


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The role of the *Self* in assessing doping cognition: Implicit and explicit measures of athletes' doping-related prototype perceptions

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1 The role of the *Self* in assessing doping cognition: Implicit and explicit measures of athletes'
2 doping-related prototype perceptions

3

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4 **Abstract**

5 Objectives: To examine athletes' implicit and explicit prototype perceptions of performance
6 enhancing substance (PES) users and non-users.

7 Design: A cross-sectional mixed-method study.

8 Methods: Competitive athletes from 39 sports (N=226; mean age= 27.66±9.74 years; 59%
9 male) completed four self-report questions and two Brief Implicit Association Tests online,
10 assessing prototype favourability and similarity of PES users and non-users.

11 Results: Athletes explicitly associated themselves with a non-user (M= 3.13±0.92) more than
12 a PES user (M= 0.56±0.88) and perceived a non-user (M= 89.92±14.98) more favourably
13 than a PES user (M= 13.18±21.38). Indexing behaviour on self-reports, doping contemplators
14 did not differ from 'clean' athletes in their perceptions of PES user prototypes while dopers
15 perceived PES users favourably and similar to themselves. In comparison, doping
16 contemplators paired the concept of 'dopers' easier with themselves than with others, while
17 clean athletes and dopers had no preference for either pairing (D = -0.33, -0.08 and 0.01,
18 respectively). All groups demonstrated some degree of preference for 'good and doper',
19 moving from slight to moderate to strong preference in the groups of clean athletes, dopers
20 and contemplators, respectively (D = -0.20, -0.37 and -0.80, respectively).

21 Conclusions: Results suggest that doping contemplators may have a positive bias towards
22 doping which is not endorsed in self-reports. Implicit preferences, along with the disparity
23 between the implicit and explicit measures of athletes' doping-related prototype perceptions
24 advance understanding of doping behaviour and make a unique contribution to research
25 methodology. Factors influencing the interplay between explicit and implicit endorsements of
26 PES user prototypes warrant further research.

27 *Key words: Mental representation; stimulus-response compatibility; sport; performance*
28 *enhancement*

29 Introduction

30 Since the introduction of the World Anti-Doping Agency's (WADA) social science
31 research programme in 2005, the number of individuals conducting research in the area of
32 anti-doping has grown. Building on an initial focus on athletes' attitudes towards doping,
33 there has been a switch in focus to other doping risk and protective factors. Yet one factor
34 that has received little attention thus far - but may help to increase understanding and the
35 prevention of doping behaviour - is an individual's prototype perceptions.

36 Drawing upon the tenets of the Prototype Willingness Model (PWM; Gibbons,
37 Gerrard, & Lane, 2003), prototype perceptions represent the images of the type of person an
38 individual thinks engages in a particular behaviour (e.g., the 'typical' doper). These
39 prototypes form when people make comparisons with others to evaluate opinions and
40 behaviour (Scott, Mason, & Mason, 2015). Prototypes for any given behaviour are distinct
41 and are made up of both positive and negative attributes (Ouellette, Hessling, Gibbons, Reis-
42 Bergan, & Gerrard, 2005). According to the PWM, there are two aspects of prototype
43 perceptions that influence an individual's willingness to engage in risky behaviour: prototype
44 favourability (how favourable/unfavourable the overall evaluation of the image is) and
45 prototype similarity (how similar an individual feels they are to the image). When
46 considering whether to engage in a behaviour, people compare themselves to their images of
47 the prototype and the positive and negative attributes that are associated with it. The more
48 favourable and similar to themselves a prototype is perceived to be, the more likely an
49 individual will engage in the behaviour (Zimmermann & Sieverding, 2010). Accordingly, if
50 an athlete perceives the image of a performance enhancing substance (PES) user (an
51 individual who uses prohibited substances) favourably and/or believes they themselves are
52 similar to a PES user, theoretically they will be more willing to dope themselves.

53 Athletes' perceptions of the type of person who engages in doping are important

54 because they may help to identify those who are vulnerable to doping. For example, if an
55 athlete perceives a PES user to consist of many positive characteristics, they may aspire to
56 become like them, which could lead to doping (Whitaker, Long, Petróczi, & Backhouse,
57 2012).

58 As individuals, we develop self-schemas from our past experiences that we use to
59 process self-related information (Cross & Markus, 1994). The schemas that we develop
60 influence our sensitivity to information and our ability to predict our future selves within a
61 specific domain (Cross & Markus, 1994). Our possible selves provide an important link
62 between motivation and our self-concept and represent how we see ourselves in the future
63 including our *ideal self*, along with our hopes and fears (Markus & Nurius, 1986). Possible
64 selves also represent what an individual perceives to be attainable and therefore act as a goal
65 to strive towards (Stevenson & Clegg, 2011). If an athlete's *hoped for self* reflects the
66 prototype of a PES user, an individual may be motivated to strive to become like a PES user.
67 Alternatively, an athlete may fear becoming like a PES user and as a result be less willing to
68 dope.

69 Typically, prototype perceptions have been investigated solely with the use of self-
70 report measures (e.g., Blanton et al., 2001; Spijkerman, van den Eijnden, Vitale, & Engels,
71 2004; Thornton, Gibbons, & Gerrard, 2002). Not only have studies identified that individuals
72 hold distinct prototypes of the type of person they think engages in a particular behaviour
73 (e.g., condom users/non-users; Blanton et al., 2001), they also indicate that prototype
74 perceptions predict willingness to engage in risky behaviours (e.g., smoking, alcohol use,
75 unsafe sex). For example, positive associations have also been made between prototype
76 perceptions and adolescents' intentions to smoke and drink in the future (Spijkerman et al.,
77 2004). Similarly, perceived social images were significantly related to young adults'
78 willingness to engage in unprotected sex, which later predicted contraceptive use six months

79 on (Thornton et al., 2002). However, the inherent limitation in self-report methodology lies
80 with the assumption that respondents are willing and able to report what they think and how
81 they feel. Proponents of implicit assessments argue that despite the deceptively reassuring
82 feeling of cognitive certainty most people experience, what is available to conscious self-
83 examination is only a small fraction of what is in the mind (Nosek, Hawkins, & Frazier,
84 2011). For example, social projection, attribute substitution and heuristical decision making
85 happens outside conscious awareness (Kahneman, 2003; Robbins & Krueger, 2005), meaning
86 self-reported and automatic motivations or preferences can differ widely (McClelland,
87 Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989; Nosek, 2007). This intriguing characteristic calls for
88 alternative measurement processes in order to capture the mental processes that happen
89 outside conscious control.

90 Because implicit measurements do not require respondents to make explicit
91 connections or evaluations about the target construct (e.g., doping attitude or PES user
92 prototypes), they are assumed to be able to tap into people's subconscious and uncontrolled
93 thought processes. Response time-based implicit tests, such as the Implicit Association Test
94 (IAT) variants (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) utilise the stimulus-response
95 compatibility (SRC) concept whereby the speed by which one is able to perform the task is
96 influenced by compatibility between (a) the stimuli and the required response (S-R) and/or
97 (b) features of the stimuli (S-S) (de Houwer, 2001; Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990).
98 Inferences are made from the response times of each S-R pair to determine which pairing
99 represents the compatible S-R pair and which is the incompatible S-R pair (e.g., 'doping and
100 cheating' vs. 'doping and fair', or vice versa). The easier pairing, which is performed quicker,
101 is presumed to be subconsciously preferred by the respondent.

102 Recent research into the phenomenology of implicit measures and implicit attitudes
103 suggests that a measurement being *implicit* does not equate to being automatic or outside

104 conscious awareness (De Houwer & Moors, 2007; Fazio & Olson, 2003). Under the right
105 conditions, people can have accurate introspection into their implicit attitudes (Cooley,
106 Payne, Loersch, & Lei, 2015). Yet, implicit measures can be constructed in multiple ways,
107 with the retrieval process being influenced by both external and internal factors as well as the
108 interaction between them. In turn, this makes them quite malleable (Payne & Cameron, 2013;
109 Payne & Gawronski, 2010; Petróczi, 2013). Recognising the importance of capturing both
110 implicit and explicit thought processes when dealing with socially sensitive issues such as
111 doping in sport, there is an increasing trend of employing both indirect measures and direct
112 assessments, such as self-report questionnaires, whilst also accounting for socially desirable
113 responding (Gucciardi, Jalleh, & Donovan, 2010). With regards to researching doping
114 behaviour, a handful of IAT test variants have been developed and tested, focusing on
115 attitudes and automatic associations (for a review, see Brand, Wolff, & Baumgarten, 2015;
116 Petróczi, 2013).

117 The most popular implicit measurement tool utilised by researchers is the IAT
118 (Greenwald et al., 1998). IATs involve a double-category lexical or pictorial sorting task
119 where two concepts (the target category and the attribute) are represented by the same
120 response key. The time taken to accurately select the correct response key is recorded and a
121 latency score is then calculated to determine which categories are easier to pair together. The
122 sorting task is perceived to be easier when there is a strong association between two concepts
123 sharing the same response key, resulting in a faster response time and fewer errors than when
124 two concepts assigned the same key are not associated (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007).
125 Recognising a need to employ indirect methods to assess socially undesirable behaviours
126 such as doping, research teams are beginning to use IAT's to investigate doping-related
127 attitudes (e.g., Brand, Heck, & Ziegler, 2014a; Brand, Wolff, & Thieme, 2014b; Petróczi,
128 Aidman, & Nepusz, 2008). In addition, Petróczi and colleagues (2011) used a Brief IAT (B-

129 IAT) combined with self-report measures and hair analysis to investigate doping
130 behaviour/attitudes.

131 To our knowledge, there have been no studies that have assessed athletes' prototype
132 perceptions using direct and indirect measures. An individual's self-concept can influence the
133 association between two concepts measured using an IAT (Greenwald et al., 2002). However,
134 Ratliff and Howell (2015) examined the role of implicit and explicit prototypes on
135 engagement in risky sun-related behaviour (e.g., using sunbeds, use of high SPF sun cream)
136 and demonstrated that implicit prototypes were more predictive of white American women's
137 risky sun-related behaviour than explicit prototypes. Thus it is assumed that the speed at
138 which the IAT task can be performed is influenced by whether the relevant descriptor (e.g.,
139 PES user) is readily accessible in the working self-concept (Cross & Markus, 1994). If the
140 descriptor is readily available in the working self-concept, response latencies on the IAT will
141 be faster (Fazio, 1990).

142 It is important to identify both implicit and explicit prototype perceptions because
143 self-reported and automatic preferences can differ widely (Nosek, 2007). Prototype
144 perceptions may help to identify athletes who are more willing to dope, which is important
145 for targeting prevention and education. Prototype perceptions also offer an alternative
146 approach to investigating doping vulnerability (Whitaker, Long, Petróczi, & Backhouse,
147 2014; Whitaker et al., 2012), rather than focusing on attitudes (which dominate the literature).
148 Although attitudes influence doping, literature shows that athletes in general - even doping
149 users - display unfavourable attitudes towards doping (e.g., Petróczi & Aidman, 2009).
150 Equally, attitudes toward an object/behaviour (e.g., doping), constitute a more abstract
151 evaluation than those directly linked to the *Self* (e.g., prototype similarities). Therefore, in this
152 paper we combine implicit and explicit measures to examine athletes' prototype perceptions
153 of PES users and non-users and how these differ according to doping experience and future

154 intentions/willingness to dope. We hypothesise that individuals reporting use of PES and/or
155 contemplating future use will directly (explicit measures) and indirectly (implicit measures)
156 perceive PES users as more favourable and similar to themselves than individuals who have
157 not used PES and have no intentions/willingness to use PES in the future. With this approach,
158 we aim to make a unique contribution to doping research methodology and advance anti-
159 doping by expanding the pool of known cognitive antecedents of the doping decision via
160 explicit and implicit prototype perceptions. The rationale is that goals related to one's Self
161 (prototypes perceptions leading to possible selves) may play an important role in initiating
162 goals and formulating goal-pursuing strategies (Read & Miller, 1989). Acknowledging the
163 limitations associated with self-awareness and self-reports, this study utilises both explicit
164 and implicit assessments of athletes' perceptions about PES user vs. non-user prototypes.
165 Such combination also offers the opportunity to investigate the similarities and discrepancies
166 between the explicit and implicit manifestations of these prototypes; and the interplay
167 between the method (explicit and implicit retrieval) and the effect of the Self through abstract
168 evaluations and Self-related similarity assessments.

169 **Method**

170 *Participants*

171 The study involved 226 competitive athletes with a mean age of 27.66 ± 9.74 years. At
172 the time of the study, participants were competing at a range of performance levels from
173 club/university level to elite level. Specifically, 31% were club/university, 18% county, 20%
174 national and 29% international level. In addition, participants represented 39 sports with the
175 highest proportions of participants being from cycling, athletics and hockey. Prior to
176 recruitment, ethical approval was gained from the University research ethics committee.
177 Participants were then recruited via a number of gatekeepers including national governing
178 bodies, local sports clubs, coaches and known athletes. Social networking sites were also

179 utilised to increase the reach of the study. When participants opened the survey link provided
180 by gatekeepers, they were provided with an online information sheet that informed them of
181 the purpose of the study, the voluntary and anonymous nature of the study and that consent
182 was implied once the questionnaire had been submitted.

183 *Procedure*

184 Data for this study were collected as part of a larger project investigating the
185 suitability of the prototype-willingness model to predict athletes' willingness to dope
186 (Anonymous, 2014). First, participants completed the explicit measures via an online survey
187 using a closed survey platform (Survey Monkey). A web-link at the end of the survey then
188 directed participants to the implicit measures where the IAT tests were conducted using a
189 bespoke Java application developed by TN. This ordering was adopted because researchers
190 advocate that IAT's are beyond deliberate conscious control (Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters,
191 2007) and assess associations which are developed over a long period of time (e.g., Boldero,
192 Rawlings, & Haslam, 2007), suggesting that priming of IAT responses would not occur.

193 *Measures*

194 A combination of implicit and explicit measures were utilised to investigate athletes'
195 doping-related prototype perceptions. The implicit and explicit measures were both designed
196 to tap into prototype similarity (athletes' self-identification with a PES user) and prototype
197 favourability (an individual's attitudes towards a PES user and non-user).

198 *Implicit measures*

199 The implicit measure chosen for this study was a Brief Implicit Association Test (B-
200 IAT). B-IATs have been used in a number of different contexts including one developed by
201 Petróczi and colleagues to investigate athletes' underlying attitudes towards doping (Petróczi
202 et al., 2010). In comparison to standard IATs, B-IATs contain fewer sorting trials, which not
203 only reduces the time necessary to conduct the test but also limits the boredom factor that

204 may come into play when conducting a repetitious task. The B-IAT uses simplified
205 instructions, which require the participant to focus on two out of four categories
206 during each combined task (Sriram & Greenwald, 2009).

207 Before a combined trial, participants were shown two category labels along with their
208 examples, whilst being instructed to respond to the items from the focal categories with one
209 key (E) and to respond to any other stimuli with an alternative key (I). Prior to the test
210 beginning, participants placed their fingers on the relevant keys and used the space bar to
211 start the test. Once the test had started, a red cross appeared in the centre of the screen when a
212 word had been incorrectly categorised and the participant would have to re-categorise the
213 word. All participants took part in a practice B-IAT first, so that they could get used to the
214 protocol before completing the task. This was to ensure that errors were limited, as a high
215 error rate would result in the data being excluded from the study. In addition, instructions
216 informing participants to sort the words into the correct category as fast as possible without
217 making a mistake preceded the test.

218 In the present study, two B-IATs were used. The first B-IAT was used to ascertain
219 whether athletes would associate PES users with themselves or others (self-identification
220 with a PES user). The target categories in this B-IAT were 'doper' (cheat, artificial, doped,
221 risky) and 'non-doper' (clean, safe, natural, honest) where 'non-doper' was non-focal. Doper
222 vs. non-doper stimuli sets were constructed based on previous research (Anonymous, 2013)
223 and were selected to avoid ambiguity by creating a very clear differentiation. Note that in
224 IAT/B-IAT, participants are not asked to explicitly endorse one set over the other or record
225 any kind of agreement. They are instructed to simply sort the stimuli words with their
226 respective, pre-set category labels (dopers vs. non-dopers) as fast and as accurately as they
227 can. To clarify this, participants are typically shown the labels and related stimuli sets at the
228 start of the test and practice the lexical sorting task in single block settings before the actual

229 test. For a more detailed description on the methodology, see the review by Petróczi (2013).
230 The attributes included in the B-IAT were ‘me’ (I, me, myself, mine) and ‘others’ (them,
231 they, others, their). In the second B-IAT, the target categories and focal points remained the
232 same (‘doper’ and ‘non-doper’). However, the attributes included were ‘good’ (love,
233 pleasant, happy, enjoyable) and ‘bad’ (failure, horrible, harmful, terrible). This B-IAT aimed
234 to determine athletes’ prototype favourability of PES users and whether athletes would
235 associate dopers as being good or bad. Response times below 300 and above 3000
236 milliseconds were capped in line with IAT convention (Greenwald et al., 1998). Mean
237 latency scores and differences along with D-scores were calculated in line with the scoring
238 algorithm recommendations made by Greenwald et al. (2003). D-scores < 0 indicate stronger
239 associations between ‘me’ and ‘doper’/‘good’ and ‘doper’ while D-scores > 0 indicate
240 stronger associations between ‘others’ and ‘doper’/‘bad’ and ‘doper’. Absolute scores
241 between -0.15 and 0.15 are considered to represent no preference to either association, 0.16 to
242 0.35 represent a slight preference, 0.36 to 0.65 represent a moderate preference and values $>$
243 0.65 represent a strong preference for ‘me’ and ‘doper’ (Sriram & Greenwald, 2009).

244 *Explicit measures*

245 Based on previous research (e.g., Zimmermann & Sieverding, 2010), four self-report
246 questions were used to assess participants’ prototype favourability and similarity (two for
247 each). To assess favourability, respondents were asked to indicate their overall evaluation of
248 an athlete who uses/does not use banned substances from 0 to 100 (0= highly unfavourable,
249 100= highly favourable). In comparison, similarity was assessed on a five-point scale where
250 respondents were asked: “do the characteristics that describe an athlete who uses banned
251 substances describe you (0= definitely not, 4= definitely yes)?”

252 Auxiliary measures used in this paper to establish the doping cluster groups and validity
253 (i.e., explicit doping attitude, perceived willingness to dope of other athletes, PES subjective

254 Norms, PES use and social desirability) are described in detail in (Anonymous, 2014).

255 *Data analysis*

256 SPSS 22.0 for Windows was used to conduct data analysis. Dependent t-tests were
257 used to assess the differences in latency times between the separate blocks within each B-IAT
258 ('me' and 'doper'/'good' and 'doper' versus 'others' and 'doper'/'bad' and 'doper') while
259 correlations between implicit and explicit prototype perceptions and social desirability hits
260 were conducted using Spearman's Rank. Similarly, differences in implicit and explicit
261 prototype perceptions between cluster groups were analysed using Kruskal-Wallis χ^2 whereas
262 pairwise comparisons were conducted using Mann Whitney U with Bonferroni correction due
263 to violation of assumptions. However, due to the lack of a non-parametric equivalent,
264 interaction effects were calculated using mixed model ANOVA with syntax modified for
265 calculating single main effects. The level of significance was set at $p = 0.05$ while effect sizes
266 reported represent eta squared and partial eta squared. Effect sizes for Kruskal-Wallis χ^2 were
267 calculated by dividing the chi square value by $n-1$ (Lenhard & Lenhard, 2015). Two-step
268 cluster analysis was conducted using log-likelihood as the distance measure and Akaike's
269 information criterion as the clustering criterion in order to determine the doping groups.

270 **Results**

271 Before presenting the implicit and explicit prototype perceptions findings, it is
272 necessary to provide some insight into how the doping cluster groups were determined to
273 enable comparisons to be made between PES users, contemplators and clean athletes.

274 *Doping cluster groups*

275 Differences in prototype perceptions were assessed according to four doping
276 behaviour-related variables: 1) previous PES use, 2) current PES use, 3) intentions to use PES
277 in the next 12 months and 4) willingness to use PES in the next 12 months.

278 Using these variables, athletes were clustered into three distinct groups: 1) clean

279 athletes (self-reported having never used PES and displayed no intention or willingness to
280 dope; $n= 179$), 2) dopers (self-reported PES use; $n= 12$) and 3) contemplators (self-reported
281 having never used PES but displayed intentions or willingness to dope; $n= 35$). The cluster
282 quality was very good (average silhouette= 0.9/1.0) but owing to the nature and prevalence of
283 the target behaviour, cluster sizes differ greatly with the ratio of 14.92 between the smallest
284 and largest cluster. Of the four indicators (when determining the cluster groups), PES use
285 intention was the factor that differentiated between the groups the most (predictor importance
286 index= 1.0/1.0); followed by past use (0.44/1.0), future willingness to use (0.23/1.0) and
287 current use (0.22/1.0) of PES. In order to check the validity of the clusters, we compared the
288 groups according to doping attitude, PES subjective norms and perceptions of other athletes'
289 willingness to use PES using a condition resembling the so-called "Goldman dilemma"
290 (Goldman, Bush, & Klatz, 1984) where athletes are asked if they would use a drug that
291 guaranteed sporting success but would result in their death in 5 years' time.

292 In line with previous literature, explicitly expressed attitudes toward doping were most
293 lenient in the group of athletes who admitted doping use ($M= 3.08 \pm 0.28$), compared to the
294 clean athletes and doping contemplators ($M= 1.40 \pm 0.85$ and $M= 1.29 \pm 0.86$, respectively;
295 $F(2,223)= 18.14$, $p< .001$, $\eta^2= .14$). Equally, the Goldman dilemma-inspired hypothetical
296 scenarios showed a similar pattern. Under the assumption that the hypothetical performance
297 enhancing drug is undetectable but guaranteed to win, dopers predicted that the vast majority
298 of the athletes would use the drug ($M= 79.83 \pm 23.69\%$), followed by contemplators ($M=$
299 $42.46 \pm 27.37\%$) and then clean athletes ($M= 32.89 \pm 27.36\%$). The difference was
300 statistically significant between ($F(2,221)= 17.62$, $p< .001$, $\eta^2 = 0.14$) users and the other two
301 groups but there was no difference between contemplators and clean athletes. The most
302 notable difference between the athlete groups was detected in PES subjective norms
303 (perceptions of whether significant others would approve of them doping). Self-reported

304 dopers scored much higher ($M= 6.58 \pm 4.83$) compared to clean athletes and contemplators
305 ($M= 0.89 \pm 1.79$ and $M= 0.66 \pm 1.63$, respectively; $F(2,223)= 45.52$, $p< .001$, $\eta^2= 0.29$),
306 whereas no difference was detected in subjective norms relating to nutritional supplements
307 ($M= 13.29 \pm 4.39$, $M= 13.34 \pm 4.15$ and $M= 15.08 \pm 4.40$ for dopers, clean and
308 contemplators, respectively; $F(2,223)= 0.96$, $p= .384$, $\eta^2= 0.01$). All pairwise differences
309 between dopers and the other two groups were significant at $p< .001$ level and there was no
310 statistically significant difference between clean athletes and contemplators in any of the
311 outcome measures used for validation of the clusters. There was no age difference between
312 the three groups ($F(2,223)= 0.321$, $p= .726$; $\eta^2=0.01$); or the proportion of individual vs. team
313 sports ($\chi^2= 2.839$, $p=.235$). All together, these results offer reassurance that the clusters are
314 indeed, qualitatively different in their approach to doping. Thus it is reasonable to assume
315 that if perceptions of PES user prototypes are linked to doping-related behaviour (past,
316 current or intended) differences, they would manifest and be detected in the related measures
317 between the doping cluster groups.

318 *Explicit measures*

319 *Prototype similarity*

320 On average, athletes perceived themselves as more similar to a non-user ($M= 3.13 \pm$
321 0.92) than a PES user ($M= 0.56 \pm 0.88$). Differences emerged in athletes' perceptions of their
322 similarity to PES users ($\chi^2= 21.73$, $p< .001$, $\eta^2= .10$) and non-users ($\chi^2= 10.72$, $p=.005$, $\eta^2=$
323 $.05$) between the clean athletes, contemplators and dopers (Figure 1). Pairwise comparisons
324 showed that dopers perceived PES users as significantly more similar to themselves than the
325 clean athletes ($p< .001$) and the contemplators ($p< .001$). However, the contemplators'
326 perceptions of PES user similarity did not significantly differ from the clean athletes ($p=$
327 1.00). Equally, dopers perceived non-users as significantly less similar to themselves than the
328 clean athletes ($p= .003$) and the contemplators ($p= .017$) but there was no significant

329 difference in non-user similarity between the clean athletes and the contemplators ($p= 1.00$).

330 -Insert figure 1 here-

331 *Prototype favourability*

332 Similarly, athletes perceived non-users ($M= 89.92 \pm 14.98$) as more favourable than
333 PES users ($M= 13.18 \pm 21.38$). Group differences also emerged in perceived PES user
334 favourability ($\chi^2= 14.97$, $p= .001$, $\eta^2= .07$) and non-user favourability ($\chi^2= 7.17$, $p= .028$, $\eta^2=$
335 $.03$) between the clean athletes, contemplators and dopers (Figure 1). Post-hoc tests revealed
336 that dopers perceived PES users as significantly more favourable than contemplators ($p=$
337 $.002$) and clean athletes ($p< .001$). However, perceptions of PES user favourability did not
338 significantly differ between clean athletes and contemplators ($p= 1.00$). In comparison, clean
339 athletes perceived non-users as significantly more favourable than self-reported dopers ($p=$
340 $.022$), yet contemplators did not significantly differ in their favourability perceptions of non-
341 users from self-reported dopers ($p= .072$) or clean athletes ($p= 1.00$).

342 *Implicit measures*

343 *Prototype similarity*

344 Implicit association of PES user similarity was based on response latency measures
345 where 'doper' was paired with 'me' and 'others'. Figure 2 shows the average latency scores
346 for 'me and doper' and 'others and doper'. A significant difference was observed between the
347 mean latency scores for 'me and doper' and 'others and doper' ($t(225)= -3.04$, 95% CI: -
348 108.96 to -23.23 ; $p= .003$, $d= .215$). Mean latency scores were faster when 'me and doper'
349 ($M= 960.09 \pm 287.95$ ms) were paired together compared to 'others and doper' ($M= 1035.18$
350 ± 324.64 ms). This suggests that on average, athletes find it easier to pair words associated
351 with 'me' and 'doper' together than they do words associated with 'others' and 'doper'.

352 The mean D-score demonstrated that participants had no preference for either
353 association ($D= -0.12$). Significant differences did emerge in the D-scores relating to the PES

354 user similarity B-IAT between self-reported dopers, contemplators and clean athletes ($\chi^2=$
355 6.05, $p=.049$, $\eta^2=.03$). However, post-hoc tests showed that the groups did not significantly
356 differ. Nevertheless, although the mean D-scores for clean athletes ($M=-0.08 \pm 0.61$) and
357 dopers ($M=0.01 \pm 0.51$) were close to zero (indicating no preference), the contemplators
358 mean D-score ($M=-0.33 \pm 0.52$) suggests they have a slight preference for 'me' and 'doper'
359 (Figure 3). These findings contradict expected findings where dopers were anticipated to
360 demonstrate greater identification with a PES user compared to clean athletes.

361 -Insert figure 2 here-

362 *Prototype favourability*

363 Implicit association of attitudes towards PES users was based on response latency
364 measures where 'doper' was paired with 'good' and 'bad'. Figure 2 shows the average
365 latency scores for 'good and doper' and 'bad and doper'. A significant difference was
366 observed between the mean latency scores for 'good and doper' and 'bad and doper' ($t(225)=$
367 -5.36 , 95% CI: -244.65 to -113.05 ; $p<.001$, $d=.463$). Mean latency scores were faster when
368 'good and doper' ($M=970.10 \pm 343.21$ ms) were paired together compared to 'bad and
369 doper' ($M=1148.95 \pm 423.70$ ms). These findings suggest that on average, athletes found the
370 association between 'good' and 'doper' easier than 'bad' and 'doper'.

371 -Insert figure 3 here-

372 The patterns in the D-scores replicated the mean latency scores and indicated that
373 participants portrayed a slight preference ($D=-0.30$) for 'good' and 'doper'. Figure 3 shows
374 the D-scores according to cluster groups. Dopers ($D=-0.37$) portrayed moderate preferences
375 for 'good' and 'doper' while contemplators ($D=-0.80$) portrayed strong preferences for
376 'good' and 'doper'. Like the B-IAT representing PES user similarity, there were significant
377 differences in D-scores relating to athletes' prototype favourability of PES users between
378 dopers, contemplators and clean athletes ($\chi^2=14.06$, $p=.001$, $\eta^2=.06$). Post-hoc tests

379 revealed that contemplators had a significantly greater preference for ‘good’ and ‘doper’
380 compared to clean athletes ($p = .001$). However, dopers did not significantly differ from clean
381 athletes ($p = 1.00$) or contemplators ($p = .522$).

382 Comparing response times by test blocks and athlete groups (Figure 4) showed no
383 interaction effect between reaction times in test blocks and athlete groups when ‘doper’ was
384 combined with self-reference (me vs. others, $F(2,223) = 1.32$, $p = .270$, $\eta^2 = 0.01$) but revealed
385 a statistically significant interaction when the ‘doper’ target concept was paired with
386 ‘good’/‘bad’ affective attributes ($F(2,223) = 5.37$, $p = .005$, $\eta^2 = 0.05$). Single main effect test
387 showed no statistically significant differences between the groups in either blocks; but there
388 was a significant difference between test block 1 and 2 in the clean ($p = .001$) and
389 contemplator group ($p < .001$), with significantly slower response times in block 2 (doper +
390 bad). The observed difference in the doper group was not significant ($p = .175$).

391 -Insert figure 4 here-

392 *Explicit - implicit relations*

393 A significant but weak relationship was found between PES user similarity and the self-
394 identification with a PES user B-IAT D-score ($r = .142$, $p = .033$). In contrast, there was no
395 relationship between non-user similarity and the B-IAT D-score ($r = -.042$, $p = .533$).

396 Similarly, there were no significant relationships between the implicit and explicit prototype
397 favourability measures, between PES user favourability and the attitudes towards a PES user
398 B-IAT D-score ($r = -.049$, $p = .464$), or between non-user favourability and the B-IAT D-score
399 ($r = .011$, $p = .867$).

400 In addition, the relationships between the explicit prototype perceptions measures and
401 total number of hits scored on the social desirability scale were practically non-existing (PES
402 user favourability $r = -.050$, $p = .459$; PES user similarity $r = -.068$, $p = .310$; non-user
403 favourability $r = .145$, $p = .029$; non-user similarity $r = .018$, $p = .793$). Similarly, there were no

404 relationships between the implicit prototype perceptions measures (D-scores) and total
405 number of hits scored on the social desirability scale (PES user similarity B-IAT $r = .014$, $p =$
406 $.834$; PES user favourability B-IAT $r = .037$, $p = .585$).

407 *Overall results*

408 In summary, explicit measures revealed that on average, athletes associated
409 themselves with a non-user more than a PES user and perceived a non-user more favourably
410 than a PES user. In addition, dopers perceived a PES user more favourably than
411 contemplators or clean athletes. They also perceived themselves as more similar to a PES
412 user than contemplators or clean athletes. In comparison, the implicit measures indicated that
413 on average, athletes had no subconscious preference for 'me' and 'doper' or 'others' and
414 'doper', but contrary to expectations, did have a slight preference for 'good' and 'doper' over
415 'bad' and 'doper'. Generally, these findings indicate that athletes did not associate PES users
416 with themselves or others but they did associate PES users more with 'good' than 'bad'.
417 Behavioural choice/intention influenced the explicit endorsements of PES user/non-user
418 prototypes and the affective implicit association, but not the self-referenced combinations.

419 **Discussion**

420 This paper aimed to examine athletes' prototype perceptions of PES users and non-
421 users using, for the first time, a combination of implicit and explicit measures. The
422 contrasting outcomes between explicit and implicit measures of PES user prototypes, along
423 with the lack of correlation between the explicit and implicit measures, were in line with
424 previous research combining implicit and explicit measures of the same construct (Nosek,
425 2007). Yet an interesting pattern within the implicit measures emerged, which could be
426 explained by the behavioural choices participants explicitly endorsed. We discuss this
427 explanation first. The alternative, or complementary explanation lies with the implicit test
428 construction and procedure. Following a detailed account by cluster groups based on the PES

429 status, we highlight the key methodological issues that could have had an effect on
430 participants' performance in the B-IATs independent of their PES-related behaviour or
431 intention. It is important to note that we have chosen to focus more heavily on the B-IAT
432 findings, not because we think that they are less valid or reliable than the self-report findings
433 but because if we can understand them correctly, they offer an alternative insight into doping
434 prevention.

435 *The influence of behavioural choices on prototype perceptions*

436 Out of the three cluster groups, the results of this study were most revealing about the
437 contemplators. Unexpectedly, findings indicated that contemplators did not differ from the
438 clean athletes in their self-reported perceptions of PES users and non-users. However, the B-
439 IAT results revealed that contemplators had a slight preference for 'me' and 'doper' and a
440 strong preference for 'good' and 'doper'. These findings are comparable to previous research
441 involving doping deniers (athletes who self-reported as clean but hair analysis indicated PES
442 use) where deniers scored similar to clean athletes on explicit measures regarding attitudes
443 towards doping but performed the IAT easier than clean athletes when presented with doping
444 words (Petróczi et al., 2010; Petróczi et al., 2011).

445 The B-IATs imply that contemplators identify themselves with a doper and perceive
446 PES users more favourably than the explicit measures suggest. One explanation is that the
447 contemplators were not honest in their self-reporting of PES use or prototype perceptions and
448 instead tried to portray themselves as clean (although they did admit to having intentions or
449 being willing to dope in the future). Alternatively, because contemplators had yet to engage
450 in PES use themselves, they portrayed similar explicit prototype perceptions to the clean
451 athletes. However, the contemplators may possess an unconscious bias towards dopers due to
452 their future possible selves reflecting a doper, explaining their intention/willingness to dope
453 in the future. As a result, the contemplators demonstrated greater preferences for 'me' and

454 'doper' and 'good' and 'doper' compared to the clean athletes and dopers (particularly on the
455 attitude towards dopers B-IAT).

456 The explicit findings relating to dopers and clean athletes were in the expected
457 direction. Self-reported dopers perceived PES users favourably and similar to themselves
458 whereas the clean athletes perceived non-users as more favourable and similar to themselves.
459 However, the implicit findings produced mixed results. Despite the D-score for the prototype
460 favourability B-IAT being in the expected direction (greater association when 'doper' and
461 'good' were paired together), self-reported dopers demonstrated a weaker preference for
462 'good' and 'doper' than the contemplators. Equally, clean athletes demonstrated a slight
463 preference for 'good' and 'doper' over 'bad' and 'doper', which was not expected. The PES
464 user similarity B-IAT produced even more unexpected results. Like previous research
465 (Petróczi et al., 2010; Petróczi et al., 2011), the D-scores did not differentiate between self-
466 reported dopers and clean athletes with both groups demonstrating no preference for 'me' and
467 'doper' or 'others' and 'doper'. In addition, the contemplators demonstrated only a slight
468 preference for 'me' and 'doper'. Nevertheless, mean latency response times for all three
469 groups were quicker when 'me' and 'doper' were paired together. This may have resulted
470 from the inclusion of the self in the category labels and self-related information tending to
471 have a dominant position in the memory (Popa-Roch & Delmas, 2010), making it easier for
472 the athletes to complete the B-IAT when 'me' and 'doper' were paired together.

473 Looking into the reaction times per test blocks, there was an observed selective effect
474 of PES-related behaviour/intention on the average speed which participant groups were able
475 to perform the B-IAT categorisation tasks. Behavioural position regarding doping exerted
476 influence over the affective categorisation task in the clean and contemplator group, but not
477 in the doping user group; nor in the self-referenced B-IAT tasks. Theoretically, performance
478 on a self-referenced task can be affected by a combination of (1) whether the respondents

479 have self-relevant active and endorsed schema (Cooley et al., 2015) - in this case, for PES
480 users; and (2) how closely the stimuli used in the implicit test matches to the labels by which
481 the construct is stored in people's minds (Petróczi, 2013). The observed pattern, showing
482 that behavioural position had an effect on the B-IAT with affective valence (good vs. bad) but
483 not on the self-referenced pairing, suggests that either participants did not have active,
484 available self-schema for doping use or - which is more likely - users and contemplators had
485 such schema but they did not conform to the more socially determined labelling. In both
486 cases, the implicitly retrieved prototype identification was most likely created on demand
487 rather than representing individuals' automatic preferences retrieved from their memory.

488 *Test construct and procedure effects on the implicit measures*

489 Due to the inconsistent implicit findings, it is important to consider whether athletes'
490 underlying prototype perceptions influenced performance on the B-IATs or whether other
491 factors could have played a role. One possibility is that the order of tasks could have
492 influenced performance on the B-IATs. Although the two B-IATs were randomised, athletes
493 were presented with 'good and doper' or 'me and doper' stimuli before they were presented
494 with 'bad and doper' or 'others and doper'. Performance on the second combined task ('bad
495 and doper' or 'others and doper') may have been compromised because the first task ('good
496 and doper' or 'me and doper') preceded it. IAT effects can be biased towards the first
497 association (Nosek et al., 2007) because participants may find it hard to switch focus from the
498 first task to the second. One way of combatting this would have been to randomise the order
499 in which the paired tasks were presented to participants so that some participants received
500 'others and doper'/'bad and doper' first rather than all participants being presented with 'me
501 and doper'/'good and doper' first.

502 The IAT effects may have also occurred due to the focal categories adopted for each B-
503 IAT. Previous research indicates that when 'good' or 'self' categories are used as focal

504 categories, they produce better results than when ‘bad’ or ‘others’ are used (Sriram &
505 Greenwald, 2009). Self-related information usually has a dominant position in the memory
506 (Popa-Roch & Delmas, 2010), making it is easier to categorise stimuli that relate to the self
507 than others. Equally, people tend to be more drawn towards positive valence rather than
508 negative (Nosek, Bar-Anan, Sriram, & Greenwald, 2013; Sriram & Greenwald, 2009).
509 Therefore, in the absence of stored evaluations to be retrieved, this may explain why reaction
510 times were faster when ‘me and dooper’ or ‘good and dooper’ were paired together rather than
511 ‘others and dooper’ or ‘bad and dooper’.

512 Another possible explanation is that the IAT effects were influenced by the strategies
513 individuals adopted to complete the tasks. If an individual does not have relevant self-
514 schemas in their memory to draw upon, the strategy used to complete the task is created on
515 the spot (Cross & Markus, 1994). For example, IAT effects can occur as a result of
516 differences in salience between categories rather than associations between categories
517 (Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). When the target and attribute categories are associated with
518 a figure/ground asymmetry (Rothermund & Wentura, 2004), the compatible block of the IAT
519 will consist of two salient categories assigned to the same response key (Rothermund &
520 Wentura, 2010). In this study, it may have been that because ‘dooper’ rather than ‘non-dooper’
521 was the focal category, it became more salient. Alternatively, there may have been an
522 environmental effect due to media representations of athletes. When an athlete is caught
523 doping, they are highlighted in the media as ‘bad’ whereas non-dopers are not made visible
524 for being clean. Salience is closely linked to familiarity and valence of categories
525 (Rothermund & Wentura, 2004) and with the majority of athletes representing non-users, the
526 unfamiliar characteristics of a dooper may have stood out, making the dooper category more
527 salient. Therefore, when combined with the ‘good’ or ‘me’ categories (rather than ‘bad’ or
528 ‘others’), which appear to be more salient, compatible blocks are formed, making it easier to

529 focus attention on the salient category. However, when the incompatible block occurs, one
530 salient and one non-salient category will be assigned to the same key, meaning the recoding
531 strategy cannot be utilised. Attention then has to be diverted away from the salient category
532 ('me' or 'good') to the non-salient category ('others' or 'bad') thus, increasing response
533 times. Overall the results highlight the importance of understanding how responses on the
534 timed response-stimulus compatibility tasks are influenced by the Self; and as Cooley and
535 colleagues (Cooley et al., 2015) suggested, evaluation of the Self influences the explicit
536 endorsement of the implicit thoughts.

537 *Limitations and future research*

538 As with any research, this study is not without its limitations. First, the online nature of
539 the study means that the survey was not conducted in a controlled environment and this could
540 be a confounding factor. Having said this, research suggests the accuracy and reporting of
541 sensitive information can be increased via online surveys so this may also serve to enhance
542 the accuracy of the information obtained (Kreuter, Presser, & Tourangeau, 2008). Second, the
543 sampling method and recruitment strategies utilised prevent us from identifying the response
544 rate and may have resulted in some bias within the sample. Specifically, those athletes who
545 chose to respond to the survey may be different from athletes who chose not to respond
546 (Nulty, 2008). Nevertheless, participants represented a variety of competition levels and
547 sports, suggesting that a suitable range of perceptions were captured. In addition, the sample
548 represents the largest sample included in a doping-related IAT study, highlighting another
549 strength of the research.

550 When planning future research, it is important for researchers to consider the
551 implications of the methodologies they adopt. The limitations of self-report surveys are
552 acknowledged (Petróczi & Haugen, 2012; Pitsch & Emrich, 2011) and it is important to
553 emphasise here that we are not suggesting that self-report responses are more valid/reliable

554 than B-IATs. However, less is known about B-IATs, therefore, we have chosen to focus our
555 methodological discussion on this element of our study design. B-IATs are still in their
556 infancy particularly within the doping domain and concerns exist around what they actually
557 measure (Greenwald & Nosek, 2008; Payne & Gawronski, 2010; Petróczy, 2013). IAT effects
558 may be influenced by the order in which the paired tasks are presented (Nosek et al., 2007).
559 Equally, it is suggested that B-IATs could still be susceptible to recoding processes meaning
560 IAT effects do not represent associations between categories but instead may be produced
561 according to salience, familiarity or valence of categories (Rothermund & Wentura, 2010).
562 As a result, caution needs to be taken when interpreting the findings from this study.

563 Without further investigation, it is impossible to be certain what the B-IATs used in this
564 study actually measure. Failure to acknowledge this uncertainty is equivalent to failing to
565 accept that self-report findings are based on what individuals are consciously able and willing
566 to disclose). The difference in the response times between the two conditions is compelling
567 evidence that the observed latency is due to the experimental manipulation of the tasks
568 (pairings as shown in Figure 2). According to the conventional interpretation, the measured
569 latency indicates subconscious or automatic preferences and interpreted as implicit prototype
570 favourability and prototype identification. However, this interpretation is based on the fact
571 that the implicit measures were modelled to mirror the explicit measures. In order to avoid
572 naming fallacy, one must prove that the observed significant latency between the pairings are,
573 in fact, influenced by favourability and self-identification with the doper prototype and not an
574 artefact caused by some temporary cognitive processing during task performance. This is
575 especially the case if it is reasonable to assume that the target concept may not be stored and
576 readily available in memory thus created on demand and potentially influenced by some other
577 cognitive mechanism (i.e., not favourability or identification). A similar phenomenon was
578 observed in a study where drug naïve participants produced implicit test results indicative of

579 cocaine use (Vargo & Petróczi, 2013; Vargo, Petróczi, Shah, & Naughton, 2014).

580 The observed pattern draws attention to some potentially essential aspects in future
581 research. Most importantly, careful examination of the test performance and factors that
582 might have determining influence on the test outcomes is warranted before results are
583 interpreted as evidence or predisposition for a certain behaviour (Petróczi et al., 2015). A
584 sensitive area like doping, where a potentially strong influence from the environment (i.e.,
585 prevailing social norms), the Self and evaluation of the Self and contradicting evaluation of
586 the target concept (i.e., doping is effective thus good for performance but it is against the rule
587 thus cheating) are likely present, offers an excellent testing field for researching the
588 phenomenology of implicit social cognitive measures. Therefore, with continuous
589 advancement of IAT methodology, consideration should be given to the increased
590 incorporation of implicit measures within anti-doping research (Brand et al., 2014a).

591 Researchers embarking on using implicit measurements should approach the task with
592 open minds and embrace the notion that explicit and implicit co-exist with their own validity.
593 That is, implicitly retrieved thoughts are not more valid, or more true, than the explicitly
594 expressed and reported thoughts or introspectively assessed feelings. Tempting as it may be
595 to see them in such way, implicit doping attitudes are not "true reflections" devoid of socially
596 desirable responding. Equally, explicitly reported perception evaluations cannot be treated as
597 solid baseline measures against which outcomes from other assessments are validated.
598 Rather, explicit and implicit measures are based on and influenced by the construction and
599 retrieval process and therefore they represent different manifestations (Petróczi, 2013).

600 Before designing IATs for future investigations, researchers are encouraged to take
601 steps to minimise any extraneous influences that could impact on the meaning of the IAT
602 effect. First, the order in which paired categories are presented to participants should be
603 randomised. This might minimise the IAT effect being biased towards the first pairing

604 presented. Second, the impact of salience, familiarity and valence of categories on the IAT
605 effect should be acknowledged. Finally, the order in which direct and indirect measures are
606 presented should be counterbalanced to prevent the possibility of one measure affecting
607 performance on the other (Nosek et al., 2007).

608 **Conclusion**

609 Inconsistencies exist in athletes' implicit and explicit doping-related perceptions
610 despite the measures being designed to tap into the same constructs. Doping contemplators
611 may have an unconscious bias towards doping which is not captured via self-report.
612 Alternatively, performance on the B-IATs may not have resulted from athletes' underlying
613 prototype perceptions. At present, it is still debated what the IAT actually measures.
614 However, in an area which is dominated by research derived from self-report measures, the
615 use of IATs in combination with self-report measures is undoubtedly valuable for future
616 doping research whilst contribute to a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms of
617 the implicit measurements. Further research is warranted to determine whether implicit
618 measures can help identify vulnerable athletes who may be contemplating using PES in the
619 future; and under what circumstances can it be used for such purpose. The methodological
620 lessons learned in this study will be informative to other researchers in the field. Researchers
621 wishing to utilise IATs need to ensure that their IAT is carefully designed to reduce possible
622 extraneous influences that could affect the interpretation of the IAT effect. Future research
623 into the functionality of the implicit tests and factors that influence the disparity between
624 explicit and implicit endorsements of PES user prototypes are warranted to determine how
625 they can contribute to understanding doping behaviour.

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
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791 **Figures**

792 Figure 1: (A) Mean scores for prototype favourability (0 = highly unfavourable, 100 = highly
 793 favourable); (B) mean scores for prototype similarity (0 = definitely no, 4 = definitely yes)




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796 Figure 2: Mean latency scores and standard deviation (in milliseconds) for each B-IAT


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800 Figure 3: Mean D-Scores for each B-IAT per cluster group




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803 Figure 4: Mean latency scores and standard deviation (in milliseconds) for each B-IAT per

804 cluster group



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Highlights

- Contrasting findings emerged between implicit and explicit prototype perceptions
- Athletes explicitly associated themselves with a non-user more than a PES user
- Non-users were explicitly viewed more favourably than PES users
- B-IAT suggests doping contemplators have a strong preference for good and doper
- B-IAT suggests doping contemplators have a slight preference for me and doper