When do we shoot the messenger? Judging responsibility of a speaker who gives uncertain statements

Gourdon, A. and Beck, S. R. (2011) When do we shoot the messenger? Judging responsibility of a speaker who gives uncertain statements. In: 23rd Subjective Probability, Utility, and Decision Making conference; 21 - 25 Aug 2011, Kingston-upon-Thames, UK. (Unpublished)

Full text not available from this archive.

Abstract

In four experiments we tested how speakers predicting uncertain events were held responsible according to the uncertainty format they used. In experiment 1, speakers used percentages, positive verbal probabilities or negative ones, of different magnitude. Speakers were held less responsible for predicting a positive event with a positive verbal probability or a percentage, but more for predicting it with a negative verbal probability. Speakers were also held more responsible if the outcome was negative than if it was positive. In experiment 2a, speakers used round or precise percentages (e.g., 70% or 71%). Only speakers who used round percentages were held more responsible after a negative outcome. In experiments 1 and 2a participants' judgements ignored the predicted likelihood of the uncertain event. Experiment 2b replicated experiment 2a with an additional measure of the intention to recommend to another. Speakers were held more responsible for positive than for negative outcomes and if the event's likelihood was high rather than low. Intention to recommend was rated higher for positive than for negative outcomes; this difference was bigger if the event's likelihood was high. Level of precision had no effect on the responsibility judgements or on the intention to recommend. Experiment 2c replicated experiment 2b but the responsibility judgement and the intention to recommend were measured between participants. Speakers were held more responsible and were more likely to be recommended for positive than for negative outcomes. They were held more responsible if the event's likelihood was low, but were more likely to be recommended if this likelihood was high. We discuss how these findings inform our understanding of the Preference Paradox (Erev & Cohen, 1990).

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Poster)
Event Title: 23rd Subjective Probability, Utility, and Decision Making conference
Organising Body: European Association for Decision Making; Kingston University
Uncontrolled Keywords: verbal probabilities, risk communication, responsibility judgements
Research Area: Psychology
Faculty, School or Research Centre: Faculty of Business and Law > Kingston Business School (Leadership, HRM and Organisation) (until July 2013)
Faculty of Business and Law
Depositing User: Amelie Gourdon - Kanhukamwe
Date Deposited: 09 Apr 2013 07:53
Last Modified: 12 Apr 2013 11:21
URI: http://eprints.kingston.ac.uk/id/eprint/25395

Actions (Repository Editors)

Item Control Page Item Control Page