The evidence of Bayesian reasoning and its place in the context of the empirical argument about rationality

Sirota, Miroslav (2008) The evidence of Bayesian reasoning and its place in the context of the empirical argument about rationality. Filozofia, 63(5), pp. 417-426. ISSN (print) 0046-385X

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Abstract

Bayesian reasoning is considered to be the prototype of rational judgment. The differences between the descriptive and non-native models of reasoning used to be interpreted as supporting the thesis of the principal irrationality of humans. The paper shows the possible re-interpretations of this research evidence by means of focusing on the contexts of individual differences as well as the context of differences in the experimental environment. Taking into account of these contexts makes the originally pessimistic answer to the question of rationality more optimistic.

Item Type: Article
Research Area: Psychology
Faculty, School or Research Centre: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (until 2017) > School of Psychology, Criminology and Sociology (from November 2012)
Depositing User: Miroslav Sirota
Date Deposited: 01 Sep 2014 11:21
Last Modified: 25 Sep 2014 09:22
URI: http://eprints.kingston.ac.uk/id/eprint/28902

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