Towards an Ordinary Language Psychoanalysis: On Scepticism and Infancy

Family Resemblances

At first glance, psychoanalysis and Ordinary Language Philosophy bear little resemblance. The apparent focus of psychoanalysis on the inner seems in fact to jar with the appeal to the ordinary. Indeed, since Ludwig Wittgenstein voiced his suspicions about Freud, philosophers have largely agreed that the two disciplines are, despite converging in some instances, ultimately incompatible. Stanley Cavell is an exception to this rule. In a review of Terrors and Experts for The London Review of Books in 1997 he picks up on Adam Phillips’ description in an earlier book of D.W. Winnicott’s “almost religious commitment to an idea of simple and personal truth, to an ordinary-language psychoanalysis.”¹ Winnicott’s commitment to “an ordinary-language psychoanalysis” is, Phillips argues, based on the conviction that the how of what we say and do not say, and what we do and do not do, captures better than any psychoanalytic technique each of our simple, personal and often incommunicable truths.² Cavell shares this commitment to the ordinary as something that owes its therapeutic powers to its ability to capture the way we truly are. Cavell’s attentiveness to this aspect of Winnicott’s marks perhaps nothing more than a brief flash of recognition upon finding his own reflection in his work.

There is also a different argument to be made here, namely that Cavell’s consideration of Phillips’ neologism shows that he is sufficiently taken by the apparent affinities between psychoanalysis and ordinary language philosophy to wonder whether there might a still to be acknowledged deeper kinship between them. In the term “an ordinary-language
psychoanalysis” he hears an invitation to consider more closely the relationship between psychoanalysis and philosophy as it is practiced by Wittgenstein, Austin and, presumably, Cavell himself.3 This essay takes up this invitation by considering the hitherto unacknowledged family resemblances between Cavell’s inheritance of Ordinary Language Philosophy, as demonstrated by his interpretation of scepticism, and object relations psychoanalysis, particularly the work of Melanie Klein and Winnicott.

As the essay will show, in his reinterpretation of scepticism Cavell relies not merely on traditional Ordinary Language Philosophy but also on conceptual resources that, although not limited to them, are most prominently used by object relations psychoanalyst’s to flesh out the infant’s earliest experiences. In making this argument, it is not its aim to fashion Cavell as an inheritor of Freud, Klein and Winnicott rather than an inheritor of Austin and Wittgenstein. This is partially because the eclectic nature of Cavell’s corpus means that there are more than these two conceptual lineages at play (others include, for instance, Emerson, Thoreau, and Shakespeare). Most importantly, however, it is because the issue of inheritance or lineage—together with the questions of hierarchy or primacy that it brings with it—is deeply unsympathetic to the way the Cavellian project picks up on, harmonises with and augments insights from other discourses. Equally, talk of a mere affinity or similarity would not do justice to the depth of shared concern between Cavell’s Ordinary Language Philosophy and object relations psychoanalysis. Instead Cavell’s work on scepticism points us toward an area of inquiry where thought structures overlap, conceptual resources are shared and ideas have purchase in ways that are not constricted by disciplinary borders or concerns about conceptual heritage and superiority. The reason for this is not that the Cavellian project is governed by something akin to Jacques Derrida’s textual model, where texts and ideas may relate to each other not because they share a conceptual or historical
lineage or context but because all texts are reading heads for other texts. It rather hinges on the discovery of a significant and interrelated set of family resemblances.

For Wittgenstein, family resemblances describe a relation between two or more things where some features are shared but no attribute is present in all. Allowing the cohabitation of similarity and dissimilarity, this concept is a reminder that drawing up links or limits of conceptual alliances is a complex and delicate undertaking. There are significant similarities between philosophical and psychoanalytical characterizations of scepticism, whether it is addressed as such or under the psychoanalyst’s study of the causes and consequences of the false self or disintegration. More importantly, both philosophy and psychoanalysis link infancy and scepticism to each other, either figuratively or causatively. Both in their own way then turn to the figure of the infant—both in terms of a figment of an adult’s deferred fantasies and as the subject of theorizations pertaining to either language acquisition or development in general—when considering the sceptical predicament. This essay will, however, also argue that although they share important traits, the descriptions of infancy in Ordinary Language Philosophy and object relations psychoanalysis are not completely congruent. But an acknowledgment of what separates these discourses does not invalidate what it is that they do share. On the contrary, whilst what is shared may invite interesting comparisons, Cavell’s interpretation of scepticism owes its originality to his willingness to move beyond mere narcissistic reflection to borrow structures of thought from psychoanalysis that challenge and potentially change some of the ways in which Ordinary Language Philosophy sees itself.

In order to explore this significant and interrelated set of family resemblances this article describes a series of reading encounters between Ordinary Language Philosophy and object relations psychoanalysis that hinge in one way or another on the intersections between the experience of infancy and that of scepticism. The scene is set with a brief outline of what sets
Cavell’s Ordinary Language Philosophy apart from familiar interpretations of it; this section gives an account of the common ground between Cavell and psychoanalysis and how past work has considered it. The first reading scene the essay focuses on is Wittgenstein’s reading of Augustine’s account of how he learned to speak. A consideration of how Cavell’s reading of Klein has a bearing on the ways in which his sense of Augustine the infant differs from Wittgenstein’s follows. It then turns to how the Shakespearean psychoanalytic critic Janet Adelman draws on Winnicott and Cavell when offering her startlingly original interpretation of Shakespearean tragedy, thus revealing the kinship between these two thinkers. The final two sections explore the limits of Cavell’s and Winnicott’s shared conceptual horizons by probing their treatment of separateness and aloneness on the one hand and their hope about whether philosophy can cure itself on the other.

A Not So Ordinary Language Philosophy

As philosophical “schools” go Ordinary Language Philosophy is rather soft-spoken. Yet, behind its seemingly demure exterior lies an extraordinarily ambitious meta-philosophical project. Ordinary Language Philosophy looks toward our ordinary, quotidian uses of language to cure philosophy of some of its more debilitating puzzlements, or to use Wittgenstein’s term, bewitchments [Verhexungen]. For Ordinary Language Philosophy, many of these problems are rooted in the philosopher using language in a way that is markedly different from how he would use it when living ordinarily. In thus misusing language, the philosopher takes on the role of the sceptic: asking questions he would normally not consider, and pretending to inhabit a position toward the world and others that
he in truth does not, he finds himself separated from them. Language famously being our form of life, the sceptic’s misuse of language is indicative of a deeper alienation from the world. For Ordinary Language Philosophers, a particular use of language is, however, not just scepticism’s symptom, it is not even just its cause, it also is its cure. The appeal to ordinary language in times of philosophical or sceptical bewitchment is effective because, in reminding the sceptic of the ordinary use of our words and the ordinary forms of life they mark, it can remind them of their true relation to the world, to others and to themself. The suggestion is of course that matters are more straightforward than the figure of the sceptic fears.

Whilst it would be wrong to conflate Wittgenstein’s and Austin’s distinct contributions to Ordinary Language Philosophy, their appeals to ordinary language share the more or less overt postulation of something given and shared, a common ground that the sceptic-philosopher’s feet have, despite their protestations, never left. For Wittgenstein the recounting of ordinary criteria refutes scepticism because they establish certainty about what the sceptic puts in doubt. For Austin our inherited ordinary language can bring us once again closer to the world and others, because in it are encoded certain values and ways of being together as humans. What both of these accounts have in common is that they, at least according to traditional readings, seek to show that the sense of separation that the sceptic suffers is an illusion belied by the ways in which ordinary language assures our continued togetherness.

What sets Cavell apart from other proponents of Ordinary Language Philosophy is that in his reading neither Austin nor Wittgenstein denies the fact of separateness. It is because of this acknowledgment of separateness that in Cavell’s work a discussion of ordinary language often gives way to an examination of voice. For him ordinary language does not undo our common separateness, but as his analysis of Bizet’s Carmen, for example, shows, our voice
can highlight, even celebrate it. Separation is, of course, an important theme in philosophy. For Cavell, however, there is a crucial distinction to be made between separateness and separation: the fact that we are separate from each other does not mean that we are separated from each other. For Cavell separateness does not hinder our lives together; separateness must not necessarily separate us.

A well-known passage from “The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy” states that “all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls ‘forms of life’,” in short all “human speech an activity, sanity and community, rest upon nothing more, but nothing less, than” our ability and willingness to agree upon them. The literature on Cavell rarely recognizes how radical this assertion is. The claim that our ordinary attunement rests on nothing more and nothing less than our willingness and ability to agree with each other implies that there is no undergirding, shared, common structure that guarantees it. Separateness is affirmed. In the secondary literature on Cavell this acute sense of our separateness is more often than not glossed over by providing more or less overt accounts of precisely the kind of undergirding structure that Cavell’s work does away with in the first place. Espen Hammer is one of the few who acknowledge that this insistence on separateness means for Cavell that scepticism is “neither curable (Kant) or incurable (Hume),” but that separateness is an unavoidable aspect of our language, our forms of life. Even Hammer, however, does not explain under what circumstances this separateness—which ordinarily does not pose problems—grows into the sceptic’s sense of separation from the world.

Separation, particularly the primary separation of birth, is an important theme in psychoanalysis. Cavell writes openly about his “intellectual debt” to Freud. His path from music to philosophy would indeed pass through psychoanalysis, with Cavell at one point even considering training to become a psychoanalyst. Even after he had abandoned any thought of training, Freud remained a lasting influence on his work, particularly in his
readings of Shakespeare and Hollywood films of the 1930s and 1940s. Whether Cavell draws on Freudian notions of hysteria in his reading of Bette Davies in *Now, Voyager* or Freud’s Wolf Man case in his reading of *Hamlet*, in much of his work relating to literature or film psychoanalysis is used as an interpretative tool, employed for instance for throwing light onto a character’s motivations. Other texts bear testament to Cavell’s more systematic engagement with psychoanalysis; most important amongst these is his work on Emerson and Thoreau, where he falls back on Freudian notions of transference and countertransference to work out a mode of reading that does philosophical work itself, that is, in other words, philosophically operative and significant. No less important, though less well-studied, is Cavell’s reading of Jacques Lacan’s reading of Poe’s “The Purloined Letter” in *In Quest for the Ordinary*, which is testament to the extent to which psychoanalytical insights affect even core philosophical notions in Cavell’s project. In the piece Cavell connects Wittgenstein’s sense of “the everyday and its language” as “strange to themselves” to Lacan’s account of the uncanny nature of language and of the unconscious in order to suggest that the ordinary is not already attained but infinitely perfectible.

Freud’s importance for Cavell’s work, in particular in relation to the therapeutic powers of the act of reading that he most explicitly tackles in his work on Thoreau and Shakespeare, has been addressed by a number of different scholars with varying conclusions. Whilst Timothy Gould, for instance, argues that the mutual receptiveness Cavell observes in Thoreau’s account of reading and writing in *Walden* is indebted to his engagement with Shakespeare and Freud, he is reluctant to give too much systematic importance to psychoanalysis. There are also scholars who have acknowledged the importance of psychoanalysis for Cavell’s philosophy more enthusiastically, including Arnold Davidson, Ewa Plonowska Ziarek and Mulhall. For them the influence goes beyond a superficial incorporation of psychoanalytic terminology. Ziarek and Mulhall in particular recognize a cross-fertilization between
philosophy and psychoanalysis, where the recovery of scepticism not merely resembles psychoanalytic therapy, but becomes therapy in a psychoanalytic sense.\textsuperscript{16} Ziarek even goes so far as to speak, albeit briefly, of a “psychoanalysis of philosophy.”\textsuperscript{17} Similarly, Mulhall speaks not merely of a “family resemblance,” but even of a “founding psychoanalytic claim.”\textsuperscript{18} What is striking about previous accounts of the relationship between Cavell’s philosophical project and psychoanalysis, whether sympathetic to the idea of a foundational influence or not, is that they are limited exclusively to Freud. Cavell’s invitation to think towards an ordinary-language psychoanalysis, however, suggests that Ordinary Language Philosophy and psychoanalysis also intersect at later, post-Freudian junctures.

\textbf{Augustine Throws a Tantrum: Wittgenstein Reads the \textit{Confessions}}

Wittgenstein famously begins his \textit{Investigations} with a reading of Augustine’s account of how he learned language. Augustine was not, he writes, taught words “by way of formal instruction, as it was the case soon afterward with reading”.\textsuperscript{19} He learns by observing his elders, by for instance interpreting their body language and by using the mind that the grace of God bestowed on him: “No, I taught myself, using the mind you gave me, O my God.”\textsuperscript{20} It is a peculiar scene not merely because no purposeful teaching is taking place, but also because through all of this Augustine the infant remains always at arm’s length from his elders.
The *majores homines* are remarkably animated, but their expressions are neither directed at the child, nor do not affect the child directly in any emotional way. It is interesting, too, that Augustine’s elders do not seem to make the same effort at interpreting his body language that he does with theirs. It is true that the infant Augustine gets mad, but it is a rage that originates in his inability to make himself understood rather than in the adult’s inability or unwillingness to understand him. When Augustine, the infant—from Latin *infantus*, quite literally one who has no speech—tries to make his “wishes known to those who might satisfy them” and fails “because my desires where inside me, while other people were outside and could by no effort of understanding enter my mind” he resorts to “toss[ing] about” and “scream[ing]” and when he did not get his way he would “take revenge on them by bursting into tears” and by throwing a “tantrum.” Despite his outburst, or perhaps rather because of the calculation behind it (Augustine throws a tantrum not out of frustration but because he wants to take revenge), the infant here appears to be remarkably self-possessed, grounded in and already in control of a self. Put differently, the infant’s experience is centred on an already well-known and fully experienced interiority. For instance, in the passage just quoted, the attempt is not to better project his desires outwardly so as to be better understood; it is to allow the elders access into *his* mind. As the disjunction between the child and his elders suggests, the infant’s sophisticated inner world—full of desires and rage—is established before and independently of any significant interpersonal relationships. Augustine’s particular view of language thus also implies an underlying belief about the infant’s relative cognitive and emotional self-reliance.

Wittgenstein seems to subscribe to this view of the infant when much later in the *Investigations* he asks whether we might not be “over-hasty in our assumption that the smile of an unweaned infant is not a pretence.” For Mulhall, the subtle shift from child [*Kind*] to an unweaned infant [*Säugling*] at this point of the *Investigations* is motivated by the wish “to
invoke a sake of human life so early that it has no room for the existence of certain relatively complex and necessarily intersubjective projects,” in order to make a point about the naturalness our forms of life, echoing it seems Augustine’s description of the infant’s mature inner life." It is, however, important to see Wittgenstein’s remark about the lying infant in its entirety; the suggestion that lying must be learned as any other language-game in fact runs counter to Augustine’s vision of the infant. Indeed, the notion that if the infant’s smile at the breast were indeed a pretense, then even this most primitive of lies would have to be learned from or with others. Wittgenstein’s critique of Augustine’s picture of language also challenges a particular picture of a supreme and autonomous self. In place of God-given brains, Wittgenstein puts the learning couple: teacher and child.

A Condition of Derangement: Cavell Reads Wittgenstein with Klein

Whilst, as Mulhall notes, Augustine’s elders were not interested in teaching, the problem with Wittgenstein’s elders is that they do not do anything apart from teaching: “they seem to look upon their child’s suffering solely as an opportunity for education, as if their concern for him extended exclusively to his prospects as a fellow-speaker.” Both Wittgenstein and Augustine to some extent think about the infant very much in terms of a miniature adult. Cavell’s sense of the infant is very different. What strikes Cavell most about this passage is the philosopher’s description of “how isolated the child appears.” He similarly remarks on
“the absoluteness in [the child’s] initial incapacity to make itself known,” and “its absolute reliance on its elders’ recognition of its attempts at expression, that is, on their recognition of the grip of its needs as the medium of expression.”

This interest in the infant not merely as a learner but also as someone seeking—and failing—to make a connection with those around him indicates the fact that any consideration of Cavell’s view of language must be preceded or at least accompanied by an inquiry into separateness. In his reading of Augustine’s account the infant is not self-reliant; his vocalizations are not aimed at wreaking revenge, but by his cries, babbling and movements the infant longs to establish a connection to his elders. If his elders recognized this as an attempt at communication, Cavell’s Augustine does not tell us. It is the child’s absolute, permanent and utter isolation that makes him think of it as “mad,” and if “not exactly deranged,” then certainly “in the condition of derangement.”

“The World as Things” similarly speaks of “the child’s world as hedged with madness, negotiating melancholy for paranoia, reparation for destructiveness.”

No doubt, Cavell understands this absolute solitude in terms of “madness” or “derangement,” because behind his perception of the child’s derangement lies Cavell’s “experience of Melanie Klein’s accounts of the pre-verbal child’s development of experience in terms of paranoia and depression ....” It is important to note that, as the quirkiness of “my experience of Melanie Klein’s accounts” implies, Cavell reads Klein—and this will be hardly shocking for those familiar with his work—selectively and idiosyncratically. The unorthodoxy or eccentricity of a reading does not, however, make the lessons learnt from it less formative. On the contrary, an author’s thought may strike us most profoundly in places where she may have not taken it herself. Klein’s work on child analysis was revolutionary because it assumed a vivid inner life in infants—phantasies—long before Freud and another leading lady of child analysis, his daughter Anna, thought possible. In Klein’s developmental model, at birth the infant has a very rudimentary, unintegrated ego governed by strong
instincts, which are in a first instance directed at the mother’s breast. The infant’s instinctual desires translate into “greedy, erotic and destructive phantasies” where the infant imagines “attack[ing]” or “rob[bing]” the breast that in turn lead to persecutory phantasies in which the infant fears to be punished for these attacks.\(^{32}\) Klein’s violent account of the nursing situation is notorious, but for all the apparent crassness of her descriptions of a cannibalistic—and yes, mad—infant, these early occurrences in the infant’s phantasy life play an important role for healthy development. Cavell thinks of the “deranged” child’s experience in terms of paranoia and depression. In phantasy, Klein writes in “Weaning” (1936), “the child sucks the breast into himself, chews it up and swallows it; thus he feels that he has actually got it there, that he possesses the mother’s breast within himself, in both its good and in its bad aspects.”\(^{33}\) In this early or paranoid-schizoid stage the good breast—the breast that is felt to clench the infant’s desire—and the bad breast—the breast that is perceived to be unwilling or unable to do so—also become in phantasy the repositories of any good or bad experience the child makes. As Klein suggests in “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms” (1946), this binary splitting is an integral part of healthy development, as it helps the infant to integrate enough good experiences to provide an anchor to shore up the self against the onslaught of life’s challenges. The second term Cavell chooses to characterize his experience of the child’s condition of derangement through Klein is “depression”; and indeed if development precedes within the bounds of normality and health these extreme paranoid anxieties and schizoid defenses are given up and make way for the depressive position, in which the child feels protective of the now-integrated good object and guilty about its previous attacks on it.\(^{34}\)

These Kleinian positions are also what “The Interminable Shakespearean Text” in the context of Lear’s perception of Cordelia’s “thanklessness” describes as “the idea of aggressiveness causing, and caused by, gratitude for lavishness, or rather of ingratitude for the idea of lavishness withdrawn or delayed.”\(^{35}\) We also reencounter these positions in “What
is the Scandal of Skepticism?” where again Cavell draws on Klein’s idea of “original murderousness” to start imagining “a basis for recognizing responsibility towards the other, as a kind of reparation for my having failed to acknowledge the other.”36 In this reading of Klein, the child only begins to recognize the other when “the other, which sustains life with its nourishment, manifests its separateness,” for instance through an “inevitable” and “momentary withdrawal or withholding of nourishment.” Such a withholding causes first “a murderous rage: and then a “persecutory guilt” in the child and thus marks “the first developmental stage Klein calls the paranoid position,” which in times makes way for the “schizophrenic position, in which reparation is offered for the prior aggressiveness. (Now we have two poles of responsibility: the mother’s, which is total but comes to an end; and the child’s, which is derivative but which has no assigned end …).”37 In fact, the Kleinian positions are reversed here; nevertheless, the passage speaks eloquently of Cavell’s familiarity with Kleinian thought.

Although the defense mechanisms which Klein describes in “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms” are normal, they can under certain instances—for example “if persecutory fears are very strong”—form “the basis for later schizophrenic illness.”38 Whilst the processes Klein describes are limited to the infant’s phantasy life, “the effect of this phantasy is a very real one, because it leads to feelings and relations (and later on, thought-processes) being in fact cut off from one another.”39 Some shared features between Cavell’s descriptions of scepticism and Klein’s account of the paranoid-schizoid position are already becoming apparent: most prominently a sense of separation and the experience of a severing between inner and the outer. Equally, Augustine’s account of an angry, revenge-hungry and manipulative infant could come straight out of Klein. Despite the fact that with his description of the child as “deranged” Cavell draws on Klein and that there are indeed some
similarities between scepticism and the paranoid-schizoid position in particular, we must look elsewhere for the psychoanalytic kin to Cavell’s interpretation of scepticism.

The Nursing Couple: Adelman Reads Shakespeare with Winnicott and Cavell

There are good reasons to think about the resonances between Cavell and psychoanalysis, and object relations theory more in particular, in the context of Shakespeare: both his psychoanalytically most astute readings and his most eloquent impressions of the consequences and possible causes of the sceptic’s avoidance can be found in his work on the plays. My main guide in navigating the psychoanalytically rich ground of Cavell’s reading of Shakespearean tragedy is Janet Adelman. Despite an absolute silence on the subject in the scholarship on Cavell, Adelman is a strong influence on his interpretation of scepticism in and through Shakespearean tragedy, just as his work has informed her reading of the latter.40

Scrutinizing images of pregnancy, childbirth and nursing in the plays and contextualizing them with early modern ideas about a mother’s perilous influence, in her seminal Suffocating Mothers Adelman convincingly shows that Shakespeare’s tragic heroes recognize the origin of their unbearable predicaments to be maternal. As the Coriolanus essay “‘Anger’s My Meat’: Feeding, Dependency, and Aggression in Coriolanus” argues, her original interpretation of Shakespearean tragedy is drawn not from a generic understanding of psychoanalysis but more specifically from an interest in “feminism and object-relations psychoanalysis.”41 Object relations theory is of course commonly associated with Klein, but another notable proponent is Winnicott.
The fact that Adelman collocates her reading of tragedy in Cavell and Winnicott is crucial for any mapping of the conceptual resources that psychoanalysis and Ordinary Language Philosophy share. Both authors are, despite their demotion here to a footnote, a strong influence on her interpretation of tragedy through scepticism and vice versa:

In associating this crisis of faith specifically with the mother’s body and with the loss of interior aliveness, and the resolution of this crisis with the return of the capacity to play, I am following the insights of Winnicott, for whom the mother’s reliable response to the infant’s needs, especially in the nursing situation, creates “a belief that the world can contain what is wanted and needed, with the result that the baby has the hope that there is a live relationship between inner reality and external reality, between innate primary creativity and the world at large” (The Child, the Family, and the Outside World [Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964], p.90). (Cavell’s formulations are of course congruent with Winnicott’s; in his reading of The Winter’s Tale, birth stands for primary separation, what the sceptical annihilation of the world – like the paranoid’s refilling it with its own projections – is attempting to deny [Disowning Knowledge, esp. pp. 206–13]).

Adelman is right in thinking of Winnicott and Cavell together. In place of Klein’s emphasis on internal processes, instincts and phantasies, to which interpersonal relationships take a secondary role, Winnicott establishes the primary importance of interpersonal relations. Whilst for Klein the world that the infant learns about is met with innate instincts that are already present in them, in the picture that emerges from Winnicott’s account there are no such innate and primary phantasies to be satisfied. As Phillips puts it, Winnicott’s
infant “clamours for intimacy, not only for relief of tension—for relatedness, not simply for satisfaction.” Similarly, in Cavell’s reading of the passage from the *Confessions* the child’s existence and sanity depend on his elders’ ability and availability to heed it. It is utterly dependent on its elders to interpret “the grips of its needs as the medium of expression” The strangeness of the turn of phrase “the grips of its needs” renders well the intense and inchoate nature of the infant’s demands not for instinctual satisfaction but for connection. It is in the depiction of this intense drive to connect that Cavell’s proximity to Winnicott rather than Klein becomes evident.

The difference between Klein’s and Winnicott’s accounts may seem at first too psychoanalytically subtle to be pertinent to a reconsideration of a philosophical view of scepticism. Klein defends herself vigorously against the charge against her that all infants are deranged. And in fact the splitting mechanisms at work during the paranoid-schizoid stage can lead to but do not in themselves necessarily constitute madness. This is recognized in Cavell’s phrasing about the child being “not exactly deranged” but “in the condition of derangement.” Nevertheless, Klein equips the infant *ab initio* with aggressive phantasies, which the child learns to negotiate more or less well depending on the care it receives. For Winnicott, in early life there is no such condition of derangement; “ordinary babies are not mad,” he writes. Whilst his desire made Klein’s infant a madbaby, in Phillips imaginative phrase a “misfit,” Winnicott’s infant is determined in very different terms. This does not mean that the infant cannot become mad; Winnicott himself describes the individual from its very “beginnings of ’I am’” as “raw, … undefended, vulnerable, potentially paranoid.” But the crucial difference between Winnicott’s and Klein’s developmental accounts is this: any actual paranoia in the Kleinian infant is rooted in internally arising phantasy, whereas for Winnicott it originates primarily in the infant’s environment. On its path to health and maturity Klein’s infant cannot but help cross through a condition of derangement, whereas
Winnicott’s infant can hope to be spared it.\textsuperscript{50} Klein’s view that this inner life is governed by innate instinctual impulses could in fact not be further away from Cavell’s Wittgensteinian interpersonal view of self.\textsuperscript{51}

Just how different Winnicott’s views on the infant self is from Klein’s is clarified when considering his work on nursing. Although both Klein and Winnicott concentrate on the nursing situation, they focus on markedly different aspects: Klein describes the infant’s initiating aggression, whereas Winnicott always focuses on the infant as a dependent and relation-seeking part of the nursing-couple dyad. In a “Close-up of Mother Feeding Baby” (1949), Winnicott sketches an ordinary nursing situation, where the nipple is offered, contact with the mouth made, the infant suckles and then averts his face from the breast. Here, “the baby had an idea, and the breast with the nipple came, and a contact was made. Then the baby was finished with the idea and turned away, and the nipple disappeared.”\textsuperscript{52} Highly sensitive to her baby’s feelings, the ordinary devoted mother is, Winnicott argues (using no doubt unawares very Wittgensteinian terminology), “attuned.”\textsuperscript{53} Attunement is incidentally also the term chosen by developmental psychologist Daniel Stern to describe a feedback loop between mother and infant, in which both parties are, it seems, engaged in a finely tuned choreography and “attempting constantly to adjust their behaviour to one another’s.”\textsuperscript{54} In this ordinary nursing situation “natural feeding is given exactly when the baby wants it, and ceases as he ceases to want it.”\textsuperscript{55} The baby has the illusion of omnipotence; the nipple does not impinge on the infant, but is \textit{created} by them when needed. This illusion of omnipotence, made possible by the mother’s “adaptive technique,” has crucial developmental importance, because, as is already suggested in the passage from \textit{The Child, the Family, and the Outside World} cited in Adelman’s footnote on Winnicott and Cavell, it gives the baby “hope that there is a live relationship between inner reality and external reality, between innate primary creativity and the world at large.”\textsuperscript{56} In this early phase of development the mother’s
responsiveness allows the infant self to integrate and to become secure enough to be “alive” to itself and to others. A well-managed nursing situation hence helps the infant to come to terms with the primary separation that birth marks, and to integrate his self securely.

Nursing is also important in Adelman’s interpretation of Shakespearean tragedy, particularly in her reading of Coriolanus. There may indeed be no play of Shakespeare’s more concerned with the complex relationship between mother and child, crystallized in the nursing situation with its myriad of possibilities for fulfilment and frustration of needs. Coriolanus is filled to the brim with images of hunger, of neglect, of not having enough food, love, power. First amongst the unsatisfied: the nursing couple of Coriolanus and Volumnia, whose name already poses the question of a *volume* waiting to be filled, of a want. That the nursing situation should also haunt Cavell’s reading of Shakespearean tragedy speaks again to the strength of Adelman’s influence. Cavell notes the ear-whispering scene between Hermione and Mamillius in *The Winter’s Tale* with much interest. Here his sense of the “mutually seductive gestures” between Hermione and Mamillius—which name is again incidentally reminiscent of the maternal breast or mammilla and which brings to mind a much younger child—brings to mind Winnicott’s view of a well-managed nursing situation where mother and infant are wrapped up in each other. Whether through Adelman or by a more direct route, Winnicott’s notion of the central importance of the nursing situation finds its way into Cavell’s thinking about scepticism with and through Shakespearean tragedy. His focus on the nursing situation resonates strongly with object relation theory’s view of the foundational, integrative function of the first relationship rather than with Klein’s view of the instinctively aggressive infant.

Cavell shares Winnicott’s sense that infancy clarifies the conditions for scepticism. The importance of the mother–infant relationship is acknowledged throughout *Disowning Knowledge* and particularly in the “Introduction” where Cavell claims that “what philosophy
registers as uncertainty in our knowledge of the existence of the world is a function of, say intellectualization of, the child’s sense of loss in separating from the mother’s body.” At the same time, the terms with which Winnicott describes the effect of prolonged and consistent misattunement between mother and child bear striking resemblance to Cavell’s descriptions of scepticism. On a separate sheet of paper found attached to Winnicott’s chapter on the establishment of a relationship with external reality, in the posthumously published manuscript of *Human Nature*, he describes two kinds of relationship that can be the result of a failure of adaptation in infancy. The first is a “silent secret relationship to an essentially personal and private inner word of subjective phenomena,” which is essentially divorced from the outside world. In the other, a false self is formed. The infant becomes “a collection of reactions to impingement,” forever hiding behind “a false self, which complies with and generally wards off the world’s knocks.” In the first scenario, the true self, though “alive” or “real,” remains essentially incommunicable. In the second case, the self is, though compliant to the outside world, false. The false self is in a state of disintegration: “the term disintegration is used to describe a sophisticated defence, a defence that is an active production of chaos in defence against unintegration in the absence of maternal ego-support, that is, against the unthinkable or archaic anxiety that results from failure of holding in the stage of absolute dependence.” Importantly, although complete insularity of self is incompatible with health, the ability to access states of unintegration when the infant does not feel “a need to integrate, the mother’s ego-supportive function being taken for granted” is characterised as a developmental achievement. Cavell too thinks about the sceptic’s “conversion of metaphysical finitude into intellectual lack” in terms of a defensive mechanism as opposed to the ability to at times simply relax into one’s voice and separateness. It seems that Cavell’s and Winnicott’s views on the alignment of infancy and scepticism are truly, to borrow Adelman’s word, congruent. Further transposing Winnicottian
insights to Cavell’s reading of scepticism (like Adelman does), this means that we are born into the condition of scepticism (and up to here Klein would agree). Contra Klein, however, our sceptical condition flowers to scepticism not from the inside out, from something that we carry inside us, but from the outside in, from something that happens to us.

Cavell’s Separateness and Winnicott’s Aloneness

Whether or not one subscribes to the view that scepticism begins at the mother’s breast, the resonances between Winnicott’s and Cavell’s way of looking at infancy, particularly as heard in Adelman’s work, bring into view the particularity of Cavell’s interpretation of scepticism. For Adelman, the psychological fact behind the pronounced nursing and feeding imagery in Coriolanus is simple: “the taking in of food is the primary acknowledgment of one’s dependence on the world, and as such, it is the primary token of one’s vulnerability.” She understands the play’s obsessive returns to questions of feeding, starving and nursing as grappling with the issue of our vulnerability and mortality. For Adelman, then, what is at the heart of tragedy and the tragic hero’s predicament, is the avoidance of his separateness, exemplified par excellence in the infant’s vulnerability to and complete dependence on their mother. This is what Winnicott calls the “unthinkable or archaic anxiety” resulting from “absolute dependence.” Incidentally, this fear of vulnerability and dependence also provides his explanation for the misogyny that Adelman diagnoses in Shakespeare’s tragic heroes: “The general failure of recognition of absolute dependence at the start contributed to the fear of WOMAN that is the lot of both men and women.” Here aggression dissimulates and
most importantly defends vulnerability. The tragedy of this self-defense mechanism is that, following the logic of what Derrida calls autoimmunity, it destroys the very thing that it seeks to protect: a connection to others.

The fact of separateness dictates the vital importance of being able to connecting to others. But what is separateness? What Adelman’s tragic hero and what Cavell’s sceptic avoids is the fact that “we are separate, but not necessarily separated (by something); that we are, each of us, bodies, i.e. embodied; each is this one and not that, each here and not there, each now and not then.” For Winnicott too the primary separation of birth marks the fact that even when we are enclosed in our mother’s womb our body is separate from hers. The image Winnicott returns to again and again to think about these “earliest states” is one of two non-touching bubbles, a smaller one, the individual, enclosed within a bigger one, the first environment, the mother. In less than ideal circumstances, in which the environment encroaches or impinges on the individual, the momentum goes from the outside towards the inside and the outer bubble risks bursting the smaller bubble by pressing on it. Under near-perfect circumstances, the individual discovers his environment through his own movement, for instance through a move towards the nipple at the theoretical first feed or, earlier, through a movement in the womb. Here the border of the smaller bubble will move outwards to touch the larger bubble, but it will do so without bursting, remaining separate. In highlighting the importance of the primary relationship between infant and mother Cavell does not necessarily give scepticism a primal scene. He is, however, pointing us with renewed urgency toward the realization that the sceptic’s avoidance is triggered by the unavoidable and terrifying and terrifying because unavoidable fact that our bodies are separate from others, that our bodies are even at times separate from ourselves. And that we, like our bodies, are mortal.

The similarities to Winnicott bring to the surface a more granular picture of Cavell’s rather elusive concept of separateness. By his simple “diagrammatic representation” of the
smaller bubble enclosed in a bigger one Winnicott highlights the importance of the environment at this early stage for the long-term health of the individual. But he also posits “the absolute isolation of the individual” at birth.\textsuperscript{72} This primary and original isolation is not something that could be avoided or overcome but it forms “the basis of human nature in terms of individual development.”\textsuperscript{73} Even after the initial steps of development have been absolved—and in fact, like Cavell, Winnicott believes that our human development is never finished and that we are infinitely perfectible—this separateness remains. In fact, for Winnicott, to a large extent development can be understood as that arch which step after step takes the individual “towards recognition of the essential aloneness of the human being.”\textsuperscript{74} Beyond our ability to communicate and our enjoyment of being with others, each individual remains “an isolate, permanently non-communicating, permanently unknown, in fact unfound.”\textsuperscript{75} Riffing on his vocabulary, Phillips describes Winnicott’s self as “isolated, secret and silent.”\textsuperscript{76} One cannot but be struck by the similarities of this account of aloneness and Cavell’s description of the human condition of being “hidden and silent and fixed.”\textsuperscript{77}

\textit{The Claim of Reason} suggests that perhaps “we are forced to the concept of knowledge” when faced with the problem of scepticism, “because we do not quite know how to speak of the other’s aliveness to himself, his being together with himself, by himself, in as it were a private place, a place he has to himself.”\textsuperscript{78} The notion of “aliveness” is to be sure Winnicott’s and also describes the secure self’s ability to rest in states on unintegration. Cavell’s insistence on the condition of separateness as not being debilitating to human relationships but foundational to them is reminiscent of the way Winnicott views unintegration—as opposed to debilitating disintegration—as the point from which all development must commence. For Winnicott, our self is most alive and true when, not afraid of the dependence that our primary separation marks, we remain open to the experience of being unintegrated. For Cavell, too, the health of our bonds to others and ourselves depends on our ability to
resists the sceptical temptation of denying how separate, dependent and mortal we truly are. Does Cavell’s separateness then have to be understood in terms of Winnicott’s aloneness as the description of this “private place” seems to suggest? Both Winnicott and Cavell stress the absoluteness of privacy just as they do its importance. For Winnicott, everything that happens in early life is in service of protecting the inner, incommunicado, separate element which is “sacred and most worth of preservation.”79 For Cavell, the idea of privacy inherent in philosophy’s fantasy of a private language is, in fact, not radical enough, because it “fails to express how private we are, metaphysically and practically.”80 Our privacy is both less and more deep that the sceptic wants to admit. It is deeper, in the sense that our separateness, just like our mortality and the finiteness of our bodies cannot be intellectualized away. It is less deep, because this is not as much of a hindrance to our understanding each other as the sceptic would like us to believe.

There is a tendency to smooth over Cavell’s acknowledgment of separateness, undoubtedly because it feels too close to scepticism. Ordinary Language Philosophy is traditionally understood to counter scepticism by insisting on the ordinariness of our connection to each other. Cavell’s work shows to the contrary that an insistence on the ordinariness of our connection to each other does not have to entail a denial of our common separateness, but must entail our full acknowledgment of it. The fact that both Winnicott and Cavell embrace the fact of separateness does not make them sceptics. Quite the opposite, as Adelman rightly notes, “birth stands for the primary separation, what the sceptical annihilation of the world … is attempting to deny.”81 Indeed, the avoidance of the separateness that our primary dependence on our mother symbolizes would precisely mean falling back into scepticism’s compulsive patterns. For Winnicott, “the traumatic experiences that can lead to the organization of primitive defences, belong to the threat to an isolated core, the threat of its being found, altered, communicated with.”82 Cavell argues very much
along the same lines in offering a new reading of the sceptic’s fantasy of private language “as an attempt to account for, and protect, our separateness, our unknowingness, our unwillingness or incapacity either to know or to be known.” For both thinkers, separateness _an sich_ is not a problem; indeed it is a possibility that for neither can be avoided and therefore must be acknowledged. This is something that is deeply understood in Cavell’s reading of the motif of nurturing in _Coriolanus_. In his way of looking at the play, the “condition of insatiability (starving by feeding, feeding as deprivation)” manifested by Coriolanus and Volumnia “is a condition sometimes described as the infiniteness of desire, imposing upon the finiteness of the body.” The problem arises when they do not recognise that this hunger manifests not an occasional lack but a condition of lack as “a name or a definition of the human, like being mortal.” Coriolanus and Volumnia are insatiable not because they are starving; they are starving because they are insatiable. The problem of scepticism is not brought about by the possibility of separateness, but by an inability, or an unwillingness, to accept its givenness.

_Philosophy’s Holding Environment_

Can there be such a thing as an ordinary-language psychoanalysis? Can philosophy become psychoanalysis and still know itself? For both Cavell and Winnicott the border between philosophy and psychoanalysis is permeable. More surprising even than Cavell’s association of philosophical issues and psychoanalytic concerns is Winnicott’s repeated acknowledgments in _Human Nature_ that psychoanalytic issues may also be of philosophical
concern. The philosophical problem of scepticism is inserted in a list of matters that he deems pertinent to the issue of human development. Thus “the practical matter of the management of the mother and infant in the first hours and days after a baby is born,” significantly also including the first feed, is enumerated alongside “the claim of the psychotic that what is not real is real, and the claim of the antisocial child that what is untrue is true and that dependence (which is a fact) is not a fact” and, most importantly, “the philosophical problem of the meaning of the word ‘real’.”

The suggestion here is that the dynamics of the first interactions between mother and infant, for example at the breast, are pertinent to whether a psychotic, or an antisocial child or indeed a philosopher are able to distinguish what ordinarily counts as real. Winnicott’s view implies that a lack of good-enough care can flower into a certain type of philosophical inquiry. A baby who has received persistently good-enough care might come to the conclusion that “I know that there is no direct contact between external reality and myself, only an illusion of contact, a midway phenomenon that works very well for me when I am not tired. I couldn’t care less that there is a philosophical problem involved.” For this baby the philosophical problem of scepticism has no real bite. On the other hand, the baby who, due to less-fortunate circumstances, was not able to create a sense of continuity between inner and outer is “really bothered by the idea of there being no direct contact with external reality.” In contrast to the fortunate baby, who is able to acknowledge separateness as a fact that does not necessarily threaten his integrity, for this baby “the philosophical problem becomes and remains a vital one, a matter of life and death, of feeding or starvation, of love or isolation.” Put somewhat simplistically, what is suggested is that good-enough care in early life can impart resilience to the philosophical problem of scepticism. In this picture psychoanalysis can become philosophy’s “holding environment,” a term which for Winnicott can mean both the maternal environment in which the infant is held and the analytic setting in
which the analyst helps the patient restore health by fulfilling a version of the maternal function for them.

“It is not every philosopher who sees that this problem that besets every human being is a description of the initial relationship to external reality at the theoretical first feed; or for that matter at any theoretical first contact,” Winnicott writes. Winnicott’s sense that in the case of some children “some degree of primitive agony has to be carried on into life and living,” is matched by Cavell’s claim that “in [his] own limited experience with children, certainly they are having problems that eventually, we know, as they flower, will become philosophical issues.” But it is with Winnicott’s notion that philosophical problems can be solved psychoanalytically that these projects leave common ground, undoubtedly also because Cavell’s interest in the infant is not clinical but figurative. Cavell notes that although Freud’s contention that the interpretation of dreams may lead to results that philosophy might be interested in can be taken to mean that “our vain waiting for philosophy is now to be replaced by the positive work of something else, call it psychoanalysis.” Alan Badiou has suggested that in maintaining that a grounding in anti-philosophy should be part of psychoanalytic training, Lacan characterized philosophy not as the guardian of knowledge but rather as the victim of a particular kind of ignorance. For Cavell, psychoanalysis is not such an anti-philosophy, neither is it a savior come to redeem philosophy. If he is critical of philosophy he is even more severe with psychoanalysis:

But psychoanalysis has not surmounted the obscurities of the philosophical problematic of representation and reality it inherits. Until it stops shrinking from philosophy (from its own past), it will continue to shrink before the derivative question, for example, whether the stories of its patients are fantasy merely or (also?)
of reality; it will continue to waver between regarding the question as irrelevant to its work and as the essence of it.”

The most eloquent passage about Cavell’s commitment to philosophy as opposed to psychoanalysis is paradoxically also one of his most eloquent invocations of Winnicott. It can be found in the “Remarks from Discussion” following Vincent Colapietro’s paper in *The Education of Grownups* on voice and philosophy. Ruminating on the possibility of doing philosophy with children Cavell remarks:

> It gives me the creeps when certain kinds of adults are very impatient with them [children], perhaps dismissing them as silly. There is real work to be done here. Where does the light go when it’s out? ... And I think that those things can be addressed as though they are heartfelt problems, not just words. So what is the bargain you are establishing to be? A holding environment? That’s what Winnicott calls it, and a classroom is also a kind of holding environment.

Here, the place of philosophical instruction, the classroom, has become just as much as the space in which the parent–child dynamic unfolds, a “holding environment.” The audacity of this comparison lies in the conviction it expresses, namely that philosophical instruction can do if not the same, then some of the work that good-enough mothering can do in Winnicott’s developmental model: it can establish or re-establish health.

Like Wittgenstein’s project, Cavell’s is first and foremost meta-philosophical, it is concerned with reforming or healing philosophy by offering an alternative, albeit still philosophical, path of inquiry. Like Wittgenstein’s, Cavell’s project can only be called anti-philosophical if one concedes that he counters philosophy with nothing but itself.
Winnicott implies that philosophy is a condition once the first holding environment has failed, Cavell believes that philosophy can become a holding environment unto itself.

2 Ibid., 24.

3 Cavell, “Finding Words.”


7 Cavell, *Must We Mean What We Say?* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 52.


13 Cavell, *Little Did I Know*, 414. Much more remains to be said about the similarities between Winnicott’s and Cavell’s conceptions of the ordinary, for instance that for both the “ordinary” often expresses a wish. See Phillips, *Winnicott*, 140.


20 Ibid., 47–8.

21 Ibid., 43–4.


25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., 36.


29 Ibid.


37 Ibid.


39 Ibid., 6.

40 I have written elsewhere on the depth of influence of Adelman’s insights into Shakespearean tragedy on Cavell’s reading of them.


42 Ibid., 359.


44 Phillips, Winnicott, 9.

45 Cavell, Philosophical Passages, 170.

46 See in particular Klein, “Notes on some Schizoid Mechanisms.” The crassness of Klein’s account of early infancy is often exaggerated. See Meira Likierman, Melanie Klein: Her Work in Context (London and New York: Continuum, 2001) for a balanced account of her work.

47 Cavell, Philosophical Passages, 170.


51 Wittgenstein’s view is ultimately incompatible with Klein’s account of development. Although it acknowledges the interplay between internal and external factors, Klein puts the emphasis on the internal aspect first. As Daniele Moyal-Sharrocks suggests, the picture of self that emerges from the third Wittgenstein is in contrast externalist and interpersonal. See Moyal-Sharrocks’s discussion of the mind-behaviour gap in
Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 203. Claudine Verheggen has done consonant important work on the similarities between Wittgenstein’s and Donald Davidson’s accounts of language acquisition. Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the teacher is testament to the fact that he gives the communitarian even interpersonal view of language acquisition and self-formation more credence. Whilst it is true that Wittgenstein does not do away with the idea that there is something given, even natural, about our forms of life, these are always in interplay with external factors. See Claudine Verheggen, “‘How Social Must Language Be?’” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 36:2 (2006): 203-219 and Triangulating With Davidson.” The Philosophical Quarterly 57:226 (2007): 96-103.


56 Adelman, Suffocating Mothers, 359.

57 Cavell, Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 194.

58 Ibid., 13.


60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.


63 Ibid.

64 Cavell, Disowning Knowledge, 138.


Winnicott. “Primary Maternal Preoccupation” [1956], in Through Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis (London: The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1975), 304. In light of this insight, Winnicott’s claim and Cavell’s intimation that the self’s health depends on the mother is even more contentious and controversial, not the least because the idolization of woman is merely the obverse of misogyny. In these accounts, the mother risks becoming a metaphysical presence, just like she does in Augustine where thanks to some transubstantive magic the human milk the infant suckles from is in fact divine (see Augustine, Confessions, 43). Winnicott is rightly praised for championing a no-nonsense approach to motherhood by positing that it was by no means necessary to be perfect, but that being an ordinary good-enough-mother would do. One can, however, not help wonder whether behind the modern enlightenment there still lurk old hang-ups. See Elissa Marder The Mother in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction: Psychoanalysis, Photography, Deconstruction (New York: Fordam University Press, 2012) for an illuminating account of the uncanny status of the mother in philosophy.


70 Ibid., 127.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid., 131.


75 Phillips, Winnicott, 150.

76 Cavell, Disowning Knowledge, 109.

77 Cavell, Claim of Reason, 367.


79 Ibid., 356.

80 Adelman, Suffocating Mothers, 359.


85 Ibid.


87 Ibid., 114–15.

88 Ibid., 115.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid., 114.

91 Winnicott, *Babies and Their Mothers*, 38.


93 Cavell, “Freud and Philosophy,” 388.


95 Cavell, “Freud and Philosophy,” 393.

96 Cavell, “Remarks from discussion,” 147.