When do we shoot the messenger? Judging responsibility of a speaker who gives uncertain statements

Gourdon, A. and Beck, S. R. (2011) When do we shoot the messenger? Judging responsibility of a speaker who gives uncertain statements. In: 23rd Subjective Probability, Utility, and Decision Making conference; 21 - 25 Aug 2011, Kingston-upon-Thames, UK. (Unpublished)

Abstract

In four experiments we tested how speakers predicting uncertain events were held responsible according to the uncertainty format they used. In experiment 1, speakers used percentages, positive verbal probabilities or negative ones, of different magnitude. Speakers were held less responsible for predicting a positive event with a positive verbal probability or a percentage, but more for predicting it with a negative verbal probability. Speakers were also held more responsible if the outcome was negative than if it was positive. In experiment 2a, speakers used round or precise percentages (e.g., 70% or 71%). Only speakers who used round percentages were held more responsible after a negative outcome. In experiments 1 and 2a participants' judgements ignored the predicted likelihood of the uncertain event. Experiment 2b replicated experiment 2a with an additional measure of the intention to recommend to another. Speakers were held more responsible for positive than for negative outcomes and if the event's likelihood was high rather than low. Intention to recommend was rated higher for positive than for negative outcomes; this difference was bigger if the event's likelihood was high. Level of precision had no effect on the responsibility judgements or on the intention to recommend. Experiment 2c replicated experiment 2b but the responsibility judgement and the intention to recommend were measured between participants. Speakers were held more responsible and were more likely to be recommended for positive than for negative outcomes. They were held more responsible if the event's likelihood was low, but were more likely to be recommended if this likelihood was high. We discuss how these findings inform our understanding of the Preference Paradox (Erev & Cohen, 1990).

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