national culture earlier than many other Slav peoples; as a result, we had forged the most strong weapons: script and culture'.

¹⁰⁴ Chapter One Part Two.

¹⁰⁵ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 163 and Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 79.

craftsmen and the intellectuals were represented as an active part of the national revolutionary movement and opted for armed revolution, chorbadzhis (landowners) and wholesale merchants preferred diplomacy to revolution¹⁰⁶ and negotiated the future of the nation with its subjugator ceding to them some of the national interests and rights.

In contradiction to the Stalinist doctrine that the big bourgeoisie advanced nationalism, Bulgarian Marxist authors stated¹⁰⁷ that the Bulgarian bourgeoisie played a conservative role concerning its attitude towards the national question in the 19th century. It upheld Turkish-Bulgarian dualism, a suitable solution for its class interests¹⁰⁸, instead of an independent liberated state; whereas it is argued that the petty bourgeoisie and peasantry played a progressive role in relation to the national movement¹⁰⁹. This concept of the progressive character of peasantry and petty-bourgeoisie was extremely helpful for the BCP in early post-war years, when peasants, intellectuals and small entrepreneurs were considered allies of the working class in its social and national struggle.

Another example of an “anti-national” class is the class of the boyari (medieval landowners) whose interest in maintaining their power led them to unite with the Turks and assist them. Consequently, according to official historiography, the real patriotic force, the people -unarmed and impoverished-, did not effectively resist the Ottoman Turks¹¹⁰. ‘In some cases, the people fought against the Turkish conquerors, but usually the feudal leaders betrayed the people’s struggle, by concluding agreements with the Turks and by recognising the superiority of the Turkish sultan’¹¹¹.

¹⁰⁶ Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 13-15 and BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 743 (1948): 19 (Vlahov).

¹⁰⁷ Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 106-107.

¹⁰⁸ The Bulgarian bourgeoisie was supposed to be interested in the maintenance of the big Ottoman market. In essence, it seems to reflect the Marxian preference of large states.

¹⁰⁹ See, for instance, Natan (1946) and Pavlov (1946): 6-9, who records that there was not a proletariat to undertake the hegemonic role in the national liberation movement.

¹¹⁰ Burmov, Dikovski, Bliznev and Hristov (1950⁵): 39-40. The lack of any national consciousness in the medieval times is outside the authors’ point of view.

¹¹¹ Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 75.

The fusion of Marxist and nationalist elements in historiography affected the narration of the past in one more way. An old theory, Pan-Slavism, was reintroduced in historiography with a different purport. In this new context, Germans and Slavs were presented as two rival forces clashing with each other since primordial times. Pan-Slavism was in accordance with the nationalism of a national belonging to a tribal family. Bulgaria linked its past and future interests with the Slav peoples. Therefore, this sense of kinship had to be taken into account and to shape the nation and its historical path. Such a conceptualisation was in accordance with the adherence of Bulgaria to the socialist block, headed by the Soviet Union and largely comprised of Slav nations, albeit uneasily so as the socialist bloc was ethnicised or tribalised.

Post-war “socialist Pan-Slavism” relies on the linguistic, religious, political and cultural proximity of the Slavs. Pan-Slavism is supposed to derive its legitimisation from the remote past; the battle of Griundval in 1410 and the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 were projected as examples of effective Slav solidarity¹¹². At the same time, inter-Slav rivalries (e.g. the wars between Bulgaria and Serbia in 1885 and 1913) are reduced to fratricidal wars (an Andersonian ‘reassurance of a fratricide’) or accidents of history and conspiracies of the enemies of the Slav peoples¹¹³. Nevertheless, as Snyder points out, the Pan-Slavist idea originated from Herder¹¹⁴. Kohn states that ‘the corresponding Slav thought, in spite of its anti-German attitude and its insistence on Slav originality or samobytnost, was deeply indebted to the Germans’¹¹⁵. Marx excoriated Pan-Slavism as ‘a ludicrous anti-historical movement behind which stood the terrible reality of the Russian Empire’. Engels denounced it as ‘an absurd anti-national current the aim of which is to subordinate the civilised West to the barbarian East, the city to the village, trade, industry and education to the primitive agriculture of Slav serfs’¹¹⁶. Consequently, Bulgarian historiography had to

¹¹² It is argued that Russians, Poles, Byelorussians, and other Slavs were allied and defeated the Teutonic conquerors in the battle of Griundvald. In 1877-1878, it is argued that all the South Slavs allied with the Russian Army in order to destroy the Turkish Empire, in *Rabotnicheskoe Delo* #141, 03.03.1945. However, it is forgotten, for instance, that Serbia declared war against the Ottoman Empire after the fall of Plevna, when the victory of Russian arms was largely looming, presumably to take part in the sharing of spoils.

¹¹³ Mitev (1947): 86-88.

¹¹⁴ Snyder (1984): 19-20 cites Herder, ‘Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Mankind’, 1784, chapter 4, Book 16; ‘To the Slav People’.

¹¹⁵ Kohn (1953): 2.

¹¹⁶ Snyder (1984): 32-33.

forget or radically reinterpret some rather embarrassing pages of the Marxian literature.

The concept of 'eternal competition' between Slavs and Germans also lays the foundations of post-war Pan-Slavism¹¹⁷. Hence, all Slavs had a common enemy. As Mitev argues in *Istoricheski Pregled* (Historical Review), the German race had intended to conquer, assimilate and exterminate the Slav peoples from medieval times onwards¹¹⁸. On the other side, the Slavs are portrayed as defending their freedom and democracy¹¹⁹. The German aggressionism collapsed after the victory of the Soviet Union on the last version of 'germanism', namely Hitlerism¹²⁰.

Apart from the statement that Hitlerist imperialism represented the imperialist interests of the monopolistic capital¹²¹, an economical or political reason to explain racial conflicts between Germans and Slavs is entirely absent. Mitev interpreted Nazism as consistent with the racial version of pangermanistic ideas of the 19th century and the eternal aggressionism of the Germans towards the Slav lands. Thus, German aggressionism just took the form of Nazism in the imperialist era¹²². Similarly, Burmov discusses National Socialism as the uppermost endeavour of the Germans to advance eastwards, where the Slavs lived¹²³. Consequently, the eternal struggle of the Germans to exterminate the Slavs is discussed in essentially racial or tribal terms.

In one of the articles of the *Rabotnichesko Delo*, it is argued that the concept of a cultural and peaceful universal mission of Slavdom is a part of pan-Slav classifications. The contribution of the Slavs to the universal civilisation is dated back as early as the time of Cyril and Methodius. The two brothers and the bogomil

¹¹⁷ For various "slavisms" of the past see Krindzhalov (1946-1947): 460-464 and 476-477.

¹¹⁸ Stalin himself referred to a similar scheme in the 1930s, when he mentioned as one of the pretexts for war that 'a "superior race", e.g. the Germans, would launch a war against an "inferior race", e.g. the Slavs, to render the "inferior race" fruitful to rule over it'. Stalin, *Report to the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) on the work of the central Committee (1934)*, in Bruce (1973): 235.

¹¹⁹ See, also, Burmov's article on the struggle of the Slavs against the Germans in *Rabotnichesko Delo* #141, 03.03.1945. Mitev and Burmov were members of Party's historical apparatus specialised in medieval history, BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 359 (1949): 5.

¹²⁰ Mitev (1945): 172-174.

¹²¹ Mitev (1945): 174.

¹²² Mitev (1945): 191-192.

¹²³ *Rabotnichesko Delo* #141, 03.03.1945

movement¹²⁴ developed ideas for human rights. Having influenced the Bulgarian Renaissance, the cultural and peaceful mission of Slavdom reached its peak under the international role that the Soviet Union was to play after the Second World War¹²⁵.

In conclusion, it could be argued that the so far discussed particular Marxist version of history-writing combines a nationalist approach to the past and Marxist theoretical and methodological tools of explaining and analysing the past. This synthesis of Marxism and nationalism in history-writing is relied on the central philosophical dogma of the BCP, in particular, and the communist movement, in general: national in form (a narration of the past with national criteria) and socialist in content (Marxist methods).

The mutation of Marxism that has so far been described was dictated by instrumental political considerations. During the early post-war years, Bulgarian historiography had an overwhelmingly instrumental perspective. The fundamental purposes of historiography had been explicitly outlined at the Fifth Congress of the BWPC in December 1948¹²⁶ and reflected in the new law of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (B.A.N.)¹²⁷. Theories and views opposed to Marxism–Leninism were to be confronted; ‘nationalism’, as the BCP used this term in opposition to patriotism, ‘great Bulgarian chauvinism’, any remnants of the fascist ideology, ‘anarchism’, and ‘Trotskyism’ were to be discredited. “Falsifications” of Bulgarian history from the long antiquity to up-to-date events, committed by bourgeois historians, were to be replaced by a ‘scientific approach’, as the BCP believed that it wrote “objective history”. This raises the question of who were entitled to write history under the Bulgarian communist regime and what was their affinity with Marxism.

5.5 The historical apparatus

¹²⁴ It was a social-religious movement. It emerged in Bulgaria in the 10th century and lasted until the 14th century. Followers of this movement had a Manichean, dualistic worldview; they renounced any power, the state, the church, and the clergy; and they did not respect the cross, icons, holidays, and ceremonies.

¹²⁵ Rabortnichesko Delo #141, 03.03.1945. This article was published on the occasion of the Slav Congress in Sofia.

¹²⁶ BCP Records Fund 223, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 1, vol. IV (1948): 947-968.

¹²⁷ Pundeff (1969): 381.

As Certeau¹²⁸ points out, it is impossible to analyse historical discourse independently of the institution which produces it, that is in this case, the communist-led “historical front”, a strongly centralised and strictly controlled institution. A historical institution “constructs” the knowledge of a discipline and “engineers” the ideas that circulated within society. No way is “objective”, since it is not autonomous or isolated from the society. In the Bulgarian case, as the example of the Conference of the Workers of the Historical Front supervised and regulated by Chervenkov shows, the BCP sought to integrate professors, academicians, and authors, namely the constituents of any historical institution of the modern time. Thus, the so-called historical front did not write an “objective” history, as it was dependent on the state and the power.

In the initial period after 9 September, immediate political concerns dominated the BCP. Pundeff points out that until 1948, the BCP allowed non-communist scholars to write history¹²⁹. Up to 1948, non-members of the BCP participated in historical debates and gave lectures, even though party scholars prevailed. Characteristically, from the long list of the authors in charge of writing the textbooks, ‘only two were not party members’¹³⁰. The BCP promoted its line on historiography by publishing articles in the controlled press and by editing historical books.

Concerning the authors of the textbooks on the national history of Bulgaria, the team of Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev¹³¹ writes the one published in 1946. It was in use for at least the school year 1947-1948. Most possibly, it was substituted by the textbook written by the team of Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev¹³². Two more historical textbooks on the national history of Bulgaria were edited later. A textbook for the state schools written by Burmov, Dikovski, Bliznev and Hristov¹³³, and a textbook for the military academies written by Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev,

¹²⁸ Certeau (1988): 58-64.

¹²⁹ Pundeff (1961): 683.

¹³⁰ BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 10 (1946): 159.

¹³¹ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946). There are editions up to 1948, but it could have been in use later on.

¹³² Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴).

¹³³ Burmov, Dikovski, Bliznev and Hristov (1950⁵). Existing in the National Library in Sofia textbook is the fifth edition. The contents of the book imply that it was, most possibly, published in 1949. However, it could have been published earlier and modified in 1949 in order to include the chapters on the building of socialism and the Constitution.

Topalov and Hristov¹³⁴. Mitev, who was a major, wrote a book comprised of lectures on modern Bulgarian history for the military school¹³⁵. Bozhikov took part in the writing of the textbooks published in 1946, 1949 and 1951⁴, while Burmov, is one of the authors of the textbooks issued in 1946, 1950⁵ and 1951⁴. So far as there are sources concerning authors of historical textbooks, they were members of the BCP. Burmov, Lambrev, Hristov, Kosev, Mitev and Topalov were Marxists; nevertheless, all of them apart Mitev and Lambrev joined the BCP after 9 September¹³⁶.

Regarding the so-called “historical front”, as Chervenkov recognised, it incorporated skilled cadres of old uncommitted specialists as well as skilled specialists, who had been integrated into the BCP, with old bourgeois ideological background. Both categories were of significant meaning for the field of history according to Chervenkov’s opinion¹³⁷. Verdery attributes a military sense to the “historical front” and considers it vital to shaping both the national and materialistic facets of the regime’s ideology¹³⁸. The institution of an “historical front” allowed the BCP to draw the production of historiography more and more tightly under the control of the state.

Except the school textbooks of history, the Communist regime put under its control all bodies related to history. The Bulgarian Academy’s membership was selected by the BCP, its presidency was undertaken by the Marxist philosopher, Todor Pavlov, and it was transformed into an academy of a soviet type exemplified by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR¹³⁹. Cleansing of “fascist and bourgeois” professors had been completed in Universities. A main historical journal, *Istoricheski Pregled* (Historical Review)¹⁴⁰, was recognised as official and replaced all others of the same field. Control of education and the nationalisation of the press and of publishing houses put the most crucial means of cultural production in Party hands. As mentioned above, a conference consisting of all prominent Bulgarian historians was organised by the

¹³⁴ Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949).

¹³⁵ Mitev (1947).

¹³⁶ Analytically, Burmov, Hristov, Kosev joined the BCP in 1944, Lambrev in 1919 and Mitev in 1941; Bozhikov most possibly was a member of the BCP (he was called “comrade” in the Conference of the workers of the historical front). The rest of authors positively had a kind of professional relation with the Ministry of Education.

¹³⁷ ‘Fifth Congress...’ (1949): 291.

¹³⁸ Verdery (1991): 220.

¹³⁹ Pundeff (1969): 381.

¹⁴⁰ *Istoricheski Pregled* had a run of over 10,000 copies in 1948, in Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 744 (1948): 8.

Committee of Science, Art, and Culture, and supervised by Chervenkov, in order to designate the framework of history's rewriting in a materialist and Marxist view. New textbooks were rewritten and new treaties on history were commissioned to underpin the new Party's discourse. As Verdery argues¹⁴¹, a centralised culture disables alternative foci. A monolithic Party-State produces a monolithic nation. As a centralised regime adopts nationalism, an increased concentration of national values and symbols occur. Within this context, the (re)construction of past with national criteria was shaped. It consisted of Marxist and national elements, as the following analysis of certain issues is demonstrated.

As argued so far, the process of (re)construction of the past with national criteria, as committed by the BCP, was channelled through mass educational system, textbooks, and historiography. Certain features of 'Marxist nationalism', as it deployed by the Party's historical apparatus, were presented. In the following section, certain topics of the approach of the Bulgarian communists to the past with national criteria are analysed.

¹⁴¹ Verdery (1991): 315.

5.6 An outline of how the Bulgarian communists imagined the past of Bulgaria

Bulgarian lands since prehistory

Billig points out that ‘a nation is more than an imagined community of people, for a place –a homeland– also has to be imagined’. And quoting Agnew, he adds that ‘nationalism is never beyond geography, since the national place has to be imagined’¹. This geographical imagination extends to the long past of the nation as well. The place, within the boundaries of which the nation emerged and developed its first civilization, needs to be designated in an abstract and flexible manner. Smith evaluates the significance of the land for nationalism, that is, a special place for the nation to inhabit: an historic land, a homeland, an ancestral land². Thus, emphasis on land, in especial since primordial times, constitutes a feature of nationalism and not of Marxism.

In the historical textbooks, there are references to ‘the most ancient residents of Bulgaria’ hundreds of thousands of years ago. Thracians were the first people who accomplished a kind of social organisation, but ‘in Bulgarian lands’³. Danov published a study on the sources of the ancient history of Bulgarian [our] lands⁴. Thus, a somewhat preposterous scheme was developed, which can be seen as an oxymoron in that these lands were called Bulgarian or Slav⁵ before Bulgarians and Slavs settled the area.

Burmov sought to give an explanation of the above oxymoron. At the Conference of the Workers of the Historical Front, he questioned when the Bulgarian history begins: from Slavs and pre-Bulgarians or from prehistoric times as it was written in the old and new programme of the textbooks on Bulgarian history. Burmov suggested the conference should think about the population who lived in the Bulgarian [our] land

¹ Billig (1995): 74.

² Smith A. (1999): 149.

³ Burmov, Dikovski, Bliznev and Hristov (1950⁵): 5-8. Its first chapter has the title ‘Bulgarian lands until the coming of Slavs’. In Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 3-7 and Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 4-6 the term ‘Bulgarian lands’ and ‘our lands’ are used. See also the chapter title ‘Bulgarian lands up to the coming of the Slavs’ in Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 299. The term ‘Bulgarian lands’ is also used in relation to the Ottoman era, see Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 75.

⁴ Danov (1947).

⁵ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 17 and 38.

before Slavs and pre-Bulgarians settled it. His thesis was that this population should not be excluded from the Bulgarian history, since 'it bequeathed its blood and culture to the Slavs and pre-Bulgarians inhabited later the Bulgarian lands'⁶. This thesis would constitute the basis of the future myth of the ethnic descent of the contemporary Bulgarians, that they are an ethnical mixture of Thracians, Slavs, and pre-Bulgarians. Lambrev, an older member of the BCP than Burmov, argued that the prehistoric era was the first stage of the periodisation of Bulgarian history. It may be not history of the Bulgarian narod, but it should have been included in the 'Bulgarian history of our fatherland'⁷.

Including Thrace in the Bulgarian lands was congruent with the international political demands of Bulgaria in the early post-war years: the restoration of Western Thrace to Bulgaria. Then, Bulgaria based its claims on the language that the people spoke in these lands. The Greeks were accused of evacuating the Bulgarians from the Western Thrace and expelling the Bulgarian population, as long as the Greek state was the 'mandatary' of the victorious in the First World War Great Powers (treaties of San Remo and of Sevres, 1920)⁸. The annexation of Western Thrace to Bulgaria had constituted a national cause of Bulgaria since the treaty of San Stefano. Even though the BCP blamed the pre-9 September Bulgarian rulers for Great-Bulgarian chauvinism and expansionism, after 9 September it was the Fatherland Front government, dominated by the BCP, which promoted the same Bulgarian cause of an outlet to the Aegean Sea before the international peace conferences.

Presentation of origin

Apart from a myth of ethnoscape, myths of ethnic descent (temporal origin, location and migration), as defined by Smith⁹, were also articulated. Smith identifies myths of temporal origin, or when we were begotten, with one of the main tasks of nationalist historians, i.e. to date the community's origins, and so to locate it in time and in relation to other relevant communities. In the case of Bulgaria, the date 681 is that of

⁶ BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 743 (1948): 56

⁷ BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 744 (1948): 79 and 85.

⁸ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 388-389. Mitev (1948): 306 plainly notes that Thrace would be liberated from the monarchist-fascist Greece and the semi-feudal Turkey so as Bulgaria would realise the unification of her lands.

⁹ Smith A. (1999): 63-64.

the Bulgarian community's origin¹⁰, but also the time when feudalism began in the Bulgarian lands. Hence, a category of nationalism is reconciled with a Marxian one.

Myths of location and migration, or where we came from and how we got here, define an acknowledged and distinctive homeland. Both Slavs and Asparuhian pre-



Bulgarians who settled the lands of the contemporary Bulgarian state migrated and located in that area. For the Marxist Bulgarian historians of the early post-war time, the question under debate was which ethnic element finally prevailed in the Bulgarian narod as early as its emergence. A Slav origin for Bulgarians was consistent with the Bulgarian nationalism of belonging to the eastern socialist block, the backbone of which was identified with the Slav nations. Consequently, Bulgaria was indebted to the

East and not the West.

The origin of the Bulgarians was a complicated question and still is¹¹. The Bulgarian people developed a Slav language, whereas its ethnic name is of Turkish origin. In the historical schoolbooks of the early post-war years, it is argued that *pre-Bulgarians*¹², a tribe of Turkish origin, inhabited the area to the south of the Danube. The term “*pre-Bulgarians*” has evidently prevailed with respect to the historical narration of the early medieval times. However, it is argued that the majority of the *pre-Bulgarian* group of Asparuh, who founded the first Bulgarian state, were Slavs. Therefore,

¹⁰ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 37, Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 3, and Burmov, Dikovski, Bliznev and Hristov (1950⁵): 14.

¹¹ There is also a question of whether the ‘making of Slavs’ is a matter of invention, imagining and labeling by Byzantine authors respective to the military and political potential of the groups settled on its northern boundaries. Curta (2001) claims that no people called themselves Slavs up to the time of the ‘Russian Primary Chronicle’ (far after the early medieval times); hence, the term ‘Slavs’ underwent a ‘national use’ for claims to ancestry. On the other hand, it is doubted even that Bulgarians are Slavs. Tzvetkov (1998), after a strong criticism of the ‘Slavian myth’, deduces that Bulgarians are a more ancient group than both Slavs and Turks.

¹² Burmov (1948): 328-336 claims that the pre-Bulgarians were an ethnically mixed group of Sarmates, Onogures and other groups. He estimates that the process of the pre-Bulgarian ethnogenesis determines its Turkish character.

Asparuh established a feudal Slav-Bulgarian state, consisted of Slavs and *pre-Bulgarians*¹³. Adding the prefix *pre*, the authors of Bulgarian history suggested that there was a situation in which the Slav people of the eastern Balkan Peninsula had leaders of a different origin whose names would determine their ethnicity.

Lambrev¹⁴, following the theory of the Slav origin of the Bulgarian people as expounded by Derzhavin¹⁵, argues that the first Bulgarian state in the Balkans was in essence established by the local Slav population and not by Asparuh, a leader of a multiethnic group. Vlahov points out that the first Bulgarian state was of Slav ethnic content because the Slav masses were much more numerous than the Turanian horde of Asparuh¹⁶. Derzhavin, also, claims that Asparuhian Bulgarians were also Slavs. Since they lived in Caucasus, Asparuhian Bulgarians had become Slavs apart from their leadership, which had adopted Hazarian or other oriental political and cultural habits¹⁷. Asparuh governed the territory of the north-eastern Balkan Peninsula after a compromise with the Slav tribes who settled in this area. Pre-Bulgarians, in essence, contributed to the Bulgarian state enhancing its power and becoming entrenched within frontiers¹⁸.

The theory of the Hun origin of pre-Bulgarians was presented as congruent with the political considerations of the 'chauvinist and fascist science' of the past regime. This theory claimed that Bulgarians were Huns in terms of culture, spirit and biological aspects, and not Slavs. As a result, Bulgarians had ethnic affinities with Germans, Hungarians, Finns, and Japanese; a thesis that aligned Bulgaria to the Axis¹⁹. In essence, one theory which purposed certain political considerations was displaced by another, that of the Slav origin of Bulgarians. Theories of the origin of Bulgarians

¹³ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 28-36 *passim*, Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 3-4, Burmov, Dikovski, Bliznev and Hristov (1950⁵): 13-14, Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 20.

¹⁴ BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 744 (1948): 87.

¹⁵ Not accidentally, Derzhavin's theory on the origin of the Bulgarian people is the first article in the first volume of the *Istoricheski Pregled*.

¹⁶ Vlahov in BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 743 (1948): 15.

¹⁷ Krindzhalov (1947): 4-5 supports the Hun origin of pre-Bulgarians, but, like Derzhavin, he argues that since very early times they had been slavified apart from their leadership. He also agrees with Derzhavin that Asparuhian Bulgarians were slavified, *ibid* p. 53-54.

¹⁸ BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 744 (1948): 139 (Krindzhalov).

¹⁹ Krindzhalov (1947): 8-30 *passim*. See also his position in BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 744 (1948): 139.

constitute a striking example of how a past is ethnically (re)constructed depending on contemporary political considerations.

Bulgarians, who were seen as a part of the Slav race, were supposed to be peaceful, freedom-loving, creative and amiable people²⁰ recalling Herder's 'Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit'. According to Herder's idealism, the Slavs, being the last ones in the peoples' evolution, would accomplish peace, justice and virtue all over the world, 'since politics and legislation are bound in the long run to promote quiet toil and charm discourse among the nations of Europe'²¹. Herder's idealism was consistent with the idea that the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc were the adherents and defenders of peace on earth.

The Slavs seem to have skipped the social-economic stage of slavery. Feudalism seems to have succeeded the stage of primitive communism without the mediation of the slave-holding social-economic formation²². The major question is how a dominant group emerged from a kin-bound society based on common ownership and how it strove to control the economic production. The historical textbooks skipped an explanation; hence, a national aspect of an idealistic past overshadows Marxism.

As shown so far, economical, social and class analysis yielded ground to the search for an ethnic origin in the long past. An idealistic analysis of the Slav racial character contradicts materialism. Lastly, an attempt to show evidence of the progressive element of the Slavs rendered race as the 'womb of history' and not a class. As concerns this part of the historical narration, ethnic approaches prevailed over pure Marxist ones.

²⁰ However, Mitev (1945-1946): 413-414 notes the opposite.

²¹ Herder finishes his chapter on the Slav peoples as following: 'so you, once diligent and happy peoples who have sunk so low, will at last awaken from your long and heavy slumber, will be freed from your enslaving chains, ...and will once again celebrate on them your ancient festivals of peaceful toil and commerce', in Adler and Menze (1997): 299-301. For an analysis of Herder's theory, see Papoulia (2002): 269 ff. For the implication of Herder's philosophy to the Pan-Slav conception, see Barnard (1965): 173 ff.

²² BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 744 (1948): 10-11 (Mitev), BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 744 (1948): 106-107 (Natan), and BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 745 (1948): 64 (Krindzhalov). The notion that the Slavs skipped the slave-holding social-economic formation is also reported in the Soviet scholarship, mainly by Prigozhin and Grekov, Yareh (1962a): 54-61 and Vucinich (1962): 123-124.

As shown, the Bulgarian authors discussed the Slav presence in the Balkan Peninsula separately to Bulgarian history in particular. It resulted in stressing that the Bulgarians contributed to advance history, as long as the Bulgarians belong to the Slav race. It is also dictated from the contemporary to the early post-war international situation. The new shape of pan-Slavism as belonging to the socialist bloc was reflected in history's conceptualisation.

Byzantine Empire

The contribution of the Slavs to the history of mankind is exaggerated in the historical schoolbooks by the view that they exerted influence upon the Byzantine Empire regarding the abolition of the slaveholding way of production²³. The authors of a schoolbook maintained that 'the slaveholding labour was liquidated because of the revolutionary blow of the Slavs against the [Byzantine] Empire'²⁴. Thus, not only does one mode of production substitute for another after becoming obsolete, but also peoples could induce revolution in the mode of production after residing in an area. Derzhavin alleged that the Slavs renewed the Byzantine Empire, as German tribes did concerning the Roman Empire²⁵. It seems that people or nations or races are the driving forces of history and not the mode of production. Another slippage from Marxian to national categories occurred in order to emphasise the significance of the historical role of Slavs, including Bulgarians, concerning south-eastern Europe.

A significant issue concerning the narration of the early Byzantine times is the extent to which the Byzantine Empire influenced Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Marxist historians seem to accept that the Byzantine Empire exerted her influence over the Bulgarian state and at the same time to argue that the new-established Bulgarian state played a regenerative role for the Byzantine Empire. Thus, on the one hand, they emphasised the view that Slavs slavised the Byzantine Empire to a considerable degree, sapped her slaveholding system, democratised her social life, and revitalised her army with new blood. On the other hand, strong Byzantine influence over Bulgaria in economic and financial terms is mentioned to explain the transformation of the mode of production in the Bulgarian state. Under the influence of Byzantium, a patriarchal-

²³ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 33 and Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 4.

²⁴ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 33. See, also, Mitev (1947): 9-10.

²⁵ Derzhavin (1945): 32.

tribal system of Slav communities was developed in a territorial community of private property and class stratification, which ripened the conditions for state formation²⁶.

The evangelisation of the Bulgarian people played a progressive role in Bulgarian history. The evangelisation hastened the liquidation of the tribal system and the advance of feudalism²⁷, that is, an upper social-economic stage²⁸. In general,



Byzantine upper class cultural elements are regarded as progressive insofar they strengthened the Bulgarian state by increasing centralisation. The adoption of these elements is being dealt with as politics of the upper Bulgarian classes to reinforce and legitimise their power²⁹. For that time, it was an advancing element in human history. In parallel, however, the Bulgarian potential is described by oxymora, such as 'active reception' and 'creative assimilation'³⁰. These oxymora are produced on the basis of a Marxian theoretical tool of explaining historical evolution, that of the role of progressive and reactionary elements, and on the basis of a nationalist approach, which

sought Bulgaria not to be presented as inferior to the Byzantine Empire.

Cyril and Methodius

A myth of a civilising mission, as Schöpflin³¹ calls it, comes into question regarding the narration of the Bulgarian state and the invention of the Cyrillic script. Such myths state that the nation in question performed some special mission, some particular function. It was argued that, in medieval times, Bulgaria was the most powerful and most developed Slav centre, which preserved the achievements of the Byzantine culture and delivered them to the other Slav peoples. According to this myth, Russia became the centre of Slavic culture after the South Slavs fell

²⁶ BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 743 (1948): 14-15 (Vlahov). Angelov (1945-1946): 385-411 reports a considerable number of similarities between the Byzantine Empire and the Bulgarian state in state organisation, system of taxation and economic rules.

²⁷ Lambrev claims that Christianity was the religion of feudalism, in BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 744 (1948): 88.

²⁸ According to Chervenkov, cited in Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 29. See, also, Pavlov in Otechestven Front #149, 02.03.1945.

²⁹ Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 28-29. The authors also recognise the Byzantine influences upon Simeon and his achievements.

³⁰ For the Soviet counterparts see Shevshenko (1962): 159-161.

³¹ Schöpflin (1997): 31.

under the Turkish yoke. Cyril, Methodius, and their students, by inventing the Cyrillic script made Bulgaria the cradle of the Slav culture and civilization.

Despite the doubt surrounding their origin³², Chervenkov underscored that Bulgarians have grounds of being proud of Cyril and Methodius, because Bulgarians, first of all the Slavs, developed the Slav literature, and underlined their great contribution to the Slav thesaurus³³. In a talk given on the occasion of a celebratory meeting about Cyril and Methodius, Chervenkov stresses, ‘the Slav spirit had firstly developed in Bulgaria, whereby it was disseminated to Russia’. Chervenkov also identifies that the two brothers provided the Slav peoples with the ability to preserve and advance their national culture in their mother tongue³⁴. The decisive role of the Bulgarians in Slav history is illuminated.

Karakostov emphatically cited an expert of Paisii’s “Slavyanobilgarska Istoriya (Slav-Bulgarian History)”: Bulgarians were the first people of the Slavs who attained Slav vocal sounds, books and sacred baptism. He adds that Kliment, a Bulgarian in origin student of Cyril and Methodius, composed the Cyrillic alphabet. Afterwards, it was distributed to Russians, who retrieved and contributed to the bloom of Slav enlightenment in times of yokes of other Slavs³⁵. Therefore, considering Bulgaria as the cradle of Slav literature and culture turns up as a sort of a messianic mission of Bulgarians.

A significant forgetting occurs concerning the narration of the mission of Cyril and Methodius. First of all, their mission, dictated from the Byzantine Empire and not from their own Slav sentiments, resulted from the interstate relations of that time. Cyril and Methodius were sent to Moravia because of the alliance that Boris I, the Bulgarian king, and the Serbian ruler concluded against the East Roman Empire. The Glagolitic alphabet, forerunner of the Cyrillic, was invented in Moravia. Boris’ turn to

³² There is a certainty of their Slav origin, in Burmov, Dikovski, Bliznev and Hristov (1950⁵): 22-23 and Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 31. Kiselkov (1945): 35-83, an author from the capitalist era, repudiates the hypothesis of the Greek origin of Cyril and Methodius and argues that they definitely were Slavs.

³³ Cited in Burmov, Dikovski, Bliznev and Hristov (1950⁵): 23 and Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 33.

³⁴ Chervenkov (1945): 32-34.

³⁵ Karakostov (1945): 9. Mitev (1945-1946): 433 shares the same view with Karakostov: Bulgaria set up its own culture which was disseminated to the Serbs and the Russians.

Germany for adopting Christianity from the German clergy and a project of alliance with Luis the German are forgotten as well³⁶. A central point of narration is the opposition of the Germans to dispersing Slav literature³⁷, in both school textbooks and historiography. A fierce German persecution of Cyril and Methodius is highlighted³⁸.

Such interpretation of the past matched political considerations of the era in question. Germans were considered as the main enemies of Slav nations, because they had been belligerents until May 1945 and Stalin's fear of a future rehabilitation of Germany's military strength and a new attack against the Soviet Union. A Slav or Eastern bloc would function as embankment to any future German expansionism eastwards. Accordingly, political considerations of that time configured aspects of past narration.

The enlightening achievements of Cyril and Methodius are contrasted with the German "cultural backwardness". The superiority of the Slavs in comparison with the Germans is underlined claiming that, by founding the Slav script, the 'doctrine of the three sacred languages' that the languages of the gospels could be only the Latin, the Greek, and the Jewish, suffered a decisive stroke 600 years before Luther³⁹. As the Bulgarian script was the first Slav one, the Bulgarians played an important role regarding the Slav culture.

Survival of the nation under the Ottoman yoke (14th-18th century)

According to the Bulgarian authors of that time, three main factors show evidence of the survival of the Bulgarian nation under the Ottoman yoke: uprisings, the haiduks (bandits on the mountains), and the church. These factors underpin the evolutionary schema of narod to nation, since they show evidence of the ability of the Bulgarian narod to survive through the ages. In one more case, a national category, the narod, undermines pure Marxian categories, e.g. classes, in the historical narration of the so-called historical front.

³⁶ For historical details of that time, see Tzvetkov (1993): vol. 1, 120-122.

³⁷ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 61-70. See, also, the theses of the Central Committee of the 24th May about the assertion of the Slav origin of Cyril and Methodius, in *Rabotnichesko Delo* #204, 17.05.1945.

³⁸ Karakostov (1945): 7.

³⁹ Mitev (1945-1946): 428.

All the uprisings which broke out in the Bulgarian lands are supposed to have a national character, even though it is argued that they were the outcomes of economic and social situations as well as of people's discontent. Focusing on the Bulgarian people's desire for freedom and presenting the leadership of these revolutions as representatives of the oppressed narod, the historical narration of the textbooks underestimates the selfish motivations of the leaders, overshadows interpersonal agreements, and forgets that mercenary armies figure in uprisings⁴⁰. It is also forgotten that these uprisings were usually provoked by outside stimulation⁴¹ rather than being due to local active leaders, the discontent of the local population, or the national consciousness of the Bulgarians. As the uprisings are narrated as being of national character, it is mentioned, without any additional comment, that in two such uprisings, an ancestor of medieval Bulgarian tsars turned up⁴². Positively, the leaders of the uprisings used this artifice in order to legitimise authority and to attract the peasants with a Christian ruler.

The context of these uprisings was a war of a European state against the Ottoman Empire. It has been commented on that Bulgarian people anticipated their liberation from abroad. While all the European states disappointed them, Bulgarian trust of the *diado Ivan* (Grandfather Ivan) was at last justified⁴³. Five centuries of slavery is supposed to have inculcated in every Bulgarian a sense of brotherhood and unity with all Slavs. It strengthened the belief that without the help of "Grandfather Ivan", the biggest and the most powerful brother of the Slav family, liberation could have not been attained⁴⁴. Within this context, more contemporary claims of affiliation with the Soviet Union were historically grounded. Neither the unwillingness of the people to massively rise against the foreign yoke nor the absence of an autonomous Bulgarian uprising through the centuries of the Ottoman yoke⁴⁵ are discussed at all.

⁴⁰ Tzvetkov (1993) vol.1: 280 refers to a mercenary army sent by Germany and Transylvania to support the uprising of Chiprovets in 1598.

⁴¹ Stavrianos (2000²): 365.

⁴² Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 164-165 and 176.

⁴³ Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 7-9 and Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 79-82. Diado Ivan symbolised Russia as the safeguard of the Balkan Orthodox people. It was the counterpart of Ivan the Terrible.

⁴⁴ 'The struggle of...' (1946): 9. References to "Grandfather Ivan" were made in the early post-war years; see, for instance, the slogan on the occasion of the week on the Bulgarian-Soviet friendship: "we have been and we will be with Grandfather Ivan", in *Rabotnichesko Delo* #269, 19.11.1946.

⁴⁵ The single autonomous Bulgarian uprising, headed by the successors of the fallen Bulgarian tsars, occurred in 1403, in Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 79.

The haiduks represent the 'first manifestation of the emerging national consciousness and dignity'. It is maintained that they fought for people's rights and they wreaked revenge on the Ottomans for their crimes against the Bulgarian people. It is asserted that people admired, loved, and assisted haiduks⁴⁶. People saw in haiduks their defenders from the arbitrariness of the Turkish evildoers⁴⁷. Later on, the haiduks were converted into fighters for national honor, freedom and independence⁴⁸. However, it is not explained how banditry was transformed into national struggle.

It is questionable whether they took revenge against the Turks only. According to some Ottoman sources, the victims of the haiduks were also Christians and Jews⁴⁹. Similarly, it is doubtful whether they took action to 'avenge' for something more than their honour. Ottoman sources on haiduk trials show evidence that haiduks killed people to uncover the whereabouts of hidden fortunes⁵⁰. Furthermore, Ottoman sources do not show evidence of people's assistance to haiduks. On the contrary, in some cases citizens turned against them⁵¹.

No serious economic reasons (the transformation of the landholding system from timar to chiflik and the devastation of cities and countries) or class antagonisms are provided in the historical textbooks to explain the phenomenon of banditry. Hobsbawm⁵² observes that (a) banditry became successful in the ramshackle and effectively decentralised Turkish empire, (b) banditry tended to become epidemic in times of pauperisation and economic crisis and (c) narration on banditry was influenced, if not invented, by German literary historians, who wrote novels about

⁴⁶ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 180-181, Burmov, Dikovski, Bliznev and Hristov (1950⁵): 42. On the contrary, Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 9-10 and Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 81-82 point out that 'haiduks did not fight for the liberation of Bulgaria'. All the authors present haiduks as avengers against the feudal oppression and the injustice of the '*Turkish* feudal system'. Even as social brigands, the authors claim that haiduks defended the Bulgarian people and people praised them as heroes.

⁴⁷ Burmov, Dikovski, Bliznev and Hristov (1950⁵): 42. Mitev (1947): 36 argues that irrespective of the personal reasons that led them to resist the Turkish rule, haiduks stood up for the people against Turks and Bulgarian chorbadzhis.

⁴⁸ Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 27 (1945): 1, 32 and Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 104, 110 and 114.

⁴⁹ If the haiduks targeted only Turks, how could the existence of Muslim haiduks be explained? For the existence of Muslim haiduks, see Matkovski (1966): 67.

⁵⁰ Only one out of 109 haiduks states a religious motivation for his deeds, Matkovski (1966): 77.

⁵¹ Matkovski (1966): 69, 72, 74, 77, 81.

⁵² Hobsbawm (1969): 16-17 and 112.

bandit-heroes. Such a materialist analysis is skipped in textbooks of the early post-war years. Even when the first and the second element of Hobsbawm's analysis are mentioned, they are overshadowed because of the national contrast between haiduks and Turkish rulers. The third element, that of invention, cannot be admitted by a narration of the past with national criteria. The eventuality that haiduks could just conduct plundering is not discussed. And, most importantly, relations between haiduks and pashas are forgotten. It is also forgotten that parts of the non-regular Ottoman army, e.g. kirdzalis, sometimes revolted, fled to the mountains, and betook to banditry⁵³.

The description of the haiduks' way of life matches the partisan way of life. The haiduks were recalled in the Second World War in order that partisans could be presented as their descendants. Heroes of the remote past, that is, the haiduks, who brought into the open those qualities of courage, wisdom, self-sacrifice, zeal, and stoicism, found equal imitators in the resistance movement, that is, the partisans. The combination of social and national elements in their struggle exalted the partisan movement, as the counterpart of the haiduk phenomenon in the resistance movement.

The third factor, which preserved the Bulgarian national character through the ages of yoke, was the church. In particular, monasteries played a significant role in the Bulgarian spiritual regeneration. They preserved the Bulgarian spirit, consciousness and language⁵⁴. A romantic image is depicted: in kiliini uchilishta (cell schools) 'a priest or an instructor kept in church the flame of the Bulgarian-Slav literary tradition alive'⁵⁵. Therefore, the survival of the Bulgarian spirit seems to be more heroic. However, the Ottomans never banned any language, whereas literature was mainly a matter of religious institutions.

The Bulgarian nation had to struggle against a double yoke in order to reach its renaissance. Apart from the Turkish military and political yoke, the Bulgarian nation had to confront the Greek spiritual yoke, imposed by the Patriarchate and the Greek

⁵³ Stavrianos (2000²): 366.

⁵⁴ Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 83 underlines that 'the achievements of the Bulgarian literature and culture were preserved in monastery libraries and dark shelters'.

⁵⁵ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 189. The authors estimate that sometimes teachers of the kiliini uchilishta were laymen, *ibid* p. 205.

bishops⁵⁶. They implemented a politics of denationalization of the Bulgarians⁵⁷. A national identity was attributed to a religious institution, such as the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Moreover, the Patriarchate is identified with the Greek bourgeois aspirations of economic domination in the Balkans⁵⁸. Needs of narration to nationalise religious institutions result in contradiction to the Marxian world view: an institution of the superstructure of feudalism, that is, the church, becomes a crucial tool of the capitalist forces of production.

The establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate is considered the first stage towards national liberation. The church struggle purposed that there should be recognition of Bulgarian nationality from the Sublime Porte; it appears as a forerunner of the political struggle for national liberation⁵⁹. This premise caused two contradictions. First, Mitev speaks about 'the establishment of the national Bulgarian church'. As a result, a religious institution, the "Rum millet", dating from the beginning of the Ottoman rule becomes synonymous with the Greek people⁶⁰. Second, whereas the Exarchate was an aspect of the struggle for national recognition of Bulgaria, whereon the bourgeoisie had the hegemonic role, it finally expressed the interests of chorbadzhis⁶¹. In order for the Exarchate to be achieved, Russia assisted Bulgarian efforts. The active Russian representative in Istanbul, Graf Ignatiev, contributed to the Bulgarian spiritual independence⁶². Thus, the Bulgarian Marxist authors provided evidence that the Slav big brother of Bulgaria supported her national cause.

National Revival of Bulgaria is associated with the emergence of capitalism and the Bulgarian bourgeoisie. It is presented as the outcome of certain economical and social conditions⁶³. This view in combination with the doctrine that nation is a product of capitalism makes the term "revival" quite problematic. The question is how a national

⁵⁶ Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 9.

⁵⁷ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 186.

⁵⁸ Mitev (1947): 32.

⁵⁹ Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 27 (1945): 1 and Mitev (1947): 35.

⁶⁰ Mitev (1947): 31. This identification causes a contradiction: whereas Mitev writes that the Patriarch sold bishop positions, he continues that Greek bishops wanted to earn the money they paid for their positions, *ibid* p. 32. The question is why non-Greek clergymen could not buy such positions.

⁶¹ Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 743 (1948): 19 (Vlahov).

⁶² Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 220-221.

⁶³ Zarev (1946³): 16-51 and BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 743 (1948): 12 and 18 (Vlahov). Mitev (1945-1946): 272 maintains the same theory, although it writes that 'the narod was quickly revived and woke up from a deep sleep'.

revival can occur simultaneously with emergence of a nation. National Revival provides evidence that the Bulgarian Marxist authors maintained the backbone of the past regime's narration of the past. Short-term political considerations, such as attraction of historians, academics, and high-rank clergymen to co-operate with the new regime⁶⁴, legitimised past historical aspects and old theories despite the emergence of a different social regime.

National liberation movement against the Turkish Yoke (circa 1860-1878)

The resistance movement during the Second World War had been identified with the national liberation movement. The legacy of this identification lasted into the early post-war period. In the early post-war period, the concept that the Fatherland Front had realised the ideals of the Bulgarian Renaissance was promoted⁶⁵ in order that the Fatherland Front could present itself as the embodiment of the Bulgarian nation. In this field, socialist historiography had to confront some serious 'fascist falsifications': the individual approach of the leaders of the Bulgarian National Revival, the elimination of the progressive and revolutionary perspective of their ideology, and the neglect of referring to the sacrifices of the Russian people⁶⁶. However, the historical front that the BCP controlled did not skip similar approaches, provided that the first of the above falsifications contradicts the second. How is it possible to describe the progressive and revolutionary perspective of the ideology of the leaders of the Bulgarian National Revival, if not approaching them individually?

The role of individual, that of Levski⁶⁷ for instance, is stressed for two reasons: first because the adherents of the Bulgarian national revolution were few in numbers and, second, ideas of certain individuals suited the approach of the BCP to the National Liberation movement. Levski is depicted as a genuine democrat and an ardent patriot. 'He was the first who became aware of the exclusive weight of revolutionary organisation as a unique and effective means for securing the success of a narodna revolution. He was the first who estimated the great political and practical significance of the organisation and accentuated its priority as concerns the realisation

⁶⁴ See, for instance, the words of Dimitrov: 'Let our honest members of the Holy Synod and all church servants of the Bulgarian church understand that ... our church must be really narodna, republican, progressive', in *Rabotnichesko Delo* #115, 28.05.1946.

⁶⁵ *Rabotnichesko Delo* #347, 01.11.1945, Zarev (1946³): 138.

⁶⁶ *Rabotnichesko Delo* #37, 30.10.1944 (article written by Mateev).

⁶⁷ Too many works were written about Levski in that time.

of a revolution⁶⁸. Levski showed the significance of leadership and the necessity of centralism for the success of a revolutionary movement⁶⁹. Thus, a national hero, whose ideas and qualities could be identified with that of the Party, is configured.

The historical apparatus of the BCP projected contemporary political ideas on to the main figures of the Bulgarian national revolutionary movement. For instance, the interconnection of internationalism and patriotism in the ideology of Levski and Botev⁷⁰ is stressed to reinforce contemporary notions such as ‘proletarian internationalism’ and socialist patriotism’. Botev was presented as an example of the unity of patriotism and internationalism following the viewpoint of Dimitrov that genuine patriotism is compatible with internationalism⁷¹. To accommodate political ideas and figures of the national revolutionary movement to the politics of the BCP, historical and philosophical details should be forgotten or, at least, diminished. The utopian socialist or even anarchist political thought of Botev seems to be independent of his political role in the national revolutionary movement. His utopian socialism seems to be influenced by Russian revolutionaries (for instance Chernishevski and Nechaev) and the Paris Commune in general and not from western political thought⁷². His cosmopolitanism is described as compatible with his genuine and ardent patriotism⁷³. Significantly, Botev, as a symbolic figure, was appropriated by the anarchists as well⁷⁴. The youth anarchist-communist organisation was called “Hristo Botev”.

⁶⁸ The same extract in both Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 247 and Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 112.

⁶⁹ Pavlov (1946): 120-121.

⁷⁰ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 225, Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴):119 and 123 respectively. See, also, Minkov (1947): 9.

⁷¹ Pavlov (1946): 11 and Tsanev (1948): 11.

⁷² Pavlov (1946): 9-10, Natan (1945-1946): 293-296 and Tsanev (1948): 9. Zarev (1946³): 124 and Natan (1945-1946): 296-997 mention Proudhon’s influence over Botev; Natan (1945-1946): 291 notes the socialist-utopian character of Botev’s thought and underlines that it was impossible for Botev to be a Marxist because of social-economic reasons. As a negative element of his personality, Zarev (1946³): 129, evaluates that he could not outlive his ‘Communarian idealistic views that the main and only one enemy of peoples is their governments’. Notwithstanding, he surprisingly concludes that the Fatherland Front’s nationwide democratic movement incarnated Botev’s ideas and patriotism. On the contrary, Tzvetkov (1993) vol.1: 476 asserts that Botev maintained close relations with Bakunin’s anarchists. Stavrianos (2000²): 378 points out his nihilist doctrines and Blagoev, *Contribution to the history of socialism in Bulgaria (1906)*, (1985): 213-215 considers Botev as a Proudhonian anarchist.

⁷³ Zarev (1946³): 128.

⁷⁴ BCP Records Fund 272, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 90 (1946): 1.

Influences of Garibaldi and Mazzini over the ideas of Rakovski and Levski, in particular, are suppressed⁷⁵. The impact of the French Revolution on socio-political thought of the Bulgarian revolutionaries is absolutely limited⁷⁶. Regarding Levski, only Gandev⁷⁷ was critical to his leadership abilities and discussed the extreme difficulties of Levski in finding chieftains to serve in his army, and the indifference of Bulgarian émigrés in Romania and the Bulgarian people in the Ottoman Empire. Regarding Rakovski, furthermore, it is overlooked that he was a member of a secret Greek society and a Greek subject. What is absolutely forgotten is mistrust, criticism, and disaffection that the central national figures expressed many times towards Russia and Pan-Slav ideas. Rakovski was the writer of the pamphlet “Russia’s murderous policy towards the Bulgarians”⁷⁸.

Short-term political considerations of the BCP were legitimised by the project that unfulfilled political purposes of the national liberation movement were in accord with the politics of the BCP and the Fatherland Front in the early post-war period. First, the historical narration of the national movement underlined a combination of national aspirations and social transformation⁷⁹ similarly to communist slogans. Bulgarian national leaders envisaged a Bulgarian society free from the Ottoman yoke and based on principles of solidarity, liberty and equality.

Second, proposals of all the prominent national revolutionaries (Rakovski, Levski, Karavelov, and Botev⁸⁰) focused on a kind of federation, South-Slav or Balkan. This provided the BCP with the chance to gain legitimization for its plans on a South-Slav federation with Yugoslavia. It is presented as a democratic and anti-chauvinist enunciation of the national liberation leaders, whereas the historical necessity of

⁷⁵ Pitasio (1986): 46-55 and Tzvetkov (1993) vol. 1: 450-451. Gandev (1945): 97-105 emphasizes the Mazzinian ideological background of Levski, but he was vehemently castigated at the Conference of the Workers of the Historical Front, mainly by Zarev, Mitev, and Topalov, in BCP Records Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 743 (1948): 140-141 and Fund 146, Inventory 5, Archival Unit 744 (1948): 3 and 37.

⁷⁶ Berov (1989): 84-96 enumerates cases of the impact of the French Revolution on socio-political thought in Bulgaria during the 19th century: on the ideas of Slaveikov, Karavelov, Botev and Levski through Russian revolutionaries, and on the promulgation of the Bulgarian tricolour national flag.

⁷⁷ Gandev (1945): 110-118.

⁷⁸ Tzvetkov (1993) vol. 1: 445.

⁷⁹ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 235 entitle the relevant chapter ‘National-revolutionary Democratic movement’.

⁸⁰ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 241-243, 248 and 249 respectively. See, also, Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 104-105. In the textbook of Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 24, a single reference to Balkan federation is cited.

seeking alliance with opponents to the Ottoman Empire is hardly mentioned⁸¹. The historical necessity of a mighty alliance of all the Balkans retreated in comparison with the 'democratic convictions' of the Bulgarian national revolutionaries. Therefore, a vision for a Slav or Balkan federation is presented as due to Pan-Slav, democratic, populist and socialist ideas of the Bulgarian national-revolutionary leaders.

Legitimation of the death sentence inflicted upon many oppositionists was gained by Levski's notion⁸² that the death sentence should be the penalty of *lèse majesté*. The Bulgarian historiography of that time claimed that the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of People's Republic by the referendum of 8 September 1946 relied on visions of the figures of the Bulgarian Renaissance⁸³. Moreover, the annulment of privileges of the ruling strata derived its legitimization from the Renaissance. Lastly, the reciprocity among the Slav nations crowned the accomplishment of the objectives of the leaders of the Bulgarian National Revival⁸⁴.

The so-presented anti-national class of *chorbadzhis* is used to highlight similarities and relevancies with contemporary political groups. Botev seemed to exclude *chorbadzhis* from nation⁸⁵, as Bulgarian communists excluded their political enemies. The inimical role of *chorbadzhis* (landowners of Bulgarian origin)⁸⁶ in the preparation of and engagement in the revolution is also highlighted. The participation of two Bulgarian *chorbadzhis* in Levski's trial is underlined⁸⁷. Apart from the foreign oppressor, there was an internal treacherous anti-revolutionary element. Priest Kristiu, who betrayed Levski, constituted the counterpart of the 'traitors of the Bulgarian nation' in the 20th century⁸⁸. Bulgarian society of the second half of the 19th century is presented as identical with the early post-war one, when instead of *chorbadzhis* there

⁸¹ For instance, Bymov's article in *Rabotnichesko Delo* #38, 31.10.1944.

⁸² Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 248 and Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 19 and Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 114,

⁸³ See, for instance, Natan (1945-1946): 309-311.

⁸⁴ Minkov (1947): 14-18.

⁸⁵ Natan (1945-1946): 278, 286-288 and 291.

⁸⁶ Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 27 (1945): 42-43. Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 263-264 and Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 130 also mention the inimical role of the big bourgeoisie.

⁸⁷ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 255. For the anti-revolutionary conduction of *chorbadzhis* see p.250-261 *passim*.

⁸⁸ *Rabotnichesko Delo* #130, 19.02.1945.

were bourgeois and reactionary elements, which behaved treacherously. One of the reasons the April uprising failed was treason committed in some areas.

The April Uprising offered the opportunity of associations with the early post-war period. As in the April Uprising the Bulgarian people were absolutely united, in the resistance movement and the struggle of the Fatherland Front against the opposition the Bulgarian people became one body, one entity. As traitors betrayed the April Uprising, contemporary traitors were concentrated in the Opposition. Petkov was presented as a descendant of Levski's traitor, priest Kristiu. As the heroes of the April Uprising fought for a people's republic, contemporary Bulgarians should have fought against the monarchy⁸⁹.

The BCP presented the April uprising as a massive revolution⁹⁰ and a forerunner of Bulgarian independence, although, as Glenny points out⁹¹, it exactly highlighted above all the weakness of Bulgarian nationalism. According to the historical front, the ideological immaturity, the lack of practical preparation of the Bulgarian people for a wide and lasting revolutionary movement, and the inferior Bulgarian military equipment in comparison with that of the Ottomans give grounds for the failure of the April uprising⁹². In reality, what caused moral indignation in Europe and paved the way for the Russian invasion of the Ottoman Empire were the excessive reports published in the western, mainly, British and American press⁹³. These reports halted any intervention in favour of maintaining the status quo in the Balkans. As a result, no European country, and Disraeli in particular, could impede the Russian-Turkish war.

⁸⁹ Kondarev (1947): 6-15.

⁹⁰ Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 27 (1945): 40. Especially, Zarev (1946³): 111 gives the figure of 100,000 participants in Northern Bulgaria, where the uprising was most massive. See, also, Kondarev (1947): 4-6.

⁹¹ Glenny (1999): 108. See, moreover, Meininger (1977): 252 who quotes Strasimirov who took some interviews from participants in the April uprising. According to them, 'the uprising was weak and would easily be crushed, much more than many expected... the peasants were quite alien to the work of the rebellion'.

⁹² Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 112 and 130 and Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 27 (1945): 2.

⁹³ Glenny (1999): 109 mentions 3,000 articles denouncing Batak and other authorities appeared in some 200 newspapers. He also quotes Shaw, who maintains that the Muslim victims outnumbered the Christian dead. Stavrianos (2000²): 380 gives some figures which show clearly the size of exaggeration. 'An official Turkish estimate set the casualties at 3,100 Christians and 400 Muslims. A British consular agent estimated the dead at 12,000 while an American investigator set the figure at 15,000. Subsequent Bulgarian historians claimed losses of 30,000 to 60,000'.

The Bulgarian Marxist historical apparatus suppressed the western contribution⁹⁴ to the Bulgarian liberation and completely forgot MacGahan's reports⁹⁵. They emphasised that Bulgarian liberation is owed to the East.

The chapter of the historical textbooks on the national liberation movement gives the appropriate opportunity for Russia to be praised for her sacrifices for the Bulgarian benefit. The Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 accomplished Bulgarian expectations that *diado Ivan* (Grandfather Ivan) will liberate them⁹⁶. The Party's theses on this issue argue that Russia mobilised because of compassion for Slav brothers, whereas the quoted excerpt of a volunteer's evidence, that the BCP itself selected to quote, records orthodoxy and language as Russia's motivations. A distinction between the occupying plans of the Tsar and selfless people's emotions is also illustrated. The positive results of the Russian-Turkish war are attributed to the unprecedented alliance among the Slavs: Russians, Bulgarians, Serbs, Montenegrins, Byelorussians and Ukrainians⁹⁷. Notwithstanding, it is forgotten that Serbia signed a Peace Treaty with the Sublime Porte in February 1877, just before the war broke out, and she only backed Russians in late 1877, when a Russian victory seemed inevitable.

Diplomatic events such as Conferences of Berlin and Constantinople which laid the ground for the Russian-Turkish war were forgotten or overshadowed⁹⁸. There is a range of conferences (e.g. the Reichstadt Agreement, the Constantinople Conference, the Budapest Convention, and the London Convention)⁹⁹ and agreements that finally allowed Russia to intervene in Ottoman affairs backed and controlled by the rest of the European great powers.

⁹⁴ Mitev (1976): 62-73 long after the early post-war years wrote an article on the significance of the European, in particular the English, public in relation to Bulgarian Independence. Even then he took for granted the exaggerations of the Turkish massacres.

⁹⁵ Moser (1987): 25 estimates that MacGahan exerted a crucial influence on British public opinion, which in turn affected the policies of Disraeli. MacGahan was an American journalist, who investigated the outcomes of the Ahtil uprising for the English newspaper "Daily News".

⁹⁶ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 22-235, Burmov, Dikovski, Bliznev and Hristov (1950⁵):56-58. Notwithstanding its cut and dry historical narration, Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 24-27 state the concept of *diado Ivan*. See, also, one of the first books printed after 9 September, Bozhikov and Delyanov (1945): 3-4 and 31-32.

⁹⁷ Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 27 (1945): 2-3, 25-26.

⁹⁸ Bozhikov and Delyanov (1945): 15-16 mention that Russia gained the consent of Germany and Austria to wage war against the Ottoman Empire after the latter rejected the measures that the Conference of Consults in Constantinople proposed to her.

⁹⁹ Stavrianos (2000²): 404-406.

It was argued that not only had Bulgaria's liberation been assisted by Russia, but Russia also imposed the San Stefano Treaty on the Sublime Porte¹⁰⁰, which anticipated a large Bulgarian state. Enemies of Slavdom, that is Germany and western European countries, it was argued, modified the San Stefano Treaty in the Congress of Berlin in order to eliminate Russian influence in the Balkans. Furthermore, the authors of textbooks claimed that a large Bulgarian state was deterred, because it would impede the imperialistic plans of the western European powers in the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East¹⁰¹. At this point, it is forgotten that Russia herself had agreed that a large state in the Balkans was not to be created, in the Reichstadt Agreement (July 1876) as well as in the Conference of Constantinople and in the Budapest Convention (both in January 1877)¹⁰². Furthermore, it is forgotten that one of the most indignant states because of the San Stefano Treaty was Serbia¹⁰³.

The Bulgarian approach is that the subversion of the San Stefano Treaty left the Balkan question unsolved¹⁰⁴. The Congress of Berlin also postponed the solution of the Macedonian question once and for all¹⁰⁵. The congress of Berlin set preconditions for the Balkan nations being exploited by the Great Powers. It was to perpetuate national conflicts in the peninsula. Consequently, Germany and the western countries, that is, the hostile bloc, are described as subverting a just solution of the Bulgarian national question, whereas Russia, that is, the backbone of the bloc to which Bulgaria belonged, backed Bulgarian national interests and ideals. In that manner, Bulgaria's nationalism of belonging to the socialist bloc was historically grounded.

On the whole, the Bulgarian national myth claimed that a fair and permanent resolution of the Balkan question would be in accordance with Bulgarian interests. In effect, visions of the establishment of a Bulgarian state in accord with the provisions of San Stefano Treaty were incorporated in the international politics of Bulgaria. An

¹⁰⁰ The San Stefano Treaty could be seen as an unsuccessful adventure of Pan-Slav circles (e.g. Ignatiev, Russia's ambassador in Constantinople). For that reason, it contradicts previous interstate agreements committed by Russia and other great powers.

¹⁰¹ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 271 and 279, Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 26-28, and Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 140.

¹⁰² Stavrianos (2000²): 404-406 and Tzvetkov (1993), vol. 1: 503-506.

¹⁰³ Stavrianos (2000²): 409.

¹⁰⁴ Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 29.

¹⁰⁵ Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 27 (1945): 7.

impact of them reached the politics of the Fatherland Front, which claimed an outlet to the Aegean Sea.

National Integration: Eastern Rumelia-Macedonia (1885-1913)

Eastern Rumelia is considered unquestionably Bulgarian land, which had to be annexed to the kingdom of Bulgaria. Annexation of Eastern Rumelia is perceived as a rectification of the injustices of the Congress of Berlin. It is not deemed a result of Bulgarian bourgeois expansionism. Blagoev's claims that the annexation of Eastern Rumelia to Bulgaria was in whole Battenberg's deed against the interests of the Bulgarian people¹⁰⁶ are absolutely suppressed. On the contrary, it is declared that the Bulgarian nation, after the assistance and exhortation of Russian officers in Eastern Rumelia, supported the annexation of Eastern Rumelia to Bulgaria as a national cause¹⁰⁷. It is forgotten that, as Jelavich¹⁰⁸ explains, Russia's policy of the years following the Russian-Turkish war towards Bulgaria became hostile and that Russia supported Serbian ambitions in Macedonia. Petrovich also maintains that the Unification constitutes the triumph of Bulgarian nationalism and the collapse of Russia's supposed Bulgarian policy¹⁰⁹.

The subjective, ideological approach to the historical past is clear in dealing with the Russian final refusal of 'Bulgarian Unification'. Although the Russian officers in Eastern Rumelia supported the Bulgarian national cause, Tsarist Russia opposed it. In the textbooks, the term Tsarist Russia is used concerning its contraposition towards the 'Bulgarian Unification', whereas the term Russia is used concerning the San Stefano Treaty and the time of preparation for Unification¹¹⁰. An organic conception of the people appears: the infallible criterion of the Bulgarian people was to be able to distinguish the selfish politics of the Russian Tsar from the altruistic sacrifices of the

¹⁰⁶ Blagoev (1985): xxxi. Later on, Blagoev changed his mind and admitted the "progressive" character of the unification for the development of the Bulgarian economy.

¹⁰⁷ Political intrigues and economic discontents are mentioned as factors affected Bulgarian national integration, in Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 278 and Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 163-164. Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 33 accounts for the 'Bulgarian Unification' as a progressive step in Bulgarian history.

¹⁰⁸ Jelavich (1958).

¹⁰⁹ Petrovich (1967): 87-105. He argues that the Bulgarian view of Russia was decidedly ambivalent during the whole Renaissance period. 'Not only did some Bulgarians favour Russia while others rejected it, but many important Bulgarians, and perhaps most Bulgarians, held conflicting opinions about Russia within themselves'.

¹¹⁰ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 278-300 passim.

Russian people¹¹¹. The ‘Bulgarian Unification’ was followed by the Serbian-Bulgarian war (1884-1885), an outcome deemed a result of German political, anti-Slav manoeuvres¹¹².

The Macedonian question proves to be the most complicated one for the international affairs of early post-war Bulgaria. Thus, the Macedonian question was interpreted inconsistently. In the textbook of 1946, the authors argue that the liberation of Macedonia as well as ‘Bulgarian Unification’ were the major national tasks of the Bulgarian people. The national movement aimed at Macedonia’s liberation was organised and sustained in Bulgaria by the end of the 19th century. The slogan for an independent and autonomous Macedonia, proclaimed in the Iliden uprising (1903), was due to the multi-national population of the area and to the then existing international status quo rather than a declaration by a self-conscious, independent Macedonian nation¹¹³. In parallel, the authors denounced the conquering, chauvinist plans of the Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek ruling classes alike¹¹⁴.

Poptomov evaluates that the IMRO and the Iliden uprising purposed to ‘political autonomy of Macedonia’¹¹⁵, surprisingly not to national independence, while the BCP suffered in the struggle for self-determination for the Macedonian people¹¹⁶. Referring to the central figures of the IMRO, Deltsev and Santanski, Poptomov mentions that they were ‘sons of the Macedonian narod’, whereas they held progressive and liberation ideas of Bulgaria as well as speaking and writing only Bulgarian¹¹⁷. He considers the Macedonian population of Pirin very close and bound to the Bulgarian nation¹¹⁸. A year earlier than Poptomov’s book, Vlahov published his own, in which he denounced the great-Bulgarian policy of Virhovism towards self-determination for

¹¹¹ See, especially, Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 290.

¹¹² Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 33-34.

¹¹³ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 296-297 and 350-353. Tomchev, writing about Sandanski in *Rabotnichesko Delo* #181, 19.04.1945, definitely does not recognise a separate Macedonian nation, whilst he introduces terms as ‘Macedonian population’, ‘free and autonomous Macedonia’, ‘Macedonian revolutionary movement’ and ‘Macedonian spirit’. He presents Sandanski as ‘herald of a new spirit and a new consciousness among the Balkan peoples and among the diverse nationalities of Macedonia’. This spirit and this consciousness are not necessarily Macedonian in national terms.

¹¹⁴ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 354-359.

¹¹⁵ Poptomov (1948): 6.

¹¹⁶ Poptomov (1948): 27-28.

¹¹⁷ Poptomov (1948): 6 and 31.

¹¹⁸ Poptomov (1948): 30 and 33.

Macedonia with the ultimate principle of annexing Macedonia to motherland Bulgaria¹¹⁹. The attempted rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria between 1944 and 1948 resulted in an uncertain and inconsistent narration of the Macedonian question¹²⁰.

The complexity of the approach to the Macedonian question is revealed in the textbook of 1951⁴. The ethnogenesis of the Macedonian nation dates from 'after the wars', presumably the two world wars, when the events 'moulded the national consciousness of the Macedonians'. The Federal People's Republic of Macedonia is considered a political manoeuvre of the 'English-American' agents, namely the Titoists. It is maintained that the Macedonians enjoyed 'true freedom' only in the People's Republic of Bulgaria, while it is stressed once more that 'Macedonia belongs to Macedonians'¹²¹. This absurd approach to the Macedonian question was due to Bulgarian international affairs after the Stalin-Titoist conflict. The tradition of an uncompromising recognition of a separate Macedonian nation had not yet fallen, whereas the approach to Macedonians as original Bulgarians had not yet come into effect.

Bulgaria as a semi-colonial country (*interwar years*)

In the so-called era of imperialist capitalism, Bulgaria was transformed into a semi-colony of Germany. The dynastic cliques and the ruling classes that governed Bulgaria up to 9 September 1944 served German interests¹²². Since the late 19th century, the Bulgarian bourgeoisie had supported the great-Bulgarian chauvinist ideology in order to achieve the annexation of new lands to Bulgaria for economical reasons¹²³. To make her occupying plans successful, the Bulgarian bourgeoisie relied

¹¹⁹ Vlahov (1947): 9-14.

¹²⁰ Some alterations of minor significance were applied in the historical textbooks: the national movement in Bulgaria concerning the Macedonian question was explained in terms of Bulgarian sympathy for the enslaved Macedonians, the origin of the Miladinov brothers (educational, cultural, and social activists born in Struga, Macedonia; their most significant work was the collection of folk songs) had to be declared as Macedonians, and the state of Samuel had to be described as a feudal formation composed primarily by Slavs, in Bulgarian State Records Fund 142, Inventory 4, Archival Unit 7 (1947): 75.

¹²¹ Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 211.

¹²² The statement of the King Ferdinand, when he left Bulgaria to Germany in 1918, that he ceaselessly served German interests is pointed out, Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 36 and 50-55. See, also, Burmov, Dikovski, Bliznev and Hristov (1950⁵): 92.

¹²³ Vlahov (1947): 5.

on the support of the dynasty and foreign great powers. Its dependence on them transformed the bourgeoisie into a foreign agent, serving foreign interests.

The aggressive aspirations of the Bulgarian bourgeoisie coincided with the imperial ambitions of the Tsar Ferdinand. However, both the former and the latter were gripped by the vision of the San Stefano Bulgaria, which politicians and authors of the Party praised as the only feasible solution to the Bulgarian national question. To realise such a vision Ferdinand raised a loan from Germany in order that Bulgaria would be able to refinance her army. This loan obliged Bulgaria to place orders with Austro-Hungarian and German firms, while Bulgaria handed raw material and resources to German companies¹²⁴. The politics and means of Ferdinand, in essence, were estimated as anti-national, given that they differed from those the BCP followed. The question is what the Party approaches towards the aggressive plans of Ferdinand, the bourgeoisie, and military circles for a large Bulgarian state would have been, if these plans had been realised, given that high-rank Party members, e.g. Poptomov, maintained that the San Stefano treaty would have solved the Macedonian question¹²⁵, and the BCP itself claimed the restoration of Western Thrace to Bulgaria.

Party scholars maintained that Ferdinand sought to expand his hegemony in the Balkans and rendered Bulgaria the outpost of the German and Austrian pervasion in the Middle East. By such politics, Ferdinand served the interests of Germany and Austria-Hungary which nominated him Tsar¹²⁶. It was the Habsburg Empire that prompted its agents, Ferdinand and the pro-German quarters in Bulgaria, to dissolve the Balkan alliance in 1913 and to turn Bulgaria against Serbs in a fratricidal war¹²⁷. In the First World War, Bulgaria was commanded by Germany to attack Serbia, in as much as the German agent Tsar Ferdinand determined the international affairs of the country¹²⁸. These agents of German imperialism in Bulgaria were the culprits of two formidable national disasters (first, in the Balkan Wars, and second, in the First World War).

¹²⁴ Glenny (1999): 337.

¹²⁵ BCP, Comintern... (1998), vol. 2: 1132-1134.

¹²⁶ Vlahov (1947): 5-6.

¹²⁷ Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 27 (1945): 7.

¹²⁸ Mitev (1945): 195.

As it is claimed that Ferdinand and the bourgeoisie backed subserviently the Central Powers, the potentiality that Ferdinand and his political circle decided to ally with the Central Powers by turning to the presumable victor, is dismissed¹²⁹. A genuine love of Ferdinand for Bulgaria and a pursuit of Bulgarian national interests are by definition precluded because of his German origin and because the BCP categorically denied that there could be any other genuine patriotism apart from its own.

Apart from German imperialism, the other western powers also intervened in Bulgarian affairs. They supported the so-called monarchic-fascist dictatorship, whilst they strove against the Bulgarian people¹³⁰. German imperialism prevailed since the Bulgarian Czar Boris and the Bulgarian bourgeoisie supported them. Consequently, Bulgaria joined the Axis. In conclusion, the official historiography of the BCP considered Bulgaria as a dependent, semi-colonial state during the interwar period.

The historical apparatus of the BCP remembered to forget attempts of Boris to free Bulgaria from steadily tightening German economic fetters, as Glenny shows¹³¹. He indicates that Boris tried to persuade Britain and France to revitalise their economic contacts with Bulgaria, but in vain. Bulgaria's dependence on the German economy strengthened even more, when the former needed to buy war materials from the latter to build up the capability of her army¹³².

Semi-colonial countries required national-liberation movements. The resistance of the people during the inter-war period follows a course similar to the National Revival: insurrections, setting up of revolutionary committees and armed detachments (chetas)¹³³.

¹²⁹ Stavrianos (2000²): 561 gives this interpretation. Ferdinand joined the Central Powers after the failure of Allies at the Straits and the overwhelming defeats sustained by the Russians.

¹³⁰ Particularly, the coup of 9 June 1923 and the suppression of the uprising of 23 September 1923 ascribed to western imperialist intervention, Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 68-71.

¹³¹ Glenny (1999): 441.

¹³² Glenny (1999): 442.

¹³³ Minkov (1947): 7.

Second World War–Resistance movement–9 September 1944

The narration of the schoolbooks ends in their present. Bulgarian history terminates in the socialist era following the events of 9 September, by glorifying socialism. 9 September and the establishment of the socialist regime is the epicentre of the Bulgarian history. The long, linear advance of the Bulgarian nation culminates in the transition to socialism.

The chapter of the Second World War in the historical schoolbooks reports a strong antifascist movement, but without giving any figures¹³⁴. It is stressed that in no other satellite country to Germany was there such a mighty partisan movement as in Bulgaria¹³⁵. In every textbook, it seems to be all powerful, even though there is some clarification on some points, such as that it became successful after the Soviet victory against Hitler¹³⁶.



The resistance movement, as claimed to be effective and massive, was originated from the democratic beliefs of the Bulgarian nation as well as its sympathy and devotion to the Russian people. For this reason, it is alleged that Bulgaria did not take part in the war operations of the Eastern front, since the Bulgarian people fiercely refused to fight against

their Slav big brother. The antifascist movement opposed a consciously unified treacherous political rival: dynasty and war governments¹³⁷.

¹³⁴ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 414 and Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 99. The former states that, by the end of 1944, ‘the whole country was full of armed groups, partisan detachments, battalions and brigades, which consisted in National Liberation Insurrectionary Army’.

¹³⁵ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 421.

¹³⁶ Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 92, 102.

¹³⁷ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 414-420.

The political and military representative of this movement was the Fatherland Front, 'a national, anti-Hitlerist organisation', intended to struggle against the foreign conquerors and their domestic agents¹³⁸. The Fatherland Front is presented as the single patriotic tendency existing in Bulgaria during the Second World War. Everything not belonging to the Fatherland Front coalition was pilloried as anti-national.

The BCP and Georgi Dimitrov are considered the most decisive factors in the evolution and development of the resistance movement. The Bulgarian people corresponded to the initiative of the BCP; they recognised the necessity of the establishment of a unified political front, which would bring the country out of tremendous deadlock and save it from a certain, horrible calamity; the Bulgarian nation realised the uprising of 9 September¹³⁹. Thereby, the Bulgarian people were to be led to victory and salvation by the BCP and Dimitrov. On the whole, an uprising, which is considered as being realised by the nation, allowed the communists to take power. The BCP embodied national aspirations and pursuits.

The assistance of the Red Army and the decisive role that the Soviet Union played in the establishment of the Fatherland Front government is also stressed. The authors of the historical textbooks make some references to the welcome of the Soviet soldiers by the Bulgarian people¹⁴⁰. The contribution of the Soviet Union to the liberation of Bulgaria from the German fascist yoke is compared with the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, when the liberation of Bulgaria was also due to the Russian army¹⁴¹.

The Fatherland Front and the BCP are supposed to prolong their national redeeming role after 9 September as well. Thus Bulgaria participated in the war against Germany, resulting in a favourable status of Bulgaria before the Peace Conference.

¹³⁸ Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 94.

¹³⁹ Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 99-102, Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 427-429, Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 261-264. The historical narration about the resistance movement embellishes with Party recommendations and resolutions as well as excerpts of Dimitrov's discourse. Thus, the authors give the impression that Dimitrov and the BCP directed the events. On the other hand, they attempt to show that the nation assumed resistance and the uprising. As a result, Dimitrov and the BCP are configured as the genuine political embodiment of the Bulgarian nation.

¹⁴⁰ Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 430-431 and Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 263-264.

¹⁴¹ Rabotnichesko Delo #141, 03.03.1945.

Moreover, they prevented ‘English-Americans’ from intervening, to occupy or slaughter the country¹⁴². Thus, the international adherence of Bulgaria to the Soviet camp is justified.

Conclusion

In this chapter, texts (historiography and textbooks) as indicators of nationalism have been presented. Bulgarian communists manipulated history-writing and the single obligatory historical textbook to legitimise their regime. They mainly claimed that the communist regime was the peak in the long, linear course of Bulgarian history and that they realised unfulfilled purposes of the Bulgarian Renaissance and national liberation movement. Furthermore, they opted to adopt a monolithic view towards the past so as all alternatives would be delegitimised. The Soviet experiment despite its several shifts was taken into account, while non-communist academic cadres joined the historical apparatus of the BCP.

As a plethora of examples shows, “workers of the historical front” opted for a kind of ‘Marxist nationalism’, that is, a serious proximity to nationalism paying deference to Marxist methodological schemas. The outline of the most significant topics of the imagination of the past with national criteria demonstrates tendencies of remembering and forgetting, overestimating of some events and overlooking of others, and manipulation of the past for short-term political considerations.

After the national discourse of the BCP has been shown exploring texts, the present thesis will terminate demonstrating the national discourse of the BCP by exploring events and symbols strongly related to nationalism: commemorations, anniversaries, and national symbols.

¹⁴² Bozhikov, Burmov and Kiurkchiev (1946): 430-431, Burmov, Dikovski, Bliznev and Hristov (1950⁵): 98, Bozhikov, Kosev, Lambrev, Mitev, Topalov and Hristov (1949): 120-123, Bozhikov, Burmov and Lambrev (1951⁴): 283-284.

Chapter Six

Flagging Nationhood: Events and Symbols

6.1 The nationalist discourse of the BCP with regard to commemorations and anniversaries.

As Billig¹ argues, commemorations and anniversaries are ‘occasions sufficient to flag nationhood’. On these days, ‘ordinary routines are suspended, as the state celebrates itself. Then, sentiments of patriotic emotions, which the rest of the year have to be kept far from the business of ordinary life, can surge forth’. Commemorations and anniversaries excite a sense of shared experience through time, which, according to Anderson², is an important dimension of a sense of national identity. This leads to the construction of a shared past and future developed to represent the nation and its unity. A discourse of national unity can be achieved, because on those days, as Spillman demonstrates by examining the cases of the USA and Australia, people imagine shared values and institutions, shared qualities and prosperity³.

Commemorations and anniversaries constitute occasions of celebrating a common past and national identity. Not only did the BCP abolish, or restrict the significance of, commemorations and anniversaries in order to strike heavy blows against nationalism, but also used national anniversaries and commemorations for its own political purposes. It manipulated these events in order to reshape collective memory and to achieve political consensus: by using them as occasions for propagating its ideas during the Second World War⁴ and, in the early post-war years, by organising them. It used old models (anniversaries, manifestations and national celebrations) for new purposes. The legitimisation of traditions and innovations relied on formalisation, ritualisation, sacralisation and repetition. All national anniversaries were celebrated with

¹ Billig (1995): 44-46.

² Anderson (2002): 22-36.

³ Spillman (1997): 82-84.

⁴ See Chapter Two Part Three (the relevant section).

ceremonial pomp according to specific formalities; they followed a specific ceremonial path known to all Bulgarians and used specific means of celebration; they were sacralised as they constituted national holidays when every Bulgarian had to suspend their ordinary routine and show devotion to the nation; and they were repeated every year at the same day becoming a specific part of the annual calendar.

Bulgarian communists took advantage of commemorations, since, as Spillman points out, they could express a sense of shared progress in national history by contrasting the old and the new⁵. Technological and economic progress was highlighted in official speeches, emblems, placards mainly on the 1st May and 9th September. Spillman adds that an account of continuous progress leads to imagining a glorious future as an extrapolation of past progress⁶.

In this chapter, commemorations and anniversaries are discussed, insofar as the way the Fatherland Front honoured, contrived and interpreted dates and figures to commemorate⁷ constitutes a key means by which it articulated its national discourse. The Fatherland Front as a political agent did not deviate from the action frames Spillman notes in her book, regarding the use of commemorations by a political regime: producing national identities in celebration⁸. Using anniversaries, commemorations and centennials the BCP attempted to recast and develop an apparently new version of Bulgarian national identity, and inculcate it in the masses. Through a range of articles and newspaper issues dedicated to the commemorative events and anniversaries, the content that the BCP attributed to any national holiday was explained to the people. Thus, the Fatherland Front, as the holder of political power in early post-war Bulgaria, involved itself in an

⁵ Spillman (1997): 76.

⁶ Spillman (1997): 78.

⁷ As Nora (1998): 618 states: 'It is the present that creates the instruments of commemoration, that seeks out dates and figures to commemorate, that ignores some and invents others, sometimes artificially manipulating dates and sometimes accepting dates as given by altering their significance'.

⁸ Spillman (1997): 17.

extensive process of selective remembering and forgetting of both the past and the present⁹.

Celebrating a national anniversary was a frequent phenomenon in the post-war public life of Bulgaria. The Section of Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee of the BCP¹⁰ as well as the National Committee of the Fatherland Front often called on the Bulgarian people to celebrate putative commemorative events. They issued directives and circulars respectively to mould and supervise any kind of solemn national celebration. A central committee set up by the Fatherland Front supervised solemn manifestations. A number of organisations and committees were obliged to appoint to the central committee one or more deputies, depending on the importance of the national holiday. A network of committees all over the country under the supervision of the central one was in charge of the public ceremonies¹¹. The fundamental role of these committees was to ensure the massive, nation-wide participation of the local population in all the events of the national celebration. They were also ordered to incite the patriotic emotions of the masses¹². Thus, the originators of national holidays envisaged the day as a visible, active embodiment of officially proclaimed values, which individuals would internalise through participation in carefully organised community celebrations. On the whole, the Fatherland Front planned national anniversaries and commemorations and used the slogans and the interpretation of each national celebration, to articulate its interests.

⁹ Billig (1995): 37-38 argues that 'remembering the past involves a forgetting, or rather there is a complex dialectic of remembering and forgetting... not only is the past forgotten, but so there is a parallel forgetting of the present'.

¹⁰ (Henceforward AgitProp) BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 15 is referring to the AgitProp. Some of them are related to the organisation of solemn celebrations on the occasion of national holidays.

¹¹ A considerable number of records show evidence of this. See, for instance, BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 6, Archival Unit 531 (1948): 24 on the 9th September, BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 102 (1946): 1 on the 24th May and BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 169 (1947): 1 on the 19th February.

¹² Rabotnichesko Delo #200, 12.05.1945: 'All the Bulgarian people must take part in the ceremony of education', Rabotnichesko Delo #205, 04.09.1947: 'Activists of the Fatherland Front ... must work night and day ... to be sure that there is no citizen who has not been excited from the patriotic flame of the victory of the 9th September 1944', and Rabotnichesko Delo #101, 30.04.1948: 'No Bulgarian citizen, who loves his people and country, must be absent from the 1st May manifestation'.

Some days or, usually, a week of agitation, preparation and build-up would precede the main celebration of the national day. In that period, a range of conferences, lectures, public conversations and meetings in neighbourhoods, factories, enterprises, schools and military camps took place. The Fatherland Front committees prepared the conditions for a successful celebration and interpreted the qualities of the commemorative events¹³. The committees in charge of the organisation of any national celebration were instructed. The BCP specified the questions to be covered in public meetings, conversations and lectures¹⁴. As a consequence, the theses of the BCP on national days were widespread among the masses of the cities and the villages.

The central events of a national holiday were public demonstrations and displays. At the greatest commemorations and anniversaries a parade took place. What Spillman calls 'collective effervescence'¹⁵ was a major feature of such parades. Kong and Yeoh point out that national day parades show evidence of the state's efforts at inventing ritual and creating landscape spectacle in order to built up national identity and develop an 'imagined community'¹⁶. National day parades were ritualised in terms of space and time. They occurred on the same days every year and in the same place: in the area bordered by the church of Alexander Nievski, the statue of the Tsar Liberator, that is, the Russian Tsar Alexander II, and the parliament. Flags of the nation and the BCP were brandished¹⁷. The state also tried to add as much awe and wonder as possible to the spectacle by mass mobilisation and decoration. Ritual and spectacle contributed to develop national pride, to construct national identity and to inculcate loyalty. In general, parades sought to impress through their pageantry and show¹⁸. This was, mainly, achieved through the demonstration of military might and the deliberate use of a certain form of decoration.

¹³ BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 170 (1947): 43-45.

¹⁴ See the very revealing BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 170 (1947): 10-11 and BCP Records Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 169 (1947): 2-3.

¹⁵ Spillman (1997): 14.

¹⁶ Kong and Yeoh (1997): 213-214.

¹⁷ Rabotnichesko Delo #209, 08.09.1947.

¹⁸ For some of the above concepts on National day parades see Kong and Yeoh (1997): 214-231 passim.

The army participated in the manifestations of the 9th September and on May Day, whilst on the 24th May students, pupils, youth, teachers and scholars paraded¹⁹. On the two greatest national holidays then, the so-called Narodna Army and the Narodna Militia headed the parade. Both signified national pride and alertness. Partisan groups followed; they recalled the resistance movement and justified the national strategy of the BCP in the Second World War. Working people, peasants, students and the 'Septemvrists' (the communist organisation of children) came next. The shock workers and the outstanding students led the working and educational groups they belonged to, as long as they were considered a source of national pride for Bulgaria. Almost all representative parts of the nation thus passed before the tribunal of the celebrities.

Veterans of the resistance movement, the Fatherland War and the saga of Shipka participated in the ceremonies, commemorative events and anniversaries. The Fatherland Front acquired national consent, as it was accompanied by the national heroes of the two national sagas: the national liberation movement and the resistance movement. The former ensured that the Fatherland Front represented the nation as the official orator of its glorious past, and the latter sanctioned as national the political tactics of the BCP in the Second World War. The veterans of the battle of Shipka were honoured on 19th February (Levski's anniversary), 3rd May (day of liberation from the Turkish yoke) and 9th September. In one of the celebrations on these days, Dimitrov called the president of the association of Shipka's veterans, Kr. Popov, a 'living monument of the Bulgarian history'²⁰.

A useful feature of national celebrations was public bunting²¹. Flags, portraits, placards, posters, wallpapers and greenery were placed in public space. The

¹⁹ Thoughts and recommendations of the AgitProp for a military parade on the 3rd March did not come into existence, Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 170 (1947). For analytical reports on parades see Otechestven Front #1238, 11.09.1948 and Rabotnichesko Delo #209, 08.09.1947 about 9th September, Rabotnichesko Delo #101, 30.04.1948 about 1st May and Rabotnichesko Delo #122, 26.05.1948 about 24th May.

²⁰ Petkov (1988): 44-45.

²¹ For this issue see Fund 1, Inventory 6, Archival Unit 531 (1948): 25, 28 about the 9th September.

national tricolour, definitely the most prominent one, accompanied flags of domestic political and working organisations (e.g. trade union flags) as well as the national flags of “friendly nations” (e.g. the flag of the Soviet Union)²². The national dimension of public decoration is also revealing in the portraits. Although the portraits of Stalin, Dimitrov and Tito predominated in any manifestation, portraits of Bulgarian national heroes coexisted in streets, squares, buildings and in the tribunal of the celebrities. The groups who took part in manifestations also brandished portraits of the same figures²³. What we have called logic of equivalence²⁴ earlier in this thesis, operates here concerning flags and personalities. Flagging the national flag along with other domestic and foreign flags instituted a frontier between the national “we” and “nation-friends” vis-à-vis the Other and “enemy-nations”²⁵. In parallel, the representation of Bulgarian national heroes and contemporary political personalities as equivalent, essentially as part of a long line of historical and contemporary personalities attempted to institute and demonstrate the continuity of the nation’s past and present.

Placards, posters, wallpapers and diagrams constituted a propaganda tool for the Fatherland Front in order to illustrate its governmental achievements and to gain the consent of the masses to its rule. Using public decorations the Fatherland Front also propagated its main political topics of each national day’s time. It tried thus to make a correlation between the commemorative event and its own political discourse.

Some secondary events (in terms of importance and frequency) were also given on national commemorations and anniversaries. Representatives of the government laid wreaths at monuments on these occasions. Pilgrimages also took place to common graves and to monuments to the fallen partisans. Both were appropriately decorated for the occasion. The Fatherland Front intended to establish itself as the official holder of the memory of the resistance and the war

²² Otechestven Front #1235, 07.09.1948.

²³ Otechestven Front #1238, 11.09.1948.

²⁴ See Chapter Four Part One.

²⁵ For these terms see Chapter Four Part One.

dead. Communists portrayed the fallen partisan and the Unknown Soldier as national heroes, who sacrificed themselves for fatherland and democracy²⁶.

Orators appointed by the Fatherland Front gave speeches in meetings at schools, faculties, military campuses, factories, theatres, and cultural clubs. These speeches were accompanied by literature and musical programs, where the national anthem, anthems of “friendly” countries and suitably patriotic melodies were sung. Memorial stones were set up. School-hours, literature and cultural hours, radiograms, and commemorative mornings and evenings were devoted to national days as well²⁷. All of these events aimed to underscore the meaning of those days and, simultaneously, inculcated a form of national consciousness.

In some commemorations and anniversaries, specific national celebrations and events occurred. In June, on the occasion of Botev Day²⁸, a pilgrimage of the Bulgarian people was arranged to the place of Botev’s death. As *Rabotnichesko Delo*²⁹ reports, thousands of pilgrims departed for a march amidst the sounds of



gunfire, church bells and military bugles. Singing Botev’s revolutionary poems and carrying flags and placards, they were supposed to retrace the footsteps of Botev and his fellows. They also marched to the mountains where a few years ago partisans had fought for Botev’s ideals. An imaginary link thus was drawn between connected Botev’s legend and the resistance movement.

On the national holiday of the 24th May

²⁶ On politics about the Unknown Soldier see Gorman (1994): 307-314.

²⁷ Bulgarian State Records Fund 21, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 434: 86, 87, 93-94, 119.

²⁸ *Rabotnichesko Delo* #217, 02.06.1945 and *Rabotnichesko Delo* #118, 21.05.1948.

²⁹ *Rabotnichesko Delo* #217, 02.06.1945.

1946, a nationwide, youth relay race was held. It was claimed in the *Rabotnichesko Delo*³⁰ that 75,000 young people joined it and covered 14,000 kilometres. They met with 2,000,000 spectators during their journey and the last runners were greeted by a crowd of 80,000 people. The distance that the relay race covered and the people, who ran or watched it through villages and cities symbolised the Bulgarian nation itself and certified its national character.

The anniversaries were also used to give significant political events a national element and character. An example is the Slav Congress convened on 3rd March 1945³¹. The Slav Congress was to demonstrate the compact solidarity between all the Slavs. It was also to stress the fighting unity between the Slavs in their struggle against fascism and the liberating role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War. Bulgaria considered taking advantage of it to promote her national cause, since she sought allies to support her in the peace conferences. As a Slav nation, she could enter the emerging Socialist bloc, which was headed by the great Slav brother and consisted of all the Slav family.

Centennials and millennia were celebrated in the early post-war period almost always with a nationalist content. The centennials of the birthday of Hristo Botev and Ivan Vazov as well as the millennium of Ivan Rilski were the most significant of that period³². A considerable number of events were arranged on the occasion of centennials. For example, on Botev's centennial an exhibition was set up as AgitProp had recommended. Competitions for bust, portrait, and cards depicting him took place and moments of his life, and musical compositions of his poems were enunciated. Botev monuments were to be established in Sofia, Vratsa and Kalofer. A bibliography and biography on him were commissioned. Weeks dedicated to the life-work of Botev were to be organised in schools and cultural clubs. Some important social institutions were

³⁰ *Rabotnichesko Delo* #111, 112 and 113, 22-25.05.1946.

³¹ *Rabotnichesko Delo* #139, 01.03.1945.

³² For details see Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 374 (1949) and Fund 1, Inventory 6, Archival Unit 692 (1949) for Ivan Vazov's centennial, Fund 1, Inventory 6, Archival Unit 113 (1946) for Ivan Rilski's millennium and Fund 1, Inventory 6, Archival Unit 531 for Botev's centennial.

to be named “Hristo Botev”³³. On the 7th January 1949, the centennial of his birthday was brilliantly and honourably celebrated³⁴.

In conclusion, national anniversaries and commemorations were used to reconstruct the national past on an annual basis³⁵. They, thus, constructed an annual calendar through which national history could be “relived” and “remembered”. Obviously, the spirit of this national history is associated with the recommendations to the communists of Georgi Dimitrov at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern on rewriting history. Through commemorations and anniversaries a past event could either be reinterpreted within a new historical context, or consign the undesirable aspects of it to oblivion. Because of limited space, only three occasions of commemoration and anniversaries are illustrated in the pages below. Apart from the following cases, 19th February (anniversary of Levski’s hanging), 02nd June (Botev day and the commemoration of the fallen heroes in the resistance movement and the Fatherland Front), and the 3rd May (day of national liberation from the Turkish yoke) were celebrated retaining, to a great extent, the nationalist discourse of the time of the Second World War³⁶.

September 9th (the transition day). The greatest national holiday³⁷ was the founding myth of the new regime and a temporal milestone for the Bulgarian communists. September 9th symbolised a “**date of passage**” from fascism to democracy or, analytically, from fascist treacherous governments to the pure, patriotic government of the Fatherland Front. Despite its historical recency, it seemed to have a long past, part of a much longer revolutionary tradition³⁸ which included: the insurrection of Radomir in 1918, the uprising of 23rd September 1923, and the People’s Bloc electoral victory (even excluding the

³³ Fund 1, Inventory 6, Archival Unit 531 (1948): 45.

³⁴ Fund 1, Inventory 6, Archival Unit 568 (1949): 14-17.

³⁵ About a calendar of French national life Amalvi (1998): 117 ff writes.

³⁶ See Chapter Two Part Two.

³⁷ Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 170 (1947): 41 and Rabotnichesko Delo #296, 04.09.1945.

³⁸ See for instance Rabotnichesko Delo # 204, 03.09.1947. See Amalvi (1998): 133 about a similar concept regarding the link between the Bastille Day and the Third Republic.

Communists) in 1931³⁹. It was also claimed that the Bulgarian narod (nation-people) had anticipated the achievements of the 9th September since its liberation from the Turkish yoke. Applying the logic of equivalence and stressing the continuity between past and present, the “victory of the people”, as the uprising of 9th September was called, was supposed to have come from a long national revolutionary tradition. Thus, 9th September acquired a sense of inevitability and significance as was linked in a chain of equivalent popular uprisings. More importantly, as it was linked to the national liberation movement of the 19th century and the subject of the uprisings that ensued was supposed to be the entire Bulgarian people, 9th September acquired a definite national dimension. All this symbolism led to an underestimation and forgetting of the substantial contribution of the Red Army to the September 9th uprising.

The role of the Soviet Union was forgotten, however, only in order to be remembered. The BCP could not omit slogans concerning the Red Army and the generalissimo Stalin. The Fatherland Front honoured the Russian people as the liberators of Bulgaria and mighty assistants in the success of September 9th. At the same time, honour was paid to the partisans and the soldiers who had fallen during the resistance movement and the Fatherland War respectively⁴⁰. They represented martyrs to the realisation of September 9th uprising and, thereby, the new Bulgaria.

September 9th constituted the vaulting horse for the so-declared “free, independent, democratic and powerful Bulgaria”⁴¹, as the new socialist regime envisaged it. The BCP underlined the national perspective of 9th September. A long, humiliating, bloody and devastating yoke of the Bulgarian narod was overthrown. September 9th incarnated the day of narodno liberation from the fascist yoke and the day of the restoration of the national independence and state

³⁹ Recited by Chervenkov in a historical report on the occasion of the national holiday of 9th September as revolutionary forerunners of 9th September, in *Rabotnichesko Delo* #210, 09.09.1947

⁴⁰ Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 170 (1947): 42 and Fund 1, Inventory 6, Archival Unit 531 (1948): 26-27.

⁴¹ The last adjective of this slogan was not permanent. It could be altered to “prosperous”, “wealthy” and so on. For slogans of the BCP on the 9th September see Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 36 (1945): 7-8.

sovereignty⁴². On that day, the communist-led Fatherland Front saved Bulgaria from a tremendous national calamity and Bulgaria gained anew her international reputation, subsuming herself under the Allies⁴³. After that day, a bright future of progress and prosperity for Bulgaria would follow.

A nation-wide unity was declared on the national holiday of the 9th September. Indeed, the unity did not refer only to the ranks of the Fatherland Front but it extended to the people as an entity⁴⁴. In its declarations, the Fatherland Front asserted that it constituted the fighting unity of the working people, the peasantry, the narodna intelligentsia, the army, the police and the patriotic industrialists and merchants⁴⁵. All these social strata were supposed to be rallied round the tricolour flag of the Fatherland Front, that is, the national Bulgarian flag. The manifestations that occurred on that day claimed to include the whole nation⁴⁶. The BCP used them as a strong argument for, and as unambiguous evidence of, the patriotic unity of the Bulgarian people.

Spillman argues that on national holidays, people celebrate signified shared virtues and qualities of the nation⁴⁷. Regarding 9th September, the Bulgarian nation celebrated national liberty, people's democracy and people's power, bravery and victory⁴⁸. Since 1946, the same day had also become a celebration of the abolition of monarchy and the establishment of the People's Republic⁴⁹. From 1947, Narodna Army and Narodna Militia celebrated the same day as their own holiday. The anniversary of the 9th September also represented a chance for

⁴² Rabotnichesko Delo #301, 08.09.1945, Rabotnichesko Delo #296, 04.09.1945 and Rabotnichesko Delo #209, 08.09.1947.

⁴³ Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 36 (1945): 7, Rabotnichesko Delo #301, 08.09.1945 and #209, 08.09.1947.

⁴⁴ 'When the narod was united and firmly rallied round a given national idea, it coped with domestic and foreign enemies', e.g. the national liberation movement, the resistance movement, and the struggle against the divisive opposition, in Rabotnichesko Delo #207, 06.09.1947.

⁴⁵ Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 36 (1945): 7, Rabotnichesko Delo #302, 10.09.1945 and #209, 08.09.1947.

⁴⁶ Rabotnichesko Delo #207, 06.09.1947.

⁴⁷ Spillman (1997): 82.

⁴⁸ Rabotnichesko Delo #209, 08.09.1947.

⁴⁹ See, for instance, the title of an article in Rabotnichesko Delo #207, 06.09.1947: Third Anniversary of 9th September and One Year from the Establishment of the People's Republic.

the Fatherland Front government to disseminate its achievements⁵⁰ and the necessity to increase productivity and realise any Economic Plan⁵¹.

The national holiday of the 9th September had to affect the patriotic emotions of the Bulgarians. According to the official tool of the BCP, the *Rabotnichesko Delo*, the commemoration of the 9th September 'caused emotions of pride in any honest Bulgarian, in any Bulgarian patriot, for the collapse of tyranny, savagery and fascism'⁵². The 9th September stood for a 'precious day for every honest Bulgarian heart, for every Bulgarian patriot'⁵³. Consequently, anyone who did not celebrate the 9th September was not a true and honest patriot. To be an enemy of the 9th September, that is the communist power, denoted that you were an enemy of the nation.

The commemorations of the 9th September were organised in order to spread and embed a specific interpretation of a very recent event. Their meaning derived from elements of both the original event and the new context within which they took place⁵⁴. In effect, the date when the BCP took power became a national holiday and a commemoration of a glorious, national uprising, which brought to Bulgaria freedom, independence and the certainty of prosperity. A meaningful day for the BCP and the Fatherland Front government, therefore, was converted into a solemn celebration of all the people, who were obliged to show their national pride during the ceremonies of that day.

1st May (May Day). May Day had already acquired the character of a holiday as well as that of a demonstration since the late nineteenth century⁵⁵. In the early post-war Bulgaria, both dimensions of May Day had a national implication. The BCP altered the main message of May Day. As the vanguard of the proletariat

⁵⁰ The official report of the government on the same day had this expediency.

⁵¹ *Rabotnichesko Delo* #204, 03.09.1947 and 205, 04.09.1947.

⁵² *Rabotnichesko Delo* #301, 08.09.1945.

⁵³ *Rabotnichesko Delo* #204, 03.09.1947. In *Rabotnichesko Delo* #211, 11.09.1947, the following excerpt is quoted: 'The working people demonstrated its great achievements in terms of productivity, the peasants expressed their pleasure in the collection of harvests and to secure bread, the Narodna army manifested its alertness to safeguard the country's integrity and all the people demonstrated their national pride'.

⁵⁴ Carrier (1996): 435.

⁵⁵ Hobsbawm (1983): 283 ff gives an analytical historical account of the symbolism of May Day in the period of 1870-1914.

seized power, May Day implied renewal, technical advance and certainty for a brighter future for the Bulgarian state. Thus, the international “Chicago martyrs” were absolutely omitted or forgotten and replaced by the muscular figure of a worker who asserted a prosperous future for Bulgaria. As Dimitrov concluded in his speech on the occasion of May Day 1946, the meaning of this celebration summed up three objectives: the patriotic unity of the Bulgarian people; the brave, decisive struggle for the People’s Republic; and the struggle of the working people for financial security⁵⁶.

On May Day, the ‘patriotic unity’⁵⁷ of all the social strata under the flag of the Fatherland Front was celebrated. It is incarnated by the central sculptural figure established in Sofia on the occasion of May Day 1946, which stood for unity between the working people, the peasants and the intelligentsia⁵⁸. The same concept was symbolised in a poster for May Day 1945. It depicted a flag with the slogan “Long Life to the 1st May” accompanied with a soldier, a worker, a peasant, and an intellectual⁵⁹.

Apart from patriotic unity, May Day acquired a national dimension in order to motivate people to increase productivity and exceed labouring norms by their hard work. Although the 1st May represented the labour and international solidarity of the working people, there were slogans concerning the increase of productivity and the successful accomplishment of the Economic Plans⁶⁰. May Day slogans gained a national context, provided that the technological and financial advance of the country was a matter of national pride⁶¹. In parallel, there were slogans and messages expressing gratitude to all the Slavs, the Soviet Union, in particular, and Stalin, in person, namely the great national friends of

⁵⁶ Rabotnichesko Delo # 96, 02.05.1946.

⁵⁷ As Dimitrov himself characterised it in one of his speeches, Rabotnichesko Delo # 96, 02.05.1946. For the same topic see also Rabotnichesko Delo # 101, 30.04.1948.

⁵⁸ See a photo of it in Rabotnichesko Delo # 93, 27.04.1946.

⁵⁹ Rabotnichesko Delo # 191, 30.04.1945.

⁶⁰ Some of May Day slogans with such content fall under the Bulgarian State Records Fund 28, Inventory 1, Archival Unit 414: ‘Railway workers, speed up your work for safe and regular transport service’ (p. 12); ‘Implementation of Two Years Plan will reinforce democratic rights and freedoms of the Bulgarian people’ (p. 30); ‘Intellectuals, work for the grandeur of the fatherland and for development of national economy’ (p. 32); and ‘Youth, be shock workers’ (p. 35).

⁶¹ Similarly, the shock workers were considered Bulgaria’s national pride, Rabotnichesko Delo # 102, 01.05.1948.

Bulgaria⁶². Bulgaria expected their assistance in peace conferences to maintain its territorial integrity. In the same context, on May Day, Bulgaria mentioned its demand for an outlet to the Aegean Sea or the so-called return of Western Thrace⁶³. Furthermore, on May Day, Bulgarian people were encouraged to maintain their alertness and to preserve with all their strength their national freedom and independence⁶⁴. Within this framework, May Day acquired a certain national character.

24th May (Day of Cyril and Methodius who enlightened the Slavs). The 24th May was celebrated as a national and Slav, international holiday. It was devoted to education, Slav culture and solidarity, to youth in general and the education of youth in particular, to the spring and to flowers⁶⁵. The central purpose of this holiday was to highlight the role of education, school and the intelligentsia in the new Fatherland Front Bulgaria and to contrast it with the illiteracy that had dominated in Bulgarian society in the past⁶⁶. At the same time, as the atmosphere of Panslavism of that time presupposed⁶⁷, Slav unity and solidarity and, above all, fraternity with the Soviet Union were propagated⁶⁸. It was considered that all Slavs had a common culture; a Pan-Slav culture was highlighted⁶⁹. The nation celebrated its own youth, education and science, as long as it commemorated its international membership of the family of the Slav nations and its adherence to the Eastern Socialist bloc, led by the Soviet Union.

The Bulgarian nation felt that it stood equal to the other Slav nations in this tribal family. Even though the Bulgarian nomenclature had not officially and definitely yet stated the allegedly Bulgarian nationality of Cyril and Methodius, and in general it referred to them as Slav brothers from Thessaloniki, Cyril and

⁶² Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 170 (1947): 24, 33-36, Rabotnichesko Delo # 30, 30.04.1946 and #94, 22.04.1948.

⁶³ See, for instance, the speech of Dimitrov in the Narodn (national-people's) Theatre on the 30th April 1946 in Rabotnichesko Delo # 96, 02.05.1946.

⁶⁴ Rabotnichesko Delo # 101, 30.04.1948.

⁶⁵ Rabotnichesko Delo #202, 15.05.1945 and #203, 16.05.1945.

⁶⁶ Rabotnichesko Delo #122, 26.05.1948.

⁶⁷ See Chapter Four Part Two (the relevant section).

⁶⁸ Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 36 (1945): 1 and Otechestven Front #523, 21.05.1946.

⁶⁹ In Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 10 (1945): 1 the day of Cyril and Methodius is also called a day of Pan-Slav culture.

Methodius are mentioned as Bulgarians in public speeches⁷⁰. Beside their great contribution to Slav languages and culture, the AgitProp stressed their contribution to the Bulgarian nation in particular. Not only had Bulgarians avoided assimilation and disappearance during long periods of slavery, but also discovered their national identity⁷¹.

The rivalry between the Slavs and the Teutonic race is well juxtaposed in slogans, articles and speeches on the occasion of the celebration of 24th May, especially, the so-called fascist German agents. The Bulgarian governments of the Second World War and the dynasty were blamed for forbidding the celebration of the Day of Cyril and Methodius⁷². This represented the deslavisation of the Bulgarian people undertaken by German agents. In the same context, it was noted that the Bulgarian rulers and the Hitlerites planned to abolish the Cyrillic script and replace it with the Latin one⁷³. On the same day, the BCP recalled the excerpt of Dimitrov's plea before the court during the Leipzig trial, where he stressed the civilised mission of the two brothers⁷⁴. The struggle of Cyril and Methodius to spread Slav literature, notwithstanding German reaction, was correlated to the struggle of the Leipzig hero who defended Bulgaria and Slavdom before a court of modern German reaction.

Throughout this national holiday, the BCP and the Fatherland Front sought to vindicate their role as the pure and original interpreter of the Bulgarian nationalism. They claimed that they followed the doctrines of Cyril and Methodius, so that Bulgaria adhered to the Slav bloc.

⁷⁰ See for instance the broadcast speech of the communist regent, Todor Pavlov, on the occasion of the 24th May 1945 as an example for the co-existence of both tendencies, *Rabotnichesko Delo* #205, 18.05.1945.

⁷¹ Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 102 (1946): 6.

⁷² Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 36 (1945): 2 and 5-6 and Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 102 (1946): 7.

⁷³ *Rabotnichesko Delo* #121, 24.05.1948.

⁷⁴ Fund 1, Inventory 15, Archival Unit 102 (1946): 6 and *Rabotnichesko Delo* #121, 24.05.1948. The excerpt was the following: 'at a period when the German Emperor Karl V vowed that he would talk German only to his horses, at a time when the nobility and intellectual circles of German wrote only Latin and were ashamed of their mother tongue, in barbarous Bulgaria the apostles Cyril and Methodius invented and spread the use of the old Bulgarian script'.

6.2 National Symbols

A nation, defined as an imagined community by Anderson⁷⁵, is ratified by a range of symbols. The anthropologist, Raymond Firth, in his study of the role of flags in contemporary life, emphasises their symbolic function as a 'condensation symbol' and a 'focus of sentiment about society'⁷⁶. 'The National Flag and the National Emblem are two symbols through which an independent country proclaims its identity and sovereignty and, as such, they command instantaneous respect and loyalty. In themselves, they reflect the entire background, thought and culture of a nation'⁷⁷. They help forge and intensify national solidarity, cohesion, devotion and consent.

Firth and McCrone argue that the national flag affirms and symbolises the national identity on a daily basis⁷⁸. Availability, variability in terms of material used to produce a flag, and adaptability in terms of display make a flag a prime choice for symbolic use⁷⁹. A flag, a specific material object, represents a nation, an abstract notion with tangible boundaries. Furthermore, as Firth concludes, a flag as a material object becomes in itself an object of sentiment, which is transferred from the notion represented⁸⁰. Flags are assigned to a total and highly important behavioural focus; they are treated as a secular sacred object, a modern counterpart of an ancient clan's totem or holy Christian image depicting a saint.

The flag represents a complex set of ideas in a generalised and emotional manner. As Billig maintains, the flag is inhabited in contemporary daily life⁸¹. Billig also notes that, despite its own universality, a flag indicates particularity, with its own individual patterns⁸². Individual patterns of flags proclaim national

⁷⁵ Anderson (1991).

⁷⁶ Firth (1973): 356.

⁷⁷ Firth (1973): 341 citing an excerpt of the brochures issued by the Indian government on the origin, meaning and use of these symbols of the Indian nation.

⁷⁸ For the symbolism of flags see Firth (1973): 328-367 and McCrone (1998): 40 ff.

⁷⁹ Firth (1973): 342.

⁸⁰ Firth (1973): 339-340 writes: 'the flag, a specific material object, is taken as the representative of every general object, a country, of abstract as well as of material character'.

⁸¹ Billig (1997): 43.

⁸² Billig (1997): 86.

virtues and qualities, always of a positive, morally approved content. The national flag, waved or unwaved⁸³, recalls a glorious past.

It is argued that the emblem has a long history, whilst the national flag is a historically recent innovation. The emblem can also be the embodiment of a crucial historical event. Every nation has its own unique emblem, even though the main feature or a part of the whole emblem could be used by another nation. Connotations are possible to add or remove from the emblem or of a part of it, depending on contemporary political considerations⁸⁴.

Such national symbols can be reworked when a nation is in transition⁸⁵. Thus, the Fatherland Front modified them, when Bulgaria entered the socialist era, opting to introduce both national and socialist features to the main national symbols. The BCP used the national symbols to show its own image of the nation. Its own nationalism depicted on the Bulgarian national symbols.

6.2.a *The National emblem*



The National Emblem

In the Constitution of 1947⁸⁶, Bulgaria adopted the rampant lion as the main state emblem, which had been instituted since the Tirnovo Constitution⁸⁷, in 1878. However, the lion ceased to be depicted as crowned, since the monarchy had been abolished by the plebiscite of September 8, 1946. An azure blue field replaced the dark-red field. New elements emerged in the emblem: ears of wheat surrounded the lion on both sides, a five-pointed star, instead of a crown, a cog-wheel and the inscription below the lion: “9-IX-1944”⁸⁸. As cited in a school historical textbook of Chervenkov’s era, this emblem represented ‘the progressive

⁸³ For these terms see Billig (1995): 39-43.

⁸⁴ The red star of the Bulgarian flag would imply the belonging of Bulgaria to the socialist block.

⁸⁵ Both French and Russian Revolution abandoned the old flag and created a new one.

⁸⁶ The Fatherland Front government had already proclaimed Bulgaria as a People’s Democracy and the opposition parties had been repressed. The monarchy had been abolished.

⁸⁷ It was the first Constitution of the Bulgarian national state.

⁸⁸ Stoyanov (1981): 14. For a picture of the emblem see Encyclopaedia Bulgaria (1981): 384 ff.

advance of the country on the path of socialism'⁸⁹, that is, a socialist nation in progress.

The lion implied the historical continuity of Bulgaria. Its origin was claimed as early medieval⁹⁰. Henceforward, it had been used in many circumstances: as a decoration for monuments and coins, as the main figure of flags and seals in the Bulgarian Renaissance, as a literary motive. Thus, the lion underscores Bulgaria's national past. Moreover, it symbolises strength, valour, fearlessness and heroism, that is, the Bulgarian national virtues and qualities.

The five-pointed star hints at internationalism and socialism, whilst the red star claims unity with the Soviet Union and the eastern block. The synthesis of the lion and the red star suggest a connection between the revolutionary–apostles of the national liberation movement of the 1870s and the partisans of the resistance movement in the Second World War⁹¹. The azure blue field makes internationalism clearer; it symbolises the participation of the Bulgarian people in the struggle for peace in the world. The cog-wheel and the wheat ears on the lion's right and left highlight the alliance of workers and peasants, and their unity in social struggles⁹². The wheat ears, in particular, stand for the love of work of the Bulgarian people and the fertility of the Bulgarian land⁹³.

The lion, the star, the azure blue field, the cog-wheel and the wheat ears incarnate both proletarian internationalism and socialist patriotism. The Bulgarian national emblem thus attempted to forge a synthesis between a national past and socialist present.

⁸⁹ Burmov, Dikovski...(1950⁵): 123.

⁹⁰ Stoyanov (1981): 13 states that the image of the lion was used as a decoration in the palaces of the khan Omourtag. He also mentions the lion as 'the national symbol of the Bulgarian people since ancient times'.

⁹¹ Burmov, Dikovski...(1950⁵): 123.

⁹² For the symbolisation of the Bulgarian emblem see Stoyanov (1981): 14.

⁹³ Burmov, Dikovski...(1950⁵): 123.

6.2.b *The National Flag*

Although the national emblem might have its roots in the ancient or recent past, the national flag is a matter of modernity. It could be argued that the origin of a national flag is uncertain⁹⁴ or, rather, invented, as the national flag usually is instituted with the formation of an independent national state. National qualities are supposed to be depicted on the flag by its morally significant colours⁹⁵. National propaganda indoctrinates people with the national qualities, supposed to be represented by the flag, through the educational system.

The Bulgarian national flag has three colours. The Bulgarian tricolour was established by the Constituent Assembly of Tirmovo. The oldest tricolour flag, the same as the one used after the liberation from the Ottoman domination, was made hardly a year before Bulgaria's autonomy (1878)⁹⁶. Officially, it claimed its origin in the flag used by the Bulgarian League of Rakovski based in Belgrade⁹⁷. The symbolisation of the three colours is the following. The white represents peace and progress and the red stands for the socialist revolution. The green has a double meaning; it signifies the love for the fatherland and the struggles for national liberation as well as the fertility of the Bulgarian land⁹⁸. Apparently, some of the meanings of the colours of the Bulgarian national flag were attributed to it after 9th September.

The Bulgarian national flag maintained its tricolour shape after the Constitution of 1947. The national emblem in its new form was located on the flag's upper left corner to underscore the relation between the national liberation of 1878 and the one of 9.IX.1944. The BCP and the Fatherland Front government had no reason to change the shape of the flag. They called the Bulgarian people to fight against the Germans and Bulgarian governments of the Second World War

⁹⁴ Girardet (1998): 5.

⁹⁵ Firth (1973): 350-351.

⁹⁶ Stoyanov (1981): 15 and Encyclopaedia Bulgaria (1981): 384 ff. See also the history of the French tricolour in Girardet (1998): 3-26, especially the uncertainty of the design of the tricolour for quite some time and the enigma of its origin. For some details on the allegedly evolution of the Bulgarian national flag through the ages see Klincharov (1941): 19-32 passim, who is in accordance with the national myth.

⁹⁷ Burmov, Dikovski...(1950⁵): 123.

⁹⁸ Stoyanov (1981): 15-16.

under the Bulgarian tricolour. The BCP had adopted the tricolour side by side with the red one since the 1930s. The BCP brandished both as symbols of national liberation and socialist revolution.

Conclusion

National holidays, commemorations and anniversaries constituted a powerful weapon in the political arsenal of the BCP. On national holidays, the BCP and the Fatherland Front were solemn orators speaking about, and in the name of the Bulgarian nation. They used commemorations and anniversaries effectively to promote their political purposes, insofar as each national holiday was bound up with a contemporary political topic.

Political agitation and propaganda of the BCP aimed to convince the Bulgarian people that the nation as an entity shared a common past and a common future. As we have seen in this chapter, commemorations and anniversaries underscored this concept by establishing a sense of equivalence and continuity between a selectively constructed and remembered past and the present. The common struggle of the Bulgarian people for liberation from the Turkish yoke, the desire and wrestling of Bulgarians for democratic rights and national sovereignty, since imperialists ruled the country, and, finally, the common uprising of the 9th September were all parts of a common national past. Simultaneously, a bright, prosperous, wealthy *new Bulgaria* celebrated on May Day. It was the new socialist society the Bulgarian nation would together develop and advance. Finally, by 24th of May celebrations, Bulgaria was situated in the eastern socialist arena, among all the Slav nations. This national holiday, in particular, was used to bring out the meaning of the eternal fraternity with the big Slav brother and twice liberator of Bulgaria, the Russian people. Thus, on the occasion of commemorative events the BCP spoke about Bulgaria's place in the world.

The BCP argued that what characterised the Bulgarian nation on each national holiday was national unity. Working people, peasants, intellectuals, army and militia rallied round the tricolour, the greatest symbol of national identity, and

participated “to the last” in manifestations supervised by the AgitProp and the government. National symbols, the flag and the emblem, gave symbolic representation to national identity and national values as given by the new regime.

Conclusion

My thesis has analysed the case of the BCP as a Marxist institution which increasingly adopted and adapted nationalism. It has tried to explain the reasons for this and has provided evidence of the Party's nationalism across a number of spheres of political life. In conclusion, I summarise the basic ideas of my thesis.

First of all, this thesis has attempted to explain why the BCP accommodated nationalism into its discourse during the Second World War and the early post-war period. In Chapter 1, it is argued that Marxism was unable to confront the dynamics of nationalism at the beginning of the 20th century, since it lacked a coherent theory of nationalism. As Marxism underwent a serious theoretical crisis (the course of events did not follow the path as "scientifically" determined by Marxism) and nationalism came to the fore because of a series of events (the First World War and the out-break of the Revolution in a multi-national Empire, where the national question was both unsolved and sharp), Marxists were compelled to arrive at some kind of reconciliation with nationalism in order to be able to reach a mass audience and, therefore, overcome their relative isolation. Leninist theory and Stalinist practice were primarily responsible for introducing key nationalist themes into Marxism, while the Comintern fused elements of Marxism and nationalism in a number of crucial ways, especially in the mid-1930s. Popular fronts in particular, as tactics aiming to assist communist parties to assume a hegemonic role at a national level, involved communist parties in using a systematic, ambitious, and extensive nationalism. National discourses, in effect, contributed greatly to the transformation of communist parties from small cadre-parties to massive ones, and, finally, underpinned their takeover of power in many places after the war.

The BCP was in no position to resist this process. It was a loyal member of the highly centralised Comintern and a thoroughly Stalinised party. Most of its members grew up politically in the USSR, while its own leader, Dimitrov, was himself the architect of the popular front. The adoption of nationalism was further facilitated by the etatist and centralised nature of the BCP. In addition, a

set of particular factors relating to Bulgarian society facilitated the adoption of nationalism: an almost complete metamorphosis of the BCP in terms of membership, the lack of a significant proletariat in Bulgaria, the hegemonic status of national discourse in Bulgarian society, the need to minimise the significance of the Party's reliance on the Soviet Union and the Red Army would be downplayed, and the need to modernise and rebuild Bulgaria as a nation-state.

The rest of the thesis shows how the BCP deployed its nationalist discourse during the Second World War (chapter 2) and the early post-war years (chapter 3-6). Chapter 2 discusses in detail the way that the Bulgarian communist leadership absorbed and articulated a number of Marxist concepts which helped to integrate core nationalist ideas into its discourse in the 1930s and the Second World War: anti-imperialism, socialist patriotism, proletarian internationalism. It also analyses the Manichean schemes which were used for the purpose of strictly dividing the Bulgarian political sphere into patriots and traitors. The partisan movement shows how nationalism was used by the Bulgarian communists at that time. A series of partisan apparatuses had been given names with national connotations (most importantly, the Fatherland Front and the Radio Station "Hristo Botev"); nationalist discourse was articulated through propaganda means (texts, events, songs, rituals). Above all, the desperate need of communists for alliances within the Fatherland Front and to control the mobilisation of Bulgarians in partisan detachments led them to downplay communism, sovietisation, and internationalism and highlight nationalist themes in order not to "frighten off" the masses. As a result, after the uprising of September 9, they had already developed and elaborated a whole set of nationalist concepts and notions.

When the BCP took power, it saw a dramatic increase in its membership and enjoyed the support of the Red Army stationed in Bulgaria. However, the dominance of the BCP was not unchallenged. It was the mainstream of a coalition of political forces, which proved to be fragile. Soon, political groups split off and set up independent parties so that the unity of the Fatherland Front was put in danger. The most powerful of them was BANU, whose programme

and slogans seemed to be influential in a predominantly agrarian society and posed threats to the communist regime. To save the unity of the Fatherland Front and defeat the opposition, the BCP deployed a number of tactics, all of which were legitimated by nationalist arguments.

This discourse (analysed in Chapter 3) was essentially the product of the syncretism of two discursive elements articulated in earlier discourses. The first element originated from a bourgeois nationalistic discourse, identifying people, nation, and state, while the second element came from a Marxist discourse, identifying state, people, and the Party. The result of the syncretism of these elements was an all-embracing, totalitarian discourse. This discourse did not underpin just the totalitarianism of the state, as analysts of totalitarianism have argued, but something more: the totalitarianism of the nation-state.

The totalitarian discourse of the nation-state claimed that the BCP and the Fatherland Front were the unique representative of the Bulgarian nation and had the right to occupy every single policy domain (apparatuses and institutions, economic policies and governance). At the same time, all groups and figures that opposed or were critical to the communists and the Fatherland Front were presented as opposed to Bulgaria, since nation, people, state, and the Party were all equated with each other. To challenge a communist policy meant challenging the nation. This discourse was used by the communists to delegitimize and criminalise the opposition.

Beyond the realm of domestic politics, the Bulgarian communists deployed an extensive nationalist discourse in respect of the international arena (Chapter 4). Within the context of the Cold War, a “nationalism of belonging” had emerged. I invented this term to explain how belonging to a bloc could be presented as wholly compatible with the identity of a nation. As a member of the socialist bloc Bulgaria presented herself as progressive, freedom-loving, peaceful, democratic, patriotic and anti-imperialist nation. Anti-imperialism gained a new content: struggle for maintaining national independence and sovereignty. The Cominform was conceived of as a shield of anti-imperialist socialist countries against the hostile bloc dominated by the USA, which was supposed to be a

threat to national independence and prosperity. Within this context, the world was divided into friend-nations and enemy-nations.

As all Slav nations belonged to the socialist bloc a reconceptualisation of Pan-Slavism took place. Bulgaria was positioned firmly within a wide family of Slav nations and the Bulgarian communists emphasised in particular the Bulgarian-Soviet affinity in national terms. The division of the world into two parts and thus pan-Slavism helped explain how national questions were dealt with by the BCP at an international level. They officially claimed the restoration of Western Thrace to Bulgaria at the expense of Greece. In their attempts to ease Bulgarian-Yugoslavian rapprochement and to ensure the incorporation of Yugoslavia into the socialist camp, the BCP negotiated the unification of Macedonia but only after the establishment of a South Slav federation. Despite the project of “national and cultural self-determination” of Pirin Macedonia, the Bulgarian communists, in effect, hampered the so-called “macedonisation” of Pirin. This was, because they insisted on imagining Macedonians as of Bulgarian origin and on the proximity of Macedonians to Bulgarians in national, cultural, and, in particular, linguistic terms.

As with other nationalisms, the ‘Marxist nationalism’ of the BCP flagged nationhood in diverse ways. Chapter 5 shows how it flagged nationhood in terms of text –historical texts in particular- and Chapter 6 in terms of events (anniversaries, commemorations) and symbols. Historiography and textbooks show evidence of the flagging of nationhood. The peculiar Marxist version of history writing that the Bulgarian communist regime deployed involves a whole set of nationalist discursive elements. Paradoxically, the evolutionary schema the BCP adopted resembles the ethno-symbolists’ interpretation of the national phenomenon. A schema of evolution from tribe to “narod” and then to nation was elaborated, in which a Bulgarian community was presented as having existed since primordial times. Reproducing the past, the historical apparatus of the BCP developed a peculiar Marxist version of history writing which merged Marxian axioms (modes of production, socioeconomic formations, classes) with national categories (narod, land, language, kinship). The past (the origin of the Bulgarians, the deeds of Cyril and Methodius, the renaissance movement etc)

was selectively remembered and interpreted in a specifically nationalist way for particular political reasons.

The BCP used a number of events and symbols to flag the nation in particular ways. Commemorations and anniversaries show evidence of how the BCP imagined the national past, how it redefined national identity, reshaped collective memory, and propagandised communist achievements. A series of national anniversaries and commemorations are examined under this prism: 9th September, 1st May, and 24th May. National symbols (flag and emblem) encapsulate national identity and national values as given by the new regime. The BCP depicted its 'Marxist nationalism' in the Bulgarian flag and emblem by combining socialist and national elements and values.

To sum up, my thesis argues that the BCP used the influential and politically powerful national idea to accomplish its own political aims. In its struggle to assume a hegemonic role, it adopted a systematic and extensive nationalist discourse, as it seemed to be the most effective means for gaining popular support and consolidating its power. This thesis tries to provide evidence of this nationalist discourse, which we have called Marxist nationalism and was articulated in all possible discursive domains: resistance movement, radio broadcasting, songs, manifestos and proclamations, official press, domestic politics, struggle against the opposition, foreign policy, national questions, education, historiography, commemorations, anniversaries, and symbols.

The Bulgarian communists articulated and developed an extensive and systematic nationalism for a set of reasons. At the time of the communist takeover in Bulgaria, the BCP had not got the support of the great majority of the Bulgarian population. As the masses were not being proletarianised and did not approach the Party, the Party was compelled to approach the masses, embracing their 'native' dialect, that is, nationalism, well-entrenched in Bulgarian society after decades of official propaganda. Nationalism offered the potentiality of constructing a strong, unified will. Using nationalism then the BCP presented itself as the defender of the entire Bulgarian nation and the genuine representative of its aspirations. Such a plainly etatist ideology was absolutely

necessary for the communists, who had now become the bureaucracy of a nation-state (governmental authorities, heads of social institutions, directors of industries and collectives). Presenting themselves in the traditional Marxist way, that is, as the avant-garde of the proletariat, would result in failure of the communist totalitarian project.

In its efforts to legitimise its regime, to pacify Bulgarian society, and to re-build and modernise the Bulgarian state, the BCP articulated an all-embracing, totalitarian discourse, which denied social divisions. It equated both its own political frontiers and those of the Fatherland Front with national frontiers; it identified itself with the nation, the people, and the state. Nothing remained outside the Party, the people and the nation but their common enemies. In this sense, the elimination of the opposition was justified as well as the BCP legitimised its eternal and exclusive political rule.

Nationalism also helped the BCP to win over participants in the resistance movement; to refute opposition claims that it was a Russified party that received directives from the Soviet Union; to argue that adherence to the socialist block and close relations with the USSR were compatible with the Slav character of the Bulgarian nation; to present itself as the embodiment of national unity and the only political force able to save Bulgaria from a tremendous national disaster; to secure popular support for its projects of modernisation, industrialisation, collectivisation; to legitimise its power by presenting Bulgarian history as a linear drift towards the socialist era and the communists as the inheritors of the great traditions of the Bulgarian nation.

However, by introducing a discursive element (nationalism) apparently incompatible and antagonistic to Marxism and internationalism it caused a significant mutation of its core ideology in that since the 1940s, the BCP had already adopted and adapted a specific nationalist discourse, that is, Marxist nationalism, and assumed to define Bulgaria's national interests and ideals.

This thesis aspired to investigate and interpret the nationalist elements of the discourse of the BCP as articulated by its leadership in the 1940s. It did not

examine the influence or the impact of this discourse on the membership of the BCP and Bulgarian society. There is not an in-depth analysis of other discursive elements of BCP's discourse of that time, e.g. Marxism or populism; this thesis deals with them to the extent that there is a relation of them with Party's nationalism. Of course, this thesis aspires to open the research on the above fields as well as to suggest future lines of inquiry on the subsequent relationship between Marxism and nationalism in Bulgaria. Three periods of research interest may be detected: the so-called stalinisation era (when a populist nationalism seemed to emerge), Zivkov's era (when an old-fashion nationalism resurged), and finally post-communism (when different versions and tendencies of nationalism co-exist). Marxist nationalism of the 1940s seems to play a significant role in the subsequent versions of Bulgarian nationalism.

Although this thesis focuses on Bulgaria, it seeks to contribute to the study of other communist parties of that time and of the potential intersection between nationalism and their political discourse. Marxist nationalism of the 1940s could be analysed under the following contextualisation and periodisation introduced in this thesis: as was articulated in Second World War (when communist parties all over Europe put much effort to organise a resistance movement, defended the Soviet Union and, most importantly, became massive and got themselves ready for takeovers); as was articulated in Eastern Europe after the Second World War (when communist parties seized power assuming the hegemony of a coalition of political forces)⁹⁹; finally, as was articulated in the rest of post-war Europe especially in countries where communist parties were popular.

The relevance of the findings of this thesis goes beyond the study of communist parties of the period as its main problematique has affinities with other debates on the use of nationalist rhetoric by Marxist or socialist movements. Marxist nationalism was of major significance for Third World movements, uprisings and revolutions. Anderson argues that 'since World War II every successful revolution has defined itself in *national* terms', giving examples such as the

⁹⁹ It should be mentioned that two books related to this subject were published when this thesis was in the writing-up stage. The book of Mevius provides evidence of the extensive nationalist discourse of the Hungarian Communist Party, while that of Abrams examines the nationalism of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia.

People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam¹⁰⁰. An account of revolutions in Latin America as well as in Africa could also be added in Anderson's examples. The questions raised in the examination of the nationalist discourse of the Bulgarian Communist Party can also be found relevant and applicable in cases of left-wing armed political organisations, in both the Third World and industrial or post-industrial societies. For instance, the Greek armed political organisation 17N used nationalism with some degree of success to legitimise political assassinations and other activities. It is crucial to focus on the problematic yet evident relationship between nationalist discourse and such instances of self-proclaimed left-wing political violence in order to better understand the motivation and cultural and political structural factors that make this articulation feasible and plausible to those who engage in such action as well as their 'audience'.

Apart from case studies this thesis aspires to raise issues related to the 'compatibility' of Marxism and nationalism and consequences of such compatibility. Is merging national and social domains compatible with solidarity and internationalism, insofar as nationalism comprises an exclusionary world view whereas solidarity and internationalism are inclusive and universal? Since Marxist internationalism has become problematic since the late 19th century, as this thesis has already discussed, and since nationalism accommodated itself with Marxist discourses, could it be argued that finally Marxism has apparently proved incapable of surmounting the limits of the nation-system? What should be the stance of current left-wing parties and movements running in nation-states fractured because of significant migration movements? Is there any room for nationalism in modern multi-national socialist movements? Could Marxist internationalism be helpful in modern times, taking into account its successive defeats by nationalism? Is there a need for the articulation or redefinition of universalism? Is there a need for a new universalistic imaginary, which would promote values and identities that unite and not exclude?

¹⁰⁰ Anderson (2002): 2.

APPENDIX ONE

POLITICAL PARTIES

BANU: Founded in 1899 as a professional-educational agrarian organisation. In 1905, it was transformed into a political party. Both its leadership and its membership came from the agrarian masses. Stamboliiski had become its leader and theorist one year earlier. In the elections of 1908, BANU was the most powerful party of the opposition. During the 1920s, BANU developed anti-monarchist and anti-militarist ideas as well as declaring its opposition to the participation of Bulgaria in the First World War. It led the uprising of soldiers in 1918. In the XV Congress of 1919, BANU turned to more radical views and excluded many right-wing agrarians. BANU governed Bulgaria from 1919 (as a part of a coalition government) and from 1920 (on its own) to 1923. In the elections of April 1923, BANU gained 52.7% of the vote. During its running of the country, a lot of radical reforms were realised; in the sphere of international relations, Bulgaria followed a policy of friendship and co-operation with the other Balkan countries and the USSR. The coup of 1923 removed BANU from power and many of its leaders were assassinated or imprisoned. Afterwards, BANU split into many groups (contradictory tendencies had been forming within BANU ever since the First World War); the most significant were BANU-Vrabcha-1 (advocating right-wing agrarian views and having as its leaders Gichev and Muraviev) and BANU-Al. Stamboliiski or BANU-Pladne (advocating left-wing agrarian views and having as its leaders Petkov and Avramov). Left-wing agrarians of BANU-Pladne joined the Fatherland Front in 1942. BANU-Vrabcha-1 was the hegemonic pole of Muraviev's government (02-08 September 1944). In 1945, BANU split off; the pro-communist BANU remained within the Fatherland Front, whereas the BANU-Petkov became the most powerful opposition party. Since 1948, BANU and the BCP have been the only parties still existing in Bulgaria, as all others were eliminated or self-dissolved.

BWSDP: Founded in 1903 after a split in the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Party (which in 1894 was renamed BWSDP). Its followers then adopted the name "broad socialists" so as to be distinguished from the "narrow socialists",

who would later establish the BCP. It attracted artisans, the petty-bourgeois social strata, civil servants and workers. Traditionally, it had been a small party, which gained membership and grew in popularity when it participated in governmental coalitions (1919-1920, 1923-1924). When it separately participated in elections, it could not attract much more than 4-5% (in the elections of 1919). One of the prominent Social-Democrats, D. Kazasov, took part in the coup of 1923. In the 1930s, a right and a left wing were formed within it. There were some social-democrats that even joined fascist parties (e.g. that of Tsankov) and others that co-operated with the communists to establish the Fatherland Front. After 1944, it split anew; a pro-communist BWSDP remained in the Fatherland Front and an opposition one adopted anti-communist positions. The latter was eliminated, while the former self-dissolved in 1948.

Democratic Party: Founded in 1896 by followers of the Karavelov wing of the Liberal Party. It attracted merchants, industrialists and petty-bourgeois social strata. The Democratic Party formed the government of Bulgaria from 1908-1911 (proclaiming Bulgaria's independence) and in 1918-1919 (last government of the First World War which presided over the so-called "national calamity"). After the war, its popularity considerably declined. It took part in the Narodn Block and was a part of its government between 1931 and 1934. It was eliminated after the coup of 1934, restored in 1945, and dissolved in 1947.

Federation of Anarchist-Communists of Bulgaria: Founded in 1919. Anarchists declared a front against any regime: bourgeois, agrarian or communist. After the mid-1920s anarchists divided into many groups, while they strengthened their position during the years of the Civil War in Spain. Its official newspaper was the Workers' Thought (Rabotnicheska Misil). The youth organisation of anarchist-communists was given the name of Botev. After September 9, they renounced any kind of power and propagated the establishment of a society consisting of associations without classes or power. In January 1945, anarchist-communists attempted to summon a conference; however, just at its beginning, the Militia dissolved it, arrested all participants and incarcerated them in labour camps.

IMRO: a tiny organisation largely composed of army officers claiming to be the heir of the organisation that led the Ilinden uprising in 1903. According to Bulgarian nationalism, the aforementioned uprising symbolised the fight of Bulgarians that lived in Macedonia to liberate themselves from the Ottoman yoke.

Military League: It seemed to be a political descendant of the “Military League”, an organisation of conspirators and coup plotters, founded in 1919 by army officers, who opposed the Agrarian regime and held strong anti-communist views. It sought to keep the army united and defended the interests of officers. In co-operation with the Narodn Entente, the Military League overthrew the Agrarian government of Stamboliskii in 1923 via a military coup, assassinated its leadership and promoted a regime of terror in the country. It stood for different things and changed leadership often. On 19 May 1934, the Military League supported Zveno to commit one other coup, this time against the then government of Narodn Block. It dissolved in 1937. Many of the officers that participated in the Military League were at the same time members of Zveno (e.g. Georgiev and Velchev). The most constant feature of its ex-activists during the Second World War was their pro-allied and anti-German policy. Some of the members of the “Military League” (Colonel Ivanov, General Stanchev) supported actively the communists to seize power, but later they were sentenced to long-term imprisonment.

Neutral Officer: Tiny conspirational military fascist organisation. Founded in 1945 by a group of officers. Their leader seemed to be General Iv. Popov. Its political platform focused on overthrowing the people’s democracy via a coup, restoration of monarchy, and adherence of Bulgaria to the capitalist block.

Proletarian Communist Union – Bulgaria, Trotskyists: Trotskyist groups appeared in Bulgaria during the 1930s and led by Stefan Manov. They joined the Fourth International. During the early post-war years, they issued the bulletin “Communist Appeal” (Komunisticheski Zov). They fiercely criticised the Fatherland Front; they were eliminated and most of them were imprisoned in concentration camps.

Radical Party: Founded in 1905 as “Radical-Democratic Party” by politicians who were differentiated from the Democratic Party. In 1926, it was renamed the “Radical Party”. It mainly attracted artisans, land-owners, civil servants and teachers. It had always been a tiny party, gaining support only as a member of a governmental coalition (1919, 1923-1924, 1931-1934). Its membership reached its peak, namely 49,135, when it participated in the government of the Naroden Block in 1934. After the mid-1920s, a group of Radicals left the party and formed another party under the same name. After the 1934 coup, it disbanded but was restored in 1945, when it split into a pro-communist and an opposition party. The former self-disbanded in 1948, while the latter was eliminated.

Tsar Krum: Ultra right-wing organisation of a limited membership largely comprised of army officers. It was named after the Han that reigned in Bulgaria from 803 to 814. Krum issued laws, carried out successful wars, and considerably extended his state.

Zveno: Founded in 1927 by right-wing politicians, army officers mainly from the Military League, and independent intellectuals. At the outset it claimed to be “ideological quarters” and “supra-party organisation” seeking to prevent Bulgarian politicians from dividing the political spectrum into two opposite camps. Until 1933, its membership numbered several hundred people. Zveno members were adherents of corporatism, authoritarianism, Italian fascism, and the achievements of Mussolini in Italy. They were also anti-monarchists and supported the ideal of “Internal Yugoslavia”, that is, the participation of Bulgaria and Albania in a broader Yugoslav state. It mainly attracted the bourgeoisie and the Army. Zveno’s prominent members, Georgiev (its leader since 1934) and Velchev, respectively prime minister and minister of war in the first Fatherland Front government, had participated in the 1923 coup against Stamboliiski and led the 1934 coup. After the 1934 coup, Zveno began a series of contacts with the left of the political spectrum. Its activists, with Georgiev as their head, joined the Fatherland Front in 1942. In 1948, Zveno was self-abolished and its membership was integrated into the Fatherland Front.

APPENDIX TWO

FIGURES

Angelov Dimitir (1918-1996): Historian. Graduated in history from Sofia University. Specialised in Byzantology in Munich. Assistant Professor (1944); Professor of Byzantine history (1949); Head of Division in Ancient and Philologic Faculty at Sofia University (1961-1963 and 1969-1972); Corresponding Member of the B.A.N. (1974) and full member of the B.A.N. (1979); Academician (1979); Director of Bulgarian Studies Center (1986). His field was Byzantine and Medieval Bulgarian and Balkan history. His works include: "History of Bulgaria" (3 volumes), "The Formation of the Bulgarian Nationality", "The Bogomil Movement in Bulgaria".

Blagoev Dimitir (1856-1924): Born in Zagorichane, Greece. As a student in Russia, he was influenced by Marxism and established the first Social-Democratic organisation in Russia (1883). His political activities led the Russian authorities to expel him. It was on his initiative that the BWSDP was founded (1891). During the Balkan Wars and the First World War, he fiercely criticised militarism and the Great Bulgarian chauvinism. He voted against the war credits. Under his leadership, the BWSDP (narrow socialists) was transformed into the BCP, which was integrated into the Comintern and became of a Leninist type. He was the most significant Marxist theorist; for this reason, he was called "grandfather" among the communists. Author of the "Contribution to the History of Socialism in Bulgaria" (1906), the first Marxist analysis of Bulgaria's history.

Bagryanov Ivan (1891-1945): Aide-de-camp of both Tsars of Bulgaria, Ferdinand and Boris. Right-wing politician. Minister of Agriculture between 1938 and 1941. Prime Minister in one of the war governments (June-September 1944). At the end of his period of power, he declared the neutrality of Bulgaria and began negotiations with the U.K. and the U.S.A. regarding the cessation of hostilities. He was put on trial by a People's Court and executed.

Bozhikov Bozhidar (1900-?): Historian and ethnographer. President of the “Bulgarian Historian Association”, Director of the Ethnographic museum (1949-1964), and part-time teacher of history at the Faculty of Philology in Sofia University (1949-1957).

Burmov Alexandir (1911-1965): He studied Slav literature and history at Sofia University, followed by postgraduate study in Vienna (1940-1941). Member of the BCP since 1944. Head of the Department of Bulgarian History and History of Byzantium). He had worked for the B.A.N. since 1950. Corresponding Member of the B.A.N. (1958) and Professor of Bulgarian history at Sofia University since 1946. His most significant works are “Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee (1868-76)” and “Secret Central Bulgarian Committee (1960)”, both of them dealing with the Bulgarian national-revolutionary movement.

Burov Atanas (1875-1954): One of the leaders of the Narodna Party and one of the founders of the Democratic Entente. He also was a fierce fighter for the Agrarian regime of Stamboliiski. He was the owner of one of the biggest banks in Bulgaria until its nationalisation. He resisted both the monarchical policy of joining the Axis and the communist one of setting up the Fatherland Front. He became a Minister in the Muraviev’s cabinet (2-8 September 1944) and, for that reason, was tried by a People’s Court. Later on, he was prosecuted again and died in prison.

Chervenkov Vilko (1900-1980): Born in Zlatitsa/Srednogie. He was a member of the BCP since 1919. He was active in the uprising of 1923 and involved in the events of 1925. He immigrated to the USSR (1925). He was sentenced to death in absentia. Between 1937 and 1938 he was appointed Director of the International Leninist Party School. He was married to Dimitrov’s sister. He was a member of the ECCI (1938-1941), while he did not enter the Foreign Bureau of the BCP until 1941. During the Second World War, he was editor-in-chief of the Hristo Botev Radio Station. In 1944, he returned to Sofia to become a member of the Politburo and later Secretary of the Central Committee of the BCP. In 1944 he was the Head of the Central Committee’s

Agitation and Propaganda. Between 1947 and 1949 he was Chairman of the Chamber for Science, Arts and Culture. He became Prime Minister (1950-1956) and was known as “little Stalin”. He was ceased to be General Secretary of the BCP in 1954. He was expelled from the PolitBureau in 1961 on the grounds that he had made “mistakes” during the period of his personality cult.

Cheshmedzhiev Grigor (1879-1945): A prominent Social-Democrat. Member of the BWSDP since 1899. He resisted the monarchical dictatorship and the politics of Tsar Boris during the Second World War. One of the founders of the Fatherland Front. In 1943, he joined the National Committee of the Fatherland Front. After September 9, he became Minister of Social Policy. In August 1945, he joined the opposition BWSDP-united; however, he died shortly afterwards.

Danov Hristo (1908-?): Historian specialised in Thracology. He studied in several European cities (Vienna, Rome, and Paris). Curator of the Ancient Department of the Archaeological Museum of Sofia (1936-1940); Assistant Professor (1942); Professor of History of the Ancient World at Sofia University (1946-1975); Head of the Faculty of Ancient and Medieval history (1963-1975). His main fields were Ancient Thrace and epigraphy. His works include “On the Historical Aspects of Ancient Thrace” (2 volumes), “Ancient Thrace”.

Dimitrov Georgi (1882-1949): Born in Kovachevtsi (district of Radomir). Printer’s apprentice. He joined the BWSDP in 1902. He was elected as a member of the Parliament for a long period. After the uprising of 1923, he fled to the USSR, where he established the Foreign Bureau of the BCP. He became Secretary and President of the Balkan Communist Federation (1923-1933) and Head of the Western European Bureau of the Comintern (1929-1933). In 1933-1934, he was accused of involvement in the Reichstag Fire, tried and acquitted. The Leipzig trial made him a very famous and heroic international communist figure. He then became the General Secretary of the Communist International until its dissolution and the architect of the Popular Front. He returned to Bulgaria in 1945 and became Prime Minister in 1946.

Dimitrov Georgi Mihov (so-called Gemeto) (1903-1972): Leader of BANU-“Al. Stamboliiski” in the 1930s. He opposed Bulgaria’s alliance with the Axis. In February 1941 he emigrated to Egypt, where he headed the so-called Bulgarian National Committee. He developed contacts with the UK. He rejected co-operation with the communists during the resistance movement. After September 9th, he returned to Bulgaria and headed BANU. Because of his opposition to the Fatherland Front, he was excluded from the ranks of BANU. Soon, he fled abroad and settled in the USA, where he established the Agrarian Committee. It was planned to unite all powerful forces opposed to the communists and fight the Eastern European communist regimes. In parallel, he headed the Bulgarian National Committee, which had been founded in 1944 and sought to resist the communist regime in Bulgaria.

Dimitrov-Stanke Marek (1889-1944): Born in Dupnitsa (renamed to Stanke Dimitrov after 1944). Lawyer. Member of the BWSDP (narrow socialists) since 1904. He participated in the uprising of soldiers in 1918. Between 1920 and 1925, he assumed high rank party positions. He was arrested on the eve of the uprising of 1923, but released later on. Under his leadership, the illegal Conference of the BCP taken place in Vitosha and agreed a new uprising during 1925. After the terrorist explosion at Sveta Nedelya church, he was deprived of being in charge of responsible posts of the BCP. He was also sentenced to death in absentia and immigrated to the USSR. Between 1925 and 1935, he taught in Soviet University schools. He returned to Bulgaria in 1935 and elected Secretary of the Central Committee of the BCP. In 1937 he left to Moscow, where became a member of the Foreign Bureau of the BCP and editor of the Radio Station “Hristo Botev”. He returned to Bulgaria with other political immigrants on the eve of September 9th, but died after their airplane crashed.

Dragoitseva Tsola (1898-1993): Born in Byala Slatina. Teacher (studied pedagogy in Sofia). She joined the BCP in 1919. After the events of 1925, she was arrested and sentenced to death but was amnestied in 1932. Between 1933 and 1936, she taught at the International Leninist Party School in the USSR. She returned to Bulgaria in 1936 and soon she became member of the Central Committee and the PolitBureau of the BCP. During the Second World War, she

was a prominent leader of the resistance movement; she was sentenced to death (1942). Between 1944 and 1948, she was the General Secretary of the National Committee of the Fatherland Front, while she became Minister of Posts, Telegrafs, and Telephones (1947-1957). She later maintained a constant presence within the organs of the Party.

Dramaliev Kiril (1892-1961): Born in Sofia. Active in the educational domain (studied German literature in Munich and was the holder of a PhD). He was a member of the BCP since 1921 and member of the Central Committee of the BCP during the Second World War. In 1942, he became a member of the National Committee of the Fatherland Front. He was the President of the Union of Workers in Education (1946-1947) and Minister of Education (1947-1952). He later served as an ambassador in Eastern European countries.

Dobroslavski Traicho (1903-1964): Between 1933 and 1934 he supported Zveno as a journalist. He joined the BCP in 1942 and later on the NOVA. He contributed to the success of the uprising of September 9. Afterwards, he assumed a high rank position in the Ministry of War (1944-1946), became Minister of Health (1947-1950), and Director of "Bulgarian Cinematography" (1950-1956). Later, he was Minister Plenipotentiary in Finland.

Exarch Stefan I (1878-1957): Exarch of Bulgaria (1945-1948). He studied at the Clerical Academy of Kiev. Bishop of Sofia since 1922. He contributed to the talking down of the schism between the Bulgarian Exarchate and the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In 1948, he was sent into exile in Banya. He was honoured by the Israel Memorial Institution "Vashem" for his contribution to the survival of Jews in Bulgaria (2002).

Filov Bogdan (1883-1945): Archaeologist and President of the B.A.N. (1937-1944). He was the Prime Minister of Bulgaria (February 1940-September 1943), who signed the accession of Bulgaria to the Axis (01 March 1941). After Boris's death, he became Regent until September 9th. He followed a pro-German policy. He was tried and executed by the communist regime.

Gandev Hristo (1907-?): Member of the BCP since 1945. He studied history at Sofia University; private Assistant Professor (1940-1943); Assistant Professor (1944-1946); Professor of Modern History from 1946; Dean of the Faculty of History and Philology of Sofia University (1948-1951). His fields were the Bulgarian Revival, history and ethnography.

Ganev Venelin (1880-1966): Jurist. Professor since 1918. His main field was the theory and philosophy of law. Regent of Bulgaria (1944-1946).

Genov Georgi (1883-1967): Professor of international law at the University of Sofia. Adherent of the Radical Democratic Party, which he supported until 1934. Then, he headed the group that split from the Radical Democratic Party and formed an independent Radical Party. During the Second World War, he supported the politics of the government. For this reason, he was put on trial by a People's Court and deprived of his right to teach at the University. When he released from prison in 1945, he established an independent Radical Party opposite to the Fatherland Front.

Georgiev Kimon (1882-1969): Born in Pazardzhik. Military officer. After the end of the First World War, he was made a Major and was one of the founders of the Military League (1919). He participated in the 1923 coup against Stamboliiski; one of the authoritative figures of the terrorist regime of Tsankov. One of the leaders of Zveno, which led the 1934 coup. Then, he became Prime Minister and also undertook several ministerial posts. Zveno was influenced by Mussolini's regime, amended Timovo's Constitution, dissolved the parliamentary life in the country, and opened the way to the monarchical dictatorship that followed 8 months after the coup (January 1935). During the Second World War, he participated in the "centre of legal opposition" led by Mushanov and, in parallel, joined the Fatherland Front. In 1943, he became a member of the National Committee of the Fatherland Front. He was the President of Zveno from its restoration (1 October 1944) until its self-dissolution (February 1949). From September 9th until 23 November 1946, he was the Prime Minister; afterwards, he became Minister of the Foreign Affairs (up to 11 December 1947) and Minister of Electrification and Land Reclamation (up to

July 1949). Until 1962, he assumed several high rank posts in the government and the National Committee of the Fatherland Front.

Gichev Dimitir (1893-1964): One of the leaders of “Vrabcha-1”, an agrarian party that developed after the BANU of Stamboliiski broke away. He undertook ministerial posts as his party joined the Narodn Block (1931-1934). During the monarchical dictatorship, he joined the so-called legal opposition; despite his sympathies with the Popular Front movement, he rejected any co-operation with the communists. He was for Bulgaria’s neutrality during the Second World War, but he never joined the resistance movement. For his participation in the cabinet of Muràviev (2-8 September 1944), he was brought to trial by a People’s Court. After he was released, he joined the opposition BANU; he was prosecuted and sentenced to many years imprisonment. Before he died, he decided to join the Fatherland Front.

Girginov Aleksadir (1879-1953): One of the traditional and devoted leaders of the Democratic Party. He assisted the restoration of the independence of the Democratic Party after the coup of the Democratic Entente (1923). During the government of the Narodn Block, he assumed ministerial posts. He opposed the monarchical regime of the mid-1930s. He argued that Bulgaria had to keep her neutrality during the war. He participated in the cabinet of Muraviev (2-8 September 1944) and, for that reason, he was tried by a People’s Court. He contributed to the restoration of the Democratic Party (summer 1945) and became editor-in-chief of its official newspaper “Zname” (flag). After the opposition was eliminated, he was prosecuted and maltreated.

Hristov Hristo (1915-1992): Member of the BCP since 1944. He studied history at Sofia University. Assistant Professor (1949-1953); Professor of history since 1953; member of Board of editors of Istoricheski Pregled since 1950; Director of the Institute of history at the B.A.N. since 1963; Corresponding Member of the B.A.N. (1967) and full member (1974); deputy Chairman of the Higher Educational Council at the Ministry of Education (1972-1980); Academician (1974). His field was modern and recent Bulgarian history. His most significant works are “Paisii Hilendarski”, “The Agrarian

Question in the Bulgarian National revolution”, “Bulgaria, the Balkans and Peace”.

Karakolov Raicho (1898-?): Marxist philosopher. Member of the BCP since 1922. He taught as a Professor in the USSR (1930-1936). Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy at Sofia University (1948-1961); Chief of the section “Science and Education” of the BCP (1944-1951); founder and Head of the Department of Philosophy at the BCP school (1945-1956). He assumed high rank positions in the B.A.N. in the 1960s.

Karakòstov Stefan (1915-1988): Critic of drama and literature, historian, and journalist. Member of the BCP since 1948 and Professor since 1951. Some of his works include the “History of Russian and Soviet Theatre” (2 volumes), and “Bulgarian Theatre: Medieval times, Renaissance, and Enlightenment”.

Kolarov Vasil (1877-1950): Born in Shumen. Lawyer (studied law in Geneva, 1897-1900). Member of the Central Committee of the BCP since 1905. Between 1911 and 1923 he was a Narrow Socialist/communist representative in the National Assembly, where he stood against the war. After 1923, he immigrated to the USSR. There he held several high posts in international communist organisations: Member of the ECCI (1921-1943), General Secretary of the Comintern (1922-1924). From 1924 to 1934, he was the official leader of the BCP. On 9 September 1945, he returned to Sofia to become Chairman of the National Assembly (15 December 1945) and provisional President of Bulgaria (15 September 1946) in which capacity he represented Bulgaria at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946. In December 1947, he became deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. In July 1949, he became Prime Minister.

Kondarev Nikola (1911-?): Member of the BCP since 1931. His fields were libraries and cultural clubs. He studied law at Sofia University. He took part in the resistance movement as one of the clandestine editors of the newspaper “Voice of the Fatherland Front”, issued in Sofia in 1944. Central Secretary of the “Union of People’s Cultural Club” (1945-1950); Editor-in-chief of the

journal "Cultural Club" (1948-1954); member of the National Committee of the Fatherland Front (1954-1960). He later assumed high ranking academic positions.

Kosev Dimitir (1903-1996): Historian. Member of the BCP since 1944. Political prisoner (1925-1926). He studied history in Sofia University. Assistant Professor since 1946 and Professor since 1950 at Sofia University; Corresponding Member of the B.A.N. (1951) and full member (1965); Academician (1961); Rector of Sofia University (1962-1967); member of the Central Committee of the BCP since 1971; Vice-President of the BAN (1973); Chairman of History National Committee (1975). Co-author of the first Marxist history of Bulgaria. He published scientific works only after 1944.

Kostov Traicho (1897-1949): Born in Sofia. Journalist (he studied law for a while). Member of the BCP since 1920. He took part in the preparation of the uprising of 1923 and the first clandestine Vitosha Conference of the BCP. In 1924, he was arrested and sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment. Between 1932 and 1938, he lived in Moscow; during that period, he visited Sofia on Party orders. During his stay in the USSR, he served in several posts in the ECCI of the Comintern, the Foreign Bureau of the BCP and the Communist University. He was one of the main communist figures who subverted the group of the so-called "ultra-left sectarians" amongst the leadership of the local BCP and he promoted popular front tactics. After 1938, he became secretary of the local BCP and central organiser of the partisan movement. Between 1940 and 1942, he was the editor-in-chief of the official newspaper of the BCP, 'Rabotnichesko Delo'. In 1942, he was arrested again and sentenced to life imprisonment. After September 9th, he became Secretary of the BCP. Then, he held several high posts in the BCP and the government, including Vice Prime Minister, Minister of Electrification, Chairman of the Governmental Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs (1946-1949). He was accused of Titoism and hanged in December 1949. In 1956, he was posthumously rehabilitated.

Kosturkov Stoyan (1866-1949): Born in Panagjurishte. Teacher. He joined the Democratic Party but soon he became Secretary of the Central Direction of the

Radical Democratic Party (1906). He resisted Bulgaria's coalition with Germany in the First World War. He became Minister of Education (1918-1919). He was charged with the "national catastrophe" of the First World War as a member of Malinov's cabinet and arrested in 1922 in order to stand before a State Court. He participated in the government of the Democratic Entente at the beginning of its formation. Soon, however, the Radical Democratic Party split with the Democratic Entente. In the summer of 1945, he restored the Radical Party, which immediately joined the Fatherland Front. He became Minister of Education between September 1945 and November 1946, at which time he was in poor health.

Kunin Petko (1900-1978): Born in Mihalchi. Member of the BCP since 1919. He participated in the uprising of 1923. In 1925, he immigrated to the USSR and studied at the Academy of Communist Education. Between 1932 and 1934, he was a Member of the PolitBureau of the BCP, while he immigrated anew to the USSR (1934-1936). During the Second World War he was an internee of concentration camps. Since February 1944 he had been a partisan-political commissar. After September 9, he became Professor of Economics at Sofia University (since 1945), Minister of Industry and Manufacturing (1947-1949) and Minister of Finance (1949). At the same time he assumed high rank party positions. In 1949, he was cleansed from the BCP to return as a Member of the Central Committee in 1962.

Lambrev Kiril (1897-?): Historian. Member of the BCP since 1919. He specialised in Bulgarian history after 1944, while he had finished his studies in 1921. Science assistance (1951-1957). His fields were the modern and recent history of Bulgaria.

Lulchev Kosta (1882-1965): A prominent Social-Democrat. He was a member of the BWSDP since its origin. From 1924 to 1933, he was elected Secretary of the Central Committee of the BWSDP. After 1944, he attempted to legitimise his party. He was elected its General Secretary and became one of its representatives at the National Committee of the Fatherland Front. Nevertheless, because he was critical of communist initiatives, he was ostracised by the

leadership of his party. He took the initiative to summon a fractional congress of the BWSDP, which substantially established the opposition BWSDP-united. His party was eliminated in 1947 and he was prosecuted and maltreated.

Mitev Iono (1916-?): Member of the BCP since 1941. He studied history at Sofia University. In 1943, he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. He participated in the so-called Fatherland War as a political officer. He became a Major. Teacher of history at the military school of Veliko Tirnovo (1946-1950).

Muraviev Konstantin (1893-1965): Member of BANU since 1918. One of the leaders of BANU-Vrabcha-1. He became a minister in many governments and, finally, Prime Minister in the last government before the uprising of September 9th, which lasted just a week and his premiership led him to be put on trial by a People's Court.

Mushanov Nikola (1872-1951): One of the traditional and devoted leaders of the Democratic Party. Many times Member of Parliament and Minister. He was the Prime Minister of the government of the Narodn Block (October 1931-May 1934). He was blamed for the "second national catastrophe" (1922) and brought to trial. He opposed the regime of the Democratic Entente, the coup of 19 May 1934, and the monarchical regime that dominated Bulgaria after the mid-1930s. During the Second World War, he backed the legal opposition and stood for pro-English tendencies; thus, he was against the official policy of Tsar Boris, which aligned Bulgaria with Germany, but also against the establishment of the Fatherland Front. He took part in the cabinet of Muraviev (2-8 September 1944), the last before the uprising of September 9th. For that, he was tried by a People's Court. In the summer of 1945, he was released and restored to the Democratic Party. Later on, he was prosecuted once again.

Natan Zhak (1902-1974): Marxist economist and historian. Member of the BCP since 1920. During 1925 and 1926, he was the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol. Between 1926 and 1930, he immigrated to the USSR, where he studied at the International Leninist Party School. He was imprisoned (1934-1936); he spent most of the war years in a concentration

camp. After September 9th, he became a Member of the National Committee of the Fatherland Front (1946-1949), and Director of Partizdat (1947-1949), that is, the publishing house of the BCP, Vice Chairman of the Chamber for Science, Art, and Culture (1949-1952), Director of the Economic Institute of the BAN (1949-1951). Professor since 1949, Corresponding Member of the B.A.N. (1958), and Academician (1961). Most significant works: “Bulgarian Renaissance” and “Economic History of Bulgaria”.

Neikov Dimitir (1884-1949): One of the leadership of the BWSDP. Since the First World War, he had been elected Secretary of the Central Committee of the BWSDP. Since the 1930s, he had thought of a coalition with left-wing parties; in 1943, he became a member of the National Committee of the Fatherland Front. In the post-war years, he headed the pro-communist BWSDP as its Secretary from 1945 to 1948; he was an adherent of the Fatherland Front. Minister of Trade, Industry, and Labour (September 1944-November 1946) and President of the Grand National Assembly (1946-1949).

Obbov Aleksandir (1887-1975): Member of BANU since 1904. He assumed high posts, while he became Minister of Agriculture and State Properties in the independent government of BANU (1920-1923). After the coup of 1923, he emigrated. When the organisation of Agrarian émigrés split, he joined the right wing. He returned to Bulgaria in 1933. From 1935 to 1944, he was one of the leaders of BANU-“Al. Stamboliiski”. After 1944, his views on whether BANU would have an uncritical pro-communist view or would follow an independent line were ambivalent. He participated in the Fatherland Front government as representative of BANU (Minister of Agriculture and State Properties, March-November 1946 and Vice Prime Minister, November 1946-December 1947) but in 1947 he lost the leadership of Fatherland Front BANU and the trust of the communists.

Obretenov Aleksandir (1903-?): Architect and art specialist. Studied architecture in Vienna. During the 1920s and the 1930s he was a member of several district committees of the BCP. Member of the BCP since 1931. Imprisoned between 1938 and 1939 and a participant in the resistance

movement. Chief editor of the *Rabotnichesko Delo* (1944); Chairman of the Chamber of People's Culture (1945-1947); deputy Chairman of the Chamber of Science, Art, and Culture (1947); Head of the section "Propaganda of Marxism-Leninism" of the Central Committee of the BCP (1948-1950); Head of Architectural Faculty at State Polytechnical School (1951-1958); Professor at the same (1952-1966); chief editor of journals on culture; Director of the Institute for Fine Arts at the B.A.N. (1959-1982). Corresponding Member of the B.A.N. (1961). Author of many books and editor of newspapers and journals.

Ormadzhiev Ivan (1890-1963): Historian. He co-operated with the monarchical dictatorship and was one of the main figures who furnished it with historical arguments that the monarchy was the heir and defender of the original Bulgarian national culture. Active member of the "Thracian Scientific Institute". Author of historical textbooks during the interwar years and books mainly related to modern history of Thrace.

Pastuhov Kristio (1874-1949): Member of the BWSDP since the 1890s. After the BWSDP split, he joined the broad socialists. He vociferously opposed BANU government and any kind of collaboration with the communists. In the 1930s, he joined the legal opposition to the monarchical dictatorship and fought for the restoration of Tirmovo's constitution and parliamentary life. During the Second World War, even though he disagreed with the official policy of Tsar Boris, he did not join the Fatherland Front. Even after 1944, he remained adamant to his anti-communist views; as a result, he was expelled from the Central Committee of the BWSDP and contributed to the foundation of BWSDP-united. In 1946, he was brought to trial and sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment. He was murdered in prison by a fellow inmate.

Pavlov Todor (1890-1977): Born in Shtip. Teacher and intellectual; Marxist philosopher. Member of the BCP since 1919. During the 1920s, he spent a lot of years in prison and was sentenced to death three times. He became Professor of dialectical materialism at the Institute of Red Professorship in the USSR (1932-1936). He returned to Bulgaria in 1936 and dealt with publishing. During the Second World War, he was an internee in several concentration camps. After

September 9th, he became a Regent (1944-1946). Later on, he was a member of the Presidium (1947-1954). Professor at Sofia University (1946-1948), Director of the Institute of Philosophy (1949-1952), editor-in-chief of the communist journal “Philosophical Thought” [Filosofska Misil] (since 1945), and President of the B.A.N. (1947-1962).

Petkov Nikola (1893-1947): Son of Dimitir Petkov (leader of the nationalist right and Bulgaria’s Prime Minister), who was assassinated in 1907, and brother of Petko Petkov (activist of BANU), who was assassinated in 1924. He joined several agrarian wings during the 1930s. He opposed Bulgaria’s participation in the Second World War as an ally of the Axis. In 1943, he participated in the establishment of the National Committee of the Fatherland Front and, after September 9, he became Minister without portfolio in the first Fatherland Front government. Since January 1945, he was General Secretary of BANU. In July, he resigned from his governmental posts and established the opposition BANU-Petkov. He also became editor-in-chief of the official newspaper of BANU: “Narodno Zemedelsko Zname” (People’s-National Agrarian Flag). He vehemently criticised the communist power. In August 1947, he was arrested, tried, and finally executed.

Popov Georgi: Member of the pro-communist BWSDP. Minister of Social Policy (August 1945-November 1946), Vice Prime Minister (November 1946-July 1949), and Chairman of the Governmental Committee on Social and Cultural Affairs (December 1947-July 1949).

Poptomov Vladimir (1890-1952): Teacher. Member of the BWSDP (narrow socialists) since 1912. He took part in the uprising of 1923. After its collapse, he immigrated to the USSR and participated in the Foreign Bureau of the BCP. Between 1925 and 1933, he was the Political Secretary of the IMRO (united) and editor-in-chief of its newspaper “Macedonian Affair” (1925-1933). After 1934, he worked in the apparatus of the Comintern. After September 9th, he became a member of the PolitBureau of the BCP. Editor-in-chief of the newspaper of the BCP, “Rabotnichesko Delo” (1945-1949); Minister of Foreign Affairs (1949-1950).

Radoslavov Vasil (1854-1929): After a long period in the Opposition, the Liberal Party that he headed was given the mandate (1913). After the crisis of the Balkan wars, his government had to sign Peace treaties in conflict with Bulgarian national interests. His government decided Bulgaria should enter the First World War on the side of Germany. This decision led to economic stagnation, speculation, famine, and great discontent on the front. As a result, Tsar Ferdinand established a new cabinet under Malinov (June 1918). He fled to Germany when a crisis broke out at the end of the war. Thus, he escaped the trials of politicians accused of the new “national catastrophe” of Bulgaria; nevertheless, he was tried in absentia and sentenced to many years’ imprisonment. He never returned to Bulgaria.

Stainov Petko (1890-1972): Lawyer (studied law in Paris). Member of the Democratic Entente, which formed the government after the coup of 1923 and later Minister in Lyapchev’s cabinet. He participated in the cabinet of Muraviev (02-08 September 1944); however, instead of being tried by a People’s Court, he became Minister of Foreign Affairs and Religions in the first Fatherland Front government (1944-1946). He was one of the first theorists on the administrative jure in Bulgaria; he had been a Professor since 1947, while an academic since 1942.

Stamboliiski Aleksandir (1879-1923): The most influential leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian movement. One of the founders of BANU (1899). He was against the war and the monarchy. For his political activities, he was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment (1915). After the First World War, the popularity of BANU was dramatically increased and he became Prime Minister. His regime tried to restrict the power of the Tsar and implemented many reforms but collapsed after the coup of 9 June 1923 and he was assassinated.

Tonchev Stefan (1902-?): Member of and activist for BANU since 1922. After 1923, he dealt with underground political activities. Between 1926 and 1945, he was an emigrant in the USSR. He returned to Bulgaria in 1945 and assumed high rank governmental and party positions (Minister of Railways, Posts, and

Telegraphs, 1945-1949). He advocated close co-operation between BANU and the BCP within the framework of the Fatherland Front. In 1951, he became Secretary of the Standing Committee of BANU.

Traikov Georgi (1898-?): A pro-communist leader of BANU. He joined BANU in 1919. He was imprisoned for seven months after the coup of 1923 against Stamboliiski's government. He joined the Fatherland Front in 1942. In 1946 he became Minister of Agriculture and in 1947 Deputy Prime Minister. Since 1947 he was the Secretary of the pro-communist BANU. In 1964 he became Head of the State.

Tsankov Aleksandir (1879-1959): He started his political life as a member of the BWSDP and soon became a contributor to the theoretical journal of the party, "New Era" (Novo Vreme) edited by Blagoev. After the BWSDP split off, he followed the broad socialist tendency. Nevertheless, during the First World War, he was an adherent of Radoslavov politics and in 1921 was one of the founders of the Naroden Entente, which contributed to the realisation of the 1923 coup, and later the leader of the Democratic Entente. Prime Minister between 1923 and 1926. Some of his significant policies were Bulgarian claims for an outlet to the Aegean Sea and unprecedented terror against revolutionary forces in the country. In the 1930s, he founded the National Socialist Movement, which was highly inspired by Hitler's party. He was an adherent of Bulgaria's commitment to the Axis. Just before September 9th, he left Bulgaria and settled in Austria, where he established the emigrant government of Bulgaria operated until late-1940s.

Tsar Boris III (1894-1943): He reigned in Bulgaria from 1918 (when his father, Ferdinand, abdicated) to 1943. Since 1935, he had established a monarchical dictatorship in the country. He followed a pro-German policy during the Second World War. He mysteriously died in 1943.

Tsar Ferdinand I (1861-1948): He reigned in Bulgaria from 1887 until 1918, when he abdicated amidst popular dissent, strikes, and uprisings.

Velchev Damyan (1883-1954): Military officer. Central figure in and main founder of the Military League. He had headed the 1923 coup against Stamboliiski's regime as a member of the Military League and led the 1934 coup as a member of Zveno. In 1935, he was sentenced to life imprisonment, accused of plotting an anti-monarchist coup. As Zveno's representative, he entered the National Committee of the Fatherland Front. He became Minister of War (September 1944-September 1946). Later, he was sent to Switzerland by the communist regime as Minister Plenipotentiary. He spent the rest of his life abroad.

Vlahov Tushe (1899-1981): Historian. Member of the BCP since 1944. He studied history at Sofia University; followed by postgraduate study in Berlin and Paris (1929-1932). Professor since 1954 and Corresponding Member of the B.A.N. (1967). His main fields were the new and modern history of Bulgaria and international relations. Specialist in issues related to Macedonia and Thrace.

Yugov Anton (1904-1991): Born in Karasuli/Polykastron in Greece. Tobacco worker. He joined the Bulgarian Communist Youth Union in 1921 and participated in the uprising of 1923. Since 1928 he had been a member of the BCP. Between 1933 and 1934, he was the Secretary of the Central Committee of IMRO (united). He lived in the USSR between 1934 and 1936; he studied at the International Leninist Party School. Since 1937 he had been a Member of the Central Committee and the PolitBureau of the BCP. During the Second World War he was one of the leaders of the partisan movement, secretary of the Central Committee of the BCP, and Member of the Central Staff of the NOVA. Between 1944 and 1949 he was Minister of the Interior. He undertook high governmental posts until 1962, when he was dismissed, accused of "serious mistakes" during the Chervenkov personality cult period.

Zarev Pantelei (1911-1997): Critic and historian of literature. Member of the BCP since 1932. Between 1935 and 1936 he was a political prisoner. Member of the Central Committee of the BCP since 1966. He studied philosophy at Sofia University. Assistant Professor (1947-1950), Professor of theory of literature in Sofia University since 1950, Corresponding Member of the B.A.N. (1951),

Academician (1967). Some of his most significant works: “Bulgarian Renaissance” (1945), “Panorama of Bulgarian Literature” (1966-1971).

APPENDIX THREE

TABLES

TABLE 1: FATHERLAND FRONT MEMBERSHIP

PARTY	end 1944		beg. 1945	March 1948	
	members	% of membership	% of membership	members	% of membership
BCP	14, 120	53.80 %	56.12%	389,408	56.76%
Zveno	410	1.56%	1.64%	23,544	3.43%
BANU-FF	8,682	33.08%	32.22%	213,979	31.19%
BWSDP-FF	854	3.25%	3.07%	36,314	5.29%
Radical Party*				3,813	0.56%
Non-affiliated	2,179	8.30%	6.95%	19,100	2.78%

* the Radical Party was restored in September of 1945.

Data collected from Isusov (1983): 24 and 95.

TABLE 2: SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF BULGARIA OF 1946

Social strata	Number	Percentage
Workers	638,249	15.3%
Employees	191,757	4.5%
Peasants-members of co-operative farms	96,806	2.3%
Peasants and other categories	3,255,507	77.9%

Data collected from Todorov (1981): 453.

TABLE 3: ESTIMATES OF LABOUR FORCE IN 1946*

Sector	Percentage
Agriculture	66.1%
Industry	14.5%
Other	19.5%

* males only

Data collected from Lampe and Jackson (1982): 559.

TABLE 4: PERCENTAGES OF WORKERS WHO HAD JOINED THE BCP BY THE END OF 1944

Districts	Percentages of workers joined the BCP
Sofia	10.62%
Plovdiv	14.23%
Vracha	23.91%
Blagoevgrad	4.16%
Pleven	20.33%
Stara Zagora	15.22%
Gabrovo	24.72%
Gornooryahovo	10.00%

Data collected from Isusov (1971): 140.

TABLE 5: SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE BCP

Social strata	1919	Jan 1945	1947	1948
Workers	10.2%	21.4%	25.9%	26.5%
Peasants	46.2%	40.7%	43.8%	44.7%
Middle class	43.6%		30.3%	
White Collars				16.3%
Others				12.5%
Intelligentsia		6.6%		
Artisans		4.6%		
Unreported		26.6%		

Data collected from Burks (1961): 35 and 52; Bell (1986): 81 and 131

TABLE 6: ELECTIONS OF OCTOBER 1946

PARTY	Percentage of vote	MPs
BCP	53.16	275
BANU-FF	13.22	69
Zveno	1.66	8
BRSDP-FF	1.87	9
Radical Party	0.2	4
BANU-Petkov	28.0	90
BRSDP(united)		8
Democratic Party	0.5	

TABLE 7: MEMBERSHIP OF POLITICAL PARTIES

PARTY	beginning 1946	October 1946
BCP	413,225	421,559
BANU-FF	152,788	150,756
BWSDP-FF	29,039	31,529
Zveno	31,111	34,186
Radical Party	5,595	3,873
BANU-Petkov	53,531	51,361
BWSDP-united	3,020	2,214
Democratic Party	1,607	1,240

Data collected from Ognyanov (1993): 90 and Isusov (1975): 57.

TABLE 8: DISTRIBUTION OF LOCAL OFFICES

a. at the end of 1944, in 84 out of 92 districts and Sofia district

OFFICE	BCP	BANU	BWSDP	Zveno	Non-Party
Town Mayors	74	12	2	2	6
Town Vice-Mayors*	17	13	7	2	0
Village Mayors	1,039	147	9	2	35
Village Vice-Mayors	2,117	602	4	5	293

b. at the beginning of 1947, when i. Fatherland Front parties opposite to the BCP had been split and ii. international pressure had been exerted to the communists in order to make concessions in terms of power

OFFICE	BCP	BANU	BWSDP	Zveno	Non-Party
Town Mayors	73	13	10	3	0
Village Mayors	1190	666	40	40	25

* no data about Sofia district

Data collected from Ostoich (1967): 76-77.

LITERATURE

ARCHIVES

Bulgarian Communist Party Records

Bulgarian State Records

NEWSPAPERS

Rabotnichesko Delo (official newspaper of the BCP).

Otechestven Front (official newspaper of the Fatherland Front).

Shturmovak (satirical weekly newspaper controlled by the BCP)

SECONDARY LITERATURE¹⁰¹

Abrams, B. (2004) *The Struggle for the Soul of the Nation: Czech Culture and the Rise of Communism* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers).

Adler, H. and Menze, E. (eds) (1997) *On World History. Johann Gottfried Herder, an Anthology* [translated by Menze, E. with Palma, M. and Sharpe, M.] (London: M. E. Sharpe).

Allum, P. and Sassoon, D. (1977) 'Italy', in McCauley, M. (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe, 1944-1949*, (London: Macmillan Press).

Amalvi, C. (1998) 'Bastille Day: from Dies Irae to Holiday', in Nora Pierre (ed.), *Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past* [translated by Goldhammer, A.] (New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press).

Anderson, B. (2002, 1991, 1983¹) *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso).

Andreev, V. (1947) *Partisan Songs* (Партизански Песни) (Sofia: BWPC).

Andreev, V. (1981) *The Partisan Oath: Biography of a Document* [Партизанска Клетва. Животопис на един Документ] (Sofia: n.p.).

Angelov, D. (1945-1946) 'Incomes of the Medieval Bulgarian State' [Приходи на Средновековната Българска Държава], *Istoricheski Pregled*, 2 (4-5), 385-411.

Angelov, V. (1990) 'The Campaign on the Census in the Pirin District (25-31 December 1946)' [Акцията за Демографско Преброяване на

¹⁰¹ Superscripts on dates of publication indicate what publication is the one used in this thesis. First publication is also mentioned.

- Населението в Пиринския Край, 25-31 Декември 1946], *Istoricheski Pregled*, 46 (8), 48-64.
- Angelov, V. (1999) *The Chronicle of a National Treason. Attempts at Forcible Denationalisation of Pirin Macedonia (1944-1949)* [Хроника на едно Национално Предателство. Опитите за Насилствено Денационализиране на Пиринска Македония (1944-1949)], (Blagoevgrad: Univ. Izd. Neofit Rilski).
- Atanasov, Z. (1970) 'The Socialist Reconstruction of Education in Bulgaria' [Социалистическото Преустройство на Образованието в България], *Izvestiya na Instituta po Istoriya na BKP* 26, 5-43.
- Auty, P. (1950) 'Bulgaria', in Betts, R. (ed.), *Central and South East Europe, 1945-1948* (London-New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs).
- Avramov, P. (1965) 'The Organisational Building of the BCP after its Exit from Illegality (9 September 1944–February 1945)' [Организационно Изграждане на БКП след Излизането и от Нелегалност (9 Септември 1944–Февруари 1945)], *Istoricheski Pregled*, 21 (2), 2-31.
- Bagchi, K. (1983) *Towards a Correct Reading of Lenin's Theory of Imperialism* (Calcutta: Centre for Studies in Social Sciences).
- Balibar, E. (1991) 'Racism and Nationalism', in Balibar, E. and Wallerstein, I. (eds), *Race, Nation, Class. Ambiguous Identities* (London: Verso).
- Banas, I. (2003) *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933-1949* (London: Yale University Press).
- Barnard, M. (1965) *Herder's Social and Political Thought: from Enlightenment to Nationalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- Bauer, O. (1996) 'The Nation', in Balakrishnan, G. (ed.), *Mapping the Nation* (London: Verso).
- Bell, J. (1977) *Peasants in Power* (Princeton; New Jersey: Princeton University Press).
- Bell, J. (1986) *The Bulgarian Communist Party from Blagoev to Zhivkov* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press).
- Benner, E. (1995) *Really Existing Nationalisms – A Post-Communist View from Marx and Engels* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

- Berov, L. (1989) 'Impact of the Ideas of the Great French Revolution on Sociopolitical Thought in Bulgaria during the 19th and early 20th century' [Отражение на идеите на Великата Френска Революция върху Обществено-политическата Мисъл в България през XIX и Началото на XX в.), *Balkanistika*, 3, 84-98.
- Bhabha, H. (1990a) 'Introduction: Narrating the Nation', in Bhabha, H. (ed.), *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge).
- Bhabha, H. (1990b) 'DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation', in Bhabha, H. (ed.), *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge).
- Billig, M. (1997, 1995¹) *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage Publications).
- Blagoev, D. (1985) *Selected Historical Works* [Избрани Исторически Съчинения] (Sofia: Nauka i Izkustvo).
- Blaut, J. (1987) *The National Question – Decolonising the Theory of Nationalism* (London: Zed Books).
- Block, R. (1975) *Lenin's fight against Stalinism: Selected Papers of V. I. Lenin and Leon Trotsky* (New York: Pathfinder Press).
- Bogdanova, R. (1992) 'Politics and Culture: An Outline of the Cultural-Political Development in Bulgaria, (Sept.1944–Sept. 1945)' [Политика и Култура: Щрихи от Културно-Политическо Развитие на България, (Септ. 1944–Септ. 1945)], *Istoricheski Pregled*, 48 (7), 47-65.
- Boggs, C. (1976) *Gramsci's Marxism* (London: Pluto Press).
- Bourdieu, P. (1977) *Outline of a Theory of Practice* [Esquisse d' une Théorie de la Pratique, translated by Nice R.] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Bozhikov, B., Burmov, A., and Kiurkchiev, P. (1946) *Bulgarian History for the Seventh Class of Secondary Schools* [Българска История за Седми Клас на Гимназийте] (Sofia: Narodna Prosveta).
- Bozhikov, B. Burmov, A., and Lambrev, K. (1951⁴) *Bulgarian History: School Textbook for XI Class of Preliminary Schools* [Българска История. Учебник за XI клас на Общообразователните Училища] (Sofia: Narodna Prosveta).
- Bozhikov, B., Kosev, D., Lambrev, K., Mitev, I., Topalov, P. and Hristov, H. (1949) *History of Bulgaria. School Textbook for Soldier* [История на

- България, Учебник за Войника] (Sofia: Political Administration of the Army).
- Vozhikov, V. and Delyanov, K. (1945, 1944¹) *The Liberation of Bulgaria* [Освобождението на България] (Sofia: Biblioteka Narodna Mladezh, Central Youth Committee of the N.C. of the F.F.).
- Vozhkov, L. and Ninov, S. (1980) *The Historical Path of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union* [Историческият Път на Българския Земеделски Народен Съюз, translated by Velichkov B.] (Sofia: Sofia Press).
- Brass, P. (1991) *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison* (New Delhi: Sage).
- Braunthal, J. (1966, vol. 1-1967, vol. 2) *History of the International* [Geschichte der Internationale, translated by Clark J.] (London: Nelson).
- Breuilly, J. (1993) *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
- Brokgaus, F. and Efron, I. (1897) *Word Encyclopaedia* [Енциклопедически Словари] (<http://encycloped.narod.ru/>).
- Brown, J. (1970) *Bulgaria under Communist Rule* (London: Pall Mall Press).
- Bruce, F. (1973) *The Essential Stalin: Major Theoretical Writings, 1905-1952* (London: Croom Helm).
- Bulgaria before the Peace Conference: The Demand of Bulgaria for Western Thrace* (1946) [България преди Конференцията за Мир] (Statement of the Bulgarian Representative V. Kolarov – President of Bulgarian Parliament, issued in the 5th session of the political and territorial commission) (Sofia: n.p.).
- Bulgaria Claims Western Thrace. III. The Ethnical Background. The Justice for Bulgaria* (1946) (Sofia: Justice for Bulgaria Committee).
- Bulgaria Claims Western Thrace. V. Why Bulgaria should Take back this Region.* (1946) (Sofia: Justice for Bulgaria Committee).
- Bulgarian-English Dictionary* (1980) (edited by Atanassova, T., Rankova, M., Roussev, R., Spassov, D., Phillipov, V., Chakalov, G.) (Sofia: Nayka i Izkystvo).
- Burin, I. (1970) *Bulgarian National-People's Songs* [Български Народни Песни] (Sofia: Bilgarski Pisatel).

- Burks, R. (1961) *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Burmov, A. (1948) 'On the Question of the Origin of the Pre-Bulgarians' [Към Въпроса за Произхода на Прабългарите], *Izvestiya na Bilgarskoto Istorichesko Druzhestvo* 298-338.
- Burmov, A., Dikovski, G., Bliznev, L. and Hristov, H. (1950⁵) *Fatherland History and Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, for the IV class of Preliminary Schools* [Отечествена История и Конституция на Н.Р. България, за IV клас на Единните Училища] (Sofia: Narodna Prosveta).
- Calhoun, G. (1997) *Nationalism* (Buckingham: Open University Press).
- Carr, E. (1950) *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917 – 1923* (London: Macmillan).
- Carr, E. (1983, 1982¹) *The Twilight of the Comintern, 1930-1935* (London: Macmillan Press).
- Carrier, P. (1996) 'Historical Traces of the Present: the Uses of Commemoration', *Historical Reflections*, 22 (2), 431-445.
- Chang-Tai, H. (1996) 'The Politics of Songs: Myths and Symbols in the Chinese Communist War Music, 1937-1949', *Modern Asian Studies*, 30 (4), 901-929.
- Chervenkov, V. (1945) *Dimitjr Blagoev and his Work–The Lifework of the Brothers Cyril and Methodius* [Димитър Благоев и неговото Дело–Делото на Братя Кирил и Методий] (Sofia: BWPC).
- Chervenkov, V. (1945) *For a Total Victory of the Fatherland Front in the Elections* [За пълна Победа на отечествения Фронт в Изборите] (Sofia: BWPC).
- Chervenkov, V. (1945) *The Fatherland Front Has Not Yielded and Will Not Yield Ground with Regard to its General Political Line* [Отечественият Фронт не е Отстъпил и няма да Отстъпи от своята Генерална Линия] (Sofia: Local Committee of the BWPC).
- Claudin, F. (1975) *The Communist Movement: from Comintern to Cominform* [La Crisis del Movimiento Comunista, translated by Pearce B. and Mac Donagh F.] (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books).

- Colley, L. (1992) *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press).
- Connor, W. (1984) *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press).
- Crampton, R. (1994) *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge).
- Crampton, R. (2002) *The Balkans since the Second World War* (London: Longman).
- Curta, F. (2001) *The Making of the Slavs: History and Archaeology of the Lower Danube Region, c.500-700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Dellin, L. (1979) 'The Communist Party of Bulgaria', in Fisher-Galati, St. (ed), *The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe* (New York; Guildford: Columbia University Press).
- Danaher, G., Schirato, T. and Webb, J. (2000) *Understanding Foucault* (London: Sage Publications).
- Danov, C. (1947) *Contribution to the Historical Aspect of Ancient Thrace II (study into the sources of the ancient history of our lands)* (Sofia: Godishnik na Universitet, University Press).
- Daskalov, D. (1989) 'Georgi Dimitrov and the Anti-Fascist Struggle in Bulgaria during 1942' [Георги Димитров и Антифашистката Борба в България през 1942 г.], *Izvestiya na Instituta na BKP*, 64, 61-96.
- Davies, N. (1979) 'Poland', in McCauley, M. (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe, 1944-1949*, (London: Macmillan Press).
- Davis, H. (1967) *Nationalism and Socialism – Marxist and Labour Theories of Nationalism to 1917* (New York and London: Monthly Review Press).
- Davis, H. (1976), *Selected Writings by Rosa Luxemburg on the National Question* (New York and London: Monthly Review Press).
- Debray, R. (1977) 'Marxism and the National Question: Interview with Regis Debray', *New Left Review*, 105, 25-41.
- De Certeau, M. (1988) *The Writing of History* [translated by Conley, T.] (New York: Columbia University Press).
- Declaration of the National Committee of the Fatherland Front* (1946) (Sofia).

- Degras, J. (1971) *The Communist International, 1919-1943: Documents* (London: Frank Cass).
- Derzhavin, S. N. (1945) 'The Origin of the Bulgarians and the Establishment of the First Bulgarian State' [Произход на Българите и Образуване на Първата Българска Държава], *Istoricheski Pregled*, 1 (1), 6-33.
- Deutscher, I. (1967, 1949¹) *Stalin: a Political Biography* (London: Oxford University Press).
- Dimitrov, G. (1945) *Forward Towards a Brilliant Overwhelming Electoral Victory* [Напред за Блестяща Съкрушителна Изборна Победа], (Sofia: Fatherland Front–National Committee).
- Dimitrov, G. (1946) *Before the Judgement of the People* [Пред съда на Народа] (Sofia: BWPc).
- Dimitrov, G. (1948) *Political Report, V Congress of the BCP* (Sofia: Sofia Press).
- Dimitrov, G. (1948) *Report before the XVI Plenum of the CC of the BWP(c), 12 July 1948* [Доклад пред XVI Пленум на ЦК на БПП(к)] (Sofia: BWPc).
- Dimitrov, G. (1949) *Political Report, V Congress of the BCP* (Sofia: Press Dep.-Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
- Dimitrov, G. (1971) *The Fatherland Front* [Отечествен Фронт] (Sofia: Fatherland Front).
- Dimitrov, G. (1972) *Selected Works* (Sofia: Sofia Press).
- Dimitrov, G.M. (1948) 'Agrarianism', in Gross, F. (ed.), *European Ideologies: A Survey of Twentieth century Political Ideas* (New York: Philosophical Library).
- Dochev, D. and Iliev, I. (1974) 'The Partisan Oath' [Партизанската Клетва], *Izvestiya na Instituta po Istoriya na BKP*, 30, 79-103.
- Douglas, M. (1970, 1966¹) *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concept of Pollution and Taboo* (Harmondsworth: Penguin).
- Dramaliev, K. (1945a) *The Educational Policy of the Fatherland Front* [Просветната Политика на О.Ф.] (Sofia: Bulgarian Women Union).
- Dramaliev, K. (1945b) *The Educational Reform of the Fatherland Front* [Просветната Реформа на О.Ф.] (Sofia: Union of the Education's Workers of Bulgaria).

- Dramaliev, K. (1947a) *The Educational Policy of the Fatherland Front* [Просветната Политика на О.Ф.] (Sofia: B.W.P.(c.)).
- Dramaliev, K. (1947b) *The History of the Fatherland Front* [История на Отечествен Фронт] (Sofia: BWPC).
- Drandenberger, D. (2000) 'Soviet Social Mentalite and Russocentrism on the Eve of War, 1936-1941', *Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas*, 48, 388-406.
- During, S. (1993) *The Cultural Studies Reader* (London: Routledge).
- Encyclopaedia Bulgaria* [Енциклопедия България] (1981) (Sofia: B.A.N.).
- Fejto, F. (1974) *A History of People's Democracies: Eastern Europe since Stalin*, transl. by Weissbort D. (Harmondsworth: Penguin).
- Ferro, M. (1984, 1981¹) *The Use and Abuse of History, or How the Past is Taught* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).
- Ferro, M. (1985) *The Bolshevik Revolution, A Social History of the Russian Revolution* [La Revolution de 1917: Octobre Naissance d' une Societé, translated by Stone N.] (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).
- Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 18-25.XII.1948* (1949) [Петти Конгрес на Българската Комунистическа Партия, 18-25.XII.1948], (Sofia: B.C.P.).
- Firth, R. (1975, 1973¹) *Symbols: Public and Private* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd).
- Forsyth, M. (1987) *Reason and Revolution: the Political Thought of the Abbé Sieyès* (Leicester: Leicester University Press).
- Foucault, M. (1972) *The Archaeology of Knowledge* [translated by Smith, S.] (London: Tavistoch Publications).
- Furet, F. (1978) *Penser la Révolution Française* (Paris: Gallimard).
- Gaddis, J. (1997) *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford Clarendon Press).
- Gaddis, J. (2000) 'On Starting All Over Again: A Naïve Approach to the Study of the Cold War', in Westad, O. (ed.), *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory* (London: Frank Cass).

- Gallagher, T. (2001) *Outcast Europe: The Balkans, 1789-1989, from the Ottomans to Milosevic* (London: Routledge).
- Gandev, H. (1945) *Vasil Levski: Political Ideas and Revolutionary Activity* [Васил Левски. Политически Идеи и Революционна Дейност] (Sofia: Biblioteka "Niva").
- Gati, C. (1994) 'Hegemony and Repression in the Eastern Alliance' in Leffler M. and Painter D. (eds) *Origins of the Cold War. An International History* (London: Routledge).
- Gellner, E. (1983) *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Genchev, N. (1962) 'Utter Defeat of the Burgeois Opposition in Bulgaria during 1947-1948' [Разгромът на Буржоазната Опозиция в България през 1947-1948 г.] *Godishnik na Sofiiskiiia Universitet (Ideologichni Katedri)*, 56, 181-273.
- Giddens, A. (1985) *The Nation State and Violence* (London: Polity Press).
- Gilroy, P. (2000) *Against Race: Imagining Political Culture beyond the Color Line* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press).
- Girardet, R. (1998) 'The Three Colours: Neither White nor Red', in Nora Pierre (ed.), *Realms of memory: The construction of the French past* [translated by Goldhammer, A.] (New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press).
- Glenny, M. (1999) *The Balkans 1804-1999: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers* (London: Granta Books).
- Gorman, K. P. (1994) 'Resurrecting the Dead: Socialist Contestation for the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier', *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History*, 21, 307-314.
- Gramsci, A. (1978⁴, 1971¹) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* (London: Laurence & Wishart).
- Greenfeld, L. (1992) *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (London; Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press).
- Grogan, R. (2000) *Natural Enemies: The United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War, 1917-1991* (Lanham: Lexington Books).
- Grozev, G. (1945) *The Anti-Fascist Insurrection of September the 9th and the Tasks of the Fatherland Front Power* [Антифашисткото Въстание от 9

- Септември и Задачите на Отечествено-фронтовската Власт] (Plovdiv: Local Committee of the Bulgarian Workers Party (communists)).
- Guide on the Records of the Bulgarian Communist Party* (2000) [Пътеводител по Фондовете на Българската Комунистическа Партия] (Sofia: General State Archives).
- Hadzhinikolov, V. et al. (1973) *Georgi Dimitrov 1882-1949* (Sofia: Sofia Press).
- Hallas, D. (1985) *The Comintern* (London: Bookmarks).
- Hanchev, V. (1954) *Verses in Cartridge-Boxes* [Стихове на Паласките] (Sofia: State Military Publishing House).
- Harman, C. (1982) *The Lost Revolution: Germany 1918 to 1923* (London: Bookmarks).
- Harris, N. (1992, 1990¹) *National Liberation* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books).
- Haslam, J. (1987) 'The Soviet Union, the Comintern and the Demise of the Popular Front, 1936-1939', in Graham, H. and Preston, P. (eds), *The Popular Front in Europe* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press).
- Himka, J. P. (1986) 'Introduction', *Critique*, 18-19, 1-120.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1969) *Bandits* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson).
- Hobsbawm, E. (1977) 'Some Reflections on 'The Break-Up of Britain'', *New Left Review*, 105, 3-23.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1983) 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions', in Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. (eds), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Hobsbawm, E. (1993, 1990¹) *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Hoston, G. (1986) *Marxism and the crisis of Development in pre-war Japan* (Princeton; Guildford: Princeton University Press).
- Howarth, D. and Stavrakakis, Y. (2000) 'Introducing Discourse Theory and Political Analysis', in Howarth, D., Norval, A. and Stavrakakis, Y. (eds) *Discourse theory and political analysis. Identities, hegemonies and social change* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

- Hristov, F. (1969) 'The 9th September and the Bulgarian People's Army' [Девети Септември и Българската Народна Армия], *Istoricheski Pregled*, 25 (2-3), 172-193.
- Hroch, M. (1985) *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Iazhborovskaia, I. (1997) 'The Gomulka Alternative: the Untravelled Road', in Naimark, N. and Gibianskii, L. (eds), *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949* (Boulder; Oxford: Westview Press).
- Ionescu, G. (1969) 'Eastern Europe', in Ionescu, G. and Gellner, E. (eds), *Populism, its Meanings and National Characteristics* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson).
- Isusov, M. (1971) *The Working Class in Bulgaria, 1944-1947* [Работническата Класа в България, 1944-1947] (Sofia: BAN).
- Isusov, M. (1975) 'Formation of the Political Structure of the People's Democracy in Bulgaria', in Isusov, M. et al. (eds), *Problems of the Transition from Capitalism to Socialism in Bulgaria* (Sofia: BAN).
- Isusov, M. (1983) *The Communist Party and the Revolutionary Process in Bulgaria, 1944-1948* [Комунистическата Партия и Револуционният Процес в България, 1944-1948] (Sofia: Partizdat).
- Isusov, M. (2000, 1978¹) *The Political Life of Bulgaria, 1944-1948* [Политическият Живот в България, 1944-1948] (Sofia: "Prof. Marin Drinov").
- Jelavich, C. (1958) *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism: Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879-1886* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
- Kagarlitsky, B. (1988) *The Thinking Reed: Intellectuals and the Soviet State from 1917 to the Present* [transl. by Pearce, B.] (London: Verso).
- Kalinin, M. (1944) *Lenin on the Defence of the Socialist Fatherland* [Ленин за защита на Социалистическото Отечество] (Sofia: Russian Book).

- Kalinova, E. and Baeva, I. (2002) *Bulgarian Transition, 1939-2002* [Българският Преход, 1939-2002] (Sofia: Paradigma).
- Kalinova, E. and Baeva, I. (2003) *The Bulgarian Foreign Policy Between 1944 and 1955* [Следвоенното Десетилетие на Българската Външна Политика (1944-1955)] (Sofia: Polis).
- Kalonkin, M. (2001) *National Liberation Revolutionary Army, Ally of the Allies in the Second World War* [НОВА, Съюзник на Съюзниците през Втората Световна Война] (Sofia: BAS).
- Karakostov, S. (1945) *Cyril and Methodius and the Struggle for Freedom and Slav Education* [Кирил и Методий и Борбата за Свобода и Славянска Просвета] (Sofia: Library Narodna Youth, Central Youth Committee of the National Committee of the Fatherland Front).
- Karobar, P. (1986) 'The Significance of the Autonomy of the Macedonian People in Pirin Macedonia', *Macedonian Review* 16 (3), 303-314.
- King, R. (1973) *Minorities under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension among Balkan Communist States* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press).
- King, R. (1980) *A History of the Romanian Communist Party* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press).
- Kiselkov, S. (1945) *The Slav Enlightening Figures of Cyril and Methodius* [Славяните Просветители Кирил и Методий] (Sofia: Bulgarian Historical Association).
- Klincharov, I. (1941) *The Evolution of the Bulgarian National Flag* [Еволюция на Българското Национално Знаме] (Sofia: P-cha Stop. Razvitie).
- Kohn, H. (1953) *Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology* (Indianapolis: Notre Dame).
- Kolarov, V. (1945) *Characteristics of the Opposition as a Reactionary, Anti-national and Treacherous Force: Criticism of its Platform* [Характеристика на Опозицията като Реакционна, Противонародна и Предателска Сила: Критика на Нейната Платформа] (Sofia: Local Committee of the BWPC).
- Kolarov, V. (1977) *Selected Works, 1944-1950* [Избрани Произведения] (Sofia: Partizdat).

- Kolev, Zh. (1964³) *On Haiduk Pathways: Partisan Memories* [По хайдушките Пътеки: Партизански Спомени] (Sofia: ВКР).
- Kondarev, N. (1947) *The April Uprising: Conclusions and Lessons* [Априлското Въстание: Изводи и Поуки] (Sofia: Supreme Cultural Clubs' Union).
- Kong, L. and Yeoh, B. (1997) 'The Construction of National Identity through the Production of Ritual and Spectacle: An Analysis of National Day Parades in Singapore', *Political Geography*, 16 (3), 213-239.
- Kostov, E. (1990) 'Pseudonyms of the Partisans of the Sixth Revolutionary Operations Zone' [По Въпроса за Псевдонимите на Партизани от Шеста Въстаническа Оперативна Зона], *Voенноисторически Сbornik*, 59 (4), 197-201.
- Krindzhalov, D. (1946-1947) 'Evolution and forms of the Slav idea' [Развои и Форми на Славянската идея], *Iсторически Преглед*, 3 (4-5), 456-477.
- Krindzhalov, D. (1947) *Are We, Bulgarians, Huns?* [Хуни ли сме ние, Българи?] (Sofia: Scientific-Popular Culture Chamber of People's Culture).
- Kumanov, M. (1991) *Political Parties, Organisations, and Movements in Bulgaria and their Leaders, 1879-1949* [Политически Партии, Организации и движения в България и техните Лидери, 1879-1949] (Sofia: Prosveta).
- Kuzmanov, P. (1998) *Kosta Lulchev: A Whole Life in the Service of the Social Democracy* [Коста Лулчев. Един Живот в служба на социалдемокрацията] (Sofia: Kuzmanov).
- Laclau, E. (1977) *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory* (London: New Left Books).
- Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1985) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* [translated by Moore, W. and Cammark, P.] (London: Verso).
- Lambrev, K. (1944) *National-People's Voice: Tool of the National-Liberation Movement – Illegal Publication of the Partisan Detachment "Hristo Botev"* [Народен Глас: Орган на Народоосвободителното Движение-

- Нелегално Издание на Партизанския Отряд “Христо Ботев”] (Plovdiv: Agitprop O.F.).
- Lampe, J. and Jackson, M. (1982) *Balkan Economic History, 1550-1950. From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press).
- Lampe, J. (1986) *The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century* (London and Sydney: Croom Helm).
- Lazarov, K. (1945) *To Whom Do We Cast our Votes?* [За кого да гласуваме?] (Sofia: Fatherland Front–National Committee).
- Leffler, M. (2000) ‘Bringing it Together: The Parts and the Whole’, in Westad, O. (ed.), *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory* (London: Frank Cass).
- Lefort, C. (1986) *The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism* (Cambridge: Polity Press).
- Lefterov, G. (1954) *Socialist Patriotism and Proletarian Internationalism* [Социалистически Патриотизъм и Пролетарски Интернационализъм] (Sofia: National Council of the Fatherland Front).
- Lenin, V. (1969) *Selected Works* (London: Lawrence and Wishart).
- Lenin V. (1970³) *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism: a Popular Outline* (Peking: Foreign Language Press).
- Lenin, V. (1976², 1965¹) *The State and Revolution: the Marxist Teaching on the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution* (Peking: Foreign Language Press).
- Lenin, V. (1982⁴, 1970¹) *On Workers’ Control and the Nationalisation of Industry* (Moscow: Progress Publishers).
- Linden, M. van der (1988) ‘Rise and Fall of the First International’, in Holthoorn, F. van and Linden, M. van der (eds), *Internationalism in the Labour Movement, 1830-1940* (Leiden, New York: Brill E.).
- Loth, W. (1988) *The Division of the World, 1941-1955* (London: Routledge).
- Loth, W. (2000) ‘Germany in the Cold War: Strategies and Decisions’, in Westad, O. (ed.), *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory* (London: Frank Cass).
- Löwy, M. (1976) ‘Marxists and the National Question’, *New Left Review*, 96, 81-100.

- Lukaszevicz, J. (1974) 'Embodiment of the Loftiest Aspirations of the Communist Movement', in Kiurkchiev, M. (ed.), *Georgi Dimitrov and the Unification of the Revolutionary and Democratic Forces for Peace, Democracy and Socialism* (Sofia: Sofia Press).
- Lukes, I. (1997) 'The Czech Road to Communism', in Naimark, N. and Gibianskii, L. (eds), *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949* (Boulder; Oxford: Westview Press).
- Lundestad, G. (1990) *The American 'Empire' and Other Studies of US Foreign Policy in Contemporary Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press).
- Lundestad, G. (1997, 1986¹) *East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics 1945-1996* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press).
- Lundestad, G. (2000) 'How (Not) to Study the Origins of the Cold War', in Westad, O. (ed.) *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory* (London: Frank Cass)
- Maier, C. (1994) 'Hegemony and Autonomy Within the Western Alliance', in Leffler, M. and Painter, D. (eds), *Origins of the Cold War. An International History* (London: Routledge).
- Manafov, C. (1958) *The Fatherland Front and the Unity of the Nation-People* [Отечествения Фронт и Единството на Народа] (Sofia: National Council of the Fatherland Front).
- Manifestos and Resolutions of the First Historical Congress of the Committees of the Fatherland Front* (1945) [Манифеста и Резолюциите на Първия Исторически Конгрес на Комитетите на О.Ф.] (Sofia: National Committee of the Fatherland Front).
- Martin, T. (2001) *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press).
- Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1976) *Collected Works* (London: Lawrence and Wishart).
- Matkovski, A. (1966) 'Sources on Haiduks in Macedonia during the second half of the XVII century' [Сведения за Хайдуги в Македония през втората половина на XVII век], *Istoricheski Pregled*, 22 (3), 67-82.

- Mayeur, J.-M. and Reberieux, M. (1984) *The Third Republic from its Origins to the Great War 1871-1914* [translated by Foster, J.] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Mazour, A. (1958) *Modern Russian Historiography* (London, Toronto: Princeton).
- Mazour, A. (1971) *The Writing of History in the Soviet Union* (California: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press).
- McCrone, D. (1998) *The Sociology of Nationalism* (London: Routledge).
- McDermott, K. and Agnew, J. (1996) *The Comintern: A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin* (London: MacMillan Press).
- Meininger, T. (1977) 'The Response of the Bulgarian people to the April Uprising', *Southeastern Europe*, 4 (2), 250-261.
- Memorandum from the Central Executive Committee of the Thracian Organisation in Bulgaria* (1946) (Sofia: n.p.).
- Merriam, A. (1964) *The Anthropology of Music* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press).
- Mevius, M. (2005) *Agents of Moscow: The Hungarian Communist Party and the Origins of Socialist Patriotism 1941-1953* (New York: Oxford University Press).
- Michev, D. (1994) *The Macedonian Question and the Bulgarian-Yugoslavian Relations, 9 September 1944-1949* [Македонският Въпрос и Българо-югославските Отношения, 9 Септември 1944-1949] (Sofia: University Publications "St. Kliment of Ohrid").
- Miller, M. (1975) *Bulgaria During the Second World War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
- Minchev, M. (1988) *The First Fatherland Front Government* [Първото Правителство на Отечествения Фронт] (Sofia: Fatherland Front).
- Minkov, T. (1947) *National Revival and the era of the Fatherland Front* [Възраждането и Епохата на Отечествения Фронт], (Sofia: High School Union Cultural-Educational Library).
- Mitev, I. (1945) 'The Eternal Struggle of the Slavs against the German Conquerors' [Вековната Борба на Славяните с Немските Завоеватели], *Istoricheski Pregled*, 1 (2-3), 172-198.

- Mitev, I. (1945-1946) 'The Evangelisation of Bulgarians' [Покръстването на Българите], *Istoricheski Pregled*, 2 (4-5), 412-434.
- Mitev, I. (1947) *Notes on the New and Modern Political History of the Bulgarian Narod* [Записки по нова и най-нова Политическа История на Българския Народ] (Sofia: People's Military School "Vasil Levski").
- Mitev, I. (1948) 'The Formation of the Bulgarian Nation' [Образуването на Българската Нация], *Istoricheski Pregled* 4 (3), 291-316.
- Mitev, I. (1976) 'The British Public and the Uprising of April 1876', *Bulgarian Historical Review*, 4 (4), 62-73.
- Molnar, M. (1990) *From Béla Kun to János Kádár: Seventy Years of Hungarian Communism* [De Béla Kun à János Kádár translated by Pomerans A.] (New York; Oxford: BERG).
- Moore, P. (1984², 1979¹) 'Bulgaria', in Rakowska-Harmstone, T. (ed.), *Communism in Eastern Europe* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press).
- Mortimer, E. (1979, 1977) 'France', in McCauley, M. (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe, 1944-1949*, (London: Macmillan Press).
- Moser, C. (1987) 'The April Uprising, the American Journalist, and the Statesmen of Europe', *East European Quarterly*, 21 (1), 25-33.
- Mouffe, C. (1993) *The Return of the Political* (London: Verso).
- Mueller, C. (1973) *The Politics of Communication. A Study in the Political Sociology of Language, Socialization, and Legitimation* (New York: Oxford University Press).
- Munck, R. (1986) *The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism* (London: Zed Books).
- Mutafchieva, V. and Chichovska, V. (eds) (1995) *The Trial Against the Historians: The Bulgarian History. Documents and Discussions, 1944-1950* [Съдът над Историците :Българската Историческа Наука. Документи и Дискусии, 1944-1950] (Sofia: Marin Drinov).
- Nairn, T. (1977) 'The Modern Janus', in Nairn, T. (ed.) *The Break-up of Britain* (London: New Left Books).
- Natan, Z. (1945-1946) 'The Ideology of Hristo Botev' [Идеологията на Христо Ботев], *Istoricheski Pregled*, 2 (3), 272-316.

- Natan, Z. (1946) *Ideological and Sociological Analysis of the "Notes" of Z. Stoyanov and the "Under the Yoke" of I. Vazov* [Идеен и Социологичен Разбор на "Записките" на З. Стоянов и на "Под Игото" на И. Вазов] (Sofia: Narizdat).
- Neshovich, S. (1986) 'Fatherland Front Bulgaria and Federal Macedonia', *Macedonian Review* 16 (2), 144-153.
- Nikolova, A. (1983) 'Radio Hristo Botev on the Uniting of the Anti-fascist Forces in Bulgaria: 1941-9.IX.1944' [Радиостанция "Христо Ботев" за Сплотяването на Антифашистките Сили в България 1941–9.IX.1944], *Известия на Института на БКП* 50, 137-173.
- Nimni, E. (1991) *Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of a Political Crisis* (London: Pluto).
- Nora, P. (1997) 'Lavissee: The Nation's Teacher', in Nora, P. (ed.), *Realms of Memory: the Construction of the French Past* [Lieux de Mémoire, translated by Goldhammer, A.] (New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press).
- Nora, P. (1998) 'The Era of Commemoration', in Nora, P. (ed.), *Realms of Memory: the Construction of the French Past* [Lieux de Mémoire, translated by Goldhammer, A.] (New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press).
- Norval, A. (1994) 'Social Ambiguity and the Crisis of Apartheid', in Laclau, E. (ed.), *The Making of Political Identities* (London: Verso).
- O'Dowd, L. and Wilson, T. (1996) 'Frontiers of Sovereignty in the New Europe', in O'Dowd, L. and Wilson, T. (eds), *Borders, Nations and States* (Aldershot: Avebury).
- Obretenov, A. (1950) *Proletarian Patriotism and Internationalism* [Пролетарски Патриотизъм и Интернационализъм] (Sofia: Union of People's Writers).
- Ognyanov, L. (1984) *The Construction of Socialism in Bulgaria* (Sofia: Sofia Press).
- Ognyanov, L. (1993) *The State Political System of Bulgaria, 1944-1948* [Държавно-политическата Система на България, 1944-1948] (Sofia: BAN).

- Oren, N. (1971) *Bulgarian Communism. The Road to Power, 1934-1944* (New York and London: Columbia University Press).
- Ostoich, P. (1967) *The BCP and the Building of the People's Republic, 9 September 1944–December 1947* [БКП и Изграждането на Народнодемократическата Държава, 9 Септември 1944-Декмври 1947] (Sofia: BCP).
- Overing, J. (1997) 'The Role of Myth: An Anthropological Perspective', in Hosking, G. and Schöpflin, G. (eds), *Myths and Nationhood* (London: Hurst).
- Padev, M. (1948) *Dimitrov Wastes no Bullets. Nikola Petkov: the Test Case* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode).
- Papoulia, V. (2002) *Ancient Tribes and Byzantine Universe* [Αρχαία Φύλα και Βυζαντινή Οικουμένη] (Thessaloniki: Vaniias).
- Parrish, S. (1997) 'The Marshall Plan, Soviet-American Relations, and the Division of Europe', in Naimark, N. and Gibianskii, L. (eds), *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949* (Boulder; Oxford: Westview Press).
- Pavlov, T. (1939) *What is Patriotism* [Що е Патриотизъм] (Sofia: Nov Svyat).
- Pavlov, T. (1940, 1939¹) *Nation and Culture* [Нация и Култура] (Sofia: D. Gologanov).
- Pavlov, T. (1946) *Hristo Botev, Vasil Levski, Svetozar Markovich* [Христо Ботев, Васил Левски, Светозар Маркович] (Sofia: Narizdat).
- Pavlowitch, S. (1999) *A History of the Balkans, 1804-1945* (London and New York: Longman).
- Pechatnov, V. and Edmondson, C. (2002) 'The Russian Perspective', in Levering, R. et al. (eds), *Debating the Origins of the Cold War: American and Russian Perspectives*, (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers).
- People's Court* (1945) (Sofia: "Brothers Miladinovi Press").
- Perris, A. (1985) *Art to Persuade, Art to Control* (London: Greenwood Press).
- Petkov, P. (1998) 'Georgi Dimitrov's Attitude Towards the Volunteers From the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 Who Survived after 9 September 1944' [Отношението на Георги Димитров към Живите след 9 Септември

- 1944 г. Опълченци от Руско-Турската Освободителна война 1877-1878], *Istoricheski Pregled*, 44 (3), 44-50.
- Petrova, D. (1963) 'Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and the People's Front (1935-1939)' [Български Земеделски Народен Съюз и Народният Фронт (1935-1939)], *Istoricheski Pregled*, 19 (1): 3-31.
- Petrova, D. (1977) 'The Political Activity of the BANU (1930-1931) [Политическа Дейност на БЗНС]', *Istoricheski Pregled*, 33 (1): 15-34.
- Petrovich, M. (1967) 'The Russian Image in Renaissance Bulgaria (1760-1878)', *East European Quarterly*, 1 (2): 87-105.
- Pitasio, A. (1986) *The Bulgarian National Revival and Garibaldi* [Българското Възраждане и Гарибалди], *Istoricheski Pregled*, 42 (4), 46-56.
- Popov, G. (1964) 'The Activity of the BCP in Reorganising School Education in the First Years of the People's Government, September 1944 – December 1948' [Дейността на БКП за Преустройство на Учебно-възпитателния Процес в Училището през Първите Години на Народната Власт, Септември 1944г. – Декември 1948г.], *Istoricheski Pregled*, 20 (1), 63-78.
- Poptomov, V. (1948) *Talk about the Macedonian Iliden Uprising in 1903 on the occasion of its 45 Anniversary* [Доклад за Македонското Илинденско Въстание в 1903 г. по случай 45-годишнината му] (Sofia: Publication of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (communists)).
- Pundeff, M. (1961) 'Bulgarian Historiography, 1942-1958', *American Historical Review*, 66 (3), 682-693.
- Pundeff, M. (1969) 'The Bulgarian Academy of Sciences', *East European Quarterly*, 3 (3), 371-386.
- Pundeff, M. (1970) 'Nationalism and Communism in Bulgaria', *Südost-Forschungen* 29, 128-170.
- Radice, E. (1977) 'Economic Developments in Eastern Europe under German Hegemony', in McCauley, M. (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe*, (London: Macmillan Press).
- Radio Station Hristo Botev is Speaking* (1952) [Говори Радиостанция Христо Ботев] (Sofia: n.p.).

- Randell, K. (1986) *France: The Third Republic 1870-1914* (London: Edward Arnold).
- Recommendations, Appeals and Manifestos of the National Committee of the Fatherland Front 1945/1946* (1947) [Окръжни, Възвания и Манифести на Националния Комитет на О.Ф.1945/1946] (Sofia: Fatherland Front–National Committee).
- Renan, E. (1999, 1990¹) ‘What is a nation?’ [Qu’ est-ce qu’ une nation?, translated by Thom M.], in Bhabha, H. (ed.), *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge).
- ‘Results of the Census of the Population in Pirin Macedonia Held in December 1946’ (1986), *Macedonian Review*, 16 (3): 315-324.
- Rosdolsky, R. (1986) ‘Engels and the ‘Nonhistoric’ Peoples: The National Question in the Revolution of 1848’, *Critique*, 18-19, 1-120.
- Rothschild, J. (1959) *The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development 1883-1936* (New York: Columbia University Press).
- Sakwa, R. (1999) *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 1917-1991* (London: Routledge).
- Schöpflin, G. (1997) ‘The Functions of Myth and the Taxonomy of Myth’, in Hosking, G. and Schöpflin, G. (eds), *Myths and Nationhood*, (London: Hurst).
- Schwarz, B. (1983) *Music and Musical Life in Soviet Russia, 1917-1981* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press).
- Schwarzmantel, J. (1991) *Socialism and the Idea of the Nation* (Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf).
- Seton-Watson, H. (1977) *Nations and States: An Enquiry in the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (London: Methuen).
- Seton-Watson, H. (1956³, 1950¹) *The East European Revolution* (London: Methuen).
- Sharlanov, D. (1966) *Formation and Activity of the Fatherland Front, July 1942-September 1944* [Създаване и Дейност на Отечествения Фронт, Юли 1942-Септември 1944] (Sofia: ВСР).

- Sharlanov, D. (1987) 'The Government of the BANU and the National Question' [Управлението на БЗНС и Националният Въпрос], *Istoricheski Pregled*, 43 (2): 3-18.
- Sharova, K. et al. (1986) *History of the Bulgarian Communist Party* (Sofia: Sofia Press).
- Shevshenko, I. (1962, 1956¹) 'Byzantine Cultural Influences', in Black, C. (eds), *Rewriting Russian History* (New York: Vintage Books).
- Shopov, I. (1975) 'The Penetration of Fascism in Bulgarian High-School Education, 1934-1939', [Проникване на Фашизма в Средното Образование (1934-1939)] *Istoricheski Pregled*, 31 (5), 45-56.
- Sieyès, E. (2003) *Political Writings* [translated by Sonenscher, M] (Indianapolis: Hackett).
- Simon, R. (1991, 1982¹) *Gramsci's Political Thought – An Introduction* (London: Laurence and Wishart).
- Sirkov, A. (1991) 'Bulgaria's National Territorial Problem during the Second World War', *Bulgarian Historical Review*, 19 (3), 3-19.
- Slezkine, Y. (1996) 'The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism', in Eley, G. and Suny, R. G. (eds), *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York: Oxford University Press).
- Smith, A. (1997) 'The "Golden Age" and National Renewal', in Hosking, G. and Schöpflin, G. (eds), *Myths and Nationhood* (London: Hurst).
- Smith, A. (1999) *The National Identity* (London: Penguin).
- Smith, A. M. (1998) *Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary* (London: Routledge).
- Smith, J. (1999) *The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917-1923* (London: MacMillan Press).
- Snyder, L. (1984) *Macro-nationalisms: A History of the Pan-Movements* (London: Greenwood Press).
- Sobolev, A. (1949) *Soviet Patriotism* [СЪВЕТСКИЯТ ПАТРИОТИЗЪМ] (Sofia: Union of the Bulgarian-Soviet Societies).
- Soviet Patriotism* [СЪВЕТСКИЯТ ПАТРИОТИЗЪМ] (1948) (Sofia: Union of the Bulgarian-Soviet Societies).
- Sowerwine, C. (2001) *France since 1870: Culture, Politics and Society* (New York: Palgrave,).

- Spencer, P. and Wollman, H. (2002) *Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (London: Sage).
- Spillman, L. (1997) *Nation and Commemoration: Creating National Identities in the United States and Australia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Stalin, J. (1983) *Stalin on the October Revolution: Socialism and Industry, Cold War* (London: Communist Party of Britain, Marxist-Leninist).
- Stavrianos, L. (2000², 1958¹) *The Balkans since 1953* (London: Hurst).
- Stefanov, H. (1984) *The Bulgarian Radical Party, 1906-1949* (Българската Радикална партия, 1906-1949) (Sofia: Nauka i Izkustvo).
- Stoin, E. (1955) *National-People's Partizan Songs, 1923-1944* [Народни Партизански Песни, 1923-1944] (Sofia: BAN, Institute of Music).
- Storry, G. (1957) *The Double Patriots. A Study of Japanese Nationalism* (London: Chatto and Windus).
- Stoyanov, S. (1949) *Narod, Nation, Patriotism* [Народ, Нация, Патриотизъм], (Svishtov: Science and Art).
- Stoyanov, S. (1981) 'Symbols of the People's Republic of Bulgaria', in Bokov, G. (ed.) *Modern Bulgaria: History-Policy-Economy-Culture* (Sofia: Sofia Press).
- Stringer, P. (1990) 'Prefacing Social Psychology: A Textbook Examble', in Parker, I. and Shotter, J. (eds), *Deconstructing Social Psychology* (London: Routledge).
- Suda, Z. (1980) *Zealots and Rebels: A History of the Ruling Communist Party of Czechoslovakia* (Stanford California: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University).
- Svestka, O. (1974) 'Important Periods of the History of the Czechoslovak Communist Party are Connected with Georgi Dimitrov', in Kiurkchiev, M. (ed.), *Georgi Dimitrov and the Unification of the Revolutionary and Democratic Forces for Peace, Democracy and Socialism* (Sofia: Sofia Press).
- Swain, G. and Swain, N. (1998, 1993¹) *Eastern Europe since 1945* (New York: St. Martins Press)

- Tappe, E. (1950) 'Roumania', in Betts, R. (ed.), *Central and South East Europe, 1945-1948* (London-New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs).
- The BCP, the Comintern and the Macedonian question, 1917-1946* (1998) [БКП Коминтернът и Македонският въпрос, 1917-1946], Biliarski, T. and Burilkova, I. (eds), (Sofia: General Administration of Archives).
- The Fatherland War of Bulgaria (1944-1945): Documents, Materials* (1978) [Отечествената Война на България (1944-1945): Документи, Материали] (Sofia: Voenno Isdatelstvo).
- The Second Fatherland Front Congress* (1948) (Sofia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Department).
- The Struggle of the Bulgarian people against Fascism* (1946) (Sofia: n.p.).
- The Trial of Nikola Petkov: Record of the Judicial Proceedings, August 5-15, 1947* (1947) (Sofia: Ministry of Information and Art, Direction of National Culture).
- The Truth about the Behaviour of the Leader of the Bulgarian Opposition and the Twenty Three Opposition MP's* (1947) (Sofia: Ministry of Information and Arts, Press Department).
- The Word of Intellectuals* (1945) (Sofia: Sofia Press).
- Thompson, J. (1984) *Studies in the Theory of Ideology* (London: Polity Press).
- Todorov, N. et al. (1981) *Economic History of Bulgaria* [Стопанска История на България] (Sofia: Nayka i Izkustvo).
- Todorova, M. (1993) 'Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Communist Legacy in Eastern Europe', *East European Politics and Societies*, 7 (1), 135-154.
- Todorova, M. (1995) 'The Course of Discourses of Bulgarian Nationalism', in Sugar, P. (ed.) *Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, (London: The American University Press).
- Tomaszewski, J. (1989) *The Socialist Regimes of East Central Europe: their Establishment and Consolidation, 1944-1967*, [translated by Krauze, J.] (London: Routledge).
- Tsanev, G. (ed.) (1948) *Hristo Botev: A Selection* [Христо Ботев: Избрания] (Sofia: National Christo Botev Committee by the Christo Botev Institute).
- Tzvetkov, P. (1993) *A History of the Balkans: A Regional Overview from a Bulgarian Perspective* (San Francisco: EM Text).

- Tsvetkov, P. (1998) *Are the Bulgarians Slavs?* [Славяни ли са Българите?] (Sofia: TANGRA).
- Ulam, A. (1974) *Stalin: the Man and his Era* (London: Allen Lane).
- Ulam, A. (1999) 'A Few Unresolved Mysteries about Stalin and the Cold War in Europe: A Modest Agenda for Research', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1 (1), 110-116.
- Vago, B. (1979) 'Romania', in McCauley, M. (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe, 1944-1949*, (London: Macmillan Press).
- Vakarelski, H. (1961) *Bulgarian National-People's Treasure* [Българско Народно Творчество] (Sofia: Bilgarski Pisatel).
- Valeva, Y. (1997) 'The CPSU, the Comintern, and the Bulgarians', in Naimark, N. and Gibianskii, L. (eds), *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949* (Boulder; Oxford: Westview Press).
- Vasilev, V. (1989) 'The Bulgarian Communist Party and the Macedonian Question between the two World Wars', *Bulgarian Historical Review*, 17 (1), 3-20.
- Velchev, B. (1974) 'Georgi Dimitrov and the Unification of the Revolutionary Democratic Forces for Peace, Democracy and Socialism', in Kiurkchiev, M. (ed.), *Georgi Dimitrov and the Unification of the Revolutionary and Democratic Forces for Peace, Democracy and Socialism* (Sofia: Sofia Press).
- Verdery, K. (1991) *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceaușescu's Romania* (Berkeley; Oxford: University of California Press).
- Verdery, K. (1992) 'Hobsbawm in the East', *Anthropology Today*, 8, 8-10.
- Verdery, K. (1996) 'Wither 'Nation' and 'Nationalism'?', in Balakrishnan, G. (ed.), *Mapping the Nation* (London: Verso).
- Vlahov, T. (1947) *Virhovism and the Great-Bulgarian Chauvinists-Supporters of Bulgarian Monarchism* [Върховъзма и Велико-Българските Шовинисти - Поддръжници на Българския Монархизъм] (Sofia: n.p.)
- Vlahovich, V. (1974) 'A Contribution to the Theoretical Treasury of the International Workers' Movement', in Kiurkchiev, M. (ed.), *Georgi*

- Dimitrov and the Unification of the Revolutionary and Democratic Forces for Peace, Democracy and Socialism* (Sofia: Sofia Press).
- Volkov, V. (1997) 'The Soviet Leadership and Southeastern Europe', in Naimark, N. and Gibianskii, L. (eds), *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949* (Boulder; Oxford: Westview Press).
- Vovelle, M. (1998) 'La Marseillaise: War or Peace', in Nora, P. (ed.), *Realms of Memory: the Construction of the French Past* [Lieux de Mémoire, translated by Goldhammer, A.] (New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press).
- Vucinich, A. (1962, 1956¹) 'The first Russian state', in Black, C. (eds), *Rewriting Russian History* (New York: Vintage Books).
- Western Thrace* (1946) [Западна Тракия] (Sofia: Research Institute of the Thracian Organisation in Bulgaria).
- Weydenthal, J. (1986, 1978¹) *The Communists of Poland: An Historical Outline* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press).
- Wiskemann, E. (1950) 'Hungary', in Betts, R. (ed.), *Central and South East Europe, 1945-1948* (London-New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs).
- Yaresh, L. (1962a, 1956¹) 'The Problem of Periodisation', in Black, C. (eds), *Rewriting Russian History* (New York: Vintage Books).
- Yaresh, L. (1962b, 1956¹) 'The Role of the Individual in History', in Black, C. (eds), *Rewriting Russian History* (New York: Vintage Books).
- Zarchev, J. (1972) 'Georgi Dimitrov – The Theorist, Inspirer and Organiser of the United Front', *Etudes Balkaniques*, 9 (1), 24-42.
- Zarev, P. (1946³, 1939¹) *The Bulgarian Revival: Character and Peculiarities* [Българското Възраждане: Характер и Особености] (Sofia: Hr. Cholchev).