Villejoubert, Gaelle and Mandel, David R. (2002) The inverse fallacy: an account of deviations from Bayes's theorem and the additivity principle. Memory & Cognition, 30(2), pp. 171178. ISSN (print) 0090502X
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Abstract
In judging posterior probabilities, people often answer with the inverse conditional probabilityï¿½a tendency named the inverse fallacy. Participants (N = 45) were given a series of probability problems that entailed estimating both p(HD) and p(~HD). The findings revealed that deviations of participants' estimates from Bayesian calculations and from the additivity principle could be predicted by the corresponding deviations of the inverse probabilities from these relevant normative benchmarks. Methodological and theoretical implications of the distinction between inverse fallacy and baserate neglect and the generalization of the study of additivity to conditional probabilities are discussed.
Item Type:  Article 

Research Area:  Psychology 
Faculty, School or Research Centre:  Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (until 2017) > School of Social Science (until November 2012) 
Depositing User:  Gaelle ValleeTourangeau 
Date Deposited:  04 Jan 2010 15:04 
Last Modified:  16 Jul 2012 21:48 
URI:  http://eprints.kingston.ac.uk/id/eprint/6308 
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