Rezapour, Shabnam, Zanjirani Farahani, Reza, Ghodsipour, Seyed Hassan and Abdollahzadeh, Sohrab (2011) Strategic design of competing supply chain networks with foresight. Advances in Engineering Software, 42(4), pp. 130-141. ISSN (print) 0965-9978Full text not available from this archive.
We consider models for duopolistic competitive supply chain network designing with sequential acting and variable delivered prices. These models design a multi-tier chain operating in markets under deterministic price-depended demands and with a rival chain present. The existing rival chain tends to open some new retailers to recapture some income in a near future. These rival chains’ structures are assumed to be set ‘‘once and for all’’ in a sequential manner but further price adjustments are possible. This problem is modeled for each of the following two strategies: (1) the von Stackelberg strategy in which we assume the existing chain will choose its future entry sites in the way to optimize its market share. This problem is modeled by a linear binary bi-level program and solved by a combinatorial meta-heuristic. (2) the minimum regret strategy in which we assume the existing chain’s future entry sites are totally unpredic, it is playing a ‘‘game against nature’’. This problem is modeled by linear binary programs.
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Supply chain network design; Stackelberg game; Linear bi-level program; Meta-heuristic, minimum regret strategy, game against nature, multicriteria decision-making, service competition, demand uncertainty, equilibrium-model, facility location, solution algorithm, price, inventory, retailers, optimization|
|Research Area:||Business and management studies|
|Faculty, School or Research Centre:||Faculty of Business and Law
Faculty of Business and Law > Kingston Business School (Informatics and Operations Management)
|Depositing User:||Reza Zanjirani Farahani|
|Date Deposited:||25 Jan 2011 14:19|
|Last Modified:||23 May 2011 08:46|
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