Deleuze and the Author

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This dissertation is dedicated to James P. and Mamie Kennedy, and to Daniel Joseph and Margaret McLaughlin.
Abstract

This thesis argues that Gilles Deleuze, as philosopher, reader, and critic, recognised the central importance of a defined authorial subjectivity, closely associated with a philosophical or intellectual project, and that his analyses of philosophy, literature, visual art and cinema were shaped and determined by his recognition of that authority. In this respect, my reading challenges those critics who find in the work of Deleuze an assault on ‘author-centric’ interpretations of texts, and more generally on the concept of a unified self, and which uphold experimentation on the part of the reader or critic rather than interpretation. I argue that Deleuze has a coherent and meaningful conception of an author as a consciousness which persists through time, learns, plans and makes projects, differentiates itself from the work of other authors, is inspired and creative, takes positions in relation to the inheritance of artistic and philosophical traditions, and which is capable of entering into collaboration with others.

Through close reading of Deleuze’s texts, I demonstrate that he consistently relies on the authorial function to impose unity and coherence on the distinctive - and often remarkable - body of work of an individual theorist or practitioner. I argue that the historical, political and social situation of an author is of great importance to the analysis of a text. Finally, unlike Roland Barthes or other critics invested in the ‘death’ or displacement of the author, I argue that Deleuze considers the competing interpretations of a text advanced by the reader or spectator to be of little or no importance.
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List of Abbreviations

Works by Gilles Deleuze

(ES)  Empiricism and Subjectivity

(NP)  Nietzsche and Philosophy

(PS)  Proust and Signs

(DR)  Difference and Repetition

(LS)  The Logic of Sense

(S)  Spinoza: Practical Philosophy

(FB)  Francis Bacon: Logic of Sensation

(C1)  Cinema 1 – The Movement-Image

(C2)  Cinema 2 – The Time-Image

(F)  Foucault

(ECAC)  Essays Critical and Clinical

(DI)  Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974


Works by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari

(AO)  Anti-Oedipus

(K)  Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature

(ATP)  A Thousand Plateaus

(WIP)  What is Philosophy?

Works by Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet

(D)  Dialogues II
Introduction

My thesis will seek to make an intervention in a major theoretical debate on the continued importance of the figure of the author, and on what Michel Foucault terms ‘the authorial function’, to our understanding of philosophy and art, an intervention which takes as its focus the work of the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze’s philosophy is often characterised as both ‘anti-identitarian’ and anti-hierarchical. This is because in his philosophical texts, notably *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze argues that we should think of difference in itself, rather than as a secondary or negative moment in the reproduction of identity. His well-known critique of representation in art, and thought more generally, starts from his premise that ‘infinite representation does not free itself from the principle of identity as a presupposition of representation’ (DR,60). A philosophy with difference at its centre, on the other hand, which would thus seek to free itself, at least to some extent, from this principle of identity, presents a challenge to any model of the production of thought which depends on identities that are fixed and stable, a question to which I shall return in this introduction.

In his interviews and short opinion pieces, too, Deleuze often rails against the position in France of public intellectuals, educators and opinion-formers, whose exalted position he views as both an outgrowth of state power, and the cause of a society trained to respect authority and ‘good sense’. At first glance then, the reader might expect Deleuze to be engaged in those currents of mid-twentieth century French thought which downplay or even attempt to nullify the significance of the author altogether. Instead, one might think he would celebrate the free play of interpretation enabled by an alternative critical paradigm which emphasises the salient importance of the response of the diverse body of readers or
spectators to our understanding of a given philosophical text or work of art. However, I shall argue that Deleuze still has a strong reliance on a quasi-transcendental authorial function, the operation of which determines his approach to the texts of the philosophers and artists he writes about, and in particular, determines his injunctions to his readers on the correct way to read the texts he analyses.

Deleuze often does not acknowledge – and sometimes explicitly denies – the role played by the authorial function in his own philosophy. He states for example in an interview on the subject of the French ‘New Philosophers’ that ‘the expressing subject takes itself all the more seriously in relation to empty propositions’. He thus contrasts his own work with the vanity and emptiness of the New Philosophers: ‘We’ve been trying to uncover creative functions which would no longer require an author-function for them to be active (in music, painting, audio-visual arts, film, and even philosophy)’ (TRM, 139). Nevertheless, without an understanding of the central importance of the figure of the author to Deleuze’s own methods of analysis, I believe that we cannot properly understand his diverse range of texts on philosophy, literature, visual art or cinema.

Deleuze in fact often uses an author-centric approach to structure his own body of work, given that a great many of his books deal principally with the thought or work of one philosopher or artist only, and contain a proper name in their titles, sometimes in association with a major concept. The fact that he often chooses to structure his analyses of broad fields of thought around one ‘great name’ is indicative of an approach to philosophy and art that both uses the figure of the author to imprint meaning on a text or a field of thought, and to limit the acceptable range of critical responses to it.
This thesis therefore will intervene in a crowded and growing field of critical work on Deleuze. I believe that part of its original argument is its treatment of Deleuze in relation to the authorial function *in general* – that is, as it exists in a broadly similar form across his whole body of work, in relation to all the different branches of thought that he writes about.

Most scholars implicitly follow the methodology Deleuze and his collaborator Félix Guattari outline in *What is Philosophy?* in which they analyse three different branches of thought (art, philosophy, science) separately, but draw parallels between them. By the same logic, much of the critical commentary on Deleuze and the author or authors focuses exclusively on Deleuze’s relationship to only one class of thinker: philosophers, novelists, film-makers, artists and so on.¹ Even that minority of critics, such as Julie Kuhlken, who gesture towards bridging this division in the literature by positing intermediate classes of thinker, such as ‘artist-philosopher’, do not fundamentally challenge the original distinction. Instead, Kuhlken suggests that an ‘artist-philosopher’ merely denotes a philosopher who works in close association with an artist, using his or her work as a resource. ‘To call someone an artist-philosopher is not to imply that he is somehow not a philosopher, and thus does not challenge the distinction made by Deleuze and Guattari. Rather, the notion of the artist-philosopher introduces the very Deleuzian idea that philosophers collaborate with practitioners of other disciplines to generate their concepts.’²

This lack of a broad-based analysis of Deleuze’s work as a whole in relation to the concept of authorship is the deficit in the literature which this project is intended to address. Nevertheless, the existing state of the field is part of the justification for the organising logic of the different chapters of the dissertation, which address in turn Deleuze’s relationship to philosophers, novelists, artists,

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¹ This principle has governed, for example, the organising assumptions of the University of Edinburgh series on Deleuze.
and film-makers. I will further argue that existing critical literature on Deleuze misses the inconsistencies and tensions which develop between his own stated philosophical positions (particularly those worked out in conjunction with Guattari), which valorise flows of intensities, the rhizome, and experimentation rather than interpretation (the AND...AND rather than OR), and the ways he actually treats the philosophers, novelists and other thinkers which he writes about.

I have conceived of this project, therefore, as an imaginative reconstruction of the figure of the author and the authorial function as it relates to and is expressed in the whole of Deleuze’s work. This approach has meant that my main preoccupation in this thesis is not to pass judgement on the broader merits of the position of Deleuze (and Guattari) on the authorial function. Instead, this thesis has sought to establish this position through a close reading not just of Deleuze’s explicit statements about authors and authorship, but of how he actually treats the individual ‘author’ figures (philosophers, novelists, film-makers and visual artists) that he writes about. I have used a method which could be deemed, in Deleuzian terms, ‘transversal’, in that I have drawn equivalences and horizontal links between the different types of authors, and related concepts, described in the different chapters of this thesis, and have sought to construct an argument based on that fundamental equivalency at a certain level, which, I hope, will bring into relief the solid foundational concepts underpinning Deleuze’s work. Such a method starts from the premise that we can meaningfully discuss concepts such as ‘style’ while using evidence from a range of Deleuze’s works which cross disciplinary boundaries, treating, for example, both visual art and literature.
This thesis however is also intended to provide a resource for the wider debate on the continued meaning and relevance of the notion of ‘authorship’ to contemporary philosophical and aesthetic studies. I am broadly in agreement with the position that I here attribute to Deleuze and Guattari: that it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to produce sustained useful and critical work in philosophy or aesthetics without reliance on, at least as some level, a meaningful notion of the author. I hope therefore that this thesis will contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the authorial function, and will discourage a firm dismissal of this reading strategy, even for those engaging with the more radical notions of experimentation versus interpretation in the production of philosophical and literary texts, and artworks, which have been advanced in the last few decades. Indeed, it is my position that such notions of radical experimentation and liberational, anti-hierarchical production of thought need not wholly dispense with ‘authorship’ at all.

In this introduction, I will first define what I understand by the authorial function, and how I intend to trace its presence in the work of Deleuze. I shall examine the confrontations that were going on in mid-twentieth century France with the notion of authorship, the intellectual context in which Deleuze would work, and briefly look at the development of the debate since then. I shall briefly trace, using in particular Foucault’s seminal piece ‘What is an Author?’ the centrality of the authorial function to intellectual production dating from early Christian theological writings, an importance which only increased in the Romantic era, in which the figure of the author began to take on a quasi-divine status. I shall then attempt to trace the reactions to it that began with the fascination with anonymity that occupied Foucault and Maurice Blanchot, and that culminated in Roland Barthes’ attempt to remove the author from our understanding of the text altogether, treating his or her interpretation
of the text as merely one, of no special value, in that sea of potential interpretations and connotations brought to the text by each new reader.

This thesis will therefore seek to situate Deleuze in and contrast him with an intellectual tradition originating in the work of Ferdinand de Saussure. Saussure’s work on linguistics – which founded the school of thought that became known as Structuralism – was a major influence on Foucault and Barthes, among others. The structuralists argued that meaning could be generated by location within systems, be they linguistic, economic, or cultural. In this respect, Structuralism was a response to and correction of Existentialism, with its emphasis on the autonomy of the individual subject. The shift from Structuralism to Post-structuralism – which played out in the work of such figures as Barthes, Foucault, Jacques Derrida, as well as Deleuze – involved a further questioning of the inherent stability of the meaning of referents or signifiers, and an exploration of the relations of power involved in the maintenance of any given structure, with at the same time a critique of the ahistorical, anti-humanist, and static nature of structuralist analysis. The post-structuralist turn thus further destabilised and problematised the meaning of the signifier, and theorists such as Barthes argued for the recognition of multiple, conflicting and overlapping webs of meaning in any text which derive from connotation as well as denotation. While it does not necessarily enhance our understanding to apply the label ‘poststructuralist’ (still less, structuralist) to Deleuze, these broader developments clearly deeply influenced and were influenced by his work, and so an examination of the persistence of a humanist perspective in Deleuze’s work sheds light on much broader questions about this period in intellectual history also.
I shall argue that even those theorists who were critical of the enhanced figure of the author—among which I would include Foucault, Deleuze as well as Jean-Paul Sartre—rely on a version of the authorial function to prevent their analysis of texts from lapsing into incoherence and pure relativism, in which nothing definitive can be said about a text, because every interpretation is as valuable as every other. I also argue that these thinkers, and in particular Deleuze, rely on the unifying effect that an author’s proper name has on his or her body of work, which therefore allows the critic to trace and develop themes and common concerns across a series of texts all authored by the same thinker. I will suggest that the critic of philosophy, literature or art relies upon an intellectual operation such as the one performed by the authorial function to connect up different texts together and render them into a coherent whole. I will therefore seek to show how necessary the appreciation of authorial intention was for Deleuze, in particular an understanding of an author’s defining project, which gives impetus and meaning to the production of each new text.

The key features of the Authorial Function

I begin by turning to the authorial function itself. My guiding text for this will be Foucault’s ‘What is an author?’. Foucault’s own work and defining intellectual project, the ‘genealogical’ investigation into meaning, required him to make a direct confrontation with the authorial function and the ways in which it imposed meaning on a text. However, I agree with Paisley Livingston that the best way to look at the authorial function as it is described in ‘What is an Author’ is as a set of injunctions and interpretative strategies imposed on the reader, guiding him or her as to the correct and incorrect ways to interpret a text or series of texts. The concern of Foucault’s piece is less with a broad definition of what it means to
be an author, but rather with the ways in which the figure of the author interacts with and determines our reading strategies. Such a view of the authorial function is also shared by Barthes, who argues that the authorial function is actually a practice of criticism which seeks to ‘give’ an author to a text which otherwise would not have one, thus allowing the critic, through a process of discovery of the author, to conquer the text and reveal its ultimate meaning: ‘To give an author to a text is to impose on it a stop clause, to furnish it with a final signification, to close the writing.’

As Foucault himself says, the authorial function can be seen as ‘a projection, in more or less psychologising terms, of the operations we force texts to undergo, the connections we make, the traits we establish as pertinent, the continuities we recognise, or the exclusions we practice’: practises which, in his view, continued even after theorists such as Barthes proclaimed the author’s supposed ‘death’. The key debates at play therefore are around legitimate textual authority and source of ultimate meaning. Gregg Lambert contextualises the issue in this way: “Early texts like Barthes’ ‘Death of the Author’ and Foucault’s ‘What is an author?’ for example, can more accurately be understood as intense theological debates that sought to wrest the authority of the text from its theological image and to liberate interpretative activity from its early Christian origins.”

Foucault’s concept of the author emerges from his theories about the development of individualism in the west. He traced the growth of a liberal bourgeois ideology which sanctified private property, including, most relevantly to our discussion, the notion of ‘intellectual property’, which compelled the attribution to a named individual of a text,

theory, or intellectual project. Foucault did, however, hold out the possibility that in a future society, one not governed by the principles of capitalist individualism, there might develop some other provision for the regulation and constraint of polysemous fictional texts. But significant for our purpose here is that Foucault did not consider either possible or desirable that there could be no such regulation of any kind at all. Foucault’s short piece therefore establishes the authorial function as “the repetition, in transcendental terms, of both the religious principle of inalterable and yet never fulfilled tradition, and the aesthetic principle of the work’s survival, its perpetuation beyond the author’s death”. This issue draws on two very deep-rooted strands of western thought.

**Theoretical and Stylistic Unity**

Drawing on the work of Saint Jerome, Foucault argues that the classical notion of authorship derives from a view of the individual which stresses the persistence of more or less fixed character traits, abilities, and convictions through time. This allows us to posit the first major characteristic of the authorial function: that the author’s proper name must impose a theoretical and logical unity on a body of work. A single body of work must not contain unexplained doctrinal or theoretical contradictions, and when analysing any particular concept elaborated by a given author, we should be able to draw supporting evidence from any text he wrote. Of particular relevance for the study of philosophers, such a view of authorship operates on the assumption that the same philosophical concepts will therefore be found elaborated and developed across the body of work of a given author. This is a critical methodology that assumes the persistence on that author’s part of a particular intellectual perspective, as well as philosophical, political, aesthetic or other investments.

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6 Foucault, ‘What is an Author’, p105.
and commitments. As we shall shortly discuss, this position seems to conform to the tradition critiqued by Deleuze, who claims that the history of western philosophy was a celebration of the Same and the Ideal, and ultimately therefore, of authority. As Foucault argues, ‘the fact that several texts have been placed under the same name indicates that there has been established among them a relationship of homogeneity, filiation, authentication of some texts by the use of others, reciprocal explication, or concomitant utilisation’⁷. Where changes of position and shifts of emphasis do occur in a given text, or series of texts, the classical view of the author would hold that they cannot happen either randomly or without a clear justification. Instead, they must be explicable by reference to a continuous personality which is engaged in the process of learning and growing, thus: ‘The author is also the principle of a certain unity of writing - all differences having to be resolved, at least in part, by the principles of evolution, maturation, or influence.’⁸ This capacity of the authorial persona to learn and mature is an necessary corollary to the effective function of the author’s name as a unifying force on a disparate group of texts, since otherwise, without such an appreciation of intellectual development, unity would often be impossible to construct.

As important as doctrinal coherence to the classical perspective described in ‘What is an Author?’ is a certain unity of style. Foucault’s text takes a rather extreme position on this point: the classical authorial function he describes holds that an author’s works must all be written in the same style and with the same means of expression, and that style is what gives the work its individual character. However, as I shall go on to discuss in my thesis, while for Deleuze style need not be uniform across the different texts in a given body of

⁷ Foucault, ‘What is an Author’, p107.
⁸ Foucault, ‘What is an Author’, p111.
work, there should be some recognisable stylistic commonality between (in particular) different texts by a literary author, or different films by the same director. A given author’s body of work must somehow be distinctive: each text must contain, in one way or another (for example – means of expression, style of language or image, clarity of concept, and so on) the individualising mark of some aspect of the author’s personality or capacity for expression. Thus for some classes of author style can perform the unifying function on a given body of work that, for other classes of author, a defining philosophical problem or concept, or, in theological terms, a doctrine, can.

In his late-career reflections on style, Barthes, too, in a retreat from some of his earlier positions, posits the author as a being who persists and develops in time, rather than existing as a transitory ‘event’, with only very limited and immediate relevance to one given text. Barthes’ later position acknowledges the need for learning, maturation and personal growth in the development of a style. Though the author does not consciously adopt a personal style, his past and personal history is relevant to it. Such history plays a role in determining that style’s formation, and its unconscious and almost involuntary expression: ‘Imagery, delivery, vocabulary spring from the body and the past of the writer and gradually become the very reflexes of his art. Thus under the name of style a self-sufficient language is evolved which has its roots only in the depths of the author’s personal and secret mythology’. A distinctive style associated with the proper name of an author can unify a body of work, particularly that of a literary author, by giving those texts a commonality.

To give a sense of the significance of the operation that the authorial function plays with regard to the unity of a text or a series of texts, let us consider a comparison with the similar

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role played by narrative itself, as it is analysed in Paul Ricoeur’s *Time and Narrative*. This work uses narrative as a solution to the problem Ricoeur presents of how we can think the phenomenological subject as a being persisting through time: what Ricoeur terms the ‘self-constancy of the subject’, something it is difficult to grasp from the standpoint of the immediacy of our experience. For Ricoeur, ‘Self-sameness, “self-constancy”, can escape the dilemma of the Same and the Other to the extent that its identity rests on a temporal structure that conforms to the model of dynamic identity arising from the poetic composition of a narrative text.’\(^{10}\) In other words, Ricoeur uses the composition of a narrative text as a model for the structure that allows him to present and to conceive of the subject as an accumulation of lived experience: an identity which is constructed and amended over time. This dynamic or narrative identity is precisely the result of the process of ‘telling a story’ about someone, constructing a picture of an individual or a community which may be constantly refigured ‘by the reflective application of such narrative configurations’\(^{11}\). A subject telling a story about herself – such as the author of an autobiography – would thus both configure and be configured by her own text: ‘the story of a life continues to be refigured by all the truthful or fictive stories a subject tells about himself or herself’\(^{12}\). Conversely, ‘Without the recourse to narration, the problem of personal identity would in fact be condemned to an antinomy with no solution’\(^{13}\). Narrative, in other words, plays an effectively transcendental role in Ricoeur’s analysis of temporality, and thus serves to regulate contradictions or antinomies at that level.

\(^{11}\) Ibid
\(^{12}\) Ibid
\(^{13}\) Ibid
Ricoeur’s interest here is in using narrative (historical or fictive) as a solution to the problem of personal identity, but the connection he identifies between the ‘self-constant self’ and narrative identity – which he explicitly refers to as a circular relation - has implications for our concept of the author also. The relationship between the narrative of a life, and the self-constant subject, can serve as a model for our relation between author and text. Narrative brings structure and unity to the different events making up the life of an individual subject, it unifies these events in a coherent whole. We can thus speak of a ‘narrative function’ at the root of our conception of the subject. In the same way, the authorial function allows us to bring together all the different elements, associations, and connotations which make up a single text, and compose of them a unified whole. Each text is part of a greater body of work, which is brought together and defined by key personal characteristics of the author, such as a defining project, style, or personal commitment. A narrative is composed in time, just like a body of work. However, the explicit circularity of Ricoeur’s argument also has implications for our understanding of the author, because the author too is composed as a subject by his or her relations with the different texts. The identity of the author as a constant self is thus forged precisely by the act of composing and accumulating successive texts, so that one becomes the author of a body of work: ‘Individual and community are constituted in their identity by taking up narratives that become for them their actual history.’

I believe it is worth stating at this point that the same assumptions about the unifying force an author’s proper name has on a series of different texts have guided my own approach to this thesis, as they guide the approach of many scholars in my position in their research on philosophers or literary figures. This thesis will use as evidence works written throughout

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Deleuze’s career, from his early philosophical monographs such as *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, to the two-volume project on cinema written decades later, and including the four books he wrote in collaboration with Guattari. While, at times in the advancement of my argument, I will note shifts in position which occurred between ‘early’ and ‘late’ Deleuze, or between ‘pre-Guattari’ and ‘post-Guattari’ Deleuze, my methodological approach has been to treat each one of these texts as a potential and equally valuable source of evidence for the claims I intend to make about Deleuze and his intellectual projects. I do not, therefore, claim that the ‘post-Guattari’ Deleuze is in any way more philosophically important, more worthy of comment, or in some way truer to his own positions than his earlier self. Such a position on my part involves making very basic assumptions about the theoretical and conceptual unity of Deleuze’s work, even taking into account the very significant mid-career collaboration, which has no equivalent in the careers of most philosophers.

If indeed we are to posit the author as an intellect which persists through time, and which develops an intellectual project, or a major theme, over the course of writing several texts, this has further implications as to how we perceive what an author actually does. An author then would become what he or she is with, and as a result of, time, reflection (both on oneself, and on one’s work) and labour.

In this respect, it is also valuable to consider the forms of discourse, in the early classical period, which had as their object the poet or literary author, often then distinguished by the term ‘artist’, and on the kind of activity practised by that artist. Artist was a term which then had a broader meaning than it does today. It then referred to someone who practised the Beaux-arts, or in other words, a craftsman, a person with a fairly low social status. As Paul
Bénichou argues, citing Diderot’s encyclopaedia, ‘The word ‘artist’ only designated, in the middle of the 18th century, a worker skilled in the application of a delicate technique.’¹⁵. This kind of worker or craftsman is endowed with utility and skill rather than, necessarily, with what will come to be called genius, talent or inspiration. These kinds of skill are, moreover, learned, developed and gradually perfected over time, they do not adhere to the practitioner as an innate property or trait. In the case of manufacturers of objects, the proper name of the artisan would be used to distinguish a particular piece, to give it the stamp of authenticity, as having been produced by a certain person and according to a certain technique. Consequently, the practice of the artist in the early modern period was viewed first and foremost as the repeated application of such a technique rather than, necessarily, as a genuinely original act of creation.

Like other artisans, authors are, according to this conception, members of a professional class, set apart because they devoted time to mastering an acquired skill, and who write works as a result of the conscious application of this skill. By this artisanal logic also, a writer’s work should be considered a finished product, and not therefore an open site for continued contestation and elaboration on the part of others. An artist was precisely, and simply, ‘whoever is competent in whichever technique’¹⁶.

Authorial Intention

Inherent in our understanding of the preceding positions too is an appreciation of the centrality of authorial intention, which is the second major point at stake in my analysis of the authorial function. Indeed, for thinkers such as Livingston, intention is the most

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¹⁶ Bénichou, Le Sacré de l’Écrivain, p423.
fundamental question there is for our understanding of authorship. Livingston holds that it is impossible to conceive of major intellectual projects which proceed without a conscious and intended application of a particular technique, skill, or talent. The definition of ‘author’ he thus offers us has intention as its sole characteristic, as he states: ‘author = (def.) an agent who intentionally makes an utterance, where the making of an utterance is an action, an intended function of which is expression or communication’\(^\text{17}\). Such a definition, which Livingston qualifies as ‘partial intentionalist’ would, for example, preclude a computer which randomly generates sequences of words from being considered the ‘author’ of the resulting text, but the programmer of that computer might be so considered. The very breadth of Livingston’s definition would, of course, mean that anyone who writes a Christmas card or a text message would also be considered an ‘author’: there is no need to pursue an intellectual project of any significance or profundity. Since, however, the purpose of this thesis is not to elaborate a definition of the author in the broad sense, but rather to consider the operation of the authorial function as it relates to Deleuze’s work, there is no need for me to pursue this expanded notion of ‘authorship’ further. More relevantly for my purposes, to proceed on the basis of Livingston’s definition would ensure that philosophers, novelists, filmmakers and also visual artists all qualified as ‘authors’. A ‘partial intentionalist’ definition would also help to satisfy the demands made by the ‘anti-theoretical turn’ in literary criticism in English in the last few decades. Stephen Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, for example, argue that it is impossible to divorce ‘meaning’ from ‘utterance’ and therefore ‘intention’. A computer could create a random series of marks which resembled language, they argue, but it would not actually be language because there would be no message to communicate. To choose to read and interpret literature is to accept the

intentionality behind language: ‘between intention and the meaning of its expression...
there can be no gulf’\textsuperscript{18}

This idea of intention is in conflict with some of the various motifs that arise in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, which relate to subjects (artistic or otherwise) being ‘forced to think’, or being acted on or overwhelmed by powerful forces from the outside. Their emphasis on the libidinal unconscious, or otherwise on the great forces which speak through an individual, seem rather difficult to reconcile with these accounts of voluntarist utterances by a given authorial subject. As they state in \textit{A Thousand Plateaus}, for example,

\begin{quote}
There are no individual statements, there never are. Every statement is the product of a machinic assemblage, in other words, of collective agents of enunciation (take “collective agents” to mean not peoples or societies but multiplicities). The proper name does not designate an individual, it is on the contrary when the individual opens up to the multiplicities pervading him or her, at the outcome of the most severe operation of depersonalization, that he or she acquires his or her true proper name (ATP:42)
\end{quote}

The tensions which arise between stated positions such as this and the operation of the authorial function within the work of Deleuze and Guattari – which does rely on ‘intention’ as one of the operations it uses to divine meaning - will be seen in the chapters which follow.

Central to this definition of intention, therefore, is the notion of communication with an intended audience. A person who makes up a poem inside their head, but never writes it down or performs it in anyone’s presence, would therefore not be considered an author. Moreover, while Livingston’s definition does not explicitly discuss meaning, the notion of meaning or intelligibility is implicit within it. If the author intends to communicate with an audience, then there must be some message to be communicated, which the author should expect the audience, in theory, to be capable of understanding. But for the logic of this

definition to hold, the critic or reader must consider the meaning of the utterance (or at least the primary meaning) to be the same as the meaning the author intended to be communicated.

However, such a ‘partial intentionalist’ position should not mean of course that the author is the only valid unit of study in philosophy, literary criticism, cultural studies, or epistemology. This is even more the case since, as I have noted, the importance of the author has waxed and waned over time as forms of narrative and modes of storytelling have changed, as well as the significance we place on the individual as a cultural and epistemological unit. A text may for example have a secondary meaning of which the author was not consciously aware, but which plays into deep-seated cultural forms of discourse in the society of his or her time. I agree with Livingston that the ‘partial intentionalist’ position is the more fruitful one for the critic to take, and that our analysis of philosophy, literature or art should not begin and end with an author’s intentions.

Barthes too, though he was for most of his career associated with a rejection of the authorial function, nevertheless agrees with Foucault as to the central position that, traditionally, the classical author held in relation to the text. Drawing on a historicist conception of the classical author as a representative of an increasingly confident liberal bourgeois humanism, Barthes portrays this author as a being who imposes his own personality and perspective on writing, which, in its own natural state, would instead be ‘hesitant’, fragmented, and resistant to totalisation. The figure of the author which Barthes polemically rejects embodies both individual agency and an almost imperial mastery of language:
It is because the pre-bourgeoisie of the Ancien Régime and the post-revolutionary bourgeoisie, using the same mode of writing, have developed an essentialist mythology of man, that classical writing, unified and universal, renounced all hesitancy in favour of a continuum in which every fragment was a choice, that is, the radical elimination of all virtualities in language. Political authority, spiritualistic dogmatism, and unity in the language of classicism are therefore various aspects of the same historical movement.¹⁹

If every literary effect is the result of a conscious choice made by a rational and unified mind, then ‘intentionality’ is the only remaining paradigm left for the critic. Barthes here explicitly associates ‘authority’ in all its guises – literary and intellectual - with political and spiritual authority, and thus aligns this intellectual development with the rise of the bourgeoisie and the growth of the absolutist Imperial state. With this vision of what we might call the ‘imperial author’ in operation, the reader is presented with a rather poor binary choice, or, as Barthes complains, ‘(the reader) is left with no more than the poor freedom either to accept or reject the text: reading is nothing more than a referendum.’²⁰ In my view however Barthes’ misrepresents the prevailing view of the classical author that he seeks to criticise: overemphasising the centrality of conscious choice, not just in the thematic content or intellectual direction of the text, but also in stylistic and formalistic qualities of language too. In fact as we shall shortly see, the prevailing intellectual climate after the French Revolution was not one which celebrated will and intention over all else, at least in the production of art and literature if not necessarily other forms of writing. In other words, Barthes’ position has been too strongly stated, and indeed it is a position that he would later resile from, as I shall go on to discuss.

The notion of intention is also given a political inflection by Sartre, albeit one radically opposed to the prevailing order. His conception of an author revolves around notions of political and social commitment, with writing being instrumental in a struggle, as befits his

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¹⁹ Roland Barthes, *Writing Degree Zero*, p64.
broader philosophy of engagement. Sartre sees the author’s work as a means for the pursuit of a certain philosophical or political project, and that sustained and serious commitment was what gave meaning and value to the writing. While Sartre acknowledges a certain value in literary style, it exists for him purely as an afterthought, and he castigates theories of art which gave it a central importance: ‘We know very well that pure art and empty art are the same thing and that aesthetic purism was a brilliant manoeuvre of the bourgeois of the last century’21. Purely literary writers, including Romantics like Charles Baudelaire or Modernists like the Surrealists, are criticised by Sartre as both utopian and abstract. In this respect, for Sartre truly valuable writing is established in relation to and with a definitive judgement on the historical and social context of the author.

Sartre holds in What is Literature? that ‘one must write for one’s age’. What he means by this becomes clear when he defines it in the context of his philosophy of engagement. ‘To write for one’s age is not to reflect it passively, it is to want to maintain it or change it, thus to go beyond it towards the future, and it is this effort to change it that places us most deeply within it.’22 In other words the writer writes as a form of commitment to and as a means of effecting political and social change. Intention, therefore, is absolutely foregrounded in Sartre’s conception of the great writer: not just to communicate a meaning through a text, but to accomplish a political objective through the communication of this meaning.

The Author as a situated being

A writer’s work means nothing without an understanding of this deeply personal commitment on his or her part. However, as a corollary to this re-emphasis on intention, the

22 Sartre, What is Literature, p236.
third major factor at stake in our consideration of the authorial function is the
determinative influence of the author’s biography, and personal and social situation, or the
place and time in which he or she wrote, on the work.

One cannot…become a writer without tracing a horizon line beyond oneself, but the
self-surpassing is in each case finite and particular. One does not surpass in general and
for the proud and simple pleasure of surpassing; Baudelairean dissatisfaction represents
only the abstract scheme of transcendence and, since it is dissatisfaction with
everything, ends by being dissatisfaction with nothing. Real transcendence requires one
to want to change certain specific aspects of the world, and the surpassing is coloured
and particularised by the concrete situations it aims to modify.

This passage makes clear the importance – but not the absolute importance – of the
author’s personal situation and intellectual commitments to Sartre. He does make clear that
the work is not meant purely as a means to reflect the author’s personality, interior world or
‘beautiful soul’ – it must surpass the author and direct itself outwards, concerning itself with
the wider society in which she writes, rather than towards abstract notions of ‘posterity’ or
‘the absolute’. This is a direct riposte to some of the fundamental beliefs of Romanticism, as
we shall discuss below.

Any attempt to surpass or transcend the self of the writer should not, however, transcend
entirely the author’s situation in society. This is the third major aspect of the authorial
function that I wish to discuss, therefore: that the author writes as a being both situated in a
given time period and set of political and social conditions, and, also, that in some respect
that author, or her work, has been influenced by this situation. Sartre has a particularly
politicised take on this basic point. As part of her project of commitment and change, he
argues, the author acts as a witness who has a political task of disclosure: ‘Similarly, the
function of the writer is to act in such a way that nobody can be ignorant of the world and

that nobody may say that he is innocent of what it’s all about.\textsuperscript{24} The importance of this point is twofold. Firstly, it implies that an understanding of the concrete political and social context an author worked in is vital to our understanding of their intentional ‘project’ or of what they intended to communicate to us. In other words, the injunction to us as readers is to familiarise ourselves with that social context in order to better understand the author’s work. Secondly, however, Sartre here also believes that an author must write for an audience – and a rather more specifically defined audience than the vague notion of ‘posterity’. In other words, the purpose of being an author again is to communicate, and to have an intention behind that communication.

If we are to follow these injunctions, then the author must be the locus, or at least one of the loci, of critical analysis, and we must thus proceed from our understanding of his biography, perspective, commitments, and intellectual development if we are to comprehend any changes and developments in his texts: ‘The author also serves to neutralize the contradictions that may emerge in a series of texts: there must be - at a certain level of his thought or desire, of his consciousness or unconscious - a point where contradictions are resolved’\textsuperscript{25}. Readers are called to practice ‘a complex operation that constructs a certain being of reason that we call author... by discerning, in the individual, a ‘deep’ motive, a ‘creative’ power, or a ‘design’\textsuperscript{26}. Where the author was unknown, the text could not fully be known: ‘And if a text should be discovered in a state of anonymity... the game becomes one of rediscovering the author.’\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{24} Sartre, \textit{What is Literature?}, p14.
\textsuperscript{25} Foucault, ‘What is an Author?’, p111.
\textsuperscript{26} Foucault, ‘What is an Author?’, p110.
\textsuperscript{27} Foucault, ‘What is an Author?, p109.
The Limit-Function of the Author

Such a critical focus on authorial intention in particular, therefore, allows the author to serve as a means to restrict textual proliferation and the free play of meaning. At stake is the fourth major function of the author in the practice of textual exegesis: the negative or limiting function. Not only does the author mark the boundary between one text and another – ‘marking off the edges of the text’ – but reference to him differentiates between valid and invalid interpretations of a text, thus allowing the author to act as a limit or check on the multiplication of alternative possible meanings. Foucault states this plainly: ‘the author is the principle of thrift in the proliferation of meaning’ and ‘the author allows a limitation of the cancerous and dangerous proliferation of significations within a world where one is thrifty not only with one’s resources and riches but also with one’s discourses and their significations.’

The tone Foucault uses to treat the suggestion that such a proliferation is ‘dangerous’ appears to me to be an attempt to cast this reliance on an authorial function as elitist, and as a product of a hierarchical, semi-aristocratic intellectual culture. Notwithstanding the fact that Foucault appears critical of the author’s operation as a ‘limit function’, however, he in no way endorses an uncritical celebration of the free play of interpretation in so far as it relates to his own texts. In the foreword to the English edition of The Order of Things – which he suggests might be termed ‘Directions for Use’ – he first of all gives a perfunctory acknowledgement that he, as the author, could not instruct the reader as to what use to make of the text, the more so as while writing the text some of the ideas discussed remained unclear to him. However, he goes on to speak of what he terms his ‘ideal reader’,

28 Foucault, ‘What is an Author?’, p118.
and links the notion of such a reader to a fidelity to his own intentions and to his project. Foucault’s list of instructions to his ‘ideal reader’ are detailed and wide-ranging, and make clear that the reader must not merely appreciate the intellectual context and the constraints he was working under, such as his refusal of the term ‘structuralist’, or indeed his insistence on the under-appreciation of the human sciences in France, but must also respect the methodology of his text: ‘This book must be read as a comparative, and not as a symptomatological study’29. Furthermore, in this foreword Foucault states that the book should be treated as an ‘open site’, with some questions remaining unresolved, and ripe for further work and discussion. In particular he suggests the problems of causality, change and the subject as being areas in which he could fruitfully foresee competing methodologies, and challenges to his presumptive conclusions. Notwithstanding this concession to openness however, it is telling that Foucault effectively gives permission to his reader to re-examine and question his problematic in certain respects, but insists on excluding certain critical perspectives in other ones: for example, insisting on an absolute refusal of phenomenology, by his rejection of the constitutive primacy of the knowing subject or of transcendental consciousness. Such a partial and limited concession to the reader’s response does not therefore mean that Foucault does not assert his ‘privilege’ as author to restrict what the reader does with the text: in particular, by rendering certain philosophical and critical perspectives ‘off-limits’. All in all, such a series of instructions and admonitions to his ideal reader, which, particularly in their reflections on methodology has a positive (that is, constitutive of meaning) and not merely a negative or limiting effect, tells us that when writing this foreword Foucault had rather an expansive idea of his own role as ‘author’ in imposing meaning and defining the legitimate interpretation of his own texts.

One final aspect which Foucault and Barthes seem more wary of treating in their writings on
the author is the question of ‘genius’ or talent: which historically – at least in the case of
literary authors – has often been defined as virtuosity of style and expression, or else as
profundity of thought. Yet, such a notion was at the heart of the Romantic conception of the
author, as I shall shortly discuss in the next section. The possession of a divinely-inspired
talent was the mark of distinction which separated the author-artist from the ordinary man.
The question of ‘genius’, therefore, though it is not fully elaborated in ‘What is an Author’ is
the fifth characteristic of the ‘authorial function’ which I shall consider in this thesis. I shall
examine the notion of genius and its associations with the qualities of distinctiveness,
profundity and originality in the text or artwork. I begin by considering the very brief
reference in passing to the concept that Foucault makes in ‘What is an Author?’.

The author... is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits,
excludes, and chooses; in short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the free
manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction. In
fact, if we are accustomed to presenting the author as a genius, as a perpetual surging
of invention it is because, in reality, we make him function in exactly the opposite
fashion.30

Foucault does not give any explicit definition of ‘genius’, and his account of it does not posit
any necessity for the text created by such an author to be unusually profound, significant or
original. With his brief mention of genius however, he rather uncritically elides the concept
with ‘proliferation’, ‘perpetual invention’, and inexhaustible provision of meaning – even
though he states that in practice, we use the figure of the author to limit this meaning. In
this respect a text would be ‘wealthier’ in so far as it is the open site of an ever-greater
profusion of signification and interpretation: showing Foucault’s sympathy for theories of

30 Foucault, ‘What is an Author?’, p119.
interpretation which prioritise reader-response. He does not seem to consider the counter-argument: one which, as I shall demonstrate, attracted Deleuze, that genius is in fact marked by rigorous elaboration of a single concept or a small number of concepts, by careful precision and clarity rather than profusion. In ‘What is an Author?’ Foucault does not offer any alternative means for us to gauge the quality of a text, nor to judge the talent or acuity of an author. However, in the next section I shall seek to give more philosophical weight to the concept of ‘genius’ through an analysis of the Romantics.

At the end of this section, I have delimited five different characteristics of the authorial function which I have traced principally through the work of Foucault, with nods to Barthes, Sartre, and others. The first is the author’s ability to hold a text and a series of texts together, particularly by reference to a key doctrinal or philosophical concept, or to a unifying style, associated with his or her proper name. The second characteristic is the determinative importance of the intention of the author in imparting meaning to a text. The third is the conscious and unconscious influences on a text of the author’s concrete historical and social situation, which implies that the injunction for the diligent reader or critic is to research it so as to better understand both the inclinations and intentions of the author, and the many subconscious influences which could be exerted on him or her. The fourth is the negative or limiting function of the author: the role the author has in limiting the power of the reader to advance interpretations which clearly conflict with the preceding three characteristics of the authorial function, and so to prevent an uncontrolled proliferation of potential interpretations of a text. Lastly, the fifth is the notion of ‘genius’, or the ability of the author – or at least any author worth mentioning – to produce work of distinctive and unusual profundity and originality. In the next section, I shall examine some
of the potential ripostes, or at least modifications to these positions, advanced in the work of some major theorists such as Barthes, Sartre and Blanchot.

**Genius, originality, and the involuntary production of meaning**

A growing interest in the significance of an author’s distinctive style marked a slight retreat by Barthes from the extremity of some of his previous positions by the end of his career. In a series of lectures he gave at the Collège de France between 1977 and 1980, Barthes too emphasises style as the defining characteristic of the literary author – much more important, in his view, than the major themes or philosophical or intellectual commitments of the authors he read. Indeed, Barthes here also came closer to the position held by Deleuze, as I shall later demonstrate, on style. Style, as Barthes argues, is not the product of intention, or of sustained reflection on one’s own practice. It is a personal and aesthetic characteristic, which expresses itself in the manner in which one writes: imagery, tone, vocabulary, and so on. Contrary to the position taken by intentionalists, style for Barthes is an involuntary characteristic of the author. While it may be defined by some unconscious process or some hidden facet of the author’s personality, it is in no way the product of any kind of self-reflection: ‘Indifferent to society and transparent to it, a closed personal process, it is in no way the product of a choice or of a reflection on Literature. It is the private portion of the ritual, it rises up from the writer’s myth-laden depths and unfolds beyond his area of control.’

31 By describing style as ‘indifferent to society’, Barthes wishes to underline the point that style is not relational: it is not an intentional means of communicating with an imagined reading public. It also is not developed, or at least consciously developed, by the author with the expenditure of time and labour. As we shall

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see, some of Barthes’ reflections on the involuntary adoption of style – but not all of them – will be borne out by Deleuze in his writing on literary authors. In this respect, I shall demonstrate, contrary to the position advanced by, for example, Knapp and Benn Michaels, that intentionality is not absolutely determinative, at least for Deleuze, to an analysis of literary authors, and other authors also.

In his reflections on style, Barthes, does, however, posits the author as a being who persists and develops in time, rather than existing as an ‘event’. Though the author does not consciously adopt a personal style, his past and personal history is influential and helps to determine its formation, and its unconscious and almost involuntary expression: ‘Imagery, delivery, vocabulary spring from the body and the past of the writer and gradually become the very reflexes of his art. Thus under the name of style a self-sufficient language is evolved which has its roots only in the depths of the author’s personal and secret mythology’.

However, notwithstanding the fact that this style is not consciously adopted, this does not mean that Barthes entirely rejects intention in so far as it is related to style. While he argued in his lecture series (at least in relation to the Romantic period) that philosophies and beliefs are uncreative, and that they do not provide the motivating force behind the author’s decision to write, but instead exist as a kind of afterthought, he posited stylistic and aesthetic predilections as the real motivating force for the author, for example, a powerful and captivating image, or the desire to express oneself in a given formal register. These things provide the ‘impetus’ which motivates the author to write, an impetus which derives its force from the desire the author has to express the style which has become his personal characteristic: ‘As a general rule, the work doesn’t let us uncover its point of departure, the

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figure of its impetus = the image that the author set out before him, the image he desired, a desire that enabled him to pass from writing to writing something. 33

In the book *Roland Barthes*, Barthes furthers this association of powerful images and defining stylistic elements in a literary work with the person of the author. He contrasts what he terms the ‘book of ideas’ with the ‘book of the Self’ – arguing that the series of images, or ‘image-repertoire’, which makes up a novel arranges itself to conform to a distribution of masks – personae – which make up the different facets of the personality at the heart of the book. Since the image-repertoire is part of the series of expressive stylistic elements which, as we have discussed, are a deeply personal characteristic of the author, this personality cannot but be another facet of the author also. These images of masks or ‘personae’, of course, resonate greatly with the Deleuzian notion of the intercessors - the conceptual persona, or the aesthetic figure - which enter into sustained and definitive relationships with his artists and philosophers. Indeed, as I shall discuss, these relationships serve to define the person of those artists and philosophers in Deleuze’s work. Barthes describes this ‘book of the Self’ in this way:

Though consisting apparently of a series of “ideas”, this book is not the book of his ideas; it is the book of the Self...For the image repertoire, fatal substance of the novel, and the labyrinth of levels in which anyone who speaks about himself gets lost – the image-repertoire is taken over by several masks (personae), distributed according to the depth of the stage (and yet no one – personne as we say in French – is behind them) 34

While Barthes maintains, between parentheses at the end of this passage, that ‘no-one’ is behind these masks, thus making a gesture towards a notion of authorial anonymity, the association between the idea of the self refracted through a series of personae, and a series of images themselves the product of a style which is a defining authorial characteristic

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means that this anonymity cannot be considered to be definitive: instead, it only exists at a
certain level of the text, serving to mask the continuity of stylistic predilections and a means
of expressive writing.

Style in the 19th century however was often discussed in association with the Romantic
notions of the beautiful and the sublime. When it came to literary authors or other forms of
artist, the ability to produce beautiful work was often discussed using the register of genius,
a concept to which I will return now, to examine the inflections that the notion of genius
acquired as we progress through the Romantic period.

While the notion of genius is relatively absent from Foucault’s work, it forms one of the
defining attributes of the great thinker or artist as this was expressed during the Romantic
period, a time during which many of the great theories on literature and art which would be
critiqued by figures such as Sartre, Deleuze, or Barthes were first elaborated. The Romantic
notion of genius is first and foremost associated with art: the art of the literary author, in
particular the poet, and also with visual artists. While the Enlightenment notion of the
philosopher as ‘great legislator’ also played with motifs of genius, the association of
philosophical thinkers with a notion of divinely-inspired genius was much less pronounced.
My discussion on this point will therefore focus on the Romantic treatment of the literary
author as a subset of all authors, but the positions taken are relevant to the broader
research question in that they defined the intellectual climate on writing or intellectual
production generally which later thinkers would react to. In the rest of this thesis I will
therefore argue that Deleuze defined himself in reaction to this set of positions, but
nonetheless, that they were to some extent still reflected in his work.
For Bénichou, the Romantic treatment of the whole question of genius presupposes a class of thinker set apart and blessed with an almost divine favour. These thinkers did not approach their work rigorously or methodically, but rather were struck with an inspiration which came from somewhere outside themselves, and allowed them to create a work which ordinary people could not aspire to.

One often attributes to genius, in particular to poetic genius, a more immediate and infallible intuition of what is true, than that derived from reason. Diderot put it this way ‘Poetry supposes an exaltation of the mind which comes close to divine inspiration. Profound ideas thus come to the poet, of which he knows neither the origin, nor the implications’.

The divinely inspired genius-poet, therefore, does not even necessarily fully understand the ideas which come to him. He does not attain these ideas as the result of careful reflection, or because he has an unusually acute faculty of observation. In fact, according to this notion of genius, those operations of the mind associated with logic and reason, such as reflection, critical inquiry and so on, attain to truths less profound than those attained by poetic inspiration. As such, the genius-poet is considered specially favoured, and a class apart.

Though Sartre criticises this strand of thinking, his biography of Gustave Flaubert emphasises its definitive influence on the climate in which that writer grew up, one which validated a quasi-divine talent as a mark of almost aristocratic distinction which, in the decades following the French Revolution, would become increasingly as important as class distinctions: the artist ‘regards himself above all as the man who receives these ecstasies and who, through this imaginary gift, finds himself placed above the common herd’. In order to create, the artist must first of all receive the gift of talent, which must come from

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35 Bénichou, Le Sacré de l’Écrivain, p49.
‘outside’: the process of literary formation is not open to everyone, but only those fortunate enough to be so blessed.

It is for this reason that the Romantic conception of artistic, in particular literary creation, relies as much on involuntary impulses as well as on the personal commitment of the author, and on the voluntary faculties. In this respect, we can see some commonality with Barthes’ position that the author is defined by a style which he has not personally and consciously chosen, although this position, in itself, does not imply that the Barthesian author is somehow forced to write, though he may be motivated by desire for the image. As Sartre’s biography of Flaubert makes clear though, the Romantic author would have conceived of himself as impelled to write by forces outwith his control and understanding:

> And Vigny’s preface, which he must have devoured, characterises the man of action, the great writer, and the poet: in the last, the adolescent believed he had discovered his own portrait; unqualified for anything but divine work, he is born to be a burden to others, and imagination entirely devours him. This possessed being observes as a stranger the movements of his own soul; his human relationships deteriorate and are finally severed.

Fundamental to our understanding of this notion of the artist is the term ‘possessed’, denoting a being taken over by powerful forces from the outside. Such a conception of the artist certainly does not foreground the notion of ‘intention’, therefore, in the process of artistic production. In the use of the word ‘devours’, the author’s faculty of the imagination is posited as something outside him, which acts upon him rather than as an integral part of his own personality. The artist loses possession of himself to the extent that he undertakes the ‘divine’ spiritual work that is his calling: not only does he become a stranger to other people, losing in the process his human relationships, but he becomes a stranger to himself and his own material preoccupations, losing his individual personality and his own being-in-

the-world in his embrace of the divine spirituality. To use a formulation familiar to Deleuze, the Romantic artist is therefore forced to think and to create by an encounter with forces from the outside. In this respect, the process of writing, again, and artistic creation in general, is emphasised as involuntary or only semi-voluntary. Moreover, to the extent to which the Romantic artist is compelled to create by this outside force, he loses his own self, and thus his understanding of his own situation in the world, and within a community, is of less and less importance to our understanding of his work.

The impossibility of the co-existence of the author with the work – the requirement that, in some sense, the author must lose possession of herself in order to create the work – is, according to the Romantic or neo-Romantic conception of the artist, ontologically inherent to her nature. Such is the fate of all artists, and it is through this process of self-negation that the work is opened up to the ‘pure’ forces that are outside of it and of its author. The same concepts of self-negation, service, and death would recur in the mid-twentieth century in the work of Blanchot, whose work would closely engage with the ideas of the Romantics: and I will trace some overlap between the work of Blanchot and of Deleuze. For Blanchot, to become a writer – at least in the classical sense of the term – means to renounce or sacrifice what is unique and personal to the author as individual. He argues that ‘The writer we call classic – at least in France – sacrifices within himself the idiom which is proper to him, but he does so in order to give voice to the universal.’\textsuperscript{38} The author does not transform into someone or something else, he is simply erased: ‘What speaks in him is the fact that, in one way or another, he is no longer himself; he isn’t anyone any more.’\textsuperscript{39}

Through this process of self-erasure the writer, for Blanchot and for the neo-Romantic


\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
tradition more generally, can give voice to the universal. By erasing one’s own identity and personal history, it becomes possible to speak on behalf of a universal human community. As Sartre also put it, ‘To speak of human nature and nature, a writer must come out of nowhere, have no roots, possess, in short, a clairvoyance unobscured by any prejudice.’ 40 Such a formulation is the explicit position adopted by Deleuze and Guattari when they come to speak of authors writing in a political ‘minor literature’, though, as I will demonstrate, their actual position is more complex.

This self-erasure is a task, an active process of self-negation. Blanchot equates it with death, which he describes thus: ’The decision to be without being is possibility itself: the possibility of death.’ 41 In this respect, we can identify one difference between Blanchot and his Romantic predecessors – for him the writer must commit himself, make a decision to go through this process of self-negation, to die. The writer thus must actively pursue death, but in doing so, ‘finds a voice’ and masters the ability to speak. ‘Death, in the human perspective, is not a given, it must be achieved. It is a task, one that we take up actively, one which becomes the source of our activity and mastery.’ 42

For Blanchot, this process of self-erasure means not just the sacrifice of one’s own ‘idiom’: the writer must also sacrifice relationality to others and to the world, so as to become an ‘empty place’. ‘The work requires of the writer that he lose everything he might construe as his own “nature”, that he lose all character and that, ceasing to be linked to others and to himself by the decision which makes him an “I”, he becomes the empty place where the impersonal affirmation emerges.’ 43 Such a position, then, is profoundly different from the

41 Blanchot, The Space of Literature, p96.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Blanchot, The Space of Literature, p55.
conception of the author as a situated being that I traced earlier, particularly in the work of Sartre.

However, in another passage regarding death, Blanchot seems to conceptualise it not as an end but as an experience the author-artist must undergo before returning to reveal its mysteries to us. Here Blanchot refers to the figure of the philosopher as passing through death before returning, an image which will also recur at several moments in the work of Deleuze, as I shall later describe: ‘Death is named solely as the necessity to kill those who – having freed themselves – having had access to the light – come back and reveal, thereby troubling order... And the philosopher is he who undergoes the supreme violence’

The neo-Romantic tradition epitomised by Blanchot did not hold up the author as a source of meaning imposed on a text, but rather insisted that the author negate or vacate the space of her own personality in order that outside, universal forces should speak through her. This position could be characterised as one half-way between the classical position of the ‘imperial’ author, and the later modern or rather postmodern position, which replaced author with reader, as I shall go on to discuss. Blanchot, however, clearly does not share many of the basic presupposition of theorists such as Barthes. He places little or no value on the reception of the text, or the response of readers, believing instead that the text is defined by universal forces which manifest themselves in the space that the author vacates. He also associates this process of self-negation with ‘mastery’ on the part of the author, which implies a continuing form of control over the development, form, and meaning of the text.

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This section has elaborated some of the challenges that the 19th and early 20th centuries made to the classical authorial function, and, as I will elaborate, these ideas left their mark on Deleuze’s work too. In the next section of this introduction, however, I will examine the polemical rejection of the authorial function led in particular by Barthes, who sought to do away with the notion of ‘author’ (at least, in so far as it was important and relevant to the work of the literary critic) and instead replace it with a notion of criticism driven by the reader’s response. Such a position served to lay the foundations for what (at least, in English-language criticism and the history of ideas) we would go on to call the postmodernist or post-structuralist turn. As I shall argue, such a position is most commonly associated with some of the explicit positions adopted by Deleuze and Guattari, in particular their exhortation to us as readers and critics to ‘experiment’ rather than to ‘interpret’. It is to this ‘death of the author’ that I shall now turn.

The Death of the Author and Birth of the Reader

The mid-twentieth century reaction to both the classical valorisation of the authorial function, and also the Romantic celebration of aristocratic genius and divine inspiration, however, can be found in the turn to reader-response theories. As Barthes, foremost among the thinkers elaborating such theories, argues, the death of the author opened the way for the reader to finally become the focus of critical attention. Barthes’ theories posit the many different interpretations brought to, and connotations derived from, the text by each individual reader to be all of equal value, and of equal value too to whatever opinion the author has herself about her own text, which was no longer considered to be of special profundity or significance. A text therefore no longer has just one meaning, but many, often incompatible ones. Reader-response theories, in the extreme form initially adopted by
Barthes eschew the authorial function altogether. In this respect, they are a highly democratic method of reading a text, one which attributes no special understanding either to the text’s author, or to critics who have a detailed knowledge of that author, her life and preoccupations. Thus, the intention of the author, the intellectual projects she pursued and the commitments she made do not disappear, but become simply irrelevant to the critical operations the reader pursues when confronted with a text. By abandoning the central importance of the author and the authorial function, Barthes also abandons any notion of the unity of a single text or a body of work. Meaning is now irreducibly plural and whatever project the author may have been pursuing imposes no special meaning on a text.

Barthesian criticisms thus demand constant evaluation rather than definitive interpretation, with the text that lends itself to the greatest number of associations being the richest text:

To interpret a text is not to give it a (more or less justified, more or less free) meaning, but on the contrary to appreciate what plural constitutes it...In this ideal text, the networks are many and interact, without any one of them being able to surpass the rest; this text is a galaxy of signifiers, not a structure of signifieds; it has no beginning; it is reversible; we gain access to it by several entrances, none of which can be authoritatively declared to be the main one 45

We should be clear that this profusion does not mean infinite originality, inventiveness, and newness. Instead, Barthes characterises it as infinite reference, the creation and organisation of a web of associations which derive from other texts dating back to Antiquity.

The Barthesian approach to a text opens it up to the construction of horizontal lines of association, rather than vertical lines of filiation: Barthesian texts do not consciously imitate earlier models, nor seek to further a project or line of inquiry begun by a predecessor, but instead resonate with allusions to other cultural formulations. The Barthesian text is the site for a postmodern operation of the constant reworking, subversion, and representation of

45 Barthes, S/Z, pp. 6-7.
these existing formulations, it allows readers to conduct constant and always unfinished experimentation:

We know that a text does not consist of a line of words, releasing a single “theological” meaning (the “message” of the Author-God) but is a space of many dimensions, in which are wedded and contested various kinds of writing, no one of which is original: the text is a tissue of citations, resulting from the thousand sources of culture.46

If we posit the Barthesian text as infinitely plural, however, does any position or relevance at all remain for the author in determining how we should relate to that text? Initially, Barthes appears to concur with Blanchot’s position on the neutrality and impersonality of literature, the manner in which all voices blend and become indiscernible, and in which this ‘impersonal abyss’ erases or devours the writing subject. ‘Literature is precisely the invention of this voice, to which we cannot assign a specific origin: literature is that neuter, that composite, that oblique into which every subject escapes, the trap where all identity is lost, beginning with the very identity of the body that writes’.47

The author is this case would just be a placeholder, without any defining characteristic which has relevance to our understanding of the text. However, in Barthes’ later work, particularly both S/Z and the lectures he gave to the Collège de France between 1977 and 1980, we see a still vital if diminished role for an author remain. Barthes’ notion of ‘scriptor’ – his term for the author of a modern text, which allows for meaning to be constructed by this process of connotation – instead posits the author as event. The term ‘scriptor’ defines the author by the very physical process of writing, emphasises that she is created as part of a process of continuous becoming, and at the same time, and in parallel to, the text. The author is a being on whom the text operates just as much as she operates on it:

46 Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’, p146.
47 Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’, p142.
Quite the contrary, the modern writer (scriptor) is born simultaneously with his text; he is in no way supplied with a being which precedes or transcends his writing, he is in no way the subject of which his book is the predicate; there is no other time than that of the utterance, and every text is eternally written here and now.\textsuperscript{48}

What the author actually does in writing the text is to perform a combinatory function, working amongst the web of literary and cultural allusions which precedes the beginning of the act of writing. As Barthes further states, his role is to arrange these different kinds of writing rather than to impose his own unique style: ‘his only power is to combine the different kinds of writing, to oppose some by others, so as never to sustain himself by just one of them’\textsuperscript{49}. As we shall see, there are strong resonances between this role of combination and the figure of the spider-author described in Deleuze’s \textit{Proust and Signs}.

Nevertheless, this supposition does not sit entirely comfortably with other positions advanced in Barthes’ lecture series, which stress the need for an author to be aware of her own heritage, her own literary and cultural predecessors.

He writes: ‘The work must be filial...it is not a matter of renewing, of recopying, of imitating, of conserving; it’s a matter of going back to a kind of heredity of noble values... a writing requires a heredity’\textsuperscript{50}. By contrast then to the above, this seems to posit the writing subject as a learning subject, implying that the author (just like the reader) exists and persists as an accumulation of texts, thus giving him access to a wider range of references and allusions as he reads and writes more. Therefore, even Barthes, one of the theorists who went the furthest in denying the author and rejecting any significant relation between author and text, thus finishes, at the end of his career, by positing the necessity of awareness on the author’s part of a literary and cultural heritage.

\textsuperscript{48} Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’, p145.
\textsuperscript{49} Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’, p146.
\textsuperscript{50} Barthes, \textit{The Preparation of the Novel}, p301.
Having now delineated the contending critical positions as they existed at the time that Deleuze began writing, I will seek to show in the chapters that follow, how there were major tensions between his explicitly stated positions, which tend to be sympathetic to reader-response theories, and his continued implicit reliance on the authorial function. First, I wish to close this introduction with a brief sketch of Deleuze’s theories on individuation and on the creation of planes of consistency, which, while concerned with difference, make clear to separate that concept from one of chaos or interminable variation. With an understanding of Deleuze’s theories of subjectivation in general, we can then proceed to a consideration of the authorial subject and authorial function.

Subjectivation, Individuation and the Rhizome-Book

Deleuze’s explicitly stated positions – particularly those worked out together with Guattari – often valorise experimentation over interpretation, transversality over hierarchy, the rhizome over the tree. He would therefore, when it comes to the interpretation of texts, seem at first glance to be closer to the anti-hierarchical and anti-authorial stance adopted by Barthes. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, for example, Deleuze and Guattari argued for a ‘rhizomatic’ theory of the book, one that at first glance does away with any notion of an author, or of attribution of the book to a thinking subject: ‘A book has neither subject nor object; it is made of variously formed matters, and very different dates and speeds. To attribute the book to a subject is to overlook this working of matters, and the exteriority of their relations. It is to fabricate a benevolent God to explain geological movements’ (ATP,4).

Similarly, Deleuze’s concept of the individual and of individuation in general, particularly as it was advanced in *Difference and Repetition*, eschews the notion of the ‘organisation of the self’, but instead relies on the concept of the ‘fractured I’ and ‘the dissolved self’. This raises
the question of the extent to which we can speak of a unified, stable authorial subject, existing in a relation of antecedence to the text, at all. It is first of all essential, however, to distinguish the notion of the ‘fractured I’ from what Deleuze termed ‘free floating, unconnected difference’. The latter ‘is not distinguishable from an indeterminate variability’ (DR, 310) and would not allow for any stable individuation. Deleuze, however, does not in fact refuse any notion of stable individuality. He uses the concept of the crystal to illustrate how individuals can have relatively stable characteristics, which nonetheless can be the product of an originating difference: ‘qualities and extensities, forms and matters, species and parts are not primary, they are imprisoned in individuals as though in a crystal’ (DR, 309). It is not, then, meaningless in Deleuzian terms to speak of an individual subject, one about which definitive claims can be made. In fact, for Deleuze there is a profound relationship between thought and the thinking subject. He draws an explicit correlation between the relationship of the ‘fractured I’ and the ‘dissolved Self’ and that between the thinker and the thought.

Moreover, in *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze goes further, particularly when he attempts to associate the notions of ‘the I’ and ‘the Self’ with the division of species. He describes the I and the Self as ‘indices of the species’ and argues that without individuation, the determination of species would not be possible. While the pure field of individuation continues to ‘cohabit’ with the individual, Deleuze posits a necessary relationship between the indeterminate and determination. ‘What cannot be replaced is individuation itself’ (DR, 321). We can surmise that for thinking to be possible, in so far as thinking is expressed as a form of differenciation, of the division of species, such thinking needs to be related to a thinking subject: one which is ‘fractured’, but nevertheless not formless. The exact nature of
this fractured I as thinking subject in so far as it relates to the notion of an ‘author’ will be the subject of this thesis. I shall ask whether we should consider this fractured I merely an ‘event’ situated as a certain point in pre-existing fields of individuation (and with a relationship to thought which is merely an accumulation of transitory effects) or whether we should consider it to have more stable, let us say ‘crystallised’, characteristics.

In other words, the question that confronts us is this: if this ‘fractured I’ and ‘dissolved self’ means something other than mere free-floating difference, how exactly are we to understand these concepts as they relate to the author of, for example, a philosophical text? The philosophical problem of individuation requires us to show how relatively stable individual characteristics are compatible with a primacy of originating difference. Though these characteristics originate in difference, the process of differenciation along diverging lines allow for differences to become relatively fixed. Similarly, the problem of the great branches of thought – philosophy, art and science – is how to acquire consistency in the concepts, affects or functions which these kinds of thought produce, and which emerge from the chaos of infinite variation. In *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari argue that the purpose of these branches of thought is not to destroy chaos, but to temper it: ‘What defines thought in its three great forms – art, science, and philosophy – is always confronting chaos, laying out a plane, throwing a plane over chaos’ (WIP, 197). In a situation of total and uncontrolled chaos, no concept would be possible, since no determinate conception between distinct points could be achieved. By contrast, ‘the problem of philosophy is to acquire a consistency without losing the infinite into which thought plunges’ (WIP, 42). The task for the philosophical, artistic or scientific author is to extract and to establish such a consistency.
How precisely can this consistency be acquired? In the comparable case of the scientist whose intellectual task is to create functions, Deleuze and Guattari make clear that what she must do is to establish relations between points and processes, rather than to recognise states beyond variations. The role of the scientific subject is therefore *relational*, and in establishing these relations, she provides form and a consistency which is more than transitory, because such relations are necessary: ‘Hence, when a constant is assigned in a scientific operation, it is not a matter of contracting cases or moments in a single contemplation, but one of establishing a necessary relation between factors that remain independent’ (WIP,215).

The scientific subject now appears as an ‘eject’, ‘because it extracts elements whose principle characteristic is distinction, discrimination: limits, constants, variables and functions’ (WIP,215). The job of the philosopher, artist, or scientist is to set up stable relations between determinate points, which they have fixed precisely in order to construct a relation between them, and to trace the outline of the concept, perpect or function that provides consistency to the plane of immanence that way. In this respect, the image for the ‘eject’ is that of the spider-narrator in *Proust and Signs*, who spins a web between the different and hitherto unconnected points of Proust’s novel: points which the spider must first of all identify precisely via this process of ‘extraction’.

In the case of the philosopher, the concept he details and determines is traced out with reference to the ‘conceptual persona’. This ‘persona’ is a rather vexed question in Deleuzian philosophy. It reappears at different moments in Deleuze and Guattari’s body of work, sometimes in relation to similar notions such as ‘intercessor’, ‘aesthetic figure’ and ‘partial observer’ – the latter two set up as formal equivalents (for art and science as opposed to
philosophy) to the ‘conceptual persona’ in *What is Philosophy?*. With the notion of ‘persona’ evoking images of a mask, or of a theatrical role, we can surmise that we are dealing with something a little different to, let us say, simply a ‘conceptual person’. On one level, the persona seems to be a distilled and personalised accretion of a given, fundamental and defining concept in the work of a philosopher. On another level, Deleuze and Guattari draw a direct analogy with what they term a ‘psychosocial type’. In other words, just as we may speak or act in our capacity in a particular role – with Deleuze and Guattari choosing the example of ‘I decree mobilisation as President of the Republic’, in the same way, in order to think philosophically, we do so through the intermediary of a third person, a conceptual persona or philosophical role through which the philosopher must think in order to produce a philosophical enunciation: ‘I think as Idiot’ or ‘I will as Zarathustra’ (*WIP*,64). We could argue, therefore, that the conceptual persona is a formal role that the philosopher must adopt, or somehow philosophise *through*, in order to produce a genuine philosophical utterance.

The relationship between the philosopher and the conceptual persona is a double movement constitutive of the philosophising subject itself. Deleuze and Guattari firstly argue that the conceptual persona – often given a proper name, such as Socrates – forms a necessary point of reference for the philosophical concept. They argue that ‘Conceptual personae carry out the movements that describe the author’s plane of immanence, and they play a part in the very creation of the author’s concepts’ (*WIP*,63). This construction of these concepts through the selection of fixed points and the relations constructed with the conceptual personae is not arbitrary, and every possible arrangement is not of equal value. Deleuze and Guattari make explicitly clear that it is the philosopher, not the reader of the
text, who is equipped to judge whether a given concept is ‘viable’ or not, or in other words, which conjunctions of points, which constructions placed on a given text, are valuable and durable: ‘The Philosopher is expert in concepts and in the lack of them. He knows which of them are not viable, which are arbitrary or inconsistent’ (WIP,3)

In *What is Philosophy*, Deleuze and Guattari also argue that, again by the very process of philosophising, the philosopher-author forms and establishes his own identity as an author. Indeed, the author becomes an author through the very relationship established with the conceptual persona: ‘Here, again, it is Plato who begins: he becomes Socrates at the same time that he makes Socrates become philosopher’ (WIP,65). The personae who are associated with, and who carry out the movements which create the philosopher’s concepts, become an integral part of the identity of the philosopher himself, think inside the philosopher himself. ‘The philosopher is only the envelope of his principal conceptual persona and of all the other personae who are the intercessors, the real subjects of his philosophy’ (WIP,64). It is therefore highly relevant that Deleuze and Guattari’s injunction to the reader is the following: referring to the conceptual persona, they state that ‘he is there, and however nameless and subterranean, he must always be reconstituted by the reader’ (WIP, 63). We cannot, therefore, as readers of a philosophical text, ignore the persona, nor its relation with the philosopher, but instead seek to uncover it.

However, it is clear that there cannot be an infinite number of such conceptual personae. This is so because Deleuze and Guattari stipulate that conceptual personae – as well as the concepts which they help to create – must be remarkable, important, interesting: they must contribute an image of thought which is worth studying. Therefore, just as Deleuze and Guattari, speaking of Herman Melville, stated that a great novelist can only have one great
character, so too do they state that great conceptual personae must be ‘Originals, Unique’ (WIP, 83). If, however, a great philosopher can create only a small number of conceptual personae, and if those personae themselves enter into a relation with the philosopher which itself is constitutive of his being, it follows that the being of a philosopher as philosopher cannot be subject to major variation. If the conceptual personae and associated concepts are stable and few in number, the person of the philosophical author must be relatively fixed also.

In the four chapters which follow, I will examine the operation of the authorial function in Deleuze’s works on philosophy, literature, visual art and cinema. I will argue that Deleuze’s use of the authorial function is most closely associated with the ‘classical’ conception of the author laid out in this introduction, but that elements of his description of authors owe something to the stance of the Romantics or neo-Romantics.

In Chapter 1, I examine the association Deleuze constructs between a philosopher and a central philosophical problem or question. Drawing on the work of Michael Hardt and Anne Sauvagnargues, I define the Deleuzian philosopher as a being who develops over time, through a process of reflection on this profound question, and who therefore bestows unity on a body of work, creating himself at the same time as the philosophical problem is elaborated. In this respect I challenge theorists such as Diane Beddoes or John Rajchman who see the Deleuzian philosopher more properly as an accumulation of effects. I also examine the proper means for the Deleuzian critic or student to relate to the great philosopher he or she studies, establishing that for Deleuze the history of philosophy is associated with proper names. I argue that the Deleuzian philosophical author must be sharply differentiated from his or her predecessors – either by a polemic rejection of their
comments, or by an appropriation and re-presentation of them. In either case, the
Deleuzian philosopher requires a central intellectual project which will determine his or her
relation to the history of philosophy. I therefore demonstrate the vital importance of the
authorial function in the creation of philosophical concepts.

Chapter 2 will analyse literary authors. I will reconsider the question of the novelist or poet
as a being who persists in time, and who constructs her self as author through a process of
lengthy apprenticeship, and through breaking down and reconstructing this self in a series
of moments. My reading is indebted on this point to Jean-Jacques Lecercle. Drawing on
Sauvagnargues and Donald Cross, I argue that style is the defining characteristic of the
literary author, but one which, unlike a philosophical problem, is not developed as the result
of a conscious and voluntary choice. Then, engaging with the work of theorists such as
Gregg Lambert and Peter Hallward, I further argue for the importance of considering literary
authors as beings situated in a social and political context, describing the inherently political
nature of Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of literature. Finally, I establish the absolute
unimportance for Deleuze and Guattari of reader-response theories of literary meaning,
showing how authority is for them a perfectly adequate reason to impose strict limitations
on the reader’s interpretation of a novelist’s work.

Chapter 3 will look at visual art through the book *Francis Bacon: Logic of Sensation*. I
examine its presentation of Francis Bacon as an artist situated in the context of the history
of art, and with a definite relationship to artistic predecessors. I examine the deconstruction
and reconstruction of the artist’s self as a defined moment in the process of artistic
creation, drawing on the work of Simon O’Sullivan, Jac Saorsa and Andrea Eckersley, and
argue that this moment of deconstruction is not incompatible with the persistence of a
central project which defines the artist. Furthermore, I emphasise the connection between artistic technique, and the personal and social history of the artist, thus establishing painters as beings very much situated in a social context.

Chapter 4, finally, will analyse the *Cinema* books. This chapter will once again take up the problem of the foundation of technique, and I will argue that cinematic technique and style have their foundations in persistent philosophical commitments or perspectives on behalf of the film-author (usually, but not always, a director). The most significant contribution of this chapter, however, will be to analyse the question of collective authorship: at stake in film production more than in any of the other branches of artistic (or philosophical) practice I have analysed. Here I will engage in particular with the work of John Mullarkey. I will argue that Deleuze’s theories on authorship do allow for a collective authorial subject, but that a cinematic text only truly has two (or more) authors when it can show evidence of distinctive and opposing aesthetic and stylistic choices, often drawing on distinctive philosophical positions adopted by each one. Finally, and engaging with the work of Patricia MacCormack, I will argue that the Deleuzian spectator of cinema must surrender himself or herself to the cinematic image: and that the kind of critical distance necessary to advance alternative readings or interpretations of a cinematic text is not really possible in Deleuzian terms.

This dissertation will seek to establish Deleuze’s strong reliance on the operation of a comprehensive notion of ‘authorial function’.
Chapter One Deleuze and the Philosophical Author

For Deleuze, the work of philosophers includes the following major tasks: creating concepts, enunciating utterances, rigorously developing a method, and relating concepts originating from art, literature, historical research, or science to philosophy. Deleuze’s most detailed and rigorous works on philosophical authors are the monographs on David Hume, Friedrich Nietzsche, Baruch Spinoza, Immanuel Kant and Michel Foucault, together with shorter pieces on thinkers such as Henri Bergson. I shall seek to argue, drawing in particular on *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, that throughout these works Deleuze has a consistent view of a philosopher as a being who learns and who develops his or her concepts through time, progressively making them more rigorous and pushing the central ‘problem’ to its furthest logical conclusions. The close and definitive association between a philosopher and his or her given ‘problem’ definitively imposes a character and meaning to a philosophical text, and defines the bounds of acceptable criticism of it. In this respect, the philosophers that Deleuze analyses act as ‘philosophical authors’, in that their proper name is associated with a coherent and unified body of work, made up of a series of texts which concern themselves with the progressive delineation of the same problem. As such, I shall also argue that Deleuze views philosophers as individuals who relate themselves to the problems and concerns of their time, as well as to the thought of the philosophers who precede them, and who define themselves in relation to these. Finally, I shall argue that Deleuze encourages students and critics of philosophy to enter into the problematic of a given philosopher, rather than attempting to impose their own critical perspectives. This then will show that many of the characteristics of the ‘authorial function’, as I defined it in the Introduction, are in operation in Deleuze’s analysis of philosophical authors.
In discussing this issue, I intend to address a significant debate in the existing critical literature, on the proper ‘Deleuzian’ approach of a philosopher, or student of philosophy, to take to the history of philosophy and to predecessor philosophers. I will argue that Deleuze’s position has shifted from one which I term ‘polemic’ to one which I term ‘pluralistic’. In other words, his views evolved on whether great thinkers should seek to critique and overthrow, or rather to build on and to complement, the work of their predecessors. With regard to this evolution I agree with Michael Hardt, who, writing on Deleuze’s work on Nietzsche and Hegel, states that ‘The ambiguities in Deleuze’s position, however, are all those related to his developing conceptions of antagonism and opposition. Deleuze gives seemingly contradictory indications about the best way to choose and relate to one’s enemy’.

The direct relevance of this discussion to my research question is that, as I shall establish, Deleuze views the philosophical author as a being with a coherent and unified set of philosophical predispositions and principles, often associated with the progressive delineation, over time, of a major philosophical problem. A philosopher therefore seeks to differentiate herself from other bodies of work in turn unified and defined by the proper name of other philosophical authors. I will also look at Deleuze’s views on the study of the history of philosophy as part of the necessary process of formation that a philosopher must undergo.

The work of Diane Beddoes provides a useful example of one broad critical position taken in the existing literature: one which, in her terms, defines Deleuze (and Guattari) as ‘difference engineers’, and considers their practice to be one of accretion and intensive connection,

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rather than one of critique. She argues that ‘Deleuze’s strategy is insistently positive: it follows escape vectors that discharge blockages rather than constructing arguments and builds new functions rather than criticising the insufficiencies of the old’². Rather than considering the work of previous philosophers as a clearly defined whole, therefore, which must be accepted or rejected on its own terms, Beddoes believes that Deleuze’s practice is rather one of ‘dissolving the possibility of attribution: of saying this is Kant here and there is Spinoza and over there Marx. There are only effects: Spinoza-effects, Marx-effects, Kant-effects: these last as transitory in nature by the time of Capitalism and Schizophrenia as passing remarks on pulverizing mechanisms’³. This bold statement would hold that for Deleuze, there is no such thing as a philosophical predecessor at all, but rather merely an accretion of transitory and temporary effects, or machinic parts which, only by convention, we distinguish with a proper name.

This position, if less forcefully stated, can also be detected in the work of John Rajchman, who speaks of ‘Deleuze’s multiple accretion through encounter, his nonmethodical rigour of the intuitions of problems and concepts’⁴ as well as in that of Rosi Braidotti, who argues that Deleuze’s work shows a shift from a rationalist or critical paradigm to one which is more ‘intensive and empathetic’. For Braidotti, Deleuze’s work shows us that ‘Thinking is the conceptual counterpart of the ability to enter modes of relation, to affect and be affected’⁵. The tension, however, between a conception of a philosopher’s body of work as an intensive surface full of effects to be mined, and of that body of work as, instead, a rigorous

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3 Ibid, p32.
and coherent whole, is brought out by Todd May, who argues that a philosophy based on
the primacy of difference risks falling into incoherence, and that therefore ‘There can be no
thought that takes difference seriously... that can avoid the unity that attaches itself to such
a project of thought’\textsuperscript{6}

An alternative position in the literature, however, is that of André-Pierre Colombat. He
argues that Deleuze’s method of experimentation does not preclude his relation to and
understanding of philosophers as discrete individuals with clearly defined, coherent and
rigorous bodies of work, which must be treated as such. Indeed, for Colombat, ‘The
centrifugal power of experimentation and its becomings allows Deleuze to assess how a
given writer, artist, or philosopher progressively creates his or her own style’\textsuperscript{7}. The notion of
style is central to Colombat’s definition of the great thinker, since, as he argues, ‘Ultimately,
for Deleuze, a great writer or a great philosopher is someone who can create his or her own
style’\textsuperscript{8}.

The problem of philosophy

This discussion about the author figure is founded on a series of debates dealing with the
question of the individual itself. In an interview with Jeanette Colombel, Deleuze argues for
a conception of the writer distinguished from the classical concept of the individual, as well
as the romantic concept of the person. Instead he argues for the ‘fourth-person singular’,
referring to an open distribution of pre-individual, impersonal singularities without
enclosures. This could imply an identity constantly in flux – one which is neither ‘a sea

\textsuperscript{6}Todd May, ‘Difference and Unity in Gilles Deleuze’, in \textit{Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy},
\textsuperscript{7}André-Pierre Colombat, ‘Deleuze and the Three Powers of Literature and Philosophy: to Demystify, to
Experiment, to Create’, in \textit{A Deleuzian Century?}, ed. Ian Buchanan, (Durham, Duke University Press, 1999),
p205.
\textsuperscript{8}Ibid, p208.
without difference’, nor a stable individuality (Di, 143). Following this logic, we might conclude that every time one writes, one writes as someone or something else, and that the author who writes a book is never the same as the author who comments on his own work: in other words that the Deleuzian author is an ‘event’. Indeed, this is the position Deleuze explicitly adopts in a preface for a later edition of Logic of Sense, where he describes himself as ‘adjacent’ to his own work (TRM, 63). However, as I shall seek to establish, Deleuze’s analysis of other philosophers emphasises continuities rather than abrupt breaks or transitions, and his own philosophical commentaries do not fully live up to the implications of the stance he has taken here.

‘Doing’ philosophy for Deleuze means first and foremost the creation of new philosophical concepts and the elucidation of philosophical problems. Though knowledge of the history of philosophy is a necessary precursor to doing philosophy, nevertheless to philosophise means something different to writing the history of philosophy. Deleuze in fact describes the history of philosophy as ‘the agent of power in philosophy, and even in thought... it effectively stops people from thinking” (D,13). For this reason, in the first chapter of Dialogues, Deleuze and Claire Parnet cite the authors they admire as having been part of the history of philosophy, but as having escaped from it in some way: by some rupture, some rejection or some new method. ⁹ The methods each philosophical author chooses to break with or escape from the history of philosophy will be definitive for how, at least for Deleuze, their career should be regarded, but the polemical break must be sharp.

⁹ In Parnet’s section of that chapter she extends this notion to speak of the escape from authorship itself: suggesting that one can be a writer, rather than an author, in a possible echo of Barthes’ distinction between ‘scriptors’ and ‘authors’ (though this notion does not seem to be pursued by Deleuze: in that co-authored chapter the terms ‘author’ and ‘writer’ appear to have different significations for Deleuze and for Parnet).
This is not, however, an easy question or a simple process. For Deleuze, reflecting on his own career, it appears that the process of ‘escaping from the history of philosophy’ was a long one: he cites *Logic of Sense* as the first book in which he sought, for the first time ‘a form that was not in keeping with traditional philosophy’ (TRM,63). In the same piece (collected in *Two Regimes of Madness*) Deleuze even cites *Difference and Repetition* as a book which, although it saw its own task as the overthrow of Platonism, was still marked by a certain classical style, a way of formulating ideas marked by the binaries of surface and depth, false and true. The process, for Deleuze, of ‘breaking free’ from the history of philosophy, and in so doing creating himself as an original thinker, was not accomplished quickly or at an early stage in his career, but involved sustained work and advanced by degrees and over time. He uses the formulation ‘I had paid off my debts’ (D,16) in reference to his books on Nietzsche and Spinoza: thus stating obliquely the need to escape the exigencies imposed by the classical history of thought. Critics such as Anne Sauvagnargues therefore note a progression in Deleuze’s early monographs, suggesting that the overall project of Deleuze’s emerging relation to Kant was advanced in stages and indirectly, thus: ‘Deleuze characterises the different authors to whom he devotes a work (Hume, Nietzsche, Proust and Bergson) by crediting them with the different stages of his deflagration of Kantianism in the manner of a free indirect discourse.’ The evidence, in my view, supports Sauvagnargues’ position rather than that of Beddoes, who argues instead that the Deleuzian critic should not look for the progressive development of themes across a philosopher’s body of work, stating that ‘And rather than resonances...with their previous

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writings confirming or establishing continuing themes, connections are produced with no necessary reference to prior distributions.\textsuperscript{11}

Deleuze’s formulation of a ‘paid debt’, moreover, draws to mind a worker labouring over time to be freed from an obligation. In addition to his reflections on his own career, in Deleuze’s discussions of Kostas Axelos we see the same ideas – that of work, labour to overcome the burden of an intellectual heritage – at play. It is interesting that while Deleuze refers to Axelos in glowing terms: for example, as the author of ‘an astonishing book’ and ‘a new philosophy’ (DI, 75) that he should nonetheless have devoted relatively little attention to him – only two short pieces. Nevertheless in these essays Axelos is described as being on the same trajectory as on which Deleuze would later situate himself – moving away from his ‘masters’ to think originally, a process that will take place over the course of a career. His early work is ‘only an introduction’ while ‘Axelos will have to invent his own new forms of expression, his own versions of the death of God, his own real fantastic machines’ (DI, 76).

The key task of philosophy (to formulate and create concepts) is equally a matter of slow, rigorous work. Deleuze argues that ‘Concepts do not exist ready-made in a kind of heaven waiting for some philosopher to come grab them. Concepts have to be produced’ (TRM, 313). This notion of production again associates the philosopher with an artisan or labourer. The question of rigour is the first that I shall address in this chapter.

In \textit{Empiricism and Subjectivity} Deleuze gives the first extensive definition of a philosophical theory we have yet seen in his work, one in which the notion of careful and rigorous labour is foregrounded:

\begin{quote}
In fact, a philosophical theory is an elaborately developed question, and nothing else; by itself and in itself, it is not the resolution to a problem, but the elaboration, to the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{11} Beddoes, ‘Deleuze, Kant and Indifference’, p33.
very end, of the necessary implications of a formulated question. It shows us what things are, or what things should be, on the assumption that the question is good and rigorous (ES,106)

Reference in this passage is made to the ‘elaborate’ development of the question, which becomes the more compelling as the implications are worked through to the very end. A philosophical question, therefore, is about ‘the necessary development of the implications of a problem’ (ES,105) and so for Deleuze the philosophical problem is central, while the required labour is the reflection on and development of this problem. For this reason, the key ideas he discusses in Empiricism and Subjectivity are stated in the form of a question and, following on from that, its implications. Thus, the question of the subject is that ‘the subject is constituted inside the given’(ES,107). The condition of possibility of the question is the postulate that ‘relations are external to ideas’ (ES,107), and the further implications of the question are therefore the theories of atomism and associationism. We can divine the rigour of the question from the precise delineation of the problem.

Deleuze’s pairing of ‘good’ and ‘rigorous’ occurs again in the same text shortly afterwards: thus ‘it is a matter of knowing whether the question which presents things in such a light is good or not, rigorous or not’ (ES,106). We are left with little purchase on how to define a ‘good’ question other than by the attendant notion of rigour: a notion which Deleuze does not explicitly define. Deleuze again emphasises this point by contrasting it with any comparison between a philosophical question and the way things ‘really’ are, thus rejecting any attempt to judge a philosopher by his or her closeness to ‘reality’: ‘It is not a matter of saying (that Hume) pulverised and atomised the given. It is only a matter of knowing whether the question he raises is the most rigorous possible’ (ES,107).
To gain more purchase on this notion of rigour, we can examine in practice the evolution of a philosophical theory as traced in a short piece by Deleuze: ‘Bergson’s conception of Difference’. For Deleuze, the concept of difference is at the heart of Bergson’s break with his predecessors (in particular, the Greeks) but this break is not predicated on some radical difference of opinion with regard to difference itself. Bergson did not reject the concepts of the Greeks but instead, merely considered them insufficiently rigorous or worked through, since those early thinkers had mistaken contingent for essential differences. Deleuze writes ‘Essentially, Bergson criticises his predecessors for not having seen true differences of nature’ (DI, 32) and also ‘where there are differences in nature, others have merely found differences of degree’ (DI, 32). This new expression of the concept gives us more purchase on what the task or nature of philosophy is today: philosophy only has a positive and direct relation to things, argues Deleuze, if it can grasp their internal difference. Bergson therefore restates for us the nature, method and tasks of philosophy, seen through the prism of his conception of difference, because it is he who has understood the centrality of the concept of difference, something which his predecessors only grasped implicitly.

‘Intuition is the joy of difference’ (DI, 33), Deleuze continues, but he also describes it as ‘the method’ which encompasses the hypothesis. To achieve a full understanding of the concept considered – in this case ‘difference’ – we must have a method appropriate to the task, but crucially also the right starting point, or perspective, which allows us to complete it. The notion of intensity is proper to Greek metaphysics, as it informs what that metaphysics teaches us about being, space and time. Bergson’s method of intuition, however, allows him to grasp tendency as the proper subject of his philosophy, and thus, from the point of view of tendency, to allow us to grasp composite objects, made up of tendencies that differ in
nature. ‘Only tendency is the unity of the concept and its object’ (DI, 36) and only the notion of tendency allows us to see objects and concepts as something other than contingent and general. ‘Bergson’s concern with finding a genuine beginning, a genuine point of departure, shows up again and again’ (DI, 50) – and, indeed, Bergson’s divergence from Friedrich Schelling is determined principally by the situation of that point of departure.

As such, only beginning from this point of departure can we fully grasp both internal difference and differences of nature, which in turn allows us (through the consideration of time, or duration) to consider duration as something which differs from itself. Here, again, we see the fruits of Bergson’s radicalisation of the concept of difference, of his decision to consider the concept in its purest form “The real sense of Bergson’s endeavour is thinking internal difference as such, as pure internal difference, and raising difference up to the absolute” (DI, 39). By doing so, he differs his notion of difference from ‘contradiction, alterity and negativity’, three notions which he considers both external to, and less profound than, the concept of difference. And by thus so distancing his notion of difference from these three concepts, he avoids falling into the trap of the dialectic (whether Platonic or Hegelian) which considers contradiction or alterity as merely a moment to be overcome in a process whose final result is the Good. Deleuze’s notion of a philosophical theory as a ‘partial object’ comes into its own here: by divesting itself of a need for a terminal point, Bergsonian difference comes closer to what Deleuze terms ‘pure difference’. Bergsonian difference is purer precisely because internal difference differs from itself, first and immediately, whereas in Hegelian dialectics, the thing differs first from what it is not. Bergson thus reproaches both Plato and Hegel with not going far enough.
Bergson’s profound re-consideration allows the concepts of prior thinkers to be both subverted, and extended, and the salience of Bergson’s theory lies in his different and more profound understanding of the central importance of a particular concept, a starting point which he used to develop the implications of his theory by generating new concepts. As such, the act which Deleuze would describe as the key task of philosophy – the creation of concepts – is in fact only the second moment in a process which instead begins with the careful delineation of a problem.

This description of the process of philosophising in fact conforms closely to the analysis that critics such as Daniel W. Smith have made of Deleuze’s own work. As Smith argues, ‘Far from refusing Platonism in its entirety, however, Deleuze’s inverted Platonism retrieves almost every aspect of the Platonic project, but now reconceived from the viewpoint of the simulacrum itself.’ With the simulacrum as subject and starting point, this refoundation of the Platonic project on a new basis allows Smith to credit Deleuze with a ‘rejuvenated’ and ‘completed’ Platonism.

Such a process of redefinition, and of precise and careful delineation of what is essential in a philosophical problem, is also the core of Deleuze’s analysis of Hume. One of the main conclusions of the empiricists, for Deleuze, was that ‘the given is not given to the subject, but the subject is constituted in the given’ and that therefore, ‘Hume’s merit lies in the singling out of this empirical problem in its pure state and its separation from the transcendental and the psychological’ (ES.87). This goes to the heart of the method of Hume and other great philosophers. Hume saw more clearly than others did what the true problem was, he was able to reach its ‘pure state’ by stripping away the seeming

‘contaminations’ of the transcendental and the psychological, which was a secondary discipline and inappropriate for a philosophy of the mind. In this formulation the philosophical project is as much one of distillation as of creation, and rigour and clear-sightedness as important tools for the work as inventiveness or originality.

As we have seen, the ‘starting point’, or the initial postulate or problematic terrain on which the philosopher intends to found a theory, was crucial for Hume as for Bergson or Deleuze. Deleuze terms this ‘inspiration’, and argues: ‘In Hume’s work, we witness the unequal development of two lines of diverse inspiration’ (ES, 27). Deleuze writes of Hume that he begins with the question of the basic incompatibility of relations and their terms, or between an abstract idea and the nature of an idea. This is his starting point, and it forms a ‘basic challenge’ (ES, 28). A philosopher is therefore defined both by the ‘starting point’ or initial challenge according to which a problem is framed, as well as by his or her ability to challenge consensus and to reframe a philosophical problem in a new way. Deleuze’s analysis in Foucault, similarly, shows that Foucault’s choice of ‘starting point’ – the ‘statement’ - represented a strong and fundamental challenge to the whole history of ‘archivism’ as it had hitherto existed. Foucault ‘will not concern himself with what previous archivists have treated in a thousand different ways: propositions and phrases... Instead he will remain mobile, skimming along in a kind of diagonal line that allows him to read what could not be apprehended before, namely statements’ (F, 3). This direct challenge to the historical weight of his discipline manifests itself, in Foucault’s case, in his choice to largely eschew quotation from the works of the great philosophers.

Deleuze provides a further example of the methodical evolution of a philosopher’s problem and method in Chapter 5 of Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. Deleuze’s account of Spinoza
rejects the claims of some critics that there are gaps in the text of the *Treatise on the Intellect*, or that it remained unfinished for a purely arbitrary reason, such as lack of time. He also rejects the claims of serious inconsistencies in the method or thought of Spinoza, arguing instead that his argument is coherent, and developed over several texts. Deleuze argues that the development noted in the *Treatise* – that of beginning from a ‘given true idea’ to arrive as quickly as possible at the idea of God via a ‘short path’ of nine propositions – is the consequence of a definitive and worked out method, which encompasses both the *Treatise* and the *Ethics*. Spinoza’s synthetic method, which encompasses the analytical method as a moment within it, had to be developed in order that he could reach what Deleuze calls an ‘anhypothetical’ principle from which all causes and consequences follow. However, following this it took the further development of the concept of the ‘common notion’ in the *Ethics* to allow the gap to be bridged between ‘geometric beings’ and infinity, or the idea of God, and from there to knowledge of the essences. This is why Deleuze argues that the steps in the progressive evolution of Spinoza’s theory and method are all necessary: ‘Once one starts from the attribute as a common notion, one is necessarily led to knowledge of the essences… everything is clear if one makes common notions the point of departure’ (SP,118). However, the selection of common notions as the new ‘starting point’ for Spinoza’s development requires him to abandon the text of the unfinished *Treatise*, the content of which would require to be modified because of the exigencies of the new starting point. In Deleuze’s account of Spinoza’s career therefore, very little (including his failure to complete the *Treatise*) is contingent, and in fact Deleuze shows how each major development follows necessarily from a previous point in Spinoza’s intellectual evolution. Once we accept these claims, it becomes difficult or impossible for the critic to consider any individual text by Spinoza in isolation, and instead his body of work becomes a coherent and
self-reinforcing whole. For this reason, I disagree with Rajchman’s account of Deleuze’s philosophy, which instead claims that ‘The coherence among the various bits shifts from one work to the next as new concepts are added... it is not given by logical consistency among propositions’ 13. Gregory Flaxman also argues that ‘Deleuze maintains that philosophical thought acquires its character and its consistency in relation to that which is nonphilosophical’ 14: I would suggest that this definition is incomplete, and that for Deleuze, philosophical thought also acquires consistency by a process of progressive self-reflection.

As a preliminary conclusion therefore we might identify the proper name of a philosopher with the carefully worked out and rigorously delineated philosophical problem with which he or she is most associated. Such a problem would serve to give definition, coherence and unity to a philosopher’s entire body of work. In this respect, Deleuze’s position would also reflect his conclusions in Empiricism and Subjectivity on Hume’s notion of the subject, in which he argues that the thinking subject should be defined precisely as its most prominent ideas, stating that ‘The mind is not nature, nor does it have a nature. It is identical with the ideas in the mind’ and that it ‘is given as a collection of ideas’ (ES,22). Moreover, the notion of development also accords with the notion of the subject as it appears in Deleuze’s reading of Hume: Deleuze states quite boldly that ‘believing and inventing is what makes the subject a subject’ (ES,85). By invention Deleuze here means the ability to reflect and thus go beyond one’s partial, lived situation, to make moral, social, and aesthetic judgements, and to create new artifices: rules and norms. Here too Deleuze, and Hume’s, emphasis is on development as a process: ‘The subject is defined by the movement through which it is developed’ (ES,85) and ‘Subject is that which develops itself’ (ES,85).

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thinking subject, therefore, is to be identified as a collection of ideas, the philosopher
develops himself as philosopher precisely by developing those ideas over time. Work – a
process of reflection in order to make judgements and to create – is necessary to create and
develop the self: including to develop the self as an author. Such a position would accord
with Constantin Boundas’ remarks about Deleuze’s theory of subjectivity. As he argues,
‘What is remarkable about this contribution is that it combines a radical critique of
interiority with a stubborn search for ‘an inside that lies deeper than any internal world’’.

It is instructive in this regard to consider Deleuze’s phrasing regarding Hume’s conclusions,
which is curiously passive: ‘two points of view coexist in Hume’, rather than ‘Hume has two
points of view’ (ES,22). This particular tone is derived from the content of Deleuze’s work on
Hume, which focuses on how the mind as subject is constituted: ‘The coherent paradox of
Hume’s philosophy is that it offers a subjectivity which transcends itself, without being any
less passive. Subjectivity is determined as an effect’ (ES,26). A given subject is ‘the
qualification of a collection of ideas’ and ‘qualified as a partial, actual subject’ (ES,64). We
can better understand Hume as a mind identified with the central problems and ideas
within it, which are precisely what determines Hume as a thinking, reflective and persisting
subject, rather than as a fully-formed intellectual being whose constitution as a subject
entirely predated his engagement with the major ideas he worked on.

Such a position would again accord with the work of Boundas, who suggests that “the
names of those Deleuze reads and writes about stand for singular points (intensities)
capable of generating series”\(^\text{16}\). We could conceive of these series as precisely the

\(^{15}\) Constantin Boundas, ‘Deleuze: Serialisation and Subject-formation’, in Theatre of Philosophy, ed. Boundas
and Olkowski, pp.99-100.

\(^{16}\) Ibid, p101.
progressive unfolding and delineation of key philosophical problems. Boundas speaks of, for example, a ‘Hume series’ of which the starting point is the question: how does the mind become a subject? Such a position would preclude any conception of the Deleuzian philosopher as merely an accumulation of transitory effects.

In this section I believe I have demonstrated the persistence of the philosophical author as a subject which develops over time through a process of self-reflection and of reflection on his or her principal philosophical problem or idea. The continuities and consistencies which Deleuze found in the work of the philosophers he reads, and his presentation of those philosophers as beings in the process of growth and evolution, are far more apparent in his analyses than discontinuities or inconsistencies.

**Originality, Opposition and Critique**

In this part of the chapter I wish to examine the ways in which, for Deleuze, ‘doing’ philosophy means establishing oneself against philosophical predecessors. I shall argue that originality in the invention of concepts, while it is a key part of Deleuze’s conception of philosophy, is not the only significant aspect of his treatment of great philosophers. I shall also draw a distinction between the intellectual activity of a philosopher and that of a critic, which has implications for how the critical reader ought to approach the text of a philosophical author.

In the early part of his career, Deleuze was considerably more combative and polemical than towards the end of his collaboration with Guattari. In *What is Philosophy*, for example, Deleuze and Guattari ask, in regard to the coexistence of different philosophical concepts, ‘Is there one plane that is better than all the others, or problems that dominate all others?"
Nothing at all can be said on this point’ (WIP,27). Yet in Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze favoured a starker and more aggressive confrontation with the past: ‘According to Nietzsche the philosophy of the will must destroy and replace the old metaphysics: it destroys and supersedes it” (NP,78). In this earlier work, Deleuze seemed to require of his philosophers that they take sides and confront intellectual foes: “The philosophical learning of an author is not assessed by numbers of quotations... but by the apologetic or polemical directions of his work itself” (NP,152). Deleuze did not believe that a philosopher could, or should, be ignorant of the history of philosophy, but rather than the proper expression of that learning was in the adoption of critical positions with regard to one’s predecessors. Turning again to the example of Axelos, we can see that Deleuze praises him for the approach he took to his own predecessors, which exemplifies ‘learning’ in this critical sense: one which criticised them for the insufficient rigour of their concepts, and for their failure to follow those ideas through to their fullest logical conclusion: in this sense we see the concerns I previously discussed in Deleuze’s account of Bergson. He writes of Axelos ‘He reproaches his mentors for not having sufficiently broken with metaphysics, for not having sufficiently conceived of the powers of a technology both real and imaginary, for having remained prisoners of the perspectives which they themselves denounce’ (DI,75). Deleuze himself frequently criticises other thinkers for not facing up to the full implications of an idea, or not carrying their thought process through to its logical conclusion. For example, the philosophers of antiquity, ‘with the exception of Heraclitus... did not face up to the thought of pure becoming, nor the opportunity for this thought’ (NP,44). Thinking of the present moment as passing, rather than as strictly present, forces us to think of becoming, but these philosophers insisted on looking for reasons why it had not yet finished, rather than trying to conceive of a pure becoming that cannot finish. These thinkers, in other words, were
guilty of a lack of rigour, and a failure to carefully and progressively delineate the problems they were associated with.

For Deleuze, ‘philosophical learning’ (knowledge of the history of philosophy) must ultimately culminate in a taking of positions, and often in a polemical rejection of what has been learnt. In an essay on Hume, Deleuze directly associates the originality and profundity of Hume’s thought to this kind of strong, polemical opposition:

Hume’s originality, one aspect of his originality, derives from the force with which he affirms: relations are exterior to their terms. Such a thesis can be understood only in opposition to the tireless effort by rationalist philosophers to resolve the paradox of relations: either a means is found to make the relation internal to the terms, or a more profound and inclusive term is discovered to which the relation is already internal (DI,163).

Colombat notes this association between originality and forcefulness when he argues that ‘originality and forcefulness always [are] the focus of Deleuze’s analyses of literary, artistic and philosophical works’\(^\text{17}\), while Deleuze himself has seemed to place great emphasis on the question of originality, by writing in an essay on teachers that ‘Our teachers, once we reach adulthood, are those who bring us something radical and new, are those who invent an artistic or literary technique’ (DI,77)

Nevertheless, this question of originality – at least in so far as that word is associated with inventiveness - in so far as it is separate from the question of the rigour of a philosophical problem, is not, in my opinion, as vitally important for Deleuze as Colombat believes. In his analysis of Axelos, for example, Deleuze praises his collage-like method, one of mixing and matching the problems and concepts borrowed from different predecessors, saying of him that ‘he is dreaming of a Heraclitus at the head of a post-Marxist group of commandos’ (DI,157). Instead, Axelos’ originality is derived from the new sense he imparts to, and the

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\(^{17}\) Colombat, ‘Deleuze and the Three Powers’, pp. 204-05
new context in which he places, the concepts of others, so, for example: ‘Heideggerian terminology is retuned and takes on new meaning, even as it is converted from the country to the city’ (DI,157). Deleuze also explicitly associates Foucault’s originality with method rather than the invention of concepts. In Foucault, he argues that Foucault’s approach to linguistic analysis was original in the way in which he chose to define the ‘corpora’ of words and propositions that he analysed: ‘Foucault’s originality lies in the way in which he takes it upon himself to limit the different corpora which operate neither on the basis of linguistic frequency or constancy, nor according to the personal qualities of the speaker or writer (great thinkers, famous statesmen, etc.).’ (F,16).

Notwithstanding this point, the originality of Hume’s vision and understanding of the human still forms an important part of Deleuze’s analysis in Empiricism and Subjectivity. Take for example Hume’s rejection of the social contract and his argument that institutions, rather than pseudo-contractual relations, shape human behaviour. ‘There is no question any longer of the relation between rights and the law, but rather of needs and institutions. This idea implies an entire remodelling of rights and an original vision of the science of humanity, that is, of the new conception of psychosociology’ (ES,46). Hume’s analysis of rights would in this case be worked out as the logical consequence of his original vision of the human.

Deleuze does explicitly state that the same great and defining idea can be shared by different great philosophers, working at different times and belonging to different ‘schools’. ‘When James calls himself a pluralist, he does not, in principle, say anything else (other than that relations are external to their terms). This is also the case when Russell calls himself a realist’ (ES.99). The Bergsonian durée is also found in the Humean concept of habit-anticipation. Nevertheless, when explaining that ‘Association explains only the surface or
‘the crust’ of our consciousness’ (ES,102): an idea which writers as diverse as Bergson and Freud agree on, Deleuze considers it worthwhile to restate that ‘The least we can say is that Hume thought of it first’ (ES,103). In this respect, originality in the creation and definition of concepts remains important, but only to a secondary degree in Deleuze’s broader argument about the practice of philosophy. That practice encompasses not just the creation of concepts or the definition of problems, but also an engagement and critique of the concepts of others.

Though critics such as Slavoj Zizek have characterised Deleuze’s method as one in which he directly spoke ‘through the interpreted author in an indirect free speech without quotation marks’18, a practice which endorses taking liberties with a thinker, and looking for imaginative reinterpretations, Deleuze seems to offer limited scope for critical re-interpretation himself in his own discussion of Nietzsche. In Nietzsche and Philosophy Deleuze seems to implicitly divide philosophical writers into two camps: original philosophers, and commentators, with the latter allowed more scope for reinterpretation than the former. He warns for example that ‘A commentator on Nietzsche must, above all, avoid any kind of pretext for dialecticising his thought’ (NP,10). That Nietzsche, and thus, presumably, later Nietzscheans (or at least, those who have correctly understood their master) are irreconcilably anti-dialectical appears to be a given. This position, too, is reinforced by a quote from Deleuze given at a seminar of his noted by Colombat, in which he enjoined his students as follows: ‘You (students) must trust the author you are studying....You must silence the voices of objection within you. You must let him (the author) speak for himself... His thought invents its own coordinates and develops along its

18 Zizek, Organs without Bodies, p47.
own axes’19. These positions would suggest that Deleuze believed that the thought of previous great thinkers should be accepted or rejected as a whole, and, moreover, that the attentive philosophical student should attempt to enter into the spirit, or paradigm, on which that thought is constructed.

An instructive contrast in how Deleuze views the process of philosophising, and the process of commenting on, or critiquing, the philosophy of another, can be found by comparing *Nietzsche and Philosophy* to *Empiricism and Subjectivity*. This further demonstrates that Deleuze appears to have different expectations for how ‘philosophers’ and ‘commentators’ ought to relate to past thinkers. Furthermore, the different injunctions given for the practice of criticism helps us to understand what, for Deleuze, philosophy truly is.

In *Empiricism and Subjectivity* Deleuze states that Hume cannot develop a proper theory of the psychology of the mind because this is impossible within the bounds, and starting from the premises of, his theory of atomism. He argues that ‘All serious writers agree on the impossibility of a psychology of the mind’ (ES, 27), whereas the psychology of affections is referred to as ‘true psychology’ (ES, 29). Deleuze argues that modern authors (whom he does not specify) merely and unwittingly reinforce Hume’s argument when they criticise the theory of atomism on the grounds of its incompatibility with psychology: a true science of the mind, being an objective study of it, cannot take place within atomism. The mind is a constituted entity: the proper object of psychology is the principles, which are a form of psychic matter. Deleuze nevertheless goes on to say that it would be incorrect to criticise Hume on the grounds that his theory does not adequately describe the given, or what is. Here, however, he seemingly contradicts a later moment in his argument.

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19 Colombat, ‘Deleuze and the Three Powers’, p204.
To criticise a theory on the grounds that it gives an inadequate picture of reality (human nature, the given, and so on) is precisely why Deleuze rejects the work of certain later critics of Hume: rather than trying to work through Hume’s theories on their own terms, they reject them because they do not conform with their own perceptions of how the world is.

But the same standard is not applied to Hume, who precisely makes these kinds of judgements with regard to the theory of others: for example, ‘Hume centres his critique on the theory of egoism, which is not even a correct psychology of human nature, since it neglects the equally natural phenomenon of psychology’ (ES,44) or ‘Hume repudiates the arguments which assign everything, including justice, to the instinct… (which) as they forget culture, give us a false image of nature’ (ES,44). Deleuze agrees with Hume’s critique of egoism because ‘Egoism can designate some means only that humanity organizes in order to satisfy drives, but not all possible means’… (its) place is no longer very important’. (ES,44).

It is not clear by what metric Deleuze qualifies those writers who believe in a psychology of the mind as ‘not serious’. Yet when dealing with thinkers whom he respects, he argues very strongly that their thought must be considered and judged on its own terms rather than by reference to any external theory or metric.

This furthermore was an injunction Deleuze himself followed in his own early work. Referring to his own work on Kant, he stated that ‘When you’re facing such a work of genius, there’s no point saying you disagree… you have to discover the problems he poses, his particular machinery’ (DI, 139). Indeed Deleuze goes further, stating that ‘You have to work your way back… to that which he does not say in what he says, in order to extract something that still belongs to him, though you also turn it against him. You have to be inspired, visited by the geniuses you denounce’ (DI, 139). To the exchange of mere
opinions on the merits of different thinkers, Deleuze prefers an attempt to radicalise, subvert or push to extremes the central problem at the heart of their work. But that would first of all require the Deleuzian critic, at an initial moment, to enter into the philosophical paradigm that he or she is critiquing.

Criticisms of the theory alone without reference to or consideration of the underlying problem (such as: that the theory of atomisation does not adequately describe the given) are denounced as being ‘philosophical in name only’ (ES,105). Deleuze uses this claim to establish his rejection of a whole subset of philosophical criticism, which he terms the ‘biographical’ approach. Deleuze rejects, in other words, an attempt to divorce a philosophical theory from a deep consideration of the founding problem which structures it, and to reduce it rather to a personal predilection of the author, a mere opinion or personal choice on his part, or to describe it as a consequence of the general spirit of his time. Deleuze therefore rejects the ‘intentionalist’ basis for a sustained criticism of the philosophical author in these terms: ‘What a philosopher says is offered as if it were what he does or as what he wants’ (ES,105). Zizek, too, forcefully rejects such a form of criticism, arguing that ‘Philosophy is emphatically not about the beliefs of different individual persons’. The author, therefore, is associated with and is an effect of the central problem of his work, rather than that problem itself, or the terms in which it is expressed, being a development of the author’s intentions or opinions.

Empiricism ‘as much as any other philosophy’ (ES,108) is opposed to psychologism: in which, we must assume, would be included a psychological evaluation of the philosophical author. Not only is this ‘psychology of the intentions’ (ES,105) fictitious, it does not begin to

20 Zizek, Organs without Bodies, p50.
criticise the theory. The task of the critic may therefore be to divine what the philosopher truly does beyond what he says. Thus the good critic can read deeper than what is presented to us on the surface by a philosopher: and perhaps grasp meanings of which the philosopher himself was unaware. The good critic works as an adjunct to the philosopher, but their roles are clearly distinct.

By contrast to these forms and methods of criticism, Deleuze presents Kant’s treatment of Hume’s work as an example of one great philosopher criticising another: and doing so by restating the terms of the problem and thus the question. While Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* as well as the work of the empiricists situated their initial problem on the terrain of the imagination, he finds no initial accord between the subject and the given, as between ‘human nature and nature’ (ES,111). This accord for Hume is natural, but Kant starts from the premise that there is no such accord, and that therefore the given must be related to the subject and is only knowable through the subject (the basis of Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’). Thus we see a restatement of the problem which takes Kant’s philosophy in a different direction, and with different implications (such as regarding the nature of relations) without, however, missing the point of Hume’s work or criticising it on irrelevant or specious grounds. Hume’s originality, too, lies in his different restatement of a problem and his different treatment of already existing philosophical concepts: the passions. Hume ‘does not present the passions as a primary movement or as a primary force to be followed by the philosopher... (rather)... as a process that in itself is simple... (but)... composite and made up of two parts’ (ES,118). Originality, therefore, as we have seen, can exist in methodology as well as problem or concept. Hume also subjects relations to a similar critique, and in so doing takes ‘the relation away from representation, (and gives) it back to
practice’ (ES,120). The practical consequences of this critique, in terms of the consequential possibility of a theory of utilitarianism, are considerable.

Polemical aggression, therefore, is not the only worthwhile means of relating the production of new thought to the writings of predecessors. Deleuze further illustrates this in Nietzsche and Philosophy through detailed discussions of two pairings: that of Nietzsche in relation to the Kantian critique, and that of Max Stirner in relation to the modern, Hegelian dialectic. In the process, he revisits the question of philosophical originality. Stirner was a dialectician who never renounced the work of Hegel and his successors but instead attempted to take their method and concepts to their logical conclusion. He is clear-sighted enough to see that Hegelianism remains abstract, and he manages to divest the dialectic of the last vestige of transcendental principles: ‘this conservation, this final alienation, disappears in Stirner’ (NP,152). Stirner lacks an original method of his own, one which is worthy of addressing the question ‘who is man’, which he can nonetheless see is the crucial question to be put to Hegel and his successors. Nevertheless, he is capable of taking the dialectical method to extremes and thus producing work of real weight: ‘Stirner is too much of a dialectician to think in any other terms but those of property, alienation and reappropriation – but too exacting not to see where this thought leads: to the ego which is nothing, to nihilism’ (NP,153).

Deleuze argues that ‘In the history of the dialectic Stirner has a place apart, the final, extreme place’ (NP,151) precisely because he is able to subject the premises of the dialectic to the dialectical method itself. In the same way, Nietzsche himself manages to complete the project of the Kantian critique by subjecting Kant’s own premise, the value he seeks to defend – truth – to that critique itself. It appears therefore, in an echo of a later and more
worked out position in *What is Philosophy?*, that neither an original method, nor a wholly original concept, are necessary to producing notable work, but that merely extending and developing the concept of another thinker is in itself a noteworthy contribution. It may seem therefore that contrary to the position of Colombat, originality (understood in the narrow sense of inventiveness, or the creation of new concepts) is not so central to Deleuze’s thought on authorship, art, and philosophy, as may have hitherto been understood.

Deleuze also habitually associates the philosophical concepts generated by the consideration of a problem with proper names. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy* he classifies concepts according to the proper name of thinkers, whom he places at the head of ‘schools’ (for example, the Heracliteans). Deleuze associates these schools with particular concepts or a certain problematic: ‘Ressentiment, bad conscience, the ascetic ideal, nihilism are the touchstone of every Nietzschean’. (NP,35) or alternatively, ‘Kantianism centres on the concept of synthesis which it discovered’ (NP,49). As Craig Lundy has argued, the conceptual personae associated with a given philosopher (such as Plato) are the means by which later philosophers enter into dialogue with any given concept: these concepts, therefore, are inescapably personalised, because philosophers themselves are nothing but instruments of their conceptual personae.\(^{21}\) This personalised nature of a concept, and by extension a philosophical text, has obvious relevance to any discussion of the authorial function. This concept of personalised ‘schools’ is put in question in Deleuze’s later work, however, where he writes ‘When you work, you are necessarily in absolute solitude. You cannot have disciples, or be part of a school’ (D,26). We should surmise therefore that a ‘school’,

properly speaking, should be regarded as a discourse carried on by different thinkers at different points in history, rather than a group of philosophers who met together.

Nevertheless, a comparison with or criticism of a past thinker does not simply amount to the juxtaposition of two independent systems of thought or a point-by-point comparison of the steps of an argument. For Deleuze’s Nietzsche, what you think was not as important as how you think, or what the sense is of the problems that occupy you. Deleuze often defines the differences between philosophers as resting on very specific points at issue, for example arguing that ‘Nietzsche’s break with Schopenhauer rests on one precise point: it is a matter of knowing whether the will is unitary or multiple’ (NP,7). However, he does not just identify a philosopher’s principal problem, but also characterises the affirmative or negative character of their approach, thus: ‘Heraclitus is the tragic thinker. The problem of justice runs through his entire work’ (NP,22). In comparing Nietzsche with the ‘tragic philosophers’ (Blaise Pascal, Søren Kierkegaard, and Lev Chestov) a simple point-by-point comparison between their writings is not sufficient: for Deleuze, it is necessary to look beneath their writings and to judge their temperament, ‘tendency’ or how they thought, such as their relation to Nietzsche’s central concepts, such as ‘ressentiment’. In this sense the commentator or critic acts as a ‘clinician’ analysing preceding thinkers, judging Kierkegaard the poet of an ascetic ideal, for example. A merely intellectual comparison of ‘programmes’ risks ‘Abstraction being made from the little bacillus, the spirit of revenge which Nietzsche diagnoses in the universe’ (NP,35). This is the case, the more so as a philosophical programme may contain many revisions and changes in direction, just as I have hitherto traced in the work of Deleuze. As he has argued, “Philosophers sometimes exhibit a forgetfulness that almost makes them ill. According to [Karl] Jaspers, Nietzsche ‘corrected
his ideas himself in order to create new ones without explicitly admitting it” (NP,21-22). Profound conceptual differences between thinkers, and between different works of the same thinker, may mask fundamental similarities in temperament, problematisation and approach: what they do as well as what they say. Thus ‘And from Kant to Hegel we see the philosopher remaining, in the last resort, a thoroughly civil and pious character, loving… the good of religion, morality or the State’(NP,97). In this respect therefore, while the actual intellectual content of a problem may form part of the definition of a philosopher, for Deleuze temperament and approach, which we can consider a kind of philosophical style, is also determinative.

To this point our analysis has been rather static and has attributed ‘senses’ and ‘concepts’ to thinkers in an atemporal way, without taking into account their processes of intellectual development and self-differentiation from their masters or predecessors. I wish to argue however that the proper name of a philosopher such as ‘Nietzsche’ can hold together a body of work which, as the Jaspers quote above makes clear, may contain many revisions and sometimes contradictory standpoints. Deleuze, even when writing Nietzsche and Philosophy, recognised this problem. Taking Nietzsche’s early work The Birth of Tragedy for example, Deleuze argues that Nietzsche wrote this book ‘not as a dialectician but as a disciple of Schopenhauer’ (NP,10). Nevertheless, ‘contradiction and its resolution still play the role of essential principles’ and the text ‘smells offensively Hegelian’. If we are to hold to Deleuze’s injunction, discussed above, to avoid any hint of the dialectical in our interpretation of Nietzsche, how, then, are we to approach this book? Rather than any particular concept or methodology, it is the figure of Dionysus which provides the link between this book and Nietzsche’s later work, being as he is both ‘the affirmative and
affirming god’ (NP, 11) and the key to the resolution of the earlier-mentioned contradiction. The ‘two essential innovations’ (NP, 12) which Deleuze states that Nietzsche, at the end of his working life, found in *The Birth of Tragedy*, and which surpass its ‘semi-dialectical, semi-Schopenhauerian framework’ (NP, 12-13) both reference Dionysus: the god’s affirmative character, and the opposition between Dionysus and Socrates, which is deeper and more fundamental than that between Dionysus and Apollo. The relationship between Nietzsche and Dionysus: one essentialised in *What is Philosophy* as that between a thinker and a ‘conceptual persona’, has a unifying effect on an otherwise disparate body of work, but the central importance and exact operation of this unifying effect is underdeveloped by Deleuze. In this respect, we can again consider the identification made by Lundy of the conceptual personae with the philosophical author. This key identification allows us to consider the set of conceptual personae represented by the name ‘Nietzsche’ to perform a unifying factor with regard to the texts which make up his work, over and above that already achieved by the persistence of Nietzsche’s central problems throughout these texts. In this respect, the authorial function performs a unifying operation on a body of work not simply because Nietzsche’s texts all formed separate and determinate moments in a developed argument, but also because they were held together in other (stylistic or aesthetic) ways, each associated with the proper name of the thinker.

The operation of phenomena other than concepts to hold together a body of work and to bring different thinkers into relation is clearly demonstrated in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. One key example is the delineation of the similarities between Nietzsche and Stéphane Mallarmé, in which the resemblances between the two are described as ‘striking’ (albeit ‘superficial’) and the argument proceeds by way of an invocation of image and metaphor:
the dicethrow, the gaming table, midnight/midday, the pairing of child Igitur and the
Dionysus-child, the book. One could compare this with Deleuze’s own work, featuring the
recurrent image of the spider in its web, representing reason, memory, logos (although
these concepts were modified somewhat, later on) which reoccurs in *Proust and Signs*. The
association of Dionysus with affirmation allows Deleuze to incorporate *The Birth of Tragedy*
into the wider unity of Nietzsche’s texts, which concerns themselves in some way with the
problem of affirmation.

Just as Deleuze classified philosophers in relation to each other by temperament and
philosophical style, so too does he use this form of analysis to relate philosophers to other
branches of knowledge, such as science. Deleuze’s position on the alleged primacy of
philosophy as a foundational form of thought shifts over the course of his career, and in
works such as *What is Philosophy?* he rejects any special, foundational place for the
discipline. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, however, Deleuze accords a privileged position to
philosophy and philosophers, allowing them to be the critic and correction to other
disciplines. He seems content to oppose Nietzsche to an undifferentiated body of
knowledge referred to as ‘science’, without specifying different intellectual currents or
approaches. Nietzsche is referred to as a ‘critic of science’, set apart from it by ‘a propensity,
a way of thinking’ (NP, 41). Deleuze contrasts Nietzsche’s work with science, claiming that
‘utilitarianism and egalitarianism’ is proper to the latter, and that science as a whole has a
‘mania for seeking balances’ (NP, 42). Indeed, it seems impossible to be a scientist and not to
participate in the ‘ nihilism’ of modern thought: ‘Science, by inclination, understands
phenomena in terms of reactive forces... Physics is reactive in the same way as biology,
 things are always seen from the petty side, from the side of reactions’ (NP, 42). While in later
works such as *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze’s knowledge of and analysis of science would become more detailed, in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* his discussions of science differ from his discussions of philosophy by the absence of proper names, and due to the fact that the does not identify specific discourses associated with the methodology, style, intellectual temperament, or concepts of great scientific thinkers. Such a means of analysis is reserved here for philosophy, and Deleuze’s philosophers have been given the freedom to be bolder and more imaginative thinkers, able to reimagine another discipline in ways impossible for specialists. In linguistics, for example, ‘Language is usually judged from the standpoint of the hearer. Nietzsche dreams of another philology, an active philology’ (NP,69). What would it mean for science to become ‘active’, positive and affirming? Deleuze argues that ‘Only an active science is capable of interpreting real activities and real relations between forces’ (NP,70), and describes an active science as a ‘symptomatology’ a ‘typology’ and a ‘genealogy’. But for Deleuze (and Nietzsche) ‘the philosopher as such is a symptomatologist, a typologist and a genealogist’. We can surmise that at least for the early Deleuze, philosophers have a privileged intellectual position, and that their ability to found discourses, associate themselves with problems, and reimagine the problematic of others, defines them in contrast to thinkers from other disciplines.

In conclusion therefore, this section of the chapter has demonstrated that philosophical originality – meaning the invention of new concepts – is not a necessary condition, for Deleuze, of the production of worthwhile philosophical work, though the creation of original concepts does often distinguish the most profound thinkers. While Deleuze’s favourite philosophers are all distinctive in some way, philosophical originality can also be demonstrated by originality in methodology, in subversion or recontextualisation of another
thinker’s concepts, or simply by the development of another thinker’s line of thought to its conclusion. I have argued that the Deleuzian critic, however, must respect the philosophical paradigm of the thinkers he or she critiques, and have demonstrated the various ways in which the philosopher’s proper name holds a body of work together. In the final section, I will examine the Deleuzian philosopher in relation to his or her time and historical and political context.

**The Philosopher within time.**

While Deleuze’s analysis of the rigorous delineation of philosophical concepts might appear to be abstracted from historical context, and while he appears to reject intentionalist or biographical methods of philosophical criticism, nevertheless he still relates the work of his great thinkers to the context of their historical situation. For example his critique of the work of Hume and the utilitarians on the economy seems historically contingent. He rejects Elie Halévy’s general critique of utilitarianism which seeks to draw false distinctions between the ‘artifice’ of politics and the ‘mechanics’ of economics. Deleuze draws no such distinction between economics and politics, but in a sense ‘excuses’ the utilitarians by suggesting that at the dawn of capitalism, they may have only been dimly aware that the interests of landowners, peasants and workers do not naturally coincide. (ES,53). In this respect, he contextualises and judges the theory by reference to its time period, something which as previously discussed he denounces other critics for. Notwithstanding this, Deleuze seeks to ‘rescue’ Hume from the charge of irrelevance (in so far as his writings on the economy are concerned) by claiming that the ‘germ’ of later theories of capitalism can be found in his writings on money.
This question poses us the problem of how to define the thinking subject in relation to a time period. If a philosopher is determined by his or her central problem, is the adoption of that problem either contingent or the result of chance or personal proclivity, or to what extent is the choice a necessary or inevitable one?

There is some ambiguity in Deleuze’s work about the extent to which a philosopher only discovers what is there for him, the extent to which he is predestined to discover his ‘one great idea’. The sense in which great philosophers are somehow deprived of agency emerges in Guattari’s reflections on his own collaboration with Deleuze. “This collaboration is not the product of a simple meeting of two individuals.... there was a whole political context that led up to it” (DI, 216). The political turmoil and revolutionary potential of 1968, as well as certain intellectual currents then fashionable (such as the impoverished state of the discipline of psychology), are the most obviously significant parts of this context. Similarly, Deleuze’s remarks on Antonio Negri imply a close and determinative relationship between a writer’s work and the political, or other forms of struggle, he is engaged in: ‘A great writer cannot practice any kind of struggle other than what he values and encourages in his work’ (TRM, 174).

Despite the fact therefore that the philosopher-artisan is engaged in a process of production, it appears that she is not free to produce whatsoever she chooses. In his discussion of Alfred Jarry and ‘Pataphysics’, Deleuze implies that the major ideas of our times have an existence external to the authors that elucidate them, and that one becomes a major author precisely by coming into contact with or being able to understand or articulate these ideas: ‘Major modern authors often surprise us with a thought that seems both a remark and a prophesy: metaphysics is and must be surpassed’ (DI, 74). When
discussing Sartre Deleuze defines a great teacher as one who ‘(finds) those ways of thinking that correspond to our modernity’. There is something which impels a philosopher’s confrontation with a new set of circumstances – for example, Bergson’s delineation of the concept ‘duration’ to confront Einsteinian physics. Deleuze, in reference to Michel Foucault, describes this as ‘Not predicting, but being attentive to the knocking at the door’ (TRM, 346).

Deleuze expands these ideas in his discussion of Sartre, whom he also approvingly quotes on the subject of the ‘ideal writer’. Sartre implies that that writer cannot have total freedom in his choice of subject or public – ‘It is not enough to grant the writer the freedom to say whatever he pleases!’ (DI, 78) but that his subject must imply ‘the continual reversal of every order, as soon as it starts to ossify. In a word, literature is essentially the subjectivity of a society in permanent revolution’ (DI, 78) In other words, real literature reflects the revolutionary desire of a society to overturn the existing order, its subject matter is chosen for it in advance. ‘A book responds to a desire only because there are many other people fed up with a current type of discourse’ (DI, 220). Deleuze’s writings on Sartre stress the importance of being reactive to one’s historical and social context, a position closely related to Sartre’s own philosophy of engagement. Sartre’s work, for Deleuze, was indeed primarily defined by reaction and overcoming: to and of the bourgeois liberal world confronted by communism, his own situation as a public intellectual, his upbringing and intellectual formation, and so on.

What then does it mean for a philosopher to be ‘untimely’? This characterisation appears to hold true not only as regards his relation to the history of philosophy as a discipline, but to history considered more generally. Whereas Deleuze, in his work on Foucault, describes
history as ‘formations which are stratified, made up of strata’, he argues that to think is to ‘reach a non-stratified material, somewhere between the layers, in the interstices’ (TRM, 241). ‘Thinking has an essential relation to history, but it is no more historical than it is eternal’ ‘It is closer to what Nietzsche calls the untimely: to think the past against the present... in favour ...of a time to come’ (TRM, 241).

This implies that being untimely is a double position – working both from within, and outside of, history. Returning again to the question of the philosopher’s relation to the history of philosophy, it implies that one must be familiar with the history of philosophy, in order to use it against the ‘image of thought’ which is the product of that history, weighing down upon those who think, write and act today, and requiring them to conform to conventional patterns of thought. Foucault’s rejection or elision of the great classical thinkers (Kant, Hegel) for lesser figures such as Georges Cuvier or David Ricardo is part of his appeal for Deleuze, who argues ‘nowhere does Foucault more resemble a great philosopher than when he rejects the major lineages for a more secret, subterrenean genealogy’ (Di, 93).

The great thinker is compelled to address his own society and social context in a particular way, and to furnish it with the methods or concepts it requires at that juncture, but, at the same time, to reject the weight of its social and intellectual heritage.

Once the philosopher has discovered a new form of thought, the implications go beyond the merely intellectual or contemplative, to impose new forms on his life as a whole: ‘Philosophical concepts are also modes of life or modes of activity for the one who invents them’ (TRM, 263). It’s no accident that Deleuze approvingly refers to Sartre as the ‘teacher’ for his generation, referencing his position outside the Academy, and his refusal of major honours such as the Nobel Prize.
Deleuze develops this notion of the untimely in a short interview with Guy Dumur on Nietzsche. He emphasises that the untimely ‘is never reducible to the politico-historical element... (but) at certain great moments, they coincide’ (DI, 150). The untimely ones are ‘The masters... those who create, who destroy in order to create, not to preserve’ (DI, 150).

In this respect the following formulation, from a different piece on Nietzsche, is instructive ‘The overman is the focal point where the reactive (resentment and bad conscience) is overcome, and where the negative gives way to affirmation” (TRM, 208). The process of ‘transmutation’ from negative/reactive to positive occurs precisely at the figure of the Overman, also described as the ‘transhistoric element of humanity’ (TRM, 208). This implies a double relation with time and privileges the figure of the Overman as great thinker. We cannot separate the great writer or thinker from his historical context: ‘Masoch is as inseparable from the revolutions of ’48 in the Austrian empire, as Sade from the French Revolution’ (DI, 131). The previous quote, coupled with the explicit linking by Guattari of his work with Deleuze to the ‘generation of ’68’ does give us some sense that revolutionary times manage to produce revolutionary thinkers, although the precise nature of the link is not clearly explained.

The temporally specific nature of philosophy and philosophers is integral to Deleuze’s work. His concept of the untimely is drawn from Nietzsche, it is neither eternal, nor historical, nor dialectical. It does not imply a timeless set of values, nor does it imply reconciling (in a Hegelian fashion) difference to the same, in some form of temporalised dialectical progress. Deleuze argues ‘Philosophy has an essential relation to time: it is always against its time, critique of the present world’ (NP,100) and ‘The philosopher creates concepts that are neither eternal nor historical but untimely’ (NP,100). Untimely truths however are ‘more
durable than all historical or eternal truths put together’ (NP, 100). In this respect, we should conclude that while Deleuze has rejected the mere biographical or intentionalist form of criticism of the philosophers he studies, that does not mean that the historical and social context of a thinker is unimportant to him. While no easy relationship between prevailing social mores and the thought of a great philosopher can be traced, for Deleuze the philosopher exists in a relationship of opposition and reaction to the prevailing opinions of his time, working against them while still embedded within society. The Deleuzian philosopher tends towards the future, both seeking out concepts which will create the world to come, and writing for an audience who does not exist yet.

In conclusion, in this chapter I have demonstrated the central importance of the authorial function, as I discussed it in the Introduction, to our understanding of Deleuze’s writings on philosophers and philosophising. Firstly, I argued for the association of a philosopher with the progressive delineation of a central philosophical problem, one which would, in turn, have a unifying effect on that philosopher’s body of work. Such a position would prevent the reduction of a philosopher’s work to a given series of transitory ‘effects’. I argued that originality, understood in the sense of the invention of new concepts, is not a necessary condition for real philosophical work for Deleuze, though it frequently distinguishes the work of the greatest philosophers. He also, however, highlights originality in method, or in the forcefulness of polemical opposition to the work of others.

Deleuze also repeatedly associates concepts and methods with proper names, often placing his major thinkers at the head of named ‘schools’. His analysis of a writer’s body of work sees it bound together by a concern with a central problem, with a specific philosophical temperament or tendency, or by the figure of a conceptual persona, a being explicitly
identified with the philosopher. When discussing the most appropriate way for critics to approach the work of a great philosopher, he demands that the work be considered on its own terms and from within its own paradigm. Such a position clearly privileges the intellectual project of a philosophical author over that of a reader of philosophy.

Finally, I argued that a philosopher’s situation within a historical and social context was determinative of his or her work – not because philosophers were bound to the spirit of their own times, but because the most enduring philosophy is ‘untimely’, or reactive against the intellectual and social context of its day.
Chapter 2 Deleuze and the Literary Author

In this chapter, I examine Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of the authorship of literary texts. This is a complicated task, since novels, poems, and stories, as well as plays, are often grouped under the rubric of ‘art’ in general rather than of writing or artistic writing in particular. My position is that the intentional creator of a literary text should be considered both author and artist. I focus on Proust and Signs, first published in 1964, and Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature, published in 1975. These two works were thus written at the mid-point of Deleuze’s career, a time-period which encompasses the beginning of his relationship with Guattari. Proust and Signs, however, was issued in two editions, in 1964 and 1972, dating from both before and after the beginning of Deleuze and Guattari’s collaboration, and was then completed by a final chapter, ‘Presence and Function of Madness: The Spider’, published in 1973. The evolution of this text shows the profound impact Guattari had on Deleuze’s concepts of art, subjectivity, and authorship, but in my opinion, it is still possible to identify continuities between the different editions as they describe an authorial subject as much marked by the involuntary exercise of the faculties of the intelligence as he or she is by a close association with style as an individuating viewpoint. The first part of this chapter then will examine style, and demonstrate how by a process of apprenticeship, disillusion and disappointment with worldly things, the author elaborates a style by which he or she will be defined. The analysis will demonstrate that contrary to some claims in the secondary literature, the personal, social and historical context of the author remains influential in the formation of a text, even if I agree that Deleuze’s position is not a ‘psychologist’ one. I then go on to discuss the image of the ‘spider-narrator’, and elaborate the role that that image demonstrates for the author in the
establishment of transversal connections in the ‘web’ of the text, a forerunner of the later concept of the ‘literary machine’. Finally, I close the chapter with an account of the negative or limiting role of the author, linked to intention, and to internal consistency in tone and style, and the restrictions that places on the reader’s interpretations of a literary text.

‘The Search’ and the apprenticeship of a style

The key movement in Proust and Signs in so far as it relates to my research question is the association of the notion of ‘author’ with apprenticeship, learning, and progression, in so far as these presume the persistence of an authorial subject who learns and grows in time. The book therefore helps to answer not just the question ‘What is an author?’ but also ‘How does one become an author?’ Marcel Proust’s novel itself, In Search of Lost Time, is also closely associated with these questions. The novel’s structure follows that of the Bildungsroman – and thus can be read as a form of ‘coming-of-age’ tale, which culminates in the hero’s decision to write a book: it is ‘the narrative of an apprenticeship: more precisely, the apprenticeship of a man of letters’ (PS,3). Though Proust’s narrator is, of course, merely a character in a novel, and while the narrator should not be read as a fictionalised Proust, Deleuze’s intense interest in this apprenticeship should be read as an indication of his views on the formation of literary authors more generally. Proust’s narrator, therefore, is first himself an aficionado of art and literature, then a society habitué, then a devoted lover, and finally decides to become an artist, undergoing a process of initial attraction, then disillusionment and disappointment, with the different worlds and situations he passes through. In Proust and Signs, Deleuze describes this movement in terms of an encounter with three different classes of ‘signs’: the signifiers emitted by persons, objects and substances, which themselves are ‘the object of a temporal apprenticeship, not of an
abstract knowledge’ (PS, 4). The classes of signs Deleuze describes are: the empty, ‘worldly’
signs (relating to the world of high society), the sensuous signs of love, and finally the
essential signs of art. These signs contain the codes needed to unlock the mysteries of
worlds which would otherwise remain completely obscure to us: such as the niceties of 19th
century diplomacy represented by M. de Norpois, or the hidden, unknown yet possible
worlds which are expressed by our beloved.

Jean-Jacques Lecercle however argues that the ‘apprenticeship’ Proust’s narrator
undergoes is even more fundamental than that of the aspiring artist: it is not just a search
for the beginnings of a literary career, but a search first and foremost for one’s self.
Deleuze’s account of Proust therefore is about ‘where the subject becomes who she is by
learning her way through a maze of signs’¹. It is therefore ‘a quest for self’ as well as ‘a
quest for truth’. Such a formulation on Lecercle’s part, of course, implies an identification
between the fundamental self of the subject, and the condition of that self as an artist: or in
other words, that the artist is not merely contingently an artist, but that the condition of
being an artist is fundamental to his or her identity.

This process of apprenticeship, or learning, does not however consist in accumulating
knowledge or in perfecting a skill, but rather in becoming ‘sensitive’ to signs. Deleuze argues
that ‘There is no apprentice who is not ‘the Egyptologist’ of something’ and ‘every act of
learning is an interpretation of signs or hieroglyphs’ (PS, 4). How exactly does one become
more sensitive, and what is the method used to interpret these signs? Consider two detailed
examples Deleuze gives of the hero’s ‘disappointments’ in the Search in his attempts to
discover a particular truth. These are the performance of the famous actress La Berma, and

¹ Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Badiou and Deleuze Read Literature, Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, 2010,
p78.
the personality of the society lady Mme. de Guermantes, both of which fail to reveal the artistic or spiritual meaning that they had promised to the narrator. For Deleuze this apprenticeship requires a moment of initial failure, which must be overcome:

‘Disappointment is a fundamental moment of the search or of apprenticeship’ (PS,23). This process is the same regardless of which ‘line’ (love, art and so on) of the apprenticeship we are discussing – or in other words, which class of signs we are becoming more sensitive to. Having failed to discover in the object of our appreciation (that is, in an analysis of Mme. de Guermantes’ charms) the secret meaning we were looking for, we switch to a ‘subjective compensation’ or in other words, ‘become personally sensitive to less profound signs... as a result of the association of ideas that she stimulates in us’(PS,23). The time spent in pursuit of learning results first and foremost in a development of our own self, of our sensitivity as well as our capacity for interpretation and for association, which enables us to undertake the study of different, less immediately apparent signs.

While at the end of this development the worldly signs are empty, ‘intact or identical’ (PS,55), and we feel we have wasted our time, the real process of development has taken place in us: we are less able to be taken in by worldliness, and ready to progress to a less material level of signs. This process of self-alteration is referred to as a ‘learning’ on our part.: ‘What is essential is not to remember, but to learn’ and ‘ the interpreter’s continuous and gradual maturation was required for a qualitative leap into a new knowledge’ (PS,58).

The process of learning to interpret the signs of love, for example, which consists in passing along a series of different loves, has wrought changes in the lover: ‘When we pass from one loved term to the next, we must take into account a difference accumulated within the subject’ (PS,44) . In fact, by passing through the previous moments of the series we accede
to a higher consciousness: ‘love’s repetition is not to be separated from a law of progression by which we accede to a consciousness that transmutes our sufferings into joy’ (PS, 47). This ‘accumulation’ within the subject of the lover (a word which implies that the differences occasioned in the subject are of degree or of intensity rather than of kind) precludes any interpretation of the apprentice-lover (or apprentice-artist) as a transitory effect or event. Instead, the apprentice is both a stable and persisting subjectivity, but one which is capable of change: change however, that occurs as a result of the accumulation of lived experience.

As Ruben Borg argues, therefore, ‘Deleuze’s philosophy retains the structure of an apprenticeship in the dramatic passions but rather than relating to time/finitude as a negative element to be overcome in the progress of knowledge, it renders time/finitude as a force inseparable from reality itself’.

Though the discussion of the apprentice-artist differs greatly from the reflections contained in Nietzsche and Philosophy on the process of formation required of the philosopher, in both cases we have the sense of a gradual progression through error towards truth. Unlike, however, the philosopher, the artist is not required to ‘attack’ or ‘destroy’ the illusions previously encountered in the form of the ‘worldly’ or ‘sensual’ signs, they have a part to play in the revelation of a deeper truth. Indeed, ‘The apprenticeship would be imperfect and even impossible if it did not pass through (the worldly signs)’ (PS, 5). The deepest and most profound artistic truths revealed in Proust’s Search explicitly contain something of the earlier worldly and sensuous signs, nonetheless rejected as illusory, which expresses itself in the final production of a work of art. ‘The work of art contains the ultimate explanation of all the other signs, they are fulfilled in the ‘end goal’’ (PS, 54). For this reason, I remain

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unconvinced by Peter Hallward’s contention that ‘The work of art... can have nothing to do with the process of describing or redecorating a reality external to it.’

According to Deleuze’s reading, ‘involuntary memory’, which is often regarded as the key to Proust’s novel, is in fact only a moment in the more important process of learning and apprenticeship which it describes. The work that the apprentice does in interpreting and developing the other classes of signs serves to enable the discovery of the essence incarnated in the artistic signs: ‘The paradoxes of involuntary memory are explained by a higher instance, which overflows memory, inspires reminiscences, and communicates to them only a part of its secret’ (PS, 42). This process seems incontrovertibly dialectical – it posits paradoxes as contradictions which are resolved in a ‘higher instance’, which overdetermines oppositions at a lesser stage of development. Consider the narrator’s apprenticeship to the signs of love, which takes place in the form of a progression along a series of different loves, with different women. A double movement appears to govern this progression: Proust’s hero must first affirm his love for his beloved, for example Albertine, then later must forget her, retracing or redescending the steps of his love. But this affirmation, then rejection, does not just apply to the loved one, but is also an operation that the lover must carry out on his own person. To pass from one loved term to the next, the self which loved the first term must cease to exist: ‘The sign (of love) develops only to the degree that the self corresponding to its meaning disappears’ (PS, 56). Annihilation of one’s own self is an essential part of the apprenticeship. But we should not take this to mean that there is no connection either between the different terms in the series, nor in the different selves of the apprentice-lover. The series is not infinite, and the process of advancement and retreat progresses towards a resolution in the final term: ‘at the other

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3 Peter Hallward, Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation, London, Verso, 2006, p104.
pole, the series of our love transcends our experience, links up with other experiences, accedes to a transsubjective reality’ (PS,45). This holds true for art just as much as for love: ‘All the stages must issue into art, we must reach the revelation of art; then we review the stages, we integrate them into the work of art itself’ (PS,42). The different selves of the apprentice are never entirely annihilated, and they will find their fulfilment and culmination in the ‘absolute self of art’ which ‘encompasses all the different kinds of self’ (PS,57). As a result, we cannot divorce the eventual maturation of the apprentice into the self-as-Artist from the realities of his or her lived experience, because the artistic self never appears spontaneously, but only at the end of this long process of development. That this development refers to an accumulation of lived experience is made clear when Deleuze states that ‘each aspect of time is now itself a term of the absolute temporal series and refers to a Self that possesses an increasingly vast and increasingly individualised field of exploration’ (PS,56-57).

This progression through the different series of signs therefore follows a set path, passing through degrees from ‘material’ or worldly to spiritual. The later, more spiritual signs are explicitly referred to as being both more profound and more valuable: ‘The sensuous signs of memory are inferior to those of art’ and ‘They represent only the effort of life to prepare us for art and for the final revelation of art’ (PS,42). Thus, ‘art gives us the true unity: unity of an immaterial sign and of an entirely spiritual meaning’ (PS,28). The reader is led to think of a form of religious process, a gradual detachment from worldly things. The trope of a worldly existence serving to prepare us for what comes after, as well as the explicit reference to a ‘final revelation’, make up an unequivocally and self-consciously religious analogy. However, this does not mean that, as Hallward suggests, creativity means an
abandonment of the worldly. Rather, a full experience of, and disenchantment with, the worldly is necessary to prepare the apprentice-artist for the final expression of this love and this disenchantment in the creation of a work of art which incorporates all the experiences that artist has lived through up to this point. In other words, an artist must be prepared by life to create art, and that art contains within it the mark or trace, the expression, in some respect, of that life.

In this respect, while Hallward is correct to identify a progression away from the worldly in (at least the first edition of) *Proust and Signs*, and perhaps also to associate art with a dimension of life which could be termed ‘extra- or other-worldly’, I do not agree with the implication that the social, political and historical context that a given author worked in has little to no importance for our understanding of his or her work. This can be seen in *Kafka*, in which Deleuze and Guattari stress the connection between the work and intellectual development of various leading thinkers in different branches of science or art, and the political context of the collapse of the Habsburg Empire. They draw a causal link between the crisis created by that collapse, at the beginning of the 20th century, and the movements which they explicitly state that it ‘accentuated’ of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation in the intellectual work that was going on in the period. Thus, they cite Albert Einstein’s theories about the representation of the universe, the Austrian dodecaphonists and their ‘deterritorialisation of musical representation’, or ‘the expressionist cinema and its double movement of deterritorialisation and reterritorialization of the image’ (K,24). That Deleuze and Guattari’s thinkers do not think purely in abstract terms is made clear by their discussion of Franz Kafka himself. They argue that ‘The problem of expression is staked out by Kafka not in an abstract and universal fashion but in relation to those literatures that are
considered minor, for example, the Jewish literature of Warsaw and Prague’ (K,16). Deleuze and Guattari’s thinkers are relational, they pursue abstract questions in terms directly relevant to their own lived experience.

However, the precise nature of the causal link between those thinkers and those political movements is not clear: we are left to question, for example, whether the political instability of the Habsburg Empire led the thinkers of the day to challenge other certainties and forms of received wisdom. The question is still more puzzling as the connection of many of these figures to the territory of the modern-day Czech Republic, or to other parts of the former Habsburg empire, is very tenuous. Einstein, who was a German Jew, taught in Prague. Robert Wiene, a leading film-maker who was born in modern-day Poland and who spent most of his life in Germany, had Czech background. Paul Wegener, another German film-maker, used ‘Prague themes’. Why do Deleuze and Guattari take such pains to stress the connection of these significant and revolutionary thinkers to the parlous, decaying, and in their terms, stressed and cramped conditions of the declining Austro-Hungarian empire – particularly when, in most cases, their connection to Germany was much more strong? This is not an attempt on their part at simple biographical criticism, in which a direct relationship is found between the most prominent influences in a thinker’s life, and his or her work: instead, to put the issue in Deleuze and Guattari’s own terms, the ‘assemblages’ created by the association of these thinkers with a politically disturbed region, even if only for a fairly brief time, had a major impact on their intellectual production. At any rate, what is relevant for the question at hand is that the revolutionary and destabilising movements which swept this part of Europe in the early part of the 20th century did not just find expression in self-consciously political writing or art: rather, that the effects were far more disparate and
widely felt, including in the domains of physics and linguistics. Deleuze and Guattari therefore, wish to posit a ‘wave’ of deterritorialisation or a collapse of existing certainties and practices which took place in one discipline or branch of thought after another in a very short time period. We may surmise then that these branches of thought were also in some respect acting on each other. In any case, the association between a thinker’s lived experience and his or her intellectual production is so presumed by Deleuze and Guattari that they devote to it little explanation or justification: they clearly view their authors as beings who cannot be fully understood outwith a historical and social environment, and whose surroundings and life experiences have a material impact on their work, as well as vice-versa.

Yet the work of art which life prepares us to create is not simply the representation or expression of our lived experience. By progressing through this temporal apprenticeship, the literary author or artist attains the ability to create art, ‘see’ according to a different and superior viewpoint, or incarnate some form of artistic essence. The final stage of the apprenticeship, the appreciation of the ‘essence’ of a work of art (such as of La Berma’s dramatic performance) is what we have been prepared for. But how precisely should we characterise the essence that is expressed through this work of art?

This essence which is incarnated in the work of art is also not the mere expression of the opinions or experiences of the artist. It ‘is not reducible to a psychological state, nor to a psychological subjectivity’ (PS,28). While we, as the artist, have changed in the course of our search, the changes to us do not fully explain the essence which we can now conceive of. The essence, however, is expressly associated with the artist as subject, but it is not synonymous with the subject: ‘Essence is indeed the final quality at the heart of a subject;
but this quality is deeper than the subject, of a different order’ (PS,28). Essence expresses an entire ‘world’ associated with a given artistic subject, seen from that subject’s individual viewpoint. It is ‘the region of Being that is revealed to the subject’ (PS,28) and it substitutes ‘for the individual in a world the viewpoint towards a world’ (PS,73).

Lecercle correctly identifies this ‘essence’ with style itself, but style in the particular sense that Deleuze, and Proust, both use that term: ‘For this is the main characteristic of style: it is of the essence. It is essential to the theory of art implicit in Deleuze’s Proust, and it belongs not to the individual author, but to the essence.’

Style therefore, at least in the particular sense Deleuze is here employing the term, is not a voluntarily adopted means of expression of a given author, but instead is associated with a particular viewpoint which expresses itself through that author, and without his conscious will, but which, nonetheless, he communicates to the reader. The artist in fact imposes this viewpoint on the spectator, thus: ‘To make another person see is to impose upon him the contiguity of a strange, abominable, hideous spectacle’ (PS,90).

This particular use of style is the same use that Proust employed in the Search, allowing us to suppose that the Deleuzian sense of ‘style’ is – at least during the writing of Proust and Signs – entirely Proustian. When Proust’s narrator discusses his favourite author, Bergotte, he notes that his style – which he terms ‘Bergottisms’ - has proven difficult for imitators to attempt to copy. The reason for this, as the narrator concludes, is that literary style does not really inhere in mere linguistic forms at all, but instead is the result of expressing a particular viewpoint and means of looking at what is, an expression which of necessity alters as the object of consideration changes. Finding the expression of his own viewpoint in each object

4 Lecercle, Badiou and Deleuze, p86.
or scene he considers gives Bergotte’s style its unique literary quality, thus Proust’s narrator reflects: ‘what was meant by ‘Bergottism’ was first and foremost, a priceless element of truth hidden in the heart of everything, whence it was extracted by that great writer by virtue of his genius... every fresh beauty in his work was the little drop of Bergotte buried at the heart of a thing and which he had distilled from it.’

The different forms that style takes are ‘the unconscious themes, the involuntary archetypes in which the words, but also the colours and the sounds, assume their meaning and their life.’ (PS, 31) Deleuze identifies as examples of style the little patch of yellow in Vermeer’s paintings, or the marine quality which characterises the work of Proust’s fictional painter Elstir. These qualities assume a significance out of all proportion to any function they appear to play in the individual painting or other work of art. Each fragment is associated with the ‘mysterious viewpoints’ of style. Each gives definition to the work of art, acting as the ‘fragment that determines a crystallisation’ (PS, 75). Style therefore is what Deleuze terms the ‘incongruity’ of the artist. Deleuze argues that ‘Art is a veritable transmutation of substance. By it, substance is spiritualised and physical surroundings dematerialised.’ (PS, 31)

Donald Cross has also persuasively identified this view of style, on Deleuze’s part, with that expressed by Proust himself as early as his work of literary criticism, Against Sainte-Beuve.

In Against Sainte-Beuve, Proust defined style as ‘a record of the transformation imposed on reality by the writer’s mind’, thus identifying it with the viewpoint, unique to each individual writer, which could only be communicated to the reader through its imposition

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via the artwork. It is for this reason that Proust argues ‘the writer’s true self is manifested in his books alone’.

However, Cross proceeds to elaborate a reading of ‘style’ which he contrasts with the notion of ‘nonstyle’. For Cross, ‘style’ arranges the different elements of a work into a whole which is totalising and uniform while ‘nonstyle’ operates immanently, without a predetermined principle. Thus, ‘style’ is arborescent, while ‘nonstyle’ is rhizomatic. Nonstyle is associated too with the minorising functions of language, thus: ‘Stuttering, then, sharpens a number of the senses at work in the non- of nonstyle: non-communicative (‘silent’), non-now or deferred (‘a style to come’), non-domestic or alienated (‘the foreign language within language’) and non-major or minor (‘a minor use of the major language.’). Nonstyle would then only unify the fragments of the work, after the fact, and could not be considered an originating difference. Yet for Cross’ reading to work, he has to argue too often that in *Proust and Signs*, when Deleuze speaks of style, he really means ‘nonstyle’. This is a highly problematic construction, as Cross himself admits, defending himself with reference to a hasty comment, between parentheses, that Deleuze made on ‘Proust’s nonstyle’ in his late essay ‘Immanence: A Life’, in order to suggest that Deleuze finally never really believed that Proust had a style at all. In any case, in my opinion, the opposition that Cross attempts to set up between ‘style’ and ‘nonstyle’, is rather too black and white, in that it suggests that the Deleuzian author can be associated with nothing – whether it is called style or method – which would in any way serve to determine the work in advance. Rather than cast ‘nonstyle’ as the polar opposite of style, I would argue that it should merely be seen as another variant of style.

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8 Cross, ‘What is nonstyle’, p85.
Some of the same conflict over the exact nature of style can be found in the work of Anne Sauvagnargues, who identifies style as a form of ‘signature’. She argues that “Style evokes a signature, such as that of the painter Francis Bacon, who favoured the technique of isolating figures on an abstract background strewn with inchoate perspectives and larval scenery”.

However, despite the fact that this technique was seemingly habitually preferred by Bacon, Sauvagnargues nevertheless states that ‘once style is no longer founded on a personal Imaginary of a symbolic generality, it becomes an event.’

Sauvagnargues’ take on Deleuze’s position elides several conflicting issues in an unfortunately rather imprecise manner. For her, although Deleuze refuses to reduce style to a personal biographical composite, imaginary or symbolic, or to identify the author with personal experience, Deleuze does not thereby intend to abandon the concept of the author, but rather to transform it. The name of the author no longer refers to a personal interiority, an individuated ego, but is, as Deleuze repeats in formulas that he takes up again and again, the nexus of an effect, of a proper name, which itself entails a process of depersonalisation.

While it’s accurate that for Deleuze, style cannot be reduced to a ‘personal biographical composite’ or a ‘personal interiority’, it does not follow for me that there can be no link between an author closely identified with a particular style, and that author’s personal experience. As I discussed above, the process of passing through a long process of engagement, then disappointment (or to put it in Deleuzian terms, deterritorialisation and reterritorialization of the self on its surroundings) to accede to a style means that something of the worldly and sensuous experiences of the author-artist are retained in the signs of art. Sauvagnargues is on stronger ground with her description of the name of the author as the ‘nexus of an effect’, which indicates the distance between an authorial ‘style’ and the

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merely voluntary imposition of some personal concern of the author’s on a text.

Nevertheless, to refer to style as an ‘event’ or an ‘effect’ rather conflicts with her earlier description of style as a ‘signature’, since the former description would rather suggest that a ‘style’ is merely a collection of transitory, contingent and unrelated effects with no clear relation to each other, while the latter suggests something more permanent. Though ‘style’ may not manifest itself in each work of art in the same way, this does not mean, as I expressed above with reference to Proust’s description of Bergotte, that it does not fundamentally reflect a singular and persistent individuating viewpoint, one which results in a different ‘effect’ as it considers a different object.

What the preceding discussion demonstrates however is that according to the position adopted by Deleuze in this text, style cannot be simply the expression of work and effort: the result of the time taken to develop a particular artistic skill or to learn a new means of expression – and this is because the adoption of a particular style is not a voluntary choice. We can see that this is the case because of Proust’s narrator’s reaction to La Berma’s acting and intonation, which Deleuze quotes with approval, thus: ‘It was because of its very clarity that it did not satisfy me. The intonation was ingenious, of an intention and meaning so defined that it seemed to exist in and of itself, as if any intelligent artist might have acquired it’ (PS, 21). Instead style is discovered as the ‘essence’ of the singular viewpoint which expresses itself through the artist. Style, rather than individual, is individuating: it does not exist as a merely contingent or secondary characteristic of an artist who should primarily be defined by the great themes of the work. Rather, it is the definitive and most significant characteristic of the literary author, which is only revealed at the end of that author’s apprenticeship. Style reveals the unique and creative viewpoint which explicates a world
which is only revealed in the work of art, but (for Deleuze) the only way to access this viewpoint and to create works of art in which this style is expressed is to pass through the process of engagement, then gradual disillusionment, with the various aspects of an artist’s lived experience: from the consumption of other works of art, through the joys and trials of love, to the gradual disillusionment with friendship and worldly society. This, therefore, will require a process of repeated deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation of the author’s self. Such a conception of ‘style’, which eschews those active and consciously adopted variations in form and technique deliberately chosen by the author or artist to create an effect, which we would commonly associate with the term, is clearly a radical departure from ‘style’ as it is traditionally understood in philosophy and aesthetics – though, as I discussed in my Introduction, theorists such as Barthes did concur with Deleuze’s position here on the largely unconscious nature of style. As I shall later argue in Chapter 4, by the time of writing the Cinema books Deleuze had shifted away somewhat from the extremity of the presently-discussed position, focusing on the importance of the intelligence, and indeed of intellectual and philosophical commitments, to the formation of a cinematic style. However, as I will argue later in this chapter, it is my contention that Deleuze (and Guattari) – at least in their discussion of literary authors - separated much what we could term ‘method’ or ‘conscious employment of technique’ out from the notion of ‘style’, and analysed it separately. The notion of ‘style’ as I here describe it therefore has a very specific Deleuzian, and Proustian, sense.

By the time of writing What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari had adopted the concept of the ‘art-monument’ to describe their vision of the task of art. What is most striking however in their description of such a monument is the persistence of these fundamental
ideas about style from *Proust and Signs*, expressed now through the notion of the construction of ‘universes’. For Deleuze and Guattari these universes are expressly identified with the proper name of a great artists, they ‘construct their own limits, their distances and proximities, their constellations and the blocs of sensations they put into motion – Rembrandt-universe or Debussy-universe’ (WIP,177). These ‘universes’ also construct their limits according to a unique viewpoint associated with the proper name of the artist: they are, properly speaking, universes of *style*.

This, therefore, is the Deleuzian definition of the nature of the artist. While the philosopher is associated first and foremost with the development of a major problem, the literary author is associated with a style. It is the artist’s style that both provides unity to the work of art, and prevents unity from being established according to the expression of any explicit concept, theme or method, which inevitably would mean that style became only of secondary importance to the understanding of any work of art. Moreover, style cannot be taught, nor collaborated on, nor imitated: Proust’s novelist Bergotte is reduced to despair because he can only vainly contemplate the ‘little patch of yellow’ in the work of Vermeer that he is unable to reproduce, or to somehow reincarnate in his own work. Style is not associated with intention, or at least conscious intention, on the part of the author. ‘Only by art can we emerge from ourselves, can we know what another sees of this universe... Thanks to art, instead of seeing a single world, our own, we see it multiply, and as many original artists as there are, so many worlds will we have at our disposal’ (PS,28).

To conclude this section, I wish to stress that Deleuze’s focus on style as the defining characteristic of the literary author in *Proust and Signs* does not mean that the critic should not take care to associate authors with defined and consciously pursued projects and with
the exploration of particular themes. Thus, though my argument to this point has focused on intention as not being determinative in the development of a style, this does not mean that intention has no relevance to authorship and its theorisation. As we shall see, intention, as well as method and project, are also relevant to our analysis. In the next section, I shall look at the intersection of authorial subjectivity, intentionality, and expression in literature.

**Method, Choice and the Spider**

Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of James Joyce and Samuel Beckett serves to make clear the importance of will and choice in the development of a literary practice. Both Joyce and Beckett can be considered ‘minor’ writers—a term which Deleuze and Guattari adopted, as we shall discuss later, to refer to those politicised authors who write in the medium of a minorised language spoken by an oppressed or culturally dominated people. Joyce and Beckett qualify as minor writers both because of their political context, as Irishmen living at the time of the formation of the Irish Free State, and linguistically, because both mixed various European languages as well as the ‘Hiberno-English’ dialect with standard English in their novels and plays. Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of Joyce and Beckett in *Kafka*, which is not lengthy, nonetheless focuses on the choice of method of each of these two writers as the defining characteristic of themselves and of their work. The ‘method’ in this case is their use of language. In Joyce’s case, his method is one of ‘exhilaration and overdetermination’, and is expressed in a hyper-intensive use of language, using ‘all the resources of symbolism, of oneirism, of esoteric sense, of a hidden signifier’ (K,19). This was also the method adopted by the ‘Prague School’ of Czech writers in German who practiced ‘a hypercultural use of German with all sorts of oneiric or symbolic or mythic flights’ (K,25).

The mirror image of this approach is the willed poverty of Beckett’s writing, which Deleuze
would later term ‘exhausted’, and the work of an ‘exhausted person’. Deleuze thus refers to
Beckett’s body of work as ‘pervaded by exhaustive series, that is, exhausting series’
(ECAC,154). What both methods have in common is that they push themselves to extremes,
the one bringing about ‘worldwide reterritorialisations’ and the other leaving behind
‘nothing but intensities’. It is this deliberate choice on the part of each author, coupled with
the will and methodical determination to push this use of language to its limits, which
characterises Joyce and Beckett’s work for Deleuze and Guattari: the guiding principles of
this method or project determine their whole body of work.

The fact that use of language is often, in literary writing, the result of a deliberate choice is
made clear when Deleuze and Guattari come to discuss Kafka. Kafka’s method is to
‘abandon sense’ and ‘deterritorialise sound’ and his use of language is marked by a
deliberate poverty of expression. ‘Kafka deliberately kills all metaphor, all symbolism, all
signification, no less than all designation’ (K,22). Though there are other routes to becoming
a minor author, this is the method chosen by Kafka, and the use of the word ‘deliberate’
makes it clear that this was a conscious choice on his part. Kafka’s method is one of violent
rejection of the allusive and some might say lyrical qualities of language, in order to tear
language away from its common usage and ‘minorise’ it. The polemical intensity of this
choice, this violence done to language, can only be the result of a firm and deliberate
commitment to the method. There is no longer a proper or figurative sense to Kafka’s
language, but a distribution of intensive states – the name ‘Milena’, for example can evoke
an image which has no logical connection to it. Kafka’s operation here is described thus: ‘To
bring language slowly and progressively to the desert.’(K, 26) What is most significant about
these passages on Kafka’s use of language, however, is the fact that Deleuze and Guattari do
not use the word ‘style’ to denote the set of linguistic choices he makes, referring instead to a ‘procedure’. Though literary critics might naturally choose the word ‘style’ to describe a particular author’s register or expressive use of language, it is clear that Deleuze and Guattari deliberately do not do so, because for them ‘style’ has an entirely different meaning. Style as Deleuze described it in *Proust and Signs* was less a means of expression and more an individualising and original viewpoint, which expressed itself in small and incongruous details in, for example, an author’s use of imagery.

That the use of language can be determined by a deliberate choice is further demonstrated by Deleuze and Guattari’s decision in these passages to soften the distinction between ‘major’ and ‘minor’ languages. An author who writes in French, therefore, is not precluded from ever writing a work of minor literature. Instead, every language is ‘polylingual’ and can be manipulated so as to accentuate the minor aspects, or make a minor use of it. In the case of Proust, Deleuze and Guattari associate his fascination for the colloquial language of servants – in class terms, another form of a minor people - as a way to intensify the minor elements within French.

As we have seen therefore, the operation of the intelligence in the work of the literary author is a complex one. While conscious choice is employed in many aspects of the writer’s work, such as the adoption of a method, the conscious effort of the intelligence is insufficient to attain the expression of a ‘style’ which makes the work of art unique. Deleuze is clear that the voluntary exercise of the faculties of the intelligence compel us to explicit signification, and to that easy expression of commonly held opinions which characterises a conversation between friends. Such a form of discourse is one ‘in which all faculties are exercised voluntarily and collaborate under the leadership of the intelligence’ in order to
‘weave that perpetual web linking Part to Whole and Whole to Part’ (PS,69). The discourse is clearly defined and easily legible, it contains nothing – like Vermeer’s ‘little patch of yellow’ – which could be termed disconcerting or incongruous, which hints at a deeper truth. In order to pursue this truth, the mind requires ‘a method capable of overcoming the external influences that distract the mind from its vocation’ (PS,60). ‘Involuntary exercise is the transcendent limit or the vocation of each faculty’ (PS,63). Deleuze specifies the ‘involuntary intelligence’ as that intelligence which acts under the pressure of the signs and is forced by its encounter with them to interpret them: in other words, this intelligence is purely reactive. The narrator must choose to develop a certain element of the content, yet ‘forces… are at work to determine his pseudo-will, to make him select a certain part of the complex composition’ (PS,77). The narrator-artist is therefore constrained by the operation of the essence, or style, which works through him. As Deleuze argues, ‘Voluntary and involuntary do not designate individual faculties, but rather a different exercise of the same faculties’. Voluntary memory, conventional thought, conversation represent the faculties acting well within the limits of their powers. These faculties: perception, imagination, memory, intelligence and thought itself are interchangeable in so far as they act within the limits of their powers – what we imagine, we could also remember or perceive. But when a faculty is forced to its limit by an involuntary exercise of its capacity, ‘it discovers and attains its own limit, it rises to a transcendent exercise…. It ceases to be interchangeable’ (PS,63).

To express this form of reactive intelligence, Deleuze and Guattari, when discussing Proust in Anti-Oedipus, offer the image of a spider-narrator which ‘sees nothing, hears nothing’ but who is constantly ‘responding to the slightest sign, to the slightest vibration’ (AO,76-77). The figure of the spider is one of the most significant additions to the later editions of Proust.
and Signs, and marks a shift in Deleuze’s argument, prompted by the beginning of his collaboration with Guattari, which has a direct relevance to his view of the author. In the conclusion later added to the 1972 edition, entitled ‘Presence and Function of Madness: The Spider’, and at a time when his work on literature began to employ the concept of the literary machine, a concept that would be further developed in Kafka, Deleuze makes clear that the spider-narrator is itself a part of this machine. He argues that ‘the web and the spider, the web and the body are one and the same machine’ (PS,117). The spider-narrator determines how the web, an earlier version of the machine, functions: it sends out threads which connects the diverse and sealed vessels of the search and makes them communicate with each other, without welding them into a totalised whole.

In Proust and Signs, the formal structure of the literary work is associated with style. The creative viewpoint of the artist is itself referred to as the disruptive or misplaced element, which, because of the very fact that it does not fit, can perform a unifying function on the text: ‘an associative, incongruous chain is unified only by a creative viewpoint that itself takes the role of an incongruous part towards the whole’ (PS,74). Since Deleuze rejects the notion of the work of art as representation of the world, objectivity can only exist ‘in the signifying formal structure of the work, in its style’ (PS,73). The act, however, of connecting the ‘sealed vessels’ of the different parts of the search is one of establishing transversals, which unifies the world of the Search as a multiplicity, rather than a coherent totality. The process of establishing these transversals is a process of choosing which consists in selecting the sealed vessel to be explicated. This process of choosing, though Deleuze appears to suggest it is a ‘pure choosing’ which has neither subject nor object, in fact falls to the narrator: ‘The narrator’s activity no longer consists in explicating, unfolding a content, but in
choosing a noncommunicating part, a sealed vessel’ (PS,82). Stéphane Chaudier has argued provocatively that Deleuze’s reading of Proust manifests ‘a resolute anti-subjectivism’, arguing that the figure of the spider ‘has none of the attributes which Descartes identified in the subject’ and is better understood as ‘the little clockwork man who sets the literary machine in motion, which then runs itself without him.’

While Deleuze may claim that this choosing is an action without a subject, in fact his position is more nuanced. While the ‘self’ of the narrator that loves Albertine, or who walked on the Guermantes Way, may not be the self who performs the act of choosing, nonetheless the narrator-as-spider, that being who establishes transversals as a reaction to the violence done to it by signs, should be considered as ‘The subject of the search... that we without content that portions out Swann, the narrator, or Charlus’ (PS,84). The spider-narrator, or narrator-as-artist, has an alternate self, a ‘self-without-content’ or spider-self which does not have an active intelligence, but nonetheless has a function in establishing transversals, in being part of the literary machine, and in making it communicate. However, the extent to which this is a partial and limited means of communication, and one always controlled and routed through the spider-narrator, is underlined by Thomas Baldwin, who argues that: ‘Deleuze flatly rejects the idea that there is a direct means of communication between the fragments of Proust’s world. Instead, there is a system of transversals which enable us to jump from one fragment or multiple to the next.’

In this respect then, the spider-narrator is more central to the process than Chaudier’s description of the little clockwork man would have us believe.

By the time Deleuze and Guattari come to write *Kafka*, however, the image of the web with the spider at the centre has come to be replaced by the concept of the ‘literary machine’.

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The exact nature of such a machine, and its relationship to the author, is a vexed one, but one which is central to Deleuze and Guattari’s entire concept of literature. In *Kafka*, Deleuze and Guattari describe the figure of the artist as it appears as a character in Kafka’s novel *The Trial* in very similar terms to the spider-narrator, a coincidence of function which is surely not accidental. The artist is a term in what Deleuze and Guattari describe as ‘a singular series’ making up part of the ‘literary machine’ of *The Trial*. This artist does not just function as a special term existing at a particular point of connection in the machine, as the series of young girls do, but he is a singular term which has the power to rearrange the whole: he ‘overflows all the segments and sweeps up all the connections’ (*K*, 69). The function of the artist in the machine, therefore, is not just a combinatory one, but one which has the power to remake the connections and reunify them around himself. He ‘reunites all these points, arranges them in his own specific machine which extends across all the whole field of immanence, and even anticipates it’ (*K*, 69). In this respect, we cannot consider ‘artists’ or ‘authors’ to be merely another part of the literary machine, instead, they have a special organising function: like the spider, they are to be found at the centre of the web. In relation to his own literary machine of expression, Kafka is described as ‘the gears, the mechanic, the operator, and the victim’ (*K*, 58). In other words, Kafka, the author, is both part of the writing machine, and the figure who makes it operate. He sets up the transversal communications between the different parts of it, but is himself also drawn into its operation, in a process of depersonalisation and deterritorialisation, as I shall go on to describe.

But there are significant differences between *Proust and Signs* and *Kafka* in the detail of the literary machine, how it operates. In the earlier work, the parts of the machine operate
relatively autonomously: ‘Far from conjoining and adapting parts, it separates and partitions
them’ (PS, 85). The ‘partial objects’ which make up the world of the Search do not
communicate, but transversal connections between them are established by the spider. But
in Kafka’s work, the parts of the machine act on and alter each other, something which
marks a significant change from the set of isolated fragments described by Baldwin, which
can only communicate indirectly. The concept of the work as literary machine has become
more detailed and developed from Deleuze’s conception of Proust’s novel as a spider web,
while we could also argue that the position of the spider or mechanic has become slightly
less central.

The analysis of the connections formed when two of the elements in the literary machine
act in conjunction, or upon each other, also differs somewhat from the description of the
spider’s web. While Deleuze in other works, such as Logic of Sensation, will generally speak
of the conjunction of two elements in a work of art setting up ‘resonances’ which imply a
productive and artistically meaningful association, in Kafka Deleuze and Guattari suggest
that their initial connection between the bent head and the portrait photo causes a
‘functional blockage, a neutralisation of experimental desire’ (K, 4). In contrast to Proust’s
work, memory and association in Kafka’s work can create blockages rather than freeing
them: with, in particular, childhood memories forming an Oedipal reterritorialization which
serves to block desire and which is the inevitable destination of so-called free association, a
practice Deleuze and Guattari disdain (but one which was vitally important to Barthes and
other post-structuralist theorists).

However, and crucially, one major difference between the ‘web’ and the ‘machine’ is that
the former represents only the individual literary work, the unique world of one particular
series of novels. In *Kafka*, however, the ‘machine’ can also, as we have seen, relate to Kafka himself, and in particular, to his body of work. The three different forms of writing practised by Kafka that Deleuze and Guattari refer at most length to - his letters, his stories, and the ‘machinic assemblages’ of his novels - are all separate gears in Kafka’s own literary machine. Between these three gears or forms of writing there nonetheless exists constant transversal communication, in all directions. The perpetual communications between these three gears prevents us from positing simple linear interpretations of Kafka’s body of work: the idea that his progress begins at the letters and ends at the attempted novels. ‘We should not believe that there is only one line that extends from the lived experience of the letters to the written experience of the stories and the novels. There is also a reverse path, and there is an equal amount of lived and written experience in both situations’ (K,40). In this respect, the progress of Kafka as author displays a marked difference from Deleuze’s account of the narrator-artist’s progress in *Proust and Signs*: though the motif of self-negation remains, gone is the progressive development from the worldly signs of life towards the more spiritual signs of art. Deleuze’s mature conception of artistic development is no longer linear: instead the three gears of Kafka’s writing machine act upon each other in a mutually reinforcing dynamic: elements from the stories, such as the becomings-animal, take on new meaning and resonance when brought into relation with the assemblage of the novels. It would therefore be wrong to suggest that the letters are in any way a ‘precursor’ of the stories, or that the novels hold the greatest artistic value.

In the next section, I will examine the situation of the Deleuzian writer, particularly as it is expressed in *Kafka*, in relation to the social and political demands of that writer’s day, especially the conception, developed for the first time in that book, of a ‘minor’ literature.
Minor Literature, minor authors

‘Minor literature’ is among the most political concepts in Deleuze and Guattari’s whole treatment of art, and its explanation and development in *Kafka* is reached by a detailed historical case study of the early twentieth century Prague in which Kafka wrote. These literatures are the intensely political bodies of work produced by a writer who works in a politically constrained situation, as part of a group without a voice and on behalf of a people who do not yet exist. The Jews in early 20th century Prague are an example of such a group, but today we could substitute any given oppressed racial or religious minority. Deleuze and Guattari here introduce the notion of necessity and inevitability, describing ‘the impossibility of not writing’ based upon the notion of a ‘national consciousness’ which necessarily exists by means of literature’ (K, 16). In this respect, though we should not push the comparison too far, we could point to similarities between the essence or style unique to the Proustian artist being refracted through him or her, and the role of the minor author as the vessel through which a people will speak. A discussion of the ‘minor author’ will intersect in rather complicated ways with the focus on intentionality which I have been developing in the thesis up to this point. For Deleuze and Guattari, when speaking of a minor author, while there might be choice involved in the method, or way one writes, the decision to write itself is not the subject of a free choice at all. The expression of a collective, and specifically, ‘national consciousness’, (in particular, a minor or oppressed one) is posited as the goal of literature, or at least this kind of literature. The artist, therefore does not have complete freedom to write what she may wish, but is constrained by the demands of the collectivity she is attempting to express. Deleuze and Guattari reference the ‘cramped

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14 It is interesting that Deleuze and Guattari do not emphasise the possible class dimension of the ‘minor people’, though there are some gestures in that direction, such as Proust’s fascination with the language of servants, or the allusion to Communism ‘knocking at the door’.
space’ of a minor popular or national culture – or alternatively, of a necessarily minorising language, such as the bastardised version of German spoken by the Prague Jews – which forces an immediate connection to politics. The decrepit or somnolent nature of the specific forms of national or political culture in these societies is ‘often inactive in external life and always in the process of break-down’, thus, ‘literature finds itself positively charged with the role and function of collective, and even revolutionary, enunciation’ (K,17). The possibilities of artistic expression are greater, as the conditions of production are more austere and unpromising. In this respect, though we may speak of the ‘bachelor author’ as being purely impersonal, the Deleuze-Guattarian minor author is surely very profoundly a creature of his or her place and time, and has been impelled to write by the political and social decay all around.

Deleuze and Guattari, however, contrast the significance of the situation of the minor author with that of the expression of his or her personality. Their discussion of this point insists on the minor author as impersonal. In order to write, the author must become someone other than who he or she is. They argue that ‘there are no possibilities for an individuated enunciation that would belong to this or that “master” and that could be separated from a collective enunciation’ (K,17). In this formulation, ‘talent’ or literary ‘mastery’ is associated with individuality in expression. This marks a significant departure from not only Deleuze’s discussion of Proust, but also Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of figures such as Joyce and Beckett. Deleuze and Guattari show how Kafka is also impelled to create. His means of creation is described thus: it ‘can only be realised in an autonomous writing even if it remains perpetually unachieved’ (K,35) Kafka cannot create as Kafka, but first must become something other than Kafka – a becoming-animal which he undergoes in
his room and which ‘is the essential object of the stories’ (K,35). As a writer Kafka must
deterritorialise himself, must overcome his own personality, and replace his own
subjectivity, before being able to write.

Deleuze and Guattari must therefore attempt to reconcile the role of the artist as individual
with their statements about the necessarily collective character of a minor, political,
national literature. The fundamental question they pose is the following: ‘In what sense is
the statement always collective even when it seems to be emitted by a solitary singularity
like that of the artist?’ (K,83). Deleuze and Guattari respond however that a collective
statement cannot be emitted by a singular subject. ‘When a statement is produced by a
bachelor or an artistic singularity, it occurs necessarily as a function of a national, political or
social community, even if the objective conditions of this community are not yet given’
(K,83-84).

We should first of all surmise that there is some necessary connection between the
‘bachelor’ – or solitary and perhaps impersonal - condition of the artist and his fitness for
being the mouthpiece of the collective community. Secondly, however, this artist can only
make statements by operating as a function of the collective. Deleuze and Guattari go so far
as to present a definition of minor literature: ‘A statement is literary when it is “taken up”
by a bachelor who precedes the collective conditions of enunciation’ (K,84). The statement,
therefore, ‘emerges’ from the assemblage through the vector of the bachelor author. Let us
consider then what it means for the bachelor author to interact in such a way with the
collectivity.

The writing-machine is the bachelor-machine, and Deleuze and Guattari claim that there is
nothing more artistic than ‘the bachelor in his mediocrity’. Here the term ‘mediocrity’
describes not just a lack of literary talent, but a personal life devoid of interest or unusual specificity. He is ‘a machine that is all the more social and collective insofar as it is solitary’, a quality described as ‘the objective definition of the machine of expression’ (K,71), corresponding to a true minor literature without petty individual concern. The bachelor has no family or conjugality (Deleuze and Guattari make much of Kafka’s doomed love affair with Milena) and becomes an appropriate vessel for the voice of his people to the extent to which he can erase his own personal and individual qualities – or at least, up to a point. Critics such as Gregg Lambert argue that Deleuze and Guattari’s minor authors are marked by estrangement from the conditions of everyday life in general, arguing that: ‘Both stupidity and forgetting are forces that define the writer’s strangeness and estrangement from ‘the lived and the livable’. Lambert thus describes the Deleuzo-Guattarian author as a ‘stranger to life’15, while Anne Sauvagnargues argues that ‘Literature must no longer be considered the matter of an exceptional individual, revealing his or her personal memories and other ‘dirty little secrets’, but should be considered a collective enterprise that explores social becomings.’16 Here Sauvagnargues elides several different issues: the literary product of an ‘exceptional individual’ and a ‘genius’ is associated with personal memories and secrets, whereas a collective enterprise is of necessity entirely impersonal. As I shall argue, there is room to question whether that impersonality should be total, or whether the author should have no defining characteristics whatsoever.

However, this reading seems to me only partly correct, the more so as Lambert seeks to compare Kafka’s alienation from women with the forgetting of language and speech in Beckett, Joyce or Antonin Artaud. While Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘bachelor authors’ seem to

renounce personal forms of relationality, such as conjugality, their connection to the linguistic, political and cultural situation they are situated in seems all the more immediate and pronounced in that Deleuze and Guattari constantly stress the ‘cramped’ nature of this situation. Furthermore, to use the terms ‘stupidity’ ‘and forgetting’ to define the relationship of figures such as Beckett and Joyce to language seems to me to be incorrect, the more so as the function of ‘minorising’ language, to the extent that both Beckett and Joyce do this, appears rather more a knowingly subversive operation, accomplished, in Joyce’s case, by a full deployment of the plenitude of language’s possibilities. In this respect, I would therefore argue that the ‘minor author’ is not estranged from broader social, cultural, linguistic and political trends in general, but their ‘bachelor’ condition is limited only to personal and immediate affective ties.

This point is further established, in my opinion, when we look again at the operation of the writing-machine. When criticising Kafka’s stories, one gear in the writing-machine, Deleuze and Guattari note the tendency on their part sometimes to ‘seize up’ or to fail to develop in the direction of a fully-fledged novel. They enumerate two dangers which can prevent the stories from developing into novels, or from progressing beyond ‘an abstract, self-destructive machine (which) cannot develop in a concrete way’ (K,48). The first is that they are no more than ‘machinic indexes’, or individual elements which have not yet been formed into an assemblage, and the second is that ‘they put into operation abstract machines that are all assembled, but dead, and never succeed in concretely plugging into things’ (K,48). In this respect then, and curiously in a manner opposite to the description of the ‘bachelor author’ commonly accepted in much of the secondary literature, Deleuze and Guattari’s writing machines actually fail if they are too ‘abstract’, if they are not ‘incarnated’
in a concrete, socio-political assemblage. Any project of withdrawal from the world, or of ‘forgetting’ on the part of the bachelor author therefore cannot involve a withdrawal from these socio-political assemblages themselves. Instead, the writing-machine must ‘plug in’ to an actually existing social field. Such a position, as Deleuze and Guattari note, valorises realist and social interpretations of Kafka.

For Camille Dumoulié, drawing on the theory of the Romantics, the poet and literary author were responsible for opening the way to the Infinite, through the creative force of the literary work. She argues, drawing on the theory of the ‘art-monument’ discussed in *What is Philosophy?*, firstly, that literature had lost its specificity in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, being merged into art in general, and secondly, that the task of the author-artist is to ‘create the finite that restores the infinite’. This then, for Dumoulié, is what is now at stake for the artist: ‘not truth, not the idea, not the Absolute, but the infinite.’

Nevertheless, the suggestion that the task of the artist-author is an unambiguous embrace of chaos, or the infinite, represented through the construction of the ‘art-monument’, is not one which is necessarily borne out by a close reading of *What is Philosophy?*. First of all, Deleuze and Guattari note that the art-monument ‘confides to the ear of the future the persistent sensations that embody the event’ (WIP, 176). That an orientation towards the future is not necessarily and clearly the same as an orientation towards the infinite is demonstrated by the fact that Deleuze and Guattari refer to the art-monument as expressing ‘the possible’.

The task of the minor author is therefore to be so aware of developments in the social field that he or she can accentuate and accelerate those movements already taking place. The

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method of ‘active dismantling’ adopted by Kafka (one that interests him more than constructing assemblages) is not a form of representation or of political criticism but instead ‘consists in prolonging, in accelerating, a whole movement that is already traversing the social field...It operates in a virtuality that is already real without being actual (the diabolical powers of the future’) (K,48). In this respect the writer’s task is to experiment, but only with the materials provided by the concrete social formation – and to divine those movements and powers of the future which are only beginning to make themselves apparent, before hitching the writing machine to them in a way which intensifies their social force and power. In this way, though the writer speaks for a people who do not yet exist (the minor people) he cannot magic these social movements out of nowhere. The writer cannot choose these movements or arrange them for himself, but must instead divine or decipher them, opening himself up to forces from the outside. Kafka’s work functions as ‘a prognostics of social forces and currents... that are only beginning to knock on the door’ (K,55). Deleuze and Guattari, for this reason, rely on a writing subject who, like the philosophers I discussed in Chapter 1, is ‘untimely’, or at an adjacent situation to her own time – unusually aware of social and political developments and able to predict which ones will have revolutionary force. The untimely, therefore, is ‘a new dimension which operates both in time and against time’ (DI,129). In an interview with Guy Dumur, Deleuze defined the ‘untimely’ as the plane on which revolutionary force and artistic joy intersected: ‘But when the people struggle for their liberation, there is always a coincidence of poetic acts and historical events or political actions, the glorious incarnation of something sublime and untimely’ (DI,130). Contrary to Lambert’s claims, the minor author has a very special and defined relationship with his or her time, and this is a relationship which is absolutely determinative of the condition of minor author.
While the minor or bachelor author is defined by specific social, political and historical relations, there remains the question of the aesthetic and cultural definitions of such an author. Here, theorists who stress the impersonality of that author appear to be on stronger ground. Deleuze and Guattari do seem to reject, through their analysis of Kafka and other minor authors, traditional concerns of the literary critic, such as ‘talent’. In rejecting the categories of narrator and character, enunciator and subject, Kafka, for Deleuze and Guattari, also rejects the traditional role of author, and refuses to produce a work that could fit into what might be termed a ‘master’s literature’. A renunciatory aesthetic practice is further valorised by the example of Josephine the mouse, who rejects the individuated act of singing, preferring simply to be a vessel for the collective voice that speaks through her, perhaps unmusically.

Moreover, though Deleuze and Guattari attempt to relate Kafka to past masters – virtuosos of the novel form, such as Honoré de Balzac, Charles Dickens, or Gustave Flaubert - they do so only in passing, and mainly to note the ultimate lack of any significant association. Kafka differs from the ‘minor philosophers’ I examined in Chapter 1, as well as from Francis Bacon as I shall go on to examine in Chapter 3, in that he does not have a clearly defined relation – whether antagonistic or otherwise – to his literary predecessors. Unlike both those minor philosophers and visual artists, Kafka eschews the literary tasks of his predecessors. He does not, for example, wish to pursue Balzac’s project of creating a social genealogy, and his conception of the ‘block’ is very different from that of Dickens. Similarly, though Kafka is prepared to take Heinrich von Kleist as a master, the questions which excite them – in Kleist’s case, ‘What is war?’ – are very different. It is of interest then, that Deleuze and Guattari can note Kleist’s deep influence on Kafka, which they fail to specify, while making
clear that they did not share any defining questions or problems. We can perhaps very tentatively posit the suggestion that literature – at least ‘minor literature’ – is both more revolutionary and more future-oriented that art or philosophy: its task it one of upheaval, of transformation of the social system, rather than one of redefining or building on the problems and philosophical or artistic projects undertaken by previous generations. The exact specificity of literature in this regard would be a useful avenue for further research.

While some degree of impersonality allows many critics to posit a notion of the Deleuzo-Guattarian author as a cipher or empty vessel – a position which, as I have argued, is somewhat, though not entirely borne out, by a close reading of the relevant passages, there is still the question of the ‘negative’ or ‘limiting’ role of the authorial function. In the next section, I shall go on to compare ‘author-centric’ to ‘reader-centric’ theories of interpretation, and argue that for Deleuze and Guattari, readers, just like the spectators of films or paintings, do not have any right or privileged position to impose their own interpretation onto an art work.

The authorial limit-function

At first glance, when discussing the novels and stories of Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari seem to reject any privileged site for interpretations of the works altogether. As they argue, using as illustration Kafka’s story ‘The Burrow’, ‘We can enter the burrow by any point whatsoever, none is more important than another’ (K,3). Indeed, in their opening paragraphs Deleuze and Guattari appear to reject any form of interpretation altogether,
replacing it with experimentation only: ‘Only the principle of multiple entrances prevents the introduction of the enemy, the Signifier, and thus attempts to interpret a work’ (K,3). According to this position then, there seemingly can be no possibility for Deleuze and Guattari of a privileged viewpoint which will reveal the essential meaning of the work, nor indeed any kind of privileged authorial viewpoint, such as was described in the discussion in *Proust and Signs of style*.

However, in a paragraph of central importance at the beginning of Chapter 5, Deleuze and Guattari discuss this role of experimentation in the posthumous arrangement and presentation of *The Trial*. But rather than the constituent texts\(^\text{18}\) being themselves presented to us as material on which we are to experiment, they are described as the *report* of an experiment. Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari describe the novel as a ‘scientific investigation’ which requires us to use the ‘texts’ therein only with great care. Immediately therefore, the Barthesian approach to a text, which emphasises the free play of interpretation and association on the part of the reader, seems an inappropriate description of the operation that Deleuze and Guattari want us, as readers, to perform. Further to this point, due to the circumstances of *The Trial*’s publication, we are in the unusual position of being able to comment on the actions of a figure who plays a kind of intermediary role between writer and reader, Max Brod, the literary executor who arranged Kafka’s novel for public consumption. However, in his case Deleuze and Guattari make the following charge, one which makes explicit the very limited role they envisage for the reader (or critic, or literary executor) in the interpretation of a novel: ‘The primary problem has involved misjudging the relative importance of these texts and making unwarranted assumptions.

\(^{18}\) Deleuze and Guattari rightly use the plural here, since *The Trial* was unpublished and unfinished, and at the time of Kafka’s death existed only as a collection of constituent texts later rearranged by Max Brod.
about their placement in the novel, as is especially evident in the ways that Max Brod arranged things to support his thesis of negative theology (K,44).

In this crucial sentence, several claims require thorough consideration. First, properly speaking it seems strange that Deleuze and Guattari can charge anyone with misjudging the relative importance of the texts. According to what criteria should the reader judge their importance, and who decides these criteria? In what sense can we say that Brod or any other reader has made a ‘misjudgement’ if we are dealing with an autonomous, self-motoring machine to which the intelligence comes after, or a burrow to which no entrance is the only correct one? However, if no entrance to the burrow is better than any other, is it really incorrect of Brod to attempt to shape the text in a way that would support his own purposes? Moreover, if Brod’s assumptions about the texts’ placement in the novel are unwarranted, that implies that the ‘true’ author, Kafka, had a scheme to which Brod will commit less error as he draws the nearer. Deleuze and Guattari, therefore, base their critical objection to Brod on the belief that he does not understand, or simply does not wish to follow, Kafka’s scheme and intentions for the text, and that Deleuze and Guattari can divine these intentions better than him.

Perhaps Deleuze and Guattari simply wish to stress that experimentation with a previously intended purpose is impermissible – thus any arrangement designed to support any kind of thesis decided in advance would not be experimentation at all. But if this were the case, the passage quoted above would not then assume that these texts had any kind of ‘relative’ importance at all, and would state instead that their importance should all be relatively equal.
Deleuze and Guattari cast doubt on the suggestion that the final chapter of *The Trial*, dealing with K’s execution, was actually written chronologically last by Kafka. They describe it as ‘a premature, delayed, aborted ending’ and suggest that had he continued to work on the novel Kafka might have situated this chapter earlier in the text. These reflections would have no purpose unless it were considered of explicit importance to know what Kafka’s ‘scheme’ or plan for the novel actually was. Deleuze and Guattari further state that ‘The idea of ending with K’s execution is contradicted by the whole direction of the novel and by the quality of “unlimited postponement” that regulates the trial’ (K,44). To finish with an execution is not just an unexpected and unlikely development in the plot, it does not sit well with the tone or ‘quality’ Kafka established. Situating the execution at the end of the book has a major thematic impact, in so far as it suggests that ‘a Prague Jew can only assume the guilt that is operating within him’ (K,44). By implication therefore, Deleuze and Guattari seem to be telling us that internal consistency is a desirable literary quality. But the maintenance of internal consistency and tone – particularly one associated with the proper name of the text’s author – is surely a very difficult task if the task of experimentation without limit is to be given over to the reader.

This requirement for consistency is demonstrated again in the successive sentence: ‘As for the other chapter ‘In the Cathedral’, the place of honour given to it, as though it indicated some sort of key to the novel, as though it constituted proof of the book’s religious character, is also well contradicted by its own content’ (K,55)

Once again, the placement of a given chapter or text within the novel’s structure has thematic consequences, as if this placement had the power to lift up certain themes to impact upon the ‘character’ of the entire book: but this placement can be ‘contradicted’ by
the chapter’s content. Deleuze and Guattari argue that the priest who tells the story about
the gatekeeper of the law is only one element in a recurring series of members of the
judiciary apparatus, and that he thus does not deserve to be given ‘privilege, since the series
has no need to stop with him’ (K,44). Nevertheless, Deleuze and Guattari then propose
giving this chapter a different place in the sequence – according, that is, with a suggestion
made by the academic Herman Uyttersprot that it be placed before the chapter entitled
‘The Lawyer, the Industrialist, and the Painter’. To do so would thus deprive this figure and
this chapter of its key interpretative privilege. Yet, this is a privilege which this figure and
that chapter ought not to have had in any case, given that previously Deleuze and Guattari
had insisted to us that no entrance point into the burrow bore more importance or
significance than any other.

Beyond that Deleuze and Guattari have an additional injunction for the critic: ‘The three
worst themes in many interpretations of Kafka are the transcendence of the law, the
interiority of guilt, the subjectivity of enunciation. They are connected to all the stupidities
that have been written about allegory, metaphor, and symbolism in Kafka’ (K,45).While, for
Deleuze and Guattari, the themes of guilt, the law and so on are central to The Trial, they
are so only because of Kafka’s project of ‘dismantling’ – a subversive operation which Kafka
performs on these themes, one which results in the prevalence of accusations where the
absence of guilt is clear from the start. The themes of law, guilt and interiority therefore
provide only ‘the superficial movement’ of Kafka’s work, and the motivating force which
makes the literary machine function is in fact Kafka’s parodic and subversive intent. ‘The
superficial movement indicates points of undoing, of dismantling, that must guide the
experimentation to show the molecular movements and the machinic assemblages of which
the superficial movement is a global result’ (K,45). For this reason too, Deleuze and Guattari describe Kafka as ‘holding out the bait’ towards ‘Oedipus’ – precisely because he wishes to make a parody of the Oedipus story as part of his ‘diabolical project’. Critics who fall into the trap of taking the apparent for the real, or mistake a parodic use for a genuine use of a certain device or theme – thus, in a sense, attempting to reterritorialise the machinic assemblage at precisely the point where Kafka wishes to dismantle it - are denounced as ‘stupid’. As Deleuze and Guattari argue ‘it is absolutely useless to look for a theme in a writer if one hasn’t asked exactly what its importance is in the work – that is, how it functions (and not what its sense is)’. But this distinction between superficial and real is not a distinction over which the reader has any power, because once again it is the writer – in this case Kafka – who determines the relative importance of themes and literary elements, and thus how the literary machine functions. While Deleuze and Guattari’s method calls for experimentation, it is an experimentation purely on the part of the writer – who has the task of constructing a book-machine made up of themes, tropes and devices which he can make work diabolically or according to the demands of ‘common sense’. The reader has only to accept or reject the machine with which he is presented, and cannot reconstruct it anew. Deleuze and Guattari later refer to the ‘machinic indexes’ – individual elements present in Kafka’s work such as animals – which do not yet form an assemblage to be established or dismantled, ‘because one knows only the individual pieces that go into making it up, but not how they go together’ (K,47). But the obvious conclusion to be drawn from this sentence is that there is only one way they can go together, or at least that there are not infinite ways, again placing severe limits on any actual ‘experimentation’ the reader can do. We are confronted once again with the image of the writer-mechanic, the successor to the spider-narrator, situated at the centre of the web or machine, and charged with being
the figure who makes the connections, decides where to situate the various elements of the literary world, and is the only person with the right to determine how the machine works.

I believe that this chapter has advanced a difficult argument, but one which has demonstrated a clearly defined and central role for the literary author throughout the evolution of Deleuze’s, and then Deleuze and Guattari’s, texts. I first of all associated the literary author with the evolution of a style as unique individuating viewpoint, which operated as a ‘signature’ to the writer’s work, and which was more than a mere transitory collection of unconnected effects. I further argued that the development of such a style necessitated a long period of apprenticeship, passing through, and becoming disenchanted with, lived experience and worldly things, which nevertheless left their mark on the work of art produced at the end. This view of the production of a literary text, just as the philosophical texts I discussed in Chapter 1, requires an authorial subject to learn, grow, and persist through time. I also discussed the centrality of intention (in the choice of method) and reactive or involuntary intelligence, expressed most significantly in the figure of the spider, who constructs transversal communications between the elements of the web, later to become the mechanic operating the literary-machine. Finally, in the closing section to this chapter I underlined the lack of importance of the competing critical perspectives advanced by readers and critics to the interpretation of a literary text, demonstrating this with an analysis of Deleuze and Guattari’s objections to the presentation of *The Trial* by Max Brod.
Chapter 3 Deleuze and Visual Artists

In contrast to *Francis Bacon: Logic of Sensation* (1981), Deleuze’s other book-length studies of individuals such as Proust, Nietzsche or Hume do not analyse methodically the progression of an entire career: tracing chronologically the development of their ideas and periodising their practice or thought. The *Logic of Sensation* is unusual, however, in that it situates Francis Bacon in the context of his artistic predecessors and attempts to give a comprehensive overview of the development of his artistic technique and practice, making it a valuable resource for my research question. Different points in Bacon’s career are related to the careers of earlier masters or simply to the general artistic character of different time periods, in an attempt to specify the influence thus exerted upon him. As Ronald Bogue has noted, ‘Deleuze argues that Bacon, like all great painters, recapitulates the history of painting in his own canvases, a history that Deleuze organises around the opposition of the haptic and the optic’¹. Deleuze’s study, therefore, is not merely a narrative account of Bacon’s career as it relates to the history of painting, but an attempt to use Bacon’s career to analyse the history of painting as a whole, reorganised around the concepts and techniques Deleuze considered most salient and significant at a given moment in that history. We can legitimately extrapolate from Deleuze’s judgements of Bacon to make further judgements on the practice and task of all visual artists.

In this chapter then I will first consider the importance of intention, will, and planning and preparation for an artistic practice. Drawing on Deleuze’s discussions of Bacon’s technique of the ‘diagram’, I will argue that the moments of ‘deterritorialisation’ and self-abandonment which, for Deleuze, the visual artist is required to undergo in order to be

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‘forced’ to think are simply moments in a longer process. This means that will and intention are precisely at the centre of artistic practice. The ‘abandonment of the self’ is but partial and momentary, and results in a reiteration of the artistic subjectivity which is a process of self-development. I shall secondly re-examine the motifs of originality and genius in asking what makes an art practice distinctive. This section will be the one in which I examine most closely Deleuze’s views on Bacon’s relation to his artistic predecessors, and to the broader concerns and most pronounced techniques and styles of the art movements of his time and earlier. I shall argue that Deleuze’s artists exist in an aesthetic context, and that their guiding projects, concerns and techniques are partly determined by their situation in that context. However, I will argue that an artist can achieve distinctiveness by the way he or she conceives of a particular problem in painting, or of a way in which he or she modifies or subverts the technique of a ‘master’. I shall also argue that an artist’s development in technique can be closely related to the defining events in his or her life and personal history, thus preventing us from considering the Deleuzian artist to be strictly ‘impersonal’. In the final section, I shall consider the political and social context to Deleuze’s analysis of Bacon’s art practice, briefly contrasting this account with the notion of ‘minor literature’ as advanced in Kafka.

At the heart of one of the most important debates in the existing critical literature is the Deleuzian notion of ‘experimentation’ as it relates to art practice. One dominant position among existing critics stresses the importance of experimentation in so far as it is opposed to the careful planning and preparation of an artistic practice. Such a position could give rise to a theory of the visual artist as merely an accumulation of transitory effects, a collection of momentary ‘events’ without anything substantial holding them together. Moreover, if we
regard the production of art as a form of thought, theorists such as John Rajchman insist that such thought is never simply ‘innate’ to the artist, and that the production of art is not therefore the mere expression of an idea, or a clearly developed style that existed prior to the creation of the artwork. Rajchman therefore argues that ‘Thinking is never just innate, Deleuze declared, because it is generated in us only through an encounter with something from the ‘outside’ such that ‘ideas always come after’\(^2\). The ideas expressed by an artwork, according to this line of argument, are only generated and understood as a secondary moment after an initial and productive encounter with something outside of the work and the artist. Rajchman also emphasises a lack of intention on the part of the artist throughout this process: the encounter with the ‘outside’ element instead forces the artist, through a form of violence, to think seriously and creatively, ‘forced by something we cannot recognise, given through a violent aesthetic element, a sensory or affective contact with something’\(^3\). A lack of re-cognition on the part of the artist of this outside element means that it cannot be easily integrated into any kind of overarching style or pre-existing aesthetic regime. Andrea Eckersley also prioritises this notion of encounter and emphasises the contingent nature of the effect it produces by arguing that ‘the surface of a painting may be regarded as an event, as one body or machine involved in an encounter with other bodies or machines’\(^4\).

By contrast Simon O’Sullivan takes a less pronounced position, arguing that the Deleuzian artist has a practice which opens up to an encounter with chaos but nonetheless retains a prior form and definition. As he argues, ‘It needs to have a certain cohesiveness and form,


\(^3\) Ibid

but equally must be able to access a certain formlessness... It is in this sense that art can never be wholly predetermined or worked out in advance but must involve this productive encounter with chaos’. In this first section then, I shall examine the process of preparation of the painting, and the extent to which an artist’s intention to pursue a defined artistic project survives the moments of ‘deteriorialisation’ which are nevertheless part of the process. I shall first attempt in this chapter to challenge Rajchman or Eckersley’s account of the contingency of painting by stressing the importance of preparation for the Deleuzian artist, and also, to demonstrate that an artistic subject or ‘self’ persists during the preparatory work for a painting.

**Intention, Will and the Preparation of the Painting**

Just as I discussed in Chapter 1, in which I considered the need for the Deleuzian philosopher to reckon with, and break from, the weight of the history of philosophy and of the conventional image of thought, so too in Logic of Sensation does Deleuze discuss at length the need for the painter to escape the weight of clichéd forms, and to define his or her own relation to both previous artists and the existing aesthetic context of the day. Deleuze argues that as a preparatory step before beginning to paint, the artist must ‘clean’ or empty the canvas of the accretion of received ideas and forms. Deleuze identifies these forms with the artist himself: ‘The painter has many things in his head, or around him, or in his studio. Now everything he has in his head or around him is already in the canvas... before he begins his work’ (FB,61). We are presented with the problem of how the artist manages to create new work while working in an environment saturated with a preponderance of already existing forms and practices.

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The relationship which an artist has with the weight of cliché which always already fills up the surface of the canvas puts the entire question of the painter’s ‘controlling intelligence’ into sharp focus. Since clichés exist both on the canvas and in the painter’s head, the painter will have to break down and redevelop his or her own self as an artist, as well as the formal elements of the painting, in order to create something genuinely new, as, for example, Paul Cézanne achieved in painting ‘the real appleyness’, which made the apple on the canvas more real than its model. In effect, this requires a confrontation with the artist’s self, as well as with the forms already existing on canvas.

Deleuze describes Bacon’s confrontation with cliché as exemplified by the photographs which fascinate him, which, though they are representations, also appear to offer the ‘truth’ of doctored images. But Bacon’s attitude towards them is one of ‘radical hostility’, rather than either simple rejection of the photo-cliché, or any attempt to transform it and integrate it into the painting, though the photograph fills the entire painting at a preparatory moment in the work. Instead, Bacon must at first embrace, then reject the photograph: he must ‘abandon (himself) to clichés, to collect them, accumulate them, multiply them...”the will to lose the will” comes first’ (FB,65). Any assessment of will, intention, cerebrality, and control on the part of the artist as he or she undertakes this process is therefore a complex one. Just as the spectator must enter the picture to embrace the sensation, the artist too must abandon himself to the clichés already collected on the canvas, and lose his will to transform them before the painting can be created: ‘the painter himself must enter into the canvas before beginning’ (FB,67). But this moment of ‘self-abandonment’ is only one in a series of steps that the artist must undertake before creating the work. Deleuze’s reference to ‘the will to lose the will’ underscores the fact that his
artists do not completely reject will, intention and a controlling intelligence at this stage in their preparatory work: the loss of will always precedes an eventual reversal and rejection of the cliché. As Deleuze terms it, ‘painters pass through the catastrophe themselves, embrace the chaos, and attempt to emerge from it’ (FB, 72). In other words, the abandonment of the will is only a moment of a process which the artist has already willed to happen. In support of this claim, let us consider the fact that Deleuze’s description of Bacon’s relationship to photos is both characteristic, and habitual. This process of embracing, then rejecting the photo-cliché did not just occur in the creation of a single work, but is presented as being a method which Bacon followed over the course of his career (especially in his series of portraits). The application of such a predetermined and elaborated method cannot really coexist with a complete abandonment of the artist’s self in the production of any one painting.

Indeed, that this abandonment of the self in the process of creation is only partial and momentary is shown by the fact that Deleuze explicitly references the painter’s idea or intentions for the work before beginning painting – the ‘prepictorial idea’ - as being responsible for the distribution of equal and unequal probabilities on the canvas. ‘It depends on what the painter wants to do, and what he has in his head: this or that place becomes privileged in relation to this or that project’ (FB, 66). The painter can begin to paint ‘when the unequal probability becomes almost a certitude’ (FB, 66).

Further to this point, I find compelling the description that the artist Jac Saorsa offers of her own creative practice. Saorsa’s academic work is valuable in that it offers one of a few examples of a working artist reflecting at length, and from a Deleuzian perspective, on her own practice. She describes it in this way: ‘I continue to construct, deconstruct and
reconstruct my artist ‘self’ through a perpetual process of de- and re-territorialisation’. Far from abandonment or destruction of the self then, or a neat sublimation into an anonymous collectivity, Saorsa sees deconstruction and deterrioralisation simply as moments in a habitual method or process which culminates in reconstruction. Saorsa’s artwork includes the series entitled Drawing Women’s Cancer, in which she holds regular conversations with female cancer patients over the course of their treatments (a series of encounters with what could be termed an element from ‘the outside’), then, using data derived from the transcripts of these encounters, produces an exploratory series of drawings for public exhibition. That this process contains a moment in which the artist opens herself up to the creative possibilities stemming from the encounter with the outside element – the patient herself, and the violence of her cancer – does not mean that the overall process is not methodical, planned, or reflected upon at length. Saorsa argues that the process of creating these drawings also allows her to develop and continually reproduce her own self as an artist, describing herself as a product of the entire process: ‘Therefore, as the creator of the drawings for Drawing Women’s Cancer, I am myself as much subject to, and a product of, the creative process as a whole as are the women who so generously share their experiences with me’. Far from conceiving of herself as an anonymous voice, Saorsa instead links the integrity of her artistic self to her ability to connect to her own surroundings, arguing that her artistic being as a whole, which she describes as ‘reflected in disorganised form in a broken surface’ nonetheless becomes both more real and more integral to her practice as she becomes more ‘viscerally responsive, ‘overly connected’, and overly

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7 For a fuller description of this project, see http://drawingcancer.wordpress.com (accessed 21/02/16). This website stresses the ‘personal involvement’ of all participants in the project, including Saorsa herself.

subjective in a capitalist society”. I therefore disagree with Peter Hallward, who has precisely the opposite reading of the outcome for the artist of the process of creation of art. He argues that the Deleuzian artist becomes completely detached from the world, thus: ‘The artist (as creature) dies so that life (as creating) might live’ and also that the artist ‘would become a being of pure sensation, of sensation in its most disinterested and non-reflexive state’. The adjective ‘non-reflexive’ is inappropriate, because artists such as Saorsa engage in a constant process of reflection – on their practice, on their subject- and self-reflection. O’Sullivan notes that ‘It would be an interesting project to identify how specific artists incorporate this lack of control ‘into’ their practice, or simply, how they contact or somehow ‘use’ that which is outside them ‘selves’. How, for example, they might mobilise chance (and perhaps error) in the production of something new’. I would suggest that Saorsa’s work would fulfil precisely those conditions and merit evaluation by such a project.

The notion of the ‘will’ is also central to Deleuze’s discussion of the history of painting. What leads Deleuze, following Wilhelm Worringer, to describe the ‘powerful nonorganic life’ of Gothic art as possessing of a ‘high spirituality’ is precisely that ‘what leads it to seek the elementary forces beyond the organic is a spiritual will’ (FB,34). Without this openness to the spiritual the forces which transgress and transverse the body and open unto chaos cannot be attained.

The distinction that Deleuze draws between the ‘Figural’ and ‘figuration’ is also crucial to our understanding of the preparatory work that Bacon undertook before each drawing.

9 Saorsa, ‘Response’, p234.
10 Peter Hallward, Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation, (Verso, London), 2006, p105.
11 O’Sullivan, ‘Stuttering and Stammering’, p255
Deleuze’s discussion on this point focuses on the technique of ‘free marks’. These are the seemingly random marks the painter makes in order to make a Figure emerge while eliminating narration in the piece by deforming or covering over the clichéd images which already cover the canvas, the ‘figurative givens’ which exist in the painter’s head. Bacon attained this effect by various techniques of scrubbing, brushing, and randomly splattering paint. Notwithstanding the element of chance or randomness however, the fact remains that these marks or asignifying traits – termed the ‘diagram’ – still constitute a process which is undertaken by deliberate choice. As O’Sullivan has noted, referring to the ‘isolation’ achieved by the use of the diagram, ‘Isolation then is a method for breaking with a certain use of images in our world – the way in which they tend to be mobilised for a certain end’ or in other words, an initial moment of deterritorialisation. But as O’Sullivan again emphasises, ‘this isolation is only one moment in a process’.

The use of the ‘diagram’ is therefore an operation that the painter performs first and foremost on himself or herself: ‘The painter’s hand intervenes in order to shake its own dependence and break up the sovereign optical organisation’ (FB, 71). The hand acts without reference to a guiding brain or intelligence, and is not, at least at this point, constrained to follow any kind of optical scheme: ‘It is as if the hand assumed an independence and began to be guided by other forces’ (FB, 71). Nevertheless, the will of the painter is engaged or rather re-engaged at the point at which the marks made by chance are integrated into a picture and used to create a Figure. The Figure which actually appears on the canvas – such as the screaming pope – is not, but is related to, the figuration which the painter imagined before beginning the work. Therefore, the guiding intelligence comes after the distributed chance, but it is also in operation at a moment at the very start of the process. It is precisely

12 Ibid, p252.
for this reason why Bacon, and Deleuze, state that Bacon’s cleaning lady (or just anyone) could not utilise this technique: because it is only one moment in a process the end of which involves knowing ‘how to utilise this chance or how to manipulate it’ (FB,67). A skilled and controlled use of this ‘diagram’ is required in order to create a real and original work of art: in the absence of such a use the painting simply fails, because the diagram has either been over- or under-used. The result would be that the painting remains ‘entangled in the figurative givens and the optical organisation of representation’ (FB,71), or else, that the painter only succeeds in overloading the canvas and mutilating the cliché. Deleuze also notes a progression or development in the application of this technique in the body of work of various artists: ‘We can date the diagram of a painter, because there is always a moment when the painter confronts it most directly’ (FB,72). Vincent Van Gogh, for example, achieves a particular intensity in his random marks from 1888. Deleuze implies a development, over the course of a painter’s career, not only in the application of a particular technique, such as that of the diagram, but also in the artist who applies these techniques: his painters develop a greater will to confront the ‘chaos’ more directly, and a greater appreciation of the importance of this technique and process. Over the course of a career the Deleuzian artist manages an increasingly effective confrontation with his or her artistic objectives. Artists, therefore, develop their talents rather than are born with them.

What we could term the ‘artistic (or authorial) function’ – or, a strategy which relies on the organising intelligence of the artist to impart meaning to the random marks of the diagram – is therefore still very much in operation in this description of an artistic practice. What the Deleuzian artist aims for is an encounter with controlled, rather than pure or total chaos, which would not be artistic. It is not enough to simply fill the canvas with any random
element: to create a painting, in theory, that a computer programme could create. If we step back a little from Deleuze’s detailed descriptions of individual painters, and look at the history of art as a whole, Stephen Zepke too has underlined and demonstrated that the artist’s organising and classifying intelligence is a necessary condition, not just in the application of this particular technique, but for the production of art itself. Using the example of Marcel Duchamp’s ‘readymade’, Zepke argues that this major development in art history ‘revealed art’s conditions as epistemological (i.e. conceptual) and institutional rather than based upon an artistic skill, or on any aesthetic taste’\textsuperscript{13}. Skill and technique are of secondary importance to intelligence, and to the initial conception of a practice. In \textit{Logic of Sensation}, this importance of a guiding artistic intelligence to the process of creation is still emphasised even though the form of painting that Deleuze discusses the most, that of creating ‘sensation’, attempts to impact directly on the nervous system of the spectator rather than speaking through the brain.

Gregory Flaxman has further suggested that the encounter with chaos assists in the development of the artistic subject: ‘the confrontation with chaos provokes a cerebral crystallisation, the development of a brain’\textsuperscript{14} which he goes on to refer to as ‘superject’. While I disagree with his later characterisation of this crystallised ‘superject’ as purely anonymous and without any determinate identity – since, if that were true, the artist would not be characterised by a style or by the application of a progressively developing technique - he is correct in my opinion to refer to this repeated confrontation with chaos as constitutive of the developing artistic subject itself.


By contrast with my discussion in Chapter 1 of philosophers, whom I associated with the progressive delineation of a central philosophical problem, this process of differentiation by repetition which Saorsa describes in *Drawing Women’s Cancer* does not seem to produce any progressive development of the methodology she employs after each ‘iteration’ or new set of drawings. The development, instead, at least in this instance, appears to be in Saorsa herself, as an artist. Deleuze’s analysis of Bacon, however, does note a progressive development and improvement of his techniques. For example his early landscapes served to prepare him for the techniques of scrubbing, and the development of the two techniques: scrubbing and free marks – belong to an ‘original system’, which is not that of the landscape, nor of pure abstraction or formlessness. That Bacon had some kind of a system is implied by further descriptions: ‘the rest of the painting is *systematically* occupied by large fields of colour’ (FH,4: my emphasis). In the rest of this section then, I will discuss the persistence of determinative artistic projects, techniques and schemas which themselves become a defining personal characteristic of the Deleuzian artist.

We cannot posit a simple linear progression in Bacon’s work, in so far as the development of his technique is concerned. Deleuze breaks down Bacon’s output into three broad periods, categorising them thus:

1. the first, in which the precise Figure confronts the hard and bright field of colour; the second, in which the “malersch” form is drawn against a curtained, tonal background, and finally the third, which brings together the “two opposite conventions” and returns to the vivid and thin ground, while inventing locally the effects of blurriness by striping and brushing (FB,21-22)

The first of these periods, therefore, emphasises sharp contrast and clear division between figure and field, the second, the “malersch”, is marked by blurriness and indeterminacy, and the third attempts to synthesise the two. Despite these contrasts, and the associated differences in technique, Deleuze notes that elements from each period coexist in them all.
For example, the positioned figure, and the contour forming a limit, are elements which constitute ‘the highly precise system’ (FB,22).

The supposed contrast between the three periods is nevertheless described by Deleuze as ‘the unity of a style and a creation’ (FB,22). Style is hereby deployed by Deleuze as a significant philosophical concept, once again determinative of an artist, but also, in this case, exercising a unifying function over a body of work, despite the evolutions within it.

O’Sullivan too has identified style as the unifying element within in an artistic practice, arguing that ‘It is an artist’s style that coheres (any) assemblage together into a particular composition’\(^\text{15}\) and further that ‘the production of new assemblages involves a recombination of already existing elements in and of the world’\(^\text{16}\). Style for O’Sullivan, guides and allows for the formation of new connections and relations between elements that already exist, either in the history of that artist’s practice, or in the wider world.

O’Sullivan describes these elements collectively as an ‘archive’ which the artist has access to: ‘Contemporary art does indeed involve the recasting of signifying material from elsewhere…. It is this that constitutes an artist’s archive, as it were, an archive that is then worked over by the artist in question’\(^\text{17}\). One example of such a process of reworking would be the inclusion of elements from Bacon’s early periods in the paintings from his later periods, together with those elements which remained the same in terms of their function in his system. To posit the artist as ‘archivist’, or a being who reworks and recombines different elements from past works into new ones via a combinatory style, surely precludes


us from taking a position that defines the artist as purely impersonal (and thus without a past or a history of past artistic production).

Establishing relationships between discrete elements in order to produce sensation is central to the activity of the painter, and as noted the manner in which this is done defines the painter’s style. For example, that which Deleuze describes as Bacon’s most significant contribution to painting – his ability to ‘make invisible forces visible’, or to paint deformations without representing some cause of the deformation, is possible because he ‘establishes a relationship between the visibility of the scream... and invisible forces, which are nothing other than the forces of the future’ (FB,44). This technique relies on establishing a relation between two pictorial elements in order to be effective. What is decisive, for Deleuze, is the coupling of sensations, this is what makes the production and rendering of the pure forces possible: ‘In the end there are only coupled Figures in Bacon – even the simple Figure must be coupled with its animal’ (FB,47). When Deleuze later discusses the ‘analogical language’ of painting, he refers to it as a language of relations, further suggesting that painting has been ‘the analogical language par excellence’ (FB,82).

If Bacon’s system and the production of sense in his paintings relies on the relations between the pairs or elements in his pictures, a key determining element in this system is the concept of ‘limit’ or ‘limit function’. A correlation or connection between the figures (the relation, that which is needed to set the sensations or invisible forces moving between the figures) is provided by the place, which is the common limit of the two. The contour in Bacon’s paintings is the location of a dynamic and fluid double relationship: it is the place of ‘an exchange in two directions, between the material structure and the Figure, and between the Figure and the field’ (FB,9). The contour is like a membrane which moderates a
movement in two directions, a movement which makes the painting somehow ‘function’. Deleuze, through Bacon, looks for this point, but does not want to move beyond it, and crucially allows it to control and shape the artistic practice he approves of, in the same way in which the guiding intelligence of the artist controlled and shaped the ‘chaotic’ elements represented by the diagram: the asignifying traits and so on.

Eckersley too notes how foundational the construction of relations between different pictorial elements is to the production of sense, arguing for example that ‘colours create sensations on the surface of a painting through their relationships to each other’\(^\text{18}\). More importantly, Eckersley also explicitly names artistic intention as one of the elements (together with materials such as canvas, pencil, pigment, fluids and liquids) which ‘combine within and on the surface’\(^\text{19}\). I would agree to an extent with this way of formulating the question, but would suggest that artistic intention is not simply one of the elements which combine together on the canvas, but rather the element which defines (in whole or in part) how the other elements combine, and which (after the preparatory work has been done) governs their distribution on the canvas. Indeed, the manner in which they compose relations both between the pictorial elements and between those and ‘chaos’, or the asignifying traits, is what determines Deleuze’s classification of painters: ‘Where painters differ is in their manner of embracing this nonfigurative chaos, and in their evaluation of the pictorial order to come, and the relation of this order with this chaos’ (FB,72). The word ‘evaluation’ implies the operation of an intelligence, one which plans an order to be carried out.

\(^{19}\) Eckersley, ‘The Event of Painting’, p207.
We can also in this context consider the meaning of the ‘continuous creation of space’ made possible by the new relations of colour, described as a pure pictorial ‘fact’. Indeed ‘the formula of the colourists is: if you push colour to its pure internal relations (hot-cold, expansion-contraction), then you have everything’ (FB,97). Modulation is defined as the relation between colours, and ‘it simply becomes apparent that modulation must simply consist of internal variations of intensity or saturation’ (FB,103). Colourism nevertheless has an additional task, namely ‘to invent singular, disconcerting and unknown forms in variation’ (FB,98).

I wish to argue that the role of the artist in the production of art is to act as a kind of ‘limit function’, to control the encounter with ‘chaos’ or the ‘outside’ – as, for example, expressed in the diagram – and to ensure that the canvas is not overloaded with cliché, nor with the ‘mess’ that would ensue if the diagram covered the entire painting. When Deleuze discusses the action painting of Jackson Pollock, he states that: ‘Bacon will never stop speaking of the absolute necessity of preventing the diagram from proliferating, the necessity of confining it to certain areas of the painting and certain moments of the act of painting’ (FB,77). In other words, chaos must be controlled, confined, ultimately subordinated to some higher purpose, and it is the role of the artist to provide this control. Chaos must be modulated, and something must remain at the end of the embrace with it – ‘the violent methods must not be given free reign, and the necessary catastrophe must not submerge the whole’. (FB,77) Cezanne’s career is described in similar terms: ‘Few painters have produced the experience of chaos and catastrophe so intensely, while fighting to limit and control it at any price’ (FB,78). We can speak, therefore, of the development of the concept of an ‘artist
function’, which imposes limits on the chaotic profusion of signification and also imposes a defined form on the work.

In this section then, I believe I have established the persistence of an artistic-authorial subject which uses intelligence and will to both conceive of and manage its projects, and to control the encounters with chaos which those projects entail. In the next section, I will go on to examine what makes the output of a visual artist distinctive, considering the motifs of ‘genius’, as well as ‘originality’ in Deleuze’s account.

Genius, originality and significance

Though Deleuze often describes some of the techniques employed by painters – such as scrubbing, brushing, or splattering paint – as ‘manual labour’, nevertheless in Deleuze’s discussion of art and artists the recurring motifs of genius and originality reappear, and terms like ‘miracle’ are applied to the work of artists like Cézanne and Sergei Eisenstein. Critically, Deleuze refers to the works of some of the painters he most admires – Bacon, Cézanne, Van Gogh – as answers to fundamental artistic questions, such as ‘How can one make invisible forces visible?’ (FB, 41) – with Bacon’s figures being one of a possible series of responses. Just like a philosophical problem, these artistic questions or problems can be shared by more than one great artist, or can be inflected or developed in different ways by each, such as by Van Gogh’s attempt to paint unknown forces, like ‘the unheard-of force of a sunflower seed’ (FB, 41)

In Deleuze’s account of these artists however, genius is more often associated with a prior conception of an artistic project, and with a commitment to following it through, rather than the application of outstanding technique or the demonstration of unusually cultivated
taste. In this way Deleuze emphasises the intellectual foundations of an artistic practice, as well as the application of a will: the true demonstration of a painter’s significance is his or her willingness to both recognise, define, and assume a task, or challenge, thus: ‘And was it not Cézanne’s genius to have subordinated all the techniques of painting to this task: rendering visible the folding force of mountains, the germinative force of a seed...’ (FB,41). Belief, will, and the cognition of the requirements of an artistic project are therefore vital, and so I agree with Maurizio Lazzarato’s statement that ‘(In) Deleuze’s expanded notion of art... belief plays a role that is both genetic and constitutive’\(^{20}\).

What makes Cézanne distinctive therefore, is not merely to have made an attempt to respond to the problem of making forces visible, but to have so understood its importance as to put it at the centre of his artistic practice. Deleuze further underlines Cézanne’s importance in relation to the form of painting he terms ‘by sensation’, which means a form of painting that creates sensible forms, like Figures, which act immediately on the nervous system rather than through the intellect. Though Cézanne did not invent this kind of painting, his significance for Deleuze is that ‘he gave it an unprecedented status’ (FB,25). While Deleuze identifies some examples of originality in technique or composition in those artists he admires, this originality is of only secondary importance: such as, for example, the fact that Cézanne was the first to introduce ‘deformations without transformation... in the form at rest’, and thus to present the whole painting as a relation of forces (FB,42). While Deleuze explicitly acknowledges that Bacon adopted this practice of Cézanne’s, and that this has implications not just for the composition of his Figures, but for the whole structure of his paintings, this adoption – and other similarities between their

work, such as Bacon’s ‘extreme elaboration of painting as analogical language’ (FB, 84), does not make him a lesser painter in Deleuze’s eyes. Indeed, as Deleuze also notes, many of Cézanne’s preoccupations – corporeality, vital instinct, ‘temperament’ – are not unique to him but equally belong to literary Naturalism. Just as we discussed in Chapter 1 therefore, originality in the invention of technique, as such, is not necessarily of the first importance in defining what makes a great painter.

This positing of shared techniques, tasks and fundamental concerns even between artists who lived centuries apart raises the question of the relation between Bacon and his artistic predecessors, and through them the whole heritage of painting. The formulation Deleuze uses to describe this relation is rather curious: ‘Bacon is Cézannean, even more so than if he were a disciple of Cézanne’ (FB, 26).

This relationship between ‘master’ and ‘disciple’ has taken on a much more restrictive meaning in *Logic of Sensation* than it did in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. By contrast with the earlier book, Bacon’s decision to continue Cézanne’s preference for painting the sensation, as well as some of his concerns and methods (such as ‘temperament’) is not enough to render him a disciple. Let us examine, however, the description of Bacon’s relation to Diego Vélasquez, a painter whom Deleuze did consider to be Bacon’s master. Bacon’s relationship to Vélasquez is to ‘hystericise’ all the elements of his painting: not just the directly comparable figures (such as their depictions of the Pope) but the pictorial structure of Vélasquez’s work, which included the split between figure and setting which Deleuze finds in Bacon. We can therefore perhaps posit a relation between Bacon and Vélasquez similar to that Deleuze identified between Nietzsche and Stirner. Bacon’s relation is to the whole of Vélasquez’s work, not just to those paintings which seem most similar to his own, and,
furthermore, his practice of ‘hystericising’ relates itself to Vélazquez’s work as a whole. We can therefore draw a parallel between the ‘disciple’ artists in *Logic of Sensation* and the ‘minor philosophers’ in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*: in that the significance of these later artists is that they have found the key yet tentatively expressed elements in the work of their masters, and have either presented them systematically from another perspective, or taken tendencies that were inherent to the earlier work and pushed them to extremes. One further example is offered by Jackson Pollock, who, in Deleuze’s analysis, pushed the line-trait and the colour patch ‘to their functional limit: no longer the transformation of the form but the decomposition of matter’ (*FB*, 74). Thus, even techniques which Deleuze refers to as ‘prodigious constants’ of painting can produce very different effects, if they are pursued with enough force, emphasis and rigour. Pollock’s significance is therefore the way in which he makes the ‘Gothic line’ the driving force behind his painting.

The question of ‘master’ and ‘disciple’ raises the broader question of the relation the Deleuzian artist has to the history of art as a whole. While, in my discussion of philosophy, I noted Deleuze’s tendency in his earlier works to argue for a polemic rejection of the weight of inherited knowledge and the presuppositions which make up ‘good sense’, this stark injunction no longer remains by the time of *Logic of Sensation*.

As I have previously noted, the key questions or ‘tasks’ that motivated the great painters appear to have remained the same throughout art history, or at least, the Classical period – such as the task of painting invisible and insensible force. Aside from that however, there exists also a second task or problem that Deleuze identifies for painters, that of ‘decomposing and recomposing effects’ which also remains the same, but which is expressed in terms of a new effect in different time periods or by different artistic schools or
movements. Thus, artists confronted the problem of depth in the Renaissance, of colours in Impressionism, of movement in Cubism. In this respect a central artistic problem was, as we have seen, not unique to one artist, but an artist also did not have a full and free choice over what problems to confront in the practice of painting: instead a painter’s aesthetic, intellectual and social context defines and limits the problems on which he or she will work. At this point it is instructive to consider the analysis David Burrows has made of ‘art scenes’, which he defines as a form of ‘group experimentation’, or a set of aesthetically and conceptually similar artistic practices and orientations coexisting in one environment – Impressionism or Cubism, or at least some of the geographical concentrations of artists within these movements, could perhaps serve as an example. Burrows, though noting that his art scenes do not necessarily foreground collective rather than individual practice, has nevertheless argued that ‘An art scene is not produced by the labour or imagination of an individual, it is the murmur of collective or rather anonymous enunciation’ 21. For Burrows, artists have difficulty in establishing a distinctive, individualised artistic practice within the logic of a scene in which techniques, forms, and tasks or problems are shared. However, I question his elision of ‘collective’ with ‘anonymous’. I believe instead that as Deleuze has demonstrated, the sharing of problems and techniques does not mean that the individual artist must be termed anonymous or impersonal, but merely that that individuality may need to be expressed, as in the example of Bacon’s relation to Vélazquez, in a development or modification of a central theme or practice. The limits within which individual artists work are predefined by their place in history, or by their membership of a school or movement. In Bacon’s case, the reason Deleuze offers for why he chose to focus on the problem of rendering invisible forces visible, rather than on the problem of effects is that ‘in the whole

history which is that of painting, they have been adequately mastered by the painters he admires’ (FB,41). The Deleuzian artist is, therefore, very much situated in a place in history, and his or her artistic concerns are inflected and determined by the concerns of the day.

As an illustration of the preceding points, let us look at the example of ‘colourism’ – which Deleuze prefers to call a ‘tendency’ rather than a school or movement. Nevertheless, colourism is defined both by technique, and by a central concern on the part of its practitioners – the substitution of relations of tonality for relations of value. Moreover, Deleuze defines a ‘formula’ which the practitioners of colourism all adopted: ‘if you push colour to its pure internal relations (hot-cold, expansion-contraction), then you have everything’ (FB,97). It is the absolute centrality, and the effort given to develop these relations to the fullest and purest possible extent, which allows the colourists to produce what Deleuze calls a ‘haptic sense’. The first principle of such a technique and of such a conception of the relations between colours were laid down by Goethe, not a visual artist at all. Notwithstanding this however, such a set of conditions are not sufficient to create a great masterpiece. Instead, this pure modulation of colour must be shaped by the vision and inventiveness of an artist. Deleuze cites Georges Duthuit as having ‘profoundly demonstrated this complementarity of a “unitive vision” and a singularised perception as they appear in (Paul) Gauguin and Van Gogh’ (FB,98). We are reminded of the association in Proust and Signs of style itself with a unique vision or perspective on the world, and it seems that such an association also is at play in Deleuze’s analysis of artists. The ‘singularised perception’ in particular requires the invention of ‘singular, disconcerting, and unknown forms’, thus requiring, as I have previously argued, the employment of originality and of an individualised perspective in the precise working-out of the broad injunctions of the
‘tendency’ or movement to which the artist subscribes. Deleuze cites as an example
Gauguin’s decision to treat the body with a single broken tone, which he terms ‘a revelation
of Martinique or Tahiti’ (FB,97). This formulation is valuable not just for its faintly religious
character, but for its explicit association of an original development of a technique with a
powerful and formative experience in Gauguin’s life. Such a unique personal history is
precisely what makes Gauguin’s perception singular, and allows him to rework the
techniques and pictorial elements of others in a distinctive way. Such an association makes
it very difficult indeed to insist that inventiveness and creativity requires impersonality, or
any tendency on the part of the artist to forget their own history and personal experience.

However, I wish also to analyse Deleuze’s situation of the artists he studies in the context of
the broader history of art. Logic of Sensation situates its discourse on Bacon in the context
of a Deleuzian account of the history of art from the Egyptians onwards, which both makes
broad claims about long-term developments in the medium, and attempts to trace the
influence of these past developments on the career of Bacon. What is unusual about
Deleuze’s account of the history of art at first glance, in contrast to his treatment of other
media and other branches of thought (in particular philosophy), is how impersonal his
account is. He will define art both by geographical location and by historical period – for
example, ‘Egyptian Art’, ‘Gothic art’, and so on – and will treat these broad movements as
actors in their own right, making such detailed and specific claims as ‘Byzantine art reverses
Greek art by giving such a degree of activity to the background that we no longer know
where the background ends and the forms begin’ (FB,89), or ‘Gothic art... also dismantles
organic representation... We are no longer directed towards the purely optical’ (FB,89-90).
These periods of art history are identified with broad developments in form and technique:
Byzantine art with purely optical space, or Gothic art with purely manual space. While of course, the identity of the artists of the surviving Egyptian or Greek masterpieces may not be known, and while Deleuze’s own knowledge of these early periods of art history may simply be limited, it is still striking that proper names only begin to appear in his discourses when treating art from the Classical period and after, and even then, only when discussing European, rather than, for example, Japanese art. Deleuze links developments in the history of art to developments in the history of thought as a whole, claiming that ‘Modern art begins when man no longer experiences himself as an essence, but as an accident’ (FB,87), and when he introduces proper names, treats them principally as the most significant example of a broader trend within their aesthetic context: noting for example that the move to depict the form as accident rather than essence was most pronounced in ‘Rembrandt and Dutch painting’ (FB,87).

Chapter 14 of Logic of Sensation, which Deleuze entitles ‘Every painter recapitulates the history of painting’ in his or her own way’, follows the structuring logic of Deleuze’s analysis. Artists are seen to emerge from the history of art, and, rather than polemically renouncing their heritage as was the case with Deleuze’s philosophers, to incarnate key trends, developments and forms from different periods of the past in their own practice. In this respect, Deleuze’s artists are profoundly connected to an aesthetic history as well as to their own personal history, and developments in their techniques can be traced to profound stylistic achievements or conceptual commitments made in and by earlier eras. Deleuze traces a direct link, for example, between the ‘nonorganic vitality’ and active, intense manual strokes, of which he detects the origin in the ‘Northern line’ proper to Gothic art, and the ‘power which stems directly from (the) manual space’ (FB,90) created by these
strokes which he finds in the work of Michelangelo. Deleuze’s artists are intensely aware of
their own heritage, and incorporate elements of it in their practice, as well as subverting
those same elements.

Chapter 15, which seeks to demonstrate how these different periods in art history are
discernible in the body of work of Bacon, specifies exactly how the Deleuzian artist
instrumentalises the elements discovered in the work of his or her predecessors. Such
elements are described as ‘stopping points and passages, which are extracted from or
reconstitute an open sequence’ (FB,94). No linear or temporal progression exists between
these stopping points, they are all at once represented in the work of the mature artist. The
practice that the artist undertakes is to select, extract and recombine these inherited
elements, in order to present them anew. As O’Sullivan says, ‘The new then involves a
recombination of already existing elements in and of the world (a new dice throw as
Deleuze might say). The new would then be a repetition, but with difference’22. Bacon, for
example, both ‘subverts’ and ‘scrambles’ what Deleuze describes as the ‘tactile-optical
world’ and the ‘purely optical world’ (FB,95). The subversion and the scrambling are
precisely what, for Deleuze, leads to the production of masterpieces: ‘Painting not only
creates its masterpieces by combining its own tendencies (linear-tactile, luminist, colorist)
but also by differentiating and opposing them’ (FB,97).

This section has demonstrated how Deleuze’s artists are situated in their own time, and how
profoundly aware they are of their own aesthetic and intellectual heritage. Deleuze’s artists
subvert and redeploy different elements in the art practices of others, but do so in a way
that is nonetheless distinctive, and which speaks to their own style and unique vision. In the

22 Simon O’Sullivan, ‘The Production of the New and the Care of the Self’, in Production of the New, eds. Zepke
and O’Sullivan, p91.
final section of this chapter, I wish to demonstrate how Deleuze’s artists are situated not just in an aesthetic context, but also in a social and political context.

**The Political Context of the Visual Artist**

In discussing the social and political context I want to confront suggestions that the Deleuzian author or artist is fundamentally detached from society, and thus apolitical in any real sense. As we have seen, in *Kafka* Deleuze and Guattari argued that the category of ‘minor literature’ was inherently political and was defined by its identification with a minoritarian people. Nevertheless, theorists such as Hallward have suggested that the Deleuzian artist, and philosopher, was characterised precisely by a distance from what Hallward terms ‘the creature’, or in other words from an affective politics of identification with a minority position. Hallward argues that ‘Nothing is more foreign to Deleuze than an unconditional concern for the other qua other’.

The question of the social and political status of the artist, though it is complicated, is discussed in *Logic of Sensation* in only in a couple of short passages. Deleuze, in a departure from his discussion of the intersection of art and politics elsewhere, focuses in *Logic of Sensation* on the association between revolutionary politics, and affective empathy. To introduce a passage detailing this association, Deleuze writes ‘Meat is undoubtedly the chief object of Bacon’s pity, his only object of pity, his Anglo-Irish pity’ (*FB*, 17). This is the first time in Deleuze’s work that ‘pity’ is upheld as a virtuous emotion, and associated with any kind of progressive politics. ‘Meat’ here refers to suffering flesh in its condition purely and simply as suffering flesh, as ‘every man who suffers is a piece of meat’ (*FB*, 17). But this does

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23 Hallward, *Out of This World*, p92. Hallward defends his reading from the obvious objection – that Deleuze and Guattari championed the concept of ‘minor literatures’ in *Kafka* – by arguing that the concern of these literatures is with minority purely in its status as minority itself, rather than with any defined social or cultural positions.
not prevent Bacon from engaging in an act of empathetic identification with the ‘meat’: ‘the painter identifies with the objects of his horror and his compassion’ (FB,17). Such a position might seem to support Hallward’s contention that the Deleuzian artist does not identify with minorities in so far as they are part of a defined subject position, but only in so far as they are marginalised and suffering. Consider, however, the way in which Deleuze describes the motivating force behind this pity. Firstly, he compares Bacon to the Russian artist Chaim Soutine, and ‘his immense pity for the Jew’ (FB,17). Far from pitying meat solely as meat, then, Soutine’s pity seems directed explicitly at a particular minority group, the Jews. More important, though, is Soutine’s own position as a painter of Russian and Jewish origin living in Paris. In a sense Soutine occupied a position adjacent to the group he pitied, he is both within and without that group: not himself subject to anti-Semitic persecution but in a position, due to his own heritage, to closely identify with its victims. It therefore is very important that Deleuze qualifies Bacon’s own feelings of pity as ‘his Anglo-Irish pity’. Though he was born in Ireland, Bacon was descended from the Anglo-Irish Protestant aristocracy. Therefore, his family were not subject to any of the persecutions of Catholics or of native Irish culture which characterised British rule in Ireland. In this respect, just like Soutine, Bacon takes up a subject position adjacent to a persecuted group. He identifies with and pities them, he is and yet he is not quite one of them. It is therefore also highly relevant that Deleuze will say of him that ‘Bacon harbours within himself all the violence of Ireland’ (FB,28), and that, in this context, he makes explicit reference to Bacon’s paintings of the crucifixion, a reference which carries a hint of the trauma of religious persecution.

Bacon’s paintings of meat therefore, are a project of imaginative empathetic identification, yet one which, of necessity, takes place at a certain remove. Indeed, the ability to go
through this process of identification, even if only momentarily, with the meat in its condition as meat, is also posited by Deleuze as a condition for a revolutionary politics: ‘What revolutionary person – in art, politics, religion or elsewhere – has not felt that extreme moment when he or she was nothing but a beast, and became responsible... before the calves that died?’ (FB,18).

Bacon, in this respect, differs from Deleuze and Guattari’s reference, in Kafka, to Josephine the Mouse, whose minoritarian politics rested on the fact that she was merely one among many, an anonymous member of a collective who was chosen as the voice or the vessel through which the voice of her people spoke. Bacon is not anonymous, and not just another member of the minority group, he is on the fringes or adjacent to the group. The position of the empathetic and revolutionary artist in relation to the minorised and suffering group is exactly the position of the figure that André-Pierre Colombat calls a sorcerer, one which Colombat, too, identified with the writer or artist: ‘an anomalous figure, shifted from the symbolic centre of a representation to its naturalised perimeter, where it denies, confronts, or captures the forces of the Outside’24. But the positioning of the sorcerer on the perimeter of the group is not just so that it thus becomes easier to confront the Outside, it is also to underline and emphasise the distance between the sorcerer and the rest of the group that he or she identifies with. But for this reading to work, contrary to what Hallward argues, we cannot posit an anonymous ‘sorcerer’ figure completely divested of a social and political context, nor one who does not identify with a minority or oppressed group in so far as they have a determined identity: Bacon’s Irish heritage, and Soutine’s or Kafka’s Jewish heritage, are central to this process of identification and pity. Deleuze further identifies a progression

in Bacon’s work, one which associates the head without a face – an individualised figure which is at the same time not an individual – and meat, which appears to represent anonymous, corporeal suffering. ‘Throughout Bacon’s work, the relationship between the head and meat runs through a scale of intensity that renders it increasingly intimate’ (FB,18-19). The intimate relation and identification between the head and the meat can be read as an analogy for the identification between the sorcerer-painter and the oppressed minority group, a reading given further support by the fact that Bacon has painted himself as a ‘head’, as ‘a piece of flesh… (with) eyes without sockets’ (FB,18).

To close this chapter, I wish to briefly consider the analysis in Logic of Sensation of the spectator, and his or her relation to the artist and the artwork. Part of the process of what Deleuze will call the task of visual art, which is the elimination of illustration, narration, and thus the spectacle, is also the elimination of the spectator. ‘One discovers in Bacon’s paintings an attempt to eliminate every spectator’ (FB,9). By spectator, of course, Deleuze means visual depictions of crowds or watching figures in Bacon’s paintings. Yet this is not a hasty remark, and we should take it to indicate the absolute unimportance, to the Deleuzian artist, of the spectator looking at the painting in a gallery also. This is a key point about Deleuze’s entire theory of art and artists: spectators are almost incidental to what the work of art is and how it functions. The spectator is excluded from depiction in the painting (with the figure of the ‘Attendant’ being considered by Deleuze to be something other than a spectator) and cannot impact upon it or how it is understood. Part of the reason for this is found in Deleuze’s Logic of Sense in the discussion of Michel Tournier’s novel Friday, or, The Other Island. Deleuze argues that the encounter with the ‘other’ – in reality, or depicted in an artwork – fundamentally changes or conditions the entire perceptual field: ‘The first
effect of Others is that around each object that I perceive or each idea that I think there is the organisation of a marginal world, a mantle or background, where other objects or other ideas may come forth in accordance with laws of transition which regulate the passage from one to another’ (LS, 344). The depiction of an ‘Other’ in the picture then would spoil the immediacy of the real spectator’s experience: he or she would be aware of multiple competing and possible perspectives from which the pictorial elements could be encountered. However, Deleuze, in a point which I shall return to in my chapter on cinema, insists on an absolutely immersive experience for the spectator or reader of an artwork. The spectator has no control or choice over how she accesses the artwork, nor does she have any room to impose her own interpretation on it. ‘As a spectator, I experience the sensation only by entering the painting, by reaching the unity of the sensing and the sensed’ (FB, 25). This ‘entering’ implies an abandonment of the critical faculties on the part of spectators, an elimination of critical distance and, in our own form of ‘becoming’, the necessity of opening ourselves up to the artist’s aesthetic schema and living it from the inside in order to have an aesthetic experience. If the artist must unite himself or herself with the artwork in order to paint, the spectator must enter into the painting in order to truly see it. The experience of the sensation for the spectator is more properly described as an ‘affect’, rather than a feeling: it does not merely provoke an emotional response in us, but rather, in a manner akin to the naturalist or vitalist ‘instinct’, the almost physical response described as the passage from one sensation or level of intensity to another. This sensation acts directly on the nervous system, which leads us to posit a hystericizing effect or affect of the painting on the spectator. Such an immersive experience makes it difficult to posit a series of spectators, each retaining their own critical distance and imposing their own interpretations on the painting, as one might expect were one to attempt to transpose
Barthes’ theories of reader-driven interpretation of texts onto the field of visual art. In fact, some theorists have gone even further, and have suggested that the Deleuzian artist does not paint for any audience at all. As O’Sullivan says, “These practices are not made for an already existing audience as it were, but in order to call forth – to invoke – an audience”\textsuperscript{25}. One does not, however, have to adopt this position in order to firmly reject any suggestion that spectators, in Deleuze’s theory of art, have any right to construct a vision for the artwork which competes with that of the painter.

I believe that this chapter has demonstrated the complex interaction of intentionality and intelligence in the process of creating the painting, as well as emphasising the historical, cultural, social, and political situation of the painter. I also believe that it has demonstrated the absolute significance of the vision of the artist, rather than any competing vision advanced by the spectator, to the understanding and proper experience of an artwork.

Deleuze’s artists access complex networks of pictorial elements, techniques, concerns and styles, and participate in geographically and historically located ‘tendencies’, schools or movements. As such, the role of the artist is to rework and redeploy the techniques and pictorial elements available to them, while at the same time making their own contribution distinctive by associating the redeployment of these elements with their own singular ‘vision’, which we should understand as both a personal characteristic of the artist, and determined by the artist’s own lived experience.

For this reason, no account of visual art as understood by Deleuze can ignore the central position of the artist, her defining project, her guiding intelligence, her degree of fidelity to the techniques and concerns of others. The central definition of artistic ‘genius’, as

advanced in this chapter, is also a function of the intelligence: the ability to conceive of the
correct task at a given moment in (art) history for an artistic endeavour, to which the
genius-artist subordinates all other concerns. It is therefore very difficult to conceive of the
Deleuzian artist as an impersonal subjectivity or as merely an accumulation of ‘events’.
Rather, I consider the Deleuzian artist to continually make and remake her own subjectivity
at the same time she develops her practice: in a series of guided and controlled encounters
with the force from the ‘outside’.
Chapter Four Deleuze and Cinema

At stake in my analysis of Deleuze’s books on cinema is a consideration of the authorial presence as an enduring, unifying element: unifying both the scenes which make up an individual film, and unifying too the different films in a single body of work into an aesthetically and philosophically coherent whole. I argue that style is best described as a consistent personal characteristic of the author, one of vital importance to the coherence and unity of a film. I further argue that at the root of collaboration between authors, and the grouping together of authors in schools, lies a philosophical, as well as aesthetic, commonality. Finally I argue that the relation of an author with an ‘intercessor’ character both requires and makes possible the death and rebirth of the author as an individual persona, and allows him to enter into relation with the new people whom he will fabulate.

Deleuze was careful to insist that his books were not a detailed historical analysis of cinema itself, rather a study of certain philosophical concepts that arose out of, or have been best exemplified by, cinema. He therefore makes no attempt to provide a comprehensive account of film, one which would embrace mainstream or ‘commercial cinema’, as well as art cinema. The majority of films Deleuze dismisses with very little discussion as ‘bad’ films, implying that they are not worth further examination. In Cinema 2 he writes for example that ‘the cinematographic image is in the present only in bad films’ (C2, 37). At the same time he also argues that real art needs a clichéd or commercial counterpart to distinguish itself from: ‘To thrive, all art needs the distinction between these two sectors, the commercial and the creative’ (TRM, 288). The cinema which Deleuze considers worthy of comment has a disruptive and provocative function, goes beyond what he terms ‘the human limits of the sensory-motor schema’ (C2, 38), towards a non-human or super-human world.
'which speaks for a new spirit'. Accordingly, the disruption and transcendence of the commonplace, together with the celebration of originality, lies at the heart of Deleuze’s approach to cinema as to other art forms.

When Deleuze refers to cinema authors, he usually, but not always, refers to the person carrying out the functions of a director: such functions as choice of set design, shot framing and perspective, styles of camera movement, script development, and editing/montage (though most of these functions can also be undertaken by other cinema professionals too).

In this respect, he conforms to the practices of journals such as the *Cahiers du Cinéma*, in the pages of which the beginnings of a properly ‘auteur-focused’ film criticism began in France, and which saw the director as the creator and as the person most closely associated with the poetic vision of the film. Yet cinema is always the result of the contributions of many different professionals. For example, Deleuze will refer to ‘the Straubs’, or Jean-Marie Straub and Danièle Huillet, as jointly fulfilling an authorial role, although they divided the usual duties of a director between them, with Huillet focusing more on editing and post-production. That the two are considered an authorial ‘pair’, without Huillet being subordinate, tells us that Deleuze’s conception of a cinematic author is not rigidly defined by function, and indeed I will argue that it is not limited purely to directors. As we shall see, actors and screenwriters are also sometimes considered authors in their own right by Deleuze, but sometimes they are not. The difference between an actor or screenwriter whom Deleuze considers an author, and one he does not, will shed a great deal of light on the basic conception of authorship Deleuze is working from.

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1 It should be noted that while Deleuze explicitly analyses cameramen, actors and screenwriters formally separately from the analysis he devotes to directors, he never considers the role of editor to be separate from a directorial role, and in fact in his comments on montage seems to consider that editing is always done by the director.
Style, technique, form

The *Cinema* books were written in the context of a French intellectual film culture dominated, in particular, by the journal *Cahiers du Cinéma* and the major theorists, critics and directors associated with it. In her history of the journal, Emilie Bickerton both emphasises the break it marked with ‘the prevailing regimes of taste in the artistic culture of the post-war’ and its position at the heart of an emerging modernist conception of film. The salient importance of the journal is its contribution to the development of the theory of ‘auteurism’: the critical position both that films were works of art equal to paintings or novels, and that the author – generally the director – of these films is the person responsible for the overall stylistic and thematic coherence, and the poetic force, of such works of art. Bickerton thus quotes Jean-Luc Godard as crediting the journal with achieving widespread recognition of film directors as artists, stating ‘The *auteurs* of films, thanks to us, have entered definitively into the history of art’. The journal’s first wave of critics-turned-directors - figures such as Godard, Claude Chabrol, François Truffaut, and Eric Rohmer – all emphasised the centrality of the *auteur* in their critical writings, which prepared them for their own film practices: ‘Writing forced them to ask, and answer, how a director employed various techniques to his own unique ends, how he conveyed his narrative visually and developed a thematic continuity through his oeuvre’. Bickerton further notes the close engagement that the *Cahiers*’ editors during the mid-1970s had with the work of Deleuze, who attended film screenings and participated in discussions with the journal, and, in particular, how they concurred on a conception of the film as an artistic creation. For his part, Deleuze saw the *Cahiers* as crucial to the development of the theoretical distinction

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3 Ibid.
4 Bickerton, *Cahiers*, x.
between the ‘commercial’ and ‘creative’ film sectors, one which he upheld in his own work, and which he again linked to the notion of the auteur. He stated that ‘The Cahiers is largely responsible for introducing this distinction into cinema and for defining what it means to be an auteur in cinema’ (TRM, 288).

The logic of both Cinema books is designed to elucidate the emergence and development of the new forms of image – movement-image, affection-image, time-image and so on – thus providing an analytical framework which Deleuze’s analysis of individual directors is intended to contribute to. Yet while the basic structure of the Cinema books focuses on these philosophical concepts, the organising logic of the analysis is auteur-centric, one which, following the prevailing trends in the film criticism of the day, assumes that a body of work is first and foremost held together and defined in a coherent way by the proper name of the author. In this respect, my analysis benefits from the fact that Deleuze has taken a broad historical perspective, one which references a great many individual directorial careers. Aesthetic and philosophical trends are pursued – often to their fullest possible extent – over the course of the career of many of Deleuze’s directors, and Deleuze often structures his analysis in a way that assumes authorial consistency – or in other words, broadly defined stylistic and conceptual similarities between most or all of the films in a given director’s corpus. These elements persist through time, and they tell us something about the director-author as a creative individual.

Deleuze will write, for example, that an individual director will best exemplify a particular technique or concept, or will bring a particular trend to fulfilment slowly over the course of a career: for example ‘[Joseph] Mankiewicz is undoubtedly the greatest flashback author’ (C2, 47), or ‘Passion, in this sense, brings to its greatest intensity what was already taking
shape in *Le Mepris*, when we witnessed the sensory-motor failure of the couple in the traditional drama... Throughout all these films, there is a creative evolution which is that of a visionary Godard’ (C2, 10). Deleuze looks for continuities in the work of an individual director, and strong relations between directors and other kinds of author: or, where there are breaks rather than continuities, will posit these as an ‘evolution’. Michelangelo Antonioni, for example, is described thus: ‘Antonioni’s art will continue to evolve in two directions: an astonishing development of idle periods of everyday banality; then, starting with *The Eclipse*, a treatment of limit situations which pushes them to the point of dehumanised landscapes’ (C2, 5). Unlike his analysis of Bacon, Deleuze usually does not describe sharply differentiated periods in the development of his preferred directors, but does at times also seems to acknowledge significant mid-career changes of direction, the analysis of which will only have relevance to a part of a director’s output. However, often these changes in technique or form are motivated by the needs of the progressive development of a director’s underlying conception of cinema, thus: ‘What interests [Elia] Kazan, and what determines the evolution of his work, is the linking of permeations and explosions so as to obtain a continuous structuring rather than a structure with two poles’ (C1, 161). In this respect Deleuze’s emphasis is on persisting aesthetic and conceptual commitments which are determinative regarding the course of an authorial career, and which define the enduring authorial personality.

A director can also prolong and extend an aesthetic technique or a particular form first conceived of by a predecessor: such as Deleuze’s discussion of the ‘geometric frame’ employed by, among others, Carl-Theodor Dreyer, but taken up by Antonioni – thus ‘Antonioni seems to go to the limit of this geometric conception of the frame which pre-
exists that which is going to be inserted within in *Eclipse*’ (C1, 14). Deleuze also remarks that Charlie Chaplin was noted for his ability to push the small burlesque form to a limit, to link it up with the cinematic ‘large form’ (of the action-image, SAS’). Furthermore, a director can also take up an aesthetic or philosophical project begun by a philosophical or literary author, and pursue it according to a similar method but in different media: for example Antonioni’s relationship with Nietzsche – ‘he is the only contemporary author to have taken up the Nietzschean project of a real critique of morality, and this thanks to a ‘symptomatologist’ method’ (C2, 8). Thus, the techniques and forms that most distinguish the work of certain directors need not be – entirely – original to them.

Deleuze also does devote some considered attention to the contributions made by others whom he does not consider authors, such as actors, or cameramen, who are explicitly recognised as contributing something distinct to a cinematic text, albeit of secondary importance. The exact relation between the contributions of the director and of these other figures is under-theorised in the Cinema books. Take for example, Deleuze’s reference to French ‘luminism’ which he attributes to great cameramen such as Georges Périnal, and which appears to be Périnal’s independent contribution to the films he shot, one not reliant on deliberate stylistic choices made by his directors. ‘Luminism’ in so far as it relates to Périnal is only briefly discussed by Deleuze, and used as a reference point in a broader argument he makes about movement within the shot, and how light was incorporated by certain directors into their technique of alternation. Nonetheless, Deleuze explicitly acknowledges that the pre-war French School of cinema is also defined chromatically and stylistically by its ‘luminous grey’. Deleuze then treats light and luminism at much greater length when he considers the German Expressionist School. He makes reference in his
discussion of German Expressionism to a ‘light-image’, arguing that movement has been put
at the service of light, and suggests that the Expressionist school as a whole is defined by
‘the infinite force of light [which] is opposed to darkness as an equally infinite force’ (C1,
50). Whether they were defined more by soft gradations of light, ‘blended series of
chiaroscuro’, or conversely by sharp contrasts, the great directors, according to Deleuze,
made themselves ‘masters’ of the relations between light and dark. Deleuze thus calls Erich
von Stroheim for instance as ‘profound’ a luminist as Fritz Lang or F.W. Murnau (such an
evocation of ‘mastery’, of course, gives the impression of a strong authorial figure imposing
his or her style and perspective on a cinematic text). If light and luminism is treated far more
extensively as it relates to these directors than as it relates to Péral, this suggests that the
Cinema books have an auteur-centric framework, one which does not consider at length
certain aesthetic and stylistic trends in film (luminism is an example) separately from their
association with the great auteurs. Rather, Deleuze only has interest in Péral’s
contribution because of the possibilities it opened up for a creative director.

Deleuze leaves more of a space for an autonomous contribution to be made by actors, but
often this is not sufficient to allow that actor to attain what he would consider to be the
status of author, or more accurately co-author of the film. In his discussion, in Cinema 2, of
the relationship between the director Tod Browning and the actor Lou Chaney, Deleuze
unequivocally relieves Chaney to a secondary role. He does this in his discussion of the
indiscernible point at which the virtuality of a ‘public role’ blends with the actuality of a
‘private crime’, arguing that only the cinema could capture the ‘crystalline circuit’ formed by
the double face and double role of the actor. He thus argues ‘Perhaps it needed an
extraordinary understanding between an author and an actor: Lou Chaney’ (C2, 70). This
understanding between author and actor allows certain effects to be achieved, such as ‘An abnormal, suffocating slowness permeates Browning’s characters in general, in the crystal’ (C2, 70). But the way in which the case is stated leaves us in no doubt that Deleuze does not consider the two contributions to be of equal importance. In this case, the characters are precisely Browning’s characters, rather than Chaney’s, and Chaney’s acting is analysed by Deleuze only as a component of an overall body of work denoted by Browning’s name, thus: ‘What we see in Browning is... a double face of the actor’ (C2, 70). For this reason, I have some sympathy with a point made by John Mullarkey, who says of Deleuze that ‘When he writes about actors it is in terms of how they were filmed by the director, rather than in terms of their own star aura, performance or casting. It is as if the actor’s image always varies with reference to one central image, that of the director.’

Mullarkey, however, is wrong to make his point so definitively. He appears to see no space within the Deleuzian conception of film for a collective authorial subject, a point on which I disagree. He is also incorrect to argue that ‘What might count as a non-directorial source that would conflict with the mastery of the director is never mentioned: for example, Greg Toland’s brilliant work with Welles on Citizen Kane.’ This pays insufficient attention to Deleuze’s still substantial discussion of actors, developed in particular in reference to the Actors’ Studio.

The Actor’s Studio is a New-York based professional training and development organisation for actors, theatre directors and playwrights which is particularly associated with the style of Method Acting. In his initial discussion of the Studio - his first systematic comments, which

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6 Ibid.
only come towards the end of *Cinema 1*, on any kind of film professional other than a director - Deleuze in fact gives it equal importance, if perhaps less sustained treatment, as a film-making and theorising body, to the different schools of directors discussed earlier in that book, speaking of it as an equivalent of the auteurs themselves. He argues for example that ‘We know that the action-image, in this sense, found its systematisation in the Actors’ Studio and in Kazan’s cinema’ (C1, 160). We can see that the Actors’ Studio had an independent conception of image and film, of real consequence for the history and development of cinema. That this is so is clear from the fact that the theory and practice of the Actors’ studio was not limited merely to acting, but also covered many of the directorial techniques that Deleuze treats at length: ‘From the outset, the rules of the Actor’s Studio applied not only to the actor’s acting out but to the conception and unfolding of the film, its framings, its cutting, its montage’ (C1, 160). We must conclude, contrary to Mullarkey, that while many of the practices discussed within this chapter and identified with the role of cinematic authors may be habitually associated with directors, they are not necessarily associated with directors.

Indeed the Actors’ Studio has what Deleuze terms an ‘orthodoxy’, that is, ‘a great global mission...divided into successive and continuous local missions’ (C1, 161), together with its own set of rules, such as ‘only the inner counts, but this inner is not beyond or hidden’ (C1, 161). The Actors’ Studio develops its own method for the great realist actors: to identify an object with an emotion which that object will bring to the surface. The Actors’ Studio therefore acts as a kind of collective subject. What unites the actors influenced by the Actors’ Studio is a method underpinned by philosophical assumptions held in common, and this is of relevance to its enhanced ‘authorial’ status.
Deleuze complicates this question in the section of *Cinema 1* which deals with the burlesque, which he terms one of the classic genres of cinema. Not only is this genre exclusively devoted to what he terms the ‘small form’ of the action-image: ASA’, or action-situation-action, but in fact it invented it. Deleuze’s discussion of the burlesque centres on three actor-directors: Chaplin, Harold Lloyd, and Buster Keaton. Yet their acting comes first and foremost in his analysis, rather than their direction. Chaplin’s originality, that which, for Deleuze, gave him ‘an incomparable place in the burlesque’ came from his ability ‘to select gestures which were close to each other and corresponding situations which were far apart, so as to make their relationship produce a particularly intense emotion’ (C1, 174).

Similarly, Lloyd is credited with profound and original formal innovations and, Deleuze argues, ‘develops a variant which moves the process on from the action-image to the pure perception-image’ (C1, 174). Lloyd, as an actor, is thus credited with having an impact on the history and conceptual development of cinema itself. The development of what Deleuze terms the perception-image is linked to Lloyd’s use of optical illusions, allowing a slight difference in perception to emphasise a massive difference in situations – with the example given, from an unnamed film, of a man framed in the window of a luxury car who in fact is riding a bicycle, thus emphasising a profound class division.

As an example of the ability of an actor to define a film in a way normally associated with an ‘auteur’, let us consider the early silent comedy *Safety Last!*. The film is defined not just by the ‘star quality’ of Lloyd, but also by the physical character of his acting and the original ways in which he uses misdirection and illusion to set up a comic scene. The humour of the film comes from the traditional staples of the physical or slapstick comedy of the 1920s, using such devices as mistaken identity, ‘race-against-time’ situations and stunts taking
place at a great height. But the film’s originality comes from the elaborate optical illusions specifically associated with Lloyd, such the opening scene - a goodbye on a station platform which is misleadingly presented as an execution. But Lloyd was not the director of Safety Last: it was in fact directed by Fred Newmeyer and Sam Taylor, neither of whom warrant a mention in the Cinema books. The scene is nonetheless aggregated into Lloyd’s body of work (at least for Deleuze’s purposes), rather than that of his directors, and an analysis of this body of work is Deleuze’s chosen means of approaching the problem of transition between action-image and perception-image.

For this reason, I must disagree again with Mullarkey, who argues that actors and all cinema professionals other than directors are of little consequence to Deleuze, and that he considers their work to be of little aesthetic or philosophical import. He states that ‘And the same is true of all the other images in the film process – cultural, commercial, technological: they all owe their art (if they have any) to the director (the first shocks of sound or Cinemascope, for instance, must have been mere trickery – a passing sensationalism – until director-artists transmuted them into genuine media for art, some time after they first appeared)’7. As we have seen, the analysis of Lloyd’s acting demonstrates that this point is incorrect.

David Fleming, by contrast, emphasises the role of collective cinematic practice in the Cinema books to a far greater extent than Mullarkey. Indeed he chooses to cast this collective practice in plainly Deleuzian terms, arguing that: ‘A filmic character, even an analogue one, is already an assemblage of sorts, partially created by the director, scriptwriter, the actor’s ‘type’, the skills they bring to the role, makeup artists, costume

7 Ibid
designers, etc.\textsuperscript{8}. While I agree with Fleming’s recognition of collective practice, I am unconvinced by his decision to compare a filmic character to a Deleuzian assemblage. A character such as Chaplin’s ‘Little Tramp’, as I have discussed above, is unmistakeably a creation of the actor, and the original force of the character – expressed through such means as gesture – is also unmistakeably the actor’s contribution. While Fleming is thus correct to note that Deleuze does indeed, at different times, recognise the contributions of many classes of film-maker to a collective practice, I would argue that he often gives precedence to one or other individual depending on the originality and force of their specific contribution: a fact that means the term ‘assemblage’ is in this instance ill-chosen.

But if Lloyd is to be considered the ‘true’ author of Safety Last, what allowed him to take primacy over the directors of that film? In a later section, I will attempt to discern the reasons why actors or screenwriters sometimes, but not always, manage to attain the status of ‘author’, for Deleuze. But this chapter will follow the Cinema books in devoting the focus of its analysis to the director, and the director’s arrangement of the film.

The focus of Deleuze’s analysis in the first half of Cinema 1 is on the shot, which he refers to as the ‘movement-image’. There is a clear link to be determined between the organising consciousness of the shot (that is, the consciousness that determines the movement of the camera, or what Deleuze will term ‘camera-consciousness’), the consciousness of the spectator, and the consciousness of the director. Arranging shots, and building up a set to be shot, and later, cutting, splicing, and other forms of editing, are the major directorial ‘tasks’ which Deleuze chooses as the focus of his analysis.

Deleuze described the function of the shot thus: ‘The shot is like the movement which continuously ensures conversion, circulation. It divides and subdivides duration according to the objects which make up the set; it reunites objects and sets into a single identical duration’. He concludes ‘Given that it is a consciousness which carries out these divisions and reunions, we can say of the shot that it acts like a consciousness. But the sole cinematographic consciousness is not us, the spectator, nor the hero: it is the camera – sometimes human, sometimes inhuman or superhuman’ (C1, 21). Deleuze argues therefore that there is a ‘sole’ cinematographic consciousness: not various consciousnesses working in tandem, or with only limited communication with each other, such as those of the various members of the crew (one would expect at least two if Deleuze were giving relevance or credence to the perspective of the cameraman as separate from the director – another reason for us to pay little attention to cinematographers as ‘auteurs’). While Deleuze explicitly denies that this sole consciousness belongs to the spectator, it is notable that he does not mention the director. But this consciousness is not merely a consciousness which reflects, or which experiences – as one would expect the consciousness of a camera, a recording device, to be. Instead it is an active consciousness, one which ‘divides’ and ‘reunites’, one which makes choices. I would therefore argue that Deleuze associates the camera-consciousness with the director, the figure most closely associated in the cinema books with the making of aesthetic choices. Indeed, for Ronald Bogue, the selection, connection, and disconnection of images (or in other words, the techniques of both shot selection, and editing) are the basic practices of the director, and, more fundamentally, are the means by which the director ‘thinks’. For Bogue, these basic aesthetic choices have a philosophical impetus: ‘For modern film directors, thinking differently, at its most fundamental level, is a matter of disconnecting and reconnecting images.... Such a choice
will be contingent, but not arbitrary, the choice of image being the result of a search for productive juxtapositions.\(^9\)

Therefore, consciousness also implies authorial intentionality: the film becomes what the director wishes it to become. By analysing the aesthetic choices implied by the arrangement of the shots (obviously this arrangement involves far more than merely the way in which the cameraman chooses to move the camera), we can understand the style and aesthetic preferences of the director. That the camera-consciousness is the ‘sole’ cinematic consciousness emphasises the unimportance of all other perspectives, such as the spectator’s perspective.

Pier Paolo Pasolini’s treatment of the concept of Free Indirect Discourse provides Deleuze with a linguistic analogy to explain his views on subjectivity in cinema. Deleuze uses an interesting image to explain the term: ‘it is like communicating vessels’ (C1, 76). The link to the profound metaphor in *Proust and Signs* – of communicating vessels which it will be the author’s job to connect and explicate – is clear. However, the director does not merely establish links between two ‘vessels’ or characters in a scenario, which communicate. Deleuze explains the concept of Free Indirect Discourse as the ‘Cogito’ of art, quoting Bergson thus: ‘there is no subject which acts without another which watches it act, and which grasps it as acted, itself assuming the freedom of which it deprives the former’ (C1, 76). One might therefore assume that in the cinema, the relationship described would be between the character on screen and the spectator who watches him. But it is in fact the camera-consciousness, rather than a spectator-consciousness, which transforms the ‘neurotic’ vision of the character on screen. It is a correlation between the perception-

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image and a camera-consciousness which, Deleuze argues, allows the transformation of perspective and an approach of ‘pure form’ or an ‘independent aesthetic consciousness’ (C1, 77). The camera-consciousness, which we previously associated with the director-author, is precisely the ‘transcendental subject’ in which the cinematic subject sees itself reflected. This kind of transformation does not occur in all cinema, only in what Pasolini termed the ‘cinema of poetry’, and Deleuze notes certain specific stylistic techniques which denote this type of cinema, such as the long take which continues to frame a space after the characters have departed, or the frequent use of zoom. Of note is that both Pasolini and Rohmer considered that this cinematic free indirect discourse served to ‘introduce an equivalence between the cinema and literature’ (C1, 78) – so the significance of this point need not be strictly limited to cinematic texts only.

But this camera-consciousness is again explicitly identified with the director in a passage in which Deleuze leaves no doubt whose perception we are describing. Referencing Antonioni, Deleuze posits a relationship between the ‘neurotic’ character, and ‘the poetic vision of the director who affirms himself in him, through him, while at the same time distinguishing himself from him’ (C1, 77). But if we identify the director with the camera-consciousness, the ‘transcendental subject’, then the foundational primacy of the director, and the director’s vision, to any understanding of the ‘cinema of poetry’ is a given.

A kind of two-way relationship is posited, in which the character is reflected in the director’s vision, and the director’s vision establishes itself through the fantasies of the character. This kind of close intimate relationship between an author and one of the elements of his work – in this case, a character – has not really been described by Deleuze in any work prior to Cinema 1. In Cinema 2, however, the close relationship between the
director and a key character – an intercessor – becomes a key part of the analysis, as I shall further examine later.’

**Montage – philosophical and aesthetic**

Merely composing a single shot, however, does not sum up the totality of the directorial function: there is also the establishment of the unity of a series of individual shots containing different and diverse elements, which is produced, as Deleuze argues, by ‘the direct liaison between elements caught in the multiplicity of superimposed shots’ (C1, 27). For Deleuze, the cinematographic act par excellence is montage, indeed montage creates the film as synthetic whole. Yet it should be clear that for the film to operate as a synthetic and aesthetic whole, a unity which is *composed* out of elements brought into relation with each other via these superimpositions, an organising and permanent consciousness is required to so arrange it. Thus montage, the defining act of cinema, requires an authorial consciousness, which is precisely a unifying and relating consciousness. In discussing Carl-Theodor Dreyer’s *Gertrud*, Deleuze argues that the film itself happened in ‘the fourth dimension’ which ‘escapes sets and their parts’ (C1, 29). He states, citing various critics, that *Gertrud* happened ‘in the splicing’. The parts of the shot, he argues, ‘must be selected, co-ordinated, enter into connections and liaisons which, through montage, reconstitute... the analytic whole of the cinema’ (C1, 28). The key authorial task here, at least in relation to *Gertrud*, is one of composition, organisation and arrangement: of bringing the different elements of the picture into relation and resonance with each other. We can see the obvious parallels with the operation of the literary machine, as I described in Chapter 2.

In discussing the work of Dziga Vertov, Deleuze shows to what extent the process of montage, too, is the result of deliberate reflection. He argues that ‘it precedes the filming, in
the choice of material…it enters into the filming, in the intervals occupied by the camera-eye… It comes after the filming, in the editing room… and in the audience, who compare life in the film and life as it is” (C1, 41).

Montage, in other words, is a function of intelligence, in that it is the result of conscious decisions made in the act of ‘splicing’. As I have stated in previous chapters, and notably regarding *Proust and Signs*, Deleuze argued that the intelligence was a function that ‘came after’, following the act of artistic creation, on which more visceral impulses had a greater effect. Here, however, Deleuze argues ‘Montage does not come afterwards… indeed it is necessary that the whole should be primary in a certain way, that it should be presupposed’ (C1, 30). Later on in *Cinema 1*, Deleuze refers to a conversation between Sergei Eisenstein and Mikhail Romm in which Eisenstein emphasises the need for an initial conception of a film which explains the mise-en-scene, a compelling image, or a series of images which show clear movement and change, one which encapsulates an unfolding situation. Deleuze also cites Akira Kurosawa, who spoke of the need for lengthy preparation and thinking before filming could begin. We can contrast this to Deleuze’s writing in *Logic of Sensation* about the preparatory work required by a painter facing a blank canvas, which tended to be one of eliminating or breaking down cliché rather than one of careful construction – although, as I argued in a previous chapter, such work of elimination and ‘forgetting’ was not incompatible with a painter’s prior commitment to a clearly defined project. However, at least during the early years of cinema, montage had to be pre-planned because of the technical limitations of a fixed camera shot. If montage is an act of intelligence, therefore, we appear to be describing a certain evolution in Deleuze’s conception of the process of authorship: one which requires a guiding intelligence to have at least a certain conception of
the whole of the text – right down to the level of individual sequences of images - before the process of filming begins.

Yet if Deleuze’s directors have license to shape the film according to their own aesthetic goals, their freedom is not unbounded. The possibilities that a visionary director has for this operation are almost infinite – space in the films of Robert Bresson, for example, deprived of sensory-motor connections, is described as ‘pure locus of the possible’ (C1, 113). Deleuze however warns against the dangers of ‘empty aestheticism’, in critiquing the practice of formal experimentation for its own sake, for example in the choice of perspective or framing of shots. While Deleuze accepts and celebrates the fact that the cinema can show ‘extraordinary points of view’ (C1, 16) he nonetheless argues that unusual shots must find some justification: whether that is found in the narrative, or whether the shot has some kind of disruptive or provocative function. As discussed in previous chapters of this thesis, Deleuze’s artistic – and philosophical - preference is for a system of controlled variation, or chaos. But this raises the question of when formal experimentation in the cinema should be considered productively disruptive, and when it is, rather, frivolous or meaningless. Deleuze goes some way to answering this question by referencing, as examples of formal experimentation he deems worthy of comment, the ‘dead spaces’ of Yasujiro Ozu or the ‘disconnected spaces’ of Bresson, without in either case specifying an individual film. He thus implicitly refers to these formal and stylistic moves as characteristic of the director in question. What this characteristic nature of these moves implies is that they are the result of conscious decisions, in other words that there is a guiding consciousness behind the framing of shots and other formal and stylistic choices: one which prevents them being merely random or chaotic, but controlled, and with the aim of achieving a given effect. Yet if
this analysis is correct, it would preclude a director taking a random approach to shot selection or montage, or operating according to a ludic whim: the kind of unrestricted experimentation which one might have assumed Deleuze would approve of, considering his preference for rhizomatic, rather than arboreal structures. In this respect, we could draw a comparison with the discussion in Logic of Sensation of the diagram – Deleuze’s painters merely overload and ruin their paintings if they include too many arbitrary free marks.

These stylistic choices have implications that go beyond the individual scene, and define the entire film: the camera traces the movement between the parts of the set, and the whole, it decomposes and recomposes movement according to the elements of the set and the changes in the whole. Deleuze describes these movements as ‘like a director’s signature, which characterise the whole of a film, or even the whole of an oeuvre, but resonate with the relative movement of a particular signed image’ (C1, 22). Citing Rohmer’s study of Murnau, Deleuze argues that it is these movements themselves that express ‘genuine Ideas in the ‘filmic space’’: Good and Evil, God and Satan. This tells us that these movements and this directorial signature, have a philosophical meaning as well as aesthetic function. These kinds of stylistic choices also operate at the level of the single shot, as ‘The great directors have particular affinities with particular secondary, tertiary, etc. frames’ (C1, 15). Let us take a closer look at some particular examples.

The signature stylistic movements which Deleuze identifies in the work of Orson Welles - a circular sweep from a high- or low- angle shot from a height – he also identifies in the literature of Kafka\(^\text{10}\), as well as in the films of Carol Reed. The presence of this signature style in the work of both Kafka and Welles is cited by Deleuze as a product of the ‘affinity’

\(^{10}\) This movement was described in Kafka as ‘bent heads – straightened heads – head over heels and away’.
between the two, one which is of more importance than mere surface form and requires Welles to confront Kafka’s work. The fact however that these movements are deemed to be rediscovered by Welles, and later by Reed, does not lessen their importance in the work of either director: in other words, Deleuze does not here place great importance on originality. Tom Conley has correctly noted that the great film directors could be described as ‘archivists’, and that their work often involved the re-use and re-creation of filmic elements from the work of other directors. This apparent lack of originality – at least in technique or shot selection – does not make their work any less profound. As he states ‘The great auteurs of cinema are no less stratèges or strategists insofar as they break open the lexicon of the archives of which they are inheritors, and by and large in following, copying and redeploying them’. These stylistic similarities between the work of Welles and of Reed leads Deleuze to present two possibilities: either Welles was involved in The Third Man in a capacity other than that of an actor, and was ‘closely involved in its construction’ (C1, 22), or else Reed should be considered Welles’ ‘inspired disciple’. Nevertheless, it is of interest that Deleuze does not at this point pursue the thought further, considering the implications of the first possibility for his general insistence on the unified, directorial style which defines a body of work or the single ‘camera-consciousness’ which frames a film. We shall consider the implications of the term ‘disciple’ towards the end of this section.

By contrast, Hitchcock’s signature movements – the spiral, as seen for example in the hero’s vertigo in Vertigo, but also the circuit he follows in his car, or the arrowing co-ordinates in North by Northwest – are the components of a general movement which expresses the whole of Hitchcock’s work. The shot is described as ‘the concrete intermediary between a whole which has changes and a set which has parts, and which constantly converts the one

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into the other’ (C1, 23). These movements are the practical performance of the unifying function we discussed earlier, they make of the series of scenes which make up a film something coherent. These lines are reminiscent of the image I discussed in a previous chapter, Proust’s sealed vessels, or Kafka’s literary machine: once again, the role of the artist-director seems to be one of deliberate assemblage or combination. We can surmise that the act of forging connections and combinations between the different elements in the work of art is one of the principal roles of the artist, and the end result expresses something definitive about him. Of note is that the examples Deleuze chooses to cite: Hitchcock’s spirals, Welles’ vertical sweep, even the thick vertical and thinner lateral strokes which Deleuze detects in the work of Kurosawa, all perform a combinatory function with regard to the different elements within the shot or the filmic set.

Daniel Yacavone has also argued that the task of film-makers is precisely to construct new relations between different existing filmic elements (which could be material or ideational): thus making the film into a composed or ‘surrounding, contextual whole’ which, nevertheless, expresses something definitive about the film’s author. As he argues, ‘The creation of a novel and aesthetically expressive totality within which these individual ‘units’ function as expressive parts is in turn bound to a new and singular narrative-cinematic structure created by the film-makers... (based on) an originality and innovation that is specific to film worlds (and their creators)”. Yacavone also notes the association between a film-maker’s ‘innate perception of life’ and the rhythmic quality which pervades his or her films.

The study of these stylistic movements are, as Deleuze says, ‘the necessary research program for all director-analysis’ (C1, 23). Their technical function, in so far as it operates as a form of montage, or splicing, allows the screen to present a unified and continuous perception to a viewer. In a real practical as well as conceptual sense therefore, the style associated with a director’s name holds both an individual film and a body of work together.

Montage appears to have a more than aesthetic function. Deleuze cites Eisenstein, who called montage not only the whole of film, but also ‘the Idea’, implying that it is a philosophical act as much as – and perhaps even more than – it is an aesthetic process. Indeed, we should question whether the ‘philosophical’ and ‘aesthetic’ aspects of the act of montage can be sharply delineated. When discussing an appropriate appellation for the pre-war French school of montage, Deleuze considers the term ‘Impressionism’ before rejecting it in favour of ‘Cartesianism’, and it is of note that he judged the philosophical-mathematical designation the best suited. This Cartesian intellectual orientation has a direct impact on style, in that Deleuze argues that the French directors sought to extract, in an algebraic fashion, the maximum degree of movement from their sets. Thus, the philosophical positions forming the intellectual underpinning of these schools of cinema – and so of these individual directors - also have a profound influence on the aesthetic choices implicated in the film-making process itself. Like the Soviets, the French school also acknowledges its debt to D.W. Griffith, in a sense its master, but chose to break from his organic composition in favour of ‘a more scientific conception’ (C1, 42). Yet what also binds together French cinema is a more stylistic unifying element, what Deleuze terms ‘a general predilection for water, the sea or rivers’ (C1, 44), which in films such as Maldone or l’Atalante form part of the
setting, but also have an implication for the composition of sets and individual images, which Deleuze terms ‘liquid’.

This unifying style, which has fundamental philosophical implications, operates at a level above that of the individual directorial career. While it can have a unifying force on an individual film, and on a body of work, it can also perform a role uniting directors – who may or may not be situated in close temporal and geographical proximity to each other – into a movement or ‘school’, which can become in turn the object of philosophical analysis.

Deleuze distinguishes four main Schools of cinema which he terms ‘Schools of montage’ (C1, 31). There is in fact a certain slippage in Deleuze’s analysis between the concept of ‘Schools of montage’ and ‘Schools of cinema’ more broadly. These four Schools are distinguished nationally: the American, the Soviet, the French and the German schools. The French school is determined temporally also: it is the ‘pre-war’ French School – and thus differs from, for example, the later ‘New Wave’, which was a post-war movement in French film-making, but one which seemingly did not merit the title of ‘School’.

While in the early chapters of Cinema 1 Deleuze speaks of the four national Schools in relation to montage only, he makes reference to other definitions which have only limited relevance to montage: such as the predilection of the members of the French School for water, what Deleuze terms their ‘aquatic lyricism’, and the concomitant liquidity of the image in their films. The German School is further defined as the ‘German Expressionist School’, a term which refers to a movement implicated in many different artistic media, and, in cinema, with implications that go beyond the use of montage and include, for example, costuming, set design and cinematography. It’s clear then that the value of the four national Schools as objects of philosophical analysis go far beyond their implications for the practice
of montage. Deleuze’s description of these Schools provides an opportunity to examine at length his analysis of trends which operate above the level of the individual authorial career, but which allow us to speak of a collectivity of authors.

Deleuze at times speaks of the School of German Expressionism as an author in its own right, even when speaking of relatively minor points of detail: for example, ‘Expressionism keeps painting the world red on red’ (C1, 56), or when speaking of a broad philosophical orientation - ‘Expressionism only conceives in principle the whole of a spiritual universe... It keeps the chaos of man and nature in the background’ (C1, 55). Clearly, Deleuze considers it possible to speak collectively of a group of authors, even though each of them should also be considered significant individually, and to treat these authors as a collective subject. But this means of speaking should be contrasted with Deleuze’s treatment of a different group of authors, mentioned in the conclusion to Cinema 2, in which he writes ‘The Straubs, Marguerite Duras and [Hans Jurgen] Syberberg have, with some justification, often been grouped together in the project of forming a whole audiovisual system, whatever the differences between these authors’ (C2, 256). But in this case we seem to be dealing with authors who never collaborated nor considered themselves part of a school, but who are being compared as part of someone else’s more speculative critical project. Their much looser association is due to the much less considerable theoretical common ground between them.

Deleuze, however defines precisely and rigorously the four national Schools: ‘In each case the directors may be very different; however, they have a community of themes, problems and preoccupations: in short, an ideal community which is all that is needed, in the cinema
as elsewhere, to found concepts of schools or trends’ (C1,31). This is an important sentence which requires careful analysis.

Firstly, Deleuze’s statement explicitly refers to areas of thought ‘elsewhere’, or beyond the cinema: the ‘schools’ he discusses could be artistic, philosophical or literary, so this is the outline of a general theory, albeit Deleuze does not go into further detail. Deleuze notes for example a concern for ‘science’ in the French and Soviet Schools which he also detects in the painting of the time, and detects a concern for ‘simultaneism’, which he believes unites French cinema, painting and literature. Secondly, a degree of common ground is required amongst the directors who make up this school which goes beyond mere stylistic or formalistic choices – they must hold in common themes and preoccupations. The relationship between these directors should be compared to the relationship I discussed in a previous chapter, of ‘disciple’ philosophers to the concepts of a ‘master’. The term ‘ideal community’ also connotes a community of ideas. To be more precise, it is not only a shared aesthetic practice, and not only a stylistic predilection, but also a shared conception of the nature and function of montage which differentiates these schools from each other. The Schools, therefore, are philosophical as well as aesthetic or technical.

Nevertheless, as previously discussed Deleuze does not put undue weight on methodological originality amongst those authors he considers worthy of analysis: Griffith did not invent the technique of montage, but Deleuze appears to consider him the first significant practitioner - thus in this respect he can be considered the ‘father’ of, at the very least, the American school.

Deleuze specifies Griffith’s contribution to montage as follows: ‘Griffith conceived of the composition of movement-images as an organisation, an organism, an organic unity. This
was his discovery’ (C1, 31). What was significant about Griffith was not his invention of the montage technique, nor any particular stylistic innovation in the development of montage. Rather, his contribution was an intellectual one – a way of conceiving montage which had implications for the whole which it constructed. Just as we discussed in Chapter 3, therefore, intelligence and the different possible ways of conceiving a practice are fundamental to film-making as they are to visual art. In this respect, Griffith’s significant contribution inevitably involved sustained reflection upon his own practice, and a sustained and continued exercise of that practice across his body of work.

In examining the relationship of Eisenstein to Griffith, Deleuze also delineates the relationships between the two Schools they headed, the American and the Soviet. Deleuze acknowledges that Eisenstein has a debt to Griffith, thus: ‘It will be noted that Eisenstein retains Griffith’s idea of an organic composition or assemblage of movement images: from the general situation to the transformed situation’. However his conception of montage is different from that of the earlier director: a philosophical and ideological difference, as well as a difference in conceiving form. Eisenstein’s conception of montage also differs from Griffith fundamentally – that is, he has not merely exaggerated or emphasised trends already inherent in Griffith’s practice, a practice that we noted earlier in Deleuze’s treatment of great and minor philosophers (this is the reason why Eisenstein is not referred to as a ‘minor director’, and why he was deemed to have founded a national School separate to that of Griffith). ‘Eisenstein criticises Griffith for having a thoroughly empirical conception of the organism, without a law of genesis or development – for having conceived of its unity in a completely extrinsic way as a unity of collection... and not as a unity of
production... for having interpreted opposition as an accident and not as the internal motive force’ (C1, 34).

Eisenstein’s concept of montage is based on a ‘scientific’ and dialectical form of opposition leading to a higher unity, one which operates throughout an entire film. The profound connection between Eisenstein’s cinematic style and his intellectual and philosophical commitments is a key question at stake in these passages. His fidelity to the dialectic compels him to adopt a more rigorously determined method than Griffith. It involves ‘the determination of remarkable points or privileged instants’, which do not, as in Griffith, contain ‘accidents’ while his changes in dimension are ‘absolute’ rather than ‘relative’. As Deleuze states, ‘the cinema must invent the spiral that suits the theme’ (C1, 36). Deleuze thus explicitly notes that the formal and stylistic elements come after, and are such as are required by, the conceptual and thematic foundation of Eisenstein’s film practice. The new theoretical concepts Eisenstein brought to cinema thus are followed by, and enable, the creation of new techniques and practices, such as a new conception of the close-up, of accelerated montage, a montage of attractions, and so on. Eisenstein’s innovation is thus a double one – while he ‘gives the dialectic a purely cinematographic meaning’, he also ‘reaches an essentially dialectical conception of the organism’ (C1, 38). He is able to both give the theory of the dialectic a hitherto unknown cinematic expression, while at the same time radically change cinema according to the requirements of the dialectic. Deleuze of course throughout his career recognised a profound difference between philosophers and artists, such that the latter think in percepts and affects, rather than create concepts. As such, we cannot consider that Eisenstein is ‘doing philosophy’ in these films, notwithstanding the importance of philosophy to his film-making practice. However, I
believe that these passages underline that philosophical positions inform the films of Eisenstein, and other directors, and that those positions are fundamentally significant, rather than merely a contingent aspect of their film-making. The work of Julie Kuhlken on ‘artist-philosophers’, which I referenced in my Introduction, would seem to be relevant here: though Kuhlken suggests that an artist-philosopher is a philosopher who collaborates with artists to generate concepts, we might surmise that, in equal and opposite fashion, Eisenstein and other directors are artists who have collaborated with philosophers to generate percepts and affects.\footnote{Kuhlken, ‘Why is Deleuze an Artist-Philosopher?’ in Holland, Smith and Stivale, \textit{Gilles Deleuze: Image and Text}, 2009.}

Thus, the philosophical commitments and intellectual predisposition of these directors comes before their aesthetic choices, and influence them. Concept determines the evolution of form. In order to belong to any one of these schools of montage, Deleuze presupposes the director as a thinking, or an intellectualising being: one who has reflected on a conception of montage and allowed it to imbue his work – and, to the extent that that process is carried through as far as possible, the director gains primacy within his school.

When discussing Eisenstein’s fellow directors in the Soviet school of montage, Deleuze re-emphasises the fact of their difference – within their broad allegiance to the foundational concept of dialectical montage. Deleuze makes reference to several ‘laws’ of the dialectic – the law of the ‘quantitative process’, or the ‘qualitative leap’ (both of which are rather vaguely specified) which give inspiration to the other Soviet school directors. These other Soviet directors appear to make stylistic choices based upon their fidelity to a single law of the dialectic, and Deleuze deems their art ‘most profound’ when it expresses to the fullest possible extent the particular law or conception of the dialectic which is fundamental to
their film-making. Thus in the case of Vsevolod Pudovkin, who chose the ‘qualitative leaps of a dawn of consciousness’ reflecting his interest in the ‘qualitative leaps’ of the dialectic (C1, 39) his most profound art ‘lies in disclosing the set of a situation through the consciousness which a character gains of it, and in prolonging it to the point where consciousness can expand and act’.

Yet Eisenstein is presented by Deleuze as the ‘leader’ of the Soviet school. Deleuze does not explain precisely what he means by this term, or what this should bring to our understanding of Eisenstein’s films. He never explicitly makes the claim that Eisenstein’s films have more artistic or philosophical merit than those of other Soviet directors. However, he suggests that Eisenstein ‘was imbued’ – or expresses most profoundly – the third law of the dialectic, which Deleuze considers to be the foundational one. I would suggest therefore that it is their understanding and expression of the dialectic – in itself, a philosophical concept before it is an aesthetic one – which determines the relative prominence of these directors in the Soviet School, because the commonality of the Soviet School is the adherence of its directors to the laws of the dialectic. ‘These are the great visions of film-makers, with their concrete practices’ (C1, 55). We must conclude from the preceding argumentation that these directors possess an enduring personality, with an enduring intellectual disposition and ideological commitment. We know that Eisenstein’s position as ‘leader’ was in consideration of his whole body of work, not because of one exceptional film. While Deleuze does cite individual films of Eisenstein to illustrate some particular aspect of his practice (arguing for example that Battleship Potemkin was the film in which Eisenstein mastered his method) no film is given clear prominence as being a more effective demonstration of his preoccupations, more aesthetically accomplished, or more
conceptually relevant than another. Though it is not clear how precisely we should theorise the relation of the other members of the Soviet school to Eisenstein, Deleuze seems uncomfortable terming them his ‘disciples’, which indicates that beyond their broad fidelity to dialectical montage, they did not embrace one of Eisenstein’s key foundational concepts in the way that the ‘minor philosophers’ did with regard to their masters.

Later, Deleuze will discuss the directors which he associates with ‘lyric abstraction’ in similar terms. Lyric abstraction is Deleuze’s term for what he terms a ‘method’ which he considers to be the fundamental point in common of a group of directors, including Jacques Tourneur and Josef von Sternberg. Deleuze does not go so far as to talk of a formal school centred around the method of lyrical abstraction, referring instead to the ‘adherents of lyrical abstraction’. This is a form of words which makes the group appear less formally cohesive than, for example, German Expressionism, and perhaps this is due to the less extensive philosophical commonality between the directors.

When describing lyrical abstraction, Deleuze begins first of all by referencing its formal and stylistic characteristics: but these characteristics are again worthy of note because they embody a deeper, philosophical orientation. Thus Deleuze contrasts the use of light and shade in lyrical abstraction and in Expressionism – the former defined by the relationship of light with white, which alternates with black and grey, and the latter defined by the infinite opposition of light and shadow, which lends itself to sharp angles and harsh contrasts. In lyrical abstraction however, the alternations of light and shade are of interest because they express a deeper and more spiritual notion of alternative or choice, one which Deleuze links to a fundamental philosophical concern. ‘A fascinating idea was developed from Pascal to Kierkegaard: the alternative is not between terms but between the modes of existence of
the one who chooses’ (C1, 117), a concept of choice which also appears in Sartre. For Deleuze, ‘A whole line of inspiration can be traced from Pascal to Bresson, from Kierkegaard to Dreyer’. (C1, 117). These alternations in lyrical abstraction can be rhythmic or geometric, can exist between images or within one image. What truly matters to the lyrical abstractionists is the consistency of the philosophical concept which binds them together: ‘diversity of adherents has never prevented a concept from being consistent’ (C1, 116). Accordingly, the foundational primacy of philosophy as a means of categorisation of cinema and cinematic authors is established.

Deleuze references not just style or forms of action but ‘conceptions, ways of conceiving and seeing a “subject”, a story or a script’ (C1, 183). ‘This second sense of the Idea, the conception, is all the more essential to the cinema in that it generally precedes the script and determines it, but equally, it can come afterwards. (Hawks stressed this point, the neutrality of the script which he could take ready-made)’ (C1, 183). This conception unites a philosophical predisposition, an aesthetic preference for form and style, a predilection for image, and so on. Thus the conceptions of the Soviet film-makers are defined by the dialectic, which is reflected in their style of montage but in other aspects of their film-making too. Alexander Dovzhenko’s preference for the large form, SAS’, of the action-image is derived from his foundational conceptions of the relations between whole, set and parts: how the whole is already present in the parts but must move from potential to actual. The intellectual foundation of a film-maker’s conception of cinema is underlined in the identification between the ‘small’ and ‘large’ forms, and the visions they lead to, which Deleuze terms ‘Ideas’, with reference to Werner Herzog, whom he terms a metaphysician,
because, for Deleuze, he understands these forms as being in themselves, rather than only in relation to each other.

**Collaboration**

Our previous examination of film-making collectives, such as the schools of montage, opens up a further discussion about the nature of collaboration in cinema and beyond. With the exception of his own partnership with Guattari, treated in some detail in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze rarely discusses collaboration at any point other than in the *Cinema* books, but he touches on the issue at length here. As discussed previously, the contribution of the Actors’ Studio-trained actor operates as an independent variable in the composition of the film-assemblage, without necessarily having direct reference to the overall schema of the director. The Actors’ Studio’s method is described succinctly: ‘The Actors Studio does not invite the actor to identify himself with his role any more than any other method; what characterises it is the reverse operation, by which the realist actor is supposed to identify the role with certain inner elements that he possesses and selects in himself’ (C1, 162-3). According to this statement, the actor should tailor the role to his own conception of the character, to elements within his own persona which may differ significantly from how the role is conceived by the director. Deleuze goes on to argue the following, however: ‘But the inner element is not merely in the actor’s training, it appears in the image’ (C1, 163). Thus, there is a kind of complementarity described here between the directing, cinematography and the acting. Yet Deleuze does not make clear whether this coincidence is merely a fortuitous one, or whether the director and actor were forced somehow to combine their methods, make them work together.
While Deleuze, when discussing his own relationship with Guattari, suggests that the two formed a kind of ‘assemblage’, he does not make explicitly clear here what kind of relation exists between the director’s and actor’s vision or practice. Deleuze however notes certain instances in a film in which some form of combination of the two does take place. For example, this could be a shot of a significant object imbued by an actor with emotional force, like the scene in *On the Waterfront* in which a man plays with a woman’s glove. Deleuze argues that what is brought together in this instance is ‘the unconscious of the actor, the personal guilt of the director, the hysteria of the image’ (C1, 163).

However, when discussing the formal characteristics of and method ascribed to the Actors’ Studio, Deleuze generally chooses as illustration films made by directors who he deems to share the same formal approach as the Studio, and which are part of what he terms ‘realist’ cinema – for example, Kazan or Samuel Fuller. Both directors, like the Actors’ Studio, aim at ‘systematising’ the action-image, while Kazan’s *America, America* perfectly illustrates the Actors’ Studio’s ‘orthodoxy’. It contains a series of ‘local missions’, or a sequence of emotively charged scenes, what Deleuze terms ‘linked explosions’: the resolution of one propelling the characters into the next. Kazan’s formal choices will no doubt have impelled him to work with the Actors’ Studio, but unfortunately Deleuze’s analysis tells us little about how the Actors’ Studio actually made an impact on Kazan’s films, what its unique contribution was, or what would happen if its members encountered a director with an opposing vision. That the Actors’ Studio should be analysed independently as an ‘author’ of cinema is heavily implied, but Deleuze’s choice of example makes that very difficult.

We can, of course, assume that if the actors and the director do not share a fundamental common purpose, the film simply fails and is no longer worthy of comment. Yet Deleuze’s
framing of the issue allows him to sidestep the broader questions of how the Actors’ Studio and other such bodies can ever make a meaningful, independent contribution.

In discussing the collaboration between the director Alain Resnais and the screenwriter Alain Robbe-Grillet, however, Deleuze appears to consider their individual creative contributions to be largely independent and formally separate, and is more rigorous in his analysis of how they differ. He writes ‘They perhaps reveal in this way the truth about all real collaboration, where the work is not simply understood but constructed according to quite different creative procedures which marry to make a success that is repeatable but each time unique’ (C2, 100). Not only is there little room for dialogue or planning between the two collaborators, but their significantly different understandings of the meanings of their work appear to persist throughout the entire creative process. This would seem to give weight to the contention that a work of art can have several, equally valid meanings or interpretations. But perhaps we can draw another conclusion, one which would explain why some collaborations are considered to be between two authors, while others (such as between Browning and Chaney) are between one author and another figure who doesn’t rise above the level of ‘assistant’. It is only when two radically different conceptions and creative methods are brought into conjunction that we can say that this has taken place, and both a radically different conceptual understanding of the work, and an independent creative process, are necessary. In this case the set of valid interpretations of a text would still not be many, but only such as would reflect the understandings of each author.

The actual distinction between Resnais and Robbe-Grillet is initially and apparently aesthetic, but also reveals itself to be philosophical. When attempting to describe the differences which allow him to state that they have an independent creative procedure,
Deleuze first considers a stylistic difference: that while the imaginary and the real are ‘distinct and yet indiscernible’ in both authors, their presentation of this material is different: discontinuous blocs or shocks, as opposed to large continuous sequences. Yet this stylistic difference is not enough, for Deleuze, as it does not permit development ‘at the level of the imaginary-real pair’ (C2, 101).

The profound difference which separates Robbe-Grillet and Resnais is both aesthetic and at another level philosophical, and concerns a different conception of the nature of time. The relationship between the way in which Resnais understood time, and the aesthetics of his imagery, is a point on which critics concur. Patricia Pisters, for example, argues that ‘We can see how in Resnais’s films the future –mostly as a dimension of the past, sometimes as dimension of the ‘future as such’ of the third synthesis of time – forms ("informs" perhaps) its aesthetics’14. Yacavone concurs with this profound relation between a director’s sense of time and his or her aesthetic choices, in particular the ‘affective rhythm’ of a film. He draws our attention to Deleuze’s own emphasis on the ‘affective figurations born of the relation between the living body within the frame and the presentation of lived time around its actions and postures’15. It must be stressed, therefore, that the differences between two given film-makers in the presentation of time are not merely the result of aesthetic choices, but also arise out of a different understanding of time itself, and that such a different understanding becomes a marker of the author’s individuality.

The difference then between Robbe-Grillet and Resnais in their sense of time exists both in such an understanding of time, and also in the structure of the time-image they present to

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15 Yacavone, Film Worlds, p209.
us (plastic in the case of Robbe-Grillet, architectural in the case of Resnais). Hence Robbe-Grillet shows us a series of disconnected peaks of present time, allows us to exist in a perpetual present, while Resnais offers a hinterland consisting of ‘circles of past’, overwhelsms us with incompatible alternative pasts. The differences are irreconcilable, and they are expressed in the meeting of the two characters, the man and the woman, in Last Year in Marienbad. Deleuze writes ‘an understanding occurs, all the stronger for being based on two opposed conceptions of time which crashed into each other’ (C2, 101). For a collaboration to be meaningful therefore it must unite two distinct and often opposing philosophical and aesthetic tendencies of equal weight, without achieving an easy resolution. Hence Deleuze would praise the collaboration of Resnais and Robbe-Grillet for its ‘productive ambiguity’. Their differing conceptions of time would make themselves felt in the formal construction of their entire body of work in each case: hence Deleuze contrasts them thus: ‘There is a statistical probabilism in Resnais which is completely different from the indeterminism of the ‘quantum’ type in Robbe-Grillet’. (C2, 116).

The notion of two equal and independent collaborators is related, yet distinct from, the question of the ‘master’ and the ‘disciple’, which we have already considered at length in previous chapters, and also above with the notion of distinct ‘schools’. The master-disciple link was considered in my chapter on philosophers, in which I looked at how disciples – minor philosophers - furthered the concept of the major philosophers they adhered to. Deleuze brings this notion back in Cinema 2, in which he looks at directors who have both an aesthetic and philosophical relationship, but who did not collaborate. Resnais is described as ‘the most independent and creative disciple’ of Welles (C2, 112). The fact that he does not offer merely a continuation of Welles’ problematic, or conception of cinema, is shown by
the fact that he is credited as a disciple who ‘transforms the whole problem’ (C2, 112). But in other respects, the discussion of the relation between Resnais and Welles mirrors the association seen in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* between the ‘major’ and ‘minor’ philosophers: in this case, that Resnais ‘attains a generalised relativity, and takes to its conclusion what was only a direction in Welles: constructing undecidable alternatives between sheets of past’ (C2, 113). The conception of and relation to time is underlined by Deleuze as the defining characteristic of Resnais’ cinema, and the point on which his productively ambiguous collaboration with Robbe-Grillet is founded: hence this conception is of defining importance to our understanding of Resnais as an author, and the fact that it is this conception of time that he took in nascent form from Welles is what allows Deleuze to term him Welles’ disciple. This is the case even though there were major aesthetic formalistic and stylistic differences between the two: in their use of the voice-off, for example.

How can we judge when a collaborator is sufficiently independent to be termed an author in his own right, then? One answer can be found in Deleuze’s discussion of thought and cinema, in which he argues, in the context of the definition of a ‘problematic’, which means precisely the imposition of an element from the outside of a situation (Deleuze references the mysterious visitor in Pasolini’s *Theorem*), that ‘An author’s strength is measured by the way he is able to impose this problematic, uncertain and yet non-arbitrary point: grace or chance’ (C2, 169). It is precisely this act of imposition that determines an author’s strength—an imposition of this outside element on a text. Those texts that are the fruit of a collaboration between two distinct authors should therefore show evidence of the imposition of at least two major and significantly different elements, be they philosophical commitments or, at another level, stylistic choices.
We can perhaps see an echo of the importance of philosophy in the definition of an author in Deleuze’s insistence on the primacy of the spiritual in cinema, over and above formal or material commitments: ‘Space is no longer determined, it has become the any-space-whatever which is identical to the power of the spirit, to the perpetually renewed spiritual decision... which takes upon itself the linking of parts’ (C1, 120-21). Indeed, the shift from the action-image to the pure optical and sound situation, from the determinate location to the any-space-whatever, is the defining difference between pre-war and post-war cinema: between realism and Italian neo-realism, for example. These new schools required both formal or stylistic and conceptual innovation to mark a profound shift in the history of cinema. It should be noted however that, as with the difference between Naturalism and realism, this innovation need not mean a complete break with the past, but rather an exaggeration of tendencies inherent in a previous school. Naturalism, for example ‘is not opposed to realism, but on the contrary accentuates its features by extending them in an idiosyncratic surrealism’ (C1, 128).

In the Cinema books, continuity and change operate at a level above the individual directorial career, as well as within it, and thus Deleuze makes references to major genres (such as the Western, or Naturalism) as well as national traditions of film-making, traditions which his film-makers must establish themselves within. As an example of this, we can see that Deleuze identified ‘four co-ordinates’ of the cinematic movement of Naturalism: originary world/derived milieu, and impulses/modes of behaviour. These four co-ordinates recur in every naturalist film, and the job of the director is one of organisation and redistribution of elements in relation to these co-ordinates. In this respect we learn what it means to be specifically a naturalist director. In the case of Joseph Losey, whom he
considers one of the pre-eminent naturalist directors, one who can employ the different elements of a naturalist film with sufficient creativity, and with a personal style, Deleuze underlines the importance of naturalism as an analytical category providing the key to an understanding of Losey’s work. As he argues, ‘The four dimensions [of naturalism] vary from film to film and enter into various relationships of opposition and complementarity, depending on what Losey wants to say and show’ (C1, 144). Deleuze’s interpretative strategy is to approach Losey’s work through the lens of ‘naturalism’, while also noting characteristic elements of Losey’s style: his predilection for actors who can express violence, his preference for the closed milieu of the Victorian house, his strange, flat, often labyrinthine spaces which act as a counterpoint to that milieu. Deleuze therefore argues of Losey that ‘His whole work is situated within naturalist co-ordinates, while he renews them in his own way’ (C1, 140). Losey has his own form of signature stylistic, just as Hitchcock or Welles did, as we remarked earlier. But Losey is of interest to Deleuze as a naturalist director, and as someone who exemplifies a great school or tradition within cinema – hence Deleuze’s decision to have a chapter sub-heading titled ‘naturalism’. It is that process of constant redistribution and renewal within the confines of a general aesthetic regime which makes Losey of interest to Deleuze – a process which calls to mind the discussion of the ‘eternal return’ and the image of the dice being thrown in *Difference and Repetition*: this condensation, redistribution and re-emission of singularities within the same Idea accomplished by the affirmed and repeated throw of the dice.

By contrast, other directors, such as Jean Renoir, may find their own inspiration and style prevents them from coming to terms with a school or mode of practice, such as naturalism, which may nonetheless fascinate them. In precisely the same way, while Eisenstein did not
develop the concept of the ‘spiral of development’ of organic representation, we rediscover this concept in his work, although ‘he conceives of the distribution and succession of vectors on the spiral entirely differently’ (C1, 156). Two great directors can share the same concept or philosophical foundation, but differ on its organisation and implementation. Though concept, and reflection on that concept come first therefore, and this is what makes a director ‘profound’, this process of making connections and redistributing elements is where the director brings that creative, signifying and stylistic signature that makes them unique.

In the case of the directors Deleuze wishes to discuss – those of the ‘cinema of poetry’, those who eschew mere action-images – these ‘assemblages’ fulfil a function beyond describing the real connections between people. It is only the director, and not the actors, or the audience, who can create this kind of virtual connection to ‘a fourth and fifth dimension, Time and Spirit’ (C1, 111). Dreyer’s films, such as The Passion of Joan of Arc, even when they do not involve a large number of close-ups, make all shots akin to close-ups, by depriving those images of the background, depth and perspective which would contextualise them in a social and historical milieu. By performing a work of intensive conjunction the director prevents the kind of extensive connections which in standard action cinema the audience would expect. Dreyer achieves this by violently disrupting the standard process of establishing a relation between different shots, sets, and parts. ‘(M)ovements are cut in their course, the continuity shots systematically false, as if it was necessary to break over-real or over-logical connections’ (C1, 110) – connections, or ‘real relations’, which we as spectators would tend naturally, almost automatically, to make. Instead, by relying on ‘unframing’, sharp, unusual angles, and the suppression of depth and
perspective, Dreyer ensures by the violence he does to the continuity shots that these real relations are impossible. What we are seeing is an example of the negative aspect of the director-author’s role of forming connections and making assemblages: that is, to first of all break the connections and disassemble the links which make up the clichéd representations cinema audiences, in common with consumers of any art form, have come to expect to be presented to them. In this respect we can recall that in *Logic of Sensation* Deleuze remarked that the painter’s first task was to strip cliché from the blank canvas, and he will elsewhere suggest that the task of poetic cinema, the cinema which was the focus of his study, was one of extraction and purification.

Dreyer’s aim in other words was to ‘extract the Passion from the trial’ (C1, 110). The director’s vision, the director’s ability to make connections and create assemblages, relies on the disorientation and disempowerment of the audience to conceive of an alternate vision or explanation – one which, to use the terms previously employed, would be over-real or over-logical. Deleuze in *Cinema 1* spoke of a semi-subjective ‘camera-consciousness’ which as we have seen was identified with the director. It should be noted that while Deleuze often chooses to stress the contrast between ‘modern’ and ‘classic’ (or pre-war and post-war) cinema, this process of selection and assemblage, by means of, for example, false continuity shots, has always been to a greater or lesser extent at the heart of what cinema does. In *Cinema 2* this autonomy of the camera (and hence of the director) reaches its fullest development in neo-realist, in which Deleuze argues that the camera, now technically much more mobile, independent and with a fuller range of shot at its disposal, abandons its role of merely following the perspective of the characters, but instead taking on a role which is purely one of connection and assemblage: ‘a camera-consciousness which
would no longer be defined by the movements it is able to follow or make, but by the mental connections it is able to enter into” (C2, 22). Deleuze uses verbs such as ‘questioning, responding, objecting, provoking, theorematizing, hypothesizing, experimenting’ to describe the fully developed range of functions open to the camera (C2, 22). Once again this underlines the point we made earlier: a logical and philosophical intelligence is at the heart of what the director, or in other words the camera-consciousness is doing. And indeed Deleuze describes the new cinema explicitly as ‘of considerable philosophical and logical importance’ (C2, 43). But it is an intelligence which makes links and connections, a unifying and relational consciousness, rather than one which necessarily seeks to present a unique or original perspective. Deleuze describes this as ‘constant reframings as functions of thought’ (C2, 23).

Let us illustrate this point with some more examples. Keaton’s major contribution, as a director, lay in ‘giving the large form a burlesque content... in having reconciled – against all the odds – the burlesque and the large form’ (C1, 177). His genius then, is in rearrangement and combination, in inserting a new performative practice into an unfamiliar aesthetic form – by such formal innovations as the ‘trajectory gag’, allowing a pure continuous trajectory of slapstick, or the ‘machinic gag’, a set of formalistic innovations with a ‘minoring function’ which allow an individual hero to operate a great machinic assemblage like an ocean liner. In this sense, what makes Keaton unique and interesting is his radical redefinitions of established genre (like the burlesque) which ‘defies all the apparent conditions... and naturally takes as its framework the large form’ (C1, 181). What is of note here is the celebration of adaptation and reinvention rather than pure originality of form. The work of an author can also be to bring different cinematic or indeed aesthetic and philosophical
traditions into contact and resonance with each other – thus, for example, Kurosawa’s predilection for establishing connections between his own work, and the Japanese tradition in general, with Russian literature such as that of Fyodor Dostoevsky.

So how then should the audience, or the critic, approach and interpret the cinematic text, taking into account that the role of the director has been to establish these connections? At first glance, the critic’s task would seem to be to validate, indeed celebrate, the free play, the constant and unresolved renewal of interpretations and conjunction of perspectives which makes up reader-response theories, coming in response to this task of assemblage and recombination performed by the director. But Deleuze does not treat the author and the critic as equals, and nor does he unequivocally celebrate an author’s experimentation in form and style. Consider the following passage:

Renoir has sometimes been criticised for his taste for the makeshift and for improvisation, both in his direction in general, and in his directing of the actors. This is in fact a creative virtue... According to Renoir, theatre is inseparable – for both characters and actors – from the enterprise of experimenting with and selecting roles, until you find the one which goes beyond theatre and enters life (C2, 83).

While this passage seems to uphold the free play of experimentation, it is important to underline that it may not do so without reservation. Elsewhere Deleuze has argued that ‘Originality is the sole criterion of the work’ (TRM,217). But is that a genuine reflection of his argumentation in these books? A genuine celebration of experimentation would surely suggest that each role, each directorial choice made by Renoir or others, would have validity, would achieve something aesthetically. But in this case the experimentation or improvisation appears to follow a process of trial by error: In other words, Renoir must experiment until he finds the role or the method that allows the ‘theatre’ to be transcended, the one which makes the film genuinely meaningful. But by which standard should it be judged meaningful?
It’s important to bear in mind this point when we read the passages in *Cinema 2* about Federico Fellini’s *Roma*, which hearken back to Deleuze and Guattari’s description, at the start of *Kafka*, of the burrow with multiple entrances, none privileged over another. All the entrances are connected in the ‘transversal’ of the crystal-image, unified by spectacle, and all entrances are formally equal. For Deleuze, spectacle in Fellini has ‘no distinction between watching and watched, without spectators, without exit… where movement, which has become movement of world, makes us pass from one shop-window to another’ (C2, 86). But in this case certain entrances are blocked, or are closed, while ‘in so far as the crystal is an ordered set… certain seeds abort’ (C2, 87). Though Deleuze does not make the point explicitly, in his analysis of Fellini’s *The Clowns* we are led to assume that the way of childhood memories is a dead end, a point which recalls Deleuze and Guattari’s earlier opposition to the prevalence of Freudian theories on the French intellectual scene.

Deleuze’s analysis of *Last Year at Marienbad* contains some of his most detailed reflections yet on the act of interpretation, as it is carried out by authors and by readers and spectators too.

Perhaps, when we read a book, watch a show, or look at a painting, and especially when we are ourselves the author, an analogous process can be triggered: we constitute a sheet of transformation which invents a kind of transverse continuity or communication between several sheets, and weaves a network of non-localizable relations between them… We draw out a sheet which, across all the rest, catches and extends the trajectory of points, the evolution of regions. This is evidently a task which runs the risk of failure: sometimes we only produce an incoherent dust made out of juxtaposed borrowings… But it is possible for the work of art to succeed in inventing these paradoxical, hypnotic and hallucinatory sheets (C2, 119).

This paragraph gives us much to discuss: it implies first of all that the process of interpretation undertaken by author and reader is the same: the constitution of this sheet of transformation is what the reader does, and the author even more so. But the implication is that this process can fail – the ‘juxtaposed borrowings’ can be incoherent and
meaningless. This further implies that there is some standard by which a given aesthetic or interpretation can be judged, which derives its legitimacy from neither an authorial intention, nor from a reader’s response. Let us investigate further one possible source of legitimacy and meaning.

**Personal history, Fabulation and the Intercessor**

Earlier we discussed Pasolini’s Free Indirect Subjective as key to a new form of semi-subjectivity described in cinema. In *Cinema 2* Deleuze takes this analysis further, linking it explicitly to the relation between author and character, one which he will develop further and in particular by introducing the notion of the ‘intercessor’. A contamination of the ‘objective’ view of the camera and the ‘subjective’ perspective of an individual character lead to a situation of ‘an internal vision, which entered into a relation of simulation (mimesis) with the character’s way of seeing’ (C2, 143). We must take Pasolini’s notion of Free indirect discourse, therefore, as describing the relation between the film-maker and the character or intercessor. Deleuze’s discussion of this relation draws most heavily on a kind of cinema that Pasolini did not practice, direct cinema, and his discussion has major implications for our understanding of the persona of the film-maker.

In two crucial passages Deleuze describes the passage from the true to the false, the break with the traditional form of storytelling and image-making:

> It is the becoming of the real character when he himself starts to ‘make fiction’, when he enters into ‘the flagrant offence of making up legends’ and so contributes to the invention of his people... He himself becomes another, when he begins to tell stories without ever being fictional. And the film-maker for his part becomes another when there are ‘interposed’, in this way, real characters, who wholly replace his own fictions by their own story-telling. Both communicate in the invention of a people (C2, 145).

The second passage relates directly to the film-maker:
But what we are saying about the character is also valid in the second place, and in particular for the film-maker himself. He too becomes another, in so far as he takes real characters as intercessors and replaces his fictions by their own story-telling, but, conversely, gives these story-tellings the shape of legends, carrying out their ‘making into legend’. Perrault makes his own free indirect discourse at the same time as his characters make that of Quebec. (C2, 147)

Deleuze initially restricts the link between film-maker and ‘intercessor’ in his analysis to the tradition of direct cinema, or cinema vérité – citing, for example, Pierre Perrault and Jean Rouch. The line between a real person and a fictional character is blurred in films like *Moi un Noir* in which the ‘actors’ play the roles of characters in a film which is nonetheless about their everyday lives. The actor-character ‘invents as a real character’ (C2, 146). A real character who tells stories is the constant becoming necessary to achieve the aims of these films – Perrault’s about Quebec, or Rouch’s about Africa – which is to create and affirm the story of a new people, the same task as that of the ‘minor authors’ described in *Kafka*. Yet Deleuze goes further than he and Guattari did in that book. In *Kafka* their model for the minor author was Josephine the mouse, a singer who was merely a cipher through which the collective voice of her people spoke. In *Cinema 2* he speaks of an authorial becoming: for the film-makers Rouch and Perrault, it is a question of discovering a new identity through the process of film-making. ‘For Perrault, the concern is to belong to his dominated people, and to rediscover a lost and repressed collective identity. For Rouch, it is a matter of getting out of his dominant civilisation and reaching the premises of another identity’ (C2,147). This makes explicit remarks which were only implicit in relation to Kafka.

The relationship of the film, and, as we shall see, of the author, to a determinate personal, social and historical background is central to Deleuze’s analysis. While, as we saw above, Deleuze presupposes an enduring intellectual and ideological personality on the part of his authors, their private and social personalities are not necessarily so enduring.
To understand this we must first acknowledge that Deleuze posits a constant link between the work of art and the time which produces it – the artistic affect stands apart from, but is the product of, its time. ‘The affect is independent of all determinate space-time; but it is nonetheless created in a history which produces it as the expressed and the expression of a space or a time... the affect is the ‘new’, and new affects are ceaselessly created, notably by the work of art’ (C1, 101)

The personal, social and political situation of an author is explicitly deemed highly relevant to this process of naming a people who are missing: Deleuze argues that authors from the third world or from certain minorities (presumably including the Quebecois) are able, precisely due to ‘their personal situation in [a] nation’ (C2, 210) to identify a missing ‘people’ and to speak on its behalf (and thus to construct a revolutionary cinema with the masses as subject). If an author’s personal lived situation can in some cases open up this possibility, in other case it is foreclosed: Western authors, Deleuze suggests, are incapable of speaking on behalf of a people, and so their form of political cinema can only be a cinema which reflects the impossibility of discovering and speaking for a people. Yet Deleuze effectively fudges this argument by attempting to move Jean Rouch into the category of ‘third world author’, thus putting the whole preceding argument in doubt. Deleuze’s analysis rests on his insistence that Rouch can be considered a third world author because ‘no one has done so much to put the West to flight, to flee himself, to break with a cinema of ethnology and say Moi un Noir’ (C2, 215).

Rouch becomes significant as an author by this process of fleeing himself, rejecting or abrogating his previous persona in order to adopt a new one, as a ‘Noir’, an African. Other writers at the time, such as Blanchot, posited the role of the author as one of negation,
elimination of one’s own persona. Yet this is not the end of the process for Deleuze. Instead
Deleuze’s authors leave what they once were to become something else, attain a new
persona which speaks on behalf of something bigger. Though he was writing in the context
of Resnais’ cinema, Deleuze has this to say about philosophers: ‘For philosophers are beings
who have passed through a death, who are born from it, and go towards another death,
perhaps the same one’ (C2, 201), and ‘The philosopher has returned from the dead and
goes back there’: a formulation which Deleuze describes as ‘the living formulation of
philosophy since Plato’. This concept of the philosopher passing through death and
returning is, as I discussed in my Introduction, taken from Blanchot’s The Space of Literature
and shows the continuing influence of a neo-Romantic association of the author with death
for Deleuze. Some ambiguity is apparent as Deleuze chooses the verb ‘return’ which would
suggest that the philosopher passes through death and returns unchanged. But in his
discussion of third world authors Deleuze makes clear that the death of the old persona
leads to the construction of a radically new one: and (in the context of third world cinema) a
revolutionary one, one which identifies with a people which do not exist yet. Deleuze’s
remarks on the pre-war French school make clear that this process of negation and renewal
of the author’s persona is not limited to ‘direct’ cinema, nor to third world cinema. In
discussing the films of Jean Grémillon for example, Deleuze emphasises his preference for
water, and for water-based nomads (such as the canal dwellers in Maldone) to be
contrasted with the familial and land-based peasant ideal of Vichy. He argues that ‘The
drama was that it was necessary to break the links with the earth, of father with son,
husband with wife and mistress, woman with lover, children with parents; to retreat into
solitude to achieve human solidarity, class solidarity’ (C1, 80). The new, water-based
‘floating population, or ‘sea people’, which is ‘capable of revealing and transforming the
economic and commercial interests at play in a society, on condition that, following the Marxist formula, it ‘cuts the umbilical cord which attaches it to the earth’ (C1, 81). While Deleuze’s point is largely elaborated in reference to revolutionary, third world identities, his analysis of the French school makes clear that western authors too, on condition of abandoning their old private persona and personal ties, can remake themselves into authors who speak on behalf of a new and revolutionary people. The identification of ‘cliché’ and ‘mediocrity’ with family dramas and a personal history is present throughout Deleuze’s work, and a genuinely revolutionary aesthetic practice requires these ties first to be cut.

The relation of the author with the ‘intercessor’ thereby forms two stages. ‘It is the real character who leaves his private condition, at the same time as the author his abstract condition, to form, between the two, between several, the utterances of Quebec, about Quebec’ (C2, 215). Firstly, the negation of the author’s past – both his own private persona, his petty individual concerns for his personal history, family life and so on: all of which are influences, as Deleuze has explicitly stated, only on mediocre, commonplace works. Secondly, the becoming of the author as a being who speaks on behalf of a people, and thus has a relationship with the real, with the intercessor, who is also real, and also, as seen in the quote above, now more than his private condition. Furthermore, the author must leave his ‘abstract’ condition: the condition of merely being an author, of standing apart from his material – he must enter into a relation with it and, like Rouch, irrevocably change himself, renounce the person he was. The relationship with the intercessor allows the author to speak indirectly, rather than directly and on his own behalf.

Note that in this case there is no question of personal rediscovery, or of returning to an archetypal lost past, since in the case of Rouch he is a European seeking to approach a kind
of African identity (in this respect, we can draw a comparison between him and another
author studied by Deleuze: T.E. Lawrence, and his relationship with Arabia). In the case of
Perrault too, he must become another to return to his own people. It is not a question of
simply negating their own personality, becoming a cypher, or a screen on which others can
project what they wish. Instead, ‘they must become others, with their characters, at the
same time as their characters must become others themselves’ (C2, 147). The authors do
not appear to speak on behalf of their characters, but neither do their characters speak
through them. Their authorial becoming is separate but also necessary to the fabulation of a
people. Indeed, when quoting Arthur Rimbaud in his discussion of this passage, and of
Rouch’s becoming a black man, Deleuze sounds almost evangelical: ‘I can be saved’.

This process of double-becoming – of the authors and of the film-maker – makes them into
an assemblage, ‘a collectivity which gradually wins from place to place, from person to
person, from intercessor to intercessor’ (C2, 148).

Yet in this case too, the praxis of the film-maker is not an entirely free or ludic one, his
‘becoming’ cannot construct, in the standard postmodern tradition, any-assemblage-
whatever, he cannot become whatever he wants. Instead – and Deleuze also cites here the
films of Shirley Clarke and John Cassavetes – ‘the becoming of the film-maker and of his
character already belongs to a people, to a community, to a minority whose expression they
practice and set free (free, indirect discourse)’ (C2, 148). The ‘becoming’ is therefore
decided in advance, and can only be part of a film which is plugged into a wider, liberational
project – or as Deleuze argued in the context of Eisenstein’s films, the subject of cinema is
the masses. In this respect no conscious intention need be present on the part of the film-
maker: in *A Portrait of Jason*, for example, Clarke wanted to make a film about herself, but it
became the film she made about Jason. This kind of film-making therefore does not amount to mere invention, an author making up a story at a whim. Deleuze argues that the author should not ‘invent a fiction which would be one more personal story: for every personal fiction, like every impersonal myth, is on the side of the ‘masters’” (C2, 213). Indeed Deleuze will argue that Perrault addresses the ‘intercessors , who are real, in order to ‘prevent any fiction’ (C2, 214). The author, in other words, is not free to invent whatever he may like, at least if the aim is to become a noted or ‘great’ author. Deleuze will criticise mediocre, commercial films for their ‘contingency’ and ‘gratuitousness, anything about anything else, as in the mass of bad arty films’ (C2, 243). The true work of art by contrast operates according to a necessity. Deleuze in his conclusion to Cinema 2 will hint at what he terms a ‘will to art’, which he terms ‘powerful, obscure, condensed’ and ‘aspiring to deploy itself through involuntary movements which none the less do not restrict it’ (C2, 255)

Often the intercessors are ‘reflexive types... original individuals who exhibit for what it is, in its singularity, the limit towards which a given series of visual images was moving... They are all interceders who function as a category’ (C2, 180). Deleuze thus cites the examples of Jean-Pierre Melville’s character in Breathless, or Jeanson in La Chinoise. It is of note that when an author forms a relationship with an ‘interceder’ or ‘intercessor’, the character is an original individual who operates as a limit function in the filmic set: thus suggesting that the author-intercessor assemblage must itself be constructed at the limits of a series of elements.

These liaisons between the different elements in a film-assemblage do not therefore happen either randomly or by accident, and it is not the consciousness of the spectator

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16 While the Continuum English translation uses two terms, ‘intercessor’, and ‘interceder’, the French version uses ‘intercesseur’ in both instances. There seems no clear reason for the variation in translation.
which brings them into connection with each other, but rather the director-editor who performs that process of selection. Deleuze describes early cinema thus: ‘The author’s way of seeing, that of the characters, and the way in which the world was seen formed a signifying unity’ (C2, 176): a formulation which both implies that the perspective of the spectator – the way the world was seen – is unified with that of the author, and thus leaves little room for the dissenting or competing perspectives that a critical audience may come up with. Moreover, in his discussion of metaphor and affective composition, Deleuze appears to presuppose that the author and the spectator will view the characters in the same way, arguing ‘the composition does not simply express the way in which the character experiences himself, but also expresses the way in which the author and the viewer judge him... A circuit which includes simultaneously the author, the film and the viewer is elaborated’ (C2, 156). Unfortunately however, Deleuze does not devote sustained attention in either of the Cinema books to an analysis of spectatorship. It would seem unlikely, given the very limited scope that Deleuze offers for sustained and critical interpretations on the part of the reader or spectator of literature and visual art which contradict those of the author (as I have discussed in Chapters 2 and 3) that he would conceive of a radically different role for the spectator of cinema. Some light can be shed on the matter by examining a 1983 interview with Hervé Guibert, ‘Portrait of the Philosopher as a Moviegoer’. Deleuze’s discussion of the spectator in that interview argues for an embrace and an acceptance of the cinematic image in its immediacy. In fact Deleuze states ‘What is most difficult is grasping images how they are presented’, and further that ‘I’m especially hostile to the notion of different levels: a first, a second, and a third level of meaning, understanding or appreciation’ (TRM, 215). The scope for a subversive reinterpretation or rereading of the cinematic image is accordingly limited. As Deleuze argues, ‘the images
themselves… impose a specific use of eyes and ears on the spectator’ (TRM, 217): the implication being that there are not multiple correct ways in which to read or experience a cinematic text. For this reason, Deleuze castigates ‘the knowing laughter of the cinephiles… supposedly on some higher level, a second level’ (TRM, 216) both because these ‘cinephiles’ reject the cinematic experience presented and intended by the director, and because they believe they can read or understand a film at a deeper and more profound level than the ordinary spectator. For Deleuze, however, the image in its immediacy, rather than the multiple and hidden layers of meaning which it may conceal, are what is at stake in the viewing of a film: a position which clearly does not accord with Barthes’ theories of the multiple and competing interpretations and connotations of a text. That Deleuze’s preferred cinematic vision is that of the auteur is demonstrated by the fact that, when discussing the ‘clairvoyance’ created by images of extreme beauty or power, he states that ‘The clairvoyant is Rosselini or Godard, not the spectator’ (TRM, 217).

Patricia MacCormack offers a strong reading of spectatorship in Deleuze. Indeed she employs the term ‘cinemasochist’ to describe the experience of the filmgoer, using it to denote a form of ‘submissive spectatorship’, which begs of the image ‘use me’. For a spectator to undergo what, for MacCormack, is a truly immersive and submissive experience, she must allow herself to let go of the need to read or comprehend the cinematic image, thus: ‘Can letting go of a need to read, comprehend, or even be astonished by any image’s ability to fox this need create a spectator who is purely cinesexual, where pleasure is found in all images, be they radical, abstract, or ‘traditional’?’17. The spatial ecstasy then of ‘embodied spectatorship’ is one which lacks the critical distance necessary

17 Patricia MacCormack, ‘Cinemasochism: Submissive Spectatorship as Unthought’ in Rodowick (ed), Afterimages, p160.
for a spectator or audience to think independently, to construct alternate readings of a film which would conflict with the director’s vision. While MacCormack’s concepts of cinesexuality and cinemasochism do not really find adequate support in Deleuze’s work, she has, in my opinion, correctly identified the need for surrender to the immediacy of the image on the part of the spectator.

In performing their own work of ‘montage’ – comparing the film with their own lives, a process which could lead to the dismissal of the film as nonsensical or fantastical – the audience do, however, do something other than merely accept pre-critically the vision of the director. Yet this shift should not be overemphasised. When discussing Last Year in Marienbad, Deleuze takes care to specify that ‘Nothing happens in the viewer’s head which does not derive from the character of the image’ (C2, 100) – or, in other words, the spectator does not legitimately bring anything to the interpretation of the filmic text which was not already presented there by the authors. Of note in particular is that while spectators may consider, and reject, the film as a whole, as being a poor reflection of their own lives, there seems to be little space for them to perform their own act of sustained interpretation, of accepting the text as valid with a meaning radically different from that intended by its author. Instead the role of cinema, and the author through the medium of film, is to stimulate thought in the viewer, to act as ‘the presence to infinity of another thinker in the thinker, who shatters every monologue of a thinking self’ (C2, 162). Thus an underlying commonality between author and reader or spectator is one of absolute necessity if the text is to have any impact.

To conclude, my analysis has demonstrated the enduring presence of the figure of the author in the Cinema books, with a consistent philosophical and ideological outlook, and a
consistent preference for aesthetic, technical and stylistic devices. My analysis of collaboration, and of aesthetic collectivities such as schools of cinema, emphasised the primacy of intelligence, which in this case comes first, and an intellectual understanding of the philosophical issues at stake, when we assess the contributions a director makes to a cinematic text. In this respect, I have shown that Deleuze considers the author to be an enduring intellectual presence, one which does not merely act viscerally or at whim. As shown in previous chapters, the role of the cinema spectator is sharply limited, being merely the choice to accept or reject the vision presented in the film itself. Finally, the abandonment of the private and personal aspects of an author’s persona – the examination of which is the focus of so much mediocre and commercial art – allows for the rebirth, in conjunction with an ‘intercessor’, of a specific kind of revolutionary political author to speak on behalf of a new people.
Conclusion

I wish to return to the initial definition of the ‘authorial function’ I described in my introduction, and reaffirm for the reader the various ways in which, in the previous chapters, I have demonstrated the central importance of this operation or reading strategy in the work of Deleuze. In other words, I hope I have demonstrated that the appreciation of the authorial function is central to the way in which Deleuze approaches the texts, art works, or films created by the authors he studies. Though the organising logic of the chapters of this thesis has been to follow Deleuze and Guattari’s basic division into the different branches of thought, this conclusion will attempt to progress thematically, by considering all the evidence for each major ‘characteristic’ of the authorial function in turn.

The first major characteristic of the authorial function is the belief in a persistence of a defined authorial subject, with firm intellectual and philosophical commitments, and in some cases a defined and continuous style, which has created every text or work in that subject’s body of work. Foucault’s discussion of the authorial function, as I referred to in my introduction, thus uses such a subject to impose unity and consistency on a body of work, whether that be in ensuring ‘doctrinal’ (or philosophical, thematic, logical) coherence within each text or between texts, or whether, in seeking to describe those alterations and developments that do occur, by ascribing them to an authorial subject in the process of learning, growing, and developing his or her ideas and problematic. Such a presupposition permits the philosophical, literary, art, or film critic to devise interpretative strategies which would seek to explicate meaning of one such text by reference to others: since the Deleuzian author is not considered merely a transitory ‘event’, such connections between different texts in the body of work can be constructed by reference to this enduring
personality. I believe that this contention has been conclusively demonstrated by my thesis. In Chapter 1 I established the association of the Deleuzian philosopher with a clearly defined philosophical problem, which runs through all of that philosopher’s texts. I moreover argued that the elaboration of this problem was a slow and gradual process, requiring time and labour on the part of the persisting authorial subject. In Chapter 4, I identified the foundation of persisting intellectual and philosophical commitments determining the aesthetic characteristics of the films in a given director’s body of work. Such commitments could serve to organise different directors into ‘schools’ (such as the American or Soviet schools). I have argued in Chapter 4 that a properly philosophical commitment allowed Deleuze to distinguish an ‘author’ from a cinema professional who does not amount to an author – such as, in the majority of films, actors. A philosophical understanding of the problem of time, for example, has been at the root of many of the different aesthetic choices directors make, particularly those relating to montage and to the internal ‘rhythm’ of the film, and their differing understandings of time helped to make the collaboration between Alain Robbe-Grillet and Alain Resnais a genuine partnership between two authors.

In chapters 2 and 3, I considered at length those arguments in the critical literature that posited the Deleuzian author or artist as an ‘event’, or which emphasised that author’s ‘letting-go’ of their own self as part of the process of the creation of art. I found that such letting go, or dissolution – or as I would argue, partial dissolution - of the authorial self, was only a moment in a longer process of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation in which nevertheless a fidelity to a defined project – with which the author was identified- provided continuity during these moments. Such moment of deterritorialisation were exemplified by the interaction of visual artists with the ‘diagram’, and the attempt by the artist to forget
the ‘clichés’ in his or her head, or, in the case of the apprentice-author discussed in chapter 2, by the moments of forgetting the self’s enchantment with worldly or sensuous things as the progression through the series of ‘signs’ continues. In the case of literary authors, I argued that style, defined as originating viewpoint, provided continuity both to the authorial self and to the series of texts in a given body of work, and in the case of film directors I argued that the style associated with their proper name helped to hold together the individual scenes in a film, as well as a larger body of work. I argued that in a manner similar to the narrative function discussed in Paul Ricoeur’s *Time and Narrative*, that Deleuze’s version of the authorial function establishes continuity and thematic, philosophical or stylistic unity between the given texts in a body of work, bringing coherence to our interpretations of them. I further argued that the continuity of the authorial self was established in the relationship between the author and the ‘intercessor’ – that character or ‘persona’ which represented a profound theme, concept or affect for the philosopher or artist. In the case of philosophers, the relationship with a ‘conceptual persona’ was determinative of that philosopher’s authorial self and his or her defining problem. In the case of novelists or film-makers, the ‘intercessor’ was rather a defining Original Character.

The second major question I considered in this thesis was that of authorial intention. I argued that will and intention plays a major role in Deleuze’s analysis of the authors and artists he writes about. This point is closely related to the discussion about the persistence of an authorial ‘self’ because I identified that self with the will or intent to pursue a defined authorial project. Thus, for example, I discussed the characteristic and habitual approach of artists like Francis Bacon to a method or art practice as constitutive of his authorial self: and this intentional pursuit of a method survived the moments of deterritorialisation in that
practice. My discussion, in Chapter 2, of the method exhibited in the use of language by authors such as James Joyce, Samuel Beckett and Franz Kafka emphasised the fact that Deleuze saw these moves – which he took to be characteristic and definitive of the authors in question and of their body of work – as deliberate.

The defining and guiding role of the intelligence in the production of philosophy or art is central to any analysis of authorial intention. Contrary to Deleuze’s repeated claims that ‘the intelligence comes after’, I found that, even in his writings on art or visual art, that this was not always the case. In cinema for example, in the practice of montage a defining intelligence was closely associated with the process at all moments, while in painting the painter’s intelligence from the beginning determined the distribution of effects or ‘givens’ on the canvas.

The operation of the author’s intelligence in literature and film is a difficult and vexed one. I discussed at length in Chapter 2 the movement between the ‘spider-web’ with the figure of the spider at the centre, and the ‘literary machine’ operated by a mechanic who is nonetheless also part of the machine. A fuller study of the development of the first idea into the second is in my opinion well merited, because the web and the machine operate in subtly different ways. However, I argued that the spider was a largely reactive intelligence – its role was to establish transversal connections and to thus link up otherwise unconnected fragments in response to stimula. The spider-narrator, or spider-author, therefore had a role to play in choosing how the different parts of the work, or web, would be linked, but such a role was circumscribed. The literary-machine, however, was rather more complex. The mechanic chose how the gears were related, and how the machine was put in motion, but the machine also seemed to have the potential to operate autonomously, and it could seize
up and stop as well as go. The author-mechanic, however, just like the film director, seemed to have retained the power that Barthes gives to his scriptors – the power of choosing, bringing different elements into resonance and association with one another, and thus setting up local ‘encounters’ in the world of the work. This is, at the very least, a limited, but highly significant, role which Deleuze and Guattari retain for their authors.

Nevertheless, and in some contrast to the points made above, Deleuze also rejects a purely ‘biographical’ approach to criticism of an author. He insists, for example, that the subjectivity of the philosophical author is determined by a close association with his central problem, just as the subjectivity of the literary author is determined by a close association with style. For that reason, Deleuzian critics should resist, as Deleuze himself says, any attempt to associate what the philosopher merely says with what he or she does. So, too, should the critic be wary of a purely ‘biographical’ criticism of a literary author: since Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate at many points how what they term the ‘bachelor’ author has rejected or abandoned many of the characteristics of his personal life, which matter nothing to our understanding of the work.

Notwithstanding this, I wish to make clear that we cannot consider the Deleuzian author to be a completely ‘impersonal’ being, and that there is thus a clear distinction between Deleuze’s position and that of Blanchot. Instead, the political, social, and historical (and aesthetic or philosophical) context that he or she operates in is determinative of the works produced, and this is the third major issue I discussed in my thesis. The clearest demonstration of this point was seen in Chapter 3, in which I discussed what it meant for a painter to make art at a certain period in (art) history, which, for Deleuze, helped to determine that painter’s central ‘question’ or problem as well as their method. Painters,
too, often belonged to ‘schools’ or tendencies which distinguished themselves by associations with particular techniques, just as philosophers and indeed film directors belonged to schools which were associated with a particular method or problem. However, and despite what I said about the lack of usefulness of a purely ‘biographical’ criticism above, Deleuze explicitly identifies, at different points, evolutions in, for example, a painter’s technique with profoundly significant events in his or her life, such as Gauguin’s stay in Tahiti. In Chapter 2, I discussed the relation that Deleuze and Guattari establish between the political and social context of the decline of the Habsburg empire with the many deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations in the thought of the time, from physics to linguistics. I also argued in Chapter 3 that the Deleuzian visual artist (and, I believe, by extension other authors too) stands at the frontier or on the fringes of a given oppressed group, and through empathetic identification creates works which express the sufferings and longing for freedom of those groups. However, of course the most significant association between an author’s political and social context, and his or her work, comes in Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of minor literature. While the ‘bachelor author’ negates some aspects of his personality, he remains firmly situated in the political, social and indeed linguistic context of his people. I also argued for a consideration of the temporal position of an author. I noted Deleuze and Guattari’s reflections on the ‘untimely’ character of both philosophers and literary authors, arguing that both are attentive to the ‘knocking on the door’ and are able to discern in advance the important political and social movements to which they will relate their philosophical and literary work.

The most important role played by authorial intention, however, is closely linked to the fourth characteristic of the authorial function I considered in this thesis, and that is the
negative, limiting or defining effect that the figure of the author has on acceptable and unacceptable interpretations of the work. Despite Deleuze and Guattari’s call to us to ‘Experiment, don’t Interpret’, I believe that in practice the scope available to the reader, spectator, or student of philosophy is actually extremely limited. This has in my opinion been one of the most comprehensively demonstrated sections of this thesis. In Chapter 2 in particular, I demonstrated Deleuze and Guattari’s opposition to ‘reader-led’ interpretative practices by demonstrating how they resist Max Brod’s arrangement and preferred interpretation of Kafka’s The Trial, relying on their assessment of Kafka’s intentions for the novel as their justification for rejecting Brod’s use of the texts. It is therefore difficult to see how such a position on their part can be reconciled with an enthusiastic adoption of ‘experimentation’ in the broad sense, at least as it could be practised by anyone other than the author of a text. This same question arises in Deleuze’s treatment of the spectators of visual art and cinema. As I have repeatedly demonstrated, Deleuze’s vision for these spectators does not allow them to adopt the detachment and critical distance necessary to advance interpretations of the artwork radically different from that intended by the author. Rather, the experience of a spectator is an immersive one, involving a self-abandonment to the ‘spatial ecstasy’ and pleasure of the image. He or she must enter the painting or film, open himself or herself up to the forces of the ‘affect’ generated by the work, and abandon detached attempts to ‘read’ it. We can also compare these readers and spectators to the students of philosophy I discussed in Chapter 1. There, I demonstrated that Deleuze encouraged his students to enter into the problematic or paradigm of the great philosophers they were studying, and to work within the basic assumptions of that problematic. This precludes critics and commentators from forcing their own critical
paradigms on a given philosopher – such as any attempt to reconcile Nietzsche’s thought with dialectics.

The fifth and final concern I treated in this thesis was the question of originality and distinctiveness, in relation to the notion of ‘genius’. As will have been seen in my introduction, for the Romantics originality and a quasi-divine inspiration were the hallmarks of the poet and the literary author, and were associated with the notion of ‘genius’, a quality to which authors and artists were born, and which served to separate the great talent from the ordinary and everyday thinker. For Deleuze and Guattari however, originality is important, but at times of only a secondary importance in their analysis of the author and artist. Deleuze often takes pains to stress the commonality of philosophers, artists or directors working together in a school, movement or tendency, and often differs them (for example, the different directors in the Soviet school of montage) only by emphasising the different extents to which they implement a particular technique or pursue a particular problem. When discussing the issue of ‘master’ and ‘disciple’ philosophers in chapter 1, I stressed that the work of minor philosophers – such as that of Stirner in relation to Hegel – did not need to demonstrate originality in terms of a new defining problem or in terms of philosophical method, but merely in terms of the recontextualisation, representation, or subversion of the concepts of another thinker, or in pushing the thought of another thinker to its extremes. Turning to Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of the arts, they note that, for example, film directors can share the problems, preoccupations and central themes of each other and indeed of literary authors. However, in Chapter 2 I identified style as the unique originating viewpoint of the literary author, a position which leads us to conclude that major authors – at least in literature and the cinema - possess an
original style. Similarly, I demonstrated in Chapter 3 the necessity for original inflections of broadly shared techniques within a given movement or school for an artist to be considered significant. The question of originality therefore is a vexed and difficult one in this thesis. I conclude that it is of significant importance to Deleuze and Guattari, as a secondary moment in their analysis of philosophical and artistic works, but that is it not of such great and defining importance to them as it was to the Romantics and neo-Romantics.

If the reader has remained with me up to this point, it should be apparent that this thesis challenges many of the working assumptions apparent in much of the critical literature on Deleuze and Guattari. In particular, there are a few assumptions which I consider to be no longer tenable. The first is the depiction of the Deleuzian author or artist as an ‘event’ or ‘effect’. Such a description would posit that the Deleuzian author has a different subjectivity or ‘self’ associated with each work and that every work consists of a different ‘encounter’ with outside forces. Moreover, it would imply that there is little use, as readers, in attempting to construct interpretative strategies which relate one work by a given author to another – the ‘proper name’ those works are tagged by is merely a matter of convention. The second is the association of the Deleuzian author with the purely impersonal, the image of the ‘bachelor author’. I have argued that this ‘impersonal’ quality is partial and transitory rather than absolute. The third is the limited scope in the Deleuzian corpus for a theory of collaboration between authors – indeed, the theory that collaboration is a way to escape the status of being author. As I believe I have established, particularly in Chapter 4, a collective and collaborative authorial subject is well provided for within the work of Deleuze and Guattari. I now finally wish to turn my attention to some possibilities for future research in this field, drawing on the conclusions of my thesis.
At this stage in my research, my view is that Deleuze’s continued reliance on the authorial function marks a basic inconsistency in his philosophy, particularly in terms of the work he wrote in collaboration with Guattari, in so far as it valorises ‘rhizome’ over ‘root’ and ‘experimentation’ over ‘interpretation’. Further research into this question is definitively warranted. In particular, I believe a closer exploration of the notion of ‘experimentation’, as discussed in, for example, Deleuze’s essay ‘On the Superiority of Anglo-American literature’ (in Dialogues) would be fruitful. Future research may establish to what extent experimentation is still possible for the student or critic, and to what extent experimentation is only possible for the author. What, then, would this experimentation with a text look like, carried out by reader, critic or author? A study of the most ‘experimental’ forms of art, such as conceptual and post-conceptual art (which Deleuze and Guattari of course famously rejected) or experimental cinema, in relation to the theories of Deleuze and Guattari could foreground these concerns.

Further research, also, could be done into the specific nature of collaboration between authors, in particular as this relates to an actual analysis of Deleuze and Guattari’s own collaboration: both what they say about it in short texts and interviews, and in terms of a detailed analysis of how they worked and what they brought to those texts they authored in common. I have sketched out the various forms of collective authorship in this thesis – from the collaboration between a film director and an actor or scriptwriter, to the operation of philosophical or artistic ‘schools’ or ‘scenes’ where participants share common concerns, methods and problems, to the specific relation between a ‘master’ and a ‘disciple’ philosopher or artist (which can often only very loosely be termed collaborative). Such
discussion as I have attempted in this thesis has not addressed, however, the relevance of the ‘conceptual persona’ or ‘aesthetic figure’ to such collaboration.

The relation between author and ‘intercessor’, sketched out in most detail in What is Philosophy has been one of the most challenging aspects of Deleuze and Guattari’s theories on authorship for me because of the very limited detail, particularly in regard to the very late introduction of ‘aesthetic figures’, of some importance in the creation of art, and ‘partial observers’, of relevance to science. Deleuze and Guattari seem to construct a parallel analysis of the three branches of thought – philosophy, art, and science – which might lead one to presume that these three branches of ‘intercessor’ should be regarded as roughly equivalent and to behave in the same way. A detailed study of how the ‘aesthetic figure’ and ‘partial observer’ could in concrete terms relate to the creation of an artwork or elaboration of a scientific theory might be interesting ground for future research. The passages in Cinema 2 in which Deleuze speaks of the ‘intercessor’ (whom we might cite as an instance of the ‘aesthetic figure’, though this term does not appear in the Cinema books), would be a good place to begin this research: in particular, the association of the relationship between film author and ‘intercessor’, the question of how a director (or other artist) finds his or her intercessor, and the elaboration of a politics of revolution or liberation from the relationship between the two is what is at stake in these questions. Any investigation into the direct relationship between ‘author’ and ‘intercessor’ in the Cinema books could look at the various shifts in how the ‘intercessor’ characters are described: are they real people, as in the traditions of ‘direct cinema’? Are they real people playing fictionalised versions of themselves, as in Jean Rouch’s film Moi un Noir? Can they be entirely fictional characters, and if so, is there anything we can say about the specificity of
these characters as they relate to an author’s style, biography, personal, historical and social situation, or any of the themes he or she worked on? The notion of ‘intercessor’ may be a way to incorporate some of the work done on the mystical, spiritual or revelatory aspects of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy.

Finally, the ontological status of the artwork in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is an interesting question for future research: the extent to which the very late concept of the ‘art-monument’ and its association with the notion of ‘affect’ says all that there is to say about the artwork, and the nature of the immersive experience that it offers us. Such a project might seek to associate the passages on the nature of the ‘shot’ in cinema with the lengthy descriptions of the interrelation of canvas, brush, and materials in *Logic of Sensation* in order to begin a consideration of the status of the artwork separately from the notion of ‘author’, ‘artist’ and ‘spectator’. I hope that part of the contribution this thesis makes to the literature in the future will be to ensure that the status, nature and roles of author/artist, reader/spectator, and work will be far more carefully and precisely delineated.
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Filmography

